. 


SECOND  PARTITION  OF 

POLAND 


LORD 


HARVARD   HISTORICAL  STUDIES 

PUBLISHED  UNDER  THE  DIRECTION   OF 
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THE    HENRY  WARREN  TORREY  FUND 
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HARVARD   UNIVERSITY   PRESS 

CAMBRIDGE,   MASS.,   U.S.A. 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION 
OF  POLAND 

A  STUDY  IN 
DIPLOMATIC  HISTORY 


BY 

ROBERT  HOWARD  LORD,  Ph.D. 

INSTRUCTOR  IN  HISTORY  IN  HARVARD  UNIVERSITY 


CAMBRIDGE 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

LONDON:   HUMPHREY  MILFORD 
Oxford  University  Press 

1915 


COPYRIGHT,  ig IS 
HARVARD  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 


Z^_3  4"  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

.  '     ,  SANTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 

L Co 


TO 

MY  FATHER 


PREFACE 

The  diplomatic  history  of  the  Second  Partition  of  Poland  has 
never  hitherto  been  made  the  subject  of  a  monograph.  It  has  by 
no  means  escaped  attention,  but  it  has  always  been  treated  as  a 
matter  of  secondary  or  collateral  interest:  it  has  been  adduced 
to  explain  the  policy  of  the  great  Powers  during  the  Eastern  and 
Northern  wars  of  1787-92,  or  in  connection  with  the  formation 
and  collapse  of  the  First  Coalition  against  Revolutionary  France, 
or  again  as  a  chapter  in  the  long  struggle  between  Poland  and 
Russia;  it  has  not  been  studied  as  a  whole,  by  and  for  itself. 

The  serious  investigation  of  the  diplomatic  questions  con- 
nected with  the  Second  Partition  began  in  the  sixth  decade  of 
the  last  century  with  Hausser's  Deutsche  Geschichte  (1854-57), 
Herrmann's  Geschichte  des  russischen  Staates  (vol.  vi,  i860),  Zin- 
keisen's  Geschichte  des  osmanischen  Reiches  (vol.  vi,  1859),  and 
Sybel's  Geschichte  der  Revolutionszeit  (1853  fL).  The  first  three 
of  these  works  were  based  chiefly  on  the  records  of  the  Prussian 
and  Saxon  archives  and  on  private  papers  (particularly  Diez's), 
and,  owing  to  the  scantiness  of  their  sources,  they  went  very  far 
astray  both  in  general  conceptions  and  in  matters  of  detail. 
Greatly  superior  to  all  of  them  was  Sybel's  masterly  work,  espe- 
cially in  view  of  the  corrections  and  additions  made  in  the 
successive  editions  through  which  it  passed.  In  it  most  of  the 
questions  that  have  since  been  debated  were  raised,  and  many 
of  them  were  practically  settled.  The  '60s  were  rilled  by  a  rather 
acrimonious  controversy  between  Herrmann  and  Sybel  with  re- 
gard to  the  policy  of  Leopold  II ;  and  a  little  later  Sybel  engaged 
in  lively  polemics  with  Vivenot  and  Huffer  about  the  falling-out 
of  Austria  and  Prussia  over  the  Polish  Question,  and  especially 
about  the  character  and  policy  of  Thugut.  Researches  on  all 
these  problems  entered  upon  a  new  stage  when  towards  1870  the 
Viennese  archives  were  finally  thrown  open  freely  to  scholars.  In 
the  next  twenty  years  investigations  and  publications  of  the 


Vlll  PREFACE 

Austrian  sources  followed  thick  and  fast.  The  predominant 
interest,  however,  was  usually  in  the  Revolutionary  War;  and 
the  Polish  Question,  which  had  previously  been  brought  forward 
chiefly  in  order  to  cover  either  Austria  or  Prussia  with  ignominy, 
ceased  to  attract  much  attention  from  German  historians  when 
the  political  rivalry  between  Berlin  and  Vienna  came  to  an  end. 
Of  late  years  controversy  in  this  field  has  centered  chiefly  about 
the  period  of  the  Oriental  crisis,  and  especially  about  the  policy 
of  Hertzberg,  although  a  few  recent  monographs  (Schrepfer's  and 
Heidrich's,  for  instance),  would  seem  to  indicate  a  revival  of 
interest  in  the  early  Revolutionary  period. 

In  Russia,  the  first  important  work  on  subjects  connected  with 
the  Second  Partition  was  Blum's  biography  of  Sievers  (1853). 
Some  years  later  Smitt's  Suworow  (1858)  and  Solov'ev's  History 
of  the  Downfall  of  Poland  (the  Russian  edition  in  1863,  the  Ger- 
man in  1865)  gave  the  first  accounts  based  on  the  documents  of 
the  Russian  archives,  and  brought  to  light  a  multitude  of  in- 
valuable facts.  Since  the  appearance  of  Kostomarov's  Last  Years 
of  the  Polish  Republic  and  Ilova'iski's  Diet  of  Grodno  (both  in 
Russian)  in  1870,  Russian  historical  writing  on  this  subject  has 
virtually  come  to  a  standstill,  although  the  publication  of  sources 
in  Russia  has  continued  uninterruptedly  —  and  on  a  scale  seldom 
paralleled. 

For  Polish  historians  the  period  of  the  downfall  of  the  Republic 
has  always  had  an  intense,  if  painful,  fascination.  If  the  older 
writers  (Lelewel,  Schmitt,  Bobrzynski,  e.  g.)  intent  chiefly  upon 
explaining  the  catastrophe  according  to  the  a  priori  ideas  of  the 
'  monarchist '  or  the  '  republican  '  school,  had  contented  them- 
selves with  a  very  inadequate  knowledge  of  facts,  Korzon's 
elaborately  documented  and  admirably  scientific  Internal  History 
of  Poland  in  the  Reign  of  Stanislas  Augustus  (1887)  gave  for  the 
first  time  a  secure  basis  for  judging  the  moral,  economic,  and 
political  forces  of  the  nation  in  that  crucial  period.  While  Polish 
scholars  have  busied  themselves  preeminently  with  the  study  of 
domestic  conditions,  Kalinka,  Dembinski,  and  Askenazy  have 
also  made  important  contributions  to  the  diplomatic  history  of 
that  age  by  extensive  investigations  in  foreign  archives. 


PREFACE  IX 

At  present  the  literature  relating  to  the  Polish  crisis  of  1788-93 
and  to  the  Second  Partition  is  immense. 

Of  the  various  collections  of  printed  sources,  one  of  the  most 
important  is  Vivenot's  Quellen  zur  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Kaiser- 
politik  Oesterreichs,  which,  for  the  period  from  January,  1790 
to  April,  1793,  contains  many  letters  of  the  Austrian  sovereigns; 
practically  all  the  extant  protocols  of  the  Staatsconjerenz;  and 
the  more  important  ministerial  reports  (Vortrdge),  dispatches  to 
the  Austrian  envoys,  and  reports  of  diplomats  on  special  missions 
(notably  Spielmann's  from  Reichenbach  and  Luxemburg).  Vive- 
not's work  has  two  considerable  defects:  he  refused  to  print  the 
reports  of  the  Austrian  envoys,  except  in  very  rare  cases;  and  he 
gave  to  the  affairs  of  the  Holy  Empire  a  quite  disproportionate 
amount  of  space  —  to  the  detriment  of  our  knowledge  of  Austrian 
policy  in  the  Polish  Question.  Zeissberg,  who  continued  Vivenot's 
enterprise,  has  avoided  both  these  faults,  and  his  publication 
leaves  little  to  be  desired  in  the  matter  of  completeness. 

Only  second  in  importance  to  the  Vivenot-Zeissberg  compila- 
tion are  the  numerous  collections  of  letters  of  the  Austrian  mon- 
archy and  ministers  of  this  period,  published  by  Arneth,  Beer, 
Vivenot,  B runner,  and  Schlitter.  Austrian  history  can  boast  of 
nothing  in  the  way  of  memoirs,  except  for  the  somewhat  dry 
reminiscences  of  Philip  Cobenzl  and  the  very  amusing  ones  of 
the  Prince  de  Ligne. 

A  publication  of  much  importance  for  the  policy  of  the  North- 
ern Courts  is  the  supplementary  volume  of  Herrmann's  Geschichte 
des  russischen  Staates,  which  contains  a  mass  of  excerpts  from  the 
Prussian,  Saxon,  and  English  state  papers  bearing  particularly 
upon  the  Polish  Question.  It  is  a  contribution  for  which  one 
must  be  grateful;  but  it  is  far  from  affording  sufficient  evidence 
on  most  questions,  and  the  choice  of  documents  in  many  cases 
seems  arbitrary  or  even  misleading.  Fragments  from  the  Prussian 
archives  are  also  found  scattered  in  Ranke's  and  Sybel's  works, 
and  in  Dembinski's  first  volume  to  which  reference  will  be  made 
below.  The  list  of  Prussian  memoirs  of  interest  for  this  period 
is  also  very  short:  Massenbach's  and  SchliefTen's  are  the  chief 
ones  that  come  into  account,  and,  apart  from  a  few  valuable 


X  PREFACE 

letters,  neither  offers  much  that  is  important,  and  neither  is 
thoroughly  reliable. 

The  first  volume  of  Professor  Dembinski's  Documents  relatifs 
a  Vhistoire  du  deuxieme  et  troisieme  partage  de  la  Pologne  deals 
with  the  period  from  1788  to  May  3,  1791,  and  contains  chiefly: 
(1)  the  correspondence  of  the  Vice-Chancellor  Ostermann  with 
the  Russian  ministers  at  Berlin  and  Vienna;  (2)  the  correspon- 
dence of  the  Prussian  government  with  its  envoys  at  St.  Peters- 
burg; (3)  the  private  correspondence  between  Hertzberg  and 
Lucchesini.  This  is  a  contribution  of  the  first  importance,  and 
the  continuation  of  this  work  will  be  awaited  with  eagerness. 

Among  the  mass  of  sources  printed  in  Russia  the  most  notable 
are:  the  correspondence  and  other  papers  of  Catherine  II  pub- 
lished in  the  C6ophhki>  HimepaTopcKaro  PyccKaro  HcTopn^ecKaro  C^mecTBa, 
the  PyccKaa  Orapiraa  and  the  Pyccirift  ApxHBv,  various  papers  and 
letters  of  Potemkin  in  the  periodical  last  mentioned;  the  invalu- 
able correspondence  of  the  brothers  Vorontsov  with  Bezborodko, 
Markov,  Zavadovski,  and  others  in  the  ApxHBt  Kna3a  BopomjoBa; 
the  papers  of  the  Razumovski  family  published  by  Wassiltchikow; 
and  the  protocols  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  in  the  ApsHBt 
rocyjjapcTBeHHaro  CoBiia.  Martens'  collection,  the  Traites  de  la  Rus- 
sie,  adduces  here  and  there  a  document,  and  meagre  as  it  was, 
being  in  French,  it  long  remained  one  of  the  standard  source-books 
for  the  Russian  policy  of  this  time.  The  memoirs  of  Engelhardt, 
Derzavin,  and  Langeron  contain  some  interesting  information, 
especially  with  regard  to  the  career  of  Potemkin;  and  one  cannot 
pass  over  in  silence  Khrapovitski's  diary,  which  furnishes  a 
detailed  chronicle  of  Catherine's  doings  and  sayings  in  the  years 
1787  to  1789,  but  becomes  somewhat  scanty  after  the  latter 
date.  It  contains  one  story  that  has  been  conscientiously  retold 
by  everyone  who  has  written  on  the  Empress'  policy  towards 
Poland. 

Of  sources  relating  exclusively  to  Polish  affairs,  the  most  im- 
portant are:  the  Domestic  Correspondence  of  Stanislas  Augustus, 
published  by  Zaleski  (i.  e.,  correspondence  with  Poles  pertaining 
to  the  domestic  affairs  of  the  country);  the  documents  printed 
by  Kalinka  in  the  second  volume  of  his  Last  Years  of  the  Reign 


PREFACE  XI 

of  Stanislas  Augustus  (the  correspondence  of  the  King  with 
Catherine,  with  Bukaty  and  Kicinski;  the  diary  of  Bulgakov, 
the  Russian  envoy  at  Warsaw  1791-92);  the  curious  and  not 
altogether  trustworthy  book  called  The  Establishment  and  Over- 
throw of  the  Polish  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May,  which  con- 
tains the  apologia  of  the  reforming  party;  and  the  memoirs  of 
Czartoryski,  Oginski,  Kozmian  and  others. 

Of  the  secondary  works  that  come  into  account  here,  Hausser's 
and  Herrmann's  are  for  the  most  part  antiquated,  in  so  far  as 
the  Polish  Question  is  concerned.  Sybel  has  the  great  merit  of 
having  first  shown  the  close  connection  and  mutual  interaction 
between  the  French  and  the  Polish  crises,  and  of  having  first 
defined  the  essential  scope  and  character  of  the  revolutionary 
policy  of  Catherine  II  and  the  pacific  and  conservative  policy  of 
Leopold.  As  was  to  be  expected,  however,  in  the  case  of  one  who 
was  breaking  so  much  new  ground,  he  fell  into  numerous  errors  in 
matters  of  detail;  he  left  many  questions  unexplored;  he  held 
obstinately  to  various  untenable  views,  even  after  it  had  been 
clearly  proved  that  he  was  in  the  wrong;  and  his  pronounced 
Prussian  bias  too  frequently  led  him  to  pervert  and  distort  facts 
in  a  truly  exasperating  fashion.  Of  recent  general  works,  Heigel's 
Deutsche  Geschichte  is,  perhaps,  the  most  notable.  It  shows  a  sort 
of  reversion  to  Herrmann's  point  of  view  in  its  appreciation  of 
Leopold's  attitude  towards  Poland.  Heigel  has,  I  think,  placed 
too  much  faith  in  the  agreeable  things  that  the  Austrians  saw 
fit  to  tell  the  Prussian  envoys. 

Among  works  relating  specially  to  Austria,  Beer's  study  of 
Leopold's  Polish  policy  (in  the  volume  Leopold  II,  Franz  II  und 
Catherina.  Ihr  Briefwechsel)  is  the  best  account  of  this  subject, 
but,  confined  as  it  was  to  the  narrow  dimensions  of  an  introduc- 
tory essay,  it  was  not  by  any  means  exhaustive  nor  altogether 
accurate.  There  are  no  monographs  on  the  era  of  Spielmann 
and  Cobenzl;  and  Thugut's  storm-encircled  figure  still  awaits  a 
proper  biography. 

Prussian  policy  has  received  much  more  attention.  The  period 
from  1787  to  1790  has  been  minutely  studied  by  Duncker, 
Bailleu,  Luckwaldt,  Andreae,  and  the  brothers  Paul  and  F.  C. 


Xii  PREFACE 

Wittichen.  The  events  that  led  up  to  the  Convention  of  Reichen- 
bach  have  been  exhaustively  investigated  —  as  far  as  Prussian 
policy  is  concerned  —  by  Sybel,  Ranke,  and  Ritter.  The  Prus- 
sian-Polish alliance  of  1790  has  lately  found  a  brilliant  historian 
in  Professor  Askenazy  of  Cracow.  The  policy  of  Prussia  towards 
Austria,  Poland,  and  France  in  1792  is  a  subject  on  which  the 
conventional  account  (Sybel's)  has  long  needed  revision.  This 
want  has  been  admirably  met  by  Heidrich's  recent  book,  Preussen 
im  Kampfe  gegen  die  franzosische  Revolution.  By  a  more  thorough 
exploration  of  the  Prussian  archives  than  had  yet  been  made,  and 
especially  by  the  use  of  the  rich  collection  of  Lucchesini's  papers 
(secured  by  the  Berlin  Archive  some  years  after  Sybel's  last 
edition  appeared),  he  has  reached  many  new  conclusions,  and 
above  all  has  brought  out  clearly  the  essentially  aggressive  char- 
acter of  Frederick  William's  policy  in  that  momentous  year.  I 
had  already  reached  views  quite  similar  to  his  when  Heidrich's 
book  appeared;  and,  apart  from  a  number  of  questions  of  detail, 
I  have  few  objections  to  raise  with  him. 

For  Poland  Kalinka's  great  work  on  the  Four  Years'  Diet 
(down  to  the  Third  of  May)  retains  a  considerable  importance, 
although  his  too  pessimistic  view  of  internal  conditions  has  been 
largely  refuted  by  Korzon,  and  his  fundamental  ideas  about 
foreign  policy  have  been  sharply  contested  by  Askenazy.  Kal- 
inka's magnum  opus  has  found  a  not  unworthy  continuation  in 
Smolensky's  Last  Year  of  the  Great  Diet,  which  is  written,  how- 
ever, from  a  very  different  point  of  view.  Smolenski's  Con- 
federation of  Targowica  is  distinctly  inferior  to  his  earlier  work; 
for  instance,  it  leaves  the  origins  of  that  unhappy  movement 
almost  untouched. 

Solov'ev's  chapters  on  the  events  that  led  up  to  the  Second 
Partition  are  rich  in  documentary  materials,  but  for  several 
reasons  they  leave  very  much  to  be  desired.  The  author  wrote 
with  too  strong  a  nationalist  bias  (intelligible,  perhaps,  in  a  book 
published  in  1863);  he  was  not  always  critically  minded;  he 
knew  little  about  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  side  of  the  case;  and 
he  often  passed  over  things  of  the  greatest  importance  with  a 
few  vague  sentences.    Kostomarov  concentrated  his  attention  on 


PREFACE  xill 

the  internal  affairs  of  Poland,  and  —  through  a  sublime  faith  in 
the  veracity  of  Stackelberg's  and  Bulgakov's  dispatches  —  pre- 
sented a  picture  of  unrelieved  blackness.  He  dismissed  the  Parti- 
tion Treaty  with  a  sentence,  and  hurried  with  quite  exasperating 
haste  through  all  the  negotiations  of  Russia  with  the  German 
Powers.  It  is  interesting  to  find  him  asserting  that  Catherine 
aimed  at  a  partition  from  the  beginning  of  her  action  in  Poland 
in  1792;  but  he  was  as  little  able  to  offer  proof  of  this  as  was 
Solov'ev  to  establish  the  contrary. 

In  general,  the  mass  of  secondary  works  dealing  with  the 
Polish  crisis  of  1 788-93  and  the  Second  Partition  seemed  to  have 
the  following  defects. 

There  remained  not  a  few  gaps  in  our  knowledge,  especially  in 
regard  to  the  policy  of  Russia  and  the  origin  and  development  of 
the  Austro-Prussian  'indemnity'  plan.  The  period  bristled  with 
controverted  questions:  one  has  only  to  recall  the  widely-diver- 
gent or  downright  contradictory  views  of  Sybel  and  Vivenot  re- 
garding the  merits  of  the  dispute  between  the  two  German 
Powers;  of  Kalinka  and  Askenazy  regarding  the  Prusso-Polish 
alliance;  of  Solov'ev  and  Kostomarov  regarding  the  aims  of 
Catherine  II.  It  was  also  to  be  noted  that,  with  very  rare  excep- 
tions, the  German  historians  who  had  dealt  with  this  period,  had 
been  unable  to  use  works  in  the  Slavic  languages,  and  Solov'ev, 
Vasil'cikov  (Wassiltchikow),  and  Kalinka  were  the  only  im- 
portant writers  in  Russian  and  Polish  whose  books  had  been 
translated  into  Western  tongues.  The  greatest  part  of  the  rich 
publications  in  Russian  and  Polish  had  thus  remained  inacces- 
sible to  most  Western  scholars.  On  the  other  hand,  Solov'ev  and 
Kostomarov  were  little  acquainted  with  the  German  investiga- 
tions in  this  field.  It  seemed  necessary,  therefore,  to  collate  the 
materials  and  the  results  that  were  to  be  obtained  from  both 
sides.  Furthermore,  it  appeared  that  while  the  Prussian  official 
documents  had  been  very  thoroughly  studied,  the  Austrian  and 
still  more  the  Russian  archives  deserved  further  exploration. 

Above  all,  there  was  need  of  a  synthetic  presentation  of  the 
whole  course  of  events  that  led  up  to  the  Second  Partition. 
Although  the  Polish  crisis  of  1788-93  has  the  same  sort  of  unity 


XIV  PREFACE 

as  that  of  1763-75,  no  one  had  attempted  to  treat  the  former  as 
a  whole,  in  the  way  that  Beer  and  Sorel  have  treated  the  latter. 
And  yet  the  Second  Partition  cannot  be  properly  understood 
when  treated  as  a  mere  casual  episode  in  the  history  of  the 
Revolutionary  War,  or  simply  as  the  result  of  a  political  '  deal ' 
arranged  between  the  great  Powers  in  1792.  In  order  to  under- 
stand it,  one  must  follow  the  whole  course  of  that  brave  venture 
to  regain  national  independence  which  was  undertaken  by  the 
Four  Years'  Diet  in  1788;  one  must  also  study  the  fundamental 
aims  and  ambitions,  to  which,  in  spite  of  many  apparent  changes 
of  '  system,'  each  of  the  neighboring  Powers  adhered  tenaciously 
throughout  this  crisis;  and  finally,  one  must  trace  the  interaction 
of  these  discordant  ambitions  through  the  astonishing  vicissitudes 
of  five  years  of  very  complicated  European  politics.  Hence  it 
appeared  that  what  the  existing  literature  dealing  with  the 
Second  Partition  especially  lacked  was  a  comprehensive  survey 
of  the  development  of  the  Polish  Question  from  the  time  when 
that  question  was  re-opened  in  1788  by  the  bold  initiative  of  the 
Great  Diet  down  to  the  drastic  resettlement  of  1793,  by  which 
the  Poles  were  punished  for  their  attempt  to  recover  their  inde- 
pendence. 

To  present  such  a  comprehensive  survey  is  the  primary  aim 
of  the  present  volume.  I  have  attempted  to  follow  with  equal 
attention  the  policy  of  each  of  the  three  great  neighbors  of  the 
Republic,  as  well  as  the  course  of  affairs  in  Poland  and  such 
events  in  the  broader  theatre  of  European  politics  as  worked 
back  upon  the  Polish  Question.  I  have  attempted  to  utilize  more 
fully  than  has  often  been  done  in  the  past  the  results  gained  not 
only  by  German  and  Austrian,  but  also  by  Russian  and  Polish 
scholarship.  For  the  most  part,  however,  the  present  work  is 
based  on  the  results  of  two  years  of  researches  in  the  Austrian, 
Prussian,  and  Russian  archives,  researches  which,  if  not  exhaus- 
tive, may,  perhaps,  fairly  be  termed  more  extensive  than  had 
hitherto  been  made. 

In  the  K.  u.  K.  Haus-Hof-und  Staatsarchiv  at  Vienna  I  had 
the  opportunity  to  use: 


PREFACE  XV 

(i )  the  correspondence  (Expeditionen  and  Berichte)  of  the  Austrian  govern- 
ment with  its  envoys  at  St.  Petersburg  (1788-93),  Warsaw  (1790-93), 
Berlin  (1790-93),  London  (1792-93),  Dresden  (1791-92),  and  Munich 
(1792-93); 

(2)  the  Vortrdge  (reports  of  the  State  Chancellery  to  the  monarch  and 
protocols  of  the  Staatsconferenz)  for  the  years  1790-93; 

(3)  Spielmann's  reports  from  his  missions  to  Reichenbach  and  to  the 
Prussian  army  headquarters  in  1792; 

(4)  the  correspondence  relating  to  Landriani's  mission  to  Dresden,  1791- 
92; 

(5)  the  private  correspondence  between  Philip  and  Louis  Cobenzl;  be- 
tween Kaunitz,  Philip  Cobenzl,  and  Spielmann;  between  Thugut 
and  Colloredo-Wallsee; 

(6)  the  (unprinted)  diary  of  Count  Karl  Zinzendorf. 

In  the  Kgl.  Preussisches  Geheimes  Staatsarchiv  at  Berlin  I  made 
use  of: 

(1)  the  correspondence  of  the  Prussian  government  with  its  envoys  at 
St.  Petersburg,  Vienna,  and  Warsaw  for  the  years  1792-93,  and,  in 
the  case  of  the  Warsaw  legation,  also  the  acts  for  the  period  July, 
1788-October,  1789; 

(2)  the  correspondence  of  the  King  and  Hertzberg  with  various  Polish 
magnates,  1788-89; 

(3)  the  acts  relating  to  Bischoffwerder's  three  missions  to  Vienna  in 
1791-92; 

(4)  the  reports  of  the  cabinet  ministry  to  the  King,  1792-93; 

(5)  the  correspondence  of  Lucchesini  with  the  cabinet  ministry,  Bischoff- 
werder,  Schulenburg,  Alvensleben,  Haugwitz,  Manstein,  Jacobi,  and 
Caesar; 

(6)  the  correspondence  of  Schulenburg  with  Haugwitz  and  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick. 

In  the  Petrograd  Archives  of  the  Empire  and  of  the  Ministry  of 
Foreign  Affairs  (rocy^apcTBeHHHH  h  neTporpa^cKiii  ApxiiBH  MannciepcTBa 
nnocTpaiiHHXT.  ^ixb) ,  I  had  the  privilege  of  using : 

(1)  a  mass  of  papers  of  the  Empress  Catherine  II  —  notes,  fragments 
and  comments  — ,  her  letters  to  Potemkin,  P.  A.  Zubov,  Bezborodko, 
Ostermann,  and  Stackelberg  (Rep.  V  and  X) ; 

(2)  the  papers  of  Potemkin,  preserved  in  Rep.  XI,  950; 

(3)  the  correspondence  of  A.  K.  Razumovski  with  Markov;  and  various 
minor  series  of  documents. 

In  the  Imperial  Public  Library  at  St.  Petersburg,  I  had  the 
opportunity  to  go  through  the  papers  of  the  "  Archives  of  V.  S. 
Popov",  which  contain  a  large  number  of  letters  and  notes  from 


XVI  PREFACE 

Bezborodko  to  Potemkin  and  Popov,  and  also  the  reports  sent 
by  Potemkin's  and  Popov's  correspondents  at  Warsaw  from  1790 
to  July,  1792. 

In  the  Moscow  Archives  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs 
(MocKOBciriii  ApxHBi,  MnHHCTepcTBa  HHocTpaHHHX'b  Jfix-b)  I  made  use  of : 

(1)  the  correspondence  of  the  Russian  government  with  its  envoys  at 
Vienna  and  Berlin,  1791-93,  and  Warsaw,  1791-92  (as  also  the 
rescripts  to  Sievers  for  1793); 

(2)  the  mass  of  correspondence  relating  to  the  Confederation  of  Targowica 
(Ceoraema  cb  IIojrLDieK),  1791-93,  IX,  1-4),  which  contains  especially 
the  correspondence  of  Buhler  with  the  Empress,  Zubov,  and  Oster- 
mann,  and  that  of  F.  Potocki,  Rzewuski,  and  Branicki  with  the 
Empress,  Potemkin,  and  Zubov; 

(3)  Bezborodko's  reports  from  Jassy,  1791-92  (CHomema  ci  TypnieK),  1792, 
IX,  60) ;  and  some  less  important  collections  of  papers. 

Finally,  I  had  the  opportunity  of  using  the  correspondence  of 
Piattoli  with  Mostowski  at  Dresden,  1791-92,  preserved  in  the 
Archives  of  Count  Zamojski-Ordynat  at  Warsaw;  and  the  corre- 
spondence of  Ankwicz,  the  Polish  envoy  at  Copenhagen,  with  his 
government  and  with  other  Polish  envoys  abroad,  1791-92,  from 
the  Ossoliriski  Museum  at  Lemberg  (MSS.  516). 

From  these  studies  in  the  archives,  I  have  reached  a  number 
of  conclusions  with  regard  not  only  to  questions  of  detail  but  to 
more  fundamental  problems,  which  differ  from  the  views  hitherto 
generally  accepted.  The  effort  is  made  in  the  following  pages 
to  show  that  the  Second  Partition  was  not  a  measure  forced  upon 
Catherine  II  against  her  will  by  the  importunities  of  Prussia,  but 
rather  the  consummation  of  the  Empress'  secret  plans  and  am- 
bitions. I  have  endeavored  to  bring  out  more  clearly  than  has 
yet  been  done  by  any  writer  except  Heidrich  the  aggressive  and 
acquisitive  character  of  Prussian  policy,  especially  with  regard 
to  the  intervention  in  France.  I  have  tried  to  correct  Sybel's 
exaggerated  account  of  Leopold  II's  efforts  on  behalf  of  Poland, 
while  showing,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  Emperor's  advocacy 
of  the  new  constitution  was  far  more  earnest  and  active  than 
Herrmann,  Heigel,  or  Beer  admit.  In  reviewing  the  long  litiga- 
tion between  Austria  and  Prussia  over  the  indemnity  question, 
I  have  advanced  the  view  that  Austria  was  in  the  right  far  more 


PREFACE  Xvii 

frequently  than  German  historiography,  dominated  by  the 
writers  of  the  '  Prussian  school,'  has  generally  been  willing  to 
concede.  Finally,  the  previous  accounts  of  the  origin  and  devel- 
opment of  the  Polish-Bavarian  indemnity  plan  and  of  the  evo- 
lution of  Russian  policy  in  the  Polish  Question  are  considerably 
supplemented  by  new  materials  in  the  present  volume. 

This  book  was  originally  prepared  in  partial  fulfilment  of 
the  requirements  for  the  degree  of  Doctor  of  Philosophy  in 
Harvard  University.  I  wish  to  acknowledge  my  indebtedness 
to  the  officials  of  the  several  archives  in  which  it  has  been  my 
privilege  to  work;  and  to  the  numerous  friends  at  home  and 
abroad  from  whom  I  have  received  advice  and  assistance, 
especially  to  M.  Serge  Goria'inov,  Director  of  the  Imperial 
Archives  in  Petrograd,  Herr  Geheimer  Archivrat  Dr.  Paul 
Bailleu  in  Berlin,  M.  Tadeusz  Korzon  in  Warsaw,  and  Professor 
Dembinski  of  Lemberg.  I  am  under  many  obligations  to  Mr. 
G.  W.  Robinson  of  Harvard  University  for  assistance  in  the 
preparation  of  the  manuscript.  Above  all,  I  am  indebted  to 
Professor  A.  C.  Coolidge,  at  whose  suggestion  this  study  was 
first  undertaken,  and  to  whose  continued  encouragement,  advice, 
and  criticism  I  owe  more  than  I  can  say. 


R.  H.  L. 


Cambridge,  Mass. 
September,  1915. 


LIST   OF  ABBREVIATIONS 

B.  A Kgl.  Preussisches  Geheimes  Staatsarchiv,  Berlin. 

M.  A Moscow  Archives  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

P.  A Petrograd  Archives  of  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs. 

V.  A K.  u.  K.  Haus-Hof-und  Staatsarchiv,  Vienna. 

F.  B.  P.  G Forschungen    zur    brandenburgischen     und     preussischen    Ge- 

schichte. 

F.  R.  A Fontes  rerum  austriacarum. 

F.  z.  D.  G Forschungen  zur  deutschen  Geschichte. 

H.  Vjschr Historische  Vierteljahrschrif t. 

H.  Z Historische  Zeitschrif t. 

R.  H Revue  Historique. 

R.  I.  A Recueil  des  instructions  donnees  aux  ambassadeurs  et  ministres 

de  France.     (See  Bibliography.) 
Vivenot Vivenot,    Alfred    von,    Quellen    zur     Geschichte    der    deutschen 

Kaiser politik    Oesterreicks    wdhrend    der    franzosischen    Revo- 

lutionskriege.     (See  Bibliography.) 

Apx.  Bop ApxHBt  KHfl3a  BopoHnosa.    (See  Bibliography.) 

Apx.  Toe.  Cob.  . .  ApxHBi  Tocy^apcTBeHHaro  CoBiTa.     (See  Bibliography.) 

Pyc.  Apx Pyccidii  ApxHBt. 

Pyc.  dap PyccKaa  Grappa. 

C6opHHK/i. C6opHHKt  HMnepaTopcKaro  PyccKaro  HcropmecKaro  06mecTBa. 


CONTENTS 


PAGE 


INTRODUCTION 3 

I.  The  Polish  Question.  —  General  character  and  phases  through 
which  it  has  passed.    Its  historical  importance. 

II.  Causes  of  the  Decline  of  Poland.  —  Decline  primarily  due  to 
political  causes  —  to  the  unfortunate  historic  evolution  of  the  Polish 
constitution.  The  Stdndestaat.  Analogies  to,  and  differences  from,  the 
constitutional  development  of  other  countries.  The  conquest  of  the 
supreme  power  by  the  szlachta:  their  triumph  over  the  Crown  and  over 
the  other  classes  of  society.  Their  failure  to  organize  their  power  properly. 
Strength  of  the  decentralizing  tendencies.  Impotence  of  the  Diet  as 
against  the  Dietines.  Imperative  mandates.  The  Liberum  Veto.  Con- 
federations. Unparalleled  freedom  and  privileges  of  the  szlachta.  Ide- 
ology of  the  szlachta-state.  Arrested  development  and  a  century  of 
stagnation. 

III.  Poland  in  the  Middle  of  the  Eighteenth  Century.  —  Area 
and  population.  Lack  of  national  and  religious  unity.  Condition  of  the 
peasantry,  the  towns,  the  magnates,  and  the  poorer  szlachta.  Dis- 
organization and  paralysis  of  the  government.  Military  impotence. 
Summary  of  the  results  of  '  golden  liberty.' 

IV.  The  Development  of  the  Polish  Question  as  an  Interna- 
tional Problem.  —  History  of  Poland's  international  relations  from 
the  First  Great  Northern  War  to  the  accession  of  Catherine  II.  Policy 
of  France  towards  Poland;  of  Austria;  of  Prussia;  of  Russia. 

V.  The  First  Partition.  —  Catherine  II,  character  and  aims.  Stanis- 
las Poniatowski  raised  to  the  throne.  His  character.  Troubles  pre- 
cipitated by  Catherine's  aggressive  policy.  An  international  crisis 
terminated  by  a  partition.  This  transaction  not  a  triumph  of  Prussia 
over  Russia.    Results  of  the  First  Partition. 

CHAPTER  I 

The  State  of  Poland  after   the   First   Partition.     The 

Beginning  of  National  Revival     56 

I.  Political  Conditions.  —  General  character  of  the  period.  The 
Russian  rule.  The  Permanent  Council.  Financial  reforms.  The  Edu- 
cation Commission.    Inadequacy  of  the  political  reforms  of  this  period. 

II.  Signs  of  National  Revival.  —  Marked  economic  progress.  In- 
tellectual awakening. 

III.  The  Reform  Movement.  —  Growth  of  reforming  ideas.  Moral 
condition  of  Polish  society.  Confused  and  perplexing  character  of  a 
period  of  transition. 


XX  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Austro-Russian  Alliance  and  the  Outbreak  of  the 

Russo-Turkish  War 64 

I.  The  Policy  of  the  Neighboring  Powers  towards  Poland  after 
the  FrRST  Partition.  —  Catherine  provisionally  committed  to  the 
status  quo.  Unsatisfied  ambitions  of  Prussia.  Austria  averse  to  further 
partitions.    Precarious  situation  of  the  Republic. 

II.  Relations  of  the  Three  Eastern  Powers  with  One  Another. — 
War  of  the  Bavarian  Succession.  Potemkin's  hints  to  Prussia  about  a 
new  partition.  Formation  of  the  Austro-Russian  alliance.  Projects  of 
the  Imperial  Courts  with  respect  to  Turkey,  Prussia,  Poland.  Idea  of 
an  Austro-Prussian  rapprochement. 

III.  Outbreak  of  the  Oriental  War.  —  Trip  of  the  Empress  to  the 
Crimea.    The  Turks  declare  war. 


CHAPTER  III 
The  Designs  of  Prussia     75 

I.  The  Hertzberg  Plan.  —  The  problem  before  Prussia.  Hertzberg's 
'  universal  panacea.'  His  diplomatic  campaign,  and  the  formation  of 
the  Triple  Alliance. 

II.  Counter  Measures  of  the  Imperial  Courts.  —  Alarm  at 
Vienna.  The  Russian  declaration  to  Austria  guaranteeing  the  integrity 
of  Poland.    Further  projects  for  thwarting  the  ambitions  of  Prussia. 


CHAPTER  TV 

The  Plan  for  a  Russo-Polish  Alliance 82 

I.  Stanislas'  Plan  for  an  Alliance  with  Russia.  —  Aims  and 
policy  of  the  King  of  Poland.  His  proposals  to  Catherine  in  1787. 
Offers  of  the  magnates  to  her. 

II.  The  Secret  Designs  of  Potemkxn.  —  Position  and  aims  of  the 
Tauric  Prince.  The  '  Kingdom  of  Dacia.'  Intrigues  with  the  Polish 
magnates.  Scheme  for  a  Cossack  and  peasant  uprising  in  the  Ukraine. 
ni.  Catherine's  Plans  for  the  Alliance.  —  The  Empress'  atti- 
tude towards  the  King  and  Potemkin.  Her  draft  for  the  treaty  of 
alliance.    Disillusionment  and  humble  submission  of  the  King. 

IV.  The  Collapse  of  the  Plan  before  the  Opposition  of  Prus- 
sia. —  Explosion  of  indignation  at  Berlin.  Revolution  in  Prussian 
policy.  The  Empress  withdraws  the  project,  but  Prussia  is  not  ap- 
peased. 


CONTENTS  XXI 


CHAPTER  V 
The  Overthrow  of  Russian  Rule  in  Poland 92 

I.  Public  Opinion  on  the  Eve  of  the  Great  Diet.  —  The  impres- 
sion produced  by  the  Oriental  war  in  Poland.  The  King's  program, 
and  that  of  the  '  Patriots.' 

II.  The  Diet  Effects  a  Revolution.  —  The  meeting  of  the  Four 
Years'  Diet.  Parties.  The  Prussian  declaration.  Triumph  of  the 
Patriotic  and  anti-Russian  party.  Overthrow  of  every  external  sign  of 
Russian  control. 

III.  Attitude  of  Prussia  towards  the  Revolution  at  Warsaw.  — 
Tortuous  and  uncertain  character  of  Prussian  policy.  Original  aim  of 
the  Prussian  intervention  in  Poland.  Desire  to  provoke  a  Counter- 
confederation.  Attempts  to  get  the  Diet  dissolved.  Embarrassment 
produced  at  Berlin  by  the  victory  of  the  '  Prussian  party  '  at  Warsaw. 

IV.  Attitude  of  the  Imperial  Courts.  —  Austria  counsels  prudence 
and  moderation  at  St.  Petersburg.  Catherine's  wrath  against  Prussia. 
Decision  to  postpone  her  revenge.  Potemkin's  visit  to  the  capital. 
Talk  of  a  new  partition  of  Poland.    The  danger  averted. 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Prusso-Polish  Alliance     112 

I.  General  Reflections  on  this  Alliance. 

II.  Origin  of  the  Project.  —  Desire  of  the  Polish  '  Patriots  '  for  an 
alliance  with  England  and  Prussia.  Proposals  sent  to  Berlin  in  July, 
1789.  Crisis  in  the  general  policy  of  Prussia.  Hertzberg  counsels  im- 
mediate action.  The  King  decides  for  a  great  offensive  enterprise  in 
the  following  year.    The  Prusso-Turkish  alliance. 

III.  Realization  of  the  Project.  —  The  alliance  agreed  upon. 
Stanislas'  efforts  to  prevent  it.  Hertzberg's  demand  for  Dantzic  and 
Thorn.  Consternation  at  Warsaw.  The  demand  withdrawn.  Conclu- 
sion of  the  alliance.    Its  aim  and  significance. 


CHAPTER  VII 
Reichenbach 128 

I.  Leopold  II.  —  His  accession;  character  and  aims.  Overtures  to 
Prussia.  Pitt's  proposal  of  the  status  quo  mite  as  the  basis  for  a  general 
pacification.     Frederick  William  persuaded  to  enter  into  negotiations. 

II.  The  Austro-Prussian  Negotiation.  —  Exchange  of  letters  and 
memorials.    Dilatory  tactics  of  both  sides. 


XXli  CONTENTS 

III.  Austrian  Appeals  to  Russia.  —  Kaunitz's  demands  at  St. 
Petersburg.  The  Empress  and  Potemkin  absorbed  in  other  affairs. 
Potemkin's  plan  for  the  seizure  of  the  Ukraine.  Austria  abandons 
hope  of  aid  from  Russia.    Decision  to  treat  with  Prussia. 

TV.  The  Convention  of  Reichenbach.  —  The  respective  situations 
of  Austria  and  Prussia  on  the  eve  of  the  congress.  The  negotiation 
between  Hertzberg  and  Spielmann.  Frederick  William's  abrupt  change 
of  front.  Leopold  accepts  the  strict  status  quo  principle.  Signature  of 
the  Convention. 

V.  Results.  —  Significance  of  the  denouement  at  Reichenbach  for 
Austria;  for  Prussia;  for  Poland. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Catherina  Constans  Invicta 153 

I.  The  Problem  of  Imposing  the  Status  Quo  upon  Russia.  — 
Catherine's  terms  for  her  peace  with  the  Turks.  Her  animosity  against 
"  the  new  dictators  of  Europe."  Rude  repulse  administered  to  the 
dictators.    Diplomacy  exhausted. 

II.  Deliberations  at  Berlin  and  London.  —  Double  and  triple- 
faced  policy  of  Prussia.  Frederick  William's  overtures  to  Austria  for 
a  reconciliation  and  joint  action  against  the  French  Revolution.  His 
overtures  to  Russia.  Reluctance  of  the  Prussians  to  go  to  war  over 
the  question  of  Oczakow.  Pitt's  '  Federative  System.'  His  plans  with 
regard  to  Poland.  Under  Ewart's  influence,  he  decides  to  coerce  Russia. 
Preliminary  reconnoissance. 

III.  Diplomatic  Battles.  —  Efforts  of  both  sides  to  win  allies.  Atti- 
tude of  the  Bourbon  Courts,  Denmark,  Sweden.  Zeal  of  the  Poles  for 
a  war  with  Russia;  dampened  by  the  equivocal  attitude  of  Prussia. 
Pitt's  intervention  at  Warsaw.  The  Dantzic  question.  Attitude  of 
Austria.    Bischoffwerder's  first  mission  to  Vienna. 

IV.  The  Crisis.  —  England  and  Prussia  decide  upon  the  most  vigor- 
ous measures.  Catherine's  firmness  put  to  the  supreme  test.  Potem- 
kin at  St.  Petersburg:  leads  the  Empress  into  one  false  step  towards 
Prussia;  again  advocates  a  partition  of  Poland.  Catherine's  prepara- 
tions to  resist  all  her  enemies. 

V.  The  Backdown  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  —  Attitude  of  the 
British  public  towards  Russia  and  the  Eastern  Question.  Storm  of 
opposition  to  Pitt's  policy  in  Parliament  and  in  the  country.  Pitt's 
decision  to  abandon  the  principle  of  the  strict  status  quo.  Prussia  joins 
in  the  retreat.  Fawkener's  mission  to  St.  Petersburg.  Complete 
triumph  of  the  Empress.    This  outcome  unfortunate  for  Poland. 


CONTENTS  XXlll 


CHAPTER  EX 

The  Revolution  of  the  Third  of  May  and  the  Formation 
of  the  Austro-Prussian  Alliance 192 

I.  The  Third  of  May.  —  Delays  and  difficulties  in  the  way  of  consti- 
tutional reform  in  Poland.  Question  of  the  hereditary  succession. 
The  '  conspiracy  '  of  the  King  and  the  '  Patriot '  leaders.  The  events 
of  May  3,  1 791  at  Warsaw.  Analysis  of  the  new  constitution.  Its 
significance. 

II.  Attitude  of  the  Neighboring  Powers.  —  Frederick  William, 
against  the  advice  of  his  ministers,  expresses  warm  approval  of  the  new 
constitution.  Leopold  and  Kaunitz  not  informed  in  advance  of  the 
plans  of  the  Polish  reformers.  They  welcome  the  revolution  at  Warsaw; 
and  endeavor  to  persuade  Russia  to  acquiesce  in  it. 

III.  The  Vienna  Convention  of  July  25,  1791.  —  Leopold  II  and 
Lord  Elgin.  Bischoffwerder's  second  mission  to  the  Emperor.  The 
crisis  in  French  affairs  induces  Leopold  to  accept  the  Prussian  alliance. 
The  conclusion  of  the  preliminary  Convention.  Indignation  of  the 
Prussian  ministers.    The  end  of  the  Oriental  crisis.    Its  results. 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Development  of  the  French  and  Polish  Questions 
to  the  Death  of  Leopold  II 217 

I.  Austria's  First  Proposals  for  a  General  Concert  on  French 
Affairs.  —  The  Circular  of  Padua.  Responses  of  the  Powers.  The 
interview  at  Pillnitz.    Temporary  lull  in  French  affairs. 

II.  Leopold's  Effort  in  Behalf  of  Poland.  —  Critical  state  of  the 
Polish  Question.  The  Austrian  program  of  November.  Proposals  to 
Prussia.  Supreme  effort  to  induce  Russia  to  agree  to  the  new  Polish 
constitution.    Landriani's  mission  to  Dresden. 

III.  Discussions  between  Austria  and  Prussia.  —  Renewal  of  the 
French  crisis.  Austria  driven  to  resume  the  plan  for  a  concert  and  to 
seek  a  thorough  understanding  with  Prussia.  Frederick  William's  ag- 
gressive policy  towards  France.  Territorial  aggrandizement  its  essen- 
tial aim.  The  question  of  '  indemnities.'  His  altered  attitude  towards 
Poland;  and  rapprochement  with  Russia.  Austria  forced  to  concessions 
in  the  Polish  Question.  Conclusion  of  the  Austro-Prussian  alliance 
treaty. 

IV.  Further  Aggravation  of  the  Crisis.  —  Goltz  discovers  a  great 
secret  at  St.  Petersburg.  First  signs  of  Prussia's  desire  to  take  the  in- 
demnities for  an  intervention  in  France  at  the  expense  of  Poland.  Bis- 
choffwerder's third  mission  to  Vienna.  Death  of  Leopold  II.  His  politi- 
cal system  already  crumbling.    His  popularity  in  Poland. 


XXIV  CONTENTS 


CHAPTER  XI 

The  Outbreak  of  War  in  East  and  West 243 

I.  Russian  Designs  against  Poland.  —  Catherine's  attitude  towards 
Poland  since  1788.  Potemkin's  schemes.  Two  rescripts  to  him.  His 
death. 

II.  Development  of  the  Empress'  Plans.  —  Catherine's  anger 
against  Austria.  The  Polish  malcontents  at  Jassy.  Bezborodko  recom- 
mends an  understanding  with  Prussia.  First  overtures  of  Russia  to  the 
German  Powers  regarding  the  overthrow  of  the  new  Polish  constitution. 

III.  "  The  Death-Sentence  of  Poland."  —  Francis  II  and  his 
advisers.  Austria's  last  effort  to  save  the  Polish  constitution.  Fred- 
erick William  decides  in  favor  of  a  new  partition.  He  waits  for  Russia 
to  make  the  first  proposal. 

IV.  The  Origins  of  the  Polish-Bavarian  Project.  —  Spielmann 
despairs  of  saving  Poland;  and  is  tempted  to  revive  the  project  for  the 
Bavarian  Exchange.  Significant  '  conversations  '  between  the  diplo- 
mats at  Vienna.  Spielmann's  first  overtures  to  Prussia  regarding  a  new 
partition.    Kaunitz  still  clings  to  the  policy  of  Leopold  II. 

V.  The  German  Powers  and  the  Intervention  in  France.  — 
Austria's  rights  to  the  support  of  Prussia.  Frederick  William's  concep- 
tion of  the  nature  of  his  participation  in  the  war.  Lack  of  a  definite  and 
binding  agreement  on  this  subject;  or  with  respect  to  the  indemnities. 

VI.  The   Russian   Intervention   in   Poland.  —  The   Polish   mal- 
contents at  St.  Petersburg.     Formation  of  the  Confederation  of  Tar- 
gowica.    Catherine's  final  military  and  diplomatic  preparations.    Her 
attitude  towards  the  question  of  a  new  partition.    The  two  '  counter- 
revolutions '  in  France  and  Poland.   Their  interaction  upon  one  another. 


CHAPTER  XII 

The  Russian  Reconquest  of  Poland 283 

I.  Polish  Preparations  for  Resistance.  —  State  of  Poland  on  the 
eve  of  the  Russian  attack.  Energetic  but  belated  measures  for  national 
defence.    The  end  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet. 

II.  The  Campaign  of  1792.    Prussia  summoned  to  recognize  the  casus 
foederis.    Potocki's  mission  to  Berlin.    Frederick  William  refuses  aid. 
Military  resources  of  Poland.     The  campaign  in  Lithuania  and  the 
Ukraine.    Situation  at  the  moment  of  the  cessation  of  hostilities. 

III.  The  Collapse  of  the  National  Resistance.  —  Stanislas  in 
terror.  He  insists  on  negotiations.  His  overtures  to  the  Empress,  and 
her  reply.  The  extraordinary  council  of  July  23.  The  King  goes  over 
to  the  Confederation  of  Targowica.  Flight  of  the  Patriots.  Submission 
of  the  army.    Poland  prostrate. 


CONTENTS  XXV 

IV.  Attitude  of  the  German  Powers.  —  Irritation  and  embarrass- 
ment at  Berlin  and  Vienna.  Kaunitz's  plan  to  checkmate  the  Empress. 
The  Austro-Prussian  declaration  to  Russia.    Failure  of  the  joint  action. 

V.  The  Empress  Renews  Her  Alliances  with  Both  the  Ger- 
man Powers. 

CHAPTER  XIII 
Austria  and  Prussia  Agree  upon  a  Partition 310 

I.  Prussia  Takes  the  Initiative  in  Proposing  a  Partition.  — 
The  conference  at  Potsdam.  Pointed  hints  to  Russia.  The  secret  corre- 
spondence between  Schulenburg  and  Spielmann.  The  Polish-Bavarian 
plan  agreed  upon  in  principle. 

II.  Kaunitz's  Fruitless  Opposition  and  Retirement. 

III.  Austrian  Overtures  to  Russia.  —  Razumovski's  conversations 
with  Cobenzl  and  Spielmann.  The  Polish-Bavarian  project  formally 
proposed  by  Austria  at  St.  Petersburg. 

IV.  Reciprocal  Advances  between  Russia  and  Prussia.  —  Cath- 
erine's significant  overtures  on  the  indemnity  question.  Prussia  replies 
by  revealing  her  ambitions  in  Poland. 


CHAPTER  XW 

Austria  and  Prussia  Disagree  about  the  Partition  .    .    .326 

I.  The  Demand  for  Ansbach  and  Baireuth.  —  The  Austrian  minis- 
terial conference  at  Frankfort.  The  Austro-Prussian  conferences  at 
Mainz.    First  rift  in  the  alliance. 

II.  Austria  Insists  upon  her  Demand.  —  Reflections  and  illusions 
of  Austrian  ministers.  Encouraging  news  from  St.  Petersburg.  A  new 
onset  upon  Prussia. 

III.  The  Prussian  Resistance  Stiffens.  —  Exasperation,  suspici- 
ons, and  anxieties  of  the  Prussian  ministers.  Their  decision  to  seek  an 
understanding  first  of  all  with  Russia.  The  demand  for  the  Margra- 
viates  definitively  rejected.  Danger  of  a  Russo-Prussian  agreement 
without  the  participation  of  Austria. 

TV.  Perplexity  and  Vacillation  at  Vienna.  —  Dissensions  in  the 
Austrian  ministry.  The  Emperor  decides  to  take  his  '  supplement  '  in 
Poland.  He  decides  to  take  it  in  Alsace  instead.  Spielmann  dispatched 
to  the  King  of  Prussia  to  negotiate  a  final  settlement  of  the  indemnity 
question. 


XXvi  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XV 

The  Note  of  Merle 348 

I.  The  Beginning  of  Speelmann's  Negotiation.  —  Military  dis- 
asters.   Spielmann's  plan  for  meeting  the  new  situation. 

II.  A  Momentous  Turn  in  Prussian  Policy.  —  Austria's  necessity, 
Prussia's  opportunity.    The  Note  of  Merle. 

III.  A  Provisional  Agreement.  —  Spielmann's  fight  against  the  new 
Prussian  principles.  Reassuring  declarations  of  the  King  and  Haug- 
witz.    Plan  for  the  forcible  sequestration  of  Bavaria. 

CHAPTER  XVI 

Haugwitz's  Final  Negotiation  at  Vienna 362 

I.  Dismal  Situation  of  Austria  at  the  Close  of  1792. 

II.  New  Policy  of  the  Imperial  Cabinet.  —  The  resolutions  of  the 
ministerial  Conference  of  November  29-30.  Unsatisfactory  reply  to 
the  Note  of  Merle.    Haugwitz  assumes  his  most  "  peremptory  "  manner. 

III.  A  Chaos  of  Misunderstandings.  —  Conflicting  testimony.  The 
dispatches  to  London.  The  ostensible  and  the  secret  instructions  to 
L.  Cobenzl.  Haugwitz  '  vanquishes  every  obstacle.'  The  question  as 
to  what  concessions  he  really  obtained.    Results  of  the  negotiation. 

CHAPTER  XVII 

The  Russo-Prtjssian  Partition  Treaty 377 

I.  Catherine  Appears  to  Favor  a  Partition.  —  The  evidence  at 
hand  as  to  the  Empress'  attitude  during  the  early  stages  of  the  project. 
Prussia  presses  for  an  immediate  agreement.  Significant  note  of  Bez- 
borodko. 

II.  Catherine  Appears  to  be  Opposed  to  a  Partition.  —  The 
Empress'  anger  at  the  fiasco  of  the  allies  in  France.  Her  "  rules  "  for 
the  negotiation  with  Prussia.  Other  motives  for  delay.  The  negotia- 
tion at  a  standstill. 

III.  The  Denouement.  —  The  reasons  for  Catherine's  decision  to 
settle  the  affair  at  once;  and  with  Prussia  alone.  Her  territorial  claims. 
A  hurried  negotiation.    The  treaty  concluded. 

rv.  The  Secret  Convention  of  January  23,  1793.  —  The  pretext 
invoked  for  the  Partition.  The  respective  acquisitions.  Illusory  pro- 
visions in  favor  of  Austria.  An  unsurpassed  triumph  of  Russian  di- 
plomacy.   Mingled  emotions  at  Berlin. 

V.  Preliminary  Measures  for  Executing  the  Partition.  —  The 
Prussian  declaration  at  Warsaw.  Entry  of  the  Prussian  troops  into 
Poland.  Pitiful  spectacle  presented  by  the  Confederates  of  Targowica. 
Manifestoes  of  the  partitioning  Powers. 


CONTENTS  XXV11 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Attitude  of  Austria  towards  the  Partition    .    .    .    .398 

I.  The  Communication  of  the  Convention  at  Vienna.  —  Delibera- 
tions of  the  Imperial  ministry  in  January.  Growing  uneasiness  in  Feb- 
ruary. Attacks  on  the  leading  ministers.  "  Indescribable  sensation  " 
produced  by  the  Partition  Treaty.  Fall  of  Spielmann  and  Philip 
Cobenzl. 

II.  Thtjgut's  Debut.  —  Character  of  Thugut.  Manifold  objections 
of  Austria  to  the  Partition  Treaty:  their  justification.  Thugut's  pro- 
visional program.  His  overtures  to  the  partitioning  Powers,  and  to 
England.    Reflections  on  his  policy. 

III.  Results  of  Thugut's  First  Action.  —  Temper  and  projects  of 
the  Prussian  ministry.  Lucchesini's  note  verbale  of  May  15.  Russian 
reply  to  Austria.  Prussia  and  the  question  of  the  Austrian  indemnities. 
England's  reply  to  Austria. 

IV.  Further  Development  of  Thugut's  Campaign.  —  The  search 
for  acquisitions.  Thugut's  suspicions  and  miscalculations  with  regard  to 
Prussia.  He  relies  chiefly  upon  Russia.  Attempts  to  secure  a  share  in 
Poland;  and  to  postpone  the  execution  of  the  Partition. 

V.  The  Lehrbach  Mission.  —  Thugut's  plan  to  "amuse  "  the  Prus- 
sians with  a  dilatory  negotiation.  Prussian  plans  to  give  the  negotiation 
a  striking  finale.  Lehrbach  and  Lucchesini.  The  crisis  at  Grodno. 
The  Prussian  note  of  September  22.    Virtual  rupture  of  the  Alliance. 

VI.  Final  Negotiations  of  Austria  with  Russia  regarding  the 

Second  Partition. 

CHAPTER  XLX 

The  Attitude  of  England  and  France  toward  the  Parti- 
tion     440 

I.  England.  —  Change  in  Pitt's  foreign  policy  since  1701.  British 
sympathy  for  Poland  in  1792.  England's  entry  into  the  war  with 
France,  and  rapprochement  with  the  Eastern  Powers.  Pitt  expresses 
his  moral  reprobation  of  the  Partition,  but  refuses  to  go  further.  De- 
bates in  Parliament. 

II.  France.  —  Traditional  friendship  of  France  for  Poland.  Con- 
tradictory desire  to  conciliate  Prussia.  Foreign  policy  of  the  Girondists. 
Lebrun's  scheme  for  a  coalition  in  Eastern  Europe.  The  First  and 
Second  Committees  of  Public  Safety.  Collapse  of  French  effort  in  the 
East. 


XXVlll  CONTENTS 

CHAPTER  XX 

The  Diet  of  Grodno  and  the  Consummation  of  the  Parti- 
tion     454 

I.  Preparations  for  the  Diet.  —  The  state  of  Poland  in  1793. 
Sievers.  The  King  induced  to  go  to  Grodno.  The  elections.  Plans  of 
the  Empress. 

II.  The  Russian  Treaty.  —  Character  of  the  Grodno  Diet.  Venality 
and  hypocrisy  of  the  majority.  The  '  Zealots.'  Turbulent  scenes  and 
measures  of  coercion.  Polish  attempt  to  separate  Russia  from  Prussia. 
The  treaty  with  Russia  passed  under  constraint. 

III.  The  Prussian  Treaty.  —  Animosity  of  the  Poles  and  duplicity  of 
the  Empress  towards  Prussia.  A  dilatory  negotiation.  Tortures  of  a 
Prussian  envoy.  The  journee  of  September  2nd.  Vigorous  resolutions  at 
Berlin  and  change  in  Sievers'  conduct.  The  '  Dumb  Session '  of  Sep- 
tember 23.    Conclusion  of  the  treaty. 

TV.  Final  Labors  of  the  Diet.  —  The  alliance  with  Russia.  The 
new  constitution.  Virtual  incorporation  of  the  remains  of  Poland  with 
Russia.    A  new  storm  gathering. 


CHAPTER  XXI 
Conclusion 484 

I.  With  Regard  to  Poland.  —  Decisive  importance  of  the  Second 
Partition.  Judgments  as  to  the  expediency  of  the  attempt  for  national 
independence  made  by  the  Four  Years'  Diet.  The  problem  of  1788. 
The  effort  made  in  the  next  three  years  on  the  whole  creditable.  The 
reverse  side  of  the  picture.  Judgments  on  the  Polish  effort  of  1792. 
Adverse  extraneous  conditions.  Material  success  or  failure  not  the 
sole  standard:  the  moral  value  of  the  work  done  at  that  time. 

II.  With  Regard  to  Prussia.  —  Prussian  policy  constantly  one  of 
territorial  aggrandizement.  Its  motives.  Apologies  for  Prussia's  con- 
duct towards  Poland.  Sybel's  theses.  "  Eine  That  gerechter  Notwehr." 
Disastrous  results  of  the  Partition  for  Prussia. 

III.  With  Regard  to  Russia.  —  Catherine  not  averse  to  the  policy 
of  partition,  as  is  generally  assumed.  The  political  unification  of  the 
Russian  race  not  the  determining  motive  of  her  policy.  Material  and 
moral  gains  and  losses  resulting  to  Russia  from  the  Partition. 

IV.  Broader  Aspects  of  the  Partition.  —  Inefficacy  of  the  efforts 
made  by  England,  France,  and  Austria  on  behalf  of  Poland.  General 
character  of  international  politics  in  the  eighteenth  century.  What  was 
new  in  the  dismemberments  of  Poland.  The  Second  Partition  the 
classic  example  of  the  moral  bankruptcy  of  the  Old  Regime. 


CONTENTS  XXIX 

APPENDICES 

I.  The  Russian  Declaration  to  Austria  of  May  10/21, 
1788,  Guaranteeing  the  Integrity  of  Poland    .    .   509 

II.  On  Catherine's  Attitude  towards  the  Project  of 
a  Russo-Polish  Alliance 510 

III.  On  Potemkin's  Secret  Plans 512 

D7.   On  the  Change  in  Prussian  Policy  in  the  Summer 

of  1789 5X6 

V.    OSTERMANN   TO   ALOPEUS,    MARCH    14/25,  179I    ....    519 

VI.  Notes  on  Chapter  DC 521 

I.  On  the  Origin  of  Bischoffwerder's  Second  Mission  to 
Leopold. 

II.  On  the  Vienna  Convention  of  July  25,  1791. 

III.  On  Bischoffwerder's  Attitude  towards  an  Intervention 
in  France. 

VII.  On  the  Austrian  Attitude  towards  the  Plan  for 

the  Permanent  Union  of  Saxony  and  Poland    .    .   524 

VIII.  On  the  Note  from  Catherine  to  Zubov  Reported 

by  Goltz,  February  3,  1792     525 

LX.  Felix  Potocki  to  Potemkin,  May  14,  1 791     ....   527 

X.   Bezborodko  to  the  Empress,  January  25/February 

5>  i792 528 

XI.   On    Frederick   William's   Attitude   towards    the 

Proposals  of  Austria  and  Russia  in  March,  1792  .   530 

XII.   Documents  Illustrating  the  Origins  of  the  Polish- 
Bavarian  Project 531 

XIII.  Documents  Illustrating  the  Earliest  Discussions 
between  Russia  and  Prussia  regarding  a  New 
Partition 534 

XD7.  On  Razumovski's  Conversations  with  Cobenzl  of 
June  30  and  July  i,  1792,  regarding  the  Polish- 
Bavarian  Plan 537 

XV.  On  the  Date  of  Spielmann's  Plan  Discussed  on 

Pages  351-352 540 


XXX  CONTENTS 

XVI.   Documents  Illustrating  Haugwitz's  Final  Negoti- 
ation at  Vienna     546 

XVII.  Notes  of  the  Empress  Belonging  to  the  Papers  of 
the  Secret  Conferences  of  October  29/NovEMBER 
9  and  November  4/15,  1792 551 

XVIII.   Rescripts  of  Catherine  II  to  Sievers  with  Regard 

to  the  Negotiations  at  the  Diet  of  Grodno    .    .    .  552 

BIBLIOGRAPHY 557 

INDEX 573 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


THE    SECOND    PARTITION    OF 

POLAND 

INTRODUCTION 


Since  the  second  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  Eastern 
Europe  has  presented  two  great  international  problems  of  equal 
interest  and  equal  importance,  the  Turkish  and  the  Polish  Ques- 
tions. The  character  and  history  of  the  former  are  familiar  to 
scholars  and,  indeed,  to  the  general  public;  but  the  latter  is  still, 
in  large  part,  an  unexplored  field. 

The  Polish  Question  has  passed  through  two  very  different 
phases.  In  the  earlier  one  it  resembled  the  Turkish  (or  Eastern) 
Question  in  not  a  few  respects.  In  both  cases  the  problem  was 
that  of  maintaining  the  existence  and  integrity  of  a  vast  but 
decrepit  state,  paralyzed  by  chronic  misgovernment,  military 
inefficiency,  racial  and  religious  antagonisms,  intellectual  stagna- 
tion, and  economic  decline.  In  both  cases  the  neighboring  Powers 
were  constantly  tempted  to  interfere  and  aggrandize  themselves, 
while  religious  oppression,  the  duty  of  restoring  '  order,'  and  the 
need  of  preserving  the  '  balance  of  power  '  served  as  ever  ready 
pretexts  for  aggression.  In  both  cases  the  chief  safeguard  of  the 
menaced  state  was  the  mutual  jealousy  of  the  great  Powers. 
For  various  reasons  the  catastrophe  which  threatened  both 
Turkey  and  Poland  overtook  the  latter  country  first.  By  the 
Partitions  of  1772,  1793,  and  1795  the  Polish  state  was  anni- 
hilated. That  drastic  attempt  at  a  solution  did  not  end  the 
Polish  Question,  but  it  altered  its  character  completely.  Thence- 
forth the  problem  was  that  of  a  conquered  and  dismembered 
people  attempting  to  regain  its  liberty  and  unity  in  the  face  of  the 
three  strongest  monarchies  of  Eastern  Europe.  In  this  form 
the  Polish  Question  has  been  the  most  difficult  and  perplexing 


4  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  the  '  national '  problems  with  which  the  past  century  has  had 
to  deal. 

Of  the  historical  importance  of  the  Polish  Question  numerous 
illustrations  may  be  given. 

No  other  event  in  modern  times  has  produced  such  extensive 
lasting  changes  in  the  map  of  Europe  as  did  the  dismemberment 
of  the  Polish  Republic,  a  state  which  had  been  the  third  in  size  on 
the  Continent,  and  whose  area  very  considerably  surpassed  that 
of  France  or  Germany  today.  As  a  result  of  the  Partitions, 
Russia,  previously  so  remote,  and,  as  long  as  a  strong  Poland 
existed,  so  largely  cut  off  from  communications  with  the  West, 
extended  her  frontiers  deep  into  Central  Europe,  to  within  two 
hundred  miles  of  Berlin  and  Vienna.  The  territories  which  she 
acquired  from  Poland  now  support  a  population  almost  as  large 
as  that  of  France.1  They  form,  indeed,  about  one-eighth  of  the 
area,  and  they  contain  nearly  one-third  of  the  total  population,  of 
European  Russia.  Through  the  appropriation  of  Polish  lands  the 
Hohenzollerns  were  first  enabled  to  unite  and  round  out  their 
scattered  possessions  into  a  compact  and  defensible  realm ;  and  if 
these  acquisitions  were,  as  is  often  maintained,  indispensable  to 
the  consolidation  of  Prussia,  then  the  dismemberment  of  Poland 
and  the  unification  of  Germany  appear  to  stand  in  very  close 
connection. 

The  Polish  Question  has  played  a  large  role  in  modern  diplo- 
matic history.  It  is  well  known  that  the  quarrels  over  the  dis- 
tribution of  spoils  in  Poland  lamed  and  then  disrupted  the  First 
Coalition  against  revolutionary  France;  that  the  spectre  of  a 
revived  Poland  chilled  the  friendship  of  Tilsit  and  hastened  the 
great  breach  of  1812;  that  the  Polish-Saxon  question  came  near 
to  breaking  up  the  Congress  of  Vienna,  and  plunging  Europe  into 
a  new  general  war;  and  that  the  Polish  insurrection  of  1830 
facilitated  the  triumph  of  the  revolutions  of  that  year  in  the  West, 
just  as  the  final  struggles  of  the  old  Republic  contributed  to  the 

1  I  am  referring  here  to  the  lands  acquired  by  all  four  of  the  partitions  of  Poland 
(1772,  1793,  1795,  1815).  The  present  Kingdom  of  Poland  and  the  ten  governments 
of  Western  Russia  which  formerly  belonged  to  the  old  Polish  Republic  contained  on 
January  1,  191 2,  according  to  the  estimates  of  the  Russian  Central  Statistical  Com- 
mittee, a  population  of  38,963,000. 


INTRODUCTION  5 

victory  of  France  in  her  first  revolution.  For  a  century  the 
Polish  Question  had  an  important  effect  in  determining  the 
grouping  of  the  Powers,  estranging  France  and  Russia,  and  bind- 
ing together  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  through  a  common  interest 
and  a  common  anxiety.  It  was  by  his  ineffectual  intervention  in 
favor  of  the  Poles  in  1863  that  Napoleon  III  completely  alienated 
Russian  sympathies,  while  by  his  clever  complacency  towards 
Russia  on  that  occasion  Bismarck  secured  the  benevolent  neu- 
trality and  moral  support  of  Alexander  II  during  the  critical 
decade  when  German  unity  was  made.  Even  down  to  very  recent 
years,  in  spite  of  the  new  alignment  of  the  Powers,  Poland  served 
to  '  keep  the  wire  open  '  between  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg,  while 
Austria's  occasional  flirtations  with  the  Poles  have  furnished  one 
more  cause  of  antagonism  between  the  Dual  Monarchy  and  Russia. 

Each  of  the  two  states  which  profited  most  by  the  Partitions 
has  acquired  an  internal  problem  of  the  most  embarrassing  kind. 
First  came  the  period  of  insurrections  (1830,  1848,  1863),  when 
Poland,  like  Italy  and  the  Balkan  Peninsula,  formed  one  of  the 
permanent  danger-zones  of  Europe.  In  more  recent  years  the 
Poles  have  indeed  renounced  the  method  of  armed  uprisings;  but 
they  have  maintained  and  powerfully  developed  the  conscious- 
ness of  their  national  unity,  their  traditions,  their  strength;  they 
have  tenaciously  resisted  every  effort  to  destroy  their  national 
individuality;  and  they  have  been  struggling  hard  to  gain  some 
recognition  of  their  national  rights  in  each  of  the  empires  among 
which  they  are  divided. 

That  policy  of  colonization,  expropriation,  and  persecution, 
which  the  Prussian  government  has  been  conducting  against  the 
Poles  for  thirty  years,  has  hitherto  failed  not  only  to  Germanize 
the  Polish  districts,  but  even  to  prevent  the  Poles  from  peacefully 
conquering  new  territory,  for  instance,  in  East  Prussia  and  Silesia. 
Prussia  is  faced  by  the  danger  of  seeing  her  eastern  provinces 
slowly  but  surely  Polonized  and  lost  to  German  nationality. 
Prince  von  Biilow  has  declared  that  the  Polish  problem  is  one  of 
the  gravest  of  those  confronting  Prussia,  and  one  upon  which  the 
future  of  the  Empire  and  the  whole  German  nation  depends.1 

1  Cf.  Biilow,  Imperial  Germany,  pp.  325  f. 


6  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

The  Russians  have  also  met  with  such  difficulties  in  their 
'  Kingdom  of  Poland  '  that  they  have  several  times  considered 
abandoning  it  to  Prussia.1  The  forty  years  of  quiet  after  1864 
did  indeed  raise  hopes  that  the  spirit  of  the  obstinate  nation  was 
broken,  but  that  was  only  because  the  nation  had  no  normal  and 
effective  means  of  manifesting  its  feelings.  Since  the  Revolution 
of  1905-06  has  partially  removed  the  obstacles  to  political  dis- 
cussion and  the  expression  of  popular  opinion,  it  has  become  clear 
that  the  policy  of  Russification  has  broken  down  completely  and 
that  the  Poles  are  more  united  and  determined  than  ever  in  the 
demand  for  national  autonomy. 

At  the  present  moment,  a  war  which  has  turned  Poland  into  a 
second  Belgium  has  once  more  drawn  the  horrified  attention  of 
the  world  to  this  unhappy  country.  The  belligerents  on  both 
sides  have  attempted  to  win  Polish  support  by  far-reaching 
promises  for  the  future.  Whatever  the  outcome  of  the  struggle 
may  be,  is  it  too  much  to  hope  that  this  time  Poland  will  not  have 
suffered  in  vain;  that  this  time  the  rights  of  a  nation,  which  is 
after  all  the  sixth  or  seventh  largest  in  Europe  and  which  has  so 
many  claims  upon  the  respect,  the  sympathy,  and  the  justice  of 
the  world,  will  not  go  unrecognized;  that  this  time  the  Polish 
Question,  which  has  tortured  the  conscience  of  Europe  for  over  a 
century,  will  finally  be  set  at  rest  ? 

II 

The  Polish  Question  owes  its  origin  to  the  desperate  and  well- 
nigh  irremediable  decadence  which  overtook  the  Polish  Republic 
about  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century,  and,  continuing 
unchecked  for  a  hundred  years,  brought  the  country  to  the  verge 
of  ruin.  The  causes  of  this  decline  and  of  the  ensuing  catas- 
trophe have  been  discussed  by  numerous  historians  and  publicists 
with  intense  interest,  although  generally  with  too  little  knowl- 
edge and  too  great  national  or  party  bias.2     A  final  explanation 

1  Poschinger,  Also  sprach  Bismarck,  i,  pp.  74  f.;  Dmowski,  La  Question  polonaise, 

PP-  55  f- 

2  A  very  useful  survey  of  the  literature  on  the  downfall  of  Poland  is  to  be  found 
in  Professor  Kareev's  book,  Ha^eme  IIojBinH  bt,  HCTopniecKofi  JlHTepaTypt. 


INTRODUCTION  J 

has  not  been  given,  nor  can  it  be  given  in  the  present  state  of 
investigation. 

It  seems  clear,  however,  that  the  decline  of  Poland  is  to  be 
traced  primarily  to  political  causes,  to  the  defects  of  a  wretched 
system  of  government.  Whatever  other  cause  of  weakness  one 
may  discover,  for  instance,  the  lack  of  a  strong  middle  class,  the 
oppression  of  the  peasantry,  religious  intolerance,  racial  antip- 
athies, intellectual  or  moral  retrogression  —  these  are  all  of  but 
secondary  importance.  These  evils,  or  equally  grave  ones,  could 
be  met  with  in  other  European  states  of  the  old  regime,  and  yet 
no  other  great  state  atoned  for  them  by  the  loss  of  its  existence. 
For  everywhere  else  there  was  a  government  strong  enough  to 
curb  or  diminish  the  destructive  tendencies  and  to  produce  or 
assist  invigorating  ones.  Poland  alone  had  no  such  correcting  or 
ameliorating  force.  Poland  had  no  effective  government  what- 
ever. The  nation  lived  in  an  anarchy  thinly  concealed  under  the 
forms  of  an  elaborate  republican  constitution.  It  is  in  the  un- 
fortunate historic  evolution  of  that  constitution  that  the  explana- 
tion of  the  decline  of  Poland  is  to  be  sought.1 

The  constitution  of  the  Republic  in  its  later  years  was  so  nearly 
unique  in  Europe  that  there  was  —  and  still  is  —  a  widespread 
tendency  to  regard  it  as  something  quite  sui  generis,  as  an  entirely 
original  creation  of  a  misguided  and  fantastic  people.  In  reality 
it  was  only  an  exaggerated  and  one-sided  development  of  a  type 
of  political  organization  once  almost  universal  on  the  Continent, 
of  what  the  Germans  call  the  monarchisch-standische  Staat  or  the 
Standestaat.  Nearly  all  the  supposed  peculiarities  of  the  Polish 
constitution  can  be  traced  to  principles  and  tendencies  inherent 
in  the  Standestaat:  almost  all  of  them  find  analogies  in  other 
countries  in  the  same  stage  of  development.  Even  the  Liberum 
Veto,  which  is  often  held  up  as  the  most  unique  and  most  mon- 
strous institution  of  Old  Poland,  to  be  explained  only  from  a 
national  lack  of  political  common  sense,  or  else  from  a  survival  of 
primitive  Slavic  anarchism  —  even  the  Liberum  Veto  was  merely 
a  logical  extension  of  the  idea  pervading  mediaeval  parliament- 
arism, that  the  vote  of  a  majority  cannot  bind  a  minority.    In 

1  Cf.  Bobrzynski,  Dzieje  Polski,  ii,  pp.  353  ff. 


8  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

the  Aragonese  Cortes,  for  example,  a  valid  decision  required  the 
assent  of  all  four  brazos  (orders)  and  of  every  member  of  every 
brazo.1  In  Catalonia  a  single  nobleman  by  uttering  the  words 
'  Yo  dissent '  could  stop  the  proceedings  of  the  Cortes,2  much  as 
the  Polish  deputies  did  with  their  famous  '  Nie  Pozwalam.' 3 
But  when  all  the  parallels  have  been  drawn  —  and  they  are  very 
numerous  —  the  fact  remains  that  the  Standestaat  produced  in 
Poland  very  different  results  from  those  that  it  brought  forth  in 
most  other  countries. 

The  main  difference  is  briefly  this:  that  in  Poland  the  struggles 
of  the  Standestaat  period  resulted  in  the  victory,  not  of  the 
Crown  over  the  Estates  (as  in  most  other  lands),  nor  of  the 
Estates  collectively  over  the  Crown,  but  of  a  single  class  over 
the  Crown  and  the  other  classes  alike;  this  triumphant  class  then 
failed  to  organize  its  power  in  such  a  manner  as  to  give  the 
country  an  effective  government;  and  finally  the  ruling  class  — - 
the  szlachta 4  —  maintained  its  monopoly  of  power  far  too  long. 
A  one-sided  constitutional  development,  the  failure  to  create  a 
new  political  mechanism  adapted  to  the  new  distribution  of 
power  in  the  state,  and  then  prolonged  anarchy  and  stagnation  — 
these  seem  to  be  the  essential  causes  of  the  decline  of  Poland. 

The  szlachta,  the  military  land-owning  class,  began  to  play  a 
political  role  only  in  the  latter  part  of  the  fourteenth  century,  but 
thereafter  its  progress  was  surprisingly  rapid,  its  triumph  only 
too  sudden  and  complete.  Three  circumstances  especially  con- 
tributed to  its  victory  over  the  Crown:  these  were,  the  extinction 
of  the  ancient  dynasty  of  the  Piasts  (1370),  and  the  uncertainty 
as  to  the  succession  under  the  next  few  kings,  which  led  (by  1434 
at  the  latest)  to  the  recognition  of  the  principle  that  the  Crown 
was  elective;  the  weakness  of  character  shown  by  most  of  the 
Polish  monarchs  after  the  time  of  Casimir  the  Great;  and  finally, 
the  extraordinary  military  and  financial  needs  of  the  Crown, 
resulting  from  the  Hundred  Years'  War  with  the  Teutonic  Order, 

1  Marichalar  and  Manrique,  Hlstoria  de  la  Legislation  y  Recitationes  del  Derecho 
civil  de  Espaiia,  vi,  p.  217. 

2  Pella  y  Forgas,  Llibertats  y  antich  Govern  de  Catalunya,  p.  146. 

3  The  words  mean  '  I  forbid.' 
i  The  gentry. 


INTRODUCTION  9 

the  struggles  against  the  Muscovites  and  Tartars,  and  the 
efforts  of  the  Polish  kings  to  establish  their  dynasty  on  the 
thrones  of  Bohemia  and  Hungary.  '  The  attempt  to  play  the  part 
of  a  great  power  of  the  modern  type  with  only  the  resources  of 
a  mediaeval  feudal  state  '  l  inevitably  brought  to  the  front  the 
class  on  which  the  maintenance  of  the  new  position  and  the  suc- 
cess of  the  new  policy  of  expansion  primarily  depended.  The 
szlachta  knew  how  to  improve  the  opportunity  to  the  utmost. 
The  cornerstone  of  their  power  was  laid  by  the  Privilege  of 
Kaschau  (1374),  by  which  King  Louis  of  Anjou,  in  order  to 
assure  his  daughter's  succession  to  the  throne,  granted  the 
szlachta  exemption  from  all  taxes  (with  one  rather  insignificant 
exception)  and  from  all  duties  to  the  state  except  unpaid  military 
service.  After  that,  one  privilege  followed  fast  upon  another. 
In  1454  Casimir  IV  was  obliged  to  grant  the  Statutes  of  Nieszawa, 
the  Magna  Charta  of  the  Polish  nobility,  by  which  he  promised 
not  to  make  new  laws  or  to  order  the  pospolite  ruszenie  (the 
general  rising  of  the  nation  in  arms)  without  the  consent  of  the 
szlachta.  The  gentry  were  thus  for  the  first  time  legally  admitted 
to  a  share  in  legislation,  and  as  they  were  also  free  from  any  mili- 
tary or  financial  burdens,  save  those  they  might  voluntarily  lay 
upon  themselves,  their  position  in  the  state  was  commanding. 

These  far-reaching  concessions  required  the  creation  of  an 
organ  through  which  the  szlachta  might  regularly  exercise  their 
new  functions.  That  need  was  met  by  the  Diet,  which,  slowly 
taking  form  in  the  latter  half  of  the  fifteenth  century,  received  its 
definitive  organization  and  legal  sanction  through  the  Statute 
Nihil  Novi  in  1505. 

Set  over  against  this  vigorous  new  institution,  the  Crown 
steadily  lost  both  prerogatives  and  prestige,  although  it  retained 
a  considerable  measure  of  independence  as  long  as  the  Jagellonian 
dynasty  survived.  But  with  the  extinction  of  that  family  in  1572, 
the  foundations  of  Polish  royalty  crumbled.  The  nine  months' 
interregnum  that  followed  saw  a  change  of  really  revolutionary 

1  The  phrase  belongs  to  Dr.  Hotzsch,  who  has  a  very  suggestive  article,  "  Staat- 
enbildung  und  Verfassungsentwicklung  in  der  Geschichte  des  germanisch-slavischen 
Ostens,"  in  the  Zcitschrift  jiir  osteuropaische  Geschichte,  i  (ion),  pp.  363-412. 


IO  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

character.  The  theory  at  once  spread  that,  now  that  the  old 
dynasty  had  disappeared,  the  szlachta  no  longer  had  any  master 
over  them  and  the  supreme  power  had  lapsed  into  their  hands. 
Hence  they  hastened  to  take  possession  of  the  state,  acting  by 
means  of  armed  provincial  associations  or  '  Confederations,' 
which,  replacing  the  royal  courts  and  officials,  undertook  to  pro- 
vide for  the  unity  and  security  of  the  country  and  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  a  new  government.  It  was  true  that  the  szlachta  did 
proceed  to  the  election  of  another  king;  but  the  theory  of  election 
had  now  changed  utterly.  While  the  Jagellonian  dynasty  lasted, 
the  practice  of  election  meant  hardly  more  than  the  designation 
of  the  natural  successor  by  birth  and  an  act  of  submission  to  him; 
the  nation  had  little  real  freedom  of  choice,  and  the  Jagellonian 
princes  retained  most  of  the  prestige  of  hereditary  monarchs. 
But  from  1572-73  onward,  it  was  understood  that  the  szlachta 
were  quite  free  to  choose  whom  they  would,  and  that  the  prince 
whom  they  chose  was  only  their  delegate,  entrusted  by  them  with 
a  rigidly  limited  portion  of  authority,  which  might  be  revoked  in 
case  he  overstepped  his  mandate.  The  szlachta  had  thus  anointed 
themselves  with  the  majesty  that  had  once  pertained  to  the 
Crown,  and  henceforth  it  became  their  chief  concern  to  see  that 
the  sovereignty  did  not  slip  away  from  them.  The  state  had 
become  in  fact,  as  well  as  in  name,  a  republic.1 

After  this  revolution,  save  for  rare  instances,  the  king  of 
Poland  was  merely  the  '  painted  monarch,'  the  crowned  figure- 
head, whose  impotence  could  be  compared  only  with  that  of  the 
conventional  doge  of  Venice.  Surrounded  by  pomp  and  circum- 
stance, he  was  yet  without  any  of  those  effective  powers  which 
even  in  modern  constitutional  states  remain  to  the  monarch. 
The  chief  prerogative  left  to  him  was  the  right  of  appointing  to 
innumerable  offices,  civil  and  ecclesiastical;  but  as  appointments 
were  made  for  life,  and  the  king  possessed  no  means  of  control 
over  officials  once  appointed,  this  prerogative  was  of  little  avail. 
Indeed,  it  is  probable  that  the  jealousies,  disappointments,  and 
resentments  provoked  by  the  use  of  the  royal  patronage  quite 

1  On  the  capital  importance  and  the  results  of  the  interregnum  of  1572-73, 
cf.  Pawinski,  Rzqdy  sejmikowe,  i,  pp.  28  ff.;  KapteBi,  IIojn.CK.ifi  Ceuiii,  pp.  45  ff. 


INTRODUCTION  1 1 

outweighed  any  profit  that  the  Crown  may  have  drawn  from  it. 
Certainly  nothing  contributed  more  to  the  suspicion  that  haunted 
the  szlachta  in  the  last  centuries  of  Old  Poland,  than  the  fear  that 
the  kings  were  corrupting  the  nation  and  endangering  liberty 
by  their  insidious  and  unscrupulous  use  of  the  appointing  power; 
nothing  did  more  to  keep  alive  that  sleepless  and  ineradicable 
distrust  of  the  Crown,  which  proved  so  formidable  an  obstacle 
to  every  attempt  to  restore  some  strength  to  the  executive. 

A  long  series  of  Polish  historians,  from  Naruszewicz  down  to 
Bobrzynski,  have  deplored  the  abasement  of  the  royal  power  as 
the  primary  cause  of  the  decline  of  Poland.  It  has  often  been  said 
that  so  vast,  so  exposed,  and  so  heterogeneous  a  realm  as  this 
could  survive  only  under  a  strong  monarchy;  that  Poland  needed 
to  go  through  the  wholesome  discipline  of  enlightened  despotism 
like  the  western  nations;  that  Poland  fell  because  she  tried  to 
omit  a  stage  in  her  evolution.  But  the  more  recent  historiography 
tends  toward  a  quite  different  view.  It  is  urged  that  Poland 
might  have  attained  the  results  that  western  nations  secured 
through  absolutism,  by  other  methods,  through  the  admission 
of  all  classes  of  society  to  a  fair  share  in  the  government  of 
the  Republic.  More  serious,  more  decisive  than  the  victory  of  the 
szlachta  over  the  Crown,  was  the  victory  of  the  szlachta  over  the 
non-noble  classes.  These  elements,  unfortunately,  showed  them- 
selves incapable  of  furnishing  support  to  the  falling  kingship,  or 
of  forcing  the  szlachta  to  share  with  them  the  power  wrested  from 
the  Crown,  or  even  of  defending  their  own  political  and  economic 
existence  against  the  attacks  of  the  nobility.  If  the  Polish  state 
fell  completely  under  the  control  of  a  single  class,  with  the  most 
disastrous  results,  it  was  not  so  much  because  in  Poland  the  kings 
were  weaker  and  the  nobility  more  aggressive  than  elsewhere,  as 
because  the  lower  classes,  and  especially  the  bourgeoisie,  ex- 
hibited a  weakness  unparalleled  in  any- western  country.1 

In  the  fourteenth  and  early  fifteenth  centuries  an  admirable 
equilibrium  existed  between  the  various  classes  in  Poland.  Each 
class  enjoyed  a  fair  measure  of  rights  and  privileges,  and  no  class 
was  able  to  encroach  seriously  upon  the  others.    This  equilibrium 

1  Cf.  Kutrzeba,  Historya  ustroju  Polski,  pp.  87  f.,  1O2  ff. 


12  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

was  broken  down,  however,  in  the  later  fifteenth  and  sixteenth 
centuries,  when  the  szlachta  established  their  complete  political 
and  economic  preponderance  over  townsmen  and  peasantry  alike. 

As  against  the  peasantry,  the  szlachta  were  impelled  by  the 
same  imperious  economic  needs  that  were  about  the  same  period 
converting  the  Grundherr  into  the  Gutsherr  and  the  free  peasant 
into  the  serf  in  Eastern  Germany,  Bohemia,  Hungary,  and 
Russia.  Into  the  causes  and  history  of  this  vast  transformation 
in  the  agrarian  life  of  Eastern  Europe,  it  is  impossible  to  enter 
here.  This  economic  change  coincided  in  time  with  the  rise  of  the 
szlachta  to  political  power  and  their  conquest  of  the  right  of  legis- 
lation through  the  Diet.  The  result  was  a  series  of  '  constitu- 
tions '  (the  most  important  of  them  between  1496  and  1573), 
which  bound  the  peasant  to  the  soil,  increased  his  obligations  in 
rent  and  labor,  deprived  him  of  the  protection  of  the  law,  and  even 
subjected  his  religion  to  the  dictates  of  his  master.  Whether  or 
not  the  lord  was  legally  vested  with  the  jus  vitae  et  necis,  it  was 
assumed  that  he  possessed  it,  and  there  are  not  lacking  examples 
of  its  being  exercised.  The  peasant  thus  sank  into  the  most  abject 
kind  of  bondage;  the  landowner  was  lord  of  his  land,  his  property, 
his  life,  and  his  conscience.1 

The  degradation  of  the  Polish  peasantry  is  not  surprising  in 
view  of  what  was  occurring  elsewhere  in  Eastern  Europe;  but  the 
abasement  of  the  towns  before  the  szlachta  is  less  easy  to  under- 
stand, and  in  fact  an  entirely  adequate  explanation  has  not  yet 
been  offered.  In  the  fifteenth  and  early  sixteenth  centuries  the 
Polish  cities  were  at  the  height  of  their  prosperity.  Politically, 
they  were  by  no  means  negligible  factors.  Even  earlier  than  the 
szlachta,  they  had  learned  to  assert  their  rights  by  means  of  Con- 
federations; their  approval  was  frequently  sought  by  the  Crown 
for  important  political  acts;  and  all  through  the  fifteenth  century 
their  representatives  often  appeared  at  those  loosely  organized 
and  little  known  national  assemblies  out  of  which  the  Diet 
developed.2    But  when  that  body  was  finally  organized  through 

1  Cf .  Lehtonen,  Die  polnischen  Provinzen  Russlands  unter  Kalharina  II,  pp.  38  ff. 

2  The  history  of  the  Polish  Diet  in  the  fifteenth  century  is  still  in  very  urgent 
need  of  further  investigation.  Much  interesting  information  as  to  the  participation 
of  the  cities  is  to  be  found  in  Prochaska,  "  Geneza  i  rozwoj  parlamentaryzmu  za 


INTRODUCTION  1 3 

the  Statute  Nihil  Novi,  the  cities  found  themselves  virtually 
excluded.  Cracow  alone,  by  special  privilege,  enjoyed  a  clear 
legal  right  to  representation  in  the  Diet;  but  the  exercise  of  that 
right  encountered  such  opposition  from  the  szlachta,  the  deputies 
of  the  capital  were  subjected  to  such  humiliations  when  they 
ventured  to  show  themselves,  that  by  the  end  of  the  sixteenth 
century  they  had  ceased  to  appear.  It  is  true  that  the  cities  never 
quite  lost  their  rank  as  one  of  the  constitutional  estates  of  the 
realm.  Throughout  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries  four 
or  five  towns  continued  to  participate  in  elections  to  the  throne, 
in  extraordinary  Diets,  and  in  Confederations.  The  right  of  the 
towns  to  be  represented  at  ordinary  Diets  was  never  formally 
abolished  or  renounced ;  but  for  practical  purposes,  from  the  be- 
ginning of  the  sixteenth  century  on,  the  cities  had  lost  their  place 
in  the  national  assembly  and  in  the  political  life  of  the  nation.1 

This  elimination  of  the  bourgeois  element  from  the  Diet  was 
a  phenomenon  not  entirely  peculiar  to  Poland.  In  Hungary, 
Bohemia,  and  Moravia  —  lands  whose  constitutional  develop- 
ment closely  resembled  that  of  Poland,  and  might,  perhaps,  have 
paralleled  it  completely,  but  for  the  fortunate  advent  of  the  House 
of  Hapsburg  —  the  role  of  the  city  deputies  at  the  Diets  was 
gradually  reduced  to  little  more  than  the  right  to  be  present;  in 
Bohemia  that  right  was  restricted  to  Prague  alone,  and  in 
Hungary  and  Moravia  in  the  later  years  of  the  old  regime  all  the 
cities  together  had  only  a  single  vote.  But  nowhere  else  did  the 
city  estate  fall  so  completely  as  in  Poland,  so  suddenly,  or,  what 
is  strangest,  with  so  little  apparent  effort  at  self-defence.2 

The  explanation  most  commonly  advanced  for  this  surrender 
by  the  cities  is  the  fact  that  the  Polish  towns  in  the  Middle  Ages 

pierwszych  Jagiellon6w,"  Rozpr.  Akad.  Umiej.  w  Krakoivie,  Wyd.  Hist.-Fil.,  Serya, 
ii,  T.  xiii;  also  Piekosinski,  "  Wiece,  sejmiki,  sejmy,  przywileje  ziemskic  w  Polsce 
wiek6w  Srednich,  ibid.,  T.  xiv. 

1  Cf.  Rembowski,  Koiifederacya  i  rokosz,  pp.  2745.;  also  his  articles  in  the 
Biblioteka  Warszawska,  1892,  iv,  and  1893,  iii.  On  the  significance  of  the  Statute 
of  1505  as  virtually  excluding  the  townsmen  from  the  Diet,  see  the  article  by 
Balzer,  in  the  Kwartalnik  Historyczny,  xx. 

2  The  comparison  of  the  role  of  the  cities  in  the  Diets  of  these  four  states  is 
made  by  Kadlec,  "  Ustavnf  dejiny  Polska  podle  novych  badani,"  Casopis  Musea 
Krdl.  Ces.  1908. 


14  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

were  peopled  chiefly  by  Germans,  living  according  to  German 
law,  separated  from  the  rest  of  the  nation  by  language,  customs, 
and  interests,  and  neither  willing  nor  able  to  take  an  effective  and 
continuous  part  in  the  political  life  of  the  kingdom.  It  is  true 
that  in  the  sixteenth  century  the  towns  were  rapidly  being  Polo- 
nized,  but  this  transformation  came  too  late;  the  cities  then 
found  that  their  cooperation  was  not  wanted,  and  that  the  doors 
of  the  Diet  were  closed  against  them.  They  were  the  less  able  to 
defend  their  political  interests,  because,  despite  the  external 
appearance  of  prosperity,  economic  decline  was  setting  in.  The 
primary  cause  was  the  shifting  of  the  world's  trade-centers  at  the 
close  of  the  fifteenth  century  and  the  ruin  of  the  Black  Sea  traffic 
at  the  hands  of  the  Turks.  The  Polish  towns  thus  lost  that 
transit-trade  on  which  their  prosperity  in  the  Middle  Ages  had 
chiefly  rested,  and  henceforth  they  went  steadily  down  hill.  This 
decline  was  accelerated  by  the  encroachments  of  the  szlachta,  who, 
as  soon  as  they  had  come  into  power,  rained  blow  after  blow  upon 
the  sinking  bourgeoisie!)  The  latter  were  excluded  from  offices  in 
the  state  and  from  the  higher  places  in  the  Church;  they  were 
forbidden  to  own  land  outside  their  walls;  their  municipal  liber- 
ties were  virtually  destroyed  in  the  seigniorial  towns,  and  in  the 
royal  cities  greatly  restricted.  [Above  all,  their  trade  was  nearly 
ruined  by  the  selfish  and  short-sighted  legislation  passed  by 
assemblies  of  country  squires,  bent  only  on  assuring  their  own 
fortunes  and  ignorant  of  the  first  principles  of  a  sound  national 
economy?  As  typical  of  this  legislation  one  may  cite  the  law  of 
1565,  which  forbade  native  merchants  to  export  or  import  any 
goods  whatsoever,  or  the  enactment  of  1643  that  native  mer- 
chants were  to  sell  at  a  profit  of  no  more  than  seven  per  cent; 
foreigners,  of  five  per  cent;  Jews,  of  three  per  cent.1  The  pros- 
perity of  the  cities  might  possibly  have  survived  the  activity  of 
the  Polish  Solons;  but  the  terrible  devastations  suffered  during 
the  wars  against  Swedes,  Turks,  and  Muscovites  dealt  it  the  final 
blow.  By  the  eighteenth  century  the  once  brilliant  and  busy 
towns  presented  a  perfect  picture  of  desolation:  the  houses  de- 
serted or  falling  in  ruins,  the  streets  grown  up  to  grass,  and 

1  Kutrzeba,  op.  cit.,  pp.  171  f. 


INTRODUCTION  1 5 

business  confined  to  the  wretched  operations  of  Jewish  money- 
lenders and  petty  traders.  Poland  was  thus  left  destitute  of  the 
element  most  important  for  a  sound  political  life  —  a  strong, 
prosperous,  and  progressive  middle  class. 

Though  supported  by  great  wealth  and  by  the  prestige  nat- 
urally attaching  to  the  Church  among  an  ardently  Catholic 
people,  the  Polish  clergy  also  failed  to  oppose  an  effective  barrier 
to  the  omnipotence  of  the  szlachta.  It  is  true  that  the  bishops 
acquired  and  maintained  a  place  in  the  Senate,  and  that  in  the 
fifteenth  century  the  lower  clergy  were  occasionally  represented 
at  the  Diets.1  But  in  Poland,  as  in  England,  the  clergy  preferred 
to  tax  themselves  and  to  regulate  their  relations  with  the  Crown 
in  their  separate  assemblies;  as  an  estate  they  soon  dropped  out 
of  the  Diet;  and  then  they  too  became  the  object  of  the  attacks 
of  the  szlachta.  Failing  in  their  direct  onslaughts,  especially  in 
their  attempt  to  oust  the  bishops  from  the  Senate,  the  gentry 
nevertheless  succeeded  in  their  essential  aim.  By  securing  a 
monopoly  of  the  higher  positions  in  the  Church  for  members  of 
their  own  class,  they  removed  the  main  cause  of  antagonism,  and 
turned  the  hierarchy  into  an  aristocratic  body,  one  with  them- 
selves in  birth,  manners,  ideas,  and  interests.  With  that  the 
victory  of  the  szlachta  over  all  opposing  elements  was  complete. 
They  were  the  State.  The  struggles  of  the  Standestaat  period  had 
led  in  Poland  to  a  result  radically  different  from  that  attained  in 
most  other  states,  and  to  one  for  which  there  is  nowhere  else  an 
exact  analogy.  The  result  was  the  omnipotence  of  a  single  caste 
carried  to  a  point  unparalleled  in  any  other  European  country. 

Even  this  development  need  not  have  proved  so  disastrous,  if 
the  szlachta,  after  gaining  the  supreme  power,  had  only  properly 
organized  it.  An  efficient  aristocratic  government,  awake  to 
national  needs  and  able  to  concentrate  the  power  and  resources 
of  the  country  for  great  national  tasks,  might  have  provided 
a  tolerable  substitute  for  absolute  monarchy.     But  it  was  the 

1  This  representation  of  the  clerical  estate  in  the  fifteenth  century  is  one  of  the 
most  obscure  points  in  Polish  constitutional  history.  Some  data  may  be  found  in 
Pawinski,  Sejmiki  ziemskie,  pp.  94  f.,  and  in  Prochaska,  Geneza  i  rozwoj  parla- 
mentaryzmu,  etc.,  pp.  39  f. 


1 6  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

supreme  misfortune  of  Poland  that  the  szlachta,  after  appropriating 
the  sovereignty,  seemed  bent,  not  on  using  it  for  great  national 
aims,  but  rather  on  dividing  it  equally  among  all  the  members  of 
their  class,  taken  as  individuals.  The  authority  lost  by  the  Crown 
passed,  not  to  the  Diet,  but  to  the  local  assemblies  (Dietines),  and, 
in  the  last  analysis,  to  each  country  gentleman.  The  supreme 
power  was  atomized  until  it  simply  vanished,  leaving  anarchy. 

The  explanation  of  this  unhappy  phenomenon  is  chiefly  to  be 
sought  in  the  geographic  and  historical  conditions  under  which 
the  szlachta  had  worked  their  way  to  power.  The  Republic 
embraced  an  enormous  area;  it  was  larger  than  any  of  the  other 
states  which  at  that  time  experimented  in  popular  government. 
In  the  German  territories,  Bohemia,  Sweden,  or  Aragon,  for 
example,  all  nobles  might,  without  too  much  difficulty,  attend  the 
central  parliament;  but  in  Poland,  as  in  Hungary,  this  proved 
impossible,  and  hence  the  need  for  the  election  of  representatives, 
for  local  assemblies,  for  local  self-government.  The  mere  size  of 
Poland  rendered  decentralization  indispensable. 

The  particularist  spirit  had  also  been  fostered  by  the  historic 
evolution  of  Poland.  After  a  short  period  of  unity  under  the 
Piasts,  in  the  twelfth  century  the  realm  had  been  divided  into 
numerous  principalities,  which  soon  possessed  no  connecting 
links  whatsoever.  This  period  of  disintegration,  which  lasted 
nearly  two  hundred  years,  left  very  deep  and  abiding  traces. 
It  was  then  that  the  various  Polish  '  lands  '  —  the  principalities 
of  that  age,  the  palatinates  of  the  next  —  took  permanent  shape 
and  acquired  their  marked  individuality,  their  separatist  in- 
stincts, traditions  and  prejudices.  The  reunion  of  the  country 
effected  by  Wladyslaw  Lokietek  at  the  beginning  of  the  four- 
teenth century,  was  only  a  hasty  and  mechanical  process,  each 
'  land  '  retaining  its  own  hierarchy  of  officials,  its  own  assemblies 
of  dignitaries  and  magnates,  its  own  law,  its  own  separate  life  and 
self-consciousness.  Though  some  progress  towards  real  unity  was 
made  under  Lokietek  and  his  successor,  the  speedy  extinction  of 
the  dynasty  and  the  subsequent  weakening  of  the  royal  power, 
which  had  always  been  the  chief  bond  of  union  in  Poland,  largely 
arrested  this  salutary  process. 


INTRODUCTION  1 7 

It  was  at  this  moment,  when  the  integration  of  the  country  was 
still  so  incomplete,  that  the  szlachta  made  their  entry  into  political 
life.  Naturally  they  acted  through  the  agencies  with  which  they 
were  most  familiar,  namely,  the  local  organizations,  and  in  accord- 
ance with  those  ideas  of  local  independence  to  which  they  were 
accustomed.  So  it  happened  that  they  entrenched  themselves 
first  of  all,  not  in  a  central  parliament,  but  in  the  local  assemblies 

—  the  Dietines.  About  the  beginning  of  the  fifteenth  century  the 
old  provincial  councils  of  dignitaries  and  magnates  were  trans- 
formed (except  for  judicial  purposes)  into  assemblies  of  the  whole 
community  of  the  szlachta  of  each  '  land.'  These  Sejmiki  or 
Dietines  originally  concerned  themselves  only  with  modest  local 
affairs;  but  as  the  szlachta  extorted  one  privilege  after  another 
from  the  Crown,  it  was  through  the  Dietines  as  their  chief  organs 
that  they  exercised  their  new  functions.  For  purposes  of  taxation, 
and,  after  the  Statutes  of  Nieszawa,  for  calling  the  pospolite 
ruszenie  and  for  legislation  (at  least  legislation  affecting  the  rights 
and  privileges  of  the  szlachta) ,  the  King  was  obliged  to  consult  all 
the  Dietines  separately.  That  procedure  was  slow  and  awkward ; 
what  was  needed  was  a  concentration  of  the  local  machinery  in  a 
general  parliament. 

The  nucleus  of  such  a  body  existed  in  the  Wiec,  the  assembly  of 
the  chief  magnates  and  dignitaries  of  the  entire  kingdom,  which, 
as  a  royal  council,  under  the  first  Jagellonians  already  exerted 
great  influence  over  the  decisions  of  the  Crown  in  matters  of 
general  policy.  Throughout  the  fifteenth  century  szlachta  and 
townsmen  and,  to  some  extent,  the  lower  clergy  not  infrequently 
attended  the  meetings  of  the  Wiec;  but  it  is  still  uncertain  what 
form  their  representation  took,  and  what  part  they  had  in  the 
deliberations  of  the  assembly.  At  any  rate,  an  organic  connection 
between  the  Dietines  and  the  Wiec  (or  Diet,  as  it  came  to  be 
called),  was  definitely  established  only  at  the  close  of  the  century. 
The  Dietines  slowly  formed  the  habit  of  sending  deputies  to  the 
central  body;  and  in  1493,  f°r  the  first  time  —  as  far  as  we  know 

—  deputies  from  all  the  Dietines  in  the  kingdom  assembled  in  the 
general  Diet  at  Piotrkow.  That  was  the  Polish  Model  Parlia- 
ment.   The  Diet  took  shape  as  a  bicameral  body:   the  deputies 


1 8  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

from  the  Dietines  formed  the  Chamber  of  Nuncios,  from  which 
the  city  representatives  soon  disappeared;  and  the  upper  house 
was  formed  by  the  Senate,  (i.  e.,  the  old  royal  council  or  Wiec, 
made  up  of  the  archbishops,  bishops,  palatines,  castellans,  and 
the  great  officers  of  the  Crown),  which  through  the  Statute 
Nihil  Novi  was  placed  on  a  footing  of  equality  with  the  Chamber 
of  Nuncios  with  respect  to  legislative  rights. 

The  success  of  Polish  parliamentarism  now  depended  on  the 
question  of  what  the  relation  would  be  between  the  newly  formed 
Diet  and  the  older  provincial  assemblies.  The  predominance  of 
the  former  would  mean  the  continuation  of  the  unification  of  the 
realm  and  perhaps  the  development  of  a  strong  central  govern- 
ment; the  predominance  of  the  Dietines,  on  the  other  hand, 
would  involve  decentralization,  disunion,  impotence.  At  the 
outset,  the  decentralizing  tendency  prevailed.  The  deputies  of 
the  Dietines  represented  only  their  respective  '  lands  ' ;  they  were 
bound  by  instructions,  usually  precise  and  imperative,  from  their 
electors;  the  Diet  resembled  a  congress  of  ambassadors.  Under 
Sigismund  II  a  determined  effort  was  made  by  the  Protestant 
szlachta  to  end  this  state  of  things  and  to  give  the  Diet  the 
character  of  a  real  parliament  by  eliminating  imperative  man- 
dates, establishing  the  majority  rule  in  voting,  and  subordinating 
the  Dietines  to  the  Diet.  But  this  effort  failed,  chiefly  owing  to 
the  opposition,  and  later  the  weakness,  of  the  King  himself.1 

In  the  next  generation  the  tide  set  strongly  in  the  opposite 
direction.  The  doctrinaire  theories  of  the  age  about  the  '  free- 
dom '  and  '  equality  '  of  the  szlachta,  the  heightened  sense  of  their 
own  importance  produced  by  the  events  of  1572  in  the  minds  of 
the  gentry,  their  natural  preference  for  deciding  all  matters 
directly  in  their  local  assemblies,  rather  than  through  deputies  to 
the  Diet,  who  might  be  insidiously  influenced  by  the  King  or  the 
magnates  —  all  these  things  combined  to  assure  to  the  Dietines  a 
preponderance  such  as  they  had  never  before  enjoyed.  Re- 
stricted under  the  later  Jagellonians  to  a  very  narrow  sphere  of 

1  See  Bobrzynski,  Dzieje  Polski,  ii,  pp.  75  ff.,  who  regarded  the  proposals  of  the 
Protestant  party  as  the  most  promising  reform  program  ever  brought  forward  in 
Poland. 


INTRODUCTION  1 9 

activity,  these  assemblies  now  extended  their  encroachments  so 
far  and  assumed  such  a  plenitude  of  power  and  independence, 
that  in  the  seventeenth  century  the  Republic  came  to  resemble  a 
loose  federation  of  fifty  or  sixty  sovereign  states.  Not  only  did 
the  various  palatinates  develop  to  the  utmost  their  judicial  and 
administrative  autonomy,  but  decentralization  was  also  carried 
to  dangerous  lengths  in  the  financial  and  military  system,  on 
which  the  strength  and  security  of  the  Republic  primarily  de- 
pended. The  Dietines  granted  or  refused  taxes,  either  through 
their  deputies  to  the  Diet  or  directly,  when  the  question  was 
referred  to  them,  as  frequently  happened;  they  themselves 
assessed  and  collected  the  taxes,  turning  over  to  the  treasurers  of 
the  Crown  only  so  much  as  they  saw  fit;  and  they  raised  and 
maintained  military  forces,  which  they  tended  to  regard  as  their 
own  provincial  armies. 

This  excessive  decentralization  was,  indeed,  partially  overcome 
during  the  eighteenth  century.  The  unity  of  the  army  was 
restored;  and  the  Diet  of  1717,  by  establishing  permanent  taxes 
levied  according  to  a  fixed  scale  by  officials  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, put  an  end  to  the  financial  powers  of  the  Dietines,  except 
for  the  raising  of  local  rates.  But  by  this  time  it  was  hard  to 
undo  the  effects  of  one  hundred  years  of  disorganization  and 
chaos,  to  curb  the  deeply  rooted  particularist  spirit,  to  bring  the 
state  back  to  the  path  towards  unity,  on  which  it  had  started  in 
the  sixteenth  century.  And  above  all,  even  in  the  mid  eighteenth 
century  nothing  had  been  done  to  remedy  the  worst  evil  produced 
by  the  long  preponderance  of  the  Dietines,  namely,  the  impotence 
of  the  Diet. 

That  impotence  was  due  chiefly  to  the  system  of  the  imperative 
mandate.  Since  1572  the  instructions  given  by  the  Dietines  to 
their  deputies  had  grown  more  and  more  lengthy,  detailed,  and 
strict.  The  deputies  might  be  ordered  to  put  through  a  project 
at  all  costs,  or  not  to  allow  one  to  pass  under  any  consideration. 
Then  the  custom  had  grown  up  of  holding  so-called  '  Dietines  of 
relation  '  (Sejmiki  relacyjne)  at  the  close  of  each  Diet,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  hearing  the  reports  of  the  returned  deputies.  These 
Dietines  of  relation  not  only  kept  the  nuncios  in  wholesome  awe 


20  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  disobeying  their  instructions,  but  also,  while  they  could  not 
de  jure  alter  or  nullify  what  the  Diet  had  done,  de  facto  they  not 
infrequently  did  so. 

The  result  of  this  system  was  to  hamper  the  action  of  the  Diet 
to  the  utmost.  Whatever  was  to  come  up  in  the  central  parlia- 
ment was  discussed  and  virtually  decided  in  advance  by  the 
Dietines,  and  the  latter  decided  these  matters,  —  questions,  it 
might  be,  of  the  most  general  nature,  affecting  the  whole  Republic 
—  on  the  basis  of  local  interests,  local  knowledge,  local  prejudices; 
decided  them  prematurely,  categorically,  in  final  instance,  without 
regard  for  what  the  assembly  of  the  whole  nation,  after  a  more 
comprehensive  survey  of  the  situation  and  more  mature  delibera- 
tion, might  be  inclined  to  favor.1  The  fate  of  every  question  thus 
depended  not  so  much  upon  the  debates  in  the  Diet,  as  upon  the 
referendum  taken  in  fifty  or  sixty  tumultuous  gatherings  of  —  for 
the  most  part  —  ignorant  and  narrow-minded  country  squires. 

The  logical  development  of  the  system  of  imperative  mandates 
and  the  crowning  anomaly  of  the  Polish  constitution  was  the 
famous  Liberum  Veto:  the  right  of  any  member  of  the  Diet  to 
interpose  a  veto,  which  had  the  threefold  effect  of  defeating  the 
particular  proposition  that  had  aroused  opposition,  dissolving 
the  Diet,  and  nullifying  all  the  decisions  previously  taken  by  the 
assembly. 

The  Liberum  Veto  was  a  late  constitutional  development.  In 
the  sixteenth  century  Diets  a  determined  minority  was  generally 
able  to  check  the  action  of  the  majority,  but  if  the  dissenters  were 
very  few,  little  attention  was  paid  to  them.  In  the  seventeenth 
century,  however,  with  the  strong  tendency  of  that  age  to 
'  liberty,'  and  its  antipathy  to  '  tyranny  '  of  any  sort,  the  con- 
ception of  the  rights  of  the  minority  developed,  until  in  1652  for 
the  first  time  a  single  deputy,  Sicinski,  by  his  veto  '  exploded  '  the 
Diet.  After  that  the  use  of  the  Liberum  Veto,  although  it  rested 
on  no  written  law  and  was  in  itself  a  defiance  of  common  sense, 
became  an  established  constitutional  practice,  and  a  chronic  evil. 
The  Dietines  often  expressly  ordered  its  application,  taking 
pleasure  in  this  means  of  showing  their  importance.    The  mass  of 

1  Cf.  the  vigorous  passage  on  this  subject  in  Pawinski,  Rzqdy  sejmikowe,  i,  p.  409. 


INTRODUCTION  2 1 

the  szlachta  regarded  it  as  a  useful  safeguard  against  injustice  or 
tyranny  —  in  fact  as  the  '  palladium  of  liberty/  the  '  jewel  of  the 
constitution.'  Of  the  fifty-five  Diets  held  between  1652  and  1764, 
forty-eight  were  '  exploded,'  almost  one-third  of  them  by  the  veto 
of  a  single  deputy.  During  the  thirty  years'  reign  of  Augustus  III 
not  a  single  Diet  lived  out  its  normal  time.  As  the  Diet  met  only 
once  in  two  years,  and  then  for  six  weeks  only  (provided  it 
escaped  being  '  exploded '),  and  as  each  Diet  was  generally  brought 
to  a  violent  and  premature  end  with  nothing  accomplished,  the 
result  was  that  the  national  parliament  had  virtually  ceased  to 
function.  And  yet,  after  the  collapse  of  the  royal  power,  the  Diet 
was  the  one  institution  that  might  have  given  the  country  a 
government ! 

One  means  of  getting  around  the  Liberum  Veto  existed,  but,  as 
has  frequently  been  pointed  out,  it  was  a  remedy  worse  than  the 
disease.  This  was  the  '  Confederation,'  i.  e.,  a  voluntary  armed 
association  of  individuals  formed  for  the  purpose  of  putting 
through  its  specified  projects  in  the  face  of  any  opposition  whatso- 
ever. Confederations  —  a  characteristic  mediaeval  constitutional 
device  —  were  much  in  vogue  in  Poland  in  the  late  fourteenth  and 
fifteenth  centuries;  they  then  disappeared  for  a  time,  but  re- 
curred frequently  in  the  period  after  1572,  —  one  symptom  more 
of  the  reversion  in  type  that  marked  Polish  constitutionalism  in 
that  age.  Confederations  were  of  three  kinds:  (1)  those  formed 
during  interregna,  in  order  to  prevent  disorders  and  hold  the  realm 
together;  (2)  those  formed  during  the  life- time  of  a  king  for  the 
purpose  of  assisting  him  in  some  great  emergency;  and  (3)  those 
formed  in  opposition  to  the  kings  —  of  which  there  are  only  too 
many  examples.  Associations  of  the  first  two  kinds  were  useful; 
indeed,  a  Confederation  formed  '  at  the  King's  side,'  might  be 
merely  a  technical  device  for  putting  through  a  project  in  spite  of 
the  opposition  of  a  minority,  since  in  a  Diet  held  '  under  the  seal 
of  a  Confederation '  the  majority  ruled.  But  a  Confederation  was 
under  any  circumstances  a  hazardous  expedient,  for  it  always 
brought  with  it  the  danger  of  civil  war.  Nothing  reveals  in  a 
more  glaring  light  the  defects  of  Polish  constitutionalism.  Noth- 
ing could  be  more  detrimental  to  stability,  legality,  and  order 


22  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

than  a  system  under  which  the  ordinary  authorities  might  at  any 
moment  be  violently  replaced  by  a  set  of  ambitious  private 
persons,  who  usurped  control  of  the  administration,  the  courts, 
the  treasury,  and  the  army,  called  a  Diet,  put  through  what 
legislation  they  pleased,  and  dispersed  only  when  their  aims  were 
attained.  The  right  of  confederation,  as  Moltke  declared,  was 
revolution  legally  organized.1  It  gave  rise  to  the  epigram  that 
the  government  of  Poland  was  anarchy  tempered  by  civil  war. 

Were  there  any  truth  in  the  old  Liberal  maxim  that  those 
states  were  happiest  that  were  governed  least,  the  Polish  Republic 
must  have  approached  the  acme  of  perfection.  The  activity  of 
its  government  had  been  reduced  to  the  vanishing-point.  "  No 
people,"  said  Burke,  "  have  ever  taken  greater  precautions  to 
secure  the  possession  of  a  sober  and  well-regulated  freedom,  than 
the  Poles  have  to  preserve  themselves  in  their  present  anarchy."  2 
In  order  that  the  King  might  not  make  himself  a'  tyrant,'  he  had 
been  stripped  of  wellnigh  every  prerogative.  In  order  that  the 
Diet  might  not  endanger  '  liberty,'  it  had  been  reduced  to  com- 
plete impotence.  The  Dietines,  in  which  the  Liberum  Veto  also 
prevailed,  were,  as  organs  of  government,  scarcely  more  respect- 
able. In  Poland,  Raynal  declared,  "  everyone  has  the  power  to 
prevent  action,  and  no  one  the  power  to  act.  There  the  will  of  any 
individual  may  thwart  the  general  will;  and  there  alone  a  foolish,  a 
wicked,  or  an  insane  man  is  sure  to  prevail  over  a  whole  nation."  3 
Montesquieu  rightly  affirmed  that  '  the  object  of  the  laws  of 
Poland  was  the  independence  of  every  individual,' 4  that  is  of 
every  nobleman. 

The  szlachta  had,  in  fact,  attained  the  most  complete  freedom, 
not  only  from  every  kind  of  oppression,  but  from  any  sort  of 
obligation  or  constraint.  From  the  latter  part  of  the  seventeenth 
century  on,  they  ceased  to  render  military  service,  since  the  de- 
velopment of  warfare  had  made  the  old  feudal  levies  an  an- 
achronism;  nevertheless  they  continued  to  consider  themselves 

1  Cited  in  Lehtonen,  Die  polnischen  Provinzen  Russlands,  p.  15. 

2  Annual  Register,  1763,  p.  46. 

3  Histoire  philosophique  el  politique  des  Etablissemens  des  Europeens  dans  les 
deux  Indes,  x,  p.  52. 

4  U Esprit  des  Lois,  Bk.  11,  ch.  5. 


INTRODUCTION  23 

the  sword  and  buckler  of  Poland  and  to  claim  all  the  privileges  for 
which  their  former  service  had  been  the  sole  justification.  They 
enjoyed  a  monopoly  of  land-owning.  They  exercised  sovereign 
and  unlimited  power  over  the  serfs  on  their  estates.  They  could 
not  be  taxed  without  their  consent,  and  in  practice  they  paid 
none  of  the  usual  taxes,  not  even  customs-duties.  They  could  not 
be  arrested  or  imprisoned  or  deprived  of  their  property  without 
trial,  nor  punished  for  their  speeches  and  opinions.  They  held  a 
monopoly  of  the  higher  positions  in  the  Church,  and  of  political 
rights  and  offices.  Through  their  control  of  the  Diet,  the  Dietines, 
and  the  courts  of  justice,  they  had  in  their  hands  whatever 
machinery  of  government  existed.  Finally,  every  nobleman, 
however  indigent  or  insignificant  he  might  be,  had  the  right  to 
attend  and  to  participate  in  the  elections  to  the  throne,  as  a 
supreme  demonstration  of  the  fact  that  in  Poland  the  sovereignty 
belonged  to  every  szlachcic  individually,  as  well  as  to  all  the 
szlachta  collectively.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  any  other  class 
has  ever  obtained  such  unrestricted  independence  and  such  a 
fullness  of  power  and  privilege.  The  szlachta  themselves  were 
wont  to  boast  that  it  was  impossible  to  imagine  a  happier  lot  than 
that  of  a  Polish  nobleman,  and  they  looked  down  upon  all  the 
other  peoples  of  Europe  as  the  '  slaves  of  despots.' 

Naturally  there  grew  up  in  the  minds  of  the  ruling  class  an 
idealization  of  this  '  golden  liberty,'  purchased  by  '  the  blood  and 
toil '  of  their  'virtuous  ancestors,'  which  became  a  sort  of  relig- 
ion, and  a  veritable  obsession.  One  hardly  knows  whether  to 
wonder  more  at  the  glorification  of  the  szlachta  as  a  caste,  or  at 
the  panegyrics  lavished  upon  the  constitution  which  the  nobility 
had  created.  The  szlachta,  it  was  said,  were  exalted  above  all  the 
other  classes  as  the  cedars  of  Lebanon  above  the  common  trees. 
They  were  the  heart  and  hands  of  the  body  politic,  as  the  king 
was  the  head  and  the  commoners  the  feet.  As  they  gave  their 
lives  to  the  defence  of  the  Republic,  it  was  meet  that  the  lower 
orders  should  serve  them.  It  was  necessary  to  have  in  the  state 
one  class  of  people  who,  disdainful  of  all  gain,  sought  only  the 
dignity,  honor,  and  advantage  of  the  fatherland.  Traders  and 
artisans,  absorbed  in  money-making,  were  incapable  of  lofty 


24  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

thought  or  deeds,  just  as  the  szlachta,  living  only  for  virtue,  truth, 
and  right,  were  incapable  of  any  low  action.1 

As  for  the  constitution,  it  was  defended  with  a  great  store  of 
classical  erudition,  which  testifies  to  the  profound  influence  of 
Humanism  upon  Polish  thought.  With  their  minds  full  of  politi- 
cal and  legal  ideas  borrowed  from  antiquity,  with  the  old  phrases 
about '  tyranny,'  '  freedom,'  and  '  equality  '  ever  upon  their  lips, 
the  szlachta  finally  came  to  conceive  of  themselves  as  the  rein- 
carnation of  the  Roman  Republic.  The  analogy  was  useful  in  a 
dozen  ways.  Did  not  History  show  that  in  the  ancient  republics 
political  rights  had  also  been  confined  to  one  class  of  well-born, 
wealthy,  and  leisured  citizens,  below  which  stood  a  servile  pro- 
letariat ?  Was  not  a  deputy  exercising  the  Liberum  Veto  merely 
a  tribune  of  the  people  ?  Was  not  a  Confederation  simply  a  new 
form  of  the  Roman  dictatorship  ?  Nowhere  else,  perhaps,  was 
the  ideal  of  a  democratic  republic  of  the  ancient  type  so  popular, 
or  so  potent  in  shaping  political  theory  and  practice.2 

Religion  also  added  its  sanction  to  the  apotheosis  of  the 
szlachta-state.  In  order  to  assure  the  victory  of  the  Counter- 
Reformation,  the  Jesuits  had  not  hesitated  to  make  themselves 
ardent  champions  of  '  golden  liberty,'  and  to  proclaim  that  the 
free  constitution  of  the  Republic  was  peculiarly  adapted  to  Catho- 
lic principles  and  teaching.  Under  the  influence  of  the  clergy,  the 
Poles  came  to  regard  themselves  as  under  the  special  protection 
of  Providence,  as  a  chosen  people;  and  confirmation  for  this  belief 
was  found  in  the  many  signs  and  wonders  of  the  seventeenth 
century,  especially  in  the  miraculous  deliverance  of  the  country 
from  the  Swedes  in  the  time  of  John  Casimir.3 

Extravagant  as  such  theories  were,  they  took  deep  root  in  the 
minds  of  the  nobility.  Combined  with  material  interests,  class- 
egotism,  and  the  instinct  of  self-preservation,  they  produced  in 
the  szlachta  a  blind  conservatism,  a  horror  of  all  innovations,  a 
fierce  determination  to  maintain  the  existing  state  of  things, 
which  long  rendered  reforms  almost  impossible. 

1  Cf.  the  interesting  essay  of  Wl.  Smolenski,  "  Szlachta  w  swietle  wlasnych 
opinii,"  in  his  Pisma  historyczne,  i. 

2  KapieBt,  nojibCKift  CeiiMT.,  pp.  42  ff. 

3  Cf.  Smolenski,  Przewrot  umyslowy  w  Polsce  wieku  XVIII,  p.  9. 


INTRODUCTION  2$ 

The  constitutional  development  of  Poland  from  the  end  of  the 
fourteenth  down  to  the  middle  of  the  seventeenth  century  had 
been  continuous,  consistent,  and  logical.  Unfortunate  as  that 
evolution  had  been,  there  had  at  least  been  life  and  movement. 
But  in  the  seventeenth  century  growth  ceased.  The  constitution 
had  taken  on  fixed  forms,  and  now  entered  upon  a  period  of  petri- 
faction during  which  all  the  disastrous  effects  of  the  preceding 
evolution  made  themselves  increasingly  and  appallingly  felt. 
The  seventeenth  century  was  marked  by  intellectual  and  moral 
retrogression,  economic  decline,  growing  political  anarchy,  and 
continual,  exhausting,  and  on  the  whole  disastrous  conflicts  with 
the  neighboring  Powers.  Then  followed  the  dullest  and  dreariest 
period  of  Polish  history,  the  reigns  of  the  two  Saxon  Kings  (1697- 
1763),  an  age  in  which  patriotism,  public  spirit,  energy,  and 
initiative  seemed  to  have  deserted  Poland.  After  the  incessant 
wars  of  the  preceding  period,  amid  which  the  nation  could  still 
produce  heroes  like  Czarniecki  or  Sobieski,  the  szlaehta  laid  aside 
their  swords  and  abandoned  themselves  thenceforth  to  the  joys  of 
life  on  their  estates,  enhanced  by  constant  and  exuberant  festivi- 
ties, and  varied  by  the  excitements  connected  with  the  Diets,  the 
Dietines,  the  law-courts,  and  a  sordid  and  senseless  party  strife. 
This  age  of  materialism,  selfishness,  apathy,  and  stagnation 
brought  Poland  to  the  depths  of  degradation.  Her  impotence 
was  now  well  known  to  all  the  world,  her  anarchy  proverbial,  and 
her  complete  downfall  a  matter  of  common  discussion. 

Ill 

^In  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  just  before  the  period 
of  the  great  disasters  began,  Poland  was  suffering  from  innumer- 
able maladies.  Outwardly,  indeed,  the  Republic  might  still  make 
a  somewhat  impressive  appearance.  With  an  area  of  approxi- 
mately 282,000  square  miles,  it  ranked  as  the  third  largest  state 
on  the  Continent,1  while  in  population  it  stood  fourth,  with  over 

1  Korzon  {Wewnqtrzne  dzieje  Polski  za  Stanisiawa  Augusta,  i,  p.  44)  estimates 
the  area  in  1772  (after  the  loss  of  the  Zips,  and  without  counting  in  Courland)  at 
^jS00  geographical  square  miles,  which  would  equal  282,382.94  square  miles, 
English.    Among  European  states,  only  Russia  and  Sweden  were  larger. 


26  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

eleven  million  souls.1  But  this  population  was  far  from  homo- 
geneous. The  Poles  can  scarcely  have  formed  more  than  fifty 
per  cent  of  it  at  the  most;  more  than  one- third  of  it  was  made  up 
of  Little  and  White  Russians;  while  the  remainder  consisted  of 
Germans,  Lithuanians,  Jews,  Armenians,  and  Tartars.2  This  lack 
of  national  unity  was  aggravated  by  the  lack  of  religious  unity. 
The  Poles  and  Lithuanians  were,  with  few  exceptions,  Roman 
Catholics;  the  Germans  were  mostly  Protestants;  and  the  Rus- 
sians had  for  many  centuries  belonged  to  the  Orthodox  Eastern 
Church.  It  was  true  that  owing  to  the  unceasing  efforts  of  the 
Polish  clergy  and  the  pressure  of  the  landowners,  the  great  ma- 
jority of  the  Russian  peasantry  within  the  Republic  had  been 
brought  over  to  union  with  Rome;  but  their  conversion  had  been 
effected  so  recently  and  in  part  by  such  unedifying  means  that 
their  loyalty  to  the  Roman  Church  was  open  to  grave  suspicion. 
These  religious  diversities  were  the  more  dangerous  because, 
while  the  Poles  had  formerly  shown  themselves  the  most  tolerant 
nation  in  Europe,  they  were  now  coming  to  display  quite  the 
contrary  spirit.  During  the  later  seventeenth  and  early  eigh- 
teenth centuries  the  Dissidents  (i.  e.,  the  non- Catholics)  were 
gradually  deprived  of  political  and  even  civil  rights,  subjected  to 
many  forms  of  petty  persecution,  and  occasionally  exposed  to 
outbursts  of  violence,  such  as  the  so-called  Massacre  of  Thorn  in 
1724.  This  unhappy  state  of  affairs  contributed  not  a  little  to 
alienating  the  sympathies  of  the  European  public  from  Poland; 
it  furnished  foreign  Powers  with  a  welcome  pretext  for  interven- 
tion; and  it  produced  among  the  Russian  population  a  chronic, 
sullen,  and  ominous  discontent.  In  the  rich  palatinates  of  the 
southeast,  where  a  small  Polish  minority  of  landowners  and 
priests  ruled  over  millions  of  Russian  serfs,  the  gentry  lived  in 
constant  fear  of  a  jacquerie,  of  which  the  Orthodox  popes  would 
be  the  natural  leaders. 

1  After  elaborate  computations  Korzon  (op.  cit.,  i,  p.  63)  concludes  that  in  1764 
the  total  population  was  probably  about  11-11  1/2  millions.  Only  France,  Russia, 
and  Austria  had  larger  populations  at  that  time. 

2  So  much  can  be  gathered  from  Korzon's  statistics  with  regard  to  the  religious 
divisions,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  163  ff.  Unfortunately  he  does  not  attempt  to  supply  any 
ethnic  statistics  directly. 


INTRODUCTION  2J 

If  racial  and  religious  divisions  sapped  the  strength  of  the 
Republic,  the  social  system  of  Old  Poland  was  even  more  ruinous. 
It  has  often  been  pointed  out  that  this  state  was  a  paradise  for  the 
nobility,  but  quite  the  reverse  for  all  the  other  classes.  Now  the 
szlachta,  although  more  numerous  perhaps  than  the  nobility  of 
any  other  European  country,  formed  only  about  eight  per  cent  of 
the  population;  the  townsmen,  Jewish  and  Christian,  about 
fifteen  per  cent;  and  the  peasants  seventy-two  per  cent.1  The 
interests  of  all  the  other  classes  had  been  systematically  sacrificed 
in  favor  of  a  caste  which  numbered  less  than  a  million. 

Five-sixths  of  the  Polish  peasantry  were  serfs  on  the  estates  of 
the  Crown,  the  Church,  or  the  szlachta.  It  seems  to  be  generally 
admitted  that  the  lot  of  the  serfs  in  Poland  was  more  cruel  than 
anywhere  else,  chiefly  because  the  state  was  here  unable  to  offer 
any  protection  to  the  serf.  The  many  appalling  descriptions  that 
have  come  down  to  us  portray  the  mass  of  the  peasantry  as  sunk 
to  a  state  of  misery,  apathy,  and  brutishness  that  almost  defies 
comparison.  One  contemporary  declares:  "  These  people  differ 
little  from  cattle,  have  no  property,  live  from  hand  to  mouth,  and 
rot  in  filth  and  poverty;  half  their  offspring  die  from  lack  of 
sunlight  and  proper  nourishment,  .  .  .  and  they  themselves 
finally  perish  from  hunger,  if  a  year  of  bad  harvest  comes.  It 
must  be  confessed  that  whatever  fate  should  befall  Poland,  their 
condition  could  not  become  any  worse."  2 

The  sad  fortunes  of  the  Polish  towns  have  already  been  de- 
scribed. In  the  middle  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  Republic 
did  not  contain  a  single  city  of  50,000  inhabitants,  and  only  seven 
with  over  10,000; 3  and  most  of  the  so-called  cities  were  only 
"  agricultural  settlements  and  collections  of  straw-covered  huts," 
where  a  few  Jews,  artisans,  and  tinkers  dragged  out  a  wretched 
existence.  With  their  trade  and  industry  ruined,  largely  by  the 
selfish  class-legislation  of   the  Diet,  robbed  of  their  municipal 

1  Cf.  the  table  in  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  320.  These  figures  relate  to  the  year 
1 791;  but  it  may  be  assumed,  I  think,  that  substantially  the  same  ratio  between 
the  various  classes  existed  forty  years  earlier. 

2  Cited  in  Von  der  Briiggen,  Polens  Aujiosung,  p.  54.  For  general  descriptions  of 
the  condition  of  the  serfs,  see  Lehtonen,  Die  polnischen  Provinzen  Russlands,  pp. 
32-72,  and  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  350-366.  3  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  274  ff. 


28  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

autonomy,  exposed  to  the  continual  and  tyrannous  interference 
of  the  szlachta  in  their  domestic  affairs,  and  excluded  from  all 
political  rights  and  offices,  the  townsmen,  like  the  peasantry, 
could  scarcely  be  expected  to  feel  any  genuine  devotion  to  the 
Republic. 

As  the  state  existed  solely  for  the  benefit  of  the  szlachta,  as 
everything  else  had  been  sacrificed  to  the  interests  of  the  szlachta, 
one  might  have  supposed  that  this  class  at  least  would  be  in 
sound  and  prosperous  condition,  and  able  to  furnish  a  great 
reservoir  of  strength  to  the  Republic.  But  even  within  this 
exalted  caste,  poverty  and  wretchedness  were  the  lot  of  the  great 
majority.  Although  in  theory  all  members  of  this  class  were 
equal,  and  the  richest  magnate  was  bound  to  address  the  poorest 
szlachcic  as  '  brother,'  in  fact  this  much-vaunted  equality  was 
very  much  a  farce.  The  szlachta  were  divided  into  several  strata 
sharply  differentiated  by  wealth,  education,  and  social  position. 

At  the  top  were  sixteen  or  seventeen  great  families,  like  the 
Potockis,  the  Czartoryskis,  or  the  Radziwills;  families  who 
possessed  immense  wealth  and  estates  which  in  some  cases  sur- 
passed in  extent  many  a  principality  of  Germany  or  Italy.  Some 
of  these  magnates  maintained  courts  which  outshone  that  of  the 
king  in  splendor  and  rigid  etiquette;  kept  up  standing  armies  of 
their  own  (their  '  house-militia  '),  a  correspondence  with  foreign 
monarchs,  and  a  sort  of  foreign  policy;  aped  the  manners  of 
royalty  to  the  best  of  their  ability,  and  were  accustomed  to  sign 
themselves,  'We,  Palatine  (or  Castellan),  by  the  grace  of  God.' 
In  short,  they  conducted  themselves  like  sovereign  princes,  and 
in  fact  they  often  had  more  real  power  than  the  king  of 
Poland.  Considering  themselves  born  to  rule  the  country  and  to 
hold  all  the  most  lucrative  positions,  these  families  engaged  in 
incessant  struggles  with  one  another  for  power,  influence,  and 
plunder.  Their  rivalry  kept  the  Republic  in  constant  turmoil, 
and  was  demoralizing  and  dangerous,  not  only  because  it  was  so 
entirely  divorced  from  questions  of  principle  or  considerations  of 
patriotism,  but  also  because  in  order  to  vanquish  its  domestic 
opponents,  each  faction  was  generally  ready  to  call  in  the  aid  of 
foreign  Powers. 


INTRODUCTION  29 

Below  the  magnates  stood  the  large  number  of  fairly  well-to-do 
szlachta,  who  took  but  little  part  in  politics,  busied  themselves 
chiefly  with  their  estates,  and  led  simple,  industrious,  God-fearing 
lives  like  their  ancestors.  In  spite  of  their  ignorance  and  preju- 
dices, these  middle-class  gentry  were  probably  the  best  element 
in  the  nation. 

The  majority  of  the  szlachta  belonged  to  that  aristocratic  pro- 
letariat which  was  made  up  of  those  who  had  either  no  land  at  all 
or  only  enough  to  make  a  bare  living.  Poverty-stricken,  ragged, 
and  dirty,  living  like  peasants  or  worse,  but  still  rilled  with  all  the 
pride  of  their  caste,  and  eager  to  vent  it  on  all  occasions,  these 
people  excited  the  derision  of  every  foreigner,  and  were,  indeed, 
one  of  the  most  unique  spectacles  to  be  seen  in  Poland.  Hundreds 
and  thousands  of  them  lived  at  the  courts  of  the  magnates,  serving 
the  latter  in  their  militia,  in  the  administration  of  their  estates,  or 
even  in  menial  capacities.  It  was  a  point  of  honor  and  almost  a 
matter  of  necessity  for  every  great '  lord  '  in  Poland  to  have  hosts 
of  such  '  clients  '  at  his  disposal,  and  their  services  were  extremely 
useful.  For  it  was  from  this  class  that  the  magnates  recruited 
those  hordes  of  tattered  and  drunken  '  citizens,'  who  swarmed  in 
to  every  Dietine,  ready  to  acclaim  '  whatever  the  Lord  Hetman, 
(or  the  Lord  Palatine)  wishes,'  and  quick  to  use  their  swords  in 
case  of  opposition.  As  almost  everybody  in  old  Poland,  from  the 
Diet  down  to  the  humblest  law-court,  was  subject  to  mob-rule,  it 
was  indispensable  to  have  the  mob  on  one's  side.  It  was  the  mag- 
nates who  ruined  Poland,  and  the  '  barefoot  szlachta,'  who  formed 
their  constant  and  efficacious  instrument.  And  it  was  a  sad 
commentary  upon  '  golden  liberty  '  that  more  than  half  of  the 
class  which  boasted  of  its  republican  freedom  and  equality,  had 
been  reduced  to  pauperism  and  to  lives  of  groveling  servility. 

The  results  of  '  golden  liberty  '  in  the  political  sphere  have 
already  in  part  been  described.  The  administrative  system  was 
completely  disorganized.  The  great  officials  of  the  central  govern- 
ment, the  marshals,  chancellors,  treasurers  and  hetmans,1  were 
irremovable  and  irresponsible,  and  each  of  them  did  what  was 

1  These  great  officials  were  always  in  pairs:  one  for  '  the  Crown  '  (i.  e.,  Poland), 
and  one  for  Lithuania.    The  hetmans  were  the  highest  military  officials. 


30  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

right  in  his  own  eyes.  The  officials  who  represented  the  Crown 
in  the  provinces  had  virtually  ceased  to  discharge  their  functions. 
Whatever  local  administration  existed  was  mainly  carried  on  by 
the  Dietines.  It  need  hardly  be  remarked  that  a  state  in  which 
the  executive  power  was  thus  atrophied,  could  undertake  none 
of  those  tasks  of  economic  and  social  improvement  which  were 
coming  to  attract  the  attention  of  so  many  governments  of  that 
day.  At  a  time  when  almost  every  other  nation  was  doing  its 
utmost  to  foster  commerce  and  industry,  Poland  did  nothing 
whatever  towards  that  end.  And  —  what  was  most  serious  in  its 
immediate  consequences  —  the  Poles  were  blind  even  to  the 
necessity  of  having  those  primary  elements  of  strength,  well- 
ordered  finances  and  a  respectable  standing  army.  It  has  been 
estimated  that  about  1750  the  annual  revenues  of  the  Republic 
amounted  to  only  one-thirteenth  of  those  of  Russia,  and  one 
seventy-fifth  of  those  of  France.1  Although  the  nation  was  mis- 
erably poor,  and  had  neither  trade  nor  industry  to  be  taxed,  it 
could  undoubtedly  have  raised  far  larger  sums  with  ease,  had  the 
szlachta  been  willing  to  bear  their  proper  share  of  the  burden,  had 
the  finances  been  decently  administered,  and  had  the  govern- 
ment done  anything  to  develop  the  great  natural  wealth  of  the 
country.  Partly  because  of  the  perpetual  stringency  in  the 
treasury,  and  partly  because  the  szlachta  distrusted  a  large 
standing  army  as  a  potential  instrument  of  '  despotism,'  the 
military  forces  of  the  Republic  had  been  reduced  to  the  barest 
minimum.  The  Diet  of  17 17  had  fixed  the  size  of  the  standing 
army  at  24,000  men;  but  as  a  matter  of  fact,  hardly  half  of  that 
number  were  actually  kept  on  foot.  This  Lilliputian  army  was 
the  laughing-stock  of  the  neighbors.  There  were  generally  about 
as  many  officers  as  privates  in  a  regiment;  the  officers'  positions 
were  sold,  often  to  mere  boys  of  good  family;  the  troops  were 
chiefly  cavalry,  since  it  was  beneath  the  dignity  of  a  Polish  gentle- 
man to  serve  on  foot;  there  was  almost  no  artillery;  and  there 
was  no  discipline  at  all.2  The  Republic  possessed  only  one  fortress, 
Kamieniec.    It  had  no  natural  frontier  except  the  Carpathians. 

1  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  109  ff. 

2  Bobrzynski,  Dzieje  Polski,  ii,  p.  274;  Von  der  Briiggen,  op.  cit.,  pp.  80  f. 


INTRODUCTION  3 1 

On  every  other  side  its  vast  territories  lay  open  and  defenceless, 
almost  seeming  to  invite  the  invasion  of  the  three  great  military 
monarchies  that  encircled  it. 

The  szlachta,  however,  refused  to  recognize  the  danger.  With 
incredible  blindness  they  even  tried  to  persuade  themselves  that 
the  very  impotence  of  Poland  was  the  best  guarantee  of  its 
security.  For,  as  they  reasoned,  since  the  Republic  had  renounced 
all  aggressive  enterprises  and  had  voluntarily  rendered  itself 
incapable  of  harming  its  neighbors,  the  latter  would  never  think 
of  disturbing  a  state  of  things  so  ideally  adapted  to  their  own 
interests.  Each  of  the  neighboring  Powers  must  see  the  advan- 
tage of  having  a  weak  state  like  Poland  on  its  frontiers,  rather 
than  another  strong  military  state  like  itself.  And  hence  there 
arose  among  the  szlachta  the  insane  maxim,  '  Poland  subsists 
through  its  anarchy.' 

Without  a  government  worthy  of  the  name,  without  an  army, 
without  trade  or  manufactures,  with  misery  universal  in  all 
classes  save  a  small  minority,  rotting  away  under  a  system  of 
'  liberty  '  which  a  sagacious  Englishman  described  as  "  merely  a 
system  of  aristocratic  licentiousness,  where  a  few  members  of  the 
community  are  above  the  control  of  the  law,  while  the  majority 
are  excluded  from  its  protection,"  l  Poland  had  become,  in  the 
opinion  of  foreign  observers,  the  weakest  and  unhappiest  of 
nations.2  A  few  among  the  Poles  also  recognized  it.  "  Whatever 
happens,"  one  of  them  declared,  "  we  cannot  be  any  poorer  or 
weaker  or  more  miserable  than  we  now  are,  nor  less  free,  nor  more 
oppressed,  nor  more  despised  by  foreigners."  3 

IV 

It  was  the  cataclysm  that  so  suddenly  overwhelmed  Poland  in 
the  reign  of  John  Casimir  (1 648-1 668),  the  simultaneous  and 
amazingly  successful  attacks  of  Swedes,  Muscovites,  Cossacks, 
and  Tartars,  that  first  revealed  to  the  world  the  utter  weakness  of 
the  Republic.    Then  for  the  first  time  Europe  saw  foreign  armies 

1  William  Coxe,  Travels  in  Poland,  Russia,  Sweden  and  Denmark,  i,  p.  15. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  143;   cf.  Burke  in  the  Annual  Register,  1772,  p.  6. 
8  Konarski,  cited  in  Zaleski,  Zywoi  Czarloryskiego,  i,  pp.  23  f. 


32  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

marching  from  one  end  of  the  country  to  the  other,  the  szlachta 
deserting  their  own  sovereign  en  masse  and  welcoming  an  invader 
as  a  deliverer,  a  king  of  Poland  driven  a  fugitive  from  his  do- 
minions. Then  for  the  first  time  the  idea  of  a  partition  of  Poland 
began  to  be  seriously  and  universally  discussed.  Charles  Gus- 
tavus,  planning  to  unite  Poland  to  Sweden,  or  else  to  divide  up 
the  huge  realm  with  his  allies;  the  Great  Elector,  stipulating  for 
himself  in  his  numerous  negotiations  and  treaties  with  the  Swedes 
the  acquisition  of  West  Prussia,  Samogitia,  or  Great  Poland; 
Tsar  Alexis,  seizing  Lithuania  and  looking  forward  to  the  day 
when  he  should  take  Poland  as  well;  Austrian  diplomats  debating 
the  relative  advantages  for  the  Hapsburgs  of  getting  the  Polish 
crown  or  partitioning  the  Republic  —  all  these  actors  in  that 
crowded  scene  were  anticipating  by  a  hundred  years  the  things 
that  Catherine  and  Frederick  and  Joseph  accomplished.  So 
thoroughly  had  the  idea  of  the  imminent  disruption  of  the  Re- 
public taken  root  in  men's  minds  that  French  diplomats  sus- 
pected that  a  partition  treaty  had  already  been  signed;  *  and 
the  King  of  Poland,  addressing  the  Diet,  solemnly  prophesied 
to  the  nation  its  impending  fate:  Moscow  would  take  Lithuania; 
the  Brandenburger,  Great  Poland;  Austria,  Cracow  and  the 
neighboring  palatinates.  In  short,  the  First  Great  Northern 
War  not  only  raised  the  Polish  Question,  but  also  marked  out 
the  future  solution. 

It  was  true  that  through  a  belated  national  uprising  and  the 
intervention  of  the  enemies  of  Sweden,  Poland  escaped  from  this 
first  crisis  with  slighter  losses  than  might  have  been  expected. 
John  Sobieski  succeeded  in  restoring  to  some  degree  the  prestige 
of  the  Polish  arms,  and  in  asserting,  virtually  for  the  last  time, 
Poland's  position  as  an  independent  and  considerable  member  of 
the  European  political  system.  But  Sobieski's  victories  brought 
his  country  hardly  more  than  an  ephemeral  glory;  the  anarchy  at 
home  grew  constantly  worse;  while,  as  a  result  of  that  anarchy, 
the  Republic  became  a  prey  to  foreign  intrigues,  and  in  particular 
a  battleground  between  Hapsburg  and  Bourbon.    It  was  in  this 

1  Cf.  R.  I.  A.,  Pologne,  i,  p.  81.  The  best  account  of  the  diplomatic  history  of 
the  First  Great  Northern  War  is  Haumant,  La  Guerre  du  Nord  et  la  Paix  d'Oliva. 


INTRODUCTION  33 

second  half  of  the  seventeenth  century  that  there  arose  among  the 
szlachta  organized  French  and  Austrian  parties,  even  Brandenburg 
and  Muscovite  ones;  that  the  magnates  began  to  treat  with 
foreign  sovereigns  like  independent  princes,  and  to  accept  bribes 
and  pensions  from  abroad  as  a  matter  of  course;  that  elections  to 
the  Polish  throne  came  to  be  great  international  events  periodi- 
cally shaking  the  European  political  world,  inviting  and  almost 
compelling  the  rival  Powers  to  interfere  in  Polish  affairs.  As  yet, 
however,  this  foreign  interference  was  confined  to  the  use  of  the 
black  arts  of  diplomacy;  except  during  the  Great  Northern  War, 
the  foreigners  had  not  yet  come  to  dictating  to  the  Republic  by 
force. 

With  the  advent  of  the  Saxon  Kings,  the  Polish  Question 
entered  upon  a  second  and  more  acute  phase.  Augustus  II 
owed  his  crown  to  a  more  shameful  use  of  bribes  and  violence 
and  to  more  undisguised  attempts  at  intimidation  on  the  part  of 
foreign  Powers  —  Russia  and  Austria  —  than  had  been  known 
at  any  previous  election.  Once  seated  on  the  throne,  he  found 
it  impossible  to  maintain  himself  there  without  the  aid  of  the 
foreigners.  Having  plunged  recklessly  into  the  Second  Great 
Northern  War,  he  brought  down  on  the  Republic  the  invasion  of 
Charles  XII.  The  scenes  of  the  time  of  John  Casimir  were 
repeated ;  a  great  part  of  the  szlachta  again  deserted  their  sover- 
eign; the  invaders  roamed  through  the  country,  victorious  at  all 
points;  Charles  set  up  a  rival  king;  and  Augustus  saw  safety 
only  in  throwing  himself  into  the  arms  of  Russia.  That  was  a 
fateful  step.  For  after  Poltava  the  Swedes  disappeared,  but  the 
Muscovites  remained,  nominally  as  allies  and  protectors,  really  as 
masters.  It  is  a  fact  not  sufficiently  recognized  that  one  of  the 
most  important  results  of  the  Second  Great  Northern  War  was  to 
establish  the  predominant  influence  of  Russia  in  Poland. 

Peter  the  Great  deserves  the  credit  of  having  inaugurated  the 
policy  which  aimed  at  placing  the  Republic  under  a  Russian 
protectorate  and  ended  with  the  three  Partitions.  He  fixed  the 
traditions  of  Russia's  Polish  policy  for  nearly  a  century.  Here,  as 
in  so  many  other  cases,  Catherine  II  continued  and  completed 
what  Peter  began.    In  Peter's  time  Russian  armies  first  learned  to 


34  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

scour  Poland  from  end  to  end,  to  make  themselves  thoroughly  at 
home  in  the  country,  and  to  despise  the  military  power  of  the 
Poles.  Russian  diplomats  became  familiar  with  the  mysterious, 
but  —  to  them  —  highly  convenient,  devices  of  the  Polish  con- 
stitution, and  with  the  tangled  web  of  Polish  party  politics.  They 
learned  how  to  buy  up  magnates,  ministers,  and  even  the  court 
itself;  how  to  manage  the  Die  tines;  run  a  Confederation;  cajole, 
coerce,  or  'explode'  a  Diet.  Above  all,  the  Russian  government 
acquired  the  art  of  playing  off  the  Polish  nation  against  the  king 
and  the  king  against  the  nation,  and  thus  holding  both  in  de- 
pendence upon  itself.  Catherine  II  never  displayed  greater 
cleverness  in  handling  the  Poles  than  did  Peter  when,  in  17 16-17, 
he  imposed  his  mediation  upon  Augustus  II  and  the  rebellious 
szlachta  alike.  And  then  the  world  saw  for  the  first  time  a  Rus- 
sian ambassador  dictating  a  peace  between  the  Polish  nation  and 
its  king,  backing  up  his  terms  with  a  display  of  bayonets,  and 
placing  an  important  series  of  political  and  constitutional  arrange- 
ments under  the  guarantee  of  the  Russian  sovereign.  Prince 
Dolgoruki,  the  peace-maker  on  this  occasion,  was  the  worthy 
forerunner  of  the  Repnins,  the  Stackelbergs,  the  Sievers  of 
Catherine's  time;  and  the  'Dumb  Diet'  of  Warsaw  in  1717 
foreshadowed  the  terrorized  Polish  parliaments  of  1773  and  1793. 
The  Republic  had  now  lost  its  complete  independence.  It  had 
allowed  and  invited  its  most  dangerous  neighbor  to  exercise  a 
decisive  voice  in  its  internal  affairs.  It  had  accepted  from  the 
hands  of  Russia  a  number  of  constitutional  arrangements,  the 
aim  of  which  was  obviously  to  prevent  the  King  from  acquiring 
effective  power  in  the  state,  and  to  prevent  the  Republic  from 
strengthening  or  reforming  itself. 

Significant,  also,  of  the  new  situation  was  the  fact  that  by  the 
alliance  treaty  of  1720  and  a  long  series  of  subsequent  agree- 
ments Russia  and  Prussia  bound  themselves  to  watch  over  the 
maintenance  of  the  '  liberties  '  of  Poland.  Already  two  of  the 
neighboring  Powers  were  in  formal  accord  on  the  principle  of 
perpetuating  the  anarchy  and  impotence  of  the  Republic.  The 
protracted  negotiations  between  the  cabinets  of  St.  Petersburg, 
Vienna,  and  Berlin  about  the  future  succession  in  Poland  showed 


INTRODUCTION  3  5 

that  henceforth  the  glorified  '  freedom  of  election  '  was  to  be 
purely  illusory.  Moreover,  the  continual  disturbances  in  Poland 
during  the  first  two  decades  of  the  century  and  the  restless  ambi- 
tion of  Augustus  II  brought  about  a  great  revival  of  the  talk  of  a 
dismemberment.  The  King  of  Poland  himself  repeatedly  pro- 
posed to  Russia  and  Prussia  a  partition  of  the  realm  whose 
integrity  he  had  sworn  to  defend,  in  order  that  the  fragments  of 
the  state  left  after  the  avidity  of  the  neighbors  had  been  satisfied, 
might  be  handed  over  to  him  as  an  hereditary  kingdom.  Fred- 
erick I  of  Prussia  suggested  a  partition  at  least  four  times  to 
Charles  XII,  and  later  tried  to  press  his  '  grand  dessein  '  upon 
Augustus  and  Peter.  The  Tsar  himself  seems  to  have  played  for 
a  time  with  the  idea  of  a  dismemberment;  but  after  firmly  estab- 
lishing himself  in  Poland,  he  set  his  face  against  it,  and  sternly 
rebuffed  the  proposals  coming  from  Berlin  and  Dresden  as 
impracticable,  impolitic,  and  wicked.  Possibly  he  had  arrived 
at  the  conclusion  that  it  was  useless  to  divide  the  realm  with 
others  when  by  influence  he  could  rule  it  all.1 

The  death  of  Peter  the  Great  brought  some  alleviation  to 
Poland,  at  least  in  that  his  immediate  successors  showed  less 
firmness  and  consistency  in  dealing  with  Polish  affairs,  while  they 
scarcely  attempted  to  develop  to  its  logical  conclusion  the  policy 
he  had  inaugurated  toward  the  Republic.  Nevertheless,  they 
adhered  in  the  main  to  the  cardinal  principles  of  keeping  Poland 
weak,  maintaining  '  golden  liberty,'  and  asserting  for  Russia  a 
special  influence  in  the  distracted  state. 

On  the  death  of  Augustus  II  in  1733  the  question  of  the  Polish 
succession  provoked  a  general  European  war.  For  the  first  and 
last  time  one  of  the  Western  Powers  drew  the  sword  in  order  to 
rescue  Poland  from  the  clutches  of  her  neighbors.  But  neither 
the  capricious  and  half-hearted  efforts  of  France  nor  the  wishes  of 
the  vast  majority  of  the  szlachta  prevented  Russia  and  Austria 
from  establishing  by  force  of  arms  their  protege,  Augustus  III  of 
Saxony,  upon  the  Polish  throne.    Never  before  had  there  been 

1  On  the  plans  of  partition  discussed  at  this  time  see  especially  Droysen, 
Geschichteder  preussischen  Politik,  iv',  pp.  177  f.,  188  ff.,  197,  217  ff.;  ivH,  pp.  147  f., 
3i7- 


36  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

such  a  travesty  of  a  free  election,  so  striking  an  exhibition  of  the 
impotence  of  the  Poles  to  defend  their  independence,  so  clear  a 
demonstration  of  the  fact  that  the  neighboring  Powers  would 
tolerate  no  king  in  Poland  save  a  creature  of  their  own. 

It  can  hardly  be  denied  that  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  failed 
to  exploit  properly  its  triumphs  in  this  war.  The  Russian  states- 
men were  too  much  occupied  with  the  ensuing  contests  with 
Turkey  and  Sweden,  and  then  with  the  great  European  questions 
that  were  being  fought  out  in  Germany,  to  pay  much  attention  to 
Polish  affairs.  Under  Elizabeth,  the  close  friendship  uniting  the 
two  Imperial  Courts  1  to  the  Saxon  House  led  the  Russian  govern- 
ment into  acts  of  complaisance  towards  the  King  of  Poland  which 
Peter  or  Catherine  II  would  doubtless  have  avoided.2  As  Russia 
had  ceased  to  use  other  than  diplomatic  methods  in  Poland,  as  she 
no  longer  entered  actively  into  the  party  struggles  that  rent  the 
Republic,  as  her  whole  attention  seemed  to  be  concentrated  else- 
where, the  result  was  that  in  Elizabeth's  last  years  the  Polish 
Court  paid  less  and  less  attention  to  demands  from  St.  Peters- 
burg; the  Diet  ventured  to  assume  an  independent,  and  often  an 
unfriendly,  attitude;  while  the  '  Russian  party  '  found  itself 
diminished,  discouraged,  and  almost  discredited.    Russian  policy 

\  inPoland  seemed  to  be  losing  its  bearings. 

/f\At  the  moment  of  the  accession  of  Catherine  II  (1762),  the 
\Polish  Question  was  in  a  curiously  uncertain  state,  in  which, 
however,  several  facts  stand  out  clearly.  In  the  first  place, 
Poland  was  no  longer  considered  an  independent  member  of  the 
European  group  of  states,3  but  rather  as  what  we  should  call 
today  a  Russian  '  sphere  of  influence.'  The  Russian  influence,  it 
is  true,  had  varied  greatly  in  intensity,  and  it  had  not  yet  attained 
that  all-embracing  and  absolute  character  which  it  was  to  have 
under  Catherine  II.  The  government  at  St.  Petersburg  did  not 
yet  pretend  to  control  all  the  actions  of  the  King  and  Diet;   it 

1  Austria  and  Russia. 

2  Such  as,  for  instance,  promising  the  succession  in  Poland  to  the  Saxon  Electoral 
Prince,  or  allowing  Prince  Charles  of  Saxony  to  become  Duke  of  Courland.  Com- 
pare Catherine's  remarks  on  this  latter  affair,  CSopHHKt,  vii,  pp.  91  f. 

3  Cf.  Choiseul's  instructions  to  Paulmy,  April  7,  1760,  R.I.  A.,  Pologne,  ii, 
p.  217. 


INTRODUCTION  3  7 

still  paid  some  regard  to  the  wishes  of  the  court  and  nation;  while 
aiming  to  maintain  the  anarchy  in  Poland,  it  did  not  try  to  ex- 
ploit that  anarchy  in  order  to  gain  material  advantages  for  Russia. 
Finally,  while  the  development  of  the  Polish  Question  concerned 
Russia  preeminently,  it  also  touched  Prussia  and  Austria  very 
closely,  and  to  a  lesser  degree  France.  The  ultimate  solution 
must  depend  on  the  interaction  of  the  ambitions  and  interests  of 
three  or  four  great  Powers.  Hence,  before  proceeding  further,  it 
seems  necessary  to  examine  the  special  interests  that  guided  each 
of  these  Powers  in  its  policy  toward  the  Republic. 

France  was  the  oldest  friend  and  the  most  natural  ally  of 
Poland.  In  the  classic  system  of  French  diplomacy,  the  Republic 
occupied  a  place  along  with  Sweden  and  Turkey  as  one  of  the 
pivots  of  French  policy  in  Eastern  Europe,  as  a  confederate  that 
might  be  used  either  to  take  the  Hapsburgs  in  the  rear  or  to 
checkmate  Brandenburg-Prussia  and  Russia.  Hence  France  long 
endeavored  to  establish  a  predominant  influence  in  Poland.  The 
sixteenth  century  saw  two  Franco-Polish  alliances  (1500,  1524) 
directed  against  the  Hapsburgs,  and  —  for  a  moment  —  a  Valois 
installed  as  King  at  Cracow.  In  the  seventeenth  century  Riche- 
lieu and  Mazarin  vainly  tried  to  draw  Poland  into  the  Thirty 
Years'  War,  and  Louis  XIV  made  a  supreme  effort  to  turn  the 
Republic  into  a  useful  ally.  He  proposed  nothing  less  than  an 
"  eternal  league  .  .  .  and  an  indissoluble  alliance,"  by  which 
France  and  Poland  "  would  hem  in  the  Empire,  just  as  France 
had  formerly  been  hemmed  in  between  the  Empire  and  Spain," 
and  by  which  they  could  raise  themselves  "to  a  greater  height 
than  ever  Austria  had  attained."  l  But  all  Louis'  efforts  to  draw 
Poland  into  active  cooperation  proved  fruitless,  owing  to  the 
failure  of  the  szlachta  to  appreciate  the  advantages  of  the  French 
alliance,  and  to  the  ever-increasing  anarchy  in  the  Republic.  In 
the  eighteenth  century,  chiefly,  it  would  seem,  out  of  deference  to 
the  classic  tradition,  French  statesmen  continued  to  take  a  con- 
siderable interest  in  Polish  affairs  and  to  lavish  money  in  attempts 
to  build  up  a  party  or  to  place  a  protege  on  the  throne.  If  Poland 
could  no  longer  be  seriously  thought  of  as  an  ally,  France  was  at 

1  Instructions  for  de  Lumbres,  December  20,  1660,  R.  I.  A.,  Pologne,  i,  pp.  31  f. 


38  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

least  anxious  to  protect  it  as  a  buffer  state  shutting  off  the 
detested  Muscovite  '  barbarians  '  from  Europe;  and  she  feared, 
not  without  reason,  the  designs  the  neighboring  Powers  might 
form  upon  the  territories  of  the  Republic.  But  the  Polish  policy 
of  France  was  neither  well-considered  nor  well-conducted.  With 
strange  blindness,  the  advisers  of  Louis  XV  refused  to  see  that  the 
best  means  of  saving  Poland  was  to  assist  the  nation  to  reform  its 
government;  they  rather  persuaded  themselves  that  the  interests 
of  France  demanded  the  maintenance  of  anarchy  in  Poland,  in 
order  that  Russia  might  gain  no  advantage  from  her  influence 
there;  and  they  contributed  not  a  little  to  that  end.  Further- 
more, since  the  keynote  of  French  policy  in  Poland  was  opposition 
to  Russia  and  Austria,  the  alliance  between  Louis  XV  and  the 
Imperial  Courts  during  the  Seven  Years'  War  upset  that  policy 
completely.  The  old  French  party  in  the  Republic  was  ruined. 
And  then  with  the  advent  of  Choiseul  to  power  there  came  a 
period  in  which  France  virtually  renounced  active  participation 
in  Polish  affairs  and  pretended  to  attach  no  importance  to  them. 
In  the  critical  years  that  followed  the  accession  of  Catherine  II, 
French  policy  towards  the  Republic  was  to  vacillate  between 
misdirected  and  noxious  activity  and  equally  disastrous  passivity 
and  indifference. 

Down  to  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  Austria  was 
the  chief  rival  of  France  in  Poland.  Her  interest  in  the  Republic 
was  largely  of  a  defensive  nature.  As  long  as  Poland  retained  the 
power  to  harm,  the  Hapsburgs  had  to  be  on  their  guard  to  prevent 
their  neighbor  from  attaching  itself  to  France  or  from  assisting 
the  frequent  rebellions  in  Hungary  and  Bohemia.  The  Polish 
alliance  was  frequently  sought  by  Austria  against  Turkey  or 
Sweden;  and  at  least  on  one  occasion,  in  the  great  crisis  of  1683, 
it  proved  to  be  of  inestimable  value.  On  the  whole,  Austro-Polish 
relations  were  friendly.  The  two  states  had  no  necessarily  con- 
flicting interests;  they  did  have  many  interests  in  common;  and 
religious  affinities  and  frequent  royal  marriages  cemented  a 
friendship  that  seemed  to  He  in  the  nature  of  things.  Of  all  the 
neighboring  Powers,  Austria  had  the  strongest  motives  for  desir- 
ing the  preservation  of  Poland.    If  the  sad  condition  into  which 


INTRODUCTION  39 

the  Republic  had  fallen  in  the  eighteenth  century  precluded  both 
the  fear  of  its  hostility  and  the  hope  of  its  assistance,  the  rise  of 
Russia  and  Prussia  supplied  new  reasons  why  Austria  should 
support  and  defend  the  sinking  state;  for  neither  the  advance  of 
the  Russian  colossus  into  Central  Europe  nor  the  further  aggran- 
dizement of  Prussia  could  be  to  the  advantage  of  the  Hapsburgs. 
Austria  had  nothing  to  gain  and  much  to  lose  by  the  disruption 
of  Poland. 

Unfortunately,  Austrian  statesmen,  while  realizing  this  truth 
in  a  general  way,  did  not  sufficiently  act  upon  it.  If  the  Vienna 
Alliance  of  17 19  marked  one  momentary  effort  to  rescue  the 
Republic  from  Russian  domination,  the  rivalry  with  the  Bourbons 
and  with  Prussia  soon  led  the  Hapsburgs  to  make  the  Russian 
alliance  the  cornerstone  of  their  political  system;  and  the  interests 
of  Poland  were  sacrificed  on  the  altar  of  the  new  friendship. 
Austria  allowed  and  assisted  Russia  to  fasten  her  grip  upon  the 
Republic,  while  renouncing  for  herself  any  active  influence  in 
Polish  affairs.  As  long  as  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  prevented 
the  French  party  from  gaining  the  upper  hand  in  the  Republic  and 
protected  the  integrity  of  Poland  against  Prussia,  Austria  was 
willing  to  tolerate  its  predominance  at  Warsaw.  For  the  rest,  it 
had  come  to  be  the  accepted  doctrine  at  Vienna  that  the  existing 
anarchy  in  Poland  suited  Austrian  interests,  since  it  relieved  the 
Hapsburg  Monarchy  from  any  danger  on  its  northeastern 
frontier. 

-A«r  contrast  to^Austria,  Prussia  was  of  necessity  the  persistent 
enemy  of  Poland.  Succeeding  to  the  inheritance  of  the  Teutonic 
Order,  the  Hohenzollerns  had  fallen  heirs  to  the  ancient  rivalry 
between  that  Order  and  Poland  for  the  possession  of  the  coast- 
land  around  the  mouth  of  the  Vistula,  the  control  of  which  was 
of  vital  importance  to  both  contestants.  There  was  not  room 
enough  here  for  the  coexistence  of  a  strong  Poland  and  a  strong 
Prussia:  one  could  rise  only  at  the  expense  of  the  other.  More 
than  any  other  neighboring  Power,  Prussia  was  interested  in 
promoting  the  disruption  of  the  Republic,  for  the  scattered  terri- 
tories of  the  Hohenzollerns  could  be  bound  together  only  by  the 
annexation  of  Polish  lands.    Polish  Prussia  was  needed  in  order 


4-0  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  unite  East  Prussia  with  Pomerania;  a  part  of  Great  Poland,  in 
order  to  connect  Silesia  with  East  Prussia. 

The  Great  Elector  had  already  fixed  the  traditions  of  the  policy 
towards  Poland  which  his  successors  followed  with  remarkable 
fidelity,  perseverance,  and  consistency.  From  generation  to 
generation  one  traces  the  same  persistent  effort  to  safeguard  the 
'  liberties  '  of  the  Republic,  to  prevent  the  king  of  Poland  from 
establishing  the  hereditary  succession  or  'den  absoluten  Dominat,' 
to  keep  the  unruly  Sarmatians  in  a  state  innocuous  to  their 
neighbors.1  The  idea  of  a  dismemberment  of  Poland,  hereditary 
in  the  House  of  Hohenzollern  from  the  time  of  the  Great  Elector, 
was  brought  forward  and  furbished  up  anew  at  each  recurring 
crisis  in  the  North,  in  the  half  desperate  belief  that  it  was  '  aut 
nunc  aut  nunquam' 2  Frederick  II,  while  only  Crown  Prince, 
declared  the  acquisition  of  West  Prussia  indispensable;  he  seems 
to  have  hoped  to  get  that  province  during  the  Seven  Years'  War; 
and  in  his  Political  Testaments  of  1752  and  1768  he  designated  its 
acquisition  as  one  of  the  imperative  tasks  of  the  Prussian  Mon- 
archy.3 A  third  phase  of  the  traditional  policy  of  Prussia  was  the 
desire  to  prevent  any  hostile  Power  from  gaining  control  of  the 
Republic.  For  that  reason  the  Hohenzollerns  repeatedly  opposed 
the  attempts  of  France  and  Austria  to  establish  their  proteges  on 
the  throne  at  Warsaw.  They  viewed  with  grave  misgivings  the 
connection  between  Poland  and  Saxony.  As  long  as  relations 
between  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  were  intimate,  Prussia  ac- 
cepted not  unwillingly  the  Russian  influence  in  the  Republic;  but 
during  the  period  of  antagonism  under  the  Empress  Elizabeth 
Prussian  diplomacy  frequently  worked  hand  in  hand  with  the 
French  against  the  Russian  party  in  Poland,  and  during  the 
Seven  Years'  War  Frederick  learned  to  his  cost  the  dangers  in- 
volved in  the  subservience  of  the  Republic  to  Russia.  That  lesson 
was,  later  on,  not  wholly  forgotten  at  Berlin. 

1  Cf.  Droysen,  op.  cit.,  in"',  pp.  120  ff.;  iv!,  pp.  in,  177,  260. 

2  Haumant,  La  Guerre  du  Nord,  pp.  46  f.,  53,  100  ff.,  180  f.;  Droysen,  iv', 
pp.  177  f.,  182,  185  f.,  197,  211  ff.;   iv!i,  p.  317. 

3  Letter  to  Natzmer  of  1731,  Oeuvres,  xvi,  pp.  3  f.;  Politische  Correspondenz, 
xii,  p.  456;  xviii,  pp.  592,  611  ff.;  Lehmann,  Friedrich  der  Grosse  und  der  Ursprung 
des  siebenjdhrigen  Krieges,  pp.  62,  94. 


INTRODUCTION  4 1 

Finally,  to  come  to  the  Power  most  directly  concerned  in  the 
Polish  Question,  Russian  historians  are  accustomed  to  explain 
their  country's  encroachments  upon  Poland  by  three  reasons, 
which  may  be  called  the  inheritance,  the  nationalist,  and  the 
religious  motives.  Poland-Lithuania  having  once  appropriated 
the  western  half  of  Russia,  the  Muscovite  rulers,  as  heirs  of  the 
old  Kievan  princes  and  '  gatherers  of  the  Russian  lands,'  were 
bound  to  recover  the  ancient  home  of  their  race,  to  free  their 
compatriots  from  a  foreign  yoke,  and  to  deliver  their  Orthodox 
brethren  from  Roman  Catholic  oppression.  Undoubtedly  these 
motives  did  actuate  the  Tsars  of  the  sixteenth  and  seventeenth 
centuries  in  their  incessant  struggles  with  Poland.  Ivan  III,  by 
assuming  the  title  of  '  Lord  of  all  Russia,'  announced  the  Mus- 
covite program  and  hurled  a  challenge  at  his  western  neighbor. 
He  and  his  successors  never  tired  of  complaining  of  the  Polish 
attempts  to  force  '  Rus  '  to  the  '  Roman  law  ' ;  or  of  asserting 
that  all  the  lands  where  the  blood  of  Rurik  had  once  ruled,  were 
their  rightful  '  patrimony  ' ;  or  of  striving  to  make  good  their 
claims  by  force  of  arms.  This  policy,  pursued  by  the  Muscovite 
rulers  for  two  centuries  with  rare  perseverance,  was  temporarily 
shelved,  however,  after  the  Truce  of  Andrusovo  in  1667;  and  then, 
as  other  interests  pressed  to  the  front,  it  was,  to  all  appearances, 
abandoned. 

There  is  no  denying  that  in  the  eighteenth  century  the  old 
traditions  about  recovering  the  lost  inheritance  were  very  much 
obscured,  if  not  entirely  forgotten.  The  westernized  Russian 
statesmen  of  that  age  were  no  more  likely  to  take  seriously  claims 
that  went  back  to  Rurik  and  Vladimir  than  French  statesmen 
were  to  hark  back  to  rights  derived  from  Clovis  and  Charlemagne. 
Catherine  II  might  occasionally  declare  herself  determined  not  to 
rest  until  she  had  recovered  the  graves  of  all  the  old  Russian 
princes,  but  it  would  be  hard  to  show  that  such  considerations 
really  affected  her  policy.  The  historic  rights  of  Russia  to  the 
western  lands  might  be  adduced  to  justify  encroachments  upon 
Poland,  but  they  were  certainly  not  the  motive  that  led  to  those 
aggressions.  Nor  were  considerations  of  nationality  a  serious 
factor  in  determining  Russian  policy  towards  Poland  in  the 


42  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

eighteenth  century.  The  western  and  southern  branches  of  the 
Russian  race  had  so  long  lived  a  separate  life  under  a  foreign 
state,  they  had  developed  into  types  so  different  from  the  Mus- 
covites, that  the  latter  hardly  considered  them  Russians  at  all. 
In  the  language  of  seventeenth  century  Moscow,  the  Little  Rus- 
sians (of  the  south)  were  the  '  Cherkassian  nation  '  (^epKaccKift 
Hapoai.)  and  the  White  Russians  (of  the  west)  the  '  Lithuanian 
people'  (iHTOBCKie  jqoah).1  In  the  eighteenth  century  both  the 
government  and  the  society  of  Russia  proper  hardly  betrayed  a 
suspicion  that  the  population  of  the  eastern  provinces  of  Poland 
was  not  Polish.  As  for  the  population  in  question,  it  seemed  as 
far  removed  as  possible  from  any  consciousness  of  its  Russian 
nationality.  And  even  had  more  exact  ethnographic  notions 
prevailed,  it  would  have  made  little  difference.  The  governments 
of  the  eighteenth  century  were  not  accustomed  to  be  guided  by 
the  wishes  of  the  people;  and  the  l  rights  of  nationalities  '  were 
not  yet  recognized.  The  fact  that  in  the  partitions  of  Poland 
Russia  took  only  lands  in  which  the  bulk  of  the  population  was 
Russian,  leaving  the  purely  Polish  provinces  to  the  German 
Powers,  is  to  be  explained  as  a  geographic  accident.  The  uni- 
fication of  the  Russian  race  was  not,  and  could  not  be,  the  con- 
scious aim  of  Russian  statesmen  in  that  age  in  their  dealings  with 
Poland. 
\J  ^The  one  part  of  the  old  tradition  that  was  not  forgotten  in  the 
/\  eighteenth  century  was  the  religious  motive.  Their  common 
Orthodoxy  was  the  sole  bond  that  still  united  the  estranged 
branches  of  the  Russian  race.  The  defence  of  the  faith  in  Poland 
was  one  sure  means  by  which  the  government  at  St.  Petersburg 
could  always  acquire  merit  in  the  eyes  of  society  at  home.  By 
several  treaties,  especially  by  the  Eternal  Peace  of  1686,  the 
Russian  rulers  had  stipulated  freedom  of  worship  for  their 
coreligionists  in  Poland;  and  on  the  basis  of  those  treaties  they 
held  themselves  entitled  to  interfere  in  case  the  rights  of  the 
Orthodox  were  violated.  Unfortunately,  the  religious  intoler- 
ance which  marked  the  Poles  in  that  decadent  age  subjected  the 
Dissidents  to  ever-increasing  vexations  and  even  persecutions. 

1  nHirain>,  Hdopia  PyccKoft  3THorpa<JHH,  iv,  pp.  1 2  ff . 


INTRODUCTION  43 

The  Orthodox  clergy  in  Poland,  feeling  that  they  were  fighting 
in  the  last  ditch,  assailed  St.  Petersburg  with  constant  appeals  for 
aid  and  deliverance.  Here  was  a  perpetual,  plausible,  and  indeed 
quite  justifiable  pretext  for  Russian  interference  in  Polish  affairs, 
the  first  legal  basis  for  intervention  that  Russia  acquired.  Down 
to  the  time  of  Catherine  II,  however,  the  government  at  Peters- 
burg did  not  exert  itself  sufficiently  to  procure  any  permanent 
relief  for  the  Dissidents;  and,  when  it  did  interfere  on  their 
behalf,  its  motives  were  generally  political  quite  as  much  as 
religious. 

The  mainspring  of  Russian  policy  towards  Poland  in  the 
eighteenth  century  was,  in  fact,  the  purely  political  aim  of  obtain- 
ing a  predominant  influence  over  the  Republic.  That  ambition 
was  perfectly  natural  and  not  unjustifiable.  It  was  based,  in  the 
first  place,  on  the  needs  of  self-defence.  Poland  had  been  a 
dangerous  neighbor  in  the  past;  it  was  essential  that  she  should 
not  again  become  one  in  the  future;  hence  the  need  of  keeping  her 
in  weakness.  And,  feeble  as  they  were,  the  Poles  might  still  be 
capable  of  making  trouble,  if  they  fell  under  the  influence  of 
Russia's  enemies.  In  1719-20  it  was  an  important  part  of  the 
plans  of  George  I  of  England,  then  in  active  opposition  to  Peter 
the  Great,  to  draw  Poland  into  the  proposed  coalition  against  the 
Tsar.  During  the  wars  of  1735-39  and  1741-43  one  party  in  the 
Republic  dreamed  of  forming  an  alliance  with  France,  Prussia, 
Sweden,  and  Turkey  against  Russia.  It  was  only  through  Poland 
that  the  Western  Powers  could  strike  at  Russia  by  land;  and  the 
Russo-Polish  frontier  was  terribly  long  and  unprotected.  Thus 
Russia's  own  security  seemed  to  demand  her  control  over  Poland. 
Her  land  communications  with  the  West,  and  her  ability  to  assert 
herself  in  general  European  affairs,  to  participate  in  the  wars  of 
Germany,  even  to  strike  effectively  at  the  Turks,  these  also 
depended  on  her  power  to  dispose  of  the  vast  realm  which  sepa- 
rated her  from  the  rest  of  the  civilized  world.1    Whether  as  a 

1  Cf.  the  view  of  the  French  government  in  1726  that  "  if  one  could  make  sure 
of  the  Poles,  all  gates  would  be  closed  to  the  Muscovites,  and  they  could  no  longer 
safely  undertake  any  outside  enterprise,"  R.  I.  A.,  Pologne,  i,  p.  314.  Augustus  II 
thought  that  if  he  could  make  himself  absolute  master  in  Poland,  he  could  exclude 
Russia  from  all  European  affairs,  CojiOBbeBi,  Ilcropifl  PocciH,  iv,  p.  542. 


44  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

gateway  to  the  West  or  as  a  barrier  against  the  West,  Poland  was 
equally  important  to  Russia. 

In  order  to  assure  their  control  over  the  country,  Peter  the 
Great  and  his  successors  endeavored  to  keep  Poland  in  a  state  of 
weakness,  to  uphold  the  existing  vicious  constitution,  to  prevent 
the  increase  of  the  army,  to  preserve  the  elective  kingship,  to 
exclude  from  the  throne  any  ruler  who  could  not  be  relied  upon  to 
serve  Russian  interests,  to  shut  out  the  influence  of  other  foreign 
Powers,  and  to  maintain  a  strong  Russophile  party. 

How  far  territorial  aggrandizement  at  the  expense  of  the 
Republic  entered  into  the  calculations  of  Russian  statesmen  from 
the  time  of  Peter  down  to  the  accession  of  Catherine  II  is  a  ques- 
tion not  sufficiently  cleared  up.  As  was  remarked  above,  Peter 
seems  for  a  time  to  have  considered  seriously  plans  of  partition.1 
During  the  Seven  Years'  War  it  was  Russia's  declared  intention 
to  acquire  Courland  from  Poland,  in  exchange  for  the  conquered 
province  of  East  Prussia.2  Frederick  II  also  claimed  to  know  that 
the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  had  designs  on  the  Ukraine.3  On  the 
whole,  however,  Russia  seems  to  have  shown  little  desire  for 
Polish  territory  in  that  age,  and  it  was  chiefly  owing  to  her  opposi- 
tion that  the  numerous  plans  for  a  dismemberment  of  the  Re- 
public collapsed. 

At  the  accession  of  Catherine  II,  the  Polish  Question  had  been 
before  the  Powers  for  a  century.  European  statesmen  had  famil- 
iarized themselves  with  all  its  aspects,  and  with  its  possible 
solutions.  The  policies  of  the  other  states  towards  the  Republic 
were  fixed  by  long  tradition.  All  the  Powers  chiefly  interested, 
even  France  and  Austria,  were  agreed  upon  upholding  the 
'  liberties  '  of  Poland.  All  were  accustomed  to  maintain  parties 
of  their  own  in  the  country,  to  distribute  bribes  and  pensions,  to 
'  explode  '  Diets  when  necessary,  to  interfere  at  elections  to  the 

1  Herrmann,  Russische  Gesckichte,  iv,  pp.  258  f.,  especially  the  note  on  p.  259, 
with  reference  to  a  plan  of  partition  supposed  to  have  been  brought  forward  by 
Peter  in  17 10;  see  also  Forster,  Friedrich  Wilhelm  I,  Konig  von  Freussen,  ii,  pp. 
114-117.  In  1705  Patkul  came  to  Berlin  as  Russian  envoy  to  purchase  an  alliance 
against  Sweden  with  the  province  of  Courland  and  whatever  else  the  King  of 
Prussia  might  want  in  Poland,  Droysen,  op.  cil.,  iv',  pp.  183  f. 

2  CojiOBbeBt,  op.  cil.,  v,  p.  1072. 

3  Politische  Correspondenz,  xviii,  p.  613. 


INTRODUCTION  45 

throne.  The  idea  of  a  dismemberment  of  the  moribund  state  had 
been  common  property  for  a  hundred  years.  At  each  new  crisis 
in  the  North  that  idea  was  brought  forward  by  someone  as  the 
best  means  of  effecting  a  general  pacification  by  satisfying  the 
appetite  of  everybody.  It  is  difficult  to  enumerate  all  the  occa- 
sions on  which  a  partition  of  Poland  had  been  seriously  discussed. 
The  remarkable  thing  is,  not  that  plans  of  partition  had  been  so 
frequently  brought  forward,  but  that  hitherto  they  had  always 
failed  to  be  realized.  This  latter  fact  may  have  been  due  in  part 
to  some  surviving  scruples  about  the  morality  of  robbing  a  peace- 
ful and  harmless  neighbor;  but  chiefly  it  was  occasioned  by  the 
practical  difficulties  in  the  way  of  a  dismemberment,  in  view  of 
the  mutual  jealousy  of  the  great  Powers,  and  by  the  general  con- 
cern of  that  age  for  the  maintenance  of  the  existing  equilibrium. 
After  all,  a  partition  of  the  Republic  was  possible  only  under 
exceptional  circumstances. 

V 

•  In  1762  an  extraordinary  revolution  placed  the  crown  of  the 
Tsars  upon  the  head  of  an  Empress  whom  the  Rusians  revere  as 
the  greatest  of  all  their  rulers  save  Peter,  and  whose  name,  it  has 
been  said,  is  written  in  blood  in  the  heart  of  every  Pole.1  Catherine 
II  is  a  figure  whom  it  is  difficult  to  approach  without  admiration 
or  else  without  a  shudder,  according  as  one  remembers  that  she 
unified  Russia  or  that  she  dismembered  Poland.  Of  her  great 
ability  there  can  be  little  question.  She  undoubtedly  possessed 
masculine  will-power  and  energy,  a  clear,  penetrating  intellect, 
marvelous  cleverness  and  cunning,  boundless  courage  and  self- 
reliance,  and  an  extraordinary  talent  for  managing  men.  Forced 
to  play  the  game  of  high  politics  against  such  masters  as  Fred- 
erick II,  Joseph  II,  Kaunitz,  Choiseul,  and  the  younger  Pitt, 
invariably  she  at  least  held  her  own,  and  generally  she  got  the 
better  of  her  adversaries.  She  played  the  game  as  did  most  of  her 
contemporaries,  with  perfect  indifference  to  moral  standards. 
While  '  justice,'  '  magnanimity,' '  generosity,'  and  '  disinterested- 

1  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata  panowania  Stanislawa  Augusta,  i,  p.  96. 


\6  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

ness  '  were  always  on  her  lips,  her  policy  was  one  of  unscrupulous 
and  relentless  selfishness  and  aggression.  The  interests  of  Russia 
(conceived  in  the  materialistic  fashion  of  that  age)  and  her  own 
'  glory  '  were  the  sole  standards  of  that  policy,  and  these  two 
objects  were  to  her  one  and  inseparable.  There  was  much  of  Louis 
XIV  about  her,  especially  in  her  exalted  conception  of  the  place 
her  country  ought  to  hold  in  the  world,  and  in  her  exaggerated 
notions  of  what  her  own  dignity  and  grandeur  required.  Like 
Louis,  she  was  inclined  to  regard  the  slightest  opposition  to  her 
will  as  a  mortal  insult;  and  vanity,  pride,  and  vindictiveness 
were  capable  of  leading  her  into  acts  which  a  calmer  and  less  self- 
centered  judgment  would  have  avoided.  Still,  in  the  main,  a 
remarkably  sure  instinct  kept  her  in  the  traditional  and  natural 
paths  of  Russian  policy;  and  she  has  the  glory  of  having  carried 
through  to  a  successful  termination  not  a  few  of  the  tasks  pursued 
by  her  predecessors  for  centuries. 

Throughout  her  reign  Catherine  was  largely  occupied  with 
Polish  affairs,  and  she,  more  than  any  other  individual,  stands 
responsible  for  the  violent  and,  in  many  ways,  unfortunate 
solution  which  the  Polish  Question  then  received.  That  denoue- 
ment can  scarcely  have  lain  within  her  original  -intentions.  It  is 
highly  improbable  that  in  the  beginning  she  desired  to  annihilate 
the  Polish  state  or  even  (as  is  commonly  asserted)  to  pave  the  way 
for  the  gradual  absorption  of  the  whole  of  Poland  into  her  Empire. 
At  the  outset  she  seems  to  have  had  in  mind  two  alternative 
policies.  The  one  was  the  policy  of  governing  the  Republic  by 
'  influence,'  while  preserving  its  integrity;  the  other  the  policy  of 
annexing  convenient  Polish  territories  from  time  to  time  as 
occasion  offered,  this  latter  course  involving  the  necessity  of 
making  corresponding  concessions  to  the  two  German  Powers. 
The  former  policy  was  generally  safer  and  easier:  the  latter  was 
very  tempting,  and  not  at  all  so  repugnant  to  Catherine  as  it  has 
)ften  been  represented.  It  is,  I  think,  an  error  to  regard^  the 
fpartitions  of  Poland  as  measures  forced  upon  the  Empress  against 
her'  will  by  hard,  necessit}/-  and  by  the  victorious  impr>rfiini'tieg  of 
Prussia.  Catherine  seems  to  have  kept  both  courses  constantly 
before  her  eyes,  ready  to  adopt  either  as  circumstances  permitted 


INTRODUCTION  47 

or  suggested.    In  general,  hard  and  fast  programs  were  not  to  her 
taste. 

In  contrast  to  her  immediate  predecessors,  Catherine  attached 
extreme  importance  to  Polish  affairs.  Panin,  her  mouth-piece  in 
the  early  years  of  the  reign,  declared  that  without  control  over  the 
Republic,  Russia  would  lose  one-third  of  her  strength,  and  would 
be  unable  either  to  provide  adequately  for  her  own  security,  or  to 
participate  effectively  in  the  affairs  of  Europe.1  Catherine  felt 
that  Russia  had  not  yet  secured  a  sufficient  hold  upon  Poland, 
and  unless  the  policy  of  recent  years  was  altered,  was  in  danger  of 
losing  whatever  influence  she  possessed.  The  Empress  therefore 
began  to  take  steps  to  gain  such  an  absolute  and  exclusive  control 
over  the  Republic  that  she  could  not  only  thwart  whatever  dis- 
pleased her,  but  also  positively  govern  the  country  in  all  matters 
and  dispose  of  it  at  pleasure.  The  Poles  had  never  before  suffered 
such  a  systematic  and  merciless  assault  upon  their  independence. 
Hitherto  Russia  had  generally  posed  as  their  disinterested  friend 
and  as  the  generous  protector  of  their  '  liberties.'  In  such  a  role 
she  could  usually  count  upon  the  sympathy  and  support  of  a  great 
part  of  the  szlachta,  and  she  had  been  able  to  guard  her  essential 
interest  —  the  maintenance  of  the  Republic  in  a  state  of  weak- 
ness —  without  resorting  to  much  violence  or  deeply  wounding 
Polish  susceptibilities.  But  Catherine  II,  by  pushing  her  inter- 
ference to  excess,  presently  turned  almost  the  entire  nation 
against  her.  She  created  an  intolerable  situation.  She  precipi- 
tated a  life  and  death  struggle,  which  ended  in  the  annihilation  of 
the  Polish  state.  Thus  her  policy  towards  the  Republic  was  not  a 
mere  continuation  of  the  traditional  one :  it  was  in  some  sense  new 
and  revolutionary. 

Her  first  great  stroke  was  to  place  her  candidate  and  former 
lover,  Stanislas  Poniatowski,  upon  the  Polish  throne  (1764). 
That  enterprise,  conducted  with  masterly  prudence  and  skill, 
proved  unexpectedly  easy.  The  Poles  displayed  an  apathy 
unparalleled  at  any  previous  election,  even  in  1733;  and  foreign 
interference  was  prevented  by  Catherine's  timely  alliance  with 
Frederick  II,  the  complete  passivity  of  Choiseul,  and  Austria's 

1  'lenyjiHHi.,  BniraHflH  HojiHTHKa  Poccin,  1762-1774,  pp.  208,  226  ff.,  231  f. 


48  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

inability  to  attempt  active  opposition.  The  Empress  thus  suc- 
ceeded in  setting  up  a  king  of  Poland  selected  both  because  of  the 
known  weakness  of  his  character  and  because,  as  she  herself  said, 
he,  being  of  all  the  candidates  the  one  who  had  the  least  chance  of 
gaining  the  crown  unaided,  would  owe  Russia  the  greatest  debt  of 
gratitude.1  As  the  price  of  his  election,  Catherine  imposed  upon 
him  truly  terrible  conditions.  He  had  to  promise  always  to 
regard  the  interests  of  Russia  as  his  own,  to  maintain  a  constant, 
unfeigned  '  devotion  '  to  the  Empress,  and  never  to  refuse  to  sup- 
port her  '  just  intentions.' 2  Throughout  his  reign  he  was  never  to 
escape  from  the  consequences  of  that  Faust-like  bargain. 

This  was  the  last  king  of  Poland,  and  the  most  unfortunate. 
Stanislas  Augustus  was  a  man  of  keen  intellect,  broad  culture, 
charming  personality,  excellent  intentions,  and  enlightened, 
reforming  ideas;  but  he  was  also  weak  of  will,  morally  perverted, 
incapable  of  daring,  of  inspiring  others,  of  making  personal 
sacrifices.  He  was  the  last  man  in  the  world  fitted  to  lead  a  nation 
in  its  supreme  struggle  or  to  save  a  falling  cause.  There  was  not 
an  ounce  of  heroism  about  him.  He  cut  a  poor  figure  on  horse- 
back :  he  was  not  at  home  in  a  camp.  Throughout  the  earlier  half 
of  his  reign,  he  was  detested  as  no  other  Polish  king  had  been,  both 
because  of  his  unpopular  family  connection  with  the  arrogant 
Czartoryskis,  and  because  of  the  means  by  which  he  had  obtained 
his  crown.  Unable  to  count  upon  his  own  nation,  he  was  thrown 
upon  the  support  of  Russia,  knowing  that  if  the  Empress  aban- 
doned him,  he  was  lost.  Unable  to  lead  his  people  in  opposition  to 
Russia,  yet  too  patriotic  to  be  the  docile  instrument  of  Catherine's 
designs,  he  remained  distrusted,  despised,  insulted,  and  buffeted 
by  both  sides.  Never  did  a  king  find  himself  in  a  more  humiliat- 
ing position.  It  was  true  that  Stanislas  later  succeeded,  through 
tireless  efforts  and  consummate  tact,  in  acquiring  a  certain  meas- 
ure of  popularity  which  rendered  him  less  dependent  on  Russian 
support.  But  he  still  remained  bound  by  another  shameful 
chain  —  his  debts.  Although  the  Republic  granted  him  a  gen- 
erous income,  and  not  infrequently  extraordinary  aid,  his  extrava- 
gance plunged  him  hopelessly  into  debt  and  finally  brought  him  to 

1  PyccKifi  ApxHBi.,  1878'',  p.  290.  2  ^eiyjEHHt,  op.  cit.,  pp.  228  f. 


INTRODUCTION  49 

virtual  bankruptcy.  One  means  of  financial  salvation  was  ready 
at  hand  —  the  subsidies  of  Russia  —  and  these  Stanislas  did  not 
hesitate  to  accept,  even  in  the  greatest  crises  in  Russo-Polish  re- 
lations. At  the  time  of  the  First  Partition  and  at  the  time  of  the 
Second,  the  King  was  living  on  money  furnished  by  the  Russian 
ambassadors.  How  far  these  shameful  transactions  influenced 
his  official  acts,  cannot  be  definitely  ascertained;  but  probably 
they  did  so  to  no  slight  degree.  It  was  these  wretched  debts  that 
kept  him  on  the  throne  when  he  could  no  longer  reign  without  dis- 
honor to  himself  and  disaster  to  the  nation.  If  he  abdicated,  who 
was  to  save  him  from  his  creditors  ?  It  was  not  the  least  of  the 
misfortunes  of  Poland  that  in  the  final  crisis  the  nation  had  at  its 
head  a  king  who  was  not  only  a  weakling,  but  the  pensioner  of  his 
country's  worst  enemy,  and,  therefore,  a  traitor.1 

The  establishment  of  her  protege  on  the  Polish  throne  was  only 
the  first  step  in  Catherine's  aggressive  policy.  The  second  was  to 
raise  the  old  question  of  the  Dissidents.  Not,  of  course,  merely  for 
love  of  the  abstract  principle  of  religious  toleration,  however 
much  she  desired  the  western  public  to  think  so;  but  rather  in 
order  to  please  Orthodox  opinion  at  home,  and  also  in  the  hope 
that  by  securing  for  the  Dissidents  access  to  political  rights  and 
offices,  she  could  build  up  a  strong  party  on  which  Russia  could 
always  rely.2  Another  aim  of  the  Empress  was  to  induce  the  Poles 
to  place  their  constitution  under  her  formal  guarantee.  That 
would  assure  her  a  perpetual  right  of  interference  in  Polish 
affairs,  make  a  reform  of  the  iniquitous  constitution  impossible 
without  her  consent,  and  in  general  place  the  Russian  ascendancy 
in  Poland  on  a  permanent  legal  basis.  Pursuing  these  demands 
in  her  most  vigorous  and  imperious  manner,  Catherine  soon 
threw  Poland  into  a  wild  turmoil.  She  alarmed  the  King  and  his 
uncles,  the  Czar tory skis,  who  saw  through  her  plans;  she  exas- 
perated the  mass  of  the  szlachta  by  what  seemed  an  attack  upon 

1  The  best  account  of  Stanislas'  financial  affairs  is  in  Korzon,  Wewnqlrzne  dzieje 
Polski  za  Stanislawa  Augusta,  iii,  pp.  4  ff.  A  brilliant  character  sketch  in  Kalinka, 
Ostatnie  lata,  i,  pp.  72  ff. 

2  That  this  political  aim  was  Russia's  chief  motive  in  raising  the  Dissident 
question  is  confessed  with  perfect  frankness  by  Panin  to  Repnin  in  the  instruction 
of  August  14/25,  1767,  CSopHHKi,  lxvii,  pp.  409  ff. 


5o 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


the  Catholic  religion.  Finding  diplomacy  useless,  she  resorted  to 
force.  In  1767  Poland  was  again  flooded  with  Russian  troops, 
and  the  luckless  Confederation  of  Radom,  formed  by  the  szlachta 
chiefly  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing  the  King,  served  as  a 
pretext  for  the  Russian  ambassador  to  take  over  the  whole 
government  of  the  country.  Then  the  confederated  Diet  of 
1767-68  was  seduced,  coerced,  and  terrorized,  by  those  carefully 
graded  methods  of  which  the  Russians  were  already  past  masters, 
into  accepting  all  Catherine's  demands :  complete  religious  tolera- 
tion and  full  civil  and  political  rights  for  the  Dissidents,  and  a 
treaty  between  the  Empress  and  the  Republic,  by  which  the 
Polish  constitution  was  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  Russia. 

With  that  Catherine  and  Panin  fancied  themselves  at  the  end 
of  their  labors.  Poland  seemed  completely  crushed,  tied,  and 
bound.  But  one  must  admit  that  here  the  Empress  had  blun- 
dered. She  had  tried  to  reach  the  goal  too  quickly.  She  had 
wounded  the  Poles  too  deeply  in  their  strongest  feelings,  their 
patriotism  and  their  religious  convictions.  The  shameful  Diet  of 
1767-68  had  scarcely  dissolved  when  a  Confederation  was  formed 
at  Bar  in  the  Ukraine  for  the  defence  of  '  liberty  and  the  faith.' 
The  uprising  soon  spread  over  the  greater  part  of  the  country. 
Anti-Russian  and  anti-royalist  alike,  the  Confederation  of  Bar 
was  a  last  desperate  attempt  to  save  the  ideals  of  the  szlachta- 
republic,  very  typical  of  Old  Poland  in  its  loyalties  and  its  prej- 
udices, its  heroism  and  its  follies,  its  audacity  and  its  ineptitude. 
It  never  succeeded  in  putting  an  organized  army  into  the  field  or 
in  conducting  a  regular  campaign;  but  it  subjected  Poland  to 
four  years  of  terrible  guerilla  warfare,  during  which  the  country 
was  devastated  from  end  to  end,  and  Russians  and  Confederates 
vied  with  each  other  in  deeds  of  savagery. 

Meanwhile  the  Porte,  stirred  up  by  France,  declared  war  on 
Russia,  taking  Catherine's  aggressions  in  Poland  as  a  pretext. 
The  war  was  marked  by  brilliant  Russian  victories  on  land  and 
sea;  but  these  in  turn  alarmed  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Austria 
armed,  concluded  an  alliance  with  the  Turks,  and  assumed  a  very 
menacing  attitude  towards  Russia,  although  the  will  to  act  was 
sadly  lacking  behind  these  warlike  demonstrations.    By  1771  the 


INTRODUCTION  5 1 

situation  appeared  to  be  extremely  critical.  With  her  Turkish 
and  Polish  wars  still  on  her  hands,  Catherine  was  threatened  with 
the  armed  intervention  of  Austria,  which  then  might  lead  to  a 
ge^of&l  European  conflagration. 

/Itls  well  known  that  out  of  that  crisis  grew  the  First  Partition 
of  Poland.  That  arrangement  seemed  to  have  the  advantage  of 
reconciling  the  conflicting  interests  and  satisfying  the  cupidity  of 
the  three  great  Eastern  Powers,  while  allowing  the  Turks  to 
escape  without  too  great  losses,  and  ending  the  long  troubles  in 
Poland  with  a  drastic  and  supposedly  salutary  lesson  to  the  Poles. 
Austria  unwittingly  supplied  the  pretext  for  the  Partition  by 
occupying  the  Zips  and  some  neighboring  Polish  districts; 
Prussia  first  openly  adopted  the  plan  of  a  partition  and  pressed  it 
most  vigorously;  Russia  spoke  the  decisive  word  and  determined 
the  respective  shares.)^ 

Into  the  history  01  the  negotiations  it  is  impossible  and  unneces- 
sary to  enter  here;  but  one  point  should  be  noticed,  both  because 
it  is  so  generally  misunderstood,  and  because  it  is  important  for 
the  comprehension  of  later  events.  I  refer  to  the  attitude  of 
Russia  towards  the  Partition.  In  spite  of  the  common  opinion 
that  Catherine  accepted  that  arrangement  only  as  a  pis  alter,  in 
order  to  satisfy  her  Prussian  ally  and  avoid  a  war  with  Austria,  I 
think  it  may  be  asserted  with  confidence  that  both  the  Empress 
and  her  advisers  had  long  desired  a  partition,  and  were  well 
pleased  when  the  opportunity  for  one  at  last  presented  itself. 
Naturally  they  did  not  announce  their  ambitions  prematurely; 
they  found  it  politic  to  feign  a  certain  reluctance;  they  preferred 
to  be  begged  to  take  something  rather  than  to  beg  for  it.  But  all 
this  need  not  have  proved  misleading,  were  it  not,  unfortunately, 
the  custom  of  western  historians  —  the  Germans  particularly  — 
to  base  their  accounts  of  Russian  policy  so  exclusively  on  what  the 
Russians  saw  fit  to  tell  the  Prussian  or  Austrian  ministers,  while 
ignoring  the  documents  in  which  the  Russians  confidentially 
expressed  their  real  opinions  among  themselves. 

If  one  turns  to  the  Russian  documents,  one  finds  that  very  soon 
after  her  accession  Catherine  accepted,  sealed  up,  and  kept  in  the 
greatest  secrecy  a  memoir  (presented  by  Count  Z.  G.  Cernysev), 


52  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

proposing  that  at  the  first  convenient  moment  Russia  should 
annex  Polish  Livonia,  —  that  is,  one  of  the  chief  territories  which 
she  took  at  the  First  Partition.  In  October,  1763,  the  Russian 
Council  approved  this  plan  on  principle,  and,  while  reserving  its 
execution  to  a  more  propitious  moment,  resolved  that  it  should 
steadily  be  kept  in  view.1  That  it  was  not  lost  sight  of  in  the  next 
few  years,  appears  from  numerous  documents.  Thus  in  the  main 
instructions  to  Kayserlingk  and  Repnin  before  the  election  of 
1764,  there  is  a  threat,  which  has  been  little  noted  by  historians, 
that  if  Russia  were  drawn  into  war  over  Polish  affairs,  she  would 
not  lay  down  the  sword  until  she  had  annexed  Polish  Livonia.2 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Turkish  war  in  1768,  the  Imperial  Council, 
considering  what  aims  were  to  be  kept  in  view  during  the  war, 
resolved  that  there  were  two  great  advantages  to  be  sought,  one  of 
which  was  to  gain  a  new  frontier  on  the  side  of  Poland  that  would 
assure  the  permanent  security  of  the  Empire.3  In  1763,  1766,  and 
1767  Panin  hinted  significantly  to  the  Prussian  envoy  that  if 
Poland  involved  the  two  allies  in  great  difficulties,  they  ought  to 
indemnify  themselves  at  the  expense  of  the  Republic.4  Then, 
when  the  proper  moment  had  come,  at  the  beginning  of  1771, 
Catherine  herself,  talking  one  night  at  court  with  Frederick's 
brother,  Prince  Henry  of  Prussia,  with  smiling  lips  and  jesting 
tone  threw  out  the  idea  of  a  partition  of  Poland.5  It  is  now  well 
established  that  Frederick  took  up  the  plan  only  after  his  brother 
had  returned  and  convinced  him  that  sentiment  in  St.  Petersburg 
was  quite  in  favor  of  such  an  arrangement.6  It  is  true  that  Panin, 
the  leading  Russian  minister,  made  a  brave  parade  of  being 
insuperably  opposed  to  so  iniquitous  a  transaction.  But  his  pro- 
fessed scruples  —  which  were  exhibited  only  before  the  Prussian 
envoy,  and  of  which  there  is  no  trace  in  his  correspondence  with 
Russians  —  need  impress  no  one  who  reads  how  this  same  Panin, 
proposing  the  plan  of  partition  in  the  Council  of  the  Empire, 

1  CGopHHRt,  li,  pp.  8-1 1.  2  Ibid.,  pp.  92  ff. 

3  ApxHBt  Toe.  CoBiTa,  November  6/17,  1768,  1,  p.  7. 

4  CSopHHKt,  xxii,  pp.  188  f.,  500;  xxxvii,  pp.  49  f. 

5  Henry  to  Frederick,  January  8,  1771,  Politische  Correspondenz,  xxx,  pp.  406  f. 

6  Koser,  Friedrich  der  Grosse,  ii,  pp.  465  f.;   Volz'  studies  in  the  Forschnngen 
zur  brandenburgischen  und  prenssischen  Geschichte,  xviii  and  xxiii. 


INTRODUCTION  53 

declared  that  it  offered  "  just  such  a  chance  as  we  have  always 
thought  of,  for  realizing  what  we  all  desire  —  namely,  to  make  our 
frontier  towards  Poland  coincide  with  the  rivers."  1  In  view  of 
all  this,  we  may  well  believe  in  Catherine's  sincerity  when  she 
declared  on  ratifying  the  Partition  Treaty  that  she  had  never 
given  her  sanction  to  any  act  with  greater  satisfaction.2  The  First 
Partition  was  not,  then,  a  triumph  of  the  brilliant,  all-compelling 
Frederick  over  his  reluctant  and  sorely-pressed  ally.  It  was 
brought  about  in  the  first  place  by  the  common  and  equal  cupidity 
of  Russia  and  Prussia;  and,  in  the  second  place,  it  was  singularly 
facilitated  by  the  extraordinary  situation  of  Europe  at  that  time, 
which  made  a  partition  a  plausible  means  for  averting  a  general 
war,  forced  Austria  to  become  a  partner  in  the  nefarious  business, 
and  prevented  the  Western  Powers  from  intervening. 

When  the  three  Eastern  Powers  were  once  agreed,  through  the 
Partition  Treaties  signed  at  St.  Petersburg  on  August  5,  1772,  it 
was  no  great  task,  though  a  long  and  unpleasant  one,  to  compel 
the  victim  to  assent  to  his  own  spoliation.  After  occupying  their 
respective  acquisitions  with  their  troops,  the  three  Courts  issued 
manifestoes  announcing  their  annexations.  The  Russian  and 
Austrian  proclamations  were  wisely  laconic.  They  simply 
pointed  out  that  these  measures  were  necessitated  by  the  con- 
tinual anarchy  in  Poland  and  by  the  obstinacy  of  the  Poles  in 
resisting  the  well-meant  efforts  of  their  neighbors  to  restore  order. 
Frederick,  however,  published  a  ponderous  manifesto,  establishing 
his  just  rights  to  what  he  was  taking  on  the  basis  of  all  manner  of 
musty  documents  raked  together  from  the  Prussian  archives. 
Frederick-  fr.r  nnrp  made_  himself  ridiculous. 

The  next  step  was  to  force  the  King  of  Poland  to  convoke  a  Diet, 
in  order  to  get  the  dismemberment  ratified  in  all  form.  Stanislas 
indulged  in  eloquent  tirades  of  protest  —  "  as  good  as  the  best 
pages  in  Plutarch,"  the  Russian  ambassador  attested  —  and  then 
issued  the  letters  of  convocation.    The  elections  were  managed 

1  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  May  16/27,  1771,  i,  PP-  82  ff.     Compare  also  the  protocol  of 
1  the  Council  of  February  7/18,  1771,  ibid.,  p.  74;  Panin  to  Saldern,  April  29/May  10, 

June  n/22,  August  28/September  8,  1771,  in  the  C6opHHKi>,  xcvii,  pp.  265,335  ff., 
411  ff. 

2  Beer,  Die  erste  Theilung  Polens,  ii,  p.  198. 


54  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

with  all  the  arts  known  to  the  Russians;  the  three  allied  ministers 
at  Warsaw  disposed  of  a  joint  fnnds  de  seduction;  and  the  presence 
of  their  troops  sufficed  to  do  what  bribes  could  not  effect.  The 
Diet  which  met  at  Warsaw  in  April,  1773,  is  one  of  the  most 
melancholy  spectacles  in  Polish  history.  The  deputies,  who  were 
for  the  most  part  the  creatures  of  the  three  Powers,  were  ready 
enough  to  strike  heroic  attitudes  in  public;  but  that  was  merely 
for  the  sake  of  appearances.  Behind  the  scenes  they  joined  in  a 
wild  scramble  to  make  their  fortunes  at  the  expense  of  the  falling 
state.  It  was  characteristic  of  that  society  that  never  before  had 
Poland  seen  such  a  frenzy  for  pleasure.  At  that  awful  moment, 
life  at  Warsaw  seemed  a  long  saturnalia. 

Effective  resistance  to  the  will  of  the  three  Powers  was  virtually 
out  of  the  question.  The  nation  lay  prostrate  and  exhausted  after 
the  late  four  years'  struggle.  England  and  France,  absorbed  in 
their  mutual  rivalry,  were  perfectly  passive  in  Eastern  affairs. 
There  remained  no  means  of  opposition  except  delay,  which 
accomplished  nothing  except  the  prolongation  of  the  nation's 
agony.  Finally,  on  September  18,  1773,  King  and  Diet  gave  their 
formal  assent  to  the  dismemberment. 

By  the  First  Partition  Poland  lost  nearly  one-third  of  her  terri- 
tory and  slightly  more  than  a  third  of  her  population.1  The 
Republic  retained  an  area  approximately  equal  to  that  of  France 
at  that  time,  while  in  population  it  still  ranked  as  the  sixth  state 
in  Europe,  with  over  seven  million  people.2  There  was  no  need  to 
deplore  greatly  the  lands  yielded  to  Russia  —  the  remote,  poor, 
and  thinly  settled  palatinates  of  Polotsk,  Vitebsk,  andMohilev; 
but  the  cession  of  rich  and  fertile  Galicia  was  a  painful  sacrifice; 
and  hardest  of  all  was  the  loss  of  Warmia  and  West  Prussia,  for 
Poland  was  thereby  cut  off  from  the  sea,  and  her  trade  down  the 
Vistula  placed  at  the  mercy  of  the  enemy  at  Berlin.  As  regards 
the  partitioning  Powers,  Russia,  while  taking  the  largest  but  also 
the  poorest  share,  had  greatly  improved  her  frontier;  Austria  had 
gained  most  in  population;  Prussia's  lot  was,  from  the  financial, 
military,  and  political  standpoints,  the  most  valuable. 

However  sympathetic  the  world  has  since  become  to  the  mis- 
fortunes of  Poland,  at  the  time  of  the  First  Partition  the  con- 
1  Cf.  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  42  ff.,  160  f.  2  Ibid.,  i,  pp.  161  f. 


INTRODUCTION  55 

science  of  Europe  does  not  seem  to  have  been  deeply  stirred. 
Voltaire  set  the  tone  by  sending  his  praise  to  Catherine  and  his  con- 
gratulations to  Frederick.  The  mass  of  the  public  conformed  to 
his  opinion.  A  few  there  were,  however,  who  sympathized  with 
Poland:  Rousseau,  Condorcet,  Turgot,  for  instance;  and  some 
who  condemned  the  Partition  as  an  international  crime.  Raynal 
exposed  the  moral  aspect  of  the  transaction  when  he  wrote:  "  It 
is  in  the  security  of  peace,  without  rights,  without  pretexts,  with- 
out grievances,  without  a  shadow  of  justice,  that  this  revolution 
has  been  effected  by  the  terrible  principle  of  force,  which  is, 
unhappily,  the  best  argument  of  kings."  l  Burke  pointed  out  in 
the  Annual  Register  that  the  Partition  was  to  be  "  considered  as 
the  first  very  great  breach  in  the  modern  political  system  of 
Europe,"  which  was  thereby  threatened  with  total  subversion.2 

All  writers  agreed  in  the  gloomiest  auguries  as  to  the  future  of 
Poland.  The  Republic  had  become  the  reproach  and  the  play- 
thing of  nations,  said  Raynal; 3  it  was  virtually  a  province  of 
Russia,  added  Mably,  and  ruined  beyond  recall.4  "  It  is  hardly 
possible  to  suppose,"  Coxe  wrote,  "  that  Poland  .  .  .  will  ever 
emerge  from  her  present  situation:  her  misfortunes  .  .  .  will 
gradually  increase  .  .  .  until  by  slow  progress  or  some  violent 
revolution,  Poland  either  subsides  into  an  hereditary  monarchy, 
or  a  well-ordered  Republic;  or,  which  is  more  probable,  is  totally 
swallowed  up  by  the  neighboring  powers."  5  People  wondered  at 
the  moderation  of  the  three  Powers  in  not  appropriating  the  whole 
country  in  1772,  and  agreed  that,  in  the  natural  order  of  events,  a 
total  partition  must  follow  sooner  or  later.6 

Thus  after  a  century  of  waiting,  the  partition  so  often  proph- 
esied, so  often  planned,  so  constantly  discussed,  had  taken  place. 
Now  that  this  precedent  had  been  set,  the  final  solution  of  the 
Polish  Question  seemed  to  be  clearly  marked  out,  and  the  total 
ruin  of  the  Republic  only  a  question  of  time  and  circumstance. 

1  Ilistoire  philosophique  et  politique  des  Utablissemens  des  Europeens  dans  les 
deux  Indes,  x,  pp.  54  f.  (1780). 

2  Annual  Register,  1772,  p.  2. 

3  Op.  cit.,  x,  p.  54. 

4  De  la  Situation  de  la  Pologne  en  1776  (Oeuvres,  Paris,  L'an  III,  xiii),  pp.  7  ff. 

5  Travels  in  Poland,  Russia,  Sweden,  and  Denmark,  1784,  i,  pp.  18  f. 

6  Burke,  Annual  Register,  1772,  p.  6;   Mably,  op.  cit.,  passim,  esp.  p.  59. 


CHAPTER  I 

The  State  of  Poland  After  The  First  Partition 
The  Beginning  of  National  Revival 


Between  the  completion  of  the  First  Partition  and  the  series  of 
events  that  led  to  the  Second,  lies  a  period  of  a  dozen  years  (1775- 
87),  which,  while  outwardly  quiet,  was  still  so  full  of  changes 
underneath  the  surface  of  society  that  it  possesses  a  deep. historical 
interest.  It  was  then  that  the  Polish  people  received  whatever 
preparation  they  were  to  have  for  the  final  struggle,  for  the  great 
national  effort  associated  with  the  Four  Years'  Diet  and  Kos- 
ciuszko's  rising.  On  the  scope  and  value  of  the  work  done  at  that 
time,  the  judgments  of  historians  vary  greatly.  Those  German 
and  Russian  writers  who  are  inclined  to  deny  to  the  later  national 
movement  any  genuine  vitality  or  any  real  possibility  of  success, 
commonly  see  in  this  period  only  superficial  improvements,  half- 
hearted velleities  of  reform,  continued  and  ever-increasing  demor- 
alization, and  opportunities  frivolously  frittered  away.1  On 
the  other  hand,  many  Polish  historians  have  found  in  this  period 
the  beginnings  of  a  real  national  regeneration,  of  a  political, 
economic,  and  intellectual  transformation  which,  had  it  not  been 
so  soon  violently  interrupted,  would  have  restored  Poland  to  her 
proper  place  among  living  states.2  These  diversities  of  opinion 
are  not  due  simply  to  partisanship.  They  reflect  the  contradic- 
tions of  a  society  in  a  confused  state  of  transition,  a  society  in 
which  the  old  lawlessness,  selfishness,  corruption,  and  prejudices 
were  still  terribly  deeply  inrooted,  but  which  was  also,  slowly  but 
unmistakably,  being  leavened  by  a  new  reforming  and  patriotic 
spirit.  In  such  a  situation  the  amount  of  progress  effected  is 
peculiarly  difficult  to  estimate. 

1  So,  for  instance,  Herrmann,  Solov'ev,  Kostomarov,  and  also  in  much  the  same 
sense  Bobrzynski  among  the  Poles. 

2  So  Lelewel,  Szujski,  and  Korzon;  and  Bruckner  among  the  Germans. 

56 


POLAND  AFTER   THE  FIRST  PARTITION  S7 

The  quiet  which  Poland  enjoyed  during  this  period  was  due  in 
part  to  the  exhaustion  of  the  nation  after  the  storms  of  the  pre- 
ceding decade,  but  also  to  the  constraint  imposed  by  Russia.  For 
after  the  Partition  the  Russian  yoke  was  fastened  upon  the  country 
more  firmly  than  ever.  The  King  and  many  of  the  szlachta,  taught 
by  hard  experience,  saw  safety  only  in  absolute  deference  to  the 
will  of  the  Empress,  in  a  dependence  which,  however  humiliating 
and  irksome  it  might  be,  at  least  guaranteed  the  continued  exist- 
ence of  the  state.  During  the  next  years,  down  to  1788,  the  Rus- 
sian ambassador  Stackelberg  enjoyed  a  power  greater  than  that 
of  the  King  himself,  so  that  people  jested  about  his  '  coregency ' 
and  spoke  of  him  as  the  Empress'  'Viceroy'  at  Warsaw. 

At  all  events,  the  Russian  rule  in  Poland  was  now  very  different 
from  what  it  had  been,  and  in  many  ways  much  more  tolerable. 
Having  attained  her  immediate  aims  in  Poland  and  being  absorbed 
in  other  matters,  Catherine  desired  to  keep  the  Republic  quiet 
and  to  maintain  the  status  quo.  For  this  purpose,  it  seemed  best 
to  abandon  the  old  policy  of  playing  off  the  King  and  the  opposi- 
tion against  each  other  and  so  holding  the  balance  between 
equally  matched  parties.  That  system  was  expensive  and  dan- 
gerous; it  led  to  disturbances;  it  was  no  longer  necessary,  now 
that  the  King  had  become  the  most  docile  of  dependents.  Hence 
Stackelberg  adopted  the  policy  of  ruling  through  the  King  and 
government  of  Poland  by  diplomatic  means,  avoiding  coercion 
and  threats  as  far  as  possible,  descending  into  the  arena  of  party 
politics  only  when  it  seemed  absolutely  necessary.  The  Russian 
troops  were  withdrawn  from  the  country  by  1780.  Diets  and 
Dietines  enjoyed  the  long-forgotten  experience  of  deliberating 
without  the  '  protection  '  of  foreign  bayonets.  Even  the  ambas- 
sador's funds  for  bribery  were  reduced  to  a  minimum.  The  new 
course  thus  brought  a  considerable  alleviation  to  the  Poles,  a 
diminution  at  least  of  the  external  signs  of  subjection.  The  nation 
began  to  breathe  more  freely  again,  and  bolder  spirits  might 
dream  of  ultimate  independence. 

Another  great  advantage  of  the  new  system  from  the  Polish 
standpoint  was  that  it  allowed  —  and  even  brought  with  it  — 
certain  political  reforms.     The  Russians  had  come  to  see  that 


58  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

complete  anarchy  in  the  Republic  was  not  to  their  interest;  and 
now  that  they  had  decided  to  use  the  Polish  government  as  their 
instrument  for  ruling  the  country,  they  were  bound  to  give  that 
government  a  certain  measure  of  strength  and  efficiency.  Hence 
among  the  changes  extorted  from  the  Partition  Diet  of  1773  was 
the  establishment  of  a  new  governing  body  called  the  Permanent 
Council.  This  board  of  thirty-six  members,  elected  by  the  Diet 
every  two  years,  was  to  advise  the  Crown  in  all  important  matters. 
As  the  King  was  obliged  to  accept  the  opinion  of  the  majority,  the 
royal  power  was  virtually  put  in  commission.  The  Council  also 
served  as  a  supreme  administrative  board,  for  which  purpose  itwas 
divided  into  the  five  departments  of  Foreign  Interests,  Police,  the 
Army,  Justice,  and  Finance.  The  new  institution  was  extremely 
unpopular.  It  was  denounced  by  conservatives  as  a  menace  to 
'  liberty,'  and  an  engine  of '  despotism.'  It  was  detested  by  patriots 
as  an  invention  of  the  Russian  ambassador,  foisted  by  him  upon 
the  nation  as  a  means  of  governing  the  country  for  Russian  in- 
terests. This  latter  charge  was  quite  true,  for  Stackelberg  was  the 
creator  of  the  Council,  regularly  filled  it  with  his  friends,  and 
succeeded  in  making  it  the  stronghold  and  organ  of  Russian 
influence.  But  at  any  rate  the  Council  was  a  great  improvement 
on  anything  that  had  gone  before.  It  gave  Poland  an  executive 
that  could  dominate  the  hitherto  independent  and  lawless  great 
officers  of  the  Crown  —  the  chancellors,  treasurers,  marshals, 
and  hetmans;  it  brought  all  the  branches  of  the  public  service 
under  a  common  direction;  it  gave  to  the  administration  for  the 
first  time  something  of  unity  and  vigor. 

This  was  not  the  only  improvement  allowed  by  Russia.  The 
Partition  Diet,  facing  a  truly  desperate  situation,  adopted  a  series 
of  important  financial  reforms  which,  under  the  better  fiscal 
administration  of  the  Permanent  Council,  assured  to  the  Republic 
a  regular  and  an  annually  increasing  income.  By  1788  the  rev- 
enues were  nearly  four  times  as  great  as  under  the  last  Saxon 
king,  and  more  than  twice  what  they  had  been  in  the  early  years 
of  Stanislas  Augustus.1  The  army,  which  at  the  time  of  the  Par- 
tition had  scarcely  existed  save  on  paper,  was  slowly  brought  up 

1  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  145  ff.,  179. 


POLAND  AFTER    THE  FIRST  PARTITION  59 

to  18,000  men  (in  1786).  It  was  at  last  regularly  paid;  it  was 
trained  and  disciplined  according  to  the  Prussian  model;  it  was 
provided  with  capable  officers  from  abroad  and  from  the  new 
cadet  school.  Quite  the  most  important  reform  undertaken  by  the 
government,  however,  was  the  effort  to  found  a  national  system  of 
education.  After  the  suppression  of  the  Jesuit  Order  in  1773,  its 
property  was  taken  over  by  the  state  and  entrusted  to  the  new 
Education  Commission.  Made  up  for  the  most  part  of  men  filled 
with  a  high  appreciation  of  their  task  and  guided  by  enlightened 
and  practical  ideas,  this  Commission  established  a  national  school 
system  which  ranked  among  the  best  in  Europe  at  that  time  and 
may  claim,  indeed,  an  honorable  place  in  the  history  of  pedagogics. 
This  reform  in  education  was  of  inestimable  importance  for  the 
transformation  of  Polish  society  which  was  then  going  on.  It 
created  a  new  liberal  and  progressive  spirit  in  the  younger  gen- 
eration, which  then  communicated  itself  to  the  older  one.  From 
the  new  schools  came  a  great  part  of  the  reformers  of  the  Four 
Years'  Diet  and  the  patriots  of  1794. 

It  must  be  confessed,  however,  that  apart  from  the  work  of  the 
Education  Commission,  the  reforms  undertaken  by  the  govern- 
ment during  this  period  fell  far  short  of  what  ought  to  have  been 
attained.  Something  was  accomplished,  but  much  more  could 
have  been  done.  It  was  true  that  no  essential  changes  in  the 
constitution  were  possible,  owing  to  the  Russian  guarantee;  but 
neither  the  revenues  nor  the  army  were  brought  up  to  the  stand- 
ard which  Catherine  was  willing  to  allow,  and  which  the  country 
was  amply  able  to  support.  This  failure  was  due  not  only  to 
wretched  political  dissensions  and  to  negligence  and  lack  of 
energy  on  the  part  of  those  in  power,  but  also  in  large  measure  to 
the  general  ignorance  that  then  prevailed  as  to  the  real  resources 
of  the  nation.  As  a  result,  Poland  entered  the  great  crisis  that 
followed  ill-prepared  from  both  the  military  and  the  financial 
standpoints. 

II 

In  marked  contrast  to  the  unsatisfactory  results  attained  in  the 
political  sphere  stands  the  undeniable  and  striking  progress 
made  in  matters  economic  and  intellectual.    M.  Korzon,  whose 


60  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

thorough  researches  have  shown  us  that  the  Poland  of  those  years 
has  another  history  besides  the  conventional  chronique  scan- 
daleuse  of  the  Court,  the  Diets,  and  the  high  society  of  Warsaw, 
declares  that  after  the  Partition  a  great  and  admirable  change 
came  over  the  country.  The  nation  went  to  work  and  worked 
hard.  Agriculture,  which  had  reached  its  lowest  level  in  the  Saxon 
period,  experienced  a  remarkable  revival,  especially  in  the 
Ukraine,  whose  wealth  was  again  unlocked  by  the  reopening  of 
the  Black  Sea  to  European  trade.  In  spite  of  the  merciless  transit 
duties  imposed  by  Prussia  and  the  high  protective  tariffs  of 
Joseph  II,  Polish  trade  developed  rapidly.  Manufactures,  rural 
and  urban,  sprang  up;  there  was  scarcely  a  magnate  family  that 
did  not  found  a  factory  of  one  kind  or  another;  and  ephemeral  as 
many  of  these  enterprises  were,  still  the  native  industries  were 
presently  able  to  supply  a  great  part  of  the  articles  needed  at 
home,  and  even  to  place  Polish  manufactured  goods  —  for  the 
first  time  —  in  foreign  markets.  The  long  decadent  and  half- 
deserted  towns  awoke  to  new  life  and  animation.  Warsaw,  which 
had  but  30,000  inhabitants  at  the  accession  of  Stanislas  Augustus, 
could  boast  of  100,000  by  the  time  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet.1 
It  had  become  a  great  city,  according  to  the  standards  of  that  age, 
and  the  center  of  a  commercial,  financial,  and  intellectual  activity 
such  as  Poland  had  rarely  witnessed.  Finally,  as  a  result  of  these 
developments,  a  social  class  which  had  long  been  grievously 
needed,  at  last  appeared  on  the  scene:  a  well-to-do,  enterprising, 
and  educated  middle  class,  fitted  for  political  life  and  eager  to 
take  its  share  of  duties  and  privileges  in  the  state;  a  class  which 
in  the  final  struggle  for  independence  was  to  equal  and  perhaps 
surpass  the  szlachta  in  patriotism  and  civic  devotion.2 

When  one  considers  that  at  the  time  of  the  First  Partition 
Poland  had  been  threatened  with  economic,  no  less  than  with 
political,  ruin,  the  progress  made  since  1775  appears  highly  credit- 
able. It  shows  that  the  nation  was  shaking  off  its  lethargy  and 
putting  forth  new  life  and  energy.  It  suggests  that  at  bottom  the 
country  was  far  more  sound  and  healthy  than  the  actions  of  its 
ruling  class  would  indicate. 

1  Korzon,  op.  c'U.,  i,  pp.  274  f.  2  Cf.  Korzon,  ii,  p.  411. 


POLAND  AFTER   THE  FIRST  PARTITION  6 1 

Not  less  important  than  the  economic  revival  was  the  intellect- 
ual smovement  that  marked  this  period.  After  two  centuries  in 
which  Poland  had  dwelt  apart  in  intellectual  isolation  and  almost 
in  intellectual  stagnation,  nourishing  herself  on  the  dry  bones  of 
scholasticism  and  an  outworn  humanism,  modern  science  and  the 
'  philosophy  '  of  the  Enlightenment  made  their  triumphal  entry 
into  the  country.  The  new  culture  found  an  ardent  champion  in 
the  King,  a  ready  acceptance  with  the  aristocracy  and  the  bour- 
geoisie, an  entrance  —  disputed  but  soon  forced  —  into  the 
schools.  The  familiar  phenomena  of  that  age  in  other  countries 
were  repeated  in  Poland:  the  general  adoption  of  the  French 
language,  French  fashions,  in  fact  everything  that  came  out  of 
France;  the  immense  popularity  of  Voltaire,  Rousseau,  Condillac, 
Locke,  and  the  other  prophets  of  the  Enlightenment;  the  rage  for 
physics  and  the  other  experimental  sciences;  the  spread  of  free- 
masonry, which  numbered  the  King  and  the  leading  members  of 
the  aristocracy  among  its  adepts. 

In  Poland,  as  elsewhere,  the  new  culture  brought  with  it  a 
certain  deterioration  of  morals  and  a  wide-spread  weakening  of 
positive  religious  beliefs;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  it  helped  to 
break  down  obscurantism,  superstition,  and  prejudice,  it  aroused 
a  new  critical  spirit,  it  introduced  better  political,  economic, 
and  social  ideas,  it  promoted  the  serious  discussion  of  the  most 
fundamental  questions,  and  it  vastly  stimulated  the  demand  for 
reforms. 

Ill 

The  demand  for  reforms  was  by  no  means  new  in  Poland. 
Ever  since  the  sixteenth  century  a  long  line  of  publicists  had 
pointed  out  the  evils  in  the  Republic  and  suggested  remedies. 
Under  the  Saxon  kings  the  warning  voices  grew  louder  and  more 
frequent;  the  question  of  the  increase  of  the  army  came  to  be 
discussed  at  every  Diet;  and  Stanislas  Konarski  in  a  masterly 
book  subjected  that '  palladium  of  liberty,'  the  Liberum  Veto,  to 
a  scathing  criticism,  which  no  one  in  the  conservative  camp  was 
able  to  refute.1    At  the  death  of  Augustus  III  there  appeared  a 

1  The  book  0  skutecznym  rod  sposobie  ("  On  the  Proper  Organization  of  Assem- 
blies "),  1760-63. 


62  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

reform  party,  led  by  the  Princes  Czartoryski,  who  hoped,  with  the 
aid  of  Russia  and  after  putting  their  nephew  on  the  throne,,  to 
carry  through  a  comprehensive  program  of  reforms.  Unfortu- 
nately, the  plan  which  was  to  have  saved  the  Republic,  resulted 
only  in  subjecting  it  entirely  to  foreign  domination.  At  all  events, 
the  tragic  experiences  of  the  first  decade  of  the  new  reign  sobered 
the  more  intelligent  part  of  the  nation.  The  demand  for  reforms, 
raised  at  the  beginning  of  the  century  by  only  a  few  isolated 
individuals,  and  then  in  1764  by  a  small  party,  now  became 
general.  The  humiliating  dependence  upon  Russia,  the  constant 
danger  of  a  new  dismemberment,  the  unconcealed  contempt  with 
which  the  rest  of  the  world  regarded  the  Poles,  the  influence  of  the 
new  '  philosophy  '  and  of  foreign  travel,  the  example  of  the  neigh- 
boring states,  the  general  current  of  reforming  ideas  in  the  age  of 
the  Enlightenment  —  all  these  factors  combined  to  open  the  eyes 
of  thinking  men  to  the  glaring  evils  in  the  existing  regime  and  to 
the  fact  that  without  reforms  the  Republic  was  hastening  to  ruin. 

The  political  literature  of  that  age  was  almost  entirely  on  the 
side  of  the  reformers.  Its  greatest  representative  was  Stanislas 
Staszic,  from  whose  pen  appeared  in  1785  a  remarkable  book 
entitled  Considerations  on  the  Life  of  Jan  Zamoyski.  Staszic 
demanded  the  abolition  of  the  Liberum  Veto,  the  establishment  of 
hereditary  monarchy,  a  permanent  Diet,  an  army  of  100,000  men, 
the  increase  of  the  taxes,  a  reform  of  justice,  the  systematic 
development  of  the  national  industries,  and  the  emancipation  of 
the  serfs.  His  book  had  an  extraordinary,  an  unexampled  suc- 
cess. Its  principles  became  the  fashion  in  the  salons,  and  pene- 
trated widely  in  far  humbler  circles;  it  furnished  an  arsenal  of 
arguments  to  the  reforming  party;  it  laid  down  in  outline  the 
program  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet.1 

Undoubtedly  the  nation  was  coming  to  a  clearer  realization  of 
what  must  be  done  if  ruin  were  to  be  avoided,  but  it  remained  to 
be  proved  that  the  nation  was  capable  of  doing  it.  The  reforms 
in  question  demanded  the  abjuration  of  the  most  revered  tradi- 
tions, and  almost  a  complete  breach  with  the  past;    they  de- 

1  Cf.  Niewenglowski,  Les  Idles  politiques  en  Pologne  a  la  fin  du  xviiie  siecle, 
pp.  75  ff.;    Korzon,  "  Pocz^tki  sejmu  wielkiego,"  in  Ateneum,  1881,  i,  pp.  330  f. 


POLAND  AFTER   THE  FIRST  PARTITION  63 

manded  a  sure  political  instinct,  consummate  statesmanship, 
energy,  and  will-power  on  the  part  of  the  leaders;  they  demanded 
unity,  discipline,  perseverance,  and  the  willingness  to  make  any 
sacrifice  on  the  part  of  the  nation.  Had  Poland  the  moral 
strength  required  for  so  great  an  effort  ?  To  that  question  it  is 
peculiarly  difficult  to  give  an  answer.  Diplomats,  travellers,  and 
writers  of  memoirs  have  left  us  the  blackest  pictures  of  Polish 
society  in  that  age :  of  the  f rivolity  and  instability  of  the  national 
character,  the  corruption  of  private  morals,  the  general  inclina- 
tion to  riotous  festivities,  drunkenness,  gambling,  and  other 
forms  of  dissipation;  of  the  degradation  and  brutishness  of  the 
lower  classes,  the  ignorance,  narrow-mindedness,  and  selfishness 
of  the  lesser  gentry,  the  sordid  ambitions,  the  anarchical  spirit, 
the  venality,  the  lack  of  patriotism  of  the  magnates.  Undoubt- 
edly these  pictures  are  often  overcharged  through  personal  bias, 
and  often  based  too  exclusively  on  observation  of  the  small  group 
of  people  at  the  top.  But  in  any  case  enough  remains  to  prove  a 
very  deep  and  dangerous  demoralization.  The  political  history 
of  this  period  shows  that  too  many  of  the  Poles  had  learned 
nothing  from  the  Partition,  but  were  still  ready  to  plunge  their 
country  into  disorder,  raise  scandals  that  disgraced  the  nation  in 
the  eyes  of  Europe,  and  call  in  foreigners  against  their  own 
government,  whether  for  wretched,  selfish  aims  or  on  account  of 
misguided  political  ideas  or  through  sheer  force  of  habit.  Al- 
though the  new  reforming  tendencies  were  constantly  gaining 
ground,  a  large  part  of  the  szlachta  still  clung  blindly  to  the  old 
prejudices,  the  old  false  maxims,  the  old  horror  of  innovations. 
In  short,  while  the  period  from  1775  to  1787  shows  a  very  con- 
siderable progress  in  comparison  with  what  went  before,  while  the 
worst  was  over  and  the  nation  was  undoubtedly  on  the  right 
course  again,  still  not  nearly  enough  had  been  accomplished,  not 
as  much  as  could  and  should  have  been  done.  The  newer,  better 
tendencies  had  not  yet  gained  a  complete  predominance.  The 
nation  was  not  yet  ready  either  materially  or  morally,  when  the 
final  crisis  came. 


CHAPTER  II 

The  Austro-Russian  Alliance  and  the  Outbreak 
of  the  russo-turkish  war 


Of  the  three  Powers  who  had  joined  in  the  First  Partition,  Russia 
had  perhaps  the  most  reason  to  rest  content  with  the  arrange- 
ments then  made.  After  rectifying  her  hitherto  inconvenient 
western  frontier,  she  had  no  urgent  motives  for  seeking  further 
Polish  territories; x  and  owing  to  the  mutual  jealousy  of  the  Ger- 
man Powers,  what  remained  of  the  Republic  had  been  turned 
over  unrestrictedly  to  the  guardianship  of  the  great  Catherine. 
At  Warsaw  the  King  reigned,  the  Russian  ambassador  ruled,  and 
the  envoys  of  Austria  and  Prussia  looked  on.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances it  might  well  appear  to  be  Russia's  interest  to  main- 
tain the  status  quo,  rather  than  to  aggrandize  her  neighbors  by 
new  dismemberments.  That  seems  to  have  been  Catherine's 
view  —  with  certain  reservations.  Her  policy  after  the  First 
Partition  was  to  protect  the  Poles  in  their  remaining  possessions, 
as  long  as  they  made  no  effort  to  escape  from  her  control,  and  as 
long  as  no  conjuncture  in  general  European  affairs  rendered  it 
desirable  or  necessary  to  purchase  the  support  of  the  German 
Powers  with  drafts  on  the  usual  treasury  —  Poland.  Within 
these  limits,  the  Empress  was  committed  to  maintaining  the 
existing  arrangements. 

Very  different  was  the  position  of  her  chief  confederate  in 
depredation,  Prussia.    If  that  aspiring  young  state  was  to  main- 

1  The  one  further  improvement  of  the  Russian  frontier  on  the  side  of  Poland 
that  naturally  suggested  itself  after  the  Partition,  related  to  that  southeastern 
corner  of  the  Polish  Ukraine  which  projected  into  Russian  territory,  and  which 
was  of  great  importance  in  case  of  war  with  the  Turks.  This  acquisition  seems  to 
have  been  discussed  at  St.  Petersburg.  Cf.  the  instructions  to  the  Marquis  de 
Verac  in  1780:  "  On  parle  d'un  echange  qu'elle  [Catherine]  veut  faire  des  provinces 
qui  lui  ont  ete  cedees  contre  la  partie  de  l'Ukraine  que  les  Polonois  ont  conservee," 
R.  I.  A.,  Russie,  ii,  p.  368. 

64 


THE  AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE 

tain  the  rank  Frederick  had  won  for  it  among  the  great  Powers,  it 
needed  above  all  things  to  acquire  a  solid  territorial  foundation,  to 
unite  its  scattered  members,  to  secure  a  defensible  frontier.  It 
could  not  possibly  accept  as  final  an  arrangement  that  left  a  great 
wedge  of  Polish  territory  projecting  deep  into  its  side,  completely 
separating  East  and  West  Prussia  from  Silesia,  while  two  highly 
important  towns,  Dantzic  and  Thorn,  remained  Polish,  although 
surrounded  by  Prussian  territory.  For  the  half-built  monarchy  of 
the  Hohenzollerns,  it  was  a  vital  matter  that  the  First  Partition  of 
Poland  should  not  be  the  last.  It  was  true  that  in  his  last  years 
Frederick  II,  grown  cautious  with  age  and  haunted  by  the  fear  of 
Austria,  showed  little  taste  for  further  adventures  in  territorial 
aggrandizement.  But  the  task  was  only  deferred.  With  the 
advent  of  a  new  king,  Prussia's  unalterable  ambition  to  obtain 
Dantzic,  Thorn,  and  part  of  Great  Poland  became  one  of  the 
most  constant  and  important  factors  in  European  politics. 

Austria's  policy  towards  Poland  in  these  years  was  determined 
by  opposition  to  that  of  Prussia.  The  fact  that  Prussia  coveted 
new  acquisitions  in  that  quarter  sufficed  to  lead  Austrian  states- 
men to  attach  the  greatest  importance  to  upholding  the  integrity 
of  the  Republic.  That  any  further  aggrandizement  of  the 
'  natural  enemy  '  must  be  prevented  at  all  costs,  was  one  of  the 
cardinal  tenets  of  the  faith  once  for  all  delivered  to  Prince 
Kaunitz.  It  was  held  at  Vienna  that  the  '  artificial  state,'  raised 
to  perilous  grandeur  by  Frederick,  would,  if  confined  to  its  exist- 
ing meagre  territories,  ultimately  collapse  of  itself.  Austria 
might  hope  to  end  successfully  the  contest  for  supremacy  in  Ger- 
many, if  she  could  prevent  the  further  dismemberment  of  Poland. 
For  the  rest,  she  wanted  no  more  Polish  territories  for  herself,  and 
would  not  have  been  greatly  averse  to  parting  with  those  she 
already  possessed,  if  a  good  exchange  could  be  effected. 

Although  the  policy  of  the  two  Imperial  Courts  thus  seemed  to 
afford  some  security  to  the  Republic,  the  situation  of  Poland 
remained  highly  precarious.  If  Russia  and  Prussia  were  allied, 
the  latter  might  at  the  first  emergency  extort  from  the  Empress 
new  concessions  in  Poland  as  the  price  of  her  support.  If  the 
Imperial  Courts  were  allied,  Prussia  might  seize  the  moment 


66  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

when  they  were  engaged  in  some  great  enterprise  to  demand 
Polish  territory  as  a  condition  of  not  opposing  them.  If  all  three 
Powers  were  united,  the  combination  was  almost  sure  to  produce 
a  new  partition.  In  short,  any  grouping  of  the  three  neighbors 
contained  elements  of  danger  to  Poland.  Similarly,  almost  any 
crisis  might  engender  another  dismemberment  of  the  Republic. 
As  the  system  of  the  balance  of  power  was  then  practised,  any 
aggrandizement  of  one  of  the  Eastern  Powers  was  likely  to  lead  the 
other  two  to  demand  equivalent  acquisitions;  and  where  were 
equivalents  to  be  found  so  conveniently  as  in  the  vast,  defence- 
less intermediate  realm,  in  which,  as  it  was  said,  '  one  had  only  to 
stoop  in  order  to  take  '  ?  Whenever  the  equilibrium  was  threat- 
ened, Poland  might  be  employed  to  redress  the  balance.  And, 
unfortunately,  the  equilibrium  was  at  that  time  in  perpetual 
danger,  owing  to  the  aggressive,  the  downright  revolutionary 
policy  of  Catherine,  of  Joseph  II,  and,  after  Frederick's  death, 
of  Prussia. 

II 

The  union  of  the  three  Eastern  Powers  at  the  time  of  the  Parti- 
tion proved  only  temporary.  The  Imperial  Courts  soon  resumed 
their  dissensions  over  Turkish  affairs,  while  the  alliance  between 
Russia  and  Prussia  remained  in  full  force,  outwardly  at  least, 
down  to  1780.  The  only  grave  conflict  in  those  years,  the  War  of 
the  Bavarian  Succession,  did  not  last  long  enough  to  involve 
Poland  seriously;  but  it  did  give  rise  to  several  projects  that  were 
to  be  of  decided  importance  in  the  later  development  of  the  Polish 
Question.  At  the  moment  when  Frederick  II  was  about  to  draw 
the  sword,  his  minister  Hertzberg  came  forward  with  a  plan  for 
avoiding  war  by  a  bargain,  by  which  part  of  Bavaria  should  go  to 
Austria,  part  of  Galicia  should  be  restored  to  Poland,  and  the 
grateful  Republic  should  in  its  turn  cede  Dantzic,  Thorn,  and 
some  districts  in  Great  Poland  to  Prussia.1  This  was,  in  embryo, 
the  famous  '  Hertzberg  plan,'  which  figured  so  prominently  in 
the  Oriental  crisis  a  decade  later.  It  was  also  akin  to  that  Austro- 
Prussian  plan  of  1792  out  of  which  grew  the  Second  Partition  of 

1  Unzer,  Hertzbergs  Anteil  an  den  preussisch-ostcrreichischen  Verhandlungen, 
1778-1779,  pp.  4f.,  122  f. 


THE  AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE  67 

Poland.  Frederick  is  said  to  have  repudiated  the  project  in  1778 
with  scant  ceremony;  x  nevertheless,  after  hostilities  had  begun, 
Hertzberg  returned  to  the  charge  with  the  proposal  of  conquering 
Galicia  and  then  trading  it  off  to  Poland  for  the  acquisitions 
desired  by  Prussia.  The  King  rebuffed  him  once  more,  but  hence- 
forth the  idea  of  ousting  the  Austrians  from  Galicia  and  acquiring 
Dantzic,  Thorn,  and  part  of  Great  Poland  for  Prussia,  by  ex- 
change if  possible,  became  the  favorite  project,  the '  grand  design  ' 
of  the  persistent,  patriotic,  and  rather  pedantic  minister.2  Hertz- 
berg seems  to  have  sounded  some  of  the  Poles  on  the  subject  of  the 
exchange  at  the  time  of  the  Bavarian  war; 3  and  his  plan  may 
stand  in  some  kind  of  connection  with  the  project  of  Stanislas 
Augustus  for  recovering  Galicia  by  joining  in  hostilities  against 
Austria.  The  King's  design,  which  foreshadows  the  Polish  plans 
of  1790,  was  well  known  at  Vienna.  It  led  Austria  to  take  a  more 
active  interest  in  Polish  affairs  after  the  war,  and  it  strengthened 
her  desire  to  keep  Poland  in  a  state  of  impotence.4 

After  the  Peace  of  Teschen,  Catherine  began  to  consider  a 
change  in.  her  political  connections.  The  alliance  with  Prussia 
seemed  to  have  furnished  most  of  the  advantages  of  which  it  was 
capable;  and  for  the  vast  Oriental  plans  which  now  filled  the 
Empress'  mind,  the  friendship  of  Austria  was  necessary.  For  a 
time  Catherine  may  have  thought  of  combining  liaisons  with  both 
the  German  Powers  by  forming  that  triple  alliance  which  had 
often  been  a  favorite  project  at  St.  Petersburg.  What  the  triple 
alliance  would  have  led  to,  is  sufficiently  indicated  in  a  remark- 
able conversation  that  took  place  between  the  Empress'  favorite 
Potemkin  and  the  Prussian  envoy  Gortz  in  the  autumn  of  1779. 
At  the  order  of  his  master,  who  was  eager  to  make  sure  of  the 
favorite,  Gortz  intimated  Frederick's  willingness  to  further 
Potemkin's  supposed  plans  upon  the  crown  of  Poland.     There- 

1  His  reply  to  Hertzberg  was:  "  Allez  vous  promener  avec  vos  indignes  plans. 
Vous  etes  fait  pour  etre  le  ministre  de  gens  coujons  comme  l'electeur  de  Baviere, 
mais  non  pour  moi,"  Bailleu,  "  Graf  Hertzberg,"  II .  Z.,  xlii,  p.  446,  and  note  1. 

2  Unzer,  op.  cit.,  p.  143;  Ranke,  Die  deutschen  Machte,  i,  pp.  22  f.;  Krauel, 
Graf  Hertzberg  als  Minister  Friedrich  Wilhelms  II,  p.  36. 

3  Cf.  his  report  to  the  King,  September  4,  1778,  Unzer,  p.  143. 

4  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata  panowania  Stanislawa  Augusta,  i,  pp.  300  f.;  Herrmann, 
Geschichle  des  russischen  Staales,  vi,  pp.  481,  483  f.,  502,  520  f. 


68  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

upon  the  Russian,  while  roundly  denying  the  ambition  ascribed  to 
him,  seized  the  occasion  to  propose  a  complete  partition  of  the 
Republic,  as  the  only  means  of  ending  the  difficulties  to  which 
Poland  in  its  present  state  must  constantly  give  rise;  and  he 
expressly  charged  the  envoy  to  procure  Frederick's  views  on  the 
subject.  For  once  Frederick  professed  total  lack  of  appetite.  He 
replied  that  he  thought  of  nothing  except  keeping  what  he  had 
and  checking  the  insatiable  ambition  of  Austria.  With  that 
response  this  highly  enigmatic  episode  ended.  Of  one  thing  one 
may  be  fairly  sure:  Potemkin  could  hardly  have  been  throwing 
out  merely  his  own  ideas,  for  in  that  case  he  could  not  have  in- 
sisted upon  a  reply  from  Frederick.  He  must  have  been  acting 
with  a  commission  from  the  Empress.  But,  on  the  other  hand, 
one  cannot  be  certain  whether  Catherine  was  simply  trying  to 
probe  the  secret  ambitions  of  Prussia,  or  whether  she  seriously 
thought  of  a  total  partition  of  Poland  as  a  preliminary  to  the 
partition  of  Turkey,  and  as  a  means  of  bringing  the  Eastern 
Powers  into  complete  and  durable  accord.1  At  any  rate,  Fred- 
erick's answer  must  have  confirmed  the  idea  that  the  triple 
alliance  was  out  of  the  question,  and  that  the  Prussian  alliance 
had  exhausted  its  usefulness.  With  so  unambitious  and  super- 
annuated a  partner  as  Frederick  had  now  become,  there  was 
really  nothing  great  to  be  done. 

While  the  King  of  Prussia  was  thus  playing  the  recalcitrant,  the 
Court  of  Vienna  was  straining  every  nerve  to  supplant  his  in- 
fluence at  St.  Petersburg.  And  as  a  result  of  the  indefatigable 
activity  of  Prince  Kaunitz,  the  adroit  diplomacy  of  Count  Louis 
Cobenzl,  who  was  sent  in  1779  as  envoy  to  Russia,  the  visit  of 
Joseph  II  to  the  Empress  in  1780,  the  influence  of  Potemkin,  and 
above  all  Catherine's  own  clever  calculations,  Austria  in  1781 
could  boast  of  a  brilliant  diplomatic  victory.  By  the  letters 
exchanged  between  the  two  sovereigns  under  the  dates  of  May  2 1 
and  13/24  of  that  year,2  the  Austro-Russian  alliance  was  consum- 

1  For  this  interesting  incident,  which  deserves  a  more  thorough  investigation 
than  it  has  yet  received,  cf.  Gortz,  Denkwiirdigkeiten,  i,  pp.  123  ff.;  Dohm,  Denk- 
wiirdigkeiten,  ii,  pp.  xlv-xlviii;  Reimann,  Neuere  Geschichte  des  preussischen  Staates, 
ii,  pp.  282  ff.;   Koser,  Friedrich  der  Grosse,  ii,  p.  606. 

2  Printed  in  Arneth,  Joseph  II  und  Katharina,  pp.  72-87. 


THE  AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE  69 

mated :  an  alliance  which  in  the  next  few  years  seemed  to  domi- 
nate Europe,  and  which  was  to  be  portentous  both  for  Turkey  and 
for  Poland. 

It  was  the  fatal  defect  of  this  alliance  that  the  two  contracting 
Powers  entered  into  it  with  very  different  aims.  For  the  Aus- 
trians  the  great  object  was  security  from  Prussia  and,  if  the 
opportunity  occurred,  offensive  action  against  that  state.  For 
Catherine,  however  —  and  circumstances  inevitably  rendered 
her  the  dominant  partner  —  the  goal  was  always  the  realization 
of  her  plans  against  the  Ottoman  Empire.  For  some  years  after 
the  conclusion  of  the  alliance,  the  two  cabinets  were  intermit- 
tently engaged  in  the  discussion  of  the  grandiose  scheme  called 
the  '  Greek  project,'  which  aimed  at  nothing  less  than  the  ex- 
pulsion of  the  Turks  from  Europe,  suitable  aggrandizement  for 
the  allies,  the  restoration  of  the  Byzantine  Empire  under  Cath- 
erine's grandson  Constantine,  and  the  creation  of  a  '  Kingdom  of 
Dacia,'  presumably  intended  for  Potemkin.1  The  Austrians 
accepted  the  grand  plan  in  principle,  but  without  enthusiasm  and 
with  lively  misgivings  as  to  the  possibility  of  its  execution. 

In  Europe  at  large,  enough  of  the  '  Greek  project'  was  known  to 
arouse  enthusiasm  in  the  public  and  consternation  in  the  cabinets. 
When  in  1783  Catherine  proceeded  to  the  annexation  of  the 
Crimea,  the  other  Powers  regarded  the  step  as  a  preliminary  to 
the  final  onslaught  of  both  the  Imperial  Courts  upon  the  Turks; 
and  France  and  Prussia  prepared  for  the  worst  emergencies.  Both 
Vergennes,  the  director  of  French  foreign  policy,  and  Frederick 
were  ready  to  go  to  war,  rather  than  to  allow  the  allies  to  partition 
the  Turkish  Empire  at  pleasure.    Vergennes  thought  of  bringing 

1  I  know  of  no  direct  evidence  from  Russian  official  documents  to  prove  that 
Dacia  was  intended  for  Potemkin;  but  such  was  the  general  opinion  of  contem- 
poraries, and  that  belief  has  been  almost  universally  accepted  by  historians.  One 
reservation  must  be  made,  however.  In  case  it  proved  possible  to  free  the  Danubian 
Principalities,  but  not  to  restore  the  Greek  Empire,  then  Catherine  would  probably 
have  preferred  to  bestow  the  crown  of  Dacia  upon  Constantine,  although  doubtless 
with  Potemkin  at  his  side  as  adviser  and  mentor.  Cf.  [Helbig],  "  Potemkin  der 
Taurier,"  in  Minerva,  xxiii  (1797), pp.  228f.,xxvi,  pp.  305ff.,  xxxii,  pp.  4271?.;  Gortz, 
op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  126  f.;  Dohm,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  50;  Zinkeisen,  Geschichle  des  osmanischen 
Retches,  vi,  p.  351;  Jorga,  Geschichle  des  osmanischen  Retches,  v,  p.  91;  BpHKHepi., 
UoTeMEHHi,  pp.  64!!.,  212;    Askenazy,  Przymierze  polsko-pruskie,  p.  36. 


7o 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


into  the  field  against  the  Imperial  Courts  a  great  coalition  con- 
sisting of  France,  Spain,  Sardinia,  Prussia,  Sweden,  and  perhaps 
even  Poland.1  In  case  Catherine  and  Joseph  were  satisfied,  how- 
ever, with  wresting  a  few  provinces  from  the  Turks,  Vergennes 
preferred  to  avoid  a  general  war  by  a  bargain  which  would  give 
France  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  and  Prussia  some  Polish  terri- 
tories.2 Frederick  and  Hertzberg,  discussing  the  same  problems 
in  1783,  differed  in  that  the  King  inclined  more  to  war,  and  the 
minister  to  diplomacy;  but  the  conclusions  of  both  were  identical: 
that  in  case  Austria  made  any  considerable  conquests  from  the 
Turks,  Prussia  must  extort  equivalent  acquisitions  in  Poland.3 
The  storm  blew  over  on  this  occasion,  as  Catherine  contented 
herself  with  the  Crimea,  the  Emperor  reserved  his  claims  to  a 
later  time,  and  the  Turks  were  persuaded  not  to  risk  a  rupture. 
But  the  execution  of  the  '  Greek  project '  was  only  postponed,  not 
abandoned;  and  it  was  certain  that  whenever  the  allies  resumed 
the  plan,  they  would  have  to  reckon  with  Prussia,  and  possibly 
even  with  a  great  coalition,  such  as  Vergennes  had  outlined. 

The  Imperial  Courts  were  by  no  means  ignorant  of  the  opposi- 
tion to  be  expected.  For  a  time  the  Austrians  were  not  unwilling 
to  bribe  Prussia  to  remain  quiet  by  offering  her  a  bit  of  Polish 
territory,  for  which  the  Republic  might  be  compensated  out  of  the 
spoils  taken  from  Turkey.4  Later,  however,  they  talked  rather  of 
coercing  the  Court  of  Berlin  into  passivity  by  military  demon- 
strations or  even  active  hostilities;  and  they  frequently  suggested 
that,  in  general,  the  indispensable  preliminary  to  the  execution  of 
the  '  grand  plan '  was  '  to  remove  the  horns  of  the  King  of  Prussia.' 

1  Flassan,  Histoire  de  la  diplomatic  franqaise,  vii,  pp.  383  ff.;  Zinkeisen,  op.  tit., 
vi,  pp.  423  ff.;  Tratchevsky,  "La  France  et  l'Allemagne  sous  Louis  XVI,"  in  R.  H., 
xiv;  Lucchesini  to  Frederick  William,  November  19,  1788:  "  J'ai  vu  des  lettres 
de  ce  Ministre  au  Comte  de  Rzewuski,  demeurant  alors  a  Paris,  par  lesquelles  on 
voit  que  le  Comte  de  Vergennes,  prevoyant  la  Guerre  actuelle  entre  la  Porte  et  les 
deux  Cours  Imperiales,  auroit  voulu  pouvoir  former  une  Confederation  en  Pologne, 
soutenue  par  l'argent  de  la  France  et  de  l'Espagne,  et  y  joindre  la  Puissance  de 
V.  M.,  avec  une  diversion  que  le  Roi  de  Suede  auroit  du  tenter  en  Finlande,"  B.  A., 
Pologne,  Fasc,  1097. 

2  Flassan,  ibid.,  pp.  391  ff. 

3  Bailleu,  "Der  Ursprung  des  deutschen  Fiirstenbundes,"  H.  Z.  xli,  pp.  424  ff. 

4  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liii,  p.  ix;   Beer,  Orientalische  Politik  Oesterreichs ,  p.  48. 


THE  AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE  Jl 

After  the  formation  of  the  Fiirstenbund  —  a  crushing  blow  to 
Catherine's  German  policy  —  that  view  seemed  to  gain  ground 
on  the  Neva.1  The  Empress  was,  in  fact,  coming  to  regard  the 
Court  of  Berlin  as  her  most  dangerous  enemy.  The  state  of 
Russo-Prussian  relations  from  1785  onward  ominously  recalled 
the  tension  on  the  eve  of  the  Seven  Years'  War.2 

With  Poland  the  Imperial  Courts  were  even  less  disposed  to 
share  their  prospective  conquests.  They  intended  that  the 
Republic  should  remain  as  it  was  —  weak  and  helpless.3  By  the 
treaty  of  1781  they  had  pledged  themselves  to  maintain  tran- 
quillity in  Poland,  and  had  guaranteed  the  constitution  as  fixed 
by  the  Diet  of  1773;  and  they  were  thus  committed  to  upholding 
the  status  quo.  Practically,  the  alliance  produced  a  certain  im- 
provement in  the  position  of  Poland,  inasmuch  as  it  set  a  check 
upon  the  territorial  ambition  of  Prussia,  while,  by  diverting 
Catherine's  attention  to  the  Eastern  Question,  it  led  to  a  con- 
siderable relaxation  of  the  pressure  she  had  hitherto  exerted  upon 
the  Republic.  On  the  other  hand,  the  alliance  did  not  in  any  way 
impair  Russia's  exclusive  position  in  Poland.  Austria  gained  no 
additional  influence  there  as  a  result  of  her  new  connection,  and  the 
fear  of  arousing  the  suspicions  or  resentment  of  Russia  deterred 
her  from  any  systematic  or  continued  attempt  to  form  a  party  of 
her  own.  Joseph  interfered  vigorously  in  Poland  only  when  the 
interests  of  his  Galician  subjects  were  concerned;  and  if  these 
interventions  occasionally  led  the  Polish  opposition  (the  so-called 
'  Patriots  ')  to  fix  their  hopes  on  the  Court  of  Vienna,  it  was 
invariably  shown  that  no  permanent  support  could  be  expected 
from  that  quarter.  At  the  opening  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet  an 
Austrian  party  in  Poland  did  not  exist. 

One  question  frequently  discussed  between  St.  Petersburg  and 
Vienna  was  that  of  the  future  successor  to  Stanislas  Augustus. 
Russia  consistently  declared  in  favor  of  a  '  Piast '  (i.  e.,  a  native 
Pole);  while  Austria,  from  1782  onward,  urged  the  desirability  of 

1  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liii,  pp.  xiv  ff.,  349,  368;  liv,  pp.  13-21,  78  f.,  108,  note  1. 

2  Cf.  TpaieBCKiii,  Coi03i  Kiuraeii,  pp.  384  ff. 

3  Catherine's  notes  on  the  "  Greek  project,"  written  probably  about  1782,  in 
the  PyccKaa  Orapima,  lxxvi,  pp.  1  ff. 


J  2  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

holding  out  hopes  to  the  Elector  of  Saxony.1  Behind  this  latter 
plan  lay  the  wish  of  the  Vienna  cabinet  not  only  to  lure  the 
Elector  away  from  the  side  of  Prussia,  but  also  to  place  upon  the 
Polish  throne  a  king  less  dependent  on  Russia  and  more  amenable 
to  Austrian  influence.  Such  details  were  not  overlooked  at  St. 
Petersburg.  The  Polish  succession  remained  an  open  question 
between  the  two  Courts,  a  germ  of  future  disagreements. 

It  was  not  the  only  rift  in  the  alliance.  Indeed  the  role  of 
'  most  intimate  ally  '  to  Catherine  would  have  proved  a  bit  trying 
to  the  most  patient,  the  least  self-willed  of  monarchs.  Self- 
abnegation  was  not  Joseph's  forte.  Neither  he  nor  Kaunitz  had 
ever  felt  any  real  ardor  for  the  '  Greek  project ' :  both  occasion- 
ally vented  their  ill-humor  at  the  frivolity,  the  megalomania,  the 
slight  regard  for  her  ally,  with  which  the  Empress  pursued  the 
scheme.  Besides,  the  advantages  of  the  partnership  seemed  to 
fall  out  most  unequally.  The  alliance  had  brought  to  Catherine 
the  Crimea  —  to  Joseph,  only  failure  upon  failure.  The  Emperor 
began  to  think  about  a  change  of  policy. 

At  the  beginning  of  1785,  after  the  collapse  of  his  plan  for  the 
Bavarian  Exchange,  Joseph  was  reflecting  seriously  on  the  desira- 
bility of  a  frank  reconciliation  with  Prussia.  United,  the  two 
German  Powers  could  hold  all  Europe  in  check,  and  procure 
themselves  whatever  '  advantages  '  they  chose.2  The  '  advan- 
tage '  the  Emperor  had  in  mind  for  himself  was,  of  course, 
Bavaria:  what  Prussia  would  have  demanded  in  return,  he  could 
easily  have  imagined.  The  point  of  the  alliance,  it  appears, 
would  have  been  directed  chiefly  against  France,  while  Russia  was 
to  be  taken  into  the  partnership.  In  short,  this  was  the  system  of 
1792,  of  the  First  Coalition,  of  the  Second  Partition  of  Poland. 
Dropped  for  a  time,  the  same  ideas  returned  to  the  Emperor's 
mind  after  the  death  of  Frederick  II.  Kaunitz  dissented  vigor- 
ously, and  Joseph  appeared  to  yield;  but  behind  the  Chancellor's 
back  he  continued  the  discussion  with  the  Vice-Chancellor,  Philip 

1  Cobenzl  to  Joseph,  January  18,  1783,  and  June  3,  1785,  Kaunitz  to  Cobenzl, 
February  13,  1787,  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liii,  p.  366;  liv,  pp.  41  f.,  108.  Also  Joseph  to 
Catherine,  November  13,  1782,  and  her  reply  of  January  4/15,  1783,  Arneth, 
Joseph  II  und  Katharina,  pp.  169-175,  182-188. 

2  Joseph  to  Louis  Cobenzl,  January  22,  1785,  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liv,  pp.  5-8. 


TEE  AUSTRO-RUSSIAN  ALLIANCE  73 

Cobenzl,  and  Spielmann,  the  rising  man  in  the  Haus-Hof-und 
Staatskanzlei.  These  two  ministers,  who  were  later  to  reign  and 
fall  together,  were  already  very  much  of  one  mind,  particularly 
with  regard  to  the  policies  of  their  chief,  the  Chancellor.  They 
agreed  that  the  Emperor's  idea  of  a  reconciliation  with  Prussia 
pointed  to  the  only  course  that  could  lead  to  great  results.  Both 
before  and  after  Joseph's  trip  to  the  Crimea,  they  submitted  to 
him  in  writing  plans  for  the  realization  of  that  project.  The  exact 
nature  of  their  program  is  not  quite  certain;  but  there  can  be 
little  doubt  that  one  feature  of  it  was  the  exchange  of  Belgium  for 
Bavaria  in  the  interests  of  Austria,  while  it  probably  included 
acquisitions  in  Poland  for  the  Court  of  Berlin.  The  combination 
of  those  two  favorite  plans  was  the  natural,  the  obvious  condition 
of  any  bargain  between  the  two  states  for  'reciprocal  advantages.' 
Indeed,  towards  the  end  of  1786  an  insinuation  looking  to  an 
understanding  on  just  that  basis  reached  Berlin  as  coming  from 
Vienna.  The  whole  incident  is  very  obscure,  but  it  is  possible 
that  the  insinuation  had  some  connection  with  the  projects  then 
under  discussion  in  the  Emperor's  cabinet.  At  any  rate,  those 
projects  came  to  nothing,  at  least  for  the  time  being.  Joseph 
found  the  means  proposed  too  adventurous,  and  the  conse- 
quences too  dangerous.1 

While  these  discussions  were  going  on  at  Vienna,  similar  desires 
for  a  rapprochement  were  felt  in  some  circles  in  Berlin.  Prince 
Henry,  Frederick's  brother,  had  long  advocated  an  understanding 
with  Austria  for  reciprocal  advantages,  and  was  not  averse  even 
to  allowing  the  Bavarian  Exchange.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick  held 
somewhat  similar  opinions.  Bischoffwerder  and  Wollner,  the 
favorites  of  the  new  King,  Frederick  William  II,  cultivated  inti- 
mate relations  with  Prince  Reuss,  the  Austrian  envoy,  and 
desired  to  bring  about  a  meeting  between  the  two  monarchs.2 

1  For  the  above:  Ranke,  Die  deutscken  Machle,  ii,  pp.  298-308;  Ph.  Cobenzl 
to  L.  Cobenzl,  December  21,  1786,  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liv,  pp.  93  f.;  Brunner,  Corre- 
spondances  intimes  de  VEmpcrcur  Joseph  II,  pp.  60  f.,  66  (Ph.  Cobenzl  to  the 
Emperor,  February  23,  1787;  Joseph's  reply;  also  his  note  to  Cobenzl  of  Sep- 
tember 25,  1787);  F.  K.  Wittichen,  Preussen  und  England  in  der  europaischen 
Politik,  1785-88,  pp.  1 18-123,  186  f. 

2  Krauel,  Prinz  Heinrich  von  Preussen  als  Politiker,  pp.  24,  30,  34  ff.,  40  f.; 
Volz,  "  Prinz  Heinrich  von  Preussen  und  die  preussische  Politik  vor  der  ersten 


74  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

On  both  sides  there  was,  then,  some  desire  for  better  relations, 
some  dawning  consciousness  that  it  would  be  wise  to  end  the  long 
rivalry  by  a  friendly  understanding,  through  which  each  state 
would  be  enabled  to  make  the  acquisitions  it  most  needed,  But 
significant  as  these  ideas  were  for  the  future,  the  time  for  realizing 
them  had  not  yet  come.  In  the  great  European  crisis  of  1787-91, 
the  two  German  Powers  were  destined  to  appear  once  more  as 
bitter  enemies. 

Ill 

The  prelude  to  that  crisis  was  the  famous  voyage  of  the  Em- 
press Catherine  down  the  Dnieper  to  visit  her  new  Tauric  prov- 
inces. The  King  of  Poland  waited  seven  weeks  at  Kanev  for  a 
few  hours'  audience  with  the  Tsarina;  the  Emperor  of  the  Ro- 
mans arrived  soon  afterwards  to  pay  his  homage  to  her.  Europe 
looked  on  with  wonder  and  uneasiness,  and  the  Turks  prepared 
for  war.  Joseph  had  gone  to  the  Crimea  much  against  his  will, 
loaded  down  with  a  set  of  Kaunitz's  most  masterly  and  vol- 
uminous instructions  and  determined  to  do  his  utmost  to  dissuade 
his  ally  from  attempting  the  execution  of  the  '  grand  plan  '  just 
then.  The  meeting  passed  off  brilliantly  and  satisfactorily;  the 
Emperor  returned  to  Vienna  reassured.  Some  weeks  later 
(August  16,  1787)  the  Porte  declared  war  on  Russia.  Joseph  at 
once  acknowledged  the  casus  foederis,  though  his  public  declara- 
tion of  war  against  Turkey  was  issued  only  in  the  following 
February.  After  so  many  years  of  planning,  the  allies  were  now 
called  upon  to  carry  out  their  projects,  and  they  were  caught  only 
half  prepared.  It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the  despised  Turks 
would  prove  such  easy  victims  as  had  been  imagined,  whether  the 
other  Powers  would  quietly  look  on,  and  especially  whether  the 
two  states  that  had  suffered  most  from  the  pressure  of  the  Im- 
perial Courts  would  not  seize  the  opportunity  to  make  trouble. 
Those  states  were  Prussia  and  Poland. 

Teilung  Polens,"  F.  B.  P.  G.,  xviii,  pp.  165  s.;  F.  K.  Wittichen,  Preussen  und 
England,  pp.  18  f.;  Koser,  "  Aus  dem  ersten  Regierungsjahre  Friedrich  Wil- 
helms  II,"  F.  B.  P.  G.,  iv,  p.  600;  Welschinger,  Mirabeau  d  Berlin,  pp.  303,  402. 


CHAPTER   III 

The  Designs  of  Prussia 


Great  was  the  satisfaction  felt  at  Berlin  over  the  outbreak  of  the 
Oriental  war.  Prussia  at  once  found  herself  in  an  extraordinarily- 
favorable  situation.  With  the  forces  of  the  Imperial  Courts  tied 
up  in  an  arduous  and  costly  enterprise,  with  the  other  Powers 
suing  for  the  friendship  of  Berlin,  with  the  supposedly  invincible 
army  and  the  well-filled  treasury  left  by  the  late  King,  under  an 
ambitious  new  sovereign  and  a  veteran  minister  who  aspired  to 
surpass  all  that  the  great  Frederick  had  done,  Prussia  seemed  to 
be  in  a  position  to  make  herself  the  arbiter  of  the  Continent  and 
the  foremost  Power  in  Europe.  Everyone  at  Berlin  agreed  that  a 
unique  moment  for  great  enterprises  had  come;  but  the  question 
as  to  just  what  was  to  be  done  was  not  so  simple.  One  party  was 
for  forming  an  alliance  with  England,  Sweden,  and  Poland,  com- 
ing actively  to  the  aid  of  the  Turks,  and  fighting  out  the  contest 
with  Austria  to  a  finish.  If  Russia  stood  by  her  ally,  the  Turks, 
Poles,  and  Swedes  could  keep  her  busy.  By  fighting  two  or  three 
campaigns  now,  it  was  said,  Prussia  could  realize  all  her  most 
cherished  ambitions,  place  her  position  as  a  great  Power  upon  an 
indestructible  basis,  and  win  peace  for  the  next  century.1  Such 
plans  were  bold  and  alluring,  but  they  were  open  to  grave  objec- 
tions. What  reliance  could  be  placed  on  the  Turks,  after  the 
figure  they  had  made  in  their  last  war,  or  on  such  a  mad  knight- 
errant  as  the  King  of  Sweden,  or  on  the  feeble  and  inconstant 
Poles  ?  The  new  Prussian  entente  with  England  was  still  in  a 
very  uncertain  stage,  and  Pitt  had  hitherto  manifested  no  great 
interest  in  Eastern  affairs.  Besides,  it  ran  contrary  to  Frederician 
traditions  to  provoke  or  even  risk  a  war  with  Russia.  The  alliance 

1  Cf.  the  ideas  of  Diez  in  Zinkeisen,  op.  cil.,  vi,  p.  687;  of  Goltz,  Herrmann, 
op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  200  ff.;  also  the  plans  described  by  Askenazy,  Przymierze  polsko- 
pruskie,  pp.  19-24. 


j6  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

with  the  Empress  had  not  yet  expired,1  and  there  was  no  wish 
dearer  to  most  Prussian  statesmen  than  to  restore  the  onetime 
intimacy  of  that  connection.  The  indications  from  St.  Petersburg 
were  not  unfavorable;  for  the  Russian  ministers  talked  most 
obligingly,  and  the  Vice-Chancellor  Ostermann  even  spoke  of 
the  acquisitions  which  Prussia  might  make  in  the  course  of  this 
war.2  Would  it  not  be  wiser,  therefore,  to  play  the  part  of  the 
zealous  friend,  try  to  draw  the  Empress  away  from  the  Court  of 
Vienna,  and  in  the  end  be  paid  for  one's  services  by  a  handsome 
acquisition  in  Poland  ?  That  was,  at  least,  the  policy  that  pre- 
vailed at  Berlin  at  the  outbreak  of  the  Oriental  war;  and  if  it  led 
to  a  fiasco,  one  cannot  deny  that  it  seemed  at  the  start  well 
adapted  to  circumstances.  Later  events  were  to  prove  that  it  was 
easier  to  make  acquisitions  in  Poland  in  alliance  with  Russia  than 
in  opposition  to  her. 

But  the  particular  plan  through  which  Prussia  attempted  to 
carry  out  this  policy  was  in  truth  the  unluckiest  that  could  be 
imagined.  We  have  seen  that  Count  Hertzberg,  now  the  leading 
minister  of  Frederick  William  II,  had,  years  before,  evolved  a 
scheme  by  which,  as  he  thought,  the  mistakes  of  Frederick  II  at 
the  time  of  the  First  Partition  could  be  rectified,  the  Polish  Ques- 
tion settled  to  perfection,  and  the  whole  equilibrium  of  Europe 
assured  in  saecula  saeculorum.  Towards  the  end  of  1787  and  at 
the  beginning  of  1788,  the  long- treasured  revelation,  with  some 
adaptation  to  present  circumstances,  was  submitted  for  royal 
approval,  and  confided  in  the  greatest  secrecy  to  most  of  the  Prus- 
sian representatives  abroad,  and  to  a  great  part  of  the  foreign 
ministers  at  Berlin.  The  plan,  now  as  in  1778,  had  two  chief 
aims:  to  secure  for  Prussia  the  desired  acquisitions  in  Poland,  and 
to  oust  the  Austrians  from  Galicia.  This  was  to  be  effected  by 
purely  diplomatic  means,  and  of  the  most  extraordinary  sort. 
Prussia  was  to  induce  the  belligerent  Powers  to  accept  her  media- 
tion, and  the  following  terms  of  peace:  (1)  the  Porte  should  cede 
Wallachia  and  Moldavia  to  Austria,  and  Bessarabia  and  Oczakow 
to  Russia,  while  renouncing  all  claims  to  the  Crimea:  in  return  for 

1  The  alliance  lapsed  only  in  April,  1788. 

2  Bailleu,  "  Graf  Hertzberg,"  H.  Z.,  xlii,  p.  468. 


THE  DESIGNS  OF  PRUSSIA  J  J 

this,  Prussia  and  her  allies  would  undertake  an  eternal  guarantee 
of  the  Turkish  possessions  south  of  the  Danube;  (2)  Austria 
should  restore  Galicia  to  Poland;  (3)  the  Poles,  fired  with  grati- 
tude, should  cede  Dantzic,  Thorn  and  the  palatinates  of  Posen 
and  Kalisz  to  Prussia.  The  monstrous  impracticability  of  this 
plan  has  been  so  often  exposed  that  further  criticism  seems  almost 
superfluous.  Though  Hertzberg  compared  his  scheme  to  the 
"  egg  of  Columbus  "  and  found  that  "  no  reasonable  man  could 
resist  it,"  1  still  he  was  probably  the  only  person  at  that  time 
who  believed  in  the  project,  and  no  plan  has  ever  been  more 
unanimously  condemned  by  historians.2  The  idea  that,  of  five 
Powers  concerned,  three  would  voluntarily  submit  to  be  robbed, 
and  the  fourth,  from  sheer  gaiety  of  heart,  to  accept  foreign  dicta- 
tion, for  the  benefit  of  the  fifth,  which  had  done  nothing  whatever 
except  to  invent  this  marvelous  panacea  —  this  was  a  thought 
that  could  arise  only  in  the  mind  of  an  elderly  pedant  who 
imagined  that  his  memoires  were  perfectly  irresistible,  and  who, 
as  Mirabeau  said,  "  saw  nothing  in  this  sublunary  sphere  but 
Hertzberg  and  Prussia."  3 

All  through  the  winter  of  1787-88  Hertzberg  dwelt  in  a  fool's 
paradise.  The  King,  who  in  October  had  indicated  his  perfect 
willingness  to  take  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Vistula,  if  an  oppor- 
tunity presented  itself,4  was  slowly  won  over  to  give  at  least  a 
provisional  assent  to  the  '  grand  plan.'  Diez  at  Constantinople 
received  copious  instructions  to  prepare  the  infidels  to  receive  the 
great  light.  The  Russians  were  overwhelmed  with  kindness. 
After  offering  the  Empress  Prussian  mediation,  subsidies  for  the 
war,  and  a  renewal  of  the  alliance  treaty,  Hertzberg  waited  only 
for  the  expected  favorable  answer,  before  laying  his  plan  formally 
before  her.  March  12,  1788,  the  answer  was  delivered  in  Berlin: 
the  Prussian  proposals  were  one  and  all  declined  or  evaded.    At 

1  Luckwaldt,  in  F.  B.  P.  G.,  xv,  p.  97;   Zinkciscn,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  676. 

2  From  the  long  list  of  writers  who  have  condemned  it,  one  might  cite  Bailleu, 
Duncker,  Treitschke,  Koser,  Luckwaldt,  Krauel,  Andreae,  Kalinka,  and  Askenazy. 
Almost  the  only  defenders  have  been  the  brothers  Paul  and  F.  K.  Wittichen,  whose 
recent  attempts  at  a  vindication  of  Hertzberg  are  far  from  convincing. 

3  Welschinger,  Mirabeau  a  Berlin,  p.  206. 

4  Luckwaldt,  in  F.  B.  P.  G.,  xv,  p.  97. 


78  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

the  moment  when  Joseph  II  was  beginning  hostilities  against  the 
Turks,  Catherine  was  not  inclined  to  compromise  herself  by  a 
suspicious  intimacy  with  Prussia. 

The  first  onslaught  had  failed,  but  Hertzberg  was  not  the  man 
to  give  up  the  battle.  He  concluded  only  that  patience  and  the 
support  of  some  other  Power  were  needed.  Hence  he  next 
started  negotiations  with  England  for  converting  the  existing 
entente  into  an  alliance,  while  he  continued  to  lavish  professions 
of  friendship  at  St.  Petersburg;  he  refused  the  proposals  of 
Sweden,  which  was  just  then  preparing  to  attack  the  Empress; 
and  he  waited  with  longing  to  hear  of  the  expected  Russian 
victories  over  the  Turks.  The  presence  in  Berlin  during  the 
summer  of  a  Russian  secret  agent  of  pronounced  Prussian  sym- 
pathies, Alopeus,  was  encouraging;  and,  with  the  conclusion  of 
the  Triple  Alliance  with  England  and  Holland  in  August,  Hertz- 
berg thought  himself  on  the  highroad  to  success.  If  his  new  allies 
would  only  properly  back  him  up,  if  the  Turks  were  once  so 
soundly  thrashed  that  they  could  seek  safety  only  under  the 
protection  of  Prussia,  if  Catherine  would  only  accept  the  hand 
of  friendship  held  out  to  her  from  Berlin,  if  the  Austrians  and 
Poles  could  be  cajoled  or  coerced  into  accepting  arrangements  so 
suitable  for  them  and  so  profitable  for  Prussia,  then  the  success 
of  the  '  grand  plan  '  was  assured. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  however,  not  one  of  these  conditions  was 
likely  to  be  fulfilled.  Pitt,  while  glad  to  cooperate  with  Prussia  in 
restoring  peace  in  the  Orient,  was  by  no  means  disposed  to  back 
up  Prussian  schemes  of  aggrandizement.1  The  perverse  Turks 
exasperated  their  friends  at  Berlin  by  not  getting  beaten.  In  the 
summer  of  1788  they  were  holding  their  own  against  the  Russians, 
and  winning  victory  after  victory  over  the  Austrians.  Above  all, 
unknown  to  Hertzberg,  the  Imperial  Courts  had  been  making  new 
agreements,  especially  designed  to  prevent  the  realization  of  the 
'  grand  plan.' 

1  Cf.  Salomon,  William  Pitt,  i'li,  pp.  339  ff.,  4442.;  Rose,  William  Pitt  and 
National  Revival,  pp.  386,  508  ff. 


THE  DESIGNS  OF  PRUSSIA  79 


II 


From  a  very  early  date  (December,  1787),  intercepted  dis- 
patches had  kept  the  Austrian  government  constantly  informed 
of  the  development  of  Hertzberg's  projects.  Joseph  found  the 
grand  plan  '  as  inadmissible  as  it  was  ridiculous  '  ;  Kaunitz 
called  it  a  '  chimera  ' ; l  nevertheless  they  hastened  to  raise  the 
alarm  at  St.  Petersburg.  It  was  above  all  things  necessary  to 
make  sure  that  Russia  would  not  succumb  to  Hertzberg's  seduc- 
tions. The  ambassador  Cobenzl  was  ordered  to  propose  that  the 
two  Courts  should  pledge  themselves  to  resist  with  all  their  forces 
any  Prussian  attempt  to  make  acquisitions  in  Poland,  and  that 
they  should  at  once  set  to  work  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  the 
Republic.2  In  case  of  an  attack  on  the  part  of  Prussia,  they  might 
even  promise  the  Poles  the  restoration  of  the  provinces  ceded  to 
that  Court  at  the  time  of  the  Partition. 

On  the  receipt  of  these  instructions,  Cobenzl  exerted  himself  to 
the  utmost  to  ruin  the  Hertzberg  plan,  once  and  for  all.  There 
was  no  possible  case,  he  declared  incessantly,  in  which  his  Court 
could  consent  to  an  aggrandizement  of  Prussia ;  a  gain  for  them- 
selves, if  coupled  with  advantages  for  their  natural  enemy,  would 
be  only  a  loss;  the  acquisitions  contemplated  by  Prussia  in  Poland 
were  contrary  to  the  fundamental  interests  of  both  the  Imperial 
Courts;  and,  if  necessary,  Austria  would  abandon  the  Turkish 
war  and  sacrifice  every  other  consideration,  in  order  to  oppose  the 
Prussian  designs  with  all  her  might.3 

This  language  and  these  demands  did  not  cause  unmixed 
pleasure  at  St.  Petersburg.  Though  they  were  far  from  capti- 
vated by  the  Hertzberg  plan,  and  were,  in  general,  opposed  to 
Prussian  acquisitions  in  Poland  at  that  time,  the  Russians  dis- 
liked binding  themselves  by  too  precise  engagements,  and  were 
even  less  inclined  to  take  Austria  into  the  alliance  then  under 

1  Joseph  to  L.  Cobenzl,  December  11,  1787,  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liv,  pp.  229  f.; 
Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  December  7,  1787  and  February  7,  1788,  V.  A.,  Riissland, 
Fxpeditionen. 

2  The  project  of  alliance  had  been  included  in  the  instructions  given  Cobenzl 
on  his  return  to  Russia  in  1 786.  The  orders  mentioned  in  the  text  are  dated  Decem- 
ber 7,  1787. 

3  Cobenzl's  reports  of  February  3  and  March  1,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1788. 


8o 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


discussion  between  themselves  and  Poland.  They  could  not, 
however,  rebuff  their  ally  in  so  serious  a  matter  during  the  first 
months  of  the  joint  war  on  the  Turks.  Hence,  after  long  delays, 
CobenzPs  importunities  were  crowned  with  success.  On  May  21, 
1788,  he  received  from  the  Russians  a  formal  ministerial  declara- 
tion, to  the  effect  that  if  the  King  of  Prussia,  under  the  present 
circumstances,  undertook  to  acquire  any  of  the  possessions  of  the 
Republic  of  Poland,  the  Empress  of  Russia  bound  herself  to  unite 
with  the  Emperor  of  the  Romans  in  making  the  most  urgent 
representations  to  deter  the  King  from  such  an  intention.  If 
these  representations  proved  fruitless,  she  promised  to  make  com- 
mon cause  with  the  Emperor  in  opposing  the  execution  of  such  a 
plan  with  all  the  forces  and  means  that  she  could  employ  com- 
patibly with  the  security  of  her  Empire  and  the  need  of  defending 
herself  against  the  Porte.  The  Russian  ministers  announced  that 
this  declaration  had  the  force  of  a  formal  treaty,  and  that  they 
held  it  superfluous  to  require  a  similar  pledge  from  Austria.1 

The  Austrians  professed  themselves  completely  satisfied.  So 
far  as  Russia  could  be  considered  bound  by  a  solemn  engagement, 
they  could  rest  assured  that  she  would  not  consent  to  the  Hertz- 
berg  plan  or  to  any  other  Prussian  designs  upon  Poland.  But  if 
paper  guarantees  availed,  Poland  would  never  have  been  parti- 
tioned. The  declaration  remained  a  secret  of  the  two  Imperial 
cabinets,  unknown  at  Berlin  or  at  Warsaw.  In  the  following 
years  it  did  not  prevent  either  Austrians  or  Russians  from  con- 
sidering seriously  the  sacrifice  of  Polish  territory  to  Prussia,  when- 

1  The  Russian  attitude  in  this  matter  can  be  explained  from  the  memoir  pre- 
sented by  Bezborodko  to  the  Empress,  printed  in  the  Pycdrifi  ApxHBi,  1875,  "» 
p.  35;  and  the  protocols  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  for  December  23,  1787/Janu- 
ary  3,  1788;  and  April  20/May  1,  1788,  in  the  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  518  ff., 
556  f.  Kalinka,  the  first  historian  to  discover  this  convention,  gave  a  satis- 
factory account  of  its  origin,  except  that  he  erroneously  states  that  Russia  demanded 
a  similar  declaration  from  Austria;  he  also  gives  the  essence  of  the  text  of  the 
agreement,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  i,  pp.  52-55.  The  translator  of  the  German 
edition  of  Kalinka's  work  adds  in  a  note  that  the  text  of  this  Austro-Russian  treaty 
is  not  to  be  found  among  the  acts  of  either  the  Warsaw  or  the  St.  Petersburg  mission 
in  the  Vienna  Haus-Hof-und  Staalsarchiv.  This  is  an  error.  The  original  of  the 
Russian  '  declaration  '  is  to  be  found  appended  to  Louis  Cobenzl's  report  of 
May  24  among  the  Berichte,  Russland,  1788.  Since  this  document  has  never 
hitherto  been  published,  I  give  the  text  in  Appendix  I. 


THE  DESIGNS  OF  PRUSSIA  8 1 

ever  interest  or  necessity  suggested  such  a  course.  Yet  if  its 
practical  results  were  small,  the  declaration  still  has  a  certain 
historical  significance  as  the  most  explicit  expression  of  the  deter- 
mination of  Austria  and  Russia  at  that  time  to  maintain  the 
integrity  of  Poland. 

In  the  same  dispatches  with  which  he  transmitted  the  Russian 
declaration,  Cobenzl  reported  that  the  alliance  of  Russia  with  the 
Republic  was  well  under  way.  Not,  indeed,  that  alliance  in 
which  Austria  also  would  have  participated,  as  Kaunitz  desired, 
for  it  did  not  accord  with  Russian  policy  to  admit  any  other  Power 
to  so  close  a  connection  with  Poland.  Yet  the  proposed  alliance 
between  the  Empress  and  the  Republic  had  no  other  object 
(Ostermann  asserted)  than  that  which  the  Austrians  had  sug- 
gested: namely,  to  assure  the  Imperial  Courts,  of  Polish  aid  in 
case  of  a  war  with  Prussia.  This  was,  indeed,  the  plan  Catherine 
had  chosen  for  thwarting  the  designs  of  Hertzberg  and  for  keep- 
ing the  Republic  in  order  while  the  Oriental  crisis  lasted.  The 
plan  bore  great  results.  It  precipitated  precisely  the  troubles  it 
was  intended  to  avert. 


CHAPTER   IV 


The  Plan  for  a  Russo-Polish  Alliance 


Stanislas  Augustus,  with  all  his  weakness  of  will  in  emergencies, 
displayed  a  remarkable  tenacity  and  perseverance  in  the  pursuit 
of  his  fundamental  aims.  From  the  beginning  of  his  reign  down 
to  its  tragic  close,  he  was  haunted  by  the  desire  to  increase  his 
monarchical  power,  to  augment  the  army  and  the  revenues  of  the 
state,  and  to  restore  Poland  to  its  place  among  the  active  mem- 
bers of  the  European  political  system.  "  Born  with  a  vast  and 
ardent  ambition,"  he  said  of  himself,  "  the  ideas  of  reform,  of 
glory,  of  usefulness  to  my  country  have  become  the  background 
of  all  my  plans  and  of  my  whole  life."  x  Defeated  again  and  again, 
he  invariably  returned  to  his  projects,  by  new  detours,  timidly, 
cautiously,  but  obstinately.  The  experiences  of  the  first  decade 
of  his  reign  had  convinced  him  that  nothing  was  to  be  accom- 
plished in  opposition  to  Russia ;  but  he  still  hoped  that  much  good 
might  be  effected  with  the  consent  and  under  the  protection  of  the 
Empress.  The  great  thing  was  to  persuade  her  that  it  was  to  her 
interest  to  make  Poland  strong  enough  to  render  active  services, 
rather  than  to  leave  the  country  a  prey  to  impotence,  anarchy, 
and  constant  troubles.  Especially  in  case  of  war  between  Russia 
and  her  neighbors,  the  King  hoped  that  Catherine  would  be  will- 
ing to  purchase  Polish  aid  by  permitting  those  military,  financial, 
and  political  reforms,  without  which  the  Republic  could  not 
cooperate  effectively.  It  has  already  been  noted  that  during  the 
War  of  the  Bavarian  Succession  Stanislas  thought  of  an  alliance 
with  Russia;  and  during  the  ensuing  crisis  over  the  Crimean 
affair,  he  offered  his  alliance  at  St.  Petersburg.2     Decorously 

1  Kalinka,  Ostalnie  lata,  i,  p.  80. 

2  The  date  of  this  offer  is  given  as  1782  by  Askenazy,  Przymierze  polsko-pruskie, 
p.  28;  and  1783,  by  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  i,  p.  56. 

82 


THE  RUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  PROJECT  83 

repulsed  on  this  occasion,  he  returned  to  the  idea  some  years 
later. 

During  his  stay  at  Kanev  (March-May,  1787),  the  King  laid 
before  Catherine  and  her  advisers  the  outlines  of  a  plan  for  a 
defensive  alliance  against  the  Turks;  and  this  time  he  received 
the  Empress'  assent,  at  least  in  principle.1  In  September,  after 
the  Porte  had  begun  hostilities,  he  hastened  to  send  the  draft  of  a 
formal  treaty  to  St.  Petersburg.  He  proposed  that  the  Republic 
should  join  actively  in  the  war,  and  that  he  himself  should  take 
command  of  one  of  the  allied  armies.  In  return  he  begged  for 
some  extension  of  his  royal  prerogatives,  the  increase  of  the  army, 
a  large  subsidy  for  the  expenses  of  the  war,  and,  at  the  peace,  the 
acquisition  for  Poland  of  Bessarabia,  part  of  Moldavia,  and  a  port 
on  the  Black  Sea.  The  alliance  was  to  be  brought  about  by  means 
of  a  Confederation,  which  would  also  serve  to  prevent  internal 
disorders  in  Poland  during  the  crisis.2  Seldom  had  this  unfortu- 
nate King  allowed  his  imagination  so  bold  a  flight.  Whether  the 
plan  in  itself  was  salutary  and  statesmanlike  or  quite  the  reverse, 
is  a  disputed  question  that  need  not  be  argued  here.3  The  essential 
fact  is  that  the  better  parts  of  the  King's  project  had  not  the 
slightest  chance  of  being  accepted  at  St.  Petersburg. 

Catherine  was  not  in  the  least  disposed  either  to  gratify  the 
personal  ambitions  which  she  detected  in  Stanislas'  proposals,  or 
to  allow  the  Republic  a  greater  measure  of  strength  and  inde- 
pendence. She  attached  little  importance  to  the  military  aid  that 
Poland  might  render;  and  while  she  did  desire  an  alliance,  it  must 
be  one  on  her  own  terms.  The  primary  object  of  it  would  be  to 
keep  the  Poles  busy  with  a  harmless  enterprise,  nattering  to  their 
vanity  and  capable  of  diverting  their  attention  from  more  dan- 
gerous projects.  A  Confederation  under  her  auspices  would 
enable  her  to  put  down  possible  outbreaks  with  firmer  hand,  while 

1  Cf.  the  note  presented  by  the  King  to  the  Empress  May  6,  1787,  Memoires 
de  Stanislas  Auguste,  pp.  95-99;  also  the  very  interesting  correspondence  of  the 
King  from  Kanev,  printed  by  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii,  pp.  5-64. 

2  The  text  of  this  proposed  treaty  has  not  yet  been  found.  The  essential  features 
of  it  can  be  ascertained,  however,  from  the  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the  time. 
Cf.  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  i,  pp.  58  f. 

3  Cf.  the  qualified  approval  given  the  plan  by  Kalinka,  op.  oil.,  i,  pp.  56  fif.; 
and  the  unmitigated  condemnation  expressed  by  Askenazy,  op.  tit.,  pp.  30  ff. 


84  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

various  articles  might  be  inserted  into  the  alliance  treaty  that 
would  extend  her  legal  rights  of  guardianship  over  the  Republic. 
As  for  the  means,  she  would  not  hear  of  a  Confederation  without 
a  Diet,  or  of  the  calling  of  an  extraordinary  Diet,  as  the  King 
proposed,  for  that  would  arouse  the  suspicion  of  the  neighbors; 
she  would  wait  until  the  next  ordinary  Diet  met,  in  the  autumn  of 
1788,  then  put  through  the  alliance  as  quickly  and  as  quietly  as 
possible,  and  present  the  other  Powers  with  a.  fait  accompli.1 

While  Catherine  was  thus  deliberately  delaying  the  project, 
she  was  being  attacked  from  other  quarters  on  the  same  subject. 
Simultaneously  with  Stanislas'  propositions,  she  received  the 
offers  of  the  most  active  leader  of  the  anti-royalist  opposition  in 
Poland,  the  Grand  Hetman  Branicki.  He,  too,  wished  a  Russian 
alliance,  but  one  to  be  put  through  by  a  Confederation  directed  by 
himself.  For  that  purpose  he  and  his  friend  Felix  Potocki, 
Palatine  of  (Little)  Russia,  offered  to  put  at  the  Empress'  disposal 
both  the  troops  of  the  Republic  and  their  own  private  militia. 
Catherine,  fortunately,  rejected  this  treasonable  offer  and  read 
the  two  magnates  a  lecture  on  patriotism; 2  but  she  was  soon  to 
hear  very  similar  proposals  from  a  much  more  exalted  personage. 

II 

Of  all  the  men  whose  activity  was  dangerous  and  baneful  to 
Poland  in  these  years,  Prince  Potemkin  the  Taurian  stands  fore- 
most. Field-Marshal,  President  of  the  War  College,  Commander- 
in-Chief  of  the  principal  army  against  the  Turks,  virtual  Viceroy 
of  all  Southern  Russia,  the  Empress'  most  intimate  friend,  her 
favorite  pupil,  her  "  right  hand,"  as  she  herself  said,  Potemkin 
wielded  enormous  power  and  influence;  and  these  facilities  he 
employed,  not  only  to  render  very  considerable  services  to  his 
benefactress,  but  also  to  advance  his  own  personal  ambitions. 
His  plans,  though  different  in  kind,  were  no  less  grandiose, 
revolutionary,    and    complicated    than   Hertzberg's;    and,    like 

1  For  some  discussion  as  to  Catherine's  attitude  towards  the  Russo-Polish 
alliance  project,  see  Appendix  II. 

2  Branicki  to  the  Empress,  September  9,  1787,  her  reply  of  September  30/ 
October  n,  M.  A.,  HojiBina,  II,  6. 


THE  RUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  PROJECT  85 

Hertzberg's,  they  related  especially  to  Poland.  It  is  important 
to  bear  in  mind  that  during  the  prolonged  Oriental  crisis  the 
Republic  was  equally  threatened  by  the  Prussian  thirst  for  ag- 
grandizement on  the  one  side,  and  by  the  ambitions  of  Potemkin 
on  the  other. 

The  Prince's  secret  designs,1  once  centered  upon  the  Polish 
crown,  were  now  directed  rather  upon  those  rich  palatinates  of 
the  south  that  would  form  so  capital  an  addition  to  his  prospec- 
tive '  Kingdom  of  Dacia.'  To  further  his  plans,  he  had  long 
maintained  a  party  of  his  own  in  the  Republic,  a  party  whose 
activity  conflicted  incessantly  with  the  official  policy  of  Russia  as 
represented  by  the  ambassador  Stackelberg.  To  strengthen  his 
position  in  the  south,  the  Prince  was  continually  making  immense 
purchases  of  land  in  the  Polish  Ukraine.  His  possessions  became 
so  large  that  he  thought  for  a  time  of  having  them  erected  into  a 
vassal  principality,  something  like  Courland.  But  the  outbreak 
of  the  Turkish  war  and  Stanislas  Augustus'  proposals  for  a 
Russo-Polish  alliance  opened  the  way  to  even  more  ambitious 
projects.  What  could  be  more  tempting  to  Potemkin  than  to 
draw  the  Republic  into  the  struggle,  get  its  military  forces  under 
his  control,  occupy  the  coveted  southern  provinces  with  his 
troops,  and  then  by  means  of  a  Confederation  under  his  own 
direction  make  himself  dictator  of  Poland  and  put  through  what 
changes  he  saw  fit  ? 

The  Prince  was  versatile.  He  knew  several  routes  to  the  goal. 
Although  at  Kanev  he  had  championed  Stanislas'  alliance  proj- 
ect and  later  continued  to  negotiate  with  the  King,  at  the  same 
time  he  was  framing  with  the  leaders  of  the  Opposition  very 
different  plans,  vast  in  scope  and  revolutionary  in  character.  A 
coup  d'etat,  the  overthrow  of  the  royal  power,  the  establishment 
of  an  oligarchy,  even  the  transformation  of  the  Republic  into  a 
federation  of  provinces  or  principalities  —  such  appear  to  have 
been  some  of  the  objects  of  these  mysterious  pourparlers.  Early 
in  1788  Potemkin  sent  to  St.  Petersburg  the  plan  of  action  which 
he  had  agreed  upon  with  Branicki  and  Felix  Potocki.  He  pro- 
posed to  raise  quickly  and  secretly  an  armed  force  ('  national 

1  On  Potemkin's  schemes  with  regard  to  Poland,  see  Appendix  III. 


86  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

militia  ')  in  the  southern  palatinates,  with  the  aid  of  those  mag- 
nates and  szlachta  who  were  most  devoted  to  Russia ;  this  '  militia ' 
would  then  form  a  Confederation  in  the  provinces,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  the  Russian  troops  and  remote  from  the  malign  in- 
fluence of  the  King  and  the  agents  of  foreign  Powers;  it  would 
take  over  the  government  of  the  country,  overawe  or  beat  down 
any  opposition  that  might  be  attempted,  conclude  a  close  alliance 
between  the  Republic  and  the  Empress,  and,  in  general,  put 
through  anything  that  Russia  might  desire.  Had  this  plan  been 
carried  out,  the  result  would  have  been  the  overthrow  of  the  King 
and  the  lawful  government  of  Poland,  a  repetition  of  the  dis- 
graceful Confederation  of  Radom,  or  a  premature  mise-en-scene 
of  the  dismal  tragedy  of  1792. 

These  projects  were  the  more  dangerous  because  the  Polish 
malcontents  who  swarmed  in  Potemkin's  camp,  were  also  in  rela- 
tions with  Hertzberg,  to  whom  nothing  would  have  given  greater 
pleasure  than  an  outbreak  of  anarchy  in  the  Republic.  The 
Prussian  troops  would  at  once  have  crossed  the  frontier  '  to 
restore  order.'  And  Potemkin  himself  now  inclined  towards  the 
Prussian  alliance.  He  continually  urged  the  Empress  to  show 
more  cordiality  to  Frederick  William,  and  even  to  win  him  over 
by  the  gift  of  Dantzic;  and  he  seems,  through  his  Polish  friends,  to 
have  sounded  Berlin  with  reference  to  his  own  plans.  Obviously 
he  had  more  to  expect  from  that  quarter  than  from  Vienna. 

Even  these  measures  did  not  exhaust  the  schemes  of  the 
Tauric  Prince.  There  was  still  one  more  plan  in  reserve  —  and 
this  the  most  audacious  of  all.  Potemkin  had  an  extraordinary 
passion  for  Cossacks.  Although  it  was  he  who  had  induced  the 
Empress  to  destroy  the  Zaporozhian  Sec  1  in  1775,  he  had  later 
made  great  efforts  to  create  new  Cossack  armies;  and  especially 
in  the  winter  of  1787-88  he  was  indefatigable  in  his  exertions  to 
enlist  Cossacks  from  every  quarter.  His  recruiting  officers  were 
particularly  busy  in  Poland.  Doubtless  the  new  Cossack  forces, 
which  were  the  object  of  such  extraordinary  care,  were  of  much 
use  for  the  Turkish  war;   but  there  is  reason  to  think  that  they 

1  The  famous  fortified  camp  of  the  free  Cossacks  of  the  Dnieper,  situated  on  an 
island  just  below  the  cataracts  of  the  river. 


THE  RUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  PROJECT  87 

were  also  raised  with  a  view  to  one  other  emergency.  If  all  his 
other  Polish  plans  failed,  if  the  alliance  fell  through,  if  the  hostile 
party  gained  the  upper  hand  in  the  Republic,  then  Potemkin 
might  enter  the  country  at  the  head  of  a  Cossack  army,  rouse  the 
Orthodox  population  of  the  Ukraine,  and  repeat  the  exploits  of 
Bogdan  Chmielnicki. 

We  have  dwelt  at  length  on  these  astonishing  projects  for 
several  reasons.  In  the  first  place,  Potemkin's  intrigues  with 
Branicki,  Potocki,  and  their  associates  at  the  beginning  of  the  new 
crisis  in  Polish  affairs  form  the  first  link  in  a  chain  that  ends  at 
Targowica.  Then  it  has  been  so  often  asserted  that  the  Republic 
ought  to  have  taken  its  position  firmly  and  unconditionally  on 
the  Russian  side  in  this  crisis,  that  it  is  of  importance  to  indicate 
to  some  extent  what  advantages  Poland  might  have  expected  from 
an  alliance  which  would  have  handed  over  her  army,  her  military 
and  financial  resources,  her  strongholds,  her  southern  provinces 
to  so  inveterate  an  enemy,  so  dangerous  a  schemer  as  Potemkin. 
Finally,  the  Prince's  secret  plans  form  an  essential  part  of  the 
background  of  Russia's  Polish  policy  in  the  next  few  years. 
Catherine  did  not,  indeed,  blindly  accept  his  advice;  but,  on  the 
other  hand,  she  did  not  entirely  disregard  it.  She  generally  tried 
to  satisfy  him  to  some  extent;  she  made  many  compromises  and 
many  concessions.  Down  to  his  death  in  1791  his  opinions  and 
ambitions  weighed  heavily  on  the  fate  of  Poland;  and  then, 
unfortunately,  his  plans  lived  after  him. 

Ill 

When  Catherine  was  finally  ready  to  declare  her  precise  inten- 
tions about  the  alliance,  the  plan  she  adopted  differed  materially 
from  the  proposals  both  of  Stanislas  and  of  Potemkin.  While  she 
distrusted  the  personal  ambitions  of  the  King,  she  also  divined 
to  some  extent  the  secret  schemes  of  the  favorite,  and  she  was 
beginning  to  find  them  in  conflict  with  her  own  policies.  As  early 
as  December  Potemkin's  growing  preference  for  the  Prussian 
alliance  had  provoked  from  her  an  unusually  sharp  letter.1     She 

1  November  23/December  4,  1787,  Pyc.  OrapHHa,  xvi,  pp.  441  ff. 


88  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

allowed  him  to  take  Polish  magnates  into  her  service,  approved 
his  plans  for  organizing  and  employing  the  Polish  armies,  and 
accepted  his  amendments  to  the  King's  plan  for  the  alliance 
treaty;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  she  firmly  rejected  his  plan  for  an 
anti-royalist  Confederation  in  the  provinces.  She  was  no  more 
inclined  to  sacrifice  the  King  to  the  Opposition,  than  to  surrender 
the  opposition  to  the  King;  and  she  could  not  lend  her  approval  to 
projects  that  would  almost  infallibly  provoke  a  civil  war  in  Poland. 

In  June,  1788,  nine  months  after  Stanislas  had  sent  his  prop- 
ositions to  St.  Petersburg,  the  Empress'  definite  reply  at  last 
reached  Warsaw.  The  alliance  was  to  be  effected  through  a 
confederated  Diet  under  the  direction  of  the  King  and  the 
ambassador  —  so  much  was  satisfactory;  but  the  other  desires  of 
Stanislas  were  evaded  or  refused.  The  expenses  incurred  by  the 
Republic  through  the  war  were  to  be  repaid  only  after  the  con- 
clusion of  peace,  and  then  in  instalments  spread  out  over  six 
years.  The  military  contingent  of  the  Poles,  cut  down  from 
20,000  to  1 2 ,000,  was  to  serve  under  the  supreme  command  of  the 
Russian  generals,  and  immediately  under  that  of  Branicki,  Felix 
Potocki,  and  Stanislas  Poniatowski  (this  was  one  of  the  conces- 
sions to  Potemkin) .  No  territorial  acquisitions  for  Poland  were  to 
be  thought  of.  None  of  the  modest  constitutional  reforms  for 
which  the  King  had  hoped,  were  granted.  Finally,  an  insidious 
article,  the  aim  of  which  was  to  enable  Russia  to  take  over  the 
diplomatic  representation  of  Poland  abroad,  contained  a  new 
encroachment  upon  the  independence  of  the  Republic.1  In  short, 
Stanislas  Augustus'  original  project  had  been  transformed  almost 
beyond  recognition.  From  this  alliance,  Russia  alone  could  have 
profited:  Poland  could  have  gained  nothing  whatever  except  a 
very  dubious  protection  against  the  designs  of  Prussia.  Never- 
theless, though  bitterly  disappointed,  the  King  accepted  the 
Russian  counter-project;  perhaps  because  it  was  now  too  late  to 
draw  back  without  offending  the  Empress. 

It  was  characteristic  of  Catherine's  policy  toward  her  chief  ally 
that  the  draft  of  this  treaty  was  communicated  at  Vienna  only 

1  For  detailed  analysis  of  this  Russian  counter-project,  see  Kalinka,  Der  polnische 
Reichstag,  i,  pp.  87  ff. 


THE  RUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  PROJECT  89 

when  the  Polish  Diet  was  on  the  point  of  assembling.  Kaunitz 
fumed  and  fretted;  nevertheless  he  ordered  the  Austrian  charge 
d'affaires  at  Warsaw  (de  Cache)  to  support  all  the  measures  of 
Russia,  while  he  himself  administered  sage  advice  to  those  Polish 
magnates  whom  he  could  influence.  Yet  just  before  the  Diet 
assembled,  the  growing  ferment  in  Poland  and  the  ominous 
attitude  of  Prussia  so  alarmed  the  Austrian  Chancellor  that  he 
hastened  to  urge  at  Petersburg  the  danger  of  even  proposing  an 
alliance  of  this  sort  at  such  a  time.  But  this  warning  came  too 
late.1 

IV 

Towards  the  end  of  August  Catherine  saw  fit,  as  a  matter  of 
courtesy,  to  communicate  the  alliance  project  to  Prussia.  She 
apparently  anticipated  no  serious  opposition;2  and  she  was  cer- 
tainly not  prepared  for  the  storm  that  followed. 

The  communication  produced  a  livery  sensation  at  Berlin;  and 
not  unnaturally,  for  it  seemed  to  mean  the  shipwreck  of  the 
whole  policy  pursued  so  patiently  for  the  past  year.  Hitherto  the 
Prussians  had  been  trying  to  win  back  Russia  by  amicable  means, 
in  the  fond  hope  of  persuading  the  Empress  to  sanction  their 
designs  on  Poland.  Now,  as  a  reward  for  all  their  complais- 
ance, they  were  presented  with  this  treaty,  which  contained 
Catherine's  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of  Poland,  which  was, 
therefore,  designed  to  close  the  door  in  their  faces,  and  to  thwart 
all  their  plans  for  aggrandizement.  The  proposed  alliance  seemed 
to  be  directed  entirely  against  Prussia,  and  it  was  the  more  dan- 
gerous because  Austria  would  probably  hasten  to  accede  to  it. 
This  alliance  must  be  prevented  at  all  costs.3 

1  For  the  above:  Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  June  28  and  September  20,  V.  A.,  Russ- 
land,  Exped.,  1788;  Kaunitz  to  Czartoryski,  August  26  and  29,  V.  A.,  Polcn,  Fasc. 
66;  Kaunitz  to  Rzewuski,  September  15  (printed  in  Beer,  Leopold  II,  Franz  II  imd 
Cathar ina,  pp.  246  f.);  Cobenzl's  report  of  October  10,  V.A.,  Russland,Berichle,  1788. 

2  See  her  remarks  on  Potemkin's  plan  for  the  alliance,  PycCKiii  ApxiiBt,  1874, 
ii,  pp.  274  ff. 

3  Hertzberg  to  the  King,  September  2,  joint  report  of  Hertzberg  and  Fincken- 
stein,  September  3,  rescript  to  Buchholtz,  September  3,  B.A.,  Fol.  323  ("Acta 
betreffend  die  Allianz  welche  die  Kayserin  von  Russland  der  Republick  Pohlen  ant- 
ragen  lassen  ...  hat ").    H.  to  F.  W.,  September  2:   "II  ne  peut  pas  etre  douteux 


9° 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Moreover,  it  seemed  clear  that  the  time  had  come  for  a  com- 
plete change  of  policy.  Now  at  last  Hertzberg  urged  acting  in 
open  opposition  to  Russia.1  At  Copenhagen,  at  Constantinople, 
at  Warsaw,  Prussian  policy  took  on  a  new  aggressiveness.  At 
that  moment,  Gustavus  III  having  attacked  Catherine,  the 
Danes,  in  accordance  with  the  terms  of  their  alliance  with  Russia, 
were  preparing  a  counter-attack  on  Sweden.  Berlin  immediately 
served  notice  that  if  Denmark  did  not  cease  hostilities,  16,000 
Prussian  troops  would  invade  Holstein.  Before  this  threat  and 
the  equally  vigorous  action  of  England,  the  Danes  backed  down. 
Hertzberg  could  hardly  have  dealt  the  Empress  a  severer  blow, 
for  at  a  time  when  the  Turkish  war  left  her  but  small  resources 
against  Sweden,  the  aid  of  Denmark  would  have  been  of  great 
importance.  It  was  a  clear  sign  of  the  revolution  that  had  taken 
place  in  Prussian  policy.  The  first  step  had  been  taken  in  that 
uncertain,  wavering,  ill-starred  course  which  in  the  next  few 
years  led  Prussian  statesmen  further  and  further  into  open  hos- 
tility to  the  Power  whose  friendship  they  most  desired,  and  into 
unnatural  alliances  with  states  whose  friendship  they  despised  or 
whose  territories  they  coveted.2 

As  regards  the  alliance  project,  the  official  Prussian  reply 
delivered  at  St.  Petersburg  left  no  doubt  of  the  King's  senti- 
ments.3 Buchholtz,  the  Prussian  envoy  at  Warsaw,  was  ordered 
to  do  his  utmost  to  thwart  the  project  by  working  up  public 
opinion  against  it  and  by  organizing  a  strong  Prussian  party.  If 
possible,  he  was  to  prevent  the  approaching  Diet  from  being  con- 
federated ;  if  necessary,  he  was  to  form  a  Counter-confederation, 
which  would  then  demand  the  aid  of  Prussian  troops.4  The 
cabinet  of  Berlin  was  ready,  in  fact,  to  proceed  to  any  extremity. 
If    the   Empress  persisted    in  her   "  presumption,"  Hertzberg 

que  cette  alliance  est  uniquement  dirigee  contre  V.  M.,  pour  lui  carrer  tout  agran- 
dissement,  et  que  l'interet  de  V.  M.  exige  par  consequent  de  faire  tout  ce  qui  sera 
possible  pour  la  contrecarrer.  .  .  ,  Je  crois  qu'en  general  V.  M.  sera  obligee 
bientot  de  montrer  les  dents  a.  la  cour  de  Russie." 

1  Report  to  the  King,  September  2,  and  Frederick  William's  reply,  September 
3,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323. 

2  On  this  abrupt  change,  see  Bailleu,  in  H.  Z.,  xlii,  pp.  484  ff. 

3  Rescript  to  Keller,  September  12,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323. 

4  Rescripts  to  Buchholtz,  September  3  and  16,  ibid. 


THE  RUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  PROJECT  9 1 

wrote,  she  would  force  the  King  to  take  sides  with  Sweden  and 
the  Porte.1 

The  Empress,  however,  was  not  so  rash.  Although  deeply- 
incensed  at  the  conduct  of  Prussia,  she  recognized  that  the 
Polish  alliance  was  not  worth  the  risk  of  a  third  war  in  addition 
to  the  two  she  already  had  on  her  hands,  and  so  she  ordered 
Stackelberg  to  suspend  negotiations  on  the  subject.  But  she 
could  not  bring  herself  to  renounce  entirely  a  plan  she  had  once 
taken  up:  she  therefore  added  that  if  a  more  favorable  oppor- 
tunity presented  itself  in  the  course  of  the  Diet,  the  alliance  proj- 
ect might  be  brought  forward  again.2 

By  this  reservation  Catherine  largely  destroyed  the  value  of 
her  concession.  The  Prussians  were  not  conciliated,  but  only 
filled  with  new  suspicions.  The  Empress,  they  fancied,  was  trying 
to  lull  them  to  slumber  in  order  later  on  to  surprise  them  with  a 
fait  accompli.  Hence  they  determined  to  persevere  in  their  policy 
of  stubborn  opposition.3  When  the  Diet  assembled,  it  was  under 
the  shadow  of  a  great  impending  struggle  between  Russia  and 
Prussia  for  control  in  Poland. 

1  Hertzberg  to  Buchholtz,  September  16.  In  equally  warlike  vein  Hertzberg 
to  the  King,  October  2,  Fol.  323. 

2  Buchholtz's  report  of  September  28,  B.  A.,  ibid. 

3  Hertzberg  and  Finckenstein  to  the  King,  October  3,  rescript  to  Buchholtz, 
October  4,  ibid. 


CHAPTER  V 


The  Overthrow  of  Russian  Rule  est  Poland 


'  Jam  venit  hora!  Now  is  the  time  to  provide  for  the  needs  of 
the  Fatherland.' l  Such  was  the  general  cry  in  Poland  at  the 
outbreak  of  the  Eastern  war.  The  distractions  of  its  neighbors 
seemed  to  furnish  the  country  the  long-desired  opportunity  to 
effect  indispensable  reforms,  and  such  a  chance  as  might  never 
occur  again.  "  Our  sons  and  grandsons,"  the  Dietine  of  Samo- 
gitia  declared,  "  will  not  live  to  see  a  better  occasion  than  we  now 
have  for  setting  our  house  in  order,  increasing  the  forces  of  the 
Republic,  assuring  our  liberties,  .  .  .  and  reviving  the  once 
famous  name  of  Poles."  2  To  neglect  this  opportunity  might 
mean  certain  ruin.  Staszic's  words  rang  in  men's  ears:  "All 
these  reforms  must  be  realized  as  soon  as  possible.  This  matter 
will  brook  no  delay.  The  sickness  is  violent:  it  demands  violent 
remedies."  3  It  appeared,  then,  that  the  supreme  moment  had 
come. 

Almost  the  whole  nation  demanded  a  confederated  Diet,  the 
main  task  of  which  should  be  to  put  through  a  very  substantial 
increase  of  the  army.  The  need  of  other  reforms  was  generally 
admitted.  But  precisely  what  these  other  reforms  should  be,  how 
far  they  should  go,  whether  the  nation  should  keep  within  the 
limits  imposed  by  the  Russian  guarantee  of  the  existing  constitu- 
tion, what  attitude  the  Republic  should  adopt  towards  the 
neighboring  Powers  —  on  those  questions  public  opinion  was 
divided.  Broadly  speaking,  there  were  two  programs  before 
the  country:  that  of  the  King,  and  that  of  the  loose  array  of  the 
opposition,  which  already  called  itself  '  the  Patriots.' 

1  Quoted  from  a  letter  of  M.  U.  Niemcewicz  to  the  King,  in  Zaleski,  Korespon- 
dencya  krajowa  Stanislawa  Augusta,  p.  214. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  246. 

3  Uwagi  nod  zyciem  J  ana  Zamojskiego,  p.  144. 

92 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  93 

The  King's  hopes  and  plans  have  already  been  described. 
They  were,  in  substance,  that  Poland  should  in  this  crisis  attach 
herself  to  Russia  more  firmly  than  ever,  taking  advantage  of  the 
opportunity,  indeed,  to  effect  certain  military  and  financial 
reforms,  but  only  such  as  Catherine  in  her  present  conciliatory 
mood  might  be  found  willing  to  permit.  This  was  the  policy  of 
extreme  prudence,  if  not  of  faint-heartedness  and  self-distrust.  It 
promised  hardly  more  than  a  slight  increase  of  the  army  —  per- 
haps to  30,000  men,  the  number  indicated  by  Catherine  in  the 
guarantee  treaty;  the  honor  of  sending  Polish  troops  to  fight  in 
the  Russian  ranks  in  a  purely  Russian  war;  and  the  precarious 
protection  of  the  Empress  against  the  designs  of  Prussia.  This 
was  very  little  to  offer  to  a  nation  which  expected  so  much.  Such 
a  program  was  not  fitted  to  inspire  or  to  arouse  to  supreme 
efforts,  but  rather  to  disgust  and  to  repel;  for  it  ran  counter  to 
the  nation's  instincts,  its  sense  of  dignity,  its  conviction  of  what 
the  occasion  demanded. 

Very  different  were  the  ideas  that  were  fermenting  in  the  minds 
of  the  Patriots.  Vague  and  inchoate  as  their  program  was,  it 
still  pointed  unmistakably  to  two  goals:  the  realization  of  very 
thoroughgoing  reforms,  —  of  the  kind  sketched  by  Staszic;  and 
the  vindication  of  Poland's  independence.  These  two  ideals  were 
really  inseparable.  No  far-reaching,  solid,  and  decisive  political 
reforms  were  possible  as  long  as  Russia  maintained  her  grip  upon 
the  country.  The  elimination  of  the  Russian  '  guarantee  '  and  the 
overthrow  of  the  Russian  '  influence  '  were  necessary  before  the 
army  could  be  brought  up  to  a  really  respectable  standard  or  the 
vicious  constitution  replaced  by  something  better. 

The  program  of  the  Patriots  was  bold  and  alluring,  but 
was  it  wise  or  prudent  or  practicable  ?  It  appeared  that  there 
was  a  reasonable  chance  of  success  only  in  case  Poland  could 
count  on  the  friendship  or,  if  need  be,  the  support  of  one  of  the 
neighboring  Powers;  and  as  matters  then  stood,  such  support 
could  come  only  from  Prussia.  Of  the  dangers  lurking  in  such  a 
connection,  of  the  natural  ambitions  and  the  ill-concealed  cupid- 
ity of  Prussia,  the  Patriots  were  by  no  means  ignorant.  Their 
leaders  cannot  fairly  be  accused  of  having  thrown  themselves 


94 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


blindly  into  the  arms  of  their  worst  enemy.  From  the  outset  they 
recognized  that  Prussia  had  been,  and  under  certain  conditions 
might  again  become,  the  most  dangerous  foe  of  Poland.  But  the 
existing  circumstances  gave  ground  for  hope.  As  long  as  the 
close  connection  between  the  Imperial  Courts  lasted  —  and  it 
seemed  very  firm  at  that  moment  —  Prussia  must  remain  in 
opposition  to  Russia,  and  might  therefore  see  in  a  revived  Poland 
a  desirable  ally.  Moreover,  it  was  supposed  that  England,  Prussia, 
and  Holland  were  building  up  a  great  league  of  states  (the  '  Fed- 
erative System'),  into  which  Sweden,  Denmark,  Turkey,  and  the 
Fiirstenbund  were  to  be  admitted,  the  object  of  which  was  to 
maintain  the  balance  of  power  and  the  existence  of  the  small 
states  against  the  Imperial  Courts.  If  Poland  could  gain  admis- 
sion to  this  league,  her  future  might  seem  secure.  Finally,  the 
character  of  the  new  King  of  Prussia,  and  especially  the  generosity 
and  moderation  which  were  supposed  to  distinguish  him  so 
signally  from  his  predecessor,  inspired  hope  and  confidence. 
Might  it  not  be  expected  that  Frederick  William,  who  had  so 
recently  intervened  to  rescue  Holland  from  French  influence  and 
had  then  taken  that  Republic  into  his  alliance  on  terms  of  equal- 
ity, would  be  found  ready  to  render  equally  disinterested  services 
to  Poland  ? 

Long  before  Prussia  made  any  marked  advances  to  the  Poles, 
the  Patriots  began  to  turn  their  eyes  toward  Berlin.  At  the 
council  of  war  held  by  their  leaders  in  Paris  at  the  beginning  of 
1788,  plans  were  discussed  for  securing  the  Prussian  alliance  and 
even  for  bringing  Poland  into  the  '  Federative  System.'  1  In  the 
following  summer  many  of  the  Patriots  openly  declared  that  they 
meant  to  stand  with  Prussia  at  the  approaching  Diet,2  and  some 
of  the  magnates  were  already  writing  Berlin  to  solicit  support 
against  Russia.3     The  situation  remained  decidedly  uncertain, 

1  Dembinski,  "  Piattoli  et  son  role  pendant  la  Grande  Diete,"  in  Bulletin  de 
VAcademie  de  Cracovie,  Classe  de  Philologie,  etc.,  Juin-Juillet,  1905,  pp.  54  f.; 
Zaleski,  Zycie  Czartoryskiego ,  pp.  225  ff.;   Debicki,  Pulawy,  i,  pp.  253  ff. 

2  Zaleski,  Korespondencya  krajowa,  p.  242;  Griesheim  to  Bischoffwerder,  August 
23,  1788,  rejoices  that  the  Poles  are  "  grosstentheils  so  gut  preussisch  gesinnt," 
B.  A.,  Fol.  323. 

3  Letters  of  Radziwill  (July  20),  Sulkowski  (August  6),  and  Ogihski  (September 
10)  to  Hertzberg,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27  and  Fol.  323. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  95 

however,  down  to  the  opening  of  the  Diet,  because  the  policy  of 
Prussia  was  still  far  from  clear.  A  vigorous  declaration  from 
Berlin  was  needed  before  the  Patriots  could  enter  boldly  on  plans 
for  reform  or  venture  to  throw  down  the  gauntlet  to  Russia. 


II 

On  the  6th  of  October,  1788,  there  met  at  Warsaw  the  assembly 
destined  to  become  famous  as  the  Four  Years'  Diet,  or,  as  patri- 
otic historians  prefer  to  call  it,  the  Great  Diet.  It  opened  amid  a 
feverish  excitement  and  a  whirl  of  political  and  social  activity 
such  as  Poland  had  rarely,  if  ever,  witnessed.  Warsaw  was 
packed  to  overflowing.  The  whole  '  political  nation  '  seemed  to 
have  pressed  up  to  the  capital:  senators  and  deputies  with  their 
families,  crowds  of  simple  country  gentlemen,  the  armies  of 
clients  and  retainers  who  followed  the  magnates,  and  adven- 
turers, sight-seers,  and  fortune-hunters  from  every  corner  of 
Poland,  and  indeed  from  every  part  of  Europe.  The  lavish  and 
wellnigh  fabulous  hospitality  displayed  by  the  richer  noblemen 
and  the  constant  round  of  balls,  fetes,  dinners,  and  theatrical 
performances  might  suggest  a  society  bent  only  on  holding  per- 
petual saturnalia;  and  yet  amid  these  carnival  scenes  the  all- 
pervading  interest,  the  universal  topic  was  politics.  People 
awaited  the  result  of  a  vote  in  the  Diet  with  intense  anxiety;  the 
galleries  of  the  assembly  were  constantly  filled,  especially  by  the 
ladies  of  the  high  aristocracy,  whose  interest  and  influence  in 
polities  excited  the  astonishment  of  foreigners;  in  the  numerous 
salons,  in  clubs  like  that  of  the  Radziwill  Palace,  in  the  workshops 
and  in  the  market-places  political  discussion  ran  high;  and  even 
coachmen  and  lackeys  divided  into  '  Patriots  '  and  '  Parasites,' 
the  latter  being  the  adherents  of  Russia.1  This  passionate 
interest  in  politics  is  also  shown  by  the  immense  publicistic 
activity  of  the  time,  by  the  flood  of  treatises,  open  letters,  poems, 
dialogues,  '  fables,'  and  '  catechisms  '  evoked  by  wellnigh  every 
question.  In  short,  never,  perhaps,  had  there  been  a  Diet  which 
had  so  aroused  the  country. 

1  Kraszewski,  Polska  w  czasie  trzech  rozbiorow,  ii,  p.  126. 


96 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


In  the  beginning  there  appeared  only  one  organized  and  dis- 
ciplined party,  the  Royalists.  This  was  a  phalanx  largely  com- 
posed of  office-hunters,  but  containing  also  some  few  men  of 
talent  who  from  conviction  adhered  to  the  King's  policy  of  friend- 
ship with  Russia  and  moderate  reforms  within  the  limits  that 
Catherine  prescribed. 

The  opposition  consisted  of  a  loosely-united  host  of  hetero- 
geneous elements,  which,  after  fighting  side  by  side  in  the  early 
battles  of  the  Diet,  divided  into  two  parties  with  radically  differ- 
ent tendencies,  the  '  Republicans  '  and  the  '  Patriots.' 

The  former  represented  the  conservative  and  reactionary 
forces,  the  partisans  of  the  old  institutions,  the  fanatics  of  '  golden 
liberty,'  the  bigoted,  misguided,  or  selfish  opponents  of  all  change 
whatsoever  except,  perhaps,  a  change  backward  —  a  return  to 
the  undiluted  anarchy  of  the  Saxon  period.  The  Republicans 
were  agreed  in  opposing  the  King  —  the  traditional  and  popular 
course  in  Poland ;  and  as  for  Russia,  the  magnates  who  led  the 
party  were  ready  to  rally  to  the  Empress  whenever  she  showed 
herself  disposed  to  throw  over  the  King  for  their  sake;  while  the 
honest,  ignorant  squires,  who  made  up  the  rank  and  file  of  the 
party,  detested  Russia  but  still  unintentionally  served  her  interests 
through  their  inability  to  understand  the  needs  of  their  country 
and  through  their  blind  hostility  to  reforms.  The  Patriots,  the 
champions  of  independence  and  of  thoroughgoing  reforms,  were 
undoubtedly  the  party  which  appealed  most  strongly  to  the  heart 
and  to  the  enlightened  opinion  of  the  nation.  To  them  rallied 
spontaneously  those  who  had  freed  themselves  from  the  ancient 
prejudices  and  desired  to  reconstruct  the  state  on  a  new  basis  in 
accordance  with  the  liberal  ideas  of  the  age;  those  who  resented 
the  yoke  of  Russia  as  an  intolerable  degradation ;  those  who  had 
sufficient  faith  in  the  nation  to  believe  that  independence,  dignity, 
and  power  could  be  won  back  by  a  determined  effort.  The 
strength  of  the  party  lay  especially  in  the  younger  generation,  the 
men  fresh  from  the  new  schools,  full  of  the  energy,  the  broader 
knowledge,  the  optimism  which  the  older  generation,  broken  and 
disillusioned  by  the  Partition,  conspicuously  lacked.  These 
younger  men  were  to  play  so  prominent  a  role  in  the  Four  Years' 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  97 

Diet  that  critics  jested  of  an  assembly  of '  Lycurguses  and  Solons 
of  twenty-five.'  The  Patriots  possessed  leaders  of  high  charac- 
ter and  reputation:  Ignacy  Potocki,  a  man  of  ardent  and  noble 
soul,  disinterested,  energetic,  indefatigable,  admired  and  almost 
worshipped  by  his  younger  compatriots;  his  brother  Stanislas, 
the  most  eloquent  orator  of  the  party;  the  Marshal  of  the  Diet,1 
Stanislas  Malachowski,  '  the  Polish  Aris tides,'  a  man  whose  name 
was  synonymous  with  pure  and  lofty  patriotism;  Koll^taj,  the 
organizer  of  the  party's  propaganda,  the  leader  of  the  more  ad- 
vanced democratic  wing,  and  perhaps  the  clearest  thinker  and  the 
best  head  in  Poland;  finally,  Prince  Adam  Casimir  Czartoryski, 
the  richest  and  most  popular,  the  most  charming  and  cultivated 
man  of  his  nation.  Unfortunately,  not  one  of  these  leaders  was 
really  a  statesman  of  the  first  calibre.  The  party  was  rich  in  men 
of  integrity  and  intellect  and  fervent  patriotism,  but  it  did  not 
contain  a  single  great  man  of  action.  Nevertheless,  whatever 
talent  Poland  at  that  time  possessed  was,  with  few  exceptions, 
gathered  within  the  Patriotic  camp. 

It  was  at  the  outset  quite  uncertain  which  of  these  parties 
would  gain  the  ascendancy  in  the  Diet.  Both  Royalists  and 
Opposition  could  count  upon  a  certain  number  of  reliable  support- 
ers, but  the  majority  of  the  assembly  was  at  first  unattached, 
undecided,  and  ready  to  go  with  the  tide. 

On  October  7th  the  Diet  was,  by  general  agreement,  confed- 
erated for  the  specified  purpose  of  increasing  the  army  and  the 
taxes.  After  the  provisional  withdrawal  of  the  alliance  project, 
the  King  and  the  Russian  ambassador  had  decided  that  military 
and  financial  questions  should  furnish  the  chief  business  of  the 
session;  for  they  hoped  that  by  gratifying  the  nation's  wishes  in 
this  respect  they  could  avert  a  discussion  of  more  fundamental 
problems  and  prevent  an  explosion  of  popular  feeling  against 
Russia.  And  possibly  their  hopes  might  have  been  realized, 
possibly  Stanislas  and  Stackelberg  might  have  remained  masters 
of  the  situation,  had  it  not  been  for  the  vigorous  intervention  of 
Prussia. 

1  Or  more  strictly  Marshal  of  the  Confederation  for  the  '  Crown  '  (Poland), 
Prince  Sapieha  being  Marshal  for  Lithuania. 


98 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


At  the  first  general  session  of  the  Confederation  (October  13),  a 
note  was  read  from  the  Prussian  envoy  Buchholtz,  in  which,  in 
language  very  courteous  towards  the  Republic  but  unfriendly 
and  even  menacing  towards  the  Empress,  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment protested  against  the  Russo-Polish  alliance  project,  and 
announced  that  if  the  Poles  felt  the  need  of  an  alliance,  Frederick 
William  would  offer  them  his  own.  This  note  decided  the  course 
of  the  Four  Years'  Diet.  For  the  impression  produced  by  it  was, 
as  Stackelberg  himself  reported,  indescribable.1  While  the  party 
of  the  King  and  the  ambassador  was  seized  with  consternation, 
the  exultation  of  the  Patriots  knew  no  bounds.  For  the  first 
time  in  many  years,  one  of  the  neighboring  Powers  had  come  for- 
ward in  open  opposition  to  the  Russian  policy  in  Poland,  had  in- 
vited the  nation  to  throw  off  the  yoke,  and  had  held  out  promises 
of  support.  For  the  first  time  in  many  years,  one  of  the  neighbors 
had  addressed  the  Republic  as  if  it  were  an  independent  and  equal 
Power,  and  had  seemed  to  seek  its  friendship.  The  Poles  had  the 
new  and  delightful  experience  of  being  wooed,  and  above  all,  they 
felt  the  sense  of  deliverance.  It  was  as  if,  after  a  hundred  years  of 
servitude,  the  nation  had  been  in  a  moment  freed  from  its  chains 
and  left  master  of  its  own  actions.  An  illustrious  Pole,  describing 
many  years  later  that  springtime  of  joy  and  hope,  declared  that  it 
was  a  moment  of  inexpressible  happiness,  such  as  no  one  could 
appreciate  who  had  never  lived  through  it,  and  such  as  no  one  who 
had  lived  through  it  could  ever  again  experience  in  like  degree.2 

The  first  impulse  of  the  '  liberated  '  nation  was  to  give  free  rein 
to  its  strongest  passion,  hatred  towards  Russia;  a  hatred  born 
of  the  insults  and  indignities  endured  for  the  past  thirty  years :  the 
brutalities  of  Repnin  and  Saldern,  the  arrogance  of  Stackelberg, 
the  arrest  of  the  three  Polish  Senators  dragged  away  from  the 
midst  of  the  Diet  of  1767  to  imprisonment  in  Russia,  the  excesses 
committed  by  the  Russian  troops  during  the  War  of  the  Con- 
federation of  Bar,  the  shame  of  the  servitude  that  had  degraded 
Poland  in  the  eyes  of  all  Europe.  That  hatred  extended  to  every 
person  and  institution  associated  with  the  Russian  rule:    to  the 

1  Report  of  October  15  cited  by  Smitt,  Suworow,  ii,  p.  185. 

2  Ad.  J.  Czartoryski,  Zywot  Niemcewicza,  p.  35. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  99 

King,  to  the  Royalist  party,  to  the  Permanent  Council.  The 
ambassador  presently  found  himself  boycotted  by  Warsaw  so- 
ciety. The  Royalists  were  hooted  down  in  the  Diet  and  insulted  in 
the  streets.  To  denounce  Russia  became  the  road  to  popularity, 
and  to  attack  the  Empress  personally  was  held  a  patriotic  deed.1 

The  rising  flood  of  anti-Russian  and  pro-Prussian  feeling  swept 
everything  before  it.  The  Patriots  acquired  a  constantly 
increasing  ascendancy  in  the  Diet,  while  the  King's  party  melted 
away.  It  was  in  vain  that  Stanislas  Augustus  in  eloquent  and 
prophetic  language  warned  the  assembly  that  their  one  chance 
of  safety  lay  in  holding  fast  to  Russia,  or  at  least  to  the  letter  of 
the  existing  engagements  with  the  Empress,  and  that  Prussians 
offering  friendship  were  Greeks  bearing  gifts.  The  King's  not 
altogether  tactful  speeches  only  added  to  the  odium  of  his  past 
record.  Nor  was  Stackelberg  more  successful  in  stemming  the 
tide.  The  ambassador's  one  serious  effort  was  the  note  pre- 
sented to  the  Diet  on  November  5,  in  which  he  warned  the  Poles 
that  the  Empress  would  regard  any  change  in  the  constitution 
guaranteed  by  her  as  a  breach  of  treaty,  which  would  force  her  to 
abandon  her  friendly  attitude  towards  the  Republic.  If  anything 
had  been  needed  to  complete  the  ruin  of  the  Russian  influence,  it 
would  have  been  supplied  by  that  unlucky  note. 

Prussia  at  once  seized  the  opportunity  for  an  effective  counter- 
stroke.  On  November  20  Buchholtz  presented  to  the  Diet  a  new 
declaration,  containing  his  master's  interpretation  of  the  famous 
guarantee  of  the  constitution  by  the  neighboring  Powers.  Fred- 
erick William,  it  was  said,  regarded  the  guarantee  as  involving 
the  obligation  to  defend  the  independence  of  the  Republic,  but 
not  at  all  as  implying  a  right  to  limit  the  freedom  of  the  Poles  to 
change  their  institutions  as  they  saw  fit.  This  note  was  couched 
in  even  more  flattering  terms  than  the  last  Prussian  declaration, 
and  it  created  scarcely  less  of  a  sensation.  Its  effect  was  in- 
creased by  the  activity  of  the  Marquis  Lucchesini,  who  had  come 
to  Warsaw  to  assist  Buchholtz,  and  was  presently  to  replace  him. 
This  supple  Italian  displayed  an  amazing  virtuosity  in  captivat- 
ing the  Poles,  maligning  Russia,  and  spreading  golden  opinions  as 

1  Cf.  especially,  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  i,  pp.  242  ff. 


IOO 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


to  the  beneficent  designs  of  the  generous  Frederick  William.  He 
fairly  carried  Warsaw  by  storm.  His  successes,  together  with  the 
two  declarations  from  his  Court,  sufficed  to  assure  the  triumph  of 
Prussian  influence  in  Poland,  and  to  drive  the  Patriots  irresistibly 
forward  upon  the  exhilarating  course  of  revolution. 

The  first  work  of  the  victorious  party  was  one  of  demolition. 
Before  their  onslaughts  there  went  down  in  rapid  succession  the 
War  Department,  the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  the  Per- 
manent Council  —  in  short  the  whole  edifice  of  government 
erected  and  guaranteed  by  Russia.  There  were  many  reasons  to 
justify  so  destructive  a  course:  the  necessity  of  clearing  the 
ground  before  undertaking  comprehensive  and  thorough  reforms, 
the  undeniable  abuses  of  which  the  Council  had  been  guilty,  the 
need  of  removing  control  over  the  government  from  a  king 
devoted  to  Russia,  whom  the  nation  could  not  trust;  but  un- 
doubtedly the  primary  motive  of  the  Patriots  was  the  desire  to 
assert  the  nation's  independence  and  to  prove  that  the  detested 
guarantee  had  become  a  dead  letter.  All  understood  that  such 
changes,  made  in  the  face  of  Stackelberg's  solemn  warning,  con- 
stituted a  downright  challenge  to  the  Empress;  and  the  constant 
denunciations  of  Russia  in  the  Diet,  the  collisions  between  Rus- 
sian and  Polish  troops  in  the  Ukraine,  the  propaganda  of  the 
Patriots  in  favor  of  an  alliance  with  Prussia,  added  to  the  danger 
of  a  rupture.  The  crowning  audacity  of  the  Poles  was  the  formal 
demand,  which,  with  the  encouragement  and  diplomatic  support 
of  Prussia,  was  repeatedly  addressed  to  Catherine,  that  all  Rus- 
sian troops  should  be  withdrawn  from  the  territories  of  the  Re- 
public. In  view  of  the  exigencies  of  the  Turkish  war,  which  made 
a  free  passage  through  the  Polish  Ukraine  an  inestimable  and 
almost  indispensable  convenience,  such  a  demand  was  bound  to 
strain  Catherine's  patience  wellnigh  to  the  breaking-point.  Great 
was  the  surprise,  therefore,  when  at  the  end  of  May  (1789),  for 
reasons  to  be  explained  later,  the  Empress  courteously  announced 
that  she  would  immediately  evacuate  Polish  territory.  With 
that,  the  emancipation  of  the  Republic  seemed  complete.  Little 
more  than  six  months  had  been  required  to  throw  off  that  Russian 
yoke  which  had  galled  the  nation  for  a  quarter  of  a  century.  The 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  IOI 

result  surpassed  all  that  could  have  been  hoped  for  at  the  begin- 
ning of  the  Diet. 

But  if  the  Poles  had  freed  themselves,  it  had  been  only  with  the 
aid  of  quite  exceptional  circumstances,  which  had  led  Prussia  to 
support,  Austria  to  facilitate,  and  Russia  to  tolerate  the  revolu- 
tion at  Warsaw.  It  remains  to  examine  the  motives  underlying 
the  attitude  of  the  three  neighboring  Powers,  in  order  to  under- 
stand the  reasons  which  made  the  liberation  of  Poland  possible 
and  to  estimate  its  prospects  of  permanence. 

Ill 

Prussia  had  been  the  chief  agent  and  sponsor  of  this  revolu- 
tion. Prussia  had  given  the  signal  for  the  upheaval,  suggested 
and  encouraged  each  successive  move  of  the  Patriots  against 
Russia,  and  vaguely  promised  the  support  of  her  battalions  for  the 
work  which  the  Diet  had  accomplished.  All  this  was  assuredly 
not  done  from  pure  generosity,  or  from  disinterested  neighborly 
friendship.  Seldom  even  in  the  tortuous  diplomacy  of  the  eigh- 
teenth century  does  one  find  so  glaring  a  contrast  as  that  between 
the  secret  aspirations  of  the  cabinet  of  Berlin  and  the  seductive 
professions  wliich  it  lavished  at  Warsaw.  Yet  it  would  be  a  mis- 
take to  regard  the  Polish  policy  of  Prussia  at  this  time  as  entirely 
a  tissue  of  deceptions,  as  based  throughout  upon  a  deep-laid  and 
steadily  pursued  plan  of  treachery.  To  a  certain  degree  the  in- 
terests of  Prussia  did  coincide  with  the  aims  of  the  Patriots;  and 
a  single,  definite  plan  was  what  the  Polish  policy  of  Prussia  most 
signally  lacked.  That  policy  was  by  no  means  consistent;  it 
varied  and  shifted;  it  frequently  lost  its  bearings  and  miscarried 
in  its  reckonings.  Prussia  might  seem  to  guide  events  at  Warsaw, 
but  she  was  often  hardly  less  surprised  than  her  neighbors  at  the 
results  of  her  work. 

The  original  aim  of  the  Prussian  intervention  was  simply  to 
thwart  that  Russian  alliance  project  which  by  its  guarantee  of 
the  integrity  of  the  Republic  l  had  aroused  such  indignation  at 

1  This  is  the  aspect  of  the  alliance  plan  most  emphasized  by  Hertzberg  in  his 
report  to  the  King  of  September  2,  1788,  and  in  the  instructions  to  Buchholtz  of  the 
following  day. 


UNIVERSITY  OF  GALIFOR; 
SANTA  BARBARA  COLLEGE  LIBRARY 


102 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Berlin.  But  even  before  the  Diet  assembled,  Prussian  policy  had 
entered  upon  a  new  phase.  The  Court  of  Berlin  was  now  afraid, 
not  that  Catherine  would  put  through  her  plan,  but  that  she 
would  abandon  it.  For  the  antipathy  of  the  Poles  to  the  pro- 
posed alliance  had  become  so  manifest  that  in  case  the  Empress 
had  not  the  good  sense  to  renounce  the  project,  Prussia  would 
have  a  fine  chance  for  a  great  stroke.  In  opposition  to  the  con- 
federated Diet  about  to  be  opened  by  Stanislas  and  Stackelberg, 
Frederick  William  would  organize  a  Counter-confederation, 
which  would  then  appeal  to  him  for  '  protection  ' ;  Prussian 
troops  would  enter  Poland  and  occupy  the  long-coveted  terri- 
tories; and  the  Hertzberg  plan,  in  its  most  essential  part, 
might  be  realized  immediately.  Thus  those  professions  of  dis- 
interested friendship,  those  assurances  of  armed  support,  those 
declarations  which  so  delighted  the  early  sessions  of  the  Diet  had 
for  their  ultimate  aim  —  civil  war,  to  be  followed  by  the  dismem- 
berment of  the  Republic.1 

Catherine's  withdrawal  of  the  alliance  project  disconcerted  but 
did  not  ruin  these  pious  hopes.  If  one  pretext  for  armed  inter- 
vention disappeared,  others  might  still  be  manufactured.  Hence 
Buchholtz  and  Lucchesini  were  presently  instructed-  to  incite  the 
Patriots  to  attack  the  Permanent  Council  and  to  protest  against 
the  Russian  troops  taking  winter  quarters  in  Poland.2  One 
question  or  the  other  might,  perhaps,  produce  the  desired  rupture 
between  the  two  contending  parties  at  Warsaw.  For  a  moment 
these  hopes  seemed  near  to  being  realized.    The  attack  on  the  War 

1  Hertzberg  to  the  King,  September  21  (B.  A.,  R.  9,  27),  and  October  2, 
Hertzberg  to  Buchholtz,  September  30,  rescript  to  Buchholtz,  October  1  (B.  A., 
Fol.  323). 

September  21,  Hertzberg  to  the  King  : 

"  Si  la  Cour  de  Russie  insiste  sur  son  projet  d'alliance  avec  la  Pologne,  V.  M. 
aura  le  plus  beau  jeu  de  lui  opposer  son  alliance  et  une  Reconfederation  .  .  . ;  mais 
si  la  Cour  de  Russie  a  le  bon  esprit  de  renoncer  a  cette  alliance,  comme  le  C.  de 
Stackelberg  le  lui  a  conseille,  notre  role  deviendra  plus  difficile." 
September  30,  Hertzberg  to  Buchholtz: 

"  Je  ne  me  soucie  pas  que  ces  gens-la  fassent  leur  confederation  et  leur  alliance, 
pourvu  que  nous  puissions  parvenir  a  former  un  parti  a  peu  pres  egal,  qui  nous 
fournisse  le  titre  de  faire  une  autre  confederation  au  nom  de  laquelle  nous  puissions 
agir." 

2  Rescripts  of  October  17,  18,  21,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  1 03 

Department  —  the  prelude  to  the  onslaught  on  the  Permanent 
Council  —  led  to  a  decisive  trial  of  strength  between  the  Royal- 
ists and  the  Opposition;  party  feeling  ran  high,  and  Lucchesini, 
after  several  nocturnal  conclaves  with  various  magnates,  reported 
exultantly  that  if  the  royal  party  triumphed,  a  large  section  of  the 
Opposition  was  ready  to  resort  to  a  Counter-confederation  and 
to  appeal  for  Prussian  aid.  The  news  threw  Berlin  into  excited 
activity.  Lucchesini  was  at  once  authorized  to  promise  aid  to  a 
Counter-confederation,  no  matter  what  the  pretext  under  which 
it  was  formed,  although  he  was  to  avoid  committing  his  Court  to 
too  precise  engagements.  General  Usedom  was  ordered  to  hold 
his  troops  ready  to  cross  the  frontier  the  moment  he  should  receive 
word  from  Lucchesini.  A  manifesto  was  to  be  drawn  up  forth- 
with to  justify  the  entry  of  the  Prussian  army  into  Poland.1 
But  Prussia's  plans  were  crossed  by  the  victory  of  her  own 
party  at  Warsaw.  The  overthrow  of  the  War  Department 
(November  3)  ended  this  crisis. 

Whether  it  was  from  disappointment  at  so  tame  a  result,  or 
because  the  season  was  growing  late  for  military  operations,  or 
because  the  wind  now  blew  from  a  more  pacific  quarter  at  Berlin, 
at  any  rate  the  Prussians  now  gave  up  serious  hopes  of  a  Counter- 
confederation.  Instead  it  became  their  chief  aim  to  end  the  Diet 
as  soon  as  possible.  For  the  great  dilemma  which  had  faced  the 
Court  of  Berlin  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  assembly,  was 
becoming  increasingly  embarrassing :  the  dilemma  as  to  how  far 

1  Lucchesini's  reports  of  October  29  and  November  1,  Hertzberg  and  Fincken- 
stein  to  Frederick  William,  November  5,  instructions  to  Lucchesini,  November 
6,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323. 

This  episode  furnished  Kalinka  with  material  for  one  of  his  indictments  of  the 
Patriotic  party;  and  indeed,  if  the  leaders  of  that  party  were  conducting  such 
treasonable  negotiations  and  were  ready  to  call  in  Prussian  troops  for  so  slight  a 
pretext,  they  might  justly  be  compared  with  the  men  of  Targowica.  It  would  seem, 
however,  from  Lucchesini's  very  vague  reports  that  the  men  implicated  in  this 
disgraceful  and  dangerous  plan  for  a  Counter-confederation  were  not  the  leaders 
of  the  party,  but  men  like  Sulkowski,  Oginski,  and  Sapieha  —  adventurers  and 
broilers  of  little  influence  or  consideration.  The  one  leader  of  the  Patriotic  party 
who  undoubtedly  had  something  to  do  with  these  secret  conventicles  with  Lucches- 
ini was  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  but  it  is  quite  uncertain  how  far  he  committed 
himself.  I  know  of  no  evidence  to  justify  Kalinka's  conjecture  (Dcr  polnische  Reich- 
stag, i,  p.  218)  that  Ignacy  Potocki  took  part  in  these  meetings. 


io4 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Prussia  could  afford  to  support  a  party  which,  useful  as  it  might 
be  in  opposing  Russia,  was  still  highly  obnoxious  in  that  it  aimed 
at  increasing  the  army,  restoring  the  finances,  and  reforming  the 
government  of  Poland.  But  how  break  up  the  Diet  with  nothing 
accomplished  towards  these  latter  ends,  without  ruining  the  popu- 
larity and  influence  which  Prussia  had  just  gained  at  Warsaw  ? 
The  plan  adopted  by  the  cabinet  of  Berlin  was  sufficiently  subtle. 
It  was  to  spur  the  Patriots  on  to  renewed  attacks  on  Russia,  in 
the  hope  that  Stanislas  Augustus  would  be  exasperated  or  alarmed 
to  the  point  of  dissolving  the  Diet  and  taking  all  the  odium  of  the 
step  upon  himself.  Such  was  the  real  aim  of  the  second  Prussian 
declaration  to  the  Diet  —  the  invitation  to  repudiate  the  Russian 
guarantee.1  Once  more,  however,  the  result  fell  short  of  the 
intention.  The  Permanent  Council  was  overthrown,  but  the  Diet 
was  not  dissolved.  The  action  of  Prussia  had  only  sealed  the 
supremacy  of  the  party  which  now  prepared  to  take  up  those 
reforms  that  Prussia  most  detested. 

In  the  early  months  of  1789,  when  the  crisis  of  the  struggle  at 
Warsaw  was  over,  when  the  Diet  had  settled  down  to  a  quasi- 
permanent  existence  under  the  domination  of  the  Patriotic  party, 
when  the  Court  of  Berlin  seemed  to  have  definitely  replaced 
Russia  as  the  preponderant  Power  in  Poland,  Prussian  statesmen 
surveying  the  situation  hardly  knew  what  to  make  of  their 
triumph.  They  might  indeed  congratulate  themselves  on  a 
striking  diplomatic  victory  over  Russia.  It  was  something  to 
have  demonstrated  to  the  Empress  how  much  she  had  lost  when 
she  gave  up  the  Prussian  alliance,  and  how  little  she  could  afford  to 
ignore  or  to  slight  the  Court  of  Berlin.  But  what  material  profit 
could  Prussia  expect  from  her  new  position  in  the  Republic  ? 
What  was  mere  '  influence  '  to  a  Power  that  wanted  territory  ? 
What  reliance  could  be  placed  upon  the  friendship  or  the  grati- 
tude of  the  weak  and  fickle  Poles  ?  Lucchesini,  with  natural 
pride  in  the  work  of  his  hands,  discreetly  urged  the  maintenance 
of  the  new  position  won  by  such  labors,  pointing  to  the  positive 
advantages  to  be  expected  from  a  Polish  alliance  in  case  of  war 

1  Hertzberg  to  Finckenstein  and  to  the  King,  November  12,  rescripts  to  Buch- 
holtz,  November  12,  18,  22,  and  to  Lucchesini,  November  21,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  105 

with  the  Imperial  Courts,  and  the  negative  advantages  of  having 
deprived  Catherine  of  a  great  kingdom  that  had  been  virtually  a 
Russian  province.1  But  Hertzberg  was  much  more  skeptical 
about  the  value  of  a  Polish  alliance,  and  much  more  impressed 
with  the  dangers  involved  in  the  obnoxious  schemes  of  the 
Patriots.2 

In  the  final  analysis,  the  future  attitude  of  the  Court  of  Berlin 
towards  Poland  depended  on  whether  Prussia  was  to  draw  the 
sword  against  the  Imperial  Courts  or  to  satisfy  her  ambitions  by 
a  peaceful  bargain  with  them.  This  in  turn  depended  on  the  news 
expected  from  Constantinople,  from  London,  and  above  all  from 
St.  Petersburg.  The  visit  of  Potemkin  to  the  Russian  capital 
early  in  1789  raised  hopes  of  a  change  of  system  on  the  Neva.  For 
months  Frederick  William  and  Hertzberg  waited  with  anxiety  to 
see  whether  the  favorite  would  have  the  will  or  the  power  to  effect 
such  a  miracle.3  If  he  succeeded,  then  a  bargain  between  Russia 
and  Prussia  at  the  expense  of  the  Republic  would  be  the  natural 
outcome.  If  he  failed,  then  Prussia  might  '  break  loose  '  in  the 
summer,  and  a  Prusso-Polish  alliance  might  yet  have  its  raison 
d'etre.1 

rv 

At  Vienna  the  Polish  revolution  aroused  only  alarm  and  evil 
forebodings.  Kaunitz  was  far  from  appreciating  the  strength  of 
the  patriotic  movement  in  Poland,  or  from  foreseeing  the  energy 
and  capacity  of  which  the  Four  Years'  Diet,  with  all  its  faults, 
was  to  give  evidence;  but  he  did  judge  rightly  of  the  illusion  that 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  King,  November  5,  1788,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323;  memoir  of  Decem- 
ber 25  and  letters  to  Hertzberg,  January  26  and  February  18,  1789,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27. 

2  Hertzberg  to  Finckenstein,  November  18,  to  the  King,  December  7,  1788, 
H.  and  F.  to  the  King,  March  16,  1789,  B.  A.(  Fol.  323  and  R.  9,  27. 

3  See  the  Prussian  correspondence  of  January-June,  1789  in  Dembihski,  Docu- 
ments relatifs  d  Vhistoire  du  deuxieme  et  troisieme  partage  de  la  Pologne,  i. 

4  Hertzberg  to  Buchholtz,  March  3, 1789,  B.A.,  R.  9,  27;  Hertzberg  to  Lucchesini, 
May  30  (Dembiriski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  398  f.). 

Hertzberg  to  Buchholtz,  March  3: 

Fears  that  Potemkin  will  not  be  able  to  make  the  Empress  change  her  policy 
completely.  "  Si  cela  ne  peut  pas  avoir  lieu,  je  crois  qu'il  vaut  mieux  que  nous 
entamions  les  deux  Cours  Imperiales  et  que  nous  tachions  d'ex6cuter  notre  Plan 
avec  la  Porte  et  la  Suede  et  memo  les  Polonois,  que  nous  devons  habiliter  alors." 


io6 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


the  Diet  could  by  mere  high-sounding  decrees  at  once  restore  the 
decayed  state  to  life  and  free  it  from  all  foreign  influence;  and  he 
saw  clearly  the  danger  the  Poles  would  run  if  they  threw  them- 
selves into  the  arms  of  the  one  Power  that  coveted  their  territory. 
Any  attempt  to  reform  the  constitution,  he  held,  would  lead  only 
to  internal  disturbances,  which  would  afford  Prussia  a  chance  to 
carry  out  her  nefarious  plans.  Hence,  as  long  as  it  seemed  possi- 
ble to  hold  back  the  torrent,  he  did  not  spare  warnings  and  exhor- 
tations at  Warsaw.1  But  by  the  end  of  November,  after  the 
second  Prussian  declaration,  the  battle  was  obviously  lost.  De 
Cache,  the  Austrian  charge  d'affaires  at  Warsaw,  was  ordered  to 
suspend  further  representations  and  to  relapse  into  the  most 
cautious  reserve. 

In  his  dispatches  to  Cobenzl  at  St.  Petersburg,  Kaunitz  now  out- 
lined a  new  policy.  The  Russian  influence  in  Poland,  he  declared, 
could  be  restored  only  by  violent  means,  and  that  would  bring  on 
a  war  with  Prussia.  Austria  could  not  possibly  undertake  such  a 
contest  while  the  Turkish  war  lasted.  It  was  therefore  the  most 
pressing  interest  of  the  Imperial  Courts  to  make  peace  with  the 
Porte  as  soon  as  possible,  even  on  the  uti  possidetis  basis,  in  order 
to  turn  all  their  attention  to  Prussia  and  Poland.  In  the  mean- 
time, as  one  means  of  checking  the  insidious  designs  of  their 
enemies,  he  once  more  recommended  the  alliance  with  the  Bour- 
bon Courts,  which  had  already  been  agitated  since  1787,  and  one 
chief  point  in  which  would  be  a  guarantee  of  the  integrity  of 
Poland  by  France  and  Spain.2 

Unfortunately,  this  plan  for  a  quadruple  alliance  fell  through, 
largely  owing  to  the  reluctance  of  the  Bourbon  states  to  under- 
take the  defence  of  Poland ;  the  hope  of  an  immediate  peace  with 
the  Turks  soon  vanished;  and  almost  every  dispatch  from  Berlin 

1  Ostensible  dispatch  to  de  Cache,  November  1,  1788,  summarized  in  Kalinka, 
Der  polnische  Reichstag,  i,  pp.  376  f.;  Kaunitz  to  Czartoryski,  October  29,  V.  A., 
Polen,  Fasc.  66. 

2  Instructions  of  November  28,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Exped.,  1788.  On  the  pro- 
tracted negotiations  for  a  quadruple  alliance  see:  Segur,  Oeuvres,  iii,  pp.  266  ff., 
419  ff.;  R.  I.  A.,  Russie,  ii,  pp.  441  ff.;  Beer,  Die  orientalische  Politik  Oesterreichs, 
pp.  112,  120  f.;  Aragon,  Nassau-Siegen,  pp.  1761!.,  274  ff.;  Dembinski,  Rosya  a 
rewolucya  francuska,  pp.  33-40 ;  Barral-Montferrat,  Dix  ans  de  paix  artnee,  i, 
pp.  310  ff. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  1 07 

and  St.  Petersburg  announced  the  growing  disposition  of  those 
Courts  to  bring  matters  to  a  rupture.  Hence  it  became  one  chief 
aim  of  Austrian  diplomacy  to  remove  every  pretext  for  an  out- 
break on  the  part  of  Prussia  by  preaching  at  St.  Petersburg 
moderation,  patience,  and  long-suffering,  especially  with  regard 
to  Polish  affairs.  If  the  catastrophe  that  might  have  been  ex- 
pected did  not  at  once  befall  the  audacious  Poles,  this  was  due  in 
large  part  to  the  mollifying  influence  which  Austria  now  brought 
to  bear  upon  Russian  policy. 

Count  Cobenzl  at  Petersburg  found  himself  between  Scylla  and 
Charybdis.  On  one  side  was  a  party  which  advocated  meeting 
the  high-handed  actions  of  England  and  Prussia  with  equally 
vigorous  measures,  so  that  a  new  war  might  easily  have  followed. 
On  the  other  side  there  were  many  who  would  have  gone  so  far  as 
to  sacrifice  a  part  of  Poland,  in  order  to  conciliate  the  Court  of 
Berlin.  The  views  of  the  former  party,  which  was  dominant  in 
the  Council  of  the  Empire,  undoubtedly  accorded  best  with 
Catherine's  own  inclinations.  Long  weaned  from  any  fondness 
for  Prussia,  despising  Frederick  William  II  almost  as  much  as  she 
did  George  III,  the  Empress  had  felt  ever  since  the  beginning  of 
the  war  a  growing  and  passionate  indignation  against  the  two 
monarchs  who  had  dared  to  cross  her  plans  and  to  set  themselves 
up  as  '  dictators  '  in  Europe.  She  approved  the  bellicose  resolu- 
tions adopted  by  the  Council  in  September,  1788,  in  reply  to  the 
first  hostile  demonstrations  of  Prussia;  and  when  one  of  her 
ministers  presented  a  dissenting  opinion,  she  shed  tears  of  rage.1 
The  events  in  Poland  added  fuel  to  the  flames.  "  I  swear  to 
Almighty  God,"  she  wrote  to  Potemkin,  "  that  I  am  doing  every- 
thing possible  to  endure  all  that  these  Courts,  and  especially  the 
almighty  Prussian  one,  are  doing;  but  it  [the  latter]  is  so  puffed 
up  that,  if  its  head  does  n't  burst,  I  see  no  possibility  of  agreeing 
to  its  shameful  demands.  ...  I  am  not  revengeful,  but  what  is 
opposed  to  the  honor  of  my  Empire  and  its  essential  interests  is 
harmful.  ...  I  will  not  give  province  for  province,  nor  have 
laws  prescribed  to  me.  .  .  .    They  will  come  to  grief,  for  nobody 

1  See  the  protocol  of  the  Council  of  September  18/29,  l7&&>  Apx.  Toe.  Cob., 
i,  pp.  606-611,  and  XpariOBim,Kiii,  ^hobuhki.,  September  29/October  10,  p.  95. 


io8 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


ever  yet  succeeded  in  such  a  course.  They  have  forgotten  who 
they  are,  and  with  whom  they  have  to  deal;  and  that  is  why  the 
fools  hope  we  shall  yield."  *  "  The  Empress  is  entirely  ready  to 
strike  against  the  King  of  Prussia,"  wrote  Cobenzl  at  the  end  of 
November;  "  the  ministers,  with  the  exception  of  Count  Oster- 
mann,  are  of  the  opinion  that  perhaps  this  is  the  most  favorable 
moment  for  the  two  Imperial  Courts,  if  we  can  secure,  if  not  the 
alliance,  at  least  the  neutrality  of  the  Bourbon  Courts;  for  it  is 
hard  to  believe  that  England  will  engage  to  furnish  more  than 
indirect  aid  [to  its  ally]."  2 

Joseph,  however,  was  furious  at  the  idea.  The  roles  had 
changed  completely.  The  Austrians,  who  for  years  had  been 
preaching  the  necessity  of  '  reducing  the  Margrave  of  Branden- 
burg to  his  proper  place  in  the  world,'  were  now  as  disinclined  to 
act  against  him  as  the  Russians  were  eager  to  do  so.3  From 
December  on,  Cobenzl  counselled  nothing  but  prudence  and  self- 
restraint.  When  at  the  beginning  of  1789  the  Russians  were 
much  alarmed  at  the  talk  of  a  Prusso-Polish  alliance,  he  urged 
that  such  a  treaty  would  be  made  only  to  be  torn  up  again,  and 
that  protesting  about  it  would  be  quite  useless  under  the  circum- 
stances. In  case  of  war,  it  might  even  be  better  to  have  Poland 
on  the  side  of  Prussia  than  neutral;  and  at  any  rate,  the  two 
Imperial  Courts  ought  to  take  no  open  measures  to  prevent  such 
an  alliance.4  While  the  Russians  refrained  from  presenting  a 
protest  on  the  subject  at  Warsaw,  while  they  met  even  the  over- 
throw of  the  Permanent  Council  with  studied  indifference,  there 
was  grave  danger  that  their  patience  would  be  strained  to  the 
breaking-point  by  the  demand  formally  made  by  the  Republic, 
with  the  diplomatic  support  of  Prussia,  for  the  immediate  evacua- 

1  Letter  of  November  27/December  8,  1788,  Pyc.  Clap.,  xvii,  p.  22. 

2  Report  of  November  28,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1788. 

3  Cf.  Joseph's  letter  to  L.  Cobenzl  of  November  24,  1788  as  to  the  Empress' 
desire  to  go  to  war  with  Prussia,  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liv,  pp.  303  f.  The  view  is  advanced 
by  P.  Wittichen  {Polnische  Politik  Preussens,  pp.  17  f.),  and  Beer  (Orientalische 
Politik  Oesterreichs,  p.  112)  that  if  the  Russians  occasionally  talked  of  war,  it  was 
only  in  order  to  soothe  their  allies.  A  slight  study  of  the  Russian  documents  would 
show  how  utterly  mistaken  is  this  point  of  view.  Moreover,  to  talk  of  going  to  war 
with  Prussia  at  that  moment  was  to  do  anything  but  to  soothe  the  Austrians. 

4  Cobenzl's  reports  of  January  7  and  April  15, 1789,  V.  A.,  Rtissland,  Berichte. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  109 

tion  of  Polish  territory  by  the  Russian  troops.  But  armed  with 
an  intercepted  letter  of  Hertzberg,  in  which  that  minister  de- 
clared that  his  Court  hoped  to  find  a  pretext  for  a  rupture  in  the 
affairs  of  Poland  and  expected  to  be  ready  to  strike  in  July, 
Cobenzl  was  able  to  argue  forcibly  that  the  best  way  to  foil  the 
Prussians  was  to  remove  their  last  remaining  excuse  for  inter- 
vention.1 The  Empress  was  highly  exasperated  by  the  constant 
denunciations  to  which  she  was  subjected  by  the  Polish  Diet,  and 
by  the  frequent  collisions  in  the  Ukraine;  she  wished  nothing  so 
much  as  to  avenge  herself  in  Prussia;  but  finally  prudent  coun- 
sels prevailed.  In  May  orders  were  given  to  withdraw  all  Russian 
troops  and  magazines  from  the  territory  of  the  Republic.  Hence- 
forth the  Court  of  Petersburg  adopted  an  attitude  of  complete 
indifference  to  the  doings  of  the  Diet  of  Warsaw.  The  first  period 
of  the  Polish  crisis  thus  came  to  an  unexpectedly  peaceful  close. 
While  they  strove  successfully  to  prevent  a  rupture  with  the 
Court  of  Berlin  over  Polish  affairs,  the  Austrians  had  also  to 
guard  against  the  contrary  danger  of  an  agreement  between 
Russia  and  Prussia  at  their  expense  and  Poland's.  A  more  con- 
ciliatory policy  towards  Prussia  was  advocated  by  the  favorite 
Mamonov ;  by  Ostermann  and  Suvalov  among  the  ministers; 
by  the  Grand  Duke  Paul,  who  had  long  conducted  a  secret  corre- 
spondence with  Frederick  William;  and  above  all  by  Potemkin. 
It  seemed  only  too  obvious  that  Russia  could  free  herself  in  a 
moment  from  all  her  growing  embarrassments  by  sacrificing  the 
Austrian  for  the  Prussian  connection.  But  there  was  "  the 
Empress'  pretended  dignity  "  (as  the  heir  to  the  throne  expressed 
it).  If  any  human  power  could  prevail  over  that,  it  must  be 
Potemkin's,  and  after  the  capture  of  Oczakow  the  Prince  was 
coming  to  Petersburg.  The  court  and  the  town  looked  forward  to 
his  coming  "  as  to  a  second  Advent,"  the  Prussian  and  English 
ministers  and  their  partisans  with  keen  impatience,  Cobenzl  with 
natural  misgivings.  The  Prince  was  coming,  people  whispered 
'  to  overthrow  everything.' 2 

1  Report  of  April  15,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berickle,  1789. 

2  For  the  above,  the  letters  of  Gamovski  in  the  Pyc.  Crap.,  xvi;   the  letters  of 
the  Grand  Duke  Paul  and  his  wife  to  Nesselrode  in  the  Leltres  et  papiers  du  chart- 


IIO  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

For  a  time  there  was,  indeed,  talk  of  great  changes.  Potemkin 
told  the  Prussian  envoy  that  the  neighboring  Powers  would  have 
done  much  better  at  the  time  of  the  Partition  to  divide  up  the 
whole  of  Poland,  and  he  added  that  it  might  still  be  done  if 
the  Prussians  would  indicate  what  they  wanted.1  In  a  slightly 
different  strain  he  remarked  to  Cobenzl  that  he  wished  the 
King  of  Prussia  would  seize  a  bit  of  the  Republic ;  the  two 
Imperial  Courts  would  do  the  same,  the  Poles  would  get  their 
just  deserts,  and  the  Court  of  Berlin  would  lose  all  credit  in 
Poland.  With  equal  chagrin  the  ambassador  heard  Ostermann 
declare  that  a  partition  of  Poland  between  the  three  Courts 
would  perhaps  be  the  best  way  out  of  the  present  embarrassing 
situation.2 

All  this  was  not  merely  diplomatic  gossip.  About  this  time 
Bezborodko,  the  most  trusted  of  the  Empress'  ministers,  laid 
before  her  two  memorials,  in  which  he  advocated  using  the  good 
offices  of  Prussia  in  making  peace  with  Sweden  and  Turkey,  and 
declared  that  if  in  this  way  Russia  could  secure  the  desired  terms, 
there  would  be  no  disadvantage  in  renewing  the  alliance  with  the 
Court  of  Berlin,  or  even  in  allowing  the  latter  some  acquisition  in 
Poland.  This  was  to  be  effected  through  a  secret  negotiation  with 
Prussia,  into  which  the  Emperor  was  to  be  initiated  only  when  it 
was  approaching  completion.  Had  the  plan  been  carried  out, 
Austria  might  have  been  confronted  by  the  same  situation  as  in 
1793:   by  a  bargain  made  behind  her  back  between  Russia  and 

celier  comte  de  Nesselrode,  i,  pp.  126,  130,  133,  etc.;    the  correspondence  of  the 
Prussian  envoy  Keller  for  January-February,  1789  in  Dembinski,  op.  cit. 

1  Keller's  report  of  February  26,  1789,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  180. 

2  Cobenzl's  report  of  April  15,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1789.  The  am- 
bassador wrote:  "...  sagte  mir  Graf  Ostermann,  dass  es  ihm  lieb  seye,  dass  die 
Preussen  zu  ihrem  alten  Projekt,  ein  Stuck  von  Pohlen  zu  erhalten  zuruckkehrten; 
dieses  wiirde  vielleicht  das  beste  Mittel  seyn,  sich  aus  der  damaligen  verworrenen 
Lage  zu  ziehen.  Es  verstiinde  sich  von  selbst  dass  man  dem  Konig  in  Preussen 
nicht  zulassen  wiirde  sich  in  Pohlen  zu  vergrossern,  ohne  dass  die  beyden  Kays. 
Hofe  wenigstens  ein  gleiches  Aequivalent  erhielten;  der  Konig  miisste  uns  bey 
solcher  Verhaltniss  der  Sachen  freye  Hande  lassen,  die  Pohlen  wiirden  fiir  ihr 
ausschweifendes  Benehmen  den  verdienten  Lohn  empfangen,  und  die  beyden 
Kays.  Hofe  bald  wieder  die  Oberhand  in  diesem  Konigreich  gewinnen  und  den 
Preussischen  Credit  vertilgen."  Such  a  transaction  would  have  been  a  very  exact 
repetition  of  the  Partition  of  1772. 


THE  OVERTHROW  OF  RUSSIAN  RULE  III 

Prussia  for  the  partition  of  Poland.1  Fortunately,  however,  the 
Empress  stood  firm.  The  talk  of  a  new  partition  quickly  died  out, 
and  the  Austrian  alliance  not  only  remained  unshaken,  but  was 
about  this  time  renewed  for  another  eight  years.2 

Potemkin's  stay  in  St.  Petersburg  (February-May),  while  it 
may  have  improved  his  own  position,  seems  to  have  had  no  politi- 
cal results,  except  to  confirm  the  Empress  in  the  resolution  to 
adopt  a  somewhat  more  friendly  attitude  towards  Prussia.  As  an 
outward  sign  of  a  more  conciliatory  disposition,  in  the  early 
summer  of  1789  Alopeus  again  appeared  in  Berlin  with  a  secret 
commission.  Its  real  object  seems  to  have  been  merely  to  lull  the 
Prussian  Court  with  specious  hopes,  to  gain  time,  and  to  postpone 
the  outbreak  of  open  hostility  in  that  quarter.  It  led  to  a  tor- 
tuous and  futile  negotiation,  carried  on  chiefly  through  the  royal 
favorite  Bischoffwerder,  which  was  dragged  out  for  two  years  and 
resulted  in  practically  nothing.3 

1  These  memorials  are  printed  in  the  Pyc.  Apx.,  1875,  ii,  pp.  36  ff.  Cf.  also 
Bezborodko  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  October,  1789,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  pp.  167  ff. 

2  This  time  also  by  the  exchange  of  autograph  letters  between  the  two  sovereigns 
under  the  dates  of  May  21  and  May  24/ June  4,  1789. 

3  The  character  of  Alopeus'  mission  and  the  credibility  of  his  reports  have 
formed  the  subject  of  a  lively  controversy  between  Professors  Dembinski  and 
Askenazy.  See  the  Kwartalnik  Historyczny,  xvii  and  xviii.  After  a  study  of  these 
reports  for  the  years  1789-93,  I  find  myself  quite  in  agreement  with  Professor 
Dembinski.  Alopeus  was  undoubtedly  strongly  pro-Prussian  in  his  sympathies  and 
extremely  eager  to  effect  a  reconcilation  between  the  two  Courts;  but  that  he  was 
in  these  years  in  the  pay  of  Prussia  and  that  his  reports  were  concocted  between 
him  and  the  Prussian  ministers,  seems  to  me  utterly  improbable,  M.  Askenazy 
notwithstanding. 

Alopeus'  mission  may  probably  be  regarded  as  a  result  of  Potemkin's  exertions 
at  St.  Petersburg.  His  instructions  were  drawn  up  April  28/May  9,  i.  e.,  about  a 
week  before  the  Prince  set  out  to  return  to  the  army.  The  mission  must  also  stand 
in  some  kind  of  connection  with  the  proposals  of  Bezborodko  outlined  in  the  two 
memorials  mentioned  in  the  text.  In  Bezborodko's  mind,  it  was  to  be  some- 
thing more  than  a  mere  'dilatory  negotiation':  it  was  to  lead,  if  possible,  to 
a  satisfactory  peace  with  Sweden  and  the  Porte,  reconciliation  and  alliance  with 
Prussia,  an  agreement  with  the  latter  Power  for  equal  '  advantages  '  to  both 
Courts  at  the  expense  of  Poland  and  Turkey  (cf.  his  letter  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov  of 
October,  1789,  cited  above).  The  mission  fell  very  far  short,  however,  of  effecting 
such  important  results,  owing  both  to  the  Empress'  "  insuperable  antipathy  to  a 
rapprochement  with  Prussia  "  (the  phrase  is  Bezborodko's),  and  to  Hertzberg's 
obstinate  insistence  upon  his  utterly  inacceptable  '  grand  plan.' 


CHAPTER  VI 

The  Prusso-PolIsh  Alliance 


The  favoring  circumstances  of  the  moment  had  restored  to 
Poland  a  precarious  independence;  but  it  remained  to  consoli- 
date the  new  position,  to  provide  against  the  dangers  of  all  kinds, 
external  and  internal,  with  which  the  audacious  venture  of  the 
Patriots  was  menaced.  On  July  i,  1789,  at  a  secret  meeting  of 
four  leaders  of  the  party,1  it  was  decided  to  direct  the  future 
labors  of  the  Diet  solely  upon  three  great  tasks:  the  establish- 
ment of  a  new  and  stronger  form  of  government,  the  introduction 
of  the  hereditary  succession  to  the  throne,  and  the  conclusion  of 
an  alliance  with  Prussia.  These  three  projects  were  inseparable 
and  mutually  supplementary.  A  reformed  constitution  would 
be  of  little  avail  if  at  the  death  of  the  present  elderly  and  ailing 
King  the  state  was  to  be  exposed  to  the  anarchy  and  the  foreign 
intervention  that  regularly  accompanied  an  interregnum.  The 
Prussian  alliance  seemed  an  indispensable  guarantee  of  security 
at  a  moment  when  Poland  was  engaged  in  the  difficult  task  of 
reorganization,  and  was  constantly  forced  to  fear  an  attack  from 
her  powerful  and  vindictive  eastern  neighbor. 

As  we  look  back  upon  it  now,  this  Prussian  alliance  appears 
to  be  the  supreme  and  tragic  mistake  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet. 
Those  who  in  that  last  hour  undertook  to  save  the  Republic, 
pinned  their  hopes  to  one  Power,  and  that  Power  betrayed  them. 
Prussia  encouraged  the  Poles  mortally  to  offend  Catherine;  she 
filled  them  with  false  hopes,  and  bound  herself  to  them  by  the 
most  solemn  engagements;  she  led  them  on  and  on  from  one 
perilous  adventure  to  another;  and  then  in  the  end  she  deserted 
them  and  sold  them  to  Russia.  That  is  the  history  of  the  Prusso- 
Polish  alliance  as  viewed  from   the  Polish  standpoint.     The 

1  The  two  Marshals  of  the  Confederation,  Malachowski  and  Sapieha,  Ignacy 
Potocki  and  Bishop  Rybinski.    (Lucchesini's  report  of  July  4,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27.) 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  1 13 

Patriots  have  been  overwhelmed  with  blame  for  staking  their 
country's  fortunes  upon  so  dangerous,  so  artificial,  so  unnatural 
a  connection.  Unnatural  it  undoubtedly  was,  in  view  of  the 
fundamental  contradiction  between  the  aims  of  the  Patriotic 
party  and  Prussia's  unalterable  determination  to  keep  Poland 
weak  and  to  continue  the  dismemberment  of  the  Republic.  It 
was  an  alliance  in  which  there  could  be  little  sincerity  or  confi- 
dence on  either  side,  and  which  could  have  slight  chances  of 
permanence.  And,  judged  by  its  result,  the  whole  policy  of  the 
alliance  seems  imprudent,  false,  and  wellnigh  suicidal. 

But  if  we  do  not  judge  merely  by  the  outcome,  but  attempt  to 
place  ourselves  in  the  position  of  the  Polish  leaders  at  that  time, 
we  may  well  ask  what  else  they  could  have  done. 

A  great  and  unlooked-for  opportunity  had  presented  itself; 
the  nation  insisted  that  that  opportunity  should  not  be  thrown 
away;  as  far  as  human  foresight  could  predict,  it  might  well  be 
the  last  chance.  National  independence  and  national  revival 
were  not  to  be  hoped  for,  if  Poland  remained  on  the  side  of 
Russia.  Had  the  Patriotic  leaders  recommended  this  latter 
course,  the  nation  would  have  repudiated  them:  they  had  no 
choice  but  to  attempt  to  rid  the  state  of  the  Muscovite  control. 
But  when  that  had  been  accomplished,  Poland  could  not  relapse 
into  a  nerveless  neutrality.  Forced  as  she  was  to  guard  against 
the  future  vengeance  of  the  Empress,  too  weak,  as  yet,  to  defend 
herself  single-handed,  obliged  also  to  reckon  with  the  danger 
that  Lhe  neighbors  would  settle  their  differences,  as  usual,  by  a 
bargain  at  her  expense,  Poland  was  compelled  to  make  sure  of 
the  support  of  one  of  the  great  Powers,  and  as  matters  then 
stood,  support  could  be  expected  only  from  Prussia. 

The  Patriots  were  tolerably  well  aware  of  the  dangers  of  the 
Prussian  alliance,  although  they  did  not  foresee  the  supreme 
treachery  of  1792,  —  and  how  could  they,  since  that  desertion 
is  almost  without  parallel  in  history  ?  They  realized  from  the 
outset  that  the  alliance  would  have  to  be  bought  with  a  heavy 
price  —  Dantzic,  Thorn,  perhaps  a  part  of  Great  Poland  - 

1  See  the  program  discussed  by  the  leaders  of  the  party  in  Paris  in  January, 
1788,  Dembinski,  "Piattoli  et  son  role,"  loc.  cit.,  pp.  54  ff.;  also  Lucchesini's  report 


114  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

although  later,  unfortunately,  the  leaders  were  unable  to  bring 
the  nation  to  make  the  sacrifice.  They  also  seem  to  have  recog- 
nized that  even  if  this  price  were  paid,  no  great  confidence  could 
under  ordinary  circumstances  be  placed  in  Prussian  friendship. 
But  the  present  situation  was  of  a  decidedly  extraordinary  sort. 
Prussia  had  allowed  herself  to  be  driven  into  an  antagonism  to 
the  Imperial  Courts  that  seemed  bound  to  end  in  open  war.  By 
joining  in  that  struggle,  Poland  might  win  solid  claims  to  Prussian 
gratitude,  and  also  provide  handsomely  for  her  own  immediate 
interests.  Such  a  war  was  likely  to  spell  disaster  for  the  already 
hard-pressed  Imperial  Courts;  it  might  put  an  end  to  Catherine's 
power  of  aggression  for  good  and  all;  at  any  rate,  it  would  create 
such  a  gulf  between  Poland's  two  most  dangerous  neighbors  that 
a  new  partition  would  be  out  of  the  question  for  a  long  time  to 
come.  Under  such  circumstances  the  ordinarily  '  unnatural ' 
Prussian-Polish  alliance  might  become  the  most  natural  thing 
in  the  world. 

Moreover,  there  was  another  contingency  in  which  the  Prus- 
sian connection  might  prove  useful  and  salutary.  Prussia  was  a 
member  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  which  seemed  to  be  more  and 
more  the  dominant  factor  in  European  politics.  It  was  true  that 
that  alliance  contained  divergent  tendencies.  Prussia  was  eager 
to  make  it  the  instrument  of  her  own  plans  of  aggrandizement, 
while  Pitt's  great  aim  was  to  restore  peace  to  Europe,  to  maintain 
the  balance  of  power,  and  to  protect  the  weaker  states  against 
such  aggressive  monarchs  as  Catherine  and  Joseph.  But  which- 
ever tendency  prevailed,  Poland  stood  to  gain  something,  pro- 
viding the  Triple  Alliance  held  together  and  continued  its  policy 
of  opposition  to  the  Imperial  Courts.  And  if  Poland,  by  means 
of  an  alliance  with  Prussia,  could  gain  admission  to  this  wider 
union,  the  advantage  would  be  inestimable.  The  Republic  would 
not  only  free  itself  from  too  close  dependence  upon  Berlin,  but 
would  also  gain  the  security  resulting  from  membership  in  an 
imposing  league  of  states  —  England,  Holland,  Prussia,  Sweden, 
perhaps  also  Denmark,  Turkey  and  the  German  Furstenbund  — 

of  July  4,  1789,  as  to  his  first  conferences  with  the  Poles  on  the  subject  of  the 
alliance. 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  115 

a'  league  of  states  banded  together  for  peace  and  mutual  protec- 
tion. Perhaps  it  was  not  too  much  to  hope  that  the  Triple 
Alliance,  which  had  rescued  Holland  from  France,  which  had 
delivered  Gustavus  III  from  the  direst  necessity,  which  was 
ready  to  come  to  the  aid  of  the  struggling  Turks,  might  also 
undertake  to  defend  Poland  against  the  vengeance  of  Catherine. 
These  hopes  proved  to  be  fallacious  and  illusory,  but  under 
the  circumstances  one  cannot  unreservedly  condemn  the  Polish 
statesmen  for  cherishing  them.  Certainly  the  Poles  were  not 
alone  in  miscalculating  the  outcome  of  the  general  European 
crisis:  Prussians  and  Belgians,  Swedes  and  Turks  were  equally 
deceived.  The  difference  was  only  that  Poland  had  infinitely 
more  at  stake  on  the  issue.  The  general  situation  in  1789  was 
indeed  such  as  to  warrant  high  hopes,  and  to  make  an  alliance 
with  Prussia,  incongruous  as  it  might  be  at  other  times,  appear 
under  the  given  circumstances  a  matter  of  sane  and  practical 
politics.  It  seems  probable  that  the  alliance  would  have  justified 
itself,  if  Prussia  had  drawn  the  sword  against  the  Imperial  Courts 
in  1790,  or  if  the  Triple  Alliance  had  not  executed  so  inglorious 
a  retreat  before  Catherine  in  1791.  Undoubtedly  the  Poles  did 
not  perform  all  that  might  have  been  expected  of  them  to  make 
their  alliance  with  Prussia  a  success;  but  the  great  reasons  for 
the  failure  of  that  alliance  are  to  be  found,  not  in  anything  that 
they  did  or  left  undone,  but  in  the  vacillations,  contradictions, 
and  fiascos  of  Prussian  policy  and  in  the  collapse  of  Pitt's  'Federa- 
tive System.' 

II 

The  proposal  for  a  Prusso-Polish  alliance  came  originally  from 
the  Poles  themselves.  The  idea,  as  we  have  seen,  formed  part 
of  the  program  of  the  Patriots  as  early  as  the  beginning  of  1788. 
It  was  strengthened  by  Frederick  William's  first  declaration  to 
the  Diet  (October,  1788),  in  which  the  King  suggested  that  if 
the  Republic  really  needed  an  alliance,  he  would  offer  his  own. 
That  offer  was  hardly  intended  to  be  taken  seriously,  for  the  King 
was  merely  trying  to  checkmate  the  proposed  Russian  alliance; 
but  it  raised  hopes.    As  soon  as  the  Patriots  had  gained  control 


Il6  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  the  Diet,  they  turned  their  attention  to  the  realization  of  this 
favorite  project,  combining  it  with  the  plan  of  securing  admission 
to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  with  the  establishment  of  an  heredi- 
tary monarchy  in  favor  of  the  Elector  of  Saxony,  who  was  also  to 
be  drawn  into  the  Federative  System. 

It  is  significant  of  the  desire  of  the  Polish  leaders  not  to  be  de- 
pendent upon  Prussia  alone  that  they  at  once  attempted  to  open  a 
separate  negotiation  with  England.  In  January,  1789,  and  again 
in  June  we  find  them  making  overtures  at  London,  looking 
towards  closer  political  and  commercial  relations  between  Great 
Britain  and  Poland.  But  Pitt  was  not  yet  interested  in  the 
Republic.  Not  long  before  he  had  confessed  to  the  Prussian 
envoy,  who  wanted  to  discuss  the  Polish  crisis,  that  he  had  not  the 
ghost  of  an  idea  about  the  constitution  or  the  affairs  of  Poland.1 
His  foreign  policy  had  not  yet  taken  on  the  comprehensive 
scope  and  the  marked  anti-Russian  bias  that  it  was  soon  to 
have;  and  moreover,  he  felt  that,  as  far  as  Poland  was  con- 
cerned, it  behooved  Prussia,  as  the  Power  chiefly  interested,  to 
prescribe  the  attitude  to  be  adopted  by  the  Triple  Alliance.  He 
therefore  intimated  to  the  Poles  that  England  could  enter  into 
no  negotiations,  political  or  commercial,  with  them  apart  from 
Prussia.2 

The  leaders  of  the  Diet  had  been  sounding  the  ground  at  Berlin 
ever  since  the  close  of  the  preceding  year;  but  now,  in  July,  1789, 
they  came  out  more  openly  with  their  proposals.  At  a  series  of 
secret  meetings  with  Lucchesini  and  Hailes,  the  British  envoy, 
they  set  forth  at  length  their  desire  for  an  alliance  with  Prussia, 
admission  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  a  new  constitution,  and  the 
hereditary  succession  in  the  House  of  Saxony.3 

Hertzberg  was  fairly  aghast  at  such  '  precipitate  projects.' 
The  Poles  must  be  bereft  of  common  sense,  he  wrote,  if  they 
imagined  that  Prussia  would  aid  them  to  turn  their  Republic 

1  Luckwaldt,  F.  B.  P.  G.,  xv,  p.  35. 

2  Salomon,  Das  politische  System  des  jiingeren  Pitt  und  die  zweite  Teilung  Polens, 
pp.  24  &.;  Lucchesini's  reports  of  June  13  and  17,  1789,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27;  Kalinka, 
Der  polnische  Reichstag,  ii,  pp.  242  ff. 

3  Lucchesini's  reports  of  November  5,  1788,  January  26,  May  9,  23,  30,  July  4, 
11,  19,  22,  25,  1789,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323  and  R.  9,  27. 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  11 J 

into  a  strong  hereditary  monarchy  in  permanent  union  with 
Saxony.  It  might,  indeed,  be  desirable  to  designate  the  Elector 
as  the  future  King,  if  that  prince  could  thus  be  won  over  definitely 
to  '  the  Prussian  system  ' ;  but  Prussia  could  never  permit  the 
Polish  crown  to  become  hereditary — at  least  not  without  obtain- 
ing an  enormous  compensation.  It  may  be  that  on  this  point  the 
minister  was  not  in  agreement  with  his  master,  for  in  March, 
through  his  confidant,  BischofTwerder,  Frederick  William  had 
assured  the  Elector  of  his  willingness  to  allow  and  support  the 
hereditary  succession  in  the  Saxon  House ; l  but  the  King 
had  probably  not  seen  fit  to  inform  either  Hertzberg  or  the 
Poles  of  this.  As  for  the  project  of  alliance,  Lucchesini  was 
ordered  to  restrain  the  ardor  of  his  Polish  friends,  since  only 
the  events  of  the  Eastern  war  could  allow  Prussia  to  make  a 
final  decision.2 

The  time  for  a  final  decision  seemed,  indeed,  to  be  close  at 
hand.  The  general  situation  in  the  summer  of  1789  was  such 
as  to  challenge  Prussia  to  action.  To  all  the  older  sources  of 
embarrassment  from  which  the  Imperial  Courts  had  been  suffer- 
ing, there  was  now  added  the  Revolution  at  Paris,  which  robbed 
them  of  their  one  possible  new  ally,  and  entirely  freed  the  hands 
of  their  enemies;  while  the  growing  internal  troubles  of  Austria — 
the  danger  of  rebellions  in  Belgium,  Galicia,  and  Hungary  — 
together  with  the  mortal  illness  of  Joseph  II,  threatened  com- 
pletely to  paralyze  the  energies  of  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy. 
Under  such  circumstances,  what  glittering  prospects  opened  up 
before  the  King  of  Prussia,  with  his  untouched  resources,  his  well- 
filled  treasury,  his  numerous  allies,  his  army  of  200,000  of  the 
best  troops  in  Europe !    "  The  events  of  ten  centuries,"  Lucchesini 

1  Flathe,  Die  V erhandhingen  iiber  die  dcm  Kurfiirsten  Friedrich  August  III  von 
Sachsen  angebotene  Thronfolge  in  Polen,  p.  7. 

2  Hertzberg's  reflections  on  the  Polish  proposals  are  set  forth  in  his  report  to 
the  King  of  July  9,  and  the  rescripts  to  Lucchesini  of  July  10  and  20,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27. 
H.  to  F.  W.,  July  9:  "V.  M.  nc  peut  jamais  permettre  selon  ses  veritables  interets 
que  le  throne  devienne  h£r6ditaire  en  Pologne,  a.  moins  que  l'Autriche  ne  sorte 
entierement  de  ce  royaume,  et  que  V.  M.  ne  recoive  un  tel  aggrandissement 
et  accroissement  de  puissance  qui  La  mette  entierement  en  surety  du  cot6  de  la 
Pologne,  puisque  ce  Royaume  gouvern£  par  un  Roi  hereditaire  deviendroit  trop 
dangereux  pour  la  Prusse." 


n8 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


declared,  "  could  not  bring  about  a  situation  more  favorable  to 
Prussia  for  putting  the  last  touch  upon  her  aggrandizement."  1 

Even  Hertzberg,  whose  learned  combinations  had  so  long  held 
the  Prussian  sword  in  the  scabbard,  was  now  —  rather  suddenly 
—  seized  with  a  fever  for  action.  He  proposed  that  the  King, 
on  going  to  Silesia  for  the  annual  reviews,  should  gather  two  army 
corps  and  then  present  to  the  belligerent  Powers  in  the  form  of 
an  ultimatum  a  scheme  for  the  general  pacification  based  upon 
the  sacrosanct  '  grand  plan.'  Hertzberg  may,  not  improbably, 
have  thought  that  a  mere  military  demonstration  would  suffice 
to  secure  the  general  acceptance  of  his  terms;  but  if  the  Imperial 
Courts  refused,  then  Prussia  should  strike,  at  least  at  Austria; 
with  the  aid  of  the  Turks  and  Poles  the  business  would  be  finished 
by  winter,  and  Prussia  raised  to  the  pinnacle  of  earthly  grandeur. 
Seldom  had  the  old  minister  aroused  himself  to  such  a  pitch  of 
impetuous  energy,  and  never  had  he  seen  success  so  nearly  within 
his  grasp. 

But  now,  for  the  first  time,  the  King  eluded  him.  At  the 
royal  headquarters  in  Silesia  other  counsels  prevailed.  The  de- 
cision was  doubtless  due  in  large  part  to  the  influence  and  in- 
trigues of  England,  which  had  never  relished  Hertzberg's  schemes 
of  aggrandizement,  and  which  was  now  moving  heaven  and  earth 
to  prevent  the  outbreak  of  a  general  European  conflagration. 
Moreover,  the  Prussian  generals  declared  with  one  accord  that 
the  season  was  too  far,  and  the  military  preparations  not  far 
enough,  advanced  to  permit  of  striking  a  blow  that  year.  Freder- 
ick William  personally  was  ready  enough  to  go  to  war  in  his  own 
good  time,  but  he  did  not  propose  to  do  so  merely  in  order  to 
obtain  an  exchange  of  provinces  rather  advantageous  to  Austria. 
'  He  could  not  bring  himself,'  he  said,  'to  do  so  little  harm  to  his 
natural  enemy.' 2  Never  very  enthusiastic  about  the  Hertzberg 
plan,  he  now  seemed  to  have  made  up  his  mind  to  abandon  it  for 
something  more  practicable.  > 

The  plan  that  the  King  adopted  in  its  stead  was:  to  await  the 
expected  rebellions  in  Belgium,  Hungary,  and  Galicia;  to  con- 

1  Lucchesini  to  Hertzberg,  August  27,  1789,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  405. 

2  Lucchesini  to  Hertzberg,  August  30,  1789,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  407. 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  119 

elude  an  alliance  with  the  Porte;  to  keep  the  Poles  ready  to  act 
and  the  Swedes  from  making  peace;  to  complete  Prussia's  own 
hitherto  inadequate  military  preparations,  and  then  in  the  spring, 
with  the  aid  of  all  these  allies,  to  deliver  a  crushing  attack  upon 
the  Emperor.  Whatever  may  be  thought  of  the  morality  of  it, 
this  program,  compared  with  the  Hertzberg  system  of  '  parti- 
tions and  exchanges,'  '  equivalents  '  and  '  compensations,'  seems 
like  a  return*  to  sane  and  practical  politics.  It  had  something  of 
the  spirit  of  Frederick  the  Great.  If  only  the  King  had  the  energy 
and  the  will-power  to  conduct  the  grand  venture  in  Frederick's 
manner,  the  " opportunity  of  ten  centuries"  would  not  have  come 
in  vain.  Hertzberg,  however,  was  inconsolable  at  the  overthrow 
of  his  idolized  scheme  and  the  loss  of  the  "unique  moment"  of  the 
summer.  Henceforth  there  appears  an  ever-growing  divergence 
between  the  views  of  the  minister, still  clinging  to  his  'grand  plan' 
and  perpetually  devising  new  combinations  for  realizing  at  least 
a  part  of  it,  and  the  projects  of  the  King,  who  was  bent  not  so 
much  on  making  acquisitions  as  on  settling  once  for  all  with 
Prussia's  '  natural  enemy.'  Henceforth  Prussia  was  to  have  on 
more  than  one  occasion  two  policies,  the  King's  and  Hertzberg's, 
and  sometimes  even  a  third,  an  awkward  combination  of  these 
two.1 

At  first,  however,  Prussia  started  off  bravely  enough  on  the 
new  course.  Immediately  after  the  King's  return  from  Silesia, 
orders  were  sent  to  Diez  at  Constantinople  to  conclude  an  offen- 
sive and  defensive  alliance  with  the  Porte,  and  to  promise  that 
Prussia  would  take  up  arms  the  following  year.2  Gustavus  III 
was  encouraged  to  persevere  in  his  lonely  struggle  by  a  substantial 
loan,  coupled  with  assurances  that  Prussia  would  induce  England 
to  send  a  fleet  to  the  Baltic  and  might  even  consent  in  good  time 
to  a  Swedish  alliance.3  Negotiations  were  started  for  an  alliance 
with  Poland;   and  by  underground  channels  the  malcontents  of 

1  In  Appendix  IV  there  will  be  found  an  enumeration  of  the  authorities  for  this 
episode  of  the  summer  of  1789,  and  some  discussion  of  controversial  points. 

2  Zinkeisen,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  740. 

3  Wahrenberg,  "  Bidrag  till  historien  om  K.  Gustaf  Ill's  sednaste  regeringsar," 
in  Tidskrift  for  Litteratur,  185 1,  pp.  336  ff. 


120  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Belgium,  Hungary,  and  Galicia  were  invited  to  prepare  for 
Armageddon.1 

Frederick  William's  warlike  resolutions  were  only  strengthened 
by  the  events  of  the  autumn.  In  October  the  revolt  began  in  the 
Austrian  Netherlands;  by  the  end  of  the  year  the  Imperialists 
had  been  virtually  driven  from  the  country;  in  January,  1790, 
the  Congress  at  Brussels  proclaimed  the  independence  of  '  The 
United  States  of  Belgium.'  On  the  other  hand,  the  Turks,  who 
had  come  through  the  previous  campaign  tolerably  well,  now  met 
with  a  series  of  crushing  reverses:  the  great  defeats  of  Focsani 
(August  1)  and  Rimnic  (September  22),  the  fall  of  Bender,  Aker- 
man,  and  Belgrade,  and  the  total  loss  of  the  Danubian  Principali- 
ties. After  such  disasters  it  was  only  too  probable  that  the 
discouraged  Ottomans  would  make  peace  at  once,  unless  the 
King  of  Prussia  speedily  came  to  the  rescue. 

Driven  on  by  the  most  imperative  and  pressing  orders  from 
Berlin,  Diez  at  last  brought  his  negotiation  to  a  successful  con- 
clusion. On  January  31,  1790,  the  Prusso-Turkish  alliance  was 
signed.  Prussia  pledged  herself  to  declare  war  on  both  the  Im- 
perial Courts  in  the  coming  spring,  and  not  to  lay  down  arms 
until  the  Turks  had  recovered,  not  only  all  they  had  lost  during 
the  present  war,  but  also  the  Crimea.  In  return  the  Porte 
promised  to  exert  itself,  at  the  time  when  peace  should  be  con- 
cluded, to  procure  the  restitution  of  Galicia  to  Poland  and  to 
obtain  substantial  advantages  for  Prussia.2  This  treaty  produced 
a  tremendous  sensation  throughout  Europe,  and  not  a  little 
mortification  even  at  Berlin,  where  it  was  found  that  Diez  had 
wildly  overstepped  his  instructions,  especially  with  regard  to  the 
Crimea.  Nevertheless,  the  King  was  well  content,  for  at  last  he 
was  sure  of  the  Turks,  and  the  cornerstone  of  his  great  offen- 
sive coalition  was  laid.  Not  long  afterwards  the  Prusso-Polish 
alliance  also  came  into  existence. 

1  Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  282;  Van  de  Spiegel,  Resume  des  negotiations,  etc., 
pp.  16  ff.  and  61  ff.;  Blok,  Geschiedenis  van  het  N ederlandsche  Volk,  vi,  pp.  513  ff.; 
Bailleu,  "  Herzog  Karl  August,  Goethe,  und  die  ungarische  Konigskrone,"  in 
Goethe- J ahrbuch,  xx  (1899),  pp.  144-152;  Krones,  Ungarn  unter  Maria  Theresa  und 
Joseph  II,  pp.  51  f. 

2  This  treaty  is  printed  in  Martens,  Recueil  de  Traites  des  Puissances  de  V Europe, 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  121 

III 

For  some  months  during  the  autumn  Hertzberg  had  delayed 
a  formal  negotiation  with  the  Republic  by  every  device  his  in- 
genuity could  suggest.  If  the  minister  had  had  his  way,  the 
alliance  would  probably  never  have  been  made.  But  the  Poles 
grew  continually  more  impatient,  Lucchesini  more  insistent,  and 
Frederick  William  more  ardent  for  "  the  alliance  and  war."  x 
At  last,  on  December  10,  1789,  a  letter  was  communicated  to  the 
Diet,  in  which  the  King  of  Prussia  formally  promised  to  conclude 
an  alliance  as  soon  as  the  terms  could  be  agreed  upon.  The  sole 
condition  that  he  attached  to  it  was  that  the  Poles  should  put 
through  certain  reforms  in  their  constitution,  since  he  saw  "more 
advantage  in  a  well-ordered  government  in  Poland  which  would 
assure  the  political  existence  of  the  nation,  than  in  an  army  of 
300,000  men  under  a  state  of  things  that  exposed  the  country  to 
constant  revolutions  and  changes."  The  Diet,  roused  to  en- 
thusiasm, made  haste  to  act  upon  this  suggestion.  A  new  con- 
stitution, avowedly  imperfect  but  designed  to  meet  the  emergency 
and  to  strengthen  the  hand  of  the  government,  was  rushed 
through  in  remarkably  quick  time  and  with  still  more  remarkable 
unanimity  (December  23).  Meanwhile  the  Deputation  of  For- 
eign Interests  was  authorized  to  negotiate  an  alliance,  not  only 
with  Prussia  but  also  if  possible  with  England.2 

It  was  an  historic  moment,  the  apogee  of  the  Prusso-Polish 
honeymoon.  Never  before  nor  later  were  the  two  sides  so  nearly 
at  one  in  purposes,  desires,  and  aspirations.    The  King  of  Prussia 

iv,  pp.  466  ff.;   Hertzberg,  Recueil,  iii,  pp.  36-43;   Angeberg,  Recueil  des  Traites  et 
Conventions  concernant  la  Pologne,  pp.  216-220. 

1  Hertzberg  to  Lucchesini,  December  1,  1789:  "  Le  roi,  qui  veut  a  present  a 
tout  priz  alliance  et  guerre  .  .  .  ,"  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  419.  Very  instructive 
for  Hertzberg's  attitude  is  his  "  Denkschrift  iiber  das  zwischen  Preussen  und  Polen 
im  Jahre  1790  geschlossene  Bundniss,"  in  Schmidt's  Allgemeine  Zcitschrift  fiir 
Geschichte,  vii,  pp.  261-271. 

2  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  i,  pp.  641  ff.;  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  57  f. 
The  proposal  for  an  alliance  subsequently  made  at  London  received  only  an  evasive 
answer,  as  Pitt  was  too  much  occupied  with  other  things  and  also  fearful  of  Conti- 
nental connections  that  involved  a  danger  of  war.  See  Bukaty  to  Ankwicz, 
December  18,  1789  and  February  16,  1790,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  426  f.  (notes). 


122  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

believed  that  he  had  a  real  need  of  the  Polish  alliance  in  order 
to  complete  his  offensive  coalition.  He  was  probably  sincere  in 
his  professed  wish  to  see  a  strong  government  in  Poland,  in  order 
that  the  Republic  might  prove  an  efficient  confederate.  The 
mass  of  the  Poles  were  eager  for  a  treaty  that  promised  security 
against  Russia,  while  the  leaders  of  the  Patriots,  initiated  into 
the  aggressive  plans  of  Prussia,  rejoiced  in  the  prospect  of  a 
glorious  war,  the  recovery  of  Galicia,  the  restoration  of  Poland 
to  an  honorable  place  in  the  political  system  of  Europe.  With 
such  dispositions  on  both  sides,  it  might  have  seemed  that  the 
conclusion  of  the  alliance  would  be  a  short  and  easy  matter. 

The  formal  negotiation  was  begun  at  Warsaw  in  the  last  days 
of  December;  and  early  in  January,  the  draft  of  a  treaty  having 
been  put  on  paper,  Lucchesini  went  off  to  Berlin  to  procure  his 
master's  final  instructions.  Then,  however,  there  came  a  painful 
halt,  and  dangers  loomed  up  that  threatened  to  wreck  the  project. 
The  difficulty  came,  in  the  first  place,  from  the  King  of  Poland. 
Stanislas  Augustus  was  still  profoundly  convinced  that  salvation 
lay  only  on  the  side  of  Russia,  and  he  was  haunted  by  Stackel- 
berg's  frequent  warnings  that  the  Empress  would  pardon  any- 
thing except  an  alliance  with  Prussia.  How  far  he  had  bound 
himself  to  the  Russian  ambassador,  who  had  promised  him  the 
payment  of  his  enormous  debts  if  he  would  thwart  the  obnox- 
ious project,1  it  is  difficult  to  say;  at  any  rate,  it  is  certain  that 
the  King  viewed  the  alliance  with  repugnance,  and  worked 
against  it  as  much  as  he  dared. 

As  one  means  of  checking  the  project,  Stanislas  secretly  advised 
the  Imperial  Courts  to  present  declarations  to  the  Diet  that  they 
bore  no  ill  will  for  all  that  had  recently  taken  place  in  Poland, 
and  were  themselves  willing  to  conclude  treaties  of  alliance  with 
the  Republic,  guaranteeing  its  independence  and  integrity. 
Possibly  such  declarations  might  have  had  the  desired  effect; 
but  nothing  could  induce  the  proud  lady  in  Petersburg  to  such 

1  De  Cache's  report  of  February  6,  1790,  as  to  Stackelberg's  offer,  V.  A., 
Polen,  Berichte.  That  the  King  gave  the  ambassador  some  kind  of  a  promise  to 
place  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  alliance  appears  from  the  protocol  of  the  Russian 
Council  of  the  Empire  of  January  7/18,  1790,  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  p.  758. 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  1 23 

an  act  of  condescension.  Austria,  indeed,  took  up  the  King's 
suggestion.  At  least,  Kaunitz,  keenly  alarmed  at  the  danger 
threatening  Galicia,  approached  the  Polish  minister  at  Vienna 
with  the  rather  abrupt  offer  of  an  Austro-Polish  alliance  on  the 
same  terms  as  that  which  was  to  be  concluded  with  Prussia. 
But  as  this  overture  was  not  made  public,  the  leaders  at  Warsaw, 
rightly  regarding  it  as  a  mere  snare,  returned  an  evasive  answer 
and  avoided  bringing  the  matter  before  the  Diet  at  all.1 

While  thus  disappointed  in  the  hopes  he  had  based  upon  the 
Imperial  Courts,  Stanislas  Augustus  had  been  more  successful 
with  another  device  for  thwarting  the  Prussian  alliance.  From 
the  beginning  he  had  insisted  that  the  alliance  must  be  accom- 
panied by  a  commercial  treaty  that  would,  at  least  to  some  extent, 
free  Polish  trade  from  the  enormous  transit  duties  and  other 
restrictions  imposed  by  Prussia.  This  was,  indeed,  a  matter  of 
the  utmost  importance,  in  view  of  the  fact  that  the  vast  bulk  of 
the  foreign  trade  of  the  Republic  had  to  pass  through  Prussian 
territory,  by  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder  or  through  Silesia;  but 
it  involved  delicate  and  complex  questions  which  it  would  have 
been  wiser  not  to  raise  at  such  a  time.  The  Patriotic  leaders  fully 
realized  how  inopportune  the  demand  for  a  commercial  treaty 
was;  but  the  demand,  which  was  certain  to  be  popular,  became 
noised  abroad,  and  they  did  not  dare  resist.  Hence,  when  the 
Polish  proposals  for  the  alliance  went  to  Berlin,  the  commercial 
question  had  been  coupled  with  the  political  one.2 

All  this  was  grist  to  Hertzberg's  mill.  He,  too,  wished  to 
combine  the  two  sets  of  questions,  because,  in  his  pettifogging 
way,  he  saw  a  chance  to  drive  a  sharp  bargain  and  to  prove  once 
more  that  for  the  aggrandizement  of  Prussia  the  pen  was  mightier 
than  the  sword.  He  would  sell  the  Poles  the  alliance  and  the 
commercial  treaty  in  return  for  the  cession  of  Dantzic  and 
Thorn.  Both  Hertzberg  and  his  master  seem  to  have  believed 
that   the   Diet   would   make    the   sacrifice   without   too   much 

1  Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  February  10  and  17,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Exped.,  1790; 
the  Deputation  of  Foreign  Interests  to  Ankwicz,  February  24,  Museum  XX. 
Ossolinskich,  MS.  516;   Wegner,  Dzieje  dnia  trzeciego  i  piqtego  maja,  pp.  320  f. 

2  KaHnka,  Der  polniscke  Reichstag,  ii,  pp.  20  ff. ;   Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  p.  205. 


124      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

murmuring :  an  error  for  which  Lucchesini  and  the  Polish  envoys 
at  Berlin  were  probably  responsible.1 

When  at  the  end  of  February  the  Prussian  minister  returned 
to  Warsaw  and  presented  his  two  treaties,  including  the  demand 
for  Dantzic  and  Thorn,  the  impression  was  staggering.  The 
leaders  of  the  Patriots  were,  indeed,  ready  to  agree  even  to  these 
terms,  realizing  that  the  natural  and  inevitable  desire  of  Prussia 
for  two  cities  enclosed  in  her  own  territory  could  not  in  the  long 
run  be  denied;  but  this  mattered  little,  for  no  one  dared  come 
out  openly  in  defence  of  so  violently  unpopular  a  project.  To 
the  rank  and  file  of  the  so-called  '  Prussian  party,'  it  was  a  terrible 
disillusionment  to  find  the  '  virtuous '  and  '  disinterested ' 
Frederick  William  a  veritable  Shylock  in  disguise.  If  this  was 
the  first  sample  of  his  '  generosity,'  what  might  not  be  expected 
of  him  in  the  future  ?  To  the  mass  of  the  nation  the  idea  of  the 
proposed  cession  was  intolerable,  because  it  would  have  seemed 
like  a  new  partition,  and  this  time  the  more  shameful  because 
voluntarily  accepted.2  In  short,  the  partisans  of  the  alliance  were 
thrown  into  consternation,  while  the  '  Russians  '  and  '  Parasites  ' 
triumphed,  declaring  that  this  was  what  they  had  always  pre- 
dicted. The  Deputation  of  Foreign  Interests  did  not  venture 
even  to  lay  the  Prussian  terms  before  the  Diet.  Lucchesini  did 
not  dare  show  himself.  Sick  with  fever  or  chagrin,  the  envoy 
shut  himself  up  in  his  house  and  wrote  home  desperately,  begging 
for  permission  to  drop  the  commercial  treaty  and  the  odious 
conditions  attached  to  it,  assuring  his  Court  that  the  Diet  would 
even  rather  give  up  the  alliance  than  consent  to  sacrifice  the 
two  cities.3 

Hertzberg,  much  ruffled  at  the  inconceivable  blindness  of  the 
Poles  to  their  '  true  interests,'  would  probably  have  renounced 

1  Lucchesini  to  Hertzberg,  November  4  and  29,  1789,  Dembinski,  op.  tit.,  i, 
pp.  415  and  417;   Hertzberg's  Memoir  in  Schmidt's  Zeitschrift,  vii,  p.  267. 

2  Kraszewski,  Polska  w  czasie  trzech  rozbiordw,  ii,  p.  287. 

3  For  the  effect  produced  by  the  Prussian  demands:  Lucchesini  to  Hertzberg, 
February  27,  in  Dembinski,  pp.  423,  f.;  Lucchesini  to  Jacobi,  March  20,  B.  A., 
R-  93,  33>  de  Cache's  reports  of  March  2  and  6,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1790;  Aubert 
(the  French  charge"  d'affaires)  to  Montmorin,  February  27  and  March  3,  Dembinski, 
op.  tit.,  1,  pp.  495-498;   Engestrom,  Minnen  och  Anteckningar ,  i,  pp.  157  f. 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  125 

the  alliance  rather  than  desist  from  his  territorial  claims,  but  the 
King  was  not  so  minded.  Through  the  latter's  intervention, 
Lucchesini  was  straightway  given  the  orders  he  had  asked  for: 
the  commercial  question  was  to  be  postponed,  and  the  alliance 
to  be  concluded  at  once.1 

By  the  time. these  instructions  reached  Warsaw,  the  atmos- 
phere there  had  already  cleared.  The  evil  effects  of  the  Prussian 
demands  had  by  no  means  been  obliterated;  they  remained  to 
taint  this  alliance  from  its  birth;  but  the  news  of  the  Prusso- 
Turkish  treaty,  the  death  of  the  Emperor  Joseph,  the  exhortations 
of  the  English,  Dutch,  and  Swedish  ministers,  who  held  out  the 
prospect  of  admission  to  the  Triple  Alliance,  and  above  all  the 
energetic  exertions  of  the  Patriotic  leaders  had  combined  to  pro- 
duce a  marked  revulsion  of  public  opinion  in  favor  of  the  great 
project.2 

The  demand  for  Dantzic  and  Thorn  being  now  laid  on  the 
shelf,  the  final  arrangements  were  quickly  pushed  through.  On 
March  27  the  Diet  in  secret  session  approved  the  proposed  draft 
of  the  alliance  with  little  opposition.  The  29th  the  instrument 
was  signed. 

The  treaty  contained  the  usual  guarantees  of  the  respective 
possessions  of  the  contracting  parties,  although  it  was  stated  that 
this  should  not  exclude  a  future  voluntary  agreement  about  cer- 
tain territorial  questions  now  unsettled.  This  referred,  of  course, 
to  Dantzic  and  Thorn.  In  case  either  side  should  be  attacked, 
the  other  was  bound  to  render  military  assistance:  Poland  with 
8,000  cavalry  and  4,000  infantry;  Prussia  with  14,000  infantry 
and  4,000  cavalry.  In  case  of  extreme  necessity  either  party  was 
bound  to  aid  its  ally  with  all  its  forces.  Article  VI,  which  later 
acquired  a  mournful  celebrity,  ran:  "  If  any  foreign  Power,  by 
virtue  of  any  previous  acts  or  stipulations  or  the  interpretation 
thereof,  should  seek  to  assert  the  right  to  interfere  in  the  internal 

1  For  Hertzberg's attitude,  cf.  his  above-cited  "Denkschrift  iiber  das  Biindniss," 
in  Schmidt's  Zeitschrift,  vii,  p.  267;    Kalinka,  Der  polniscke  Reichstag,  ii,  pp.  51  ff. 

2  Kalinka,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  58  f.;  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  59  ff.;  de  Cache, 
March  13,  17,  31,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit.;  Engestrom,  loc.cit.;  Hailes'  report  of  April  29  in 
Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  546;  Stanislas  Augustus  to  Bukaty,  March  31,  in 
Kalinka,  Ostalnie  lata,  ii,  pp.  150  f. 


126  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

affairs  of  the  Republic  of  Poland,  or  of  its  dependencies  [i.  e. 
Courland],  at  any  time  or  in  any  manner  whatsoever,  His  Maj- 
esty the  King  of  Prussia  will  first  endeavor  by  his  good  offices 
to  prevent  hostilities  growing  out  of  such  a  pretension;  but  if 
these  good  offices  should  not  prove  effective  and  hostilities  against 
Poland  result,  His  Majesty  the  King  of  Prussia,  recognizing  this 
as  a  casus  foederis ,  will  then  assist  the  Republic  according  to  the 
provisions  of  Article  IV  of  the  present  treaty."  So  much  for  any 
future  attempt  of  Catherine  II  to  revive  the  Russian  guaran- 
tee. Finally,  both  sides  expressed  their  desire  to  conclude  a 
commercial  treaty,  but  that  matter  was  reserved  for  a  future 
time.1 

Thus  that  alliance  with  Prussia  which  the  Patriot  leaders  had 
hoped  and  worked  for  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the  Diet;  the 
alliance  in  which  they  saw  the  '  palladium  of  liberty,'  the  one 
guarantee  of  their  new-won  independence,  their  one  safeguard 
against  the  reprisals  and  aggressions  of  Russia ;  the  alliance  which 
was  to  admit  them  to  the  great  Federative  System  and  restore 
them  to  a  secure  and  honorable  place  in  Europe,  had  at  last  come 
to  be.  That  alliance  had  not  been  extorted  from  Prussia  by  mere 
importunities,  cajoleries,  or  ruses.  Prussia  had  entered  into  it 
voluntarily,  in  a  spirit  of  comparative  sincerity  and  amity.  How- 
ever much  Hertzberg  might  writhe  and  rage,  however  much 
Lucchesini  might  strive  to  give  his  reports  from  Warsaw  a  fine 
Machiavellian  flavor,  the  fact  remained  that  at  that  time  Fred- 
erick William  was  really  the  friend  of  Poland.  The  King  had 
ardently  desired  the  alliance;  he  wished  to  see  the  Poles  reform 
their  government  and  strengthen  their  army;  he  favored  their 
plan  of  securing  to  the  Elector  of  Saxony  the  succession  to  the 
throne;  he  contemplated  admitting  the  Republic  to  the  Triple 
Alliance.2    All  this,  of  course,  was  not  because  of  any  particular 

1  The  treaty  of  alliance  of  March  29,  1790,  is  printed  in  Martens,  Recueil,  iv, 
pp.  471  ff.;  Hertzberg,  Recueil,  iii,  pp.  1-8;  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  222-226. 

2  Before  his  return  to  Warsaw  in  February,  1 790,  Lucchesini  was  sent  to  Dresden 
to  offer  the  Elector  Prussia's  assistance  in  the  matter  of  the  Polish  succession 
(de  Cache,  February,  13).  As  to  the  admission  of  Poland  to  the  Triple  Alliance, 
see  e.  g.,  Hertzberg  to  Lucchesini,  March  6  (Dembifiski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  426  f.)  and 
to  Diez,  March  9  (Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  290). 


THE  PRUSSO-POLISH  ALLIANCE  127 

affection  for  the  Poles,  but  because  the  King  believed  that  he 
needed  their  alliance  for  his  coalition  against  Austria. 

The  alliance  was  made,  then,  by  both  sides  in  good  faith,  for 
precise,  practical  reasons.  It  was  no  mere  formality,  no  hollow 
form  of  words.  Defensive  according  to  the  letter,  it  was  in  spirit 
an  offensive  alliance,  for  it  was  formed  with  a  view  to  a  great  joint 
enterprise.  It  was  an  alliance  for  action,  for  meeting  a  great 
opportunity  with  a  great  deed.1 

1  Cf.  the  remarks  of  Askenazy,  op.  ciL,  pp.  60  ff. 


CHAPTER  VII 

Reichenbach 


Never,  perhaps,  in  the  course  of  its  stormy  history  has  the 
Austrian  Monarchy  been  placed  in  a  more  desperate  situation 
than  at  the  moment  when  Joseph  II  sank  into  the  grave.1  With 
the  costly  and  bloody  Turkish  war  still  dragging  on,  the  opulent 
Netherlands  lost,  the  other  provinces  apparently  ready  to  revolt, 
and  slight  hope  of  effective  aid  from  an  exhausted  and  unreliable 
ally,  the  tottering  edifice  of  the  Hapsburg  power  must  have 
collapsed  before  a  single  vigorous  blow  from  without.  That  the 
threatening  catastrophe  was  averted  is  the  great  merit  of  Joseph's 
brother  and  successor,  Leopold  II. 

The  new  monarch  brought  to  his  colossal  task  no  very  brilliant 
talents ;  but  he  possessed  a  deep  understanding  of  men  and  affairs, 
gained  during  twenty-five  years'  experience  of  rule  in  Tuscany; 
a  clear,  dispassionate,  and  independent  judgment;  a  keen  instinct 
for  the  practical,  coupled  with  a  complete  indifference  to  the  am- 
bitious plans  and  love  of  glory  that  had  haunted  his  brother; 
finally,  firmness,  prudence,  and  tact.  Having  lived  in  Italy, 
and  not  being  accustomed  to  confide  his  inmost  thoughts  to  all 
comers,  he  could  scarcely  hope  to  escape  the  reproach  so  often 
cast  upon  him  of  being  a  '  new  Machiavelli '  —  it  comes  with 
such  special  grace  from  Lucchesini's  lips — but  in  fact  his  policy, 
whenever  it  was  the  expression  of  his  own  will  and  not  that  of 
Kaunitz,  appears  straightforward,  honest,  and  surprisingly  simple. 
It  seems  possible  to  reduce  Leopold's  whole  political  system  to  a 
very  few  principles.  He  wished  to  secure  and  maintain  peace  at 
home  and  abroad;  to  cultivate  the  Russian  alliance,  in  so  far  as 
it  conduced  to  that  end,  and  no  farther;  and  to  effect  an  under- 
standing with  Prussia,  as  the  indispensable  condition  of  per- 

1  The  Emperor  died  on  February  20,  1790. 
128 


REICHENBACH  1 29 

manent  quiet.  Such  a  policy  contains  nothing  particularly 
Machiavellian.  And  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  his  was  precisely 
the  kind  of  policy  that  Austria  most  needed  at  that  time. 

From  the  moment  of  his  accession,  Leopold's  foremost  aims 
were  to  put  an  end  to  the  Turkish  war,  to  avert  a  breach  with 
Prussia  and  Poland,  and  to  recover  the  Netherlands.  Naturally 
he  wished  to  save  as  much  as  possible  of  the  conquests  made 
during  the  war,  but  he  was  unwilling  for  their  sake  to  risk  the 
most  essential  interests  of  the  Monarchy.  In  general,  he  was 
prepared  to  make  any  sacrifice  compatible  with  honor,  in  order 
to  rescue  the  state  from  the  desperate  situation  into  which  his 
brother  had  brought  it.  This  pacific  policy  conflicted  from  the 
outset,  however,  with  the  ideas  of  the  second  power  in  the  Em- 
pire, the  veteran  Chancellor.  Hating  Prussia  with  all  the  accumu- 
lated bitterness  of  a  lifetime,  viewing  the  glory  of  the  Monarchy 
as  identical  with  his  own,  Kaunitz  revolted  at  the  thought  of 
anything  resembling  a  surrender  to  the  rival  at  Berlin.  Rather 
than  endure  such  shame  he  would  have  risked  as  many  wars  as 
might  come.  The  result  of  these  diverging  tendencies  was,  at 
first,  a  compromise. 

It  was  decided  to  keep  open  both  avenues  of  action.  On  the 
one  hand,  while  negotiating  with  England,  whose  disinclination 
to  the  aggressive  plans  of  Prussia  was  well  known  at  Vienna, 
Leopold  meant  to  press  operations  vigorously  against  the  Turks 
in  the  hope  of  forcing  a  speedy  peace,  and  to  make  sure  of  the 
assistance  of  Russia  in  case  of  an  emergency;  on  the  other  hand, 
he  hoped  to  avert  an  immediate  outbreak  of  hostilities  on  the 
part  of  Prussia  and  her  satellites  by  making  friendly  overtures  to 
the  Court  of  Berlin.  Accordingly,  immediately  after  his  arrival 
in  Vienna,  he  wrote  Frederick  William  an  eminently  amicable 
letter,  expressing  his  desire  for  peace  and  for  better  relations. 
With  it  went  a  memorial  announcing  the  Austrian  terms  for  a 
peace  with  the  Turks:  the  frontier  as  formerly  established  by 
the  Peace  of  Passarowitz.1 

1  The  letter  and  the  memorial  are  printed  in  Van  de  Spiegel,  op.  cil.,  pp.  222- 
230 ;  the  letter  also  in  Hertzberg's  Recueil,  pp.  50  f .  In  both  these  texts  the 
date  is  given  as  March  25,  as  also  by  Duncker,  H.  Z.,  xxxvii,  p.  14,  and  Beer, 


130  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Even  so  unexpected  and  friendly  a  communication,  novelty 
as  it  was  in  the  relations  between  Berlin  and  Vienna,  might  of 
itself  have  produced  little  effect  upon  Frederick  William.  Since 
August  his  heart  had  been  set  on  war,  on  fighting  out  the  old 
rivalry  with  Austria  to  a  finish.  His  anti-Hapsburg  coalition 
was  formed;  his  army  was  mobilizing;  it  was  no  time  now  for 
turning  back  from  the  great  enterprise.  But  just  at  this  moment 
England  intervened  and  played  into  the  hand  of  Austria. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  the  two  leading  members  of  the 
Triple  Alliance  pursued  very  different  aims  during  this  protracted 
European  crisis.    While  Prussia  was  eager  to  utilize  the  situation 
for  her  own  schemes  of  aggrandizement,  Pitt  desired  only  to 
restore  peace  as  soon  as  possible,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  would 
make  the  least  possible  change  in  the  existing  equilibrium  and 
would  ensure  the  existence  of  the  small  states  against  the  aggres- 
sive and  rapacious  Powers.     Under  such  circumstances  it  had 
not  been  easy  to  maintain  even  a  semblance  of  harmony  between 
the  two  allies.    Both  agreed  that  the  Triple  Alliance  was  called 
upon  to  restore  the  peace  of  Europe;  but  when  it  came  to  a  dis- 
cussion of  ways  and  means,  there  were  endless  bickerings  and 
recriminations.    Early  in  1 790,  however,  an  agreement  had  appar- 
ently been  reached.    At  the  close  of  February,  Pitt  had  brought 
forward  his  favorite  formula  of  the  status  quo  ante  helium  as  the 
basis  upon  which  the  allies  should  attempt  to  effect  a  general 
pacification.    Being  at  that  time  still  ignorant  of  the  real  temper 
of  Austria's  new  ruler,  the  Prussians  readily  assented.     They 
reckoned  that  both  the  Imperial  Courts  would  reject  a  principle 
that  involved  the  sacrifice  of  practically  all  their  conquests;  and 
in  that  case,  Prussia  would  have  not  only  a  pretext  for  war,  but  a 
right  to  demand  the  armed  cooperation  of  England  and  Holland.1 
Pitt,  who  was  now  determined  to  take  up  the  great  work  of 
pacification  in  earnest,  had  meanwhile  been  vastly  encouraged 

Leopold  II,  Franz  II  und  Catharina,  p.  16.  Ranke  (Die  deutschen  Mdchte,  ii, 
pp.  174  f.,  note),  Sybel  {Gesch.  d.  Revolutionszeit,  i,  p.  213),  and  Heigel  {Deutsche 
Geschichte,  i,  p.  250,  note  2)  give  the  26th,  which  is  also  the  date  of  the  copy  of 
the  letter  among  the  Expeditionen,  Preussen,  1790,  in  the  Vienna  Archives. 

1  Salomon,  William  Pitt,  iH,  pp.  465  f.;    Rose,  Pitt  and  National  Revival,  pp. 

5i9  ff- 


REICHENBACH  1 3  I 

by  an  event  in  another  quarter.  Leopold's  first  act,  on  learning 
of  his  brother's  death,  was  to  summon  the  British  envoy  at 
Florence  to  a  secret  interview,  at  which  he  expressed  in  the 
strongest  terms  his  desire  for  peace,  his  willingness  to  make  the 
sacrifices  that  might  be  necessary,  and  his  wish  that  England 
should  assume  the  role  of  mediator.  It  was  true  that  he  did  not 
commit  himself  definitely  to  the  status  quo  ante  principle,  and 
that  after  his  arrival  in  Vienna,  under  the  influence  of  Kaunitz, 
his  tone  altered  and  stiffened  considerably.  But  Pitt  did  not 
wait  for  further  particulars.  Delighted  by  the  request  for  media- 
tion, and  convinced  that  Austria  was  already  converted  to  his 
favorite  principle,  he  hastened  to  send  out  invitations  to  all  the 
belligerents  for  a  peace  negotiation  on  the  status  quo  ante  basis. 
At  the  same  time  he  wrote  to  Berlin  that  the  new  King  of  Hungary 
seemed  sincerely  'anxious  for  peace  on  fair  and  moderate  terms; 
that  he  did  not  share  his  predecessor's  ambition,  or  his  predilec- 
tion for  Russia,  or  his  jealousy  of  Prussia;  and  that  it  was  to 
be  presumed  that  he  would  accept  the  status  quo  ante  principle, 
or  something  approximating  it.  If  Prussia  refused  that  basis,  in 
order  to  pursue  offensive  plans  of  her  own,  she  was  warned  that 
she  could  not  count  upon  the  cooperation  of  England.  If  she 
accepted  it,  on  the  other  hand,  the  principle  need  not  be  inter- 
preted so  strictly  as  to  exclude  certain  reasonable  modifications 
of  the  old  frontiers  to  the  reciprocal  advantage  of  the  interested 
parties;  but  great  changes  of  territory  would  be  out  of  the  ques- 
tion, and  no  changes  ought  to  be  insisted  upon  to  the  point  of 
producing  a  new  war.1 

This  communication  from  England,  following  close  upon  the 
overture  from  Austria,  placed  the  Prussians  in  a  highly  embar- 
rassing situation.  Should  they  go  forward  resolutely  with  their 
offensive  plans,  paying  no  further  attention  to  their  inconsiderate 
ally  at  London,  or  should  they  enter  upon  the  path  of  negotiation, 
as  Leopold  invited,  and  Pitt  exhorted,  them  to  do  ?  And  if  they 
negotiated,  could  they  afford  to  admit  the  status  quo  basis  ? 
Undoubtedly  that  principle  now  appeared  in  very  different  light 

1  This  dispatch,  Leeds  to  Ewart,  March  30,  is  analyzed  in  Salomon,  Pitt,  iH, 
p.  470;   Rose,  Pitt,  pp.  523  f.;   Ranke,  Die  deutschen  Mdchte,  ii,  pp.  182  f. 


I32  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

from  that  in  which  they  had  welcomed  it  only  a  month  before. 
Then  it  had  meant  a  device  by  which  they  could  draw  England 
after  them  into  aggressive  action  against  Austria.  Now  it  meant 
a  formula  by  which,  if  they  accepted  it,  Leopold  could  at  any 
moment  strike  the  arms  from  their  hands.  Frederick  William 
was  now  furious  against  the  English  for  declaring  in  favor  of  so 
insidious  a  principle,  and  he  was  strongly  tempted  to  '  emanci- 
pate '  himself  from  them  entirely.  Hertzberg,  however,  was 
rather  pleased  with  the  course  events  had  taken.  Always  in- 
clined to  prefer  diplomacy  to  arms  and  increasingly  pessimistic 
about  a  war  with  Austria,  he  now  saw  a  new  chance  for  his  old 
plan,  the  universal  panacea  —  at  least  for  the  old  plan  in  a  some- 
what reduced  and  more  moderate  form.  In  one  report  after 
another  he  urged  upon  his  master  how  dangerous  it  would  be  to 
break  with  England  entirely  and  to  risk  his  fortunes  in  a  war 
undertaken  with  no  more  reliable  allies  than  Turks,  Poles,  or 
Hungarian  rebels.  On  the  other  hand,  if  he  negotiated,  he  would, 
indeed,  have  to  admit  the  status  quo  ante  basis,  but  he  could  give 
that  principle  so  loose  a  meaning  as  to  cover  a  bargain  with 
Austria  for  reciprocal  advantages.  England  might  be  expected 
to  favor  certain  just  and  moderate  acquisitions  for  Prussia,  since 
Pitt  had  himself  declared  that  the  status  quo  principle  need  not 
be  taken  too  strictly.  In  this  way,  perhaps,  Dantzic  and  Thorn 
might  at  last  be  won,  without  the  necessity  of  striking  a  blow  or 
risking  anything.  It  would,  at  least,  do  no  harm  to  try,  and 
His  Majesty  could,  of  course,  break  off  the  negotiation  whenever 
he  chose.  At  this  point,  if  ever,  it  was  time  to  dismiss  a  minister 
obsessed  by  incongruous  and  impossible  schemes.  But  although 
Frederick  William  had  long  lost  faith  in  the  miraculous  efficacy 
of  the  '  grand  plan,'  and  was  still  as  eager  for  war  as  before,  he 
allowed  Hertzberg  to  have  his  way.  The  chief  reason  was  that 
the  army  was  not  ready  for  action,  nor  likely  to  be  for  more  than 
a  month.  Unfortunately  for  Prussia,  the  date  for  the  completion 
of  mobilization  had  been  fixed  at  May  15.1  Hence  Hertzberg 
was  to  have  one  more  chance  to  exhibit  his  virtuosity  as  a  diplo- 
mat, although,  as  the  King  insisted,  the  military  preparations 

1  P.  Wittichen,  Die  polnische  Politik  Preussens,  p.  51. 


REICH  EN  BACH    -  1 33 

were  to  continue,  and  Prussia  must  be  ready  to  strike  within 
two  months.1 

This  was,  we  think,  a  disastrous  decision.  The  King  com- 
mitted himself  to  a  formal  negotiation  in  which  the  only  alterna- 
tives under  discussion  were  to  be:  the  strict  status  quo  ante,  which 
was  of  all  solutions  the  most  repugnant  to  Prussia,  or  the  status 
quo  modified  according  to  Hertzberg's  peculiar  ideas,  which  was 
likely  to  be  repugnant  to  everybody  else.  The  negotiation  was 
destined  to  consume  many  precious  weeks,  to  wear  out  the 
patience  and  arouse  the  suspicions  of  Prussia's  allies,  to  involve 
Prussian  policy  in  a  maze  of  uncertainty,  irresolution,  and  con- 
tradictions. Above  all,  the  King  was  laboring  under  a  delusion 
as  bad  as  his  minister's  in  imagining  that  he  could  keep  open  at 
one  and  the  same  time  the  possibility  of  executing  his  original 
offensive  plan  and  that  of  carrying  through  the  Hertzberg  ex- 
change project.  The  two  plans  were  fundamentally  antagonistic 
and  incompatible.  The  one  involved  the  cooperation  of  Poland 
and  Turkey  and  the  annihilation  of  Austria;  the  other  involved 
the  spoliation  of  Turkey  and  Poland  and  advantages  for  Austria. 
When  both  plans  became  simultaneously  known  to  the  world, 
the  result  could  only  be  to  rob  Prussia  of  the  confidence  of  all 
parties  concerned,  and  to  make  the  realization  of  either  project 
almost  impossible.  Therein  lies  the  cardinal  reason  for  the  total 
fiasco  that  followed. 

II 

The  Austro-Prussian  negotiations  were  spun  out  for  two  months 
through  an  interchange  of  letters  between  the  two  sovereigns,  and 
of  memorials  and  '  verbal  communications  '  between  the  two 
chancelleries.  Hertzberg  began  by  offering  the  Austrians  the 
choice  between  two  bases  for  the  pacification:  either  the  strict 
status  quo  ante  or  an  arrangement  for  reciprocal  advantages  be- 
tween the  interested  Powers.    He  indicated  clearly  enough  that 

1  On  this  important  turning  in  Prussian  policy,  see,  Duncker,  in  H.  Z.,  xxxvii, 
p.  15;  Ranke,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  183  ff.;  Ritter,  Die  Konvenlion  von  Reichenbach,  pp. 
3ff.;  Salomon,  Pitt,  i»  pp.  470  f.;  Reede  to  Van  de  Spiegel,  April  15,  Van  de 
Spiegel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  196  ff. 


134  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Prussia  preferred  the  second  alternative.  The  arrangement  he 
proposed  was  substantially  as  follows.  The  Porte,  acting  on  the 
benevolent  advice  of  Prussia,  should  cede  to  Austria  the  '  frontiers 
of  Passarowitz  ' ;  Austria  should  restore  to  Poland  the  whole  of 
Galicia  except  the  Zips,  Pocutia,  and  Halicz  (these  last  two  dis- 
tricts forming  the  southeast  corner  of  the  province,  contiguous 
to  the  Bukovina) ;  and  the  Republic  should  cede  Dantzic,  Thorn, 
and  some  small  districts  in  Great  Poland  to  Prussia.1  In  short, 
it  was  the  old  '  grand  plan  '  warmed  over,  very  little  disguised, 
abridged,  or  improved. 

These  propositions  made  anything  but  a  favorable  impression 
at  Vienna.  It  was  true  that  the  admission  of  the  status  quo  basis 
by  Prussia  placed  in  the  hands  of  the  Austrians  at  least  the  possi- 
bility of  avoiding  a  rupture;  but  they  feared  that  the  Court  of 
Berlin  would  give  that  principle  a  stricter  interpretation  than 
England  had  done,  while  they  found  the  plan  of  "exchange,  com- 
pensation, and  depredation"  still  more  inaccep table.  At  a  great 
ministerial  Conference  (April  26),  it  was  decided  that  the 
negotiation  would  have  to  be  spun  out  for  a  time,  because  it 
was  impossible  to  risk  a  breach  with  Prussia  while  the  Turkish 
war  lasted,  and  it  was  the  opinion  of  the  Conference  that  a  double 
war  must  be  prevented  at  all  costs.  If  it  proved  possible  by 
vigorous  military  operations  to  extort  a  speedy  peace  from  the 
Porte,  or  if  Russia  would  back  up  her  ally  by  an  imposing  parade 
of  force,  then  Austria  might  take  a  bold  tone  towards  the  would- 
be  dictator.  If  not,  if  it  became  necessary  to  accept  the  mediation 
of  the  Triple  Alliance,  then  Austria  would  prefer  the  basis  of  the 
1  status  quo  non  materiel '  (i.  e.,  with  certain  slight  alterations  of 
the  old  frontier  in  her  favor),  or  even  the  status  quo  strict,  by 
which,  at  least,  Prussia  would  get  nothing,  rather  than  to  consent 
to  the  thoroughly  objectionable  Hertzberg  plan.2    Steadfastness 

1  The  alternative  was  put  to  Austria  in  general  terms  in  Frederick  William's 
letter  to  Leopold  of  April  15,  1790,  Hertzberg's  Recueil,  iii,  pp.  54-58;  Van  de 
Spiegel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  230-233.  The  details  of  the  '  arrangement  for  reciprocal 
advantages  '  were  imparted  by  Hertzberg  to  Reuss,  the  Austrian  envoy,  in  an 
interview  of  the  same  date  (Reuss'  report  of  April  16,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichle, 
1790). 

2  Protocol  of  the  Conference,  V.  A.,  Vortrdge,  1790. 


REICH  EN  BACH  1 3  5 

and  tenacity  in  misfortune  are  virtues  that  have  rarely  deserted 
Austrian  statesmen;  and,  desperate  as  was  the  situation  in  that 
spring  of  1790,  these  qualities  were  not  lacking  on  that  occasion. 
However  much  Leopold  might  be  inclined  to  concessions,  his 
ministers  were  resolved  to  put  on  a  bold  face  as  long  as  they 
could,  and  even,  under  certain  circumstances,  to  fight  rather  than 
surrender  their  conquests  of  the  past  two  years  or  submit  tamely 
to  the  dictatorship  of  Prussia. 

In  accordance  with  the  resolutions  of  the  Conference,  Leopold 
once  more  wrote  Frederick  William  a  friendly  yet  utterly  non- 
committal letter,  announcing  that  he  could  give  no  definite  reply 
to  the  Prussian  propositions  until  he  had  consulted  his  ally,  the 
Empress  of  Russia.1  A  month  earlier  such  dilatory  tactics  would 
scarcely  have  succeeded  in  Berlin,  but  in  May  the  atmosphere  at 
that  Court  was  much  more  pacific.  The  trouble  once  more  was 
with  the  army.  The  further  the  mobilization  proceeded,  the 
more  the  inadequacy  of  the  Prussian  military  preparations  came 
to  light.  The  services  of  provisions  and  transportation  were  in 
such  woful  disorder  that  the  minister  responsible  for  them  com- 
mitted suicide.  While  it  had  originally  been  intended  that  the 
army  should  be  ready  by  the  middle  of  May,  it  now  appeared 
that  at  least  another  month  would  be  required.  Meanwhile  the 
Austrians  had  massed  such  large  forces  in  Bohemia  and  Moravia 
that  they  had  for  a  time  decidedly  the  superiority.  There  was  a 
moment  when  the  Prussians  feared  an  invasion  of  Silesia.  Those 
about  the  King  urged  or  pleaded  with  him  not  to  undertake  a  war. 
Under  the  influence  of  all  these  deterrents  Frederick  William's 
martial  ardor  was  vanishing.  His  old  faith  in  the  absolute  mili- 
tary superiority  of  Prussia  was  shaken.  For  nearly  a  year  he 
had  wanted  war  and  nothing  but  war,  but  in  May  of  1790,  when 
the  time  for  action  had  come,  he  scarcely  knew  what  he  wished.2 

The  natural  result  of  this  was  that  Austria's  wholly  unsatis- 
factory reply  to  the  first  propositions  of  Prussia  evoked,  not  a 
sharp  ultimatum,  but  a  mild  offer  of  still  a  third  basis  for  nego- 

1  This  letter  of  April  28  is  printed  in  Hertzberg's  Recueil,  iii,  pp.  58 ff.,  and 
in  Van  de  Spiegel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  235  ff. 

2  For  the  above  see  especially  Ritter,  op.  cit.,  pp.  7  f.;  P.  Wittichen,  op.  cit., 
pp.  5°  ff. 


136  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

tiation.  Hertzberg  suggested,  namely,  that  Prussia  might  be 
satisfied  with  a  very  small  cession  in  Galicia,  about  one-sixth  of 
that  province,  though  in  that  case  the  Austrian  acquisitions  from 
Turkey  would  naturally  have  to  be  reduced.1 

Now  at  last  the  plans  of  the  Prussian  pacificators  began  to 
find  an  echo  at  Vienna.  Were  they  not  already  reducing  their 
demands  ?  And  this  new  proposition,  it  appeared,  might  not  be 
their  last.  Only  a  little  dexterous  bargaining,  using  the  status 
quo  to  frighten  them  into  concessions,  and  Austria  might  get  off 
with  a  handsome  acquisition  from  the  Turks  and  an  insignificant 
cession  to  Poland.  This  was,  at  least,  the  opinion  of  the  majority 
of  the  ministerial  Conference,  and  especially,  it  seems,  of  Spiel- 
mann.2  Kaunitz  was  not  so  optimistic  about  the  possibilities  of 
negotiation.  He  still  pinned  his  hopes  to  imposing  military 
demonstrations  to  be  made  in  concert  with  Russia,  and  would 
even  yet  have  trusted,  if  necessary,  to  the  arbitrament  of  war. 
Leopold  was  chiefly  anxious  for  peace  and  the  recovery  of  the 
Netherlands.  How  far  he  entered  into  Spielmann's  views,  it  is 
difficult  to  say,  but  for  whatever  reason,  he  still  postponed  a  final 
decision.  In  accordance  with  the  opinion  of  the  Conference,  one 
more  dilatory  answer  was  sent  to  Berlin,  to  the  effect  that  Austria 
could  not  declare  herself  definitely  until  the  arrival  of  the  long- 
awaited  courier  from  Petersburg.  Provisionally  it  was  stated 
that  while  preferring  even  the  status  quo  strict  to  the  other 
propositions  as  formulated  by  Prussia,  the  Court  of  Vienna  was 
willing  to  treat  on  the  basis  of  the  exchange  plan,  providing  it 
could  be  made  really  fair  and  reciprocally  advantageous.3 

Such  procrastination  could  not  continue  much  longer  without 
producing  an  explosion  of  wrath  at  Berlin,  as  the  Austrians  were 
well  aware.    In  reality,  their  final  decision  now  depended  on  the 

1  Frederick  William  to  Leopold,  May  11,  and  note  verbale  of  the  same  date, 
Hertzberg,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  60-64;  Van  de  Spiegel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  237-243;  Reuss' 
report  of  May  12,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit. 

2  Conference  protocols  of  May  21  and  June  9,  V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1790. 

3  Leopold  to  Frederick  William,  May  23,  with  the  accompanying  Memoir e 
from  the  State  Chancellery,  V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1790;  printed  in  Hertzberg,  op.  cit.,  iii, 
pp.  65-69,  and  Van  de  Spiegel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  243-248,  and  in  both  dated  erroneously 
May  25. 


REICH  EN  BACH  1 37 

replies  expected  from  Russia.  Had  Catherine  not  failed  them, 
they  might,  perhaps,  have  escaped  the  humiliation  of  Reichen- 
bach. 

Ill 

Ever  since  the  offensive  plans  of  Prussia  had  come  to  light  in 
the  previous  autumn,  the  ambassador  Cobenzl  had  been  straining 
every  nerve  to  induce  the  Russians  to  come  to  the  defence  of  their 
sorely-menaced  ally.  Now,  if  ever,  he  incessantly  declared,  was 
the  time  for  the  Empress  to  show  her  gratitude  for  all  the  loyal 
services  and  sacrifices  of  Austria  in  the  past  ten  years.  He 
demanded  that  Russia  should  at  once  send  a  corps  to  protect 
Galicia;  that  the  Empress  should  issue  a  declaration  that  she 
had  guaranteed  that  province  to  Austria,  and  would  regard  an 
attack  upon  it  as  an  attack  upon  herself;  and  that  a  supreme 
effort  should  be  made  that  spring  to  force  the  Turks  to  peace. 
Above  all,  he  wished  Russia  to  make  imposing  military  demon- 
strations against  Prussia  and  Poland,  to  indicate  precisely  what 
forces  she  would  bring  into  the  field  in  case  of  a  new  war,  and  to 
concert  with  Vienna  a  plan  for  joint  operations.  All  these  de- 
mands and  exhortations  elicited,  however,  only  unsatisfactory 
replies. 

At  times  the  Russian  ministers  professed  to  see  no  way  out  of 
the  situation  except  a  new  partition  of  Poland,  and  they  even 
offered  to  propose  that  solution  at  London  and  Berlin.  As  usual, 
Cobenzl  combated  this  idea  with  all  the  arguments  at  his  com- 
mand, and  the  Russians  did  not  insist.1  On  the  other  hand,  in 
May  Austria  for  the  first  time  requested  her  ally  to  consent  to 
certain  Prussian  acquisitions  in  Poland  as  a  last  resource,  in  case 
the  Court  of  Berlin  insisted  absolutely  upon  the  Hertzberg  plan. 
The  Russians  consented  to  this  without  much  opposition.2  Re- 
quest and  assent  are  equally  significant.  The  Imperial  Courts 
had  long  made  the  inadmissibility  of  further  Prussian  acquisitions 
in  Poland  one  of  the  chief  principles  of  their  alliance:  now  both 

1  Cobenzl's  report  of  April  9,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1700. 

2  Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  May  1,  the  latter's  report  of  the  18th,  V.  A.,  Russ- 
land, Exped.  and  Berichte,  1790. 


I38  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  them  were  willing  in  pessimo  casu  to  allow  Prussia  such 
aggrandizement. 

In  general,  the  Russians  protested  warmly  their  determination 
to  do  all  that  was  humanly  possible  for  their  ally,  but  they  con- 
stantly avoided  committing  themselves  to  precise  and  definite 
engagements.  All  the  military  arrangements,  they  told  Cobenzl, 
were  in  the  hands  of  Potemkin,  and  it  was  impossible  to  know 
what  Potemkin  would  or  would  not  do.  These  assertions  corre- 
sponded pretty  closely  to  the  facts  of  the  situation.  The  Empress 
was  really  disposed  to  do  what  she  could  for  Austria; x  she  was 
still  as  bitter  against  Prussia  as  ever;  but  her  attention  through- 
out the  spring  was  absorbed  in  the  Swedish  war,  which  was  then 
reaching  its  climax.  At  a  moment  when  Gustavus'  cannon  were 
thundering  almost  at  the  gates  of  St.  Petersburg,  or  when  the 
Russian  and  Swedish  fleets  were  breathlessly  chasing  each  other 
about  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  the  Empress  could  scarcely  ven- 
ture to  commit  herself  to  still  a  third  war,  or  even  give  much 
attention  to  the  course  of  events  in  the  West.  Whatever  was  to 
be  done  for  the  assistance  of  Austria  depended  primarily  on 
Potemkin;  and  Potemkin  had  plans  of  his  own. 

Throughout  the  whole  first  half  of  1790  the  Tauric  Prince  was 
flaunting  himself  in  regal  state  at  Jassy,  the  capital  of  his  pros- 
pective '  Kingdom  of  Dacia,'  already  assuming  the  airs  of  an 
Oriental  despot,2  and  occupied  far  less  with  the  Turkish  war 
than  with  his  own  schemes  for  personal  aggrandizement.  The 
failure  of  his  project  for  a  Confederation  in  Poland  at  the  out- 
break of  the  Eastern  war,  and  the  new  situation  created  since 
the  opening  of  the  Diet,  far  from  putting  an  end  to  his  designs 
upon  the  Republic,  had  only  led  him  back  to  an  old  plan  more 
dangerous  than  all  the  others.  He  meant  to  raise  a  Cossack  army, 
get  himself  appointed  Hetman  —  a  title  to  conjure  with  in  Little 
Russia  —  enter  the  Republic  at  the  head  of  his  Cossacks,  call  the 
whole  Orthodox  population  of  the  Ukraine  to  arms  against  their 
Polish  masters,  and  then  lead  a  war  of  national  liberation.    The 

1  Rescript  to  Potemkin,  March  19/30,  1790,  M.  A.,  Typiiia,  IX,  15  (copy). 

2  On  Potemkin's  court  and  his  sovereign  airs  at  Jassy,  see  IleTpyineBCKiH, 
CyBopoBi,  pp.  226  f.;  BpHKHept,  HoTeMKHirB,  p.  178;  Pyc.  Crap.,  xiv,  p.  226. 


REICH  EN  BACH  1 39 

result,  he  believed,  would  be  that  the  three  or  four  palatinates  of 
the  southeast  would  be  wrenched  away  from  the  Republic,  and 
annexed  either  to  Russia  or,  preferably,  to  the  new  Kingdom  of 
Dacia.1  In  view  of  the  extreme  tension  of  Russo-Polish  relations 
since  1788  and  the  probability  of  war  between  the  two  countries, 
this  audacious  project,  which  under  ordinary  circumstances  the 
Prince  would  scarcely  have  dared  to  acknowledge,  could  now  be 
urged  upon  the  Empress  with  some  chance  of  success. 

Potemkin  seems  to  have  broached  the  scheme  —  or  part  of  it  — 
during  his  stay  in  St.  Petersburg  in  the  spring  of  1789; 2  and  he 
then  submitted  it  quite  fully  in  writing  the  following  November. 
Catherine  praised  it  in  general  terms,  but  found  various  pretexts 
for  not  carrying  it  out  immediately.  At  this  time,  she  wrote, 
it  would  be  dangerous  to  stir  up  the  Poles  unnecessarily  and  pre- 
maturely; it  would  be  better  to  wait  until  after  the  peace  with 
Sweden  and  the  Porte,  and  then  execute  the  plan  on  the  occasion 
of  the  return  of  the  army  from  Moldavia  through  Poland.  It 
was  only  after  long  delays  that  she  grudgingly  accorded  him  the 
coveted  title  of  Hetman  of  the  Ekaterinoslav  and  Black  Sea 
Cossacks.3  Undeterred,  however,  by  the  obvious  coldness  at 
St.  Petersburg,  Potemkin  seemed  to  center  his  attention  more 
and  more  upon  his  Polish  plans.  It  was  to  further  them,  we 
think,  that  he  steadily  increased  his  Cossack  regiments,  organized 
a  special  corps  called  the  '  Army  of  the  Grand  Hetman's  Staff,' 
recommended  to  the  Empress  not  only  peace  but  an  alliance  with 
the  Turks,  and  secured  the  replacement  of  Stackelberg  at  War- 
saw by  his  own  creature,  Bulgakov.4     At  the  same  time  the 

1  Cf.  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  38  f.,  199  ff. 

2  Cf.  the  rescript  to  Potemkin  of  July  6/17,  1789,  CfiopHHKS.,  xlii,  p.  17. 

8  Catherine  to  Potemkin, 'November  15/26  and  December  2/13,  1789,  and  the 
rescript  of  January  10/21,  1790,  CoopHiiKt,  xlii,  pp.  47,  50  f.,  57  f. ;  see  also 
Bezborodko  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  December  20/31,  1789,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  p.  173; 
Garnovski  to  Popov,  March  21/April  1,  1790,  Pyc.  dap.,  xvi,  p.  426. 

4  Potemkin's  correspondence  of  the  early  part  of  1790  is  full  of  references  to  the 
recruiting  and  organization  of  the  Cossacks:  see  CCopimin,  BoeHHO-uCTopwiecKHXt 
MaTepiaJiOBt,  viii,  passim.  On  the  '  Army  of  the  G.  H.'s  Staff,'  sec  EiirejH>rap,Tj"i>, 
3aiiHCKH,  p.  96,  and  Langeron's  Memoirs,  in  Hurmuzaki,  Documente  privitore 
la  Istoria  Romdnilor,  Suplcmenl  iHi,  pp.  105  f.  As  to  the  alliance  with  the 
Turks  and  Bulgakov's  appointment,  see  Catherine  to  Potemkin,  March  19/30  and 
April  8/19,  C6opHHKi>,  xlii,  pp.  66  and  62  f. 


140  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

danger  of  an  attack  from  Prussia  and  Poland  gave  him  a  very 
favorable  opportunity  to  press  his  main  project  in  a  somewhat 
modified  form.  At  the  end  of  March  he  presented  to  the  Empress 
a  plan,  in  accordance  with  which,  at  the  first  offensive  movement 
on  the  part  of  the  Poles,  the  Russian  armies  were  to  occupy  the 
palatinates  of  Kiev,  Podolia,  and  Braclaw,  thus  establishing  com- 
munications with  the  Austrians  in  Galicia  and  shortening  and 
improving  their  own  line  of  defence.  And  it  was  not  merely  a 
military  occupation  that  the  Prince  proposed,  but  the  outright 
annexation  of  the  three  palatinates.  Russia  would  thus  acquire, 
he  wrote,  the  most  fertile  provinces  of  the  Republic  and  a  popu- 
lation of  more  than  a  million  of  her  coreligionists.  Volhynia  also 
might,  perhaps,  be  annexed;  or  at  least  the  Russian  frontier 
should  be  drawn  from  Choczim  to  the  government  of  Mohilev.1 
In  short,  the  Prince  proposed  appropriating  substantially  the 
same  territories  that  Russia  was  to  acquire  at  the  time  of  the 
Second  Partition. 

Catherine  again  both  praised  and  raised  objections;  but  the 
danger  was  too  pressing  to  admit  of  delay.  The  plan  was  ap- 
proved —  at  least  in  its  military  aspects  —  by  the  Council  April 
11/22,  and  sanctioned  by  an  Imperial  rescript  of  the  19/30.2 

Soon  after,  Cobenzl  at  last  received  a  fairly  definite  reply  to 
his  oft-reiterated  questions.  By  a  ministerial  note  of  May  6  he 
was  informed  that  if  the  Poles  invaded  Galicia,  Russian  forces 
would  then  make  a  diversion  by  attacking  the  southeastern 
provinces  of  the  Republic.  This  was  altogether  unsatisfactory 
to  the  Austrians,  who  had  constantly  demanded  that  a  Russian 
corps  should  be  sent  to  Galicia  at  once,  not  to  avenge  but  to 
prevent  an  attack.  But  nothing  more  could  be  secured  from  the 
Russian  ministers,  who  confessed  frankly  that  not  even  the 

1  This  plan  is  printed  in  the  Historische  Zeitschrift,  xxxix,  pp.  238  f.,  and  in  the 
Pyc.  Apx.,  1865,  pp.  401  ff. 

2  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  775  f.  The  rescript  referred  to  has  not  yet  been 
brought  to  light,  but  we  know  of  it  through  the  rescript  to  Potemkin  of  July  18/29, 
1 79 1,  published  by  Liske  in  the  H.  Z.,  xxx,  p.  295.  Cf.  also  the  letter  of  Catherine 
to  Potemkin  of  April  8/19,  cited  above,  and  also  those  of  March  30/ April  10  and 
May  13/24,  1790,  C6opHHEi>,  xlii,  pp.  67,  78  f.;  also  Bezborodko  to  S.  R. 
Vorontsov,  April  30/May  11,  1790,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  pp.  182  f. 


REICHENBACH  141 

Empress'  commands  could  make  Potemkin  do  what  he  did  not 
wish  to  do;  and  nothing  more  could  be  effected  with  Potemkin, 
who  left  letters  from  Kaunitz  and  even  from  Leopold  himself 
unanswered  for  months.1  In  this  critical  moment,  when  the  hopes 
of  Austria  so  largely  depended  on  him,  he  was  thinking  of  nothing 
but  a  Kozaczyzna  in  the  Ukraine.  The  exasperation  in  Vienna 
was  increased  by  the  fact  that  instead  of  pressing  the  campaign 
against  the  Turks,  as  the  Russian  ministers  had  promised,  Potem- 
kin kept  his  troops  idle  all  the  spring,  while  he  pursued  a  secret 
and  highly  suspicious  negotiation  with  the  enemy.  By  the  early 
part  of  June,  then,  all  hope  of  getting  any  effective  aid  from 
Russia  had  practically  disappeared. 

There  was  likewise  no  prospect  of  driving  the  Turks  to  an 
immediate  peace  by  force  of  arms,  for  the  bulk  of  the  Austrian 
troops  had  been  sent  off  to  Bohemia.  Little  help  was  to  be 
expected  from  England,  for  in  view  of  the  danger  of  war  with 
Spain  over  the  Nootka  Sound  controversy,  Pitt  was  now  less 
able  to  act  energetically  in  Continental  affairs,  and  also  more 
anxious  than  formerly  to  oblige  his  ally.  Hence  even  English 
ministers  began  to  urge  the  Prussian  terms  upon  the  Court  of 
Vienna.2  In  short,  the  bases  of  Kaunitz's  system  were  crumbling 
one  after  the  other.  By  this  time  the  King  of  Prussia  had  gone 
to  his  army  in  Silesia,  and  was  impatiently  awaiting  Austria's 
final  answer.  There  was  nothing  to  do  but  fight  or  take  the  best 
terms  one  could  get  from  him. 

Leopold  determined  to  send  Spielmann  to  Silesia  to  negotiate 
a  final  settlement.  The  active  State  Referendary  was  the  man 
whose  views  most  nearly  coincided  with  those  of  his  sovereign; 
he  did  not  share  the  Chancellor's  deep-seated  hatred  of  Prussia; 
and  he  was,  as  we  have  seen,  inclined  to  enter  upon  the  Hertzberg 
plan.  Exchanges,  equivalents,  compensations,  all  the  beloved 
political  geometry  of  the  time,  were  almost  as  much  to  his  taste 
as  to  Hertzberg's.  His  instructions  were  decided  upon  at  a 
ministerial  Conference  of  June  15  th.    As  in  May,  the  idea  of  the 

1  L.  Cobenzl's  report  of  May  9,  Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  June  19,  V.  A., 
Russland,  Berichte  and  Expeditionen,  1790. 

2  Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  June  5,  V.  A.,  loc.  oil.;  ci.  Leopold  to  Marie  Christine, 
June  23,  in  Wolf,  Leopold  und  Marie  Christine,  Ihr  Brief wechsel,  p.  162. 


142  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Conference  was  to  pretend  to  favor  the  basis  of  the  status  quo  non 
materiel,  in  order  to  drive  a  better  bargain  on  the  other  basis  — 
the  system  of  exchanges  and  equivalents  —  which  they  really 
preferred.  So  ready,  indeed,  were  the  Austrians  at  this  moment 
to  enter  into  Hertzberg's  ideas  that  they  would  willingly  have 
accorded  Prussia  much  larger  acquisitions  in  Poland  than  she  had 
asked  for,  providing  she  only  showed  herself  sufficiently  generous 
with  the  lands  of  her  ally,  the  Porte.  To  secure  Turkish  Croatia, 
Orsova,  and  Belgrade,  or  if  possible  the  frontiers  of  Passarowitz 
unmodified;  to  make  the  minimum  of  sacrifices  in  Galicia;  to 
present  a  bold  front  but  never  to  let  matters  come  to  a  rupture; 
to  bring  back  peace  at  any  honorable  price:  such  was  the  sub- 
stance of  the  instructions,  with  which  Spielmann  set  out  on  his 
far  from  promising  mission.1 

IV 

At  the  end  of  June  the  eyes  of  all  Europe  were  fixed  upon 
Silesia  in  expectation  of  stirring  events.  There  on  opposite  sides 
of  the  Riesengebirge  the  hosts  of  Austria  and  Prussia  once  more 
stood  face  to  face,  ready,  as  soon  as  the  diplomats  had  had  '  their 
little  hour  upon  the  stage,'  to  renew  the  ancient  struggle. 

In  Bohemia  and  Moravia  were  gathered  about  150,000  Aus- 
trians 2  under  the  gallant  old  Field  Marshal  Laudon,3  who  had 

1  Conference  protocol  of  June  15,  and  Kaunitz  to  Leopold,  June  16,  V.  A., 
Vortrage,  1790. 

The  Conference  protocol  says:  "  Vor  allem  ist  die  Unterhandlung  nach  dem 
Grundsatz  des  von  England  vorgeschlagenen  nicht  materielen  Status  quo  zu  eroffnen 
und  dem  preussischen  Ministerio  glauben  zu  machen,  dass  wir  diese  Basis  der 
librigen  vorziehen." 

Kaunitz  to  Leopold,  June  16:  Spielmann  had  told  him  that  it  was  the  opinion 
of  the  Conference:  "  dass  wir  absolute  und  durch  alle  mogliche  Nachgiebigkeits- 
Mittel  den  Frieden  mit  Preussen  zu  erhalten  suchen  miissen,  weil  wir  einen  Krieg 
zu  fiihren  schlechterdings  ausser  Stande  sind."    Mildly  protests. 

Leopold's  reply:  "  Ich  bin  Ihnen  fur  ihre  Mittheilung  ihrer  Wohlmeinung  sehr 
verbunden.  Unsere  innerliche  Umstande  sind  aber  leider  so  beschaffen  dass  wir 
alle  nur  einigermassen  anstandige  Mittel  anwenden  miissen,  um  einen  Bruch  mit 
Preussen  abzuhalten." 

2  149,000  according  to  the  Raisonnement  drawn  up  by  Col.  Mack  at  headquarters, 
June  8,  V.  A.,  F.  A.  a.  54. 

3  Laudon  fell  suddenly  ill  and  died  just  at  the  moment  of  greatest  crisis  in  the 
negotiations  at  Reichenbach. 


REICH  EN  BACH  1 43 

but  recently  refreshed  the  laurels  of  Hochkirch  and  Kunersdorf 
by  the  capture  of  Belgrade.  His  troops  were  posted  in  such 
admirable  defensive  positions  that  an  attack  on  them  would 
certainly  have  been  far  from  easy.  Austria's  weakness  in  case  of 
war  lay  not  in  military  unpreparedness,  but  in  the  terrible  con- 
fusion that  still  reigned  in  the  interior  of  the  Monarchy.  The 
Hungarian  Diet  was  conducting  itself  in  its  worst  manner  and 
threatening  a  formal  revolt;  the  Galicians  were  conspiring  with 
Prussia  and  Poland;  there  was  dangerous  fermentation  in  the 
other  provinces;  the  peasantry  were  in  revolt;  and  everywhere 
diets,  towns,  merchants,  nobles,  and  clergy  were  demanding,  as 
Leopold  said,  "  the  privileges  of  the  time  of  Charlemagne,"  and 
clamoring  with  threats  for  immediate  satisfaction.1  Under  such 
circumstances,  a  sustained  military  effort  would  have  been  well- 
nigh  impossible,  and  a  single  defeat  ruinous. 

Brilliant  in  comparison  was  the  situation  of  Prussia.  What- 
ever difficulties  might  have  been  encountered  in  the  course  of  the 
mobilization,  the  King  now  stood  at  the  head  of  160,000  troops,2 
supposedly  without  their  equals  in  Europe,  the  famous  veterans 
of  Frederick  the  Great.  Around  him  was  a  glittering  train  of 
princes,  generals,  diplomats  and  visitors:  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
reputed  the  foremost  general  of  that  age;  M Ollendorff, Kalckreuth, 
and  other  paladins  of  the  great  King;  the  coryphaei  of  the  Fiirsten- 
bund,  like  Charles  Augustus  of  Saxe- Weimar;  the  ministers  of  the 
allied  Powers,  England,  Holland,  and  Poland;  the  agents  of  those 
potential  allies,  the  Belgians,  Hungarians,  and  Galicians;  and 
illustrious  sightseers  like  Goethe,  who  had  come  to  witness  the 
expected  triumphs  of  the  Prussian  arms. 

Apart  from  the  main  army  in  Silesia,  two  corps  were  stationed 
in  East  and  West  Prussia  to  observe  the  Russians.  In  case  of 
war,  the  Poles  might  also  be  brought  into  action;  and  the  army 
of  the  Republic,  which  was  mainly  concentrated  on  the  Galician 
frontier,  had  now  been  raised  to  about  56,000  men.3     Poles, 

1  Leopold  to  Marie  Christine,  June  31,  Wolf,  op.  at.,  pp.  169  f. 

2  163,000  according  to  the  above  cited  Raisonnement  of  Mack.  Wittichen  de- 
clares that  the  Prussian  numbers  reached  160,000  only  after  the  arrival  of  Usedom's 
corps  on  July  17,  Die  polnische  Politik  Preussens,  p.  68. 

s  Korzon,  Wewnetrzne  dzieje,  v,  p.  62,  correcting  Lucchesini's  estimate  of  43,600. 


144  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Turks,  and  Swedes  together  might  be  counted  upon  to  keep  the 
Russians  fully  employed.  That  the  Sultan's  armies  were  by  no 
means  a  negligible  factor  was  shown  by  their  valiant  repulse  of 
the  Austrians  at  Giurgevo  (June  26);  while  Gustavus  III  was 
just  then  conducting  his  most  glorious  campaign,  which  was  soon 
to  be  crowned  by  the  splendid  naval  victory  of  Svensksund 
(July  9).  On  the  whole,  the  chances  strongly  favored  Prussia, 
if  she  had  the  courage  to  draw  the  sword. 

In  such  a  situation  a  man  of  the  Bismarck  type  would  probably 
have  forced  on  a  war,  regardless  of  what  some  timid  generals, 
some  lukewarm  allies,  or  some  indignant  publicists  might  say. 
There  were  difficulties,  of  course  —  the  defects  in  the  commissa- 
riat, the  evil  impression  produced  on  Prussia's  allies  by  the  long 
delays  of  the  spring  and  by  Hertzberg's  diplomacy,  the  opposi- 
tion to  be  expected  at  London,  the  ugly  appearances  inseparable 
from  such  a  deliberate  act  of  aggression;  but  such  things  would 
scarcely  have  deterred  a  statesman  of  real  will-power  and  deter- 
mination, possessed  by  the  genuine  Prussian  Drang  zur  Macht. 
But  Prussian  policy  was  guided  at  that  moment  only  by  a  minis- 
ter who  was  losing  himself  further  and  further  in  a  blind  alley, 
and  by  a  king  who,  although  he  was  somewhat  more  self-confident 
and  bellicose,  now  that  he  was  at  the  head  of  his  troops,  still 
varied  from  day  to  day  in  accordance  with  the  latest  news  from 
abroad  or  the  last  conversation  he  had  happened  to  have. 

On  June  27,  at  the  village  of  Reichenbach  near  the  Prussian 
headquarters  at  Schonwalde,  the  negotiation  was  begun  between 
Hertzberg  on  the  one  side,  and  Spielmann  and  Reuss  on  the  other. 
At  first  things  went  tolerably  well.  The  conferences  were,  in- 
deed, not  infrequently  stormy,  but  at  bottom  both  sides  were 
agreed  in  principle,  and  both  dreaded  the  same  things  —  namely, 
war  or  the  status  quo  ante.  By  the  29th  a  settlement  had  been 
outlined,  by  which  Austria  should  cede  to  Poland  the  northern 
part  of  Galicia  (the  circles  of  Bochnia,  Tarnow,  Rzeszow  and 
Zamosc,  and  the  town  of  Brody),  and  should  receive  from  the 
Porte  not  only  the  frontiers  of  Passarowitz,  but  also  the  much- 
coveted  Turkish  Croatia  (i.  e.,  Bosnia  as  far  as  the  river  Verbas). 
Although  the  cessions  demanded  were  unpleasantly  large,  Spiel- 


REICH  EN  BACH  1 45 

mann  thought  them  more  than  outweighed  by  the  glittering 
acquisitions  placed  in  prospect.  He  did  not  feel  able  to  decide 
without  consulting  his  Court,  but  his  report  shows  how  strongly 
he  was  inclined  to  settle  on  this  basis.1  At  Vienna,  however,  it 
was  found  that  the  proposed  cessions  would  render  Galicia  de- 
fenceless and  useless,  and  it  had  just  been  discovered  that  Turk- 
ish Croatia  was  a  mountainous,  turbulent  country,  extremely 
difficult  to  occupy,  and  not  worth  any  great  sacrifices.  Hence 
the  envoys  at  Reichenbach  were  ordered  to  save  as  much  of 
Galicia  as  possible,  to  decline  some  of  the  Turkish  lands  so 
liberally  thrust  upon  them,  and  —  if  worst  came  to  worst  —  in 
Heaven's  name  to  conclude  as  well  as  they  could.2  Probably, 
after  a  due  amount  of  haggling  and  huckstering,  an  agreement 
would  have  been  reached  on  these  lines,  had  there  not  occurred 
just  then  an  abrupt  revolution  in  Prussian  policy.  At  the 
moment  when  he  seemed,  so  far  as  Austria  was  concerned,  about 
to  realize  his  '  grand  plan,'  Hertzberg  had  been  deserted  by  his 
own  sovereign. 

Frederick  William  II,  with  all  his  faults,  and  in  spite  of  many 
sad  pages  in  his  history,  had  a  strong  sense  of  honor,  a  regard  for 
his  engagements  and  his  '  glory,'  a  certain  chivalrousness  and 
magnanimity.  Hertzberg  had  never  seen  anything  dishonorable 
in  a  scheme  which  consisted  essentially  in  Prussia's  robbing  out- 
rageously one  or  both  of  the  two  allies  whom  she  had  just  pledged 
herself  to  defend;  but  the  King  had  for  some  time  felt  growing 
scruples  about  it.  At  the  very  beginning  of  the  Reichenbach 
negotiation  he  informed  his  minister  that  unless  the  Austrians 
were  prepared  to  cede  a  large  part  of  Galicia,  so  that  he  could 
offer  the  Poles  a  handsome  equivalent  for  Dantzic  and  Thorn,  the 
exchange  plan  had  better  be  thrown  overboard;  for  it  would  only 
embroil  him  with  the  Turks  and  lose  him  the  confidence  of  the 
Poles,  and  the  status  quo  strict  would  be  "  quasi  plus  Jwnorable."  3 

1  Report  of  Reuss  and  Spielmann  from  Reichenbach,  June  29,  Vivenot, 
Qiicllen,  i,  pp.  491-496.  In  all  their  joint  reports  one  may  regard  Spielmann  as  the 
man  who  set  the  tone. 

2  Kaunitz  to  Reuss  and  Spielmann,  July  7,  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  497  f.;  Ph. 
Cobenzl  to  Spielmann,  July  3,  ibid.,  p.  497. 

3  Note  to  Hertzberg  of  June  26,  Ranke,  Die  deutschen  Machte,  ii,  p.  377. 


146  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Then  a  week  or  so  later  there  happened  a  number  of  things  in 
rapid  succession,  which  ended  the  King's  indecision  and  led  him 
to  pronounce  definitively  against  the  whole  Hertzberg  scheme. 

In  the  first  place,  Jacobi,  the  Prussian  envoy  in  Vienna,  re- 
ported that  Kaunitz  had  hastened  to  inform  the  Porte  of  the 
lavish  offers  of  Turkish  lands  that  Hertzberg  was  making  at 
Reichenbach.  This  revelation  would  probably  reach  Constanti- 
nople at  almost  the  same  moment  as  the  Prussian  ratification  of 
the  Turkish  alliance  treaty.  The  consequences  were  easily  to  be 
imagined:  at  the  least,  the  confidence  of  the  Turks  would  be 
alienated  forever,  and  the  King  would  stand  convicted  before 
the  world  of  the  most  flagrant  breach  of  faith.1 

Almost  simultaneously  with  Jacobi's  report  (July  6)  came  a 
dispatch  from  Lucchesini  repeating  in  emphatic  terms  a  warning 
often  given  before,  that  the  Poles  would  never  voluntarily  cede 
Dantzic,  Thorn,  and  a  part  of  Great  Poland  in  return  for  a  mere 
fragment  of  Galicia.2  Lucchesini's  opinion  was  only  too  well 
grounded.  The  news  of  Hertzberg's  propositions  to  Austria  had 
created  consternation  at  Warsaw.  The  Polish  envoy  to  Prussia 
had  straightway  been  ordered  to  make  earnest  remonstrances,  and 
Stanislas  Augustus  wrote  Frederick  William  a  personal  letter 
conjuring  him  to  allow  nothing  to  be  decided  detrimental  to  the 
interests  of  his  ally,  the  Republic.3  Soon  after,  Lucchesini 
arrived  at  Schonwalde  to  enlighten  his  master  still  further  about 
the  state  of  public  opinion  in  Poland,  and  to  direct  a  destructive 
criticism  against  Hertzberg's  whole  political  system.  To  com- 
plete the  minister's  defeat,  England,  which  a  few  weeks  before 
had  seemed  to  approve  the  exchange  plan,  now  came  out  de- 
cidedly against  it  and  in  favor  of  the  status  quo  ante  basis.4 

Frederick  William  was  now  thoroughly  convinced  that  the 
Hertzberg  plan  was,  as  the  English  envoy  declared,  "  as  unsuit- 

1  Ritter,  op.  cit.,  pp.  18  f. 

2  This  dispatch  is  given  at  some  length  in  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  ii, 
pp. 157  ff. 

3  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  p.  77;  the  letter,  dated  July  3,  is  cited  ibid.,  p.  210.  Deputation 
of  Foreign  Interests  to  Ankwicz,  June  26  and  July  10,  Muzeum  XX.  Ossolinskich, 
MS.  si 6. 

4  Ewart  to  Leeds,  July  8,  Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  559  ff.;  Rose,  William  Pitt, 
p.  528. 


REICH  EN  BACH  1 47 

able  in  itself,  as  its  execution  would  be  difficult  and  even  im- 
practicable." Even  if  the  Austrians  accepted  it,  it  would  be 
impossible  to  induce  the  Poles  and  the  Turks  to  do  so,  voluntarily 
at  least;  and  to  coerce  them  would  be  contrary  to  all  honor  and 
decency.  Moreover,  even  to  secure  an  agreement  with  Austria 
on  this  basis  would  probably  require  many  weeks  more  of 
wretched  bargaining  over  the  map;  and  the  King  was  sick  of 
that.  He  wanted  a  quick  decision.  Apart  from  the  cost  of  keep- 
ing his  troops  on  a  war  footing,  it  was  ridiculous  for  him  to  spend 
his  time  negotiating,  when  he  stood  at  the  head  of  an  army 
ready  to  act.  The  only  sure  and  honorable  course,  he  now  felt, 
was  to  abandon  the  exchange  plan  entirely,  and  to  fall  back  on 
the  other  alternative,  the  status  quo  strict,  which  he  had  proposed 
to  Leopold  at  the  beginning  of  the  negotiation.  If  Austria 
accepted  this,  he  would  have  the  glory  of  appearing  as  a  dis- 
interested and  loyal  peacemaker,  and  the  advantage  of  forcing 
his  '  natural  enemy  '  to  end  a  long  and  exhausting  war  without 
having  gained  a  single  village.  If  Austria  rejected  it,  he  would 
have  a  just  pretext  for  beginning  hostilities,  and  a  right  to  count 
on  the  assistance  of  England  and  his  other  allies.1  It  has  often 
been  said  that  in  going  over  to  the  status  quo  basis,  the  King  was 
trying  to  make  a  rupture  inevitable;  but  it  would  seem  that  if 
he  had  been  determined  to  force  on  a  war,  he  would  have  de- 
manded something  more  than  Leopold  had  already  declared 
himself  willing  to  grant.2  In  general,  it  was  not  the  way  of 
Frederick  William  to  force  or  guide  events:  he  waited  on  them, 
and  allowed  them  to  take  their  own  course.  If  war  had  come, 
he  would  probably  not  have  been  displeased;  but  he  deliberately 
put  the  choice  of  war  or  peace  in  his  adversary's  hands. 

It  was  only  after  three  days  of  storms,  protests,  rage,  and 
gloom  that  Hertzberg  consented  to  accept  his  defeat  and  to 

1  See  especially  the  King's  note  to  Hertzberg  of  July  n,  Ranke,  op.  tit.,  ii,  p.  379. 

2  In  the  Memoire  attached  to  Leopold's  letter  of  May  23.  Sybel  takes  as  proof 
that  Frederick  William  wished  to  provoke  a  war  the  demand  which  he  at  first 
proposed  to  make,  that  Leopold  should  admit  a  Prussian  guarantee  of  the  Hun- 
garian constitution  (Geschichte  der  Revolutionszeit,  i,  p.  232).  But  the  fact  that  the 
King  let  this  demand  fall  when  Hertzberg  urged  that  it  would  infallibly  lead  to  war, 
seems  to  me  to  point  to  a  conclusion  quite  the  opposite  of  Sybel's. 


I48  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

execute  the  new  orders  given  him.  On  July  15  he  presented  to 
the  Austrians  a  note  declaring  that  the  King  found  himself  un- 
able to  discuss  the  new  propositions  of  the  Court  of  Vienna,  both 
because  he  foresaw  with  certitude  that  they  would  be  accepted 
neither  by  the  Porte  nor  by  Poland,  and  because  they  were  too 
far  removed  from  the  original  basis  upon  which  this  negotiation 
had  started;  that  he  could  therefore  only  return  to  the  other 
basis,  the  status  quo  strict;  and  that  he  demanded  a  precise  and 
immediate  answer  whether  the  King  of  Hungary  would  consent 
to  that  principle.1  In  vain  Spielmann  and  Reuss  protested  hotly 
against  so  abrupt  a  change  of  front,  and  at  a  demand  so  deroga- 
tory to  the  honor,  so  incompatible  with  the  dignity,  of  their 
Court.  There  was  nothing  to  do  but  to  write  to  Vienna  for  new 
instructions.  Spielmann's  indignation  was  unfeigned,  for  his 
heart  was  too  firmly  set  on  the  exchange  project,  and  he  revolted 
at  the  thought  of  sacrificing  every  inch  of  conquered  territory, 
and  at  submitting  to  such  arrogant  dictatorship.2  Leopold,  how- 
ever, did  not  hesitate  over  his  decision.  He  wanted  nothing  so 
much  as  peace,  peace  at  once,  peace  on  any  even  half-way 
honorable  terms.  The  plenipotentiaries  might  try  to  secure  some 
slight  modifications  of  the  strict  status  quo  ante  helium  (such  as 
the  cession  of  Orsova  to  Austria) ;  but  that  was  to  him  a  matter 
of  merely  secondary  interest.  He  was  quite  ready  to  assent  to 
the  main  demands  of  the  Prussian  declaration. 

When  these  instructions  reached  Reichenbach  (the  24th),  the 
conferences  were  renewed  for  the  purpose  of  drawing  up  a  con- 
vention; and  after  frequent  violent  scenes  and  more  than  one 
moment  when  a  breach  seemed  imminent  over  the  article  of  the 
Netherlands,  on  July  27  an  agreement  was  finally  reached. 
Austria  consented  to  the  principle  of  the  status  quo  strict;  to  an 
immediate  armistice  with  the  Turks;  and  to  the  holding  of  a 
Congress,  where  peace  was  to  be  concluded  with  the  Porte  under 
the  mediation  and  guarantee  of  England,  Prussia,  and  Holland. 
If  at  the  final  settlement  the  Court  of  Vienna  secured  any  slight 

1  The  note  in  Hertzberg's  Recueil,  iii,  pp.  83-87,  and  in  Van  de  Spiegel,  op.  cit., 
pp.  288  ff. 

2  Reports  of  the  two  Austrian  envoys  of  July  13,  16,  18,  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i, 
pp.  499-503.  506-515- 


REICHENBACH  1 49 

modifications  of  the  status  quo  in  its  favor,  Prussia  reserved  the 
right  to  claim  equivalent  advantages.  The  Powers  of  the  Triple 
Alliance  promised  to  use  their  good  offices  to  assist  the  King  of 
Hungary  to  recover  the  Netherlands,  whose  former  constitutions 
were  then  to  be  placed  under  their  guarantee.  Finally,  Austria 
agreed  not  to  aid  Russia  in  any  way,  directly  or  indirectly,  in 
case  the  Empress  continued  the  war  with  the  Turks.  Such 
were  the  chief  provisions  of  the  written  declarations  which  con- 
stituted the  famous  Convention  of  Reichenbach.1 

V 

"  Your  Grace  will  see  the  sad  result  of  the  Reichenbach  nego- 
tiation from  the  joint  report,"  Spielmann  wrote  to  Kaunitz.  "  It 
is,  unfortunately,  an  unavoidable  consequence  of  our  internal 
circumstances  and  the  deplorable  aftermath  of  the  late  reign."  2 
"  In  sane  politics,"  was  Kaunitz's  verdict,  "  we  ought  never  to 
have  consented  to  this  congress.  It  was  an  humiliating  step. 
Decided  to  yield  everything,  we  could  have  done  it  at  Vienna, 
and  we  should  thus  have  avoided  insolent  and  insulting  lan- 
guage. .  .  .  The  declaration  is  base,  cringing,  without  a  shadow  of 
dignity;  besides,  it  leaves  the  most  essential  things  undecided."  3 
Leopold,  however,  found  the  final  terms  more  favorable  than 
Hertzberg's,  and  believed  that  of  all  the  bases  for  peace  that  were 
possible  at  that  moment,  that  of  the  status  quo  was  the  least 
disadvantageous.4  So  diverse  were  the  judgments  then  passed  on 
the  Convention  from  the  standpoint  of  Austrian  interests.  The 
verdict  of  historians  has  been  rather  more  unanimous. 

To  call  Reichenbach  an  Austrian  Olmiitz  5  is  to  overstate  the 
case.  Doubtless  the  Convention  involved  great  sacrifices;  it 
represented  the  total  failure  of  that  policy  of  resistance  to  Prussia 
for  which  Kaunitz  had  stood;   and  even  Leopold  had  probably 

1  Printed  in  Neumann,  Recueil  des  Traites  de  VAutriche,  i,  pp.  414-420;  Hertz- 
berg's Recueil,  iii,  pp.  88-101;  Van  de  Spiegel,  op.  cit.,  pp.  297-302,  etc. 

2  Letter  of  July  28,  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  530. 

8  Note  to  Ph.  Cobenzl,  undated,  cited  by  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  preface,  i,  p.  x. 

4  Letters  to  Marie  Christine  of  July  18  and  August  9,  in  Wolf,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
181  and  189. 

5  Duncker,  in  H.  Z.,  xxxvii,  pp.  41  f. 


ISO 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


hoped  for  somewhat  better  conditions.1  But  the  Austrian  ruler 
had,  at  any  rate,  gained  the  great  and  essential  objects  that  he 
had  had  in  view  since  the  beginning  of  the  negotiation;  and  such 
was  emphatically  not  the  case  with  Frederick  William.  In  this 
sense,  the  real  victor  at  Reichenbach  was  not  the  monarch  who 
dictated  the  terms,  but  the  one  who  submitted  to  the  dictator. 

To  the  King  of  Prussia  the  Convention  brought  a  little  idle 
glamour,  purchased  at  the  cost  of  the  hopes,  plans,  and  efforts 
of  the  past  three  years.  In  reality,  it  marked  a  dismal  fiasco. 
After  fixing  upon  that  summer  for  a  great  offensive  action,  after 
elaborate  military  and  diplomatic  preparations,  after  taking  the 
field  at  the  head  of  imposing  forces  and  challenging  the  attention 
of  the  world  to  the  great  deeds  that  were  to  follow,  Frederick 
William  returned  to  his  capital  wreathed  with  no  laurels,  empty- 
handed,  bringing  only  the  dubious  honor  of  having  saved  a  few 
provinces  to  the  Turks  and  of  having  paraded  himself  as  the 
disinterested  peacemaker  of  Europe.  The  pose  was  awkward, 
for  all  the  world  knew  what  chagrin  lay  behind  it,  and  how  in- 
voluntary this  disinterestedness  had  been.  For  these  triumphs 
the  King  had  spent  half  the  war- treasure  so  carefully  collected 
by  his  predecessor  for  an  emergency.  What  was  worse,  he  had 
lost  the  chance  to  make  those  indispensable  territorial  acquisitions 
to  which  he  had  looked  forward  so  confidently  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Eastern  war.  Worst  of  all,  Prussia  had  played  away  the 
splendid  opportunity  to  settle  once  for  all  with  Austria,  the  finest 
opportunity  that  had  presented  itself  since  1740.  "  I  cannot 
contain  myself  for  shame  and  grief,"  Hertzberg  wrote  to  a 
friend.2 

At  Warsaw  the  news  of  Reichenbach  was  also  a  cruel  dis- 
appointment. Since  the  previous  autumn  the  Poles  had  been 
preparing  a  revolt  in  Galicia,  planning  an  attack  upon  that 
province,  massing   their  force's  on  the  Austrian  frontier,  and 

1  Sorel's  verdict:  "  Leopold  recut  du  camp  prussien  sous  forme  d'ultimatum  ses 
propres  conditions  de  paix.  II  lui  convint  de  se  les  faire  dieter  "  (L'Europe  et  la 
Revolution  franqaise,  ii,  p.  73)  is,  I  think,  not  quite  true.  Leopold's  '  own  condi- 
tions,' it  seems,  would  have  been  the  modified  or  approximate  status  quo. 

2  Letter  of  August  1  to  Schlieffen,  in  Nachrickt  von  einigen  Hausern  des 
Geschlechts  der  von  Schlieffen,  ii,  pp.  509  f. 


REICH  EN  BACH  151 

hardly  stopping  short  of  deliberately  provoking  a  rupture.  By 
May  relations  had  become  so  strained  that  the  Austrian  minister 
was  making  ready  to  leave  Warsaw.1  At  that  moment  the  Poles 
were  honestly  and  even  eagerly  intent  upon  taking  their  full  part 
in  the  great  enterprise  planned  by  Prussia.  They  waited  only 
for  the  signal  from  Berlin.  But  weeks  and  weeks  passed  without 
the  signal  being  given,  and  meanwhile  disquieting  reports  flowed 
in  about  the  secret  negotiations  going  on  between  Leopold  and 
Frederick  William.  Irritated  and  uneasy  over  the  delay,  the 
Poles  became  indignant  and  alarmed  on  learning  how  freely 
Hertzberg  was  disposing  of  their  lands  and  interests  without 
consulting  them.  The  suspicions  bred  by  the  untimely  demand 
for  Dantzic  and  Thorn  some  months  before,  flared  up  again. 
The  result  was  that,  on  the  one  hand,  the  idea  of  undertaking  a 
war  in  conjunction  with  such  an  ally  began  to  grow  unpopular,2 
while,  on  the  other  hand,  the  Polish  government  felt  bound,  as 
we  have  seen,  to  register  an  energetic  protest  against  the  Hertz- 
berg plan.  Nevertheless,  when  the  news  of  the  denouement  at 
Reichenbach  arrived,  when  it  became  certain  that  there  was  to 
be  no  war  after  all,  the  first  impression  at  Warsaw  was  one  of 
consternation  and  regret.3  It  was  hard  now  to  bid  adieu  to  the 
hope  of  recovering  Galicia,  and  to  abandon  the  dangerously 
compromised  people  of  that  province  to  the  punishment  that 
might  be  awaiting  them.  There  was  no  denying  that  by  its 
warlike  gestures  and  poses  of  the  last  few  months  the  Republic 
had  gone  very  far  in  antagonizing  the  Imperial  Courts.  Above 
all,  the  leaders  of  the  Patriots  could  not  fail  to  recognize  that  the 
Prussian  alliance  itself — the  alliance  on  which  their  whole  political 
system  rested — was  now  endangered,  both  because  after  all  that 
had  happened  the  Polish  nation  could  no  longer  feel  the  old 
confidence  in  their  ally,  and  because  Frederick  William,  on  his 
side,  had  also  much  ground  for  complaint.    At  the  eleventh  hour, 

1  De  Cache's  report  of  May  16,  1790,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte. 

2  De  Cache  reported,  though  probably  with  some  exaggeration,  that  hardly  a 
dozen  members  of  the  Diet  would  now  have  voted  for  war  (July  3,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit.). 

3  De  Cache's  report  of  July  31  (V.  A.,  loc.  cit.);  Aubert  to  Montmorin,  July 
31,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  512;  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  ii,  pp.  170  f.; 
Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  p.  83. 


152  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

just  before  the  Congress  of  Reichenbach  assembled,  the  King  had 
learned  from  Prussian  officers  sent  to  inspect  it  that  the  Polish 
army  was  not  yet  sufficiently  advanced  in  its  reorganization  to 
cooperate  effectively.1  If  that  discovery  was  damaging  to  the 
credit  of  the  Poles,  Frederick  William's  feelings  towards  them 
were  not  improved  by  finding  his  chances  for  making  acquisitions 
by  negotiation  thwarted  largely  by  the  obstinacy  of  these  same 
useless  allies.  After  Reichenbach  the  Prussians  made  no  secret 
of  their  irritation.  A  Polish  agent  reported  that  at  Berlin  the 
worst  opinions  prevailed  regarding  the  King  of  Poland,  the  Polish 
army,  and  the  whole  Polish  nation.2  Lucchesini,  on  his  return 
to  Warsaw,  talked  blackly  about  a  complete  change  of  system  on 
the  part  of  his  Court.3  The  fact  was  that  the  collapse  of  the  pro- 
posed attack  upon  Austria  had  removed  the  one  cogent  motive 
Frederick  William  had  had  for  desiring  the  Polish  alliance. 

There  was,  then,  dissatisfaction,  disillusionment,  growing  es- 
trangement on  both  sides.  Only  four  months  after  its  conclu- 
sion the  alliance  seemed  on  the  road  to  dissolution.  One  chance 
remained,  however,  of  saving  it,  of  giving  it  renewed  vitality  and 
real  worth  in  Prussian  eyes.  If  the  joint  enterprise  against 
Austria  could  no  longer  be  carried  out,  the  point  of  the  alliance 
might  be  turned  against  Russia.  Such  a  possibility  would  pre- 
sent itself  if  the  Triple  Alliance,  having  once  undertaken  to  effect 
a  general  pacification,  attempted  to  enforce  upon  Catherine  II 
the  same  hard  terms  as  had  been  imposed  upon  Leopold. 

1  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  p.  72;  Kalinka,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  142  ff. 

2  Kalinka,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  170,  238  ff. 

3  Herrmann,  op,  cit.,  vi,  pp.  331  f. 


CHAPTER  VIII 

Catherina  Constans  Invicta 

I 

During  the  year  after  Reichenbach  Catherine  II  was  put  to  the 
hardest  test  of  her  career.  She  who,  like  Louis  XIV,  had  long 
held  her  neighbors  in  fear  by  her  continual  aggressions,  now  found 
a  powerful  coalition  rising  up  against  her;  and  for  a  time  it 
seemed  probable  that  her  reign  would  close  in  humiliation  and 
defeat,  as  Louis  XTV's  had  ended.  In  that  case,  the  future  of  the 
Polish  state  would  doubtless  have  been  vastly  different.  For  in 
the  duel  between  Catherine  and  Pitt,  which  we  are  now  to  follow, 
it  was  far  less  the  fate  of  Turkey  than  that  of  Poland  that  was  at ,, 
stake.1 

Immediately  after  Reichenbach  the  question  presented  itself, 
whether  Russia,  like  Austria,  could  be  induced  to  renounce  her 
conquests,  and  to  make  peace  on  the  strict  status  quo  ante  basis. 
On  that  subject  Catherine's  mind  was  made  up.  Nearly  two  years 
before,  her  Council  had  decided  that  when  the  negotiations  for 
peace  came,  Russia  must  insist  on  the  cession  of  the  fortress  of 
Oczakow  and  the  territory  between  the  Bug  and  the  Dniester.2 

Oczakow,  which  French  engineers  had  long  been  trying  to  turn 
into  a  sort  of  Turkish  Gibraltar,  had  a  decided  strategic  impor- 
tance. It  commanded  the  mouths  of  the  Dnieper  and  the  Bug, 
and  as  long  as  it  remained  in  hostile  hands,  it  formed  a  constant 
menace  to  Russia's  newly  acquired  possessions  in  the  Crimea. 
The  adjacent  territory  as  far  as  the  Dniester  was  at  that  time 
almost  an  uninhabited  desert;  but  it  was  of  considerable  value  as 
affording  a  broader  frontage  on  the  Black  Sea  and  controlling  the 
outlets  of  several  important  navigable  rivers.  On  this  cession  as  a 
sine  qua  non  Catherine  remained  unshakeably  firm  throughout  all 
the  storms  that  followed. 

1  Cf.  Rose,  William  Pitt,  p.  593. 

2  Sessions  of  the  Council  of  December  14-16/25-27,  1788,  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i, 
pp.  638-655. 

153 


154  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

As  the  war  turned  more  and  more  in  her  favor,  she  advanced  for 
a  time  larger  claims.  At  the  close  of  1 789  Potemkin  was  secretly 
instructed  to  induce  the  Turks,  if  possible,  to  cede  all  their  prov- 
inces north  of  the  Danube.  The  lands  as  far  as  the  Dniester  or 
even  the  Pruth  were  to  be  annexed  to  Russia,  and  the  rest  was  to 
form  the  principality  of  Dacia,  the  crown  of  which  Catherine  at 
that  time  destined  to  her  younger  grandson  Constantine.1  When 
in  January  of  1790  she  for  the  first  time  announced  her  terms  of 
peace  to  the  Courts  of  London  and  Berlin,  she  had  the  courage  to 
include  an  article  providing  for  the  erection  of  Moldavia  and 
Bessarabia  into  an  independent  state  under  a  prince  of  the 
Orthodox  faith,  a  demand  which  the  Prussians  found  as  '  arro- 
gant '  and  '  extravagant '  as  it  was  '  inadmissible.' 2  It  was  one  of 
Catherine's  better  qualities  that  she  generally  recognized  just 
how  far  she  could  safely  go.  So  on  this  occasion,  after  finding  how 
strong  an  opposition  her  tentative  proposals  had  aroused,  she 
wisely  decided  to  moderate  her  claims  and  then  to  stand  by  her 
guns  through  thick  and  thin.  In  June  she  announced  that  her 
irreducible  and  ultimate  terms  of  peace  were  the  cession  of 
Oczakow  and  of  its  territory  as  far  as  the  Dniester.3 

Having  chosen  the  position  she  meant  to  defend,  Catherine 
looked  on  at  the  proceedings  at  Reichenbach  with  indignation  but 
without  fear.  She  could  not  view  that  convention  without  afflic- 
tion, she  wrote,  since  it  was  manifestly  derogatory  to  the  dignity 
of  her  ally.  Assuredly  she  would  send  no  envoy  to  join  the 
Austrians  in  making  peace  under  the  tutelage  of  England  and 
Prussia.  "  No  human  power  shall  dictate  laws  to  me.  I  am  de- 
lighted," she  went  on  sarcastically,  "  that  the  King  of  Prussia  is 
again  demanding  Dantzic  and  Thorn  from  Poland.  I  suppose  it 
will  be  on  condition  that  I  cede  to  Poland  White  Russia  and  Kiev, 
and  that  is  just  where  His  Prussian  Majesty  will  fail."  4 

1  Secret  rescripts  to  Potemkin  of  November  30/December  n,  1789,  and 
March  19/30,  1790,  M.  A.,  Typina,  IX,  14,  15. 

2  Ostermann  to  Nesselrode,  December  28,  1789/January  8,  1790,  Frederick 
William  to  Goltz,  January  22,  24,  February  5,  22,  Dembihski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp. 
46-53,  277  5.,  282,  285. 

3  Goltz's  report  of  June  18,  1790,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  308. 

4  Undated  note,  perhaps  to  Bezborodko,  P.  A.,  X,  69. 


CATHERINA    CONST ANS  INVICTA  1 55 

The  Empress'  courage  was  increased  by  the  fact  that  she  had 
just  patched  up  a  hasty  and  very  timely  peace  with  Sweden. 
Gustavus  III  would  probably  have  preferred  to  continue  the  war; 
but  his  meagre  resources  were  exhausted,  and  he  despaired  of 
obtaining  adequate  help  from  outside.  For  years  he  had  been 
storming  the  Courts  of  London  and  Berlin  with  pleas  for  military 
and  financial  assistance;  they  had  given  him  a  long  series  of 
rebuffs;  and  when  at  last,  after  discovering  that  he  was  negotiat- 
ing for  peace  with  the  Empress,  they  came  forward  with  the  offer 
of  a  subsidy,  he  found  it  wretchedly  insufficient.  Among  the 
mistakes  made  by  Pitt  and  Frederick  William  in  dealing  with  the 
Russian  problem,  none  cost  them  more,  perhaps,  than  their 
parsimony  and  comparative  indifference  on  this  occasion.  At 
the  moment  when  they  were  about  to  begin  their  action  against 
Catherine,  they  found  they  had  lost  the  most  efficient  ally  they 
could  have  secured.1  On  August  14,  1790,  Russia  and  Sweden 
concluded  the  Peace  of  Verela,  by  which  the  territorial  status  quo 
ante  helium  was  restored,  although  vague  assurances  were  given 
on  the  Russian  side  about  a  future  '  rectification  '  of  the  frontier. 
Catherine's  exultation  over  the  peace  was  equalled  only  by  the 
discomfiture  of  the  English  and  Prussians.  "  We  have  drawn  one 
foot  out  of  the  mire,"  she  wrote  to  Potemkin;  "  as  soon  as  we  get 
the  other  one  out,  we  shall  sing  Alleluia."  2 

Freed  in  this  manner  from  her  most  pressing  anxiety,  the 
Empress  was  ready  to  show  herself  perfectly  uncompromising 
on  the  subject  of  the  peace  with  the  Turks.  If  aught  were  lacking 
to  fill  her  with  fiery  determination,  it  would  have  been  supplied 
by  her  intense  dislike  and  even  contempt  for  her  prospective 
opponents.  Her  correspondence  of  that  time  is  full  of  satirical 
thrusts  and  passionate  outbursts  against  "  the  new  dictators  of 
Europe."  Hertzberg  is  styled  "  the  enrage"  "  the  madman," 
"  the  puffed-up  pedant  ";  Frederick  William  is  "  the  universal 
Protector,"  "  the  universal  Disposer  of  other  people's  property," 
or  "la  Bete  ";   and  the  Kings  of  England  and  Prussia  are  rolled 

1  On  the  relations  between  Sweden  and  the  Triple  Alliance  down  to  this  point, 
see  especially  Wahrenberg,  "  Bidrag  till  historien  om  Kon.  Gustaf  III'  sednaste 
regeringsar,"  in  Tidskrift  for  Litter alur,  1851,  pp.  321-365. 

2  Letter  of  August  9/20,  C6opnnKt,  xlii,  p.  101. 


156  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

into  one  as  "  Gegu," l  of  whom  it  is  written  that  'not  all  the  Gegus 
possible  or  imaginable  will  make  her  conduct  her  affairs  any 
differently.'  Never  would  she  make  her  submission  to  such 
people.  "No  human  power,"  she  wrote,  "  will  ever  make  me  do 
that  which  does  not  conform  to  the  interests  of  my  Empire  or  the 
dignity  of  the  crown  I  wear."  2  When  it  appeared  that  no  help 
was  to  be  expected  from  outside  in  case  of  war,  she  declared 
unwaveringly:  "  Very  well,  alone,  yes,  perfectly  alone,  we  shall 
now  conduct  our  affairs  according  to  our  own  interests.  N.  B.  I 
shall  not  relax  a  jot  from  any  of  the  propositions  made  to  the 
Turks."  "  Our  role  is  to  be  unchangeable,  unmoved  by  whatever 
may  happen."  3  Such  was  the  attitude  and  the  indomitable 
temper  of  the  sovereign  whom  it  was  now  proposed  to  coerce 
into  surrendering  her  hard-won  conquests. 

The  application  of  such  rigorous  terms  to  Russia  had,  as- 
suredly, not  lain  within  the  original  intentions  of  the  Triple 
Alliance.  When  Pitt  first  suggested  a  general  pacification  on  the 
status  quo  basis,  in  April,  1790,  he  had  not  meant,  it  seems,  to 
interpret  that  principle  so  strictly  as  td  exclude  moderate  acquisi- 
tions such  as  Catherine  now  demanded.  Down  to  the  summer  of 
1790  both  England  and  Prussia  frequently  expressed  themselves 
in  a  sense  not  unfavorable  to  the  retention  of  Oczakow  and  its 
district  by  Russia.4  But  Reichenbach  had  altered  the  situation. 
After  England  had  there  pronounced  so  strongly  in  favor  of  the 
status  quo  basis  in  opposition  to  the  Hertzberg  exchange  plan, 
Prussia  accepted  the  principle,  but  chose  to  give  it  the  strictest 
possible  interpretation,  in  order  to  prevent  her  rival  from  gaining 
even  a  single  village.  Having  applied  the  principle  to  Austria, 
the  allies  were  then  bound  to  apply  it  to  Russia  as  well;  for 
without  derogating  from  their  professions  of  high  impartiality 
and  disinterestedness,  they  could  not  allow  the  Empress  advan- 
tages denied  to  Leopold.     Thus  England  and  Prussia  were  led 

1  See  the  correspondence  in  the  Co'opHHK'B,  xlii,  passim,  and  especially  that 
with  Grimm,  xxiii  of  the  same  collection.  "  Gegu  "  is,  of  course,  a  fusion  of 
Georges  and  Guillaume. 

2  To  Zimmermann,  January  26/February  6,  1791,  C6opHZKi,  xlii,  p.  139. 

3  Undated  notes,  P.  A.,  X,  69. 

4  Cf.  Lecky,  England  in  the  Eighteenth  Century,  v,  p.  275. 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  INVICTA  157 

rather  involuntarily  to  raise  a  demand  that  was  likely  to  involve 
them  in  a  war  which  neither  of  them  had  clearly  foreseen,  and 
which  neither  of  them  had  any  reason  to  desire. 

Towards  the  end  of  August  the  envoys  of  the  two  Courts  at 
St.  Petersburg  officially  communicated  the  results  of  the  Reichen- 
bach  negotiations  and  invited  the  Empress  to  accept  peace  on  the 
same  terms  under  the  mediation  of  the  Triple  Alliance.  The  reply 
was  a  courteous  but  flat  refusal,  During  the  autumn  the  two 
ministers  returned  again  and  again  to  their  demand,  but  always 
with  the  same  result.  The  Vice- Chancellor  Ostermann  informed 
them  that  the  Empress  was  indignant  at  "  the  unparalleled  con- 
duct "  of  the  allies  in  attempting  "  to  dictate  in  so  arbitrary  a 
manner  to  a  sovereign  perfectly  independent  and  in  want  of  no 
assistance  to  procure  the  conditions  which  seemed  to  her  best 
suited  to  satisfy  her  honor."  x  At  the  end  of  the  year  the  allied 
Courts  made  what  they  considered  a  great  concession.  They 
would  no  longer  insist  that  the  Empress  submit  to  their  mediation, 
if  she  would  only  accept  their  good  offices  and  peace  on  their 
terms.  But  this  hardly  improved  matters,  since  the  Empress 
still  held  her  to  her  own  terms.  Obviously  there  was  no  means  of 
dealing  with  her  except  by  a  show  of  force.  The  question  was 
how  far  England  and  Prussia  would  go  with  measures  of  coercion. 
Would  they  risk  a  war  ?  That  question  held  Europe  in  tense 
anxiety  throughout  the  winter  and  spring  of  1791.  The  answer 
to  it  depended  upon  many  factors:  upon  the  uncertain  and 
incalculable  course  of  Frederick  William,  the  deliberate  resolu- 
tions of  Pitt,  the  attitude  of  Austria,  Poland,  Sweden,  Denmark, 
and  various  other  states. 

II 

If  it  is  difficult  to  distinguish  with  certainty  the  motives  that 
determined  Frederick  William's  conduct  at  Reichenbach,  the 
policy  of  Prussia  after  that  convention  presents  an  almost  hopeless 
maze  of  perplexities  and  contradictions.  That  the  King  urged 
England  on  to  the  most  vigorous  measures  against  Russia,  while 
at  the  same  time  he  was  making  overtures  to  the  Empress  for  an 

1  Lecky,  op.  cit.,  v,  p.  280. 


158  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

agreement  for  mutual  advantages  between  themselves;  that  he 
planned  with  the  British  cabinet  a  great  Federative  System 
for  the  preservation  of  peace  and  the  status  quo  in  Europe,  while 
he  was  simultaneously  looking  for  other  connections  and  for 
acquisitions  wherever  they  might  be  found;  that  he  negotiated 
for  an  alliance  with  the  Jacobins  at  Paris  while  at  the  same  time 
proposing  to  Austria  a  joint  crusade  against  the  Revolution  —  all 
this,  and  much  more  besides,  shows  a  versatility  or  an  inco- 
herence in  his  plans  that  almost  defies  analysis  or  comparison. 
The  best,  though  by  no  means  a  complete,  explanation  of  his 
course  appears  to  be  as  follows. 

After  Reichenbach  Frederick  William  felt  it  a  point  of  honor 
to  bring  Russia  to  accept  the  status  quo;  he  soon  convinced  him- 
self that  earnest  measures  would  be  required;  and  he  therefore 
desired  to  make  sure  of  vigorous  support  from  England  and  of  the 
neutrality  of  Austria  and  France.  It  was  primarily  the  exigencies 
of  the  Russian  crisis  that  determined  his  conduct,  but  he  also 
looked  beyond.  He  wished,  on  the  one  hand,  to  gain  a  more 
secure  basis  for  his  policy  than  that  afforded  by  his  present  al- 
liances, and,  on  the  other  hand,  to  effect  in  one  way  or  another 
the  acquisitions  which  he  considered  so  necessary  to  Prussia. 
Hence  he  sought  to  keep  all  avenues  open;  to  put  himself  in  the 
strongest  position  as  against  Russia,  without  entirely  cutting  off 
the  possibility  of  a  friendly  agreement  with  her;  to  preserve  his 
old  connections,  while  preparing  the  way  for  new  ones;  to  be  able 
in  the  future  to  choose  between  England,  France,  Austria,  and 
Russia,  in  accordance  with  the  needs  of  his  essentially  aggressive 
policy.1 

On  the  King's  intrigues  with  the  revolutionists  at  Paris  it  is 
unnecessary  to  dwell,  since  they  produced  no  result  save  to  fur- 
nish the  Imperial  Courts  with  new  examples  of  '  Prussian  du- 
plicity.' 2    His  advances  to  Austria,  however,  deserve  attention, 

1  Cf.  especially,  Sevin,  Das  System  der  preussischen  Geheimpolitik  vom  Augicst 
ijqo  bis  zum  Mai  17 91. 

2  For  details  on  this  subject,  see  Sevin,  op.  cit.,  pp.  37  ft\;  Sybel,  Geschichte  der 
Revolutionszeit,  i,  pp.  348  f.;  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  157  ff.;  Heidrich,  Preussen  im 
Kampfe  gegen  die  franzosische  Revolution,  pp.  9  ff.  That  the  negotiation  was 
known  to  the  Austrians  appears  from  Mercy's  letter  to  Kaunitz  of  January  22, 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  INVICTA  1 59 

since  they  mark  the  beginnings  of  a  change  in  the  grouping  of  the 
great  Powers,  which  was  to  be  of  great  importance  in  the  sequel. 
Only  a  few  weeks  after  the  Convention  of  Reichenbach,  while 
Frederick  William  still  remained  in  Silesia,  there  first  began  to  be 
talk  of  a  rapprochement  between  Austria  and  Prussia.  On  in- 
numerable occasions  the  Austrian  envoy,  Prince  Reuss,  was 
assured  by  Bischoffwerder,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  others  of 
the  King's  desire  for  a  sincere  and  permanent  understanding,  and 
even  for  an  alliance,  with  Austria.  Everyone  joined  in  condemn- 
ing the  old  error  that  the  two  Powers  were  '  natural  enemies.' 
These  ideas  received  an  additional  stimulus  from  the  advent  of 
Baron  Roll,  an  agent  of  the  Count  of  Artois,  come  to  urge  the 
latter's  plans  for  effecting  a  counter-revolution  in  France  through 
a  coalition  of  the  neighboring  states.  Frederick  William,  who 
had  been  sounded  by  Artois  as  early  as  February,1  was  not 
disinclined  to  undertake  the  enterprise  as  soon  as  his  hands  were 
free.  He  allowed  Bischoffwerder  and  Prince  Hohenlohe-Ingel- 
fingen,  the  two  chief  enthusiasts  for  '  the  cause  of  all  sovereigns,' 
to  assail  Reuss  incessantly  with  hints  on  this  topic;  and  these 
hints  were  soon  followed  by  the  very  definite  proposals  made  by 
Hohenlohe,  September  13,  looking  towards  a  formal  alliance  and 
joint  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  France.  The  immediate  object 
which  Frederick  William  had  in  view  appears  from  Hohenlohe's 
intimation  that  the  proposed  alliance  was  designed  '  to  free  both 
sovereigns  from  the  need  of  troubling  themselves  so  much  about  . 
the  friendship  of  Russia,'  and  from  his  statement  that  the  French 
enterprise  could  be  undertaken  only  after  the  final  pacification  in 
the  East.  The  King's  ultimate  aim  was  shown  in  the  scheme  of 
'  compensations  '  for  the  expenses  of  the  intervention.  Austria 
was  to  take  a  part  of  French  Hainault,  and  Prussia  to  receive 
Juliers  and  Berg  in  exchange  for  an  equivalent  to  be  carved  out  in 
Alsace  for  the  Elector  of  Bavaria.    This  was  the  first  communica- 

1791,  in  Feuillet  de  Conches,  Louis  XVI,  Marie  Antoinette  et  Madame  Elisabeth, 
i,  pp.  423  ff. 

1  Bailleu,  "Zur  Vorgeschichte  der  Revolutionskriege,"  in  H.  Z.,  lxxiv,  pp.  259- 
262.  It  is  not  improbable  that  suggestions  on  this  subject  may  have  been  made 
to  him  even  earlier.  Cf.  Daudet,  Les  Bourbons  et  la  Russie  pendant  la  Revolution 
franqaise,  p.  18. 


/ 


-, 


l6o  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

tion  between  the  two  Courts  regarding  joint  action  against  the 
French  Revolution;  and  from  the  very  start  the  plan  was  bound 
up  on  the  Prussian  side  with  projects  of  aggrandizement  that 
were  to  be  the  bane  of  the  First  Coalition  and  the  ruin  of  Poland. 
Simultaneously  with  Hohenlohe's  overtures  to  Reuss,  the  Mar- 
quis Lucchesini,  passing  through  Vienna  on  his  road  to  the  peace 
congress  at  Sistova,  was  ordered  to  sound  Leopold  about  a  coali- 
tion for  the  restoration  of  order  in  France;  and,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  the  scheme  for  territorial '  indemnities '  was  not  to  be  left 
out  of  the  discussion. 

The  Austrians  replied  to  these  proposals  in  guarded  style,  point- 
ing out  the  difficulties  and  dangers  involved,  evading  the  delicate 
subject  of  '  compensations,'  urging  the  need  of  delay  until  after 
the  peace  with  the  Turks,  but  still  by  no  means  entirely  rejecting 
the  idea  of  intervention  in  France.1 

The  friendly  exchange  of  opinions  begun  on  this  topic  soon 
extended  to  other  subjects.  Kaunitz  and  Hertzberg  might  do 
their  utmost  to  keep  their  Courts  at  swords'  points  in  the  good 
old  time-honored  fashion;  but  in  spite  of  them  the  two  monarchs, 
frequently  communicating  directly  with  one  another,  were  draw- 
ing closer  together,  and  bringing  a  quite  unwonted  warmth  into 
Austro-Prussian  relations.  Both  sovereigns  had  strong  reasons 
for  desiring  a  rapprochement.  Leopold  had  long  been  resolved 
not  to  live  in  exclusive  dependence  upon  Russia,  in  servitude  to 
the  Tsarina,  as  he  considered  that  his  brother  had  done.  Fred- 
erick William,  preparing  for  a  possible  war  with  Catherine,  was 
perforce  anxious  to  lure  her  ally  away  from  her;  and  this  was, 
indeed,  the  sole  immediate  aim  of  his  advances  to  Leopold.  But 
the  old  distrust  was  still  very  deeply  rooted  at  both  Berlin  and 
Vienna.  On  the  one  question  about  which  the  Prussians  were 
most  concerned  at  that  time  —  namely,  whether  Austria  would 
remain  neutral,  in  case  they  went  to  war  with  Russia  —  they 

1  For  the  above:  Reuss'  reports  of  August  6  and  31,  September  3,  7,  io,  14, 
17,  21,  28,  Kaunitz  to  Reuss,  September  13  and  19,  Ph.  Cobenzl  to  Reuss, 
October  8,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Correspondenz,  1790;  Brunswick  to  Schlieffen,  June 
17,  1792,  in  Schlieffen,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  565;  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  350;  Sorel,  op.  cit., 
ii,  p.  160;  Beer,  Leopold  II,  Franz  II,  und  Catharina,  pp.  36  f.;  F.  K.  Wittichen, 
"  Zur  Vorgeschichte  der  Revolutionskriege,"  in  F.  B.  P.  G.,  xvii,  pp.  256  ff. 


CATHERINA   CONST  AN S  INVICTA  l6l 

could  get  no  satisfactory  answer.  Kaunitz  replied  only  with 
surly  bravado,  and  Leopold  with  courteous  evasions.  As  long  as 
this  situation  continued,  the  reconciliation  between  the  two 
Courts  could  be  regarded  only  as  a  pious  wish,  rather  than  an 
accomplished  fact;  and  so  long  Frederick  William  found  him- 
self gravely  impeded  in  undertaking  to  coerce  the  Empress. 

While  continually  urging  the  British  government  to  vigorous 
measures,  while  talking  loudly  of  war  before  the  Austrians,  and 
massing  very  considerable  forces  on  the  eastern  frontier,  the 
Prussians  were  also  ready '  to  build  a  golden  bridge  '  to  Catherine. 
Every  sign  of  more  conciliatory  intentions  on  the  Neva  was 
greeted  with  anxious  eagerness  at  Berlin.1  Hertzberg  assured 
Alopeus  that  he  cared  nothing  for  the  status  quo,  and  was  con- 
vinced that  Oczakow  was  not  worth  a  war.1  He  believed  that  all 
might  still  be  arranged  satisfactorily  to  the  Empress,  if  she  would 
offer  to  assist  Prussia  to  obtain  Dantzic  and  Thorn  through  a 
voluntary  cession  by  Poland.  He  declared  that  he  had  not  been 
authorized  to  make  such  a  suggestion,  and  that  the  King  had  even 
forbidden  him  to  speak  of  Dantzic  and  Thorn.  Possibly  he  was 
telling  the  truth  in  these  latter  statements,  in  which  case  his  pro- 
posal must  be  regarded  as  an  amazing  bit  of  insubordination; 
possibly  they  were  only  the  white  lies  of  diplomacy.  At  any  rate, 
a  proposition  that  almost  certainly  had  Frederick  William's  ap- 
proval was  that  made  to  Alopeus  early  in  February,  1791,  by 
Bischoffwerder,  the  especial  confidant  of  the  Prussian  King. 
Bischoffwerder  intimated  that  the  Empress  could  make  sure  of 
her  desired  acquisitions,  if  she  would  by  a  secret  convention 
pledge  herself  to  renew  her  old  alliance  with  Prussia  at  the  con- 
clusion of  the  Turkish  war.2  Catherine  doubtless  judged  the 
situation  at  Berlin  accurately  when  she  wrote:  "  Le  Statu  quo,  ce 
trou  seroit  bouche  avec  Danzig  et  Thorn  ";  but  she  added,  "  Ce 
n'est  pas  moi  qui  le  proposera."  3 

1  Alopeus'  reports  of  December  6,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  95-104;  Reuss 
report  of  January  25,  1791,  V.  A.,  Prcussen,  Berichte. 

2  Alopeus'  report  of  February  8/19,  Dembinski,  i,  pp.  116-119,  which  de- 
serves to  be  supplemented  by  the  unpublished  one  of  June  n/22,  M.  A.,  Ilpyccia, 
III,  27. 

3  Undated  and  unaddressed  note,  P.  A.,  X,  75. 


1 62  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

In  truth  the  Prussians  had  no  stomach  for  this  war.  The 
leading  generals  were  almost  unanimously  opposed  to  it,  as  was 
the  King's  uncle,  Prince  Henry;  and  Hertzberg  mournfully 
declared  that  it  would  be  "  the  greatest  disaster,  perhaps  the 
grave  of  the  Prussian  Monarchy."  To  invade  Russia  it  was  said 
in  military  circles,  meant  to  risk  a  repetition  of  Poltava.1  Fred- 
erick William  was,  perhaps,  the  man  in  his  kingdom  who  was  least 
averse  to  war,  since  he  felt  that  his  honor  and  his  engagements 
required  him  not  to  give  way;  but  his  moods  and  projects  varied 
incessantly.  He  would  probably  have  been  relieved,  had  the 
Turks  succumbed  to  panic  and  concluded  a  precipitate  peace  on 
their  own  initiative;  and  he  would  doubtless  have  abandoned  the 
status  quo  principle  entirely,  had  Austria  or  Russia  proposed  to 
him  a  bargain  for  reciprocal  advantages.  At  the  end  of  the  year, 
shaken  by  the  urgent  remonstrances  of  those  around  him,  dis- 
gusted with  the  campaign  the  Turks  were  making,  and  wearied  of 
the  endless  delays  of  the  British  Cabinet  in  coming  to  a  definite 
statement  of  its  intentions,  the  King  seems  almost  to  have  made 
up  his  mind  to  avoid  war,  if  it  could  possibly  be  done.2  It  was 
high  time  for  Pitt  to  declare  himself,  if  the  Anglo-Prussian  league 
and  the  Federative  System  were  to  be  saved  from  shipwreck. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  Pitt's  ideas  had  been  evolving 
into  a  comprehensive  program,  the  aim  of  which  was  to  uphold 
the  existing  political  and  territorial  equilibrium,  to  protect  the 
weaker  states  against  the  lusts  of  the  aggressive  Powers,  and  in 
general  to  put  an  end  to  that  system  of  depredations,  conquests, 
and  partitions  which  Frederick  II  and  Catherine  had  brought 
into  vogue,  and  which  was  threatening  to  subvert  the  old  political 
order  of  Europe.  As  a  means  to  this  end  Pitt  thought  to  expand 
the  Triple  Alliance  through  the  admission  of  Sweden,  Denmark, 

1  Alopeus'  reports  of  December  7/18,  14/25,  December  24/January  4,  Mous- 
tier  to  Montmorin,  March  28,  1791,  Hertzberg  to  Goltz,  December  n,  1790, 
and  to  Lucchesini,  March  3,  26,  April  24,  1791,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  107  f., 
349-352,  441  ff.,  449,  538  (note);  Schlieffen,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  365  f.;  notes  of  Prince 
Henry  to  Grimm,  C6opHHKT>,  xliv,  pp.  436  ff. 

2  I  think  Alopeus'  reports  on  this  subject,  (December  14/25,  December  24/ 
January  4,  January  25/February  5,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  107  f.,  112  ff.), 
are  sufficiently  confirmed  by  Reuss'  reports  of  December  and  by  the  overtures 
made  to  Austria  in  January. 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  IN  VICT  A  163 

Poland,  and  Turkey,  into  a  great  defensive  league,  extending  from 
the  British  Isles  to  Constantinople,  covering  the  North  and  East 
of  Europe,  and  strong  enough  to  hold  all  the  unruly  Powers  in 
check.  The  states  chiefly  threatened  at  present  were  Turkey  and 
Poland.  Pitt's  interest  in  both  countries  was  of  very  recent  date, 
but  it  was  steadily  growing.  It  has  often  been  pointed  out  that 
he  was  the  first  British  statesman  to  view  the  Eastern  Question 
from  that  pro-Turkish  standpoint  which  in  the  nineteenth  century 
became  traditional  in  England.  Poland  had  a  special  claim  to  his 
attention.  The  Federative  System  being  directed  particularly 
against  the  ambitions  of  Russia,  it  was  necessary  to  provide 
against  the  dangers  that  might  result  to  the  extensive  trade  of 
Great  Britain  with  that  country.  From  a  careful  study  of  the 
subject  Pitt  had  convinced  himself  that  the  articles  for  which 
England  was  chiefly  dependent  upon  Russia  —  grain,  timber, 
hemp,  flax,  and  hides  —  could  be  furnished  equally  well  by  Po- 
land, and  only  by  Poland.  The  preservation  and  strengthening  of 
the  Republic  and  the  establishment  of  close  commercial  relations 
with  it  thus  became  indispensable  conditions  for  the  success  of 
Pitt's  anti-Russian  policy.  But  in  order  to  attain  these  aims  it 
was,  first  of  all,  necessary  to  free  Polish  trade  from  the  crushing 
restrictions  imposed  by  Prussia,  and  to  end  the  latent  antagonism 
between  that  Kingdom  and  its  eastern  neighbor.  Pitt  thought 
to  solve  both  these  problems  in  the  following  manner.  England 
should  mediate  a  treaty  between  the  two  states,  by  which  Poland 
should  cede  Dantzic  and  Thorn  to  Prussia  in  return  for  commer- 
cial concessions  that  would  ensure  virtual  free  trade  with  the  out- 
side world;  England  would  guarantee  this  treaty,  in  order  to 
relieve  the  Poles  from  exclusive  dependence  on  Prussian  good 
faith,  and  would  then  effect  the  admission  of  the  Republic  into 
the  Triple  Alliance.  Such  an  arrangement  would  satisfy  Prussia's 
legitimate  desires  for  aggrandizement,  and  would  enable  her  to 
adopt  permanently  a  policy  of  peace,  conservatism,  and  good  will 
towards  Poland.  It  would  ensure  to  England  the  commercial  facil- 
ities she  required.  It  would  afford  Poland  the  strongest  guarantees 
of  security  and  prosperity  that  could  well  be  offered  to  her.  So 
important  a  place  did  this  Polish  plan  hold  in  Pitt's  calculations 


164      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

that  it  has  been  called,  perhaps  without  very  much  exaggeration, 
the  keystone  of  his  whole  conservative  system.1  Such  were  the 
general  ideas  with  which  he  approached  the  Russo-Turkish  prob- 
lem. 

From  April  until  November,  1790,  Pitt's  action  on  the  Conti- 
nent had  been  fettered  by  the  Nootka  Sound  controversy  and  by 
the  resulting  danger  of  war  with  Spain.  When  at  last,  after  gain- 
ing a  signal  victory  in  that  affair,  he  found  himself  free  to  con- 
centrate his  attention  on  the  Eastern  question,  he  was  for  a  time 
doubtful  whether  the  situation  warranted  a  resort  to  extreme 
measures.  There  was  much  to  be  said  for  the  opinion,  if  not  for 
the  chivalry,  of  Lord  Auckland,  who  advised  strongly  against 
running  big  risks  merely  for  the  sake  of  "  taking  a  feather  out  of 
the  cap  of  an  old  vixen,  or  of  preserving  a  desert  tract  of  ground 
between  two  rivers  to  the  Turks,  whose  political  existence  and 
safety  will  probably  not  be  diminished  if  they  are  obliged  to  have 
their  barrier  upon  the  Dniester,  or  even  on  the  Danube."  2  But 
about  this  time  Ewart,  the  immensely  active  British  envoy  to  the 
Court  of  Berlin,  came  home  on  leave  of  absence.  He  had  been 
the  first  advocate  of  the  Prussian  alliance;  he  was  perhaps  the 
originator,  and  certainly  the  most  ardent  apostle,  of  the  Federa- 
tive System;  he  was  desperately  anxious  now  to  carry  his  work 
through.  With  his  usual  energy  he  set  himself  to  convince  Pitt 
and  the  other  ministers  that  the  hour  had  come  for  great  deci- 
sions and  bold  action.  He  urged  that  if  the  Empress  were  allowed 
to  keep  Oczakow  and  its  district,  the  security  of  the  Turkish 
Empire  and  of  Constantinople  itself  would  be  perpetually  men- 
aced, while  Poland,  finding  the  natural  outlet  for  the  trade  of  its 
richest  provinces  in  Russian  hands,  would  sink  back  under  the 
Tsarina's  influence.  But  important  as  the  territory  in  question 
was,  far  larger  issues  were  involved.  England's  whole  position  as  a 
great  Power  on  the  Continent,  the  alliances  she  had  been  building 
up,  the  Federative  System  which  she  hoped  to  establish  —  all  this 

1  For  the  above  see  especially,  Salomon,  Das  polilische  System  des  jungeren  Pitt 
und  die  zweite  Teilung  Polens,  particularly  pp.  35  ff.;  also  the  same  author's  William 
Pitt  der  Jungere,  i",  pp.  348,  482  ff.;  Rose,  Pitt  and  National  Revival,  pp.  385-389, 
593,  626  f.,  631. 

2  Rose,  ibid.,  p.  602. 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  INVICTA  165 

was  really  at  stake.  If  England  yielded  in  this  crisis,  Prussia  and 
the  other  friendly  states  would  lose  all  confidence  in  her;  her 
influence  and  her  political  connections  would  be  ruined;  she 
would  be  left  isolated  and  discredited,  as  she  had  been  a  few  years 
before,  and  exposed,  perhaps,  to  far  greater  dangers  than  were 
involved  in  the  vigorous  measures  now  proposed.  That  Ewart 
badly  underestimated  Catherine  appears  from  his  opinion  that 
while  she  might,  and  probably  would,  make  some  difficulties  at 
first,  there  could  be  little  doubt  of  her  accepting  the  terms  offered 
her  before  spring,  since  she  could  never  venture  to  risk  the  con- 
sequences of  a  refusal.1  The  Prime  Minister  and  the  Foreign 
Secretary,  the  Duke  of  Leeds,  allowed  themselves  to  be  persuaded 
by  these  clear-cut,  logical,  but  too  optimistic  arguments.  About 
the  end  of  the  year  Pitt  set  out  on  the  hardest  task  he  had  ever 
undertaken,  that  of  driving  Catherine  II  to  her  knees. 

The  campaign  was  planned  with  thoroughness.  First  of  all, 
there  was  to  be  a  general  diplomatic  reconnoissance  for  the  pur- 
pose of  securing  the  alliance  of  as  many  states  as  possible,  and 
the  neutrality  of  the  rest.  Then,  if  the  results  were  favorable  and 
if  Catherine  remained  obstinate,  in  the  spring  the  ultimatum 
would  be  delivered  at  St.  Petersburg,  to  be  followed  by  the 
appearance  of  British  and  Dutch  fleets  in  the  Baltic,  while 
Prussians,  Poles,  Swedes,  and  Turks  threatened  Russia  by  sea  or 
land.  In  January,  1791,  the  British  program  was  presented  at 
Berlin,  while  English  couriers  sped  to  the  four  corners  of  the 
Continent  with  orders  to  every  envoy.  There  followed  for  some 
months  a  diplomatic  struggle  waged  at  half  the  Courts  of  Europe 
between  the  British  ministers,  more  or  less  supported  by  their 
Prussian  colleagues,  on  the  one  side,  and  the  representatives  of 
Russia  on  the  other. 

Ill 

Neither  side  could  expect  much  aid  from  the  Bourbon  Courts. 
France,  which  under  normal  circumstances  might  have  been  relied 
upon  to  hold  England  in  check,  now  seemed  to  be  a  political  zero. 
The  idea  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance  of  the  Imperial  Courts  and 

1  Rose,  Pitt,  pp.  598  f.;   Salomon,  Pitt,  ii;,  pp.  501  ff. 


1 66  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

the  Bourbons  still  lived  on,  indeed,  in  the  project  of  the '  Northern 
League  '  (Russia,  Sweden,  Denmark,  Spain,  and  perhaps  France), 
for  which  the  Spanish  ministers  professed  a  certain  zeal,  and 
which  Genet,  the  French  charge  at  St.  Petersburg,  eagerly  urged 
upon  his  government.  But  all  Catherine's  exhortations  that  the 
time  had  come  for  France  and  Spain  to  set  bounds  to  British 
arrogance,  failed  to  break  down  Montmorin's  and  Florida- 
blanca's  invincible  fear  of  England.  The  Court  of  Madrid  con- 
tented itself  with  promising  England  its  neutrality  and  Russia  its 
good  offices  at  Constantinople.  And  when  Catherine,  over- 
coming for  the  moment  her  animosity  against  the  National 
Assembly,  that  "  hydra  with  twelve  hundred  heads,"  attempted 
to  win  over  the  Jacobins,  Mirabeau  took  her  money,  promised  his 
services,  and  then,  most  unseasonably,  died.1 

Count  Bernstorff,  the  prudent  and  pacific  leading  minister  of 
Denmark,  found  himself  in  a  terribly  embarrassing  position.  The 
Russian  government,  assuming  the  imperious  tone  it  was  accus- 
tomed to  take  at  Copenhagen,  insisted  that  Denmark  should  arm 
a  fleet,  close  the  Sound  to  the  British,  and  in  general  fulfil  the 
obligations  resulting  from  the  '  eternal  alliance  '  of  1773.  Eng- 
land, on  the  other  hand,  demanded  at  first  a  free  passage  through 
the  straits,  and  then  the  use  of  the  Danish  ports,  and  for  the  rest, 
strict  neutrality.  Bernstorff  tried  to  wriggle  through  by  making 
vague  promises  to  both  sides,  and  begging  each  not  to  compromise 
him  with  the  other,  while  he  also  brought  forward  a  plan  of  con- 
ciliation, by  which  the  Empress  should  be  allowed  to  keep  the 
territories  she  demanded,  on  condition  of  razing  the  fortresses.2 

The  art  of  adroit  balancing  was  even  better  exemplified  by 
the  King  of  Sweden.    After  fighting,  denouncing,  and  generally 

1  For  these  little-explored  relations  of  Russia  with  France  and  Spain  during 
the  crisis  of  1790-91,  see:  Dembinski,  Rosya  a  rewohicya  francuska,  pp.  76-81; 
S.  R.  Vorontsov  on  the  Mirabeau  episode,  Apx.  Bop.,  viii,  p.  22;  Simolin's  reports 
from  Paris  of  April  1  and  15,  1791,  in  Feuillet  de  Conches,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  24-27, 
31  ff.;  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  849  f.,  861  f.;  the  correspondence  of  Genet  with 
Montmorin,  in  R.I.  A.,  Russie,  ii,  pp.  501-506;  Baumgarten,  Geschichte  Span- 
iens  zur  Zeit  der  franzosischen  Revolution,  pp.  295  f.,  313;  Muriel,  "  Historia  de 
Carlos  IV,"  in  the  Memorial  Historico  Espanol,  xxix,  pp.  147  ff. 

2  Cf.  Holm,  Danmark-Norges  Udenrigske  Historie  .  .  .  fra  jygi  till  1807,  i, 
pp.  2-6;  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  837,  846,  850. 


CATHERINA    CONSTANS  INVICTA  1 67 

tormenting  her  for  two  long  years,  since  the  Peace  of  Verela  Gus- 
tavus  III  had  set  himself  to  woo  the  friendship  of  his  good  cousin 
Catherine,  who  met  his  advances  with  the  coquetry  which  she  so 
well  knew  how  to  combine  with  her  many  masculine  qualities. 
During  the  winter  of  1790-91  Gustavus  was  negotiating  at  St. 
Petersburg  and  Copenhagen  with  regard  to  the  Triple  Alliance  of 
the  North,  which  the  Russians  were  anxious  to  build  up  in  order 
to  close  the  Baltic  to  hostile  fleets.  Nothing  had  been  concluded, 
however,  when  in  February  England  and  Prussia  approached 
him  with  flattering  offers,  intended  to  secure  at  least  his  neutra- 
lity, and  if  possible  his  armed  assistance.  It  was  of  extreme 
importance  for  them  to  win  him  on  account  of  his  fleets,  his  ports, 
his  strategic  position,  and  his  proved  efficiency.  It  was  hardly  an 
exaggeration,  when  his  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg  assured 
him:  "All  the  world  recognizes  that  Your  Majesty  holds  the 
balance  of  power  in  your  hands."  l  Keenly  conscious  of  the 
advantages  of  his  position,  Gustavus  proceeded  with  the  frankness 
of  an  Italian  condottiere  to  inform  each  side  of  the  offers  the  other 
was  making;  he  then  stated  his  own  price,  raised  his  terms  the 
more  the  longer  the  auction  continued,  and  waited  to  see  which 
competitor  would  offer  him  the  most  in  territory  and  money.  In 
truth,  he  much  preferred  to  attach  himself  to  Catherine,  who 
treated  him  as  her  chosen  cavalier,  and  flattered  him  in  his  darling 
plan  for  a  counter-revolution  in  France.  Still,  as  Grimm  said 
of  him,  '  if  for  heroism  he  was  of  the  family  of  the  Knight  of 
La  Mancha,  when  it  came  to  the  perquisites  he  agreed  entirely 
with  the  principles  of  the  good  Sancho,  who  looked  out  for  hard 
cash.' 2 

Of  all  the  states  in  question  Poland  was  the  one  most  strongly 
interested  in  the  success  of  the  Allies.  In  the  previous  summer,  as 
soon  as  the  first  impression  produced  by  Reichenbach  had  worn 

1  Stedingk  to  Gustavus,  April  15,  1701,  Schinkel,  Bihang,  ii,  p.  in. 

2  CfiopnnKi,  xliv,  p.  387.  For  details  on  Gustavus's  policy,  see,  Odhner,  Gustaf 
III  och  Katarina  II  efler  Freden  i  Wariila,  pp.  157  ff.,  especially  168-171;  Schinkel- 
Bergman,  Minnen,  II,  pp.  157  ff.,  and  Bihang,  i,  pp.  107-115;  Geffroy,  Gustave 
III  et  la  Cour  de  France,  ii,  pp.  115  ff.;  Rose,  Pitt,  pp.  592  f.,  600,  609;  Salomon, 
Pitt,  iu,  p.  508;  Hertzberg  to  Lucchesini,  March  3,  12,  26,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i, 
pp.  440-443- 


1 68 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


off,  the  Patriot  leaders  had  taken  up  with  ardor  the  project  of  a 
grand  concerted  attack  upon  Russia  by  Prussians,  Turks,  Poles, 
English,  Dutch,  and  Swedes.  If  this  coalition  could  be  formed, 
the  Republic  would  have  the  best  of  all  conceivable  opportunities 
to  settle  accounts  with  its  eastern  neighbor,  to  assure  per- 
manently its  independence,  and  perhaps  even  to  win  back  White 
Russia  and  Kiev.  In  the  first  flush  of  enthusiasm,  the  Diet  on 
August  2,  1790  authorized  its  envoy  at  Constantinople  to 
negotiate  an  offensive  and  defensive  alliance  with  the  Porte, 
although  only  on  condition  that  the  Sultan  should  grant  Poland  a 
favorable  treaty  of  commerce,  and  should  not  expect  the  Republic 
to  declare  war  on  the  Empress  until  after  Prussia  had  done  so. 
Simultaneously  the  plan  for  a  coalition  against  Russia  was 
unofficially  communicated  to  Frederick  William  with  an  urgent 
request  for  his  cooperation.1 

The  warlike  zeal  of  the  Poles  abated  considerably,  however,  in 
the  following  months.  In  the  first  place,  the  Peace  of  Verela 
made  a  sad  breach  in  their  calculations.  Then  the  treaties  with  the 
Porte,  when  just  on  the  point  of  being  concluded,  were  held  up  by 
the  difficulties  unexpectedly  raised  by  the  Turks  regarding  the 
commercial  concessions,  on  which  the  Poles  insisted  as  a  sine  qua 
non.  This  setback  was  due  to  the  insidious  intervention  of  Prus- 
sia. It  was  one  of  Hertzberg's  sordid  little  calculations  that  if 
Polish  trade  were  diverted  even  slightly  from  the  Vistula  to  the 
Black  Sea,  his  master  would  have  the  less  chance  to  extort  the 
cession  of  Dantzic  and  Thorn.2  The  ambiguous  attitude  and 
altered  tone  of  Prussia  were,  indeed,  the  chief  factor  in  dampening 
the  warlike  spirit  of  the  Poles.  Lucchesini,  who  had  known  so 
well  how  to  captivate  the  confidence  and  play  upon  the  feelings 
of  the  nation,  had  now  departed  to  the  Austro-Turkish  peace 
congress  at  Sistova;    and  his  locum  tenens,  the  young  Count 

1  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  83  ff.,  212-215;  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  ii, 
pp.  198  ff.;  de  Cache's  reports  of  August  4  and  7,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1790. 

2  Details  in  Kalinka,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  216-223.  A  rather  ambiguous  passage  in 
Smitt's  Suworow  una1  Polens  U  titer  gang,  ii,  pp.  227  f.,  has  led  some  historians  into 
the  erroneous  statement  that  the  Polish-Turkish  alliance  was  actually  concluded. 
See,  for  example,  Zinkeisen,  op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  812  f.,  and  Kraszewski,  Polska  w  czasie 
trzech  rozbiorow,  ii,  p.  317. 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  INVICTA  1 69 

Goltz,  was  but  little  fitted  to  replace  him.  In  contrast  to  the 
astonishing  activity  of  Prussian  diplomacy  at  Warsaw  in  the  past 
two  years,  the  Court  of  Berlin  now  maintained  an  air  of  cool, 
indifferent,  and  even  sulky  passivity.  The  honeymoon  was 
decidedly  over.  Frederick  William  had  almost  abandoned  the 
hope  of  gaining  Dantzic  and  Thorn  by  a  voluntary  cession,  since 
in  a  moment  of  irritation  against  him  the  Diet  had  been  stam- 
peded into  a  hasty  and  ill-considered  decree,  proclaiming  the 
inalienability  of  every  part  of  the  Republic's  territory  (September 
6,  1790).  And  the  King  of  Prussia  had  now  formed  so  low  an 
opinion  of  the  Polish  army  that  in  case  of  war  with  Russia  he 
hardly  cared  whether  Poland  participated  or  not.1  On  their  side, 
the  mass  of  the  Poles  regarded  their  ally  with  a  growing  distrust, 
which  was  hardly  unnatural,  perhaps,  in  view  of  the  now  only  too 
well  known  desire  of  Prussia  for  their  territories,  her  utter  unwill- 
ingness to  relax  her  strangling  grip  upon  their  commerce,  her 
perfidious  intrigues  at  Constantinople,  and  the  reigning  uncer- 
tainty whether  the  Court  of  Berlin  intended  to  go  to  war  with 
Russia  or  to  enter  into  a  bargain  with  that  Power  at  Poland's 
expense.  Rumors  of  an  impending  partition  were  not  infrequent. 
In  March,  1791,  a  report  from  Vienna  that  Prussia  had  formally 
proposed  such  an  arrangement  to  the  Emperor  created  such  a 
panic  at  Warsaw  that  Frederick  William  felt  obliged  to  present  a 
vigorous  denial.2    In  general,  the  Polish  public  had  lost  all  real 

1  See  his  communications  to  Constantinople  of  early  March,  1701,  in  Zinkeisen, 
op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  812  f.,  and  his  declaration  to  Jablonowski  in  April,  in  Askenazy, 
op.  cit.,  p.  224. 

2  It  is  quite  certain  that  this  alarming  report  of  a  Prussian  proposal  to  Austria 
for  a  new  partition  of  Poland  was  purely  apocryphal.  Kalinka  {op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  282) 
conjectures  that  Kaunitz  started  it  in  order  to  undermine  Prussian  influence  at 
Warsaw  and  thwart  the  then  pending  negotiations  for  the  cession  of  Dantzic. 
Jacobi,  the  Prussian  envoy  at  Vienna,  claimed  to  have  found  out  that  the  story 
emanated  from  Rzewuski,  one  of  the  Polish  malcontents  then  stopping  in  the 
Austrian  capital  (Sybel,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  366).  Golitsyn,  the  Russian  ambassador, 
reported  that  he  knew  on  the  best  of  authority  that  the  tale  was  invented  by 
"  some  people  of  the  local  political  [diplomatic  ?]  corps,"  and  that  the  Austrian 
ministry  saw  fit  not  to  contradict  it  (for  quite  intelligible  reasons).  Cf.  Golitsyn 
to  Ostermann,  March  12/23,  and  to  Bulgakov,  probably  of  March  15/26,  1791, 
M.  A.,  ABCTpia,  III,  50.  Dembinski  has  printed  these  two  documents  {op.  cit., 
i,  pp.  477  f.);  but  he  has  mistaken  the  letter  of  Golitsyn  to  Bulgakov  for  one  from 


170      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

enthusiasm  for  the  Court  of  Berlin,  although  the  leaders  of  the 
dominant  party  still  clung  to  the  alliance,  and  Stanislas  Augustus 
had  at  last  renounced  his  Russian  affiliations  and  come  over  to 
what  was  called  '  the  Prussian  system.' 

Such  was  the  rather  unpromising  situation  when  Pitt  inter- 
vened in  the  hope  of  patching  up  the  differences  between  Berlin 
and  Warsaw  and  preparing  the  Republic  to  take  its  place  in  the 
Anglo-Prussian  league.  The  Poles  themselves  had  taken  the 
initiative  by  sending  Count  Oginski  to  London  towards  the  close 
of  1790  to  lay  the  whole  state  of  their  affairs  before  the  English 
minister.  Pitt  entered  into  the  matter  with  much  interest  and 
thoroughness.  In  several  interviews  with  Oginski  he  dwelt  at 
length  upon  the  important  services  that  Great  Britain  and  Poland 
might  render  each  other;  upon  the  flourishing  trade  and  many 
common  interests  that  had  united  them  in  the  past  and  which 
might  now  be  renewed,  if  only  the  Republic  would  place  its  com- 
mercial relations  on  a  firm  basis  by  treaties  with  Prussia  and 
England;  and  upon  the  necessity,  to  that  end,  of  making  a  small, 
and  in  the  last  analysis  inevitable,  sacrifice  through  the  cession  of 
Dantzic.1  In  January,  1 791 ,  Hailes,  the  British  envoy  at  Warsaw, 
formally  announced  the  desire  of  his  government  to  negotiate  for 
closer  political  and  trade  relations.  The  cardinal  point  was  to 
persuade  the  Poles  to  part  with  Dantzic  in  return  for  an  advan- 
tageous treaty  of  commerce  to  be  guaranteed  by  England.  There 
was  to  be  no  more  question  of  Thorn,  in  view  of  the  September 
decree  of  the  Diet;  but  it  was  held  that  Dantzic  might  still  be 
ceded,  since  it  was  only  '  under  the  protection,'  and  not  an  integral 
part,  of  the  Republic.  The  Patriot  leaders  entered  into  Pitt's 
plan  with  much  good  will,  convinced  that  this  sacrifice,  hard  as  it 
was,  was  indispensable  for  saving  the  Prussian  alliance  and 
gaining  the  greater  security  and  freedom  of  action  that  would 
come  from  the  connection  with  England.  Hailes  displayed  for 
some  months  an  amazing,  though  often  a  misguided  and  tactless, 

Ostermann  to  Golitsyn,  and  is  thus  led  by  the  phrase  "  the  local  political  corps  " 
to  the  conclusion  that  the  story  was  of  St.  Petersburg  manufacture  —  a  quite 
erroneous  '  discovery.'    See  his  preface,  pp.  lxix  f. 
1  Oginski,  Memoires,  i,  pp.  92-100. 


CATHERINA   CONST  ANS  IN  VICT  A  171 

activity.  He  negotiated,  conferred,  promised,  apostrophized,  and 
threatened;  he  resorted  to  pamphlets  and  broadsides;  in  short, 
he  left  no  stone  unturned.  But  the  obstacles  were  wellnigh 
insuperable.  On  the  one  hand,  the  Court  of  Berlin  refused  to 
lend  any  active  assistance,  holding  that  Dantzic  alone  was  hardly 
worth  the  concessions  demanded  in  return  for  it;  and  on  the 
other  hand,  the  majority  of  the  Poles  felt  an  almost  invincible 
repugnance  to  the  abandonment  of  the  last  seaport  they  still 
possessed.  When  the  question  was  referred  to  the  Diet  at  the  end 
of  March,  there  were  protracted  debates,  but  the  utmost  that  the 
Patriot  leaders  could  secure  was  that  the  proposed  cession  was  not 
refused  outright.  A  final  decision  was  postponed  for  some  weeks 
until  the  many  absent  deputies  could  be  brought  back  to  Warsaw, 
and  in  the  meantime  the  Deputation  of  Foreign  Interests  was 
authorized  to  continue  the  negotiation  with  Hailes.  The  action 
of  the  Diet  on  this  occasion  does  more  credit  to  its  patriotism 
than  to  its  judgment;  still,  if  the  events  of  the  next  few  months 
on  the  broader  stage  of  Europe  had  gone  according  to  Pitt's 
hopes,  it  is  probable  that  his  Dantzic  plan  would  ultimately 
have  succeeded.1 

Towards  Russia,  the  Poles  were  now  in  far  less  warlike  mood 
than  in  the  preceding  summer.  Undoubtedly  they  were  eager  to 
see  England  and  Prussia  engage  the  Empress;  but  as  to  the 
advisability  of  Poland's  participation  in  such  a  contest,  opinion 
was  strongly  divided.  The  King  and  many  others  favored  strict 
neutrality.2  The  British  and  Prussian  envoys  reported  that  the 
nation  would  gladly  take  up  arms,3  but  the  Austrian  minister  at 
Warsaw  formed  quite  the  contrary  impression.4  At  any  rate, 
the  warlike  feeling  flared  up  again  during  the  exciting  days  in 
April,  when  it  was  thought  that  the  Allies  had  crossed  the  Rubi- 
con.5   Had  there  been  a  war,  it  is  difficult  to  believe  that  the 

1  Cf.  Salomon,  Das  politische  System  des  jungeren  Pitt,  pp.  50  f.  A  more  pessi- 
mistic view  in  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  ii,  pp.  283-297. 

2  Kalinka,  ibid.,  ii,  pp.  694  f.;  cf.  Zaleski,  Korespotidencya  krajowa,  p.  305. 

3  Salomon,  Pitt,  iu,  p.  510;   Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  342  f.,  569. 

4  De  Cache's  report  of  April  13,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berkhte,  1791. 

5  Bulgakov's  reports  of  April  2/13,  and  5/16,  M.  A.,  Iiojitina,  III,  63;  Goltz's 
of  April  9  and  13,  in  Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  343,  569. 


172  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Poles  would  not  have  been  drawn  into  it,  whether  by  their  own 
impulses  or  by  a  deliberate  aggression  of  Russia. 

The  Power  whose  attitude  was  of  most  concern,  both  to  the 
Allies  and  to  the  Empress,  was  Austria.  Since  the  preceding 
summer  Leopold  had  been  reaping  the  fruits  of  his  wise  modera- 
tion at  Reichenbach  by  his  election  to  the  Imperial  crown 
(September  30,  1790),  the  recovery  of  the  Netherlands  (Novem- 
ber-December), and  the  gradual  pacification  of  the  rest  of  his 
dominions.  Austria  was  once  more  in  a  position  to  command 
respect  and  to  act  with  vigor.  Ever  since  Reichenbach  Leopold 
had  been  continuously  assailed  by  demands  from  St.  Petersburg 
for  a  promise  of  aid  in  case  England  and  Prussia  proceeded  to 
extremities.  Having  sacrificed  his  own  conquests  for  the  sake  of 
peace,  he  was  little  inclined  to  go  to  war  again  merely  in  order  to 
enable  his  ally  to  save  hers ;  but  it  was  not  the  part  of  prudence  to 
say  so  flatly.  Hence  for  many  months  he  put  off  Catherine  with 
vague  or  evasive  replies,  with  exhortations  to  prudence,  offers  of 
mediation,  and  promises  to  assist  her  as  soon  as,  and  so  far  as,  his 
circumstances  permitted.1  These  responses  were  naturally 
regarded  as  far  from  satisfactory  at  St.  Petersburg.  From  them 
one  may  trace  the  beginnings  of  that  weakening  of  the  alliance, 
which  later  on  became  so  marked. 

Meanwhile  Leopold  was  also  receiving  pressing  solicitations 
from  England  and  Prussia.  First,  in  November,  1790,  Pitt  dis- 
patched Lord  Elgin  to  Vienna  to  secure  Austria's  assistance  in 
persuading  Russia  to  accept  the  status  quo.  The  Emperor 
amused  this  raw  young  envoy  with  edifying  discourses  on  the 
horrors  of  war,  the  uselessness  of  conquests,  and  the  need  that  all 
conservative  Powers  should  stand  together  to  combat  the 
ravages  of  the  new  '  French  principles  ' ;  he  promised  to  do  what 
he  could  to  bring  the  Empress  to  reason;  but  he  avoided  binding 
himself  to  anything  definite.2    Next  arrived  the  director-general 

1  Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  September  19,  1790,  Ph.  Cobenzl  to  L.  Cobenzl, 
October  10,  Kaunitz  to  L.  Cobenzl,  November  28,  January  2,  March  28,  V.  A., 
Russland,  Expeditionen,  1790  and  1791. 

2  Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  395-400,  and  Erganzungsband,  pp.  43-48;  Leopold 
to  Kaunitz,  January  14,  Beer,  Joseph  II,  Leopold  II  und  Kaunitz,  pp.  383  ff.; 
Kaunitz  to  Reuss,  January  21,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Exped.,  1791. 


CATHERINA    CONST  AN  S  INVICTA  1 73 

of  Frederick  William's  secret  diplomacy,  the  invaluable  Colonel 
Bischoffwerder.  His  mission,  as  it  was  originally  planned  early  in 
January,  1791,  marked  an  effort  of  Prussia  to  '  emancipate  her- 
self '  from  England.  The  King  was  at  that  time  still  ignorant 
of  Pitt's  resolution  to  proceed  vigorously  with  the  enforcement  of 
the  status  quo;  he  was  decidedly  out  of  humor  with  his  ally,  and 
inclined  to  seek  an  understanding  with  Russia  through  the  good 
offices  of  Austria.1  But  during  the  long  delays  incidental  to  a 
preliminary  discussion  with  Vienna,  Frederick  William  seems 
considerably  to  have  altered  his  plans.  By  the  time  Bischoff- 
werder was  ready  to  set  out  on  his  mission,  the  King's  aim  was  no 
longer  to  effect  a  bargain  between  the  three  Eastern  Courts  that 
should  leave  England  in  the  lurch,  but  rather  to  draw  the  Emperor 
over  to  the  camp  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  so  that  the  King  might 
then  dictate  his  terms  to  the  haughty  lady  in  St.  Petersburg. 
The  reasons  for  the  change  are  probably  to  be  found  in  the  fact 
that  Pitt  had  meanwhile  communicated  his  new  plan  of  action; 
that  Catherine  had  made  a  most  unsatisfactory  reply  to  the  last 
Prussian  propositions;  and  that  the  Turks  were  pressing  for  an 
answer  as  to  whether  the  King  intended  to  fulfil  his  engagements 
with  them  or  not. 

In  the  middle  of  February  it  was  ostentatiously  reported  at 
Berlin  that  Colonel  Bischoffwerder  had  fallen  into  disgrace  at 
court,  and  had  retired  to  his  estate  in  the  country.  There  were 
not  lacking  rumors  that  he  had  gone  instead  on  a  secret  mission 
to  London,  or,  as  some  indeed  surmised,  to  Vienna;  but  the  real 
facts  were  known  to  very  few  persons,  and  least  of  all  to  Count 
Hertzberg.  The  18th  the  '  merchant  Buschmann  '  arrived  in  the 
Austrian  capital  and  took  lodgings  in  an  inconspicuous  inn.  Two 
days  later  he  was  closeted  with  the  Vice-Chancellor,  Philip 
Cobenzl,  unfolding  in  a  rambling  and  incoherent  manner  that 
betrayed  the  novice  in  diplomacy,  propositions  as  extraordinary 
as  was  the  secrecy  with  which  his  mission  was  enveloped. 

Bischoffwerder  proposed  an  Austro-Prussian  alliance,  to  which 
England  and  Holland  should  be  invited  to  accede — and  perhaps 

1  Such  seems  to  be  the  drift  of  Bischoflwerder's  overtures  to  Reuss  in  January, 
Reuss'  reports  of  January  9  and  29,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte,  1791. 


174  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

even  the  Porte  —  but  from  which  Catherine  was  to  be  ex- 
cluded. One  aim  of  it  should  be  to  effect  such  a  peace  between 
the  Empress  and  the  Turks  that  the  latter  "  would  not  be  ex- 
posed to  the  danger  of  being  expelled  from  Europe  ";  a  second 
aim  was  to  exclude  Russia  from  participation  in  the  affairs  of 
Germany;  a  third  to  annul  the  Russian  influence  in  Poland,  "  the 
point  from  which  most  of  the  intrigues  of  the  Court  of  St.  Peters- 
burg have  emanated."  In  other  words,  the  Emperor  was  invited 
to  desert  Russia,  join  the  Anglo-Prussian  league,  assist  the  latter 
to  force  its  plan  of  pacification  upon  Catherine,  and  in  general  to 
oppose  his  late  ally  at  every  point.  In  its  strong  anti-Russian 
tendency,  its  professed  aim  of  freeing  Poland  from  Russian  pres- 
sure and  of  setting  bounds  to  the  encroachments  of  a  Power 
"  constantly  aggressive  and  avid  of  universal  domination,"  the 
alliance  proposed  by  Bischoffwerder  might  seem  merely  an  ex- 
tension of  Pitt's  Federative  System;  but  it  differed  from  that 
system  in  so  far  as  it  was  also  intended  to  serve  certain  ambitious 
plans  of  Prussia  for  the  future.  Bischoffwerder  suggested,  for 
instance,  an  agreement  with  regard  to  the  affairs  of  France  — 
i.  e.,  a  return  to  the  counter-revolutionary  projects  of  the  pre- 
vious summer;  and  he  proposed  that  the  two  Courts  should  come 
to  an  agreement  respecting  the  '  peaceable  '  territorial  acquisi- 
tions to  which  each  of  them  might  look  forward.  With  all 
protestations  that  his  master  was  not  ambitious  for  new  territory, 
he  admitted  that  Dantzic  would  be  much  to  Prussia's  con- 
venience, and  that  the  King  hoped  to  acquire  Ansbach  and 
Baireuth  on  the  death  of  the  present  Margrave,  and  Lusatia  in 
case  of  the  extinction  of  the  male  line  of  Saxony.  In  return 
Prussia  might  be  willing  to  favor  Austrian  pretensions  to  some 
parts  of  Bavaria  on  the  death  of  the  present  Elector.  The  longer 
the  conferences  continued,  the  more  the  subject  of  acquisitions 
was  thrust  into  the  foreground.  Presently  Bischoffwerder  was 
pressing  strongly  for  a  promise  that  the  Emperor  would  offer  no 
opposition  in  case  Poland  could  be  induced  voluntarily  to  cede 
Dantzic  and  Thorn  to  Prussia.  In  short,  it  was  clear  that  the 
proposed  alliance  had  a  double  purpose:  it  was  intended  not  only 
to  extricate  the  King  from  his  present  embarrassing  situation,  but 


CATHERINE   CONST ANS  IN  VICT  A  1 75 

also  —  once  the  Russian  crisis  was  over  —  to  serve  as  an  instru- 
ment for  his  aggressive  and  acquisitive  policy.1 

As  was  to  be  expected,  Kaunitz  found  these  proposals  simply 
"  incroyables"  Had  it  depended  only  on  him,  the  alliance  would 
assuredly  have  been  rejected  entirely.  Ever  since  the  first  tidings 
of  Bischoffwerder's  mission  reached  him,  the  old  Chancellor  had 
taken  feverishly  to  writing  memorials  proving  in  a  dozen  different 
ways  that  "  between  two  Courts  whose  interests  are  diametrically 
opposed,  a  sincere  union  ...  is  a  sheer  impossibility,  a  chimaera, 
the  falsest  political  project  that  could  ever  be  adopted."  2  But, 
as  so  often,  Leopold  was  of  another  opinion.  It  was  the  Em- 
peror's idea  to  accept  the  Prussian  alliance,  but  in  a  form  altered 
to  suit  his  own  interests,  stripped  —  for  the  most  part,  at  least  — 
of  its  anti-Russian  tendency,  capable  of  being  combined  with  his 
existing  alliance  with  Catherine.  That  was  a  resolution  of  grave 
consequence  for  the  future,  since  in  it  lay  the  seeds  of  the  ulti- 
mate reunion  of  all  the  three  great  Eastern  Powers,  a  combination 
fraught  with  misfortune  for  Poland.  From  the  standpoint  of 
Polish  interests,  it  would  have  been  far  better  had  the  Emperor 
either  accepted  the  Prussian  idea  of  a  league  for  the  protection  of 
Central  Europe  against  the  Muscovites,  or  else  rejected  the  pro- 
posed union  entirely,  thus  throwing  Frederick  William  back  upon 
the  sole  connection  with  England. 

1  Cf.  Cobenzl's  report  of  his  conversation  with  Bischoffwerder  on  February  20 
(V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1791).  Cobenzl  having  remarked  that  in  case  the  proposed 
alliance  were  concluded,  both  Powers  would  have  to  renounce  all  schemes  for 
territorial  acquisitions,  Bischoffwerder  replied:  "  Oui,  sans  doute,  ou  bien  s'en- 
tendre  a  l'amiable  toutes  les  fois  que  les  circonstances  offriroient  a  l'une  ou  a  l'autre 
des  deux  Cours  l'occasion  de  faire  une  acquisition,  soit  par  droit  de  succession,  ou 
par  convention  volontaire,  sans  jamais  employer  des  moyens  violens."  Cobenzl 
replied  that  the  second  alternative  was  not  likely  to  occur,  and  put  the  question 
bluntly  whether  the  King  of  Prussia  was  disposed  in  good  faith  to  renounce  all 
acquisitions.  Bischoffwerder  answered,  "  Oui,  tres  decidement,"  but  then,  after 
a  moment,  added:  "  Vous  savez  sans  doute  qu'on  parle  de  Danzig,  et  en  effet 
cette  acquisition  seroit  tres-fort  de  la  convenance  du  Roi,  s'il  pouvoit  la  faire  tout-a- 
fait  du  gre  de  la  Pologne,  en  faisant  a  la  Republique  d'autres  avantages.  .  .  .  Le 
Roi  espere  que  l'Empereur  n'y  seroit  pas  contraire,  si  une  fois  l'amitie'  et  l'alliance 
entre  eux  etoit  formee.  ...  On  s'entendroit  facilement  sur  des  acquisitions  que 
vous  pourriez  faire  a  votre  tour." 

2  This  from  his  "  Reflexions  relatives  a  la  Cour  de  Berlin,"  dated  February  2. 
He  proposed  rejecting  the  alliance  in  a  memorial  of  February  23,  immediately  after 
Bischoffwerder  had  first  unfolded  his  ideas.     V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1791. 


176  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

At  an  audience  granted  to  Bischoffwerder  on  February  25, 
Leopold  definitively  announced  his  willingness  to  contract  an 
alliance  with  Prussia.  It  remained  for  the  ministers  to  settle 
the  quomodo.  In  the  ensuing  conferences  it  became  clear  that  the 
affair  could  not  be  concluded  immediately,  chiefly  because  the 
Austrians  refused  absolutely  to  give  up  their  alliance  with  Russia, 
while  Bischoffwerder  maintained  stoutly  that  that  connection 
was  incompatible  with  the  one  he  was  charged  to  propose.  Nor 
could  he  obtain  the  desired  promise  as  to  Dantzic  and  Thorn, 
although  the  Austrians  covertly  hinted  at  their  inclination  to  see 
the  Oriental  crisis  ended  by  a  general  agreement,  by  which  the 
Imperial  Courts  would  secure  certain  acquisitions  from  the 
Turks,  while  Prussia  should  get  the  long-coveted  cities.  Regard- 
ing the  all-important  question  of  Austria's  attitude  in  case  of  war 
between  the  Triple  Alliance  and  Russia,  Bischoffwerder  could  not 
extort  a  binding  engagement  of  any  kind  from  the  Imperial 
ministers;  but  it  is  not  improbable  that  he  received  certain 
reassuring  oral  declarations  from  Leopold  himself.1 

After  a  last  conference  with  Cobenzl  on  March  4,  at  which  it 
was  agreed  that  the  negotiations  for  the  alliance  should  be  con- 
tinued through  Prince  Reuss  at  Berlin,  and  after  prodigal  assur- 
ances on  both  sides  that  the  grand  plan  should  infallibly  go 
through,  Bischoffwerder  departed.  His  mission  had  been  by  no 
means  a  total  failure,  but  only  a  half  success.  He  had  failed  to 
lure  Austria  over  with  bag  and  baggage  into  the  camp  of  the 
Allies,  and  so  to  isolate  Russia  completely;    but  on  the  other 

1  After  his  return  to  Berlin  Bischoffwerder  repeatedly  told  Reuss  "  que  PEm- 
pereur  lui  avoit  repondu  en  propres  termes,  lorsqu'il  avoit  demande  si  Elle  pre- 
feroit  que  Ton  s'arrangeat  avec  la  Russie  en  se  desistant  du  status  quo,  qu'Elle 
preferoit  que  la  Russie  soit  contrainte  au  status  quo  .  .  .  et  que  l'Empereur  avoit 
dit  qu'il  verroit  sans  peine  que  la  Russie  aye  du  depit  et  Lui  laisse  les  mains  d'autant 
plus  libres  pour  s'unir  bien  etroitement  a  la  Prusse."  Reuss  to  Ph.  Cobenzl, 
April  22,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte,  1791.  It  seems  hardly  probable  that  Bischoff- 
werder would  have  ventured  to  misquote  the  Emperor  on  so  weighty  a  matter  in 
conversations  which  he  knew  would  be  reported  to  Vienna.  Compare  also  the 
rescript  which  Frederick  William  sent  off  to  his  envoy  in  London  immediately 
after  Bischoffwerder's  return  to  Berlin:  "  Aiant  de  notions  sures  que  l'Autriche 
souhaite  de  se  rapprocher  de  moi  et  de  mes  allies  et  de  ce  que  l'Empereur  a  declare 
a  1'Imperatrice  de  Russie  de  ne  pouvoir  l'assister  dans  une  guerre  qui  pourrait 
naitre  de  son  refus  d'accepter  le  Statusquo,"  etc.,  Salomon,  Pitt,  i",  p.  514,  note  3. 


CATHERINA   CONST  ANS  IN  VICT  A  IJJ 

hand  he  brought  back  the  conviction  that  Leopold  strongly 
desired  a  rapprochement  with  Prussia  and  was  not  likely  to 
interfere  in  case  the  Allies  proceeded  vigorously  with  the  enforce- 
ment of  the  status  quo.1  The  envoy  did  not  suspect,  perhaps,  that 
Kaunitz  would  hasten  to  reveal  all  his  propositions  to  the  Court 
of  St.  Petersburg,  with  the  assurance  that  Austria  had  not  al- 
lowed herself  to  be  seduced  in  any  way;  or  that  in  the  critical 
months  that  followed,  the  Emperor  would  continue  to  promise 
Catherine  his  aid  in  case  of  a  rupture,  in  so  far  as  the  condition  of 
his  Monarchy  would  at  all  permit.2 

rv 

Bischoffwerder  returned  to  Berlin  on  March  10,  in  buoyant 
spirits.  He  dined  alone  with  the  King  that  afternoon.  The 
result  was  the  '  immediate  rescript '  sent  off  to  the  Prussian  envoy 
at  London  the  following  day.  In  this  dispatch  Frederick  William 
announced  the  favorable  dispositions  of  the  Court  of  Vienna ;  he 
declared  that  the  moment  for  a  final  decision  had  come;  he  sug- 
gested that  the  best  course  would  be  to  impose  the  status  quo 
upon  Russia  by  a  show  of  superior  forces  by  land  and  sea;  and, 
at  any  rate,  he  must  have  an  immediate  "categorical  declaration" 
of  what  the  British  government  was  willing  to  do.3 

This  challenge  produced  the  desired  effect  at  London.  Pitt 
himself  was  now  ready  for  action.  By  this  time  the  preliminary 
diplomatic  campaign  begun  in  January  had  advanced  far  enough 
to  enable  him  to  judge  the  intentions  of  the  various  Powers,  and 
on  the  whole  the  results  were  not  unsatisfactory.  He  could 
count  upon  the  neutrality  of  most  of  the  states  in  question,  and 
perhaps  upon  active  assistance  from  some;  while  on  the  other 
hand,  Catherine  seemed  to  be  entirely  isolated  and  in  a  truly 
desperate  position.    Misled,  perhaps,  by  the  exaggerated  reports 

1  Our  information  as  to  Bischoffwerder's  first  mission  to  Vienna  is  derived  almost 
entirely  from  the  Austrian  side.  The  chief  documents  relating  to  it  are  printed  in 
Vivenot,  Quellen  zur  Geschichte  der  deutschen  Kaiserpolitik  Oesterreichs,  i,  pp.  78- 
101,  and  Beer,  Leopold  II,  Franz  II  und  Catharine,  pp.  230-239. 

2  Dispatches  to  L.  Cobenzl,  March  28  and  April  27,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Expedi- 
tionen,  1791. 

3  Salomon,  Pitt,  in,  pp.  514  f.;  Rose,  Pitt,  p.  608. 


178  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  Whitworth  at  St.  Petersburg,  British  statesmen  were  at  that 
moment  inclined  to  believe  that  Russia  was  completely  ex- 
hausted and  virtually  bankrupt,  as  a  result  of  four  years  of  con- 
tinuous warfare,  that  Catherine  had  neither  generals  nor  armies 
nor  fleets  that  were  capable  of  dealing  with  really  formidable 
opponents,  and  that  her  Empire  was  seething  with  discontent 
and  even  on  the  verge  of  revolution.  Under  such  circumstances 
it  seemed  impossible  that  "  pride  and  obstinacy,  the  only  motives 
which  influence  the  Court  of  Petersburg,"  could  long  hold  out. 
A  war  would  scarcely  be  necessary:  mere  military  and  naval 
demonstrations  would  suffice.1  Acting  on  these  miscalculations, 
spurred  on  by  the  appeal  of  the  Prussian  ally,  convinced  that  the 
time  had  come  for  consummating  the  great  work  of  pacification 
begun  the  year  before,  on  March  21  and  22  the  British  cabinet 
took  its  final  resolutions,  apparently  with  almost  complete 
unanimity.2 

On  the  27th  a  courier  was  sent  off  to  Berlin  with  momentous 
dispatches.  He  bore,  in  the  first  place,  an  ultimatum  to  be  pre- 
sented by  the  Allies  at  St.  Petersburg,  giving  the  Empress  ten 
days  in  which  to  accept  the  strict  status  quo  principle,  and  hinting 
at  unpleasant  consequences  in  case  of  a  refusal.  This  declaration 
was  to  be  backed  up  by  the  most  vigorous  measures.  A  British 
fleet  composed  of  thirty-five  ships  of  the  line  and  a  corresponding 
number  of  frigates  was  to  be  sent  to  the  Baltic,  and  ten  or  twelve 
ships  of  the  line  were  to  be  held  in  readiness  to  sail  for  the  Black 
Sea.  A  Prussian  army  was  to  threaten  Livonia;  the  Dutch  were 
to  be  stirred  up  to  join  in  the  naval  demonstration;  the  King  of 
Sweden  was  to  be  brought  into  action  by  a  subsidy  of  two  or  three 
hundred  thousand  pounds.  Finally,  Pitt  presented  the  drafts  of 
two  conventions.  One  was  to  define  more  closely  the  aims  of  the 
impending  enterprise,  which  was  designed  only  to  force  Russia  to 
accept  the  status  quo,  without  thought  of  conquests  or  other 
material  advantages  for  the  Allies.  The  other  was  a  project  for  a 
"  preliminary  commercial  arrangement  between  Great  Britain 

1  See,  for  instance,  Whitworth's  report  of  January  8,  cited  by  Rose,  Pitt, 
p.  598,  and  Auckland  to  Grenville,  April  30,  Dropmore  Papers,  ii,  pp.  62  f.  Cf. 
Lecky,  op.  cit.,  v,  p.  279. 

2  Leeds,  Memoranda,  pp.  150  ff. 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  INVICTA  1 79 

and  Prussia,"  by  which  in  return  for  Dantzic  Frederick  William 
was  to  pledge  himself  to  extensive  concessions  to  British  and 
Polish  trade.    It  was  a  comprehensive  and  imposing  program.1 

These  communications  threw  Berlin  into  a  fever  of  excitement. 
Two  days  after  their  arrival,  on  April  7,  the  King  held  a  council  at 
Potsdam,  at  which  Field  Marshal  Mollendorff,  Count  Schulen- 
burg,  and  Hertzberg  were  present.  Of  these  three,  Schulenburg 
alone  seems  to  have  spoken  in  favor  of  risking  a  war;  Mollen- 
dorff, as  always,  opposed  it  from  the  military  standpoint;  and 
Hertzberg,  terribly  disgruntled  at  the  whole  course  of  affairs, 
brought  forth  a  variety  of  objections.  But  the  King's  mind  was 
already  made  up;  once  more  he  was  aflame  for  action.  Hertz- 
berg's  remonstrances  only  drew  down  upon  his  head  such  a 
tirade  of  reproaches  for  his  "  wretched  political  operations  ': 
that  the  old  man  was  stricken  with  a  severe  attack  of  illness  on  his 
way  back  to  Berlin.2  It  was  decided  to  conform  in  everything  to 
the  proposals  of  England.  A  Prussian  army  of  88,000  men  was  to 
be  ready  for  the  invasion  of  Livonia  and  the  siege  of  Riga.  The 
King  intended  to  go  to  the  front  with  his  two  sons  and  Mollen- 
dorff beside  him.  The  royal  equipages  were  at  once  sent  off  to 
Konigsberg.    It  appeared  that  the  die  was  cast. 

In  those  April  days  Europe  rang  with  the  news  of  the  King  of 
England's  warlike  message  to  Parliament,  of  the  great  British 
fleet  fitting  out  at  Portsmouth,  of  the  vast  military  preparations 
proceeding  in  Prussia  and  Sweden.  It  seemed  as  if  nothing  could 
now  prevent  a  general  war  unless  the  Empress  of  Russia  gave 
way. 

This  was  the  time  when  Catherine's  courage  and  firmness  were 
put  to  the  severest  strain  both  by  dangers  from  without  and  by 
faint-hearted  counsels  from  within.  She  herself  was  as  deter- 
mined as  ever  to  brave  all  the  enemies  that  might  come  rather 
than  make  what  she  considered  an  inglorious  surrender.  The 
very  words  status  quo  sufficed  to  throw  her  into  a  passion.  "  With- 
out Oczakow  and  its  territory  as  far  as  the  Dniester,  peace  will 

1  Salomon,  Pitt,  iH,  pp.  515  f . ;  Rose,  Pitt,  pp.  609  f.;  Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi, 
p.  591;  Leeds,  Memoranda,  loc.  cit. 

2  Alopeus'  reports  of  April  9  and  13,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  129,  133; 
Hertzberg  to  Lucchesini,  April  9,  16,  19,  24,  May  14,  ibid.,  pp.  444-452. 


i8o 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


not  be  made,"  she  wrote  to  Potemkin,  "  even  if  the  Empress  herself 
consented  to  the  restoration  of  the  status  quo."  l  "  I  am  now  busy 
preparing  to  receive  the  strong  English  fleet,  which  has  promised 
to  pay  us  a  visit  soon,"  she  wrote  to  Zimmermann  early  in 
February:  "  you  will  hear  of  me;  but  whether  they  attack  me 
by  water  or  by  land,  you  will  never  hear  that  I  consented  to  any 
of  the  unworthy  conditions  which  they  have  the  audacity  to 
prescribe  to  me."  l  But  the  Empress  was  wellnigh  alone  in  her 
obstinacy.  Almost  all  her  advisers  were  frightened  and  urged 
concessions; 2  and  their  remonstrances  were  powerfully  reen- 
forced  when  on  March  n  Potemkin  arrived  in  St.  Petersburg. 

The  Prince  had  come  to  the  capital  uncalled  and  even  contrary 
to  Catherine's  wishes,3  partly  in  the  intention  of  having  a  reckon- 
ing with  his  enemy,  the  new  favorite  Zubov,  and  partly  in  order  to 
press  his  schemes  against  Poland.  As  usual,  he  had  a  project  for 
every  contingency.  If  war  came,  he  proposed  to  start  a  Counter- 
confederation  in  the  Republic,  or  else  to  carry  out  his  secret  plan 
of  the  year  before  for  the  Cossack  razzia,  the  revolt  of  the  Ortho- 
dox peasantry,  and  the  seizure  of  the  Ukraine.4  But  he  much  pre- 
ferred that  there  should  not  be  a  new  war;  and  his  scheme  for 
avoiding  it  was  to  bring  about  a  new  partition  of  Poland.  As  so 
often  in  the  past,  the  partition  he  had  in  mind  was  to  be  on  a  far 
larger  scale  than  that  of  1772 ;  so  ample  a  one  that  he  might  hope, 
perhaps,  to  carve  out  a  few  territories  for  himself  as  well  as  for  his 
sovereign.5 

Immediately  upon  his  arrival,  Potemkin  set  himself  to  pave  the 
way  for  this  plan  by  effecting  a  rapprochement  with  Prussia.    It 

1  IleTpoBT.,  Biopaa  Typemcafl  Bofma,  ii,  pp.  193  f. 

2  See  the  concurrent  testimony  of  Markov,  Zavadovski,  and  S.  R.  Vorontsov, 
Apx.  Bop.,  xx,  pp.  10  f.;  xii,  p.  67;  viii,  p.  22. 

3  See  her  letters  to  him  of  January  22/February  2,  and  January  24/February 
4,  1791,  C60PHHKI.,  xlii,  pp.  135  ff. 

4  Before  starting  for  St.  Petersburg  Potemkin  had  written  to  Felix  Potocki, 
who  was  expected  to  head  a  Counter-confederation,  inviting  him  to  leave  Paris  and 
come  to  a  more  accessible  place,  in  anticipation  that  the  Empress  would  soon  be 
ready  to  act  in  Poland  (this  appears  from  Potocki's  reply  of  May  14,  M.  A.,  IloJibina, 
II,  7).  As  to  the  Cossack  plan,  see  the  rescript  to  Potemkin  of  May  16/27,  Pyc. 
Apx.,  1874,  ii,  pp.  246  ff. 

6  Cobenzl's  report  of  April  19,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1791. 


CATHERINA    CONST ANS  INVICTA  l8l 

will  be  remembered  that  just  before  his  departure  for  Vienna  the 
versatile  Bischoffwerder  had  approached  Alopeus  with  the  in- 
sidious suggestion  that  his  master  might  help  the  Empress  to 
secure  Oczakow  and  its  district,  if  she  would  at  once  sign  a  secret 
convention  pledging  herself  to  renew  the  alliance  with  Prussia  at 
the  conclusion  of  the  Turkish  war.  Catherine  had  received  that 
proposal  with  indignation:  '  she  would  not  sign  a  pact  of  servi- 
tude,' she  wrote  on  the  margin  of  the  dispatch.1  But  Potemkin 
insisted  that  she  should  accept  the  offer.  There  followed  a  severe 
conflict  and  not  a  few  lively  scenes.  From  the  laconic  diary  of  her 
secretary  we  hear  of  the  Empress  continually  "  weeping  from 
rage,"  —  "  spasms  "  —  "  colic  "  —  "  she  won't  degrade  herself 
and  correspond  with  the  King  of  Prussia  "  — -  Potemkin  irate  and 
"  determined  to  fight  it  out  with  her;  "  2  —  but  in  the  end,  for 
once,  the  Prince  prevailed.  On  March  26  very  secret  instructions 
were  sent  to  Alopeus,  ordering  him  to  announce  that  the  Empress 
accepted  the  proposed  convention,  and  would  at  once  send  a 
draft  for  it  and  full  powers  to  conclude,  as  soon  as  the  King  of 
Prussia  had  confirmed  Bischoffwerder 's  informal  overture.3  But 
this  signal  concession  came  just  too  late.  The  warlike  proposals 
of  England  reached  Berlin  a  few  days  before;  and  Alopeus  was 
able  to  reveal  the  great  secret  to  Bischoffwerder  only  on  the  very 
afternoon  of  —  perhaps  a  few  hours  after  —  the  decisive  council 
held  by  the  King  at  Potsdam  on  April  7.4  The  Empress'  pride 
had  thus  been  sacrificed  to  no  purpose. 

Potemkin  meanwhile  continued  his  efforts  for  peace  and  a  par- 
tition.    In  a  conversation  with  Goltz,  the  Prussian  envoy,  he 

1  Martens,  Recueil  des  Traites  et  Conventions  conclus  par  la  Russie,  vi,  p.  146. 

2  XpanoBHu,Kiu  JI,HeBH0Ki>,  March  15/26,  17/28,  March  22/April  2,  March 
23/April  3. 

3  Ostermann's  dispatches,  dated  March  14/25,  but  obviously  sent  the  following 
day.  The  fact  that  the  Empress  did  consent  to  this  "  pact  of  servitude  "  is  here, 
I  believe,  brought  to  light  for  the  first  time.  Dembihski,  who  has  published  Alo- 
peus' reports  on  this  subject,  did  not  succeed  in  finding  the  secret  orders  of  March 
14/25,  and  conjectured  that  the  concession  contained  in  them  was  the  offer  to  raze 
the  fortress  of  Oczakow,  if  Russia  were  allowed  to  retain  that  town  and  its  district 
{Documents,  p.  126,  note  1).  In  order  to  fill  out  this  important  lacuna  in  the  corre- 
spondence published  by  him,  I  have  printed  one  of  the  dispatches  from  Ostermann 
to  Alopeus  in  Appendix  V. 

4  Alopeus'  reports  of  April  6  and  8,  Dembinski,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  124-128. 


1 82  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

threw  out  a  sufficiently  broad  hint  on  the  latter  topic.1  With 
Cobenzl  he  discussed  his  plan  for  a  partition  with  much  frank- 
ness, saying  that  at  present  it  was  known  only  to  the  Empress, 
Bezborodko,  and  himself,  that  he  desired  to  learn  the  views  of  the 
Court  of  Vienna  on  the  subject,  and  that  they  ought  to  bring 
Prussia  to  make  the  formal  proposal.2  But  in  this  last  point  lay 
precisely  the  difficulty.  There  are  not  a  few  indications  to  show 
how  seriously  a  new  partition  of  Poland  was  then  considered  at 
St.  Petersburg;  it  seemed  the  easiest  means  of  escape  from  a 
perilous  situation;  the  Empress  herself  was  resigned  to  it  as  a 
last  resource; 3  if  Prussia  had  actually  proposed  it,  it  seems  almost 
certain  that  both  the  Imperial  Courts  would  have  agreed;  but  the 
trouble  was  that  Frederick  William  was  in  no  position  —  and 
indeed  in  no  mood  —  to  make  any  such  proposition. 

The  third  week  of  April  saw  one  courier  after  another  dashing 
into  St.  Petersburg  with  the  most  alarming  news  from  all  quarters 
—  from  Berlin,  London,  Warsaw,  Stockholm,  and  the  Hague. 
The  worst  feature  of  the  situation  was  the  apparent  determination 
of  the  British  government  to  go  to  all  extremities,  a  course  which 
the  Russian  envoy  in  London  had  down  to  the  last  moment  repre- 

1  Cobenzl's  report  of  April  7,  V.  A.,  he.  cit.  Cobenzl  claimed  to  have  got  the 
story  from  a  confidant  of  Goltz. 

2  Cobenzl's  report  of  April  19,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit. 

3  Cobenzl's  reports  of  April  (which  are  full  of  allusions  to  the  topic) ;  rescript  to 
Potemkin  of  May  16/27,  already  cited;  instructions  to  Razumovski,  April  30/ 
May  n,  M.  A.,  ABCTpifl,  III,  49. 

Potemkin  told  Cobenzl  (according  to  the  latter's  report  of  April  19):  "  Si  la 
guerre  avec  la  Prusse  a  lieu,  il  croit  qu'Elles  [les  deux  Cours  Imperiales]  devroient 
s'attacher  la  Pologne,  ou  du  moins  un  assez  grand  parti  pour  former  une  Confedera- 
tion puissante,  ....  L'autre  projet  consiste,  dans  le  cas  ou  on  parviendroit  a  un 
arrangement  entre  les  trois  Cours,  de  faire  un  nouveau  Partage  de  la  Pologne,  mais 
en  grand  et  plus  considerable  que  le  premier." 

He  told  Goltz  (according  to  Cobenzl's  report  of  April  7) :  "  Commencez  d'abord 
par  finir  la  guerre  actuelle,  montrez  un  changement  de  conduite  a  notre  egard,  que 
nous  puissions  voir  avec  evidence  que  vous  etes  nos  amis  .  .  .  alors  je  ferai  en 
sorte  que  vous  ayez  Danzig  d'une  maniere  tres  facile  que  je  vous  dirai  a  mon  retour 
et  lorsqu'une  fois  j'aurai  termine  avec  les  Turcs,  mais  qu'a  present  je  ne  puis  pas 
vous  dire." 

Rescript  of  the  Empress  to  Razumovski:  "  We  consider  as  a  measure  of  extreme 
necessity  our  agreement  to  any  acquisitions  of  the  Prussian  Court,  and  in  this  case, 
in  common  with  the  Court  of  Vienna,  we  intend  to  insist  on  a  complete  equality  of 
advantages  .  .  .  recognizing  this  principle  as  founded  on  strict  justice."     (Rus.) 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  IN  VICT  A  1 83 

sented  as  utterly  improbable.  When  this  news  arrived,  Potemkin 
and  Bezborodko  united  in  a  supreme  effort  to  break  down  their 
sovereign's  obstinacy  and  avert  an  otherwise  inevitable  war.1 
But  it  was  all  in  vain.  When  the  Council  met  on  April  21,  at  the 
worst  moment  of  the  crisis,  the  proposals  presented  to  it  in  the 
name  of  the  Empress  breathed  not  a  word  of  concessions  or  sur- 
render; they  dealt  only  with  the  necessity  of  taking  the  most 
vigorous  measures  for  self-defence.2  And  this  tone  of  uncom- 
promising resolution  and  grim  defiance  Catherine  maintained 
unwaveringly  through  the  anxious  weeks  that  followed.  Her 
Baltic  fleets  were  to  unite  and  take  up  a  position  in  front  of 
Kronstadt  to  face  the  English.  The  Finnish  frontier  was  to  be 
well  guarded,  while  at  the  same  time  a  special  envoy  was  hur- 
riedly sent  to  Stockholm  to  make  sure  of  the  slippery  Gustavus. 
While  the  army  on  the  Danube  was  to  hold  the  Turks  in  check, 
the  main  forces  of  Russia  were  to  be  kept  in  readiness  to  meet  the 
Prussians  and  Poles:  one  corps  on  the  Dvina,  one  near  Kiev,  and 
a  third  near  Bender.  The  moment  the  Poles  began  hostilities,  or 
the  moment  the  Prussians  entered  Polish  territory  in  order  to 
reach  Livonia,  these  three  Russian  armies  were  to  advance  along 
concentric  lines,  carrying  the  war  into  the  heart  of  the  Republic, 
scattering  the  Poles,  and  uniting  eventually  to  fall  upon  the  flank 
or  rear  of  the  Prussians.3 

Such  at  least  were  the  plans.  How  well  they  could  have  been 
carried  out,  how  successfully  Catherine  could  have  defended  her- 
self against  such  numerous  and  powerful  enemies,  may  be  a 
matter  for  doubt,  since  there  is  some  evidence  that  the  actual 
state  of  the  military  preparations  was  very  far  from  correspond- 
ing to  the  sonorous  resolutions  framed  at  Petersburg.4  At  any 
rate,  the  question  was  never  put  to  the  test. 

1  XpaiiOBHUKw,  op.  cit.,  April  7-9/18-20.  2  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  843  f. 

3  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  April  17/28, 19/30,  April  24/May  5,  April  28/May  9, May  1/12, 
3/14,  pp.  846-852;  Potemkin's  plan  of  operations  against  the  Prussians  and  Poles, 
IleTpoB'B,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  195  ff.;  C6"opHHKi>,  xlii,  pp.  150  ff.;  XpanoBHUKiii,  op. 
cit.,  p.  211. 

4  See  especially  the  very  pessimistic  letter  of  Bezborodko  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov 
of  March  7/18,  1791,  in  C6opHHKi>,  xxvi,  pp.  423-426,  and  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  pp. 
177-181  (erroneously  dated  1790  in  this  latter  collection). 


1 84 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


About  the  end  of  April  a  ray  of  light  appeared  on  the  western 
horizon;  early  in  May  there  began  to  be  strong  hopes  at  St. 
Petersburg ;  and  by  the  last  days  of  the  month  hope  had  turned 
to  certitude.    The  Empress  had  won,  for  England  had  yielded. 


V 

Pitt  can  scarcely  be  acquitted  of  having  gone  into  the  Russian 
enterprise  in  too  sanguine  and  rash  a  spirit,  without  duly  weighing 
the  opposition  to  be  expected  in  Parliament  and  the  probable 
temper  of  the  country.  He  had  done  little  or  nothing  to  prepare 
public  opinion,  which  was  therefore  startled  and  shocked  when 
the  crisis  arrived.  A  perhaps  exaggerated  reluctance  to  disclose 
official  secrets  prevented  him  from  stating  his  position  fully  and 
frankly.  This,  together  with  his  lack  of  adequate  knowledge 
about  the  territory  on  which  the  debate  was  bound  to  turn,  com- 
pelled him  to  rest  his  case  chiefly  on  generalities  about  the  balance 
of  power,  which  were  hardly  likely  to  satisfy  a  nation  so  much 
more  concerned  about  peace,  trade,  and  taxes.1 

Anglo-Russian  relations  had  been  uncommonly  close  and 
friendly  throughout  most  of  the  eighteenth  century.  It  was  true 
that  in  recent  years  there  had  been  some  ground  for  ill-feeling, 
especially  owing  to  the  Armed  .Neutrality,  which  was  resented  in 
England  as  a  signal  display  of  ingratitude  and  hostility.  But 
over  against  this  was  the  great  fact  that  English  merchants  and 
manufacturers  found  Russia  one  of  their  very  best  customers. 
They  furnished  that  country  with  the  great  bulk  of  its  imports, 
and  drew  from  it  large  supplies  of  the  most  indispensable  raw 
materials.  About  a  thousand  English  ships  went  annually  to 
Russian  ports.2  On  the  other  hand,  the  English  trade  with  the 
Levant  was  quite  insignificant;  commercially  as  well  as  politically 

1  It  is  a  curious  fact  that  it  was  apparently  not  until  August,  when  everything 
was  over,  that  it  was  proposed  (by  Lord  Auckland)  to  send  a  confidential  agent  to 
examine  Oczakow  and  the  Dniester  country  and  report  on  the  real  political,  mili- 
tary, and  commercial  value  of  the  territory  around  which  so  hot  a  dispute  had 
raged.     See  Auckland  to  Grenville,  August  19,  i7gi,Dropmore  Papers,  ii,  pp.  169  f. 

2  Cf.  Ewart's  "  Observations  on  the  connection  which  has  hitherto  subsisted 
between  Great  Britain  and  Russia,"  in  Dropmore  Papers,  ii,  pp.  44-49,  and  Rose, 
Pitt,  p.  590. 


CATHERINA    CONST ANS  IN  VICT  A  1 85 

Turkey  had  long  been  reckoned  a  client  of  France;  and  the 
conception  of  the  Eastern  Question  as  Pitt  now  viewed  it,  as 
Englishmen  generally  viewed  it  in  the  nineteenth  century,  had 
not  yet  begun  to  penetrate  the  consciousness  of  the  British  public. 
Hence  the  Prime  Minister  was  certain  to  encounter  grave  diffi- 
culties when  he  attempted  to  persuade  his  countrymen  to  risk  a 
great  war  and  to  sacrifice  the  lucrative  Russian  trade  for  the  sake 
of  a  nebulous  balance  of  power  and  for  love  of  the  Turks. 

On  March  28,  the  day  after  the  ultimatum  was  dispatched  to 
Berlin,  a  royal  message  was  sent  to  Parliament,  announcing  in 
rather  vague  terms  that  the  King  felt  obliged  to  augment  his 
naval  forces  as  a  means  of  adding  weight  to  the  representations 
he  and  his  allies  were  making  to  the  Empress  of  Russia  regarding 
her  peace  with  the 'Porte.1  To  the  country  this  was  almost  like  a 
bolt  from  the  blue;  but  it  was  not  a  total  surprise  to  the  Opposi- 
tion. For  some  days  before,  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  the  active  Russian 
envoy,  had  secretly  informed  Fox  and  his  friends  of  the  plans  of 
the  ministry,  with  details  as  to  the  diplomatic  situation,  the 
moderate  terms  the  Empress  was  defending,  and,  in  general,  a 
whole  arsenal  of  arguments  to  be  used  against  the  Government.2 
Hence  when  on  March  29  there  took  place  the  first  great  debate 
on  the  '  Russian  armament,'  the  Opposition  were  armed  for  the 
fray. 

They  protested,  in  the  first  place,  against  the  reticence  of 
ministers,  who  seemed  determined  to  rush  the  nation  into  war 
without  giving  any  explanations  whatsoever.  They  demanded 
that  the  country  should  be  informed  of  the  purpose  of  these  arma- 
ments. Was  it  not  a  case  of  attacking  Russia  merely  on  account 
of  a  single  town  and  a  few  adjacent  deserts  ?  Fox,  in  an  able 
speech,  challenged  the  Government  to  show  that  the  balance  of 
power  would  be  fatally  upset  or  any  British  interest  seriously 
affected,  if  the  Empress  were  allowed  to  keep  Oczakow.  Russia, 
he  said,  was  the  natural  ally  of  England,  and  the  one  naval 
Power  that  was  ever  likely  to  be  of  assistance  to  her.  To  attack 
such  a  state  for  so  insignificant  an  object  was  as  unjust  as  it  was 

1  Hansard,  Parliamentary  History,  xxix,  coll.  31  f. 

2  S.  R.  Vorontsov  to  his  brother,  April  26,  Apx.  Bop.,  ix,  pp.  193  ff. 


1 86  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

impolitic.  Pitt  replied  in  not  very  effective  fashion,  trying  to  prove 
that  the  existence  of  Turkey,  the  independence  of  Poland  and 
Sweden,  and  the  security  of  Prussia  were  British  interests,  all  of 
which  would  be  imperiled  if  the  Empress  were  permitted  to  keep 
her  conquests  and  continue  her  aggressive  course.  Burke  followed 
with  a  burning  tirade  against  a  foreign  policy,  the  object  of  which 
was  to  maintain  in  Europe  "  a  horde  of  barbarous  Asiatics," 
"  destructive  savages  "  to  whom  "  any  Christian  Power  was  to 
be  preferred."  In  the  end  Pitt  was  able  to  muster  a  majority  in 
both  Houses;  but  the  Opposition  had  undoubtedly  carried  off  the 
honors  of  the  debate.1  The  galleries  were  with  them,  and  it  soon 
appeared  that  the  country  was  also. 

The  energetic  minister  of  Russia  at  this  moment  began  a  furious 
campaign  to  arouse  the  British  public  against  its  government. 
Seldom,  if  ever,  has  a  foreign  envoy  interfered  so  actively  or  so 
successfully  in  English  politics.  Vorontsov  relates  in  his  auto- 
biography that  he  bought  up  more  than  twenty  newspapers  and 
a  small  army  of  hack-writers;  that  he  scattered  pamphlets 
throughout  the  provinces;  that  he  and  the  other  members  of  the 
embassy  worked  night  and  day  for  months  dashing  off  articles 
and  tracts,  carrying  them  around  to  the  newspaper  offices,  and 
rushing  about  here  and  there  conferring  with  members  of  Parlia- 
ment, merchants,  and  everyone  else  whose  sympathies  or  services 
might  be  of  value.  As  a  result  of  his  exertions,  he  declares,  alarm 
seized  the  manufacturing  towns;  at  Norwich,  Wakefield,  Leeds, 
and  Manchester  meetings  were  held  to  protest  against  the  policy 
of  the  government;  letters  flowed  in  in  great  numbers  to  members 
of  Parliament  begging  them  to  vote  against  the  ministry;  and 
popular  feeling  in  London  voiced  itself  in  the  inscription  which 
everywhere  appeared  upon  the  walls  of  the  houses:  "  No  war 
with  Russia."  2 

Whatever  exaggeration  there  may  be  in  this,  it  is  certain  that 
within  a  very  few  weeks  the  opinion  of  the  country  had  mani- 
fested itself  as  strongly  opposed  to  the  warlike  plans  of  the 

1  The  speeches  of  Pitt,  Fox,  and  Burke  in  Hansard's  Parliamentary  History, 
xxix,  coll.  52-79. 

2  Apx.  Bop.,  viii,  pp.  19-23;   cf.  also  ix,  pp.  191  f.,  491  ff.,  xxxiv,  pp.  466-474. 


CATHERINA   CONST  ANS  IN  VICT  A  1 87 

cabinet.1  The  discontent  of  the  merchant  and  manufacturing 
classes  worked  back  on  Parliament.  On  successive  divisions  Pitt 
did,  indeed,  manage  to  keep  a  majority,  but  it  was  much  below 
the  normal  size.  He  himself  later  confessed  that  from  what  he 
knew  of  the  sentiments  of  the  greatest  part  of  his  followers  and 
even  many  of  his  warmest  friends,  he  was  sure  that  he  could  not 
go  further  with  his  policy  without  risking  a  defeat.2  On  top  of  all 
this  came  differences  of  opinion  in  the  cabinet.  Immediately 
after  the  debates  of  March  29,  Lord  Grenville  and  the  Duke  of 
Richmond  declared  that  they  could  no  longer  approve  of  coercive 
measures  against  Russia,  while  the  Foreign  Secretary,  the  Duke 
of  Leeds,  held  unswervingly  to  the  line  of  policy  already  adopted.3 
All  these  things  combined  to  break  down  Pitt's  resolution. 
The  first  sign  of  his  weakening  came  on  March  3 1 ,  when  he  asked 
and  obtained  the  cabinet's  assent  to  dispatching  a  courier  to 
Berlin  with  the  request  that  the  Prussian  government  should 
delay  forwarding  the  joint  ultimatum  to  Petersburg  until  it  had 
received  certain  new  communications  presently  to  be  made  from 
London.  Then  in  the  next  ten  or  eleven  days  Pitt  slowly  and 
reluctantly  made  up  his  mind  to  yield.  His  judgment  as  to  the 
expediency  and  importance  of  restoring  the  strict  status  quo 
remained  unchanged.  Many  weeks  later  he  wrote  that  he  was 
still  convinced  that  that  would  have  been  the  wisest  policy,  and 
that  "  the  risk  and  expense  of  the  struggle  with  Russia,  even  if 
Russia  had  not  submitted  without  a  struggle,  would  not  have 
been  more  than  the  object  was  worth,"  if  only  he  could  have 
obtained  the  support  of  the  nation.4  But  he  saw  clearly  that  to 
persist  in  so  extremely  unpopular  a  course  meant  to  risk  the  over- 
throw of  the  ministry  and  the  ruin  of  all  his  other  plans.  He 
knew  now  that  he  had  blundered  into  the  worst  predicament  in 
which  he  had  ever  yet  found  himself.  With  tears  in  his  eyes,  he 
confessed  to  Ewart  that  '  this  was  the  greatest  mortification  he 

1  Salomon,  Pitt,  i",  pp.  516-520;   Stanhope,  Life  of  Pitt,  ii,  p.  115;    Auckland, 
Correspondence,  ii,  pp.  387  f. 

2  Pitt  to  Ewart,  May  24,  Stanhope,  Pitt,  ii,  p.  116. 

3  For  the  deliberations  of  the  cabinet  during  this  anxious  period,  see  especially 
the  Leeds  Memoranda,  pp.  1526". 

4  To  Ewart,  May  24,  1701,  Stanhope,  Pitt,  ii,  pp.  n  5-1 18. 


i88 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


had  ever  experienced  ' ;  he  had  thought  of  resigning,  but  could 
not  bring  himself  to  abandon  the  King  and  the  country  to  a 
factious  Opposition;  he  still  hoped,  however,  to  find  some  means 
of  getting  out  of  the  scrape  without  "  any  serious  bad  conse- 
quences." 1 

On  April  10,  at  Pitt's  proposal,  the  cabinet  decided  to  abandon 
the  demand  for  the  strict  status  quo.  There  followed  the  resigna- 
tion of  the  Foreign  Secretary,  the  Duke  of  Leeds,  who  could  not 
be  reconciled  to  this  surrender,  and  who  was  succeeded  by  Gren- 
ville,  the  most  pronounced  advocate  of  a  pacific  policy.  Under 
the  new  program,  a  special  envoy,  Fawkener,  was  to  be  sent  to 
St.  Petersburg  to  negotiate  an  arrangement  on  a  compromise 
basis,  or  the  so-called  status  quo  modifie.  Various  gradations 
might  be  proposed:  the  land  between  Bug  and  Dniester  might 
remain  a  neutral  waste  between  the  two  Empires;  or  it  might  be 
ceded  to  Russia  on  condition  that  it  was  left  unfortified  and  un- 
inhabited; or,  at  the  worst,  the  Empress  might  have  Oczakow 
and  some  adjacent  territory  without  any  restrictions,  if  only  both 
banks  of  the  Dniester  remained  in  Turkish  hands.2  At  the  same 
time  the  indispensable  Ewart  was  to  hasten  back  to  Berlin  to  per- 
suade Frederick  William  to  support  these  propositions,  while  Lord 
Elgin  was  sent  to  pursue  Leopold,  then  travelling  in  Italy,  in  the 
hope  of  winning  him  over  definitively  to  the  side  of  the  Allies. 
This  profusion  of  diplomatic  expeditions  pointed  to  what  was  the 
cardinal  weakness  of  the  new  policy.  The  ministry  soon  decided 
to  suspend  arming  and  to  abandon  all  idea  of  backing  up  its  new 
propositions  with  a  show  of  force.3  Whether  a  due  regard  for 
public  sentiment  at  home  rendered  so  extreme  a  resolution  neces- 
sary, may  well  be  doubted.  At  any  rate,  this  decision  proved  far 
more  disastrous  than  the  mere  abandonment  of  the  strict  status 
quo  principle.  It  led  England  inevitably  to  a  complete  diplomatic 
defeat.  It  turned  what  began  as  a  fairly  dignified  retreat  into  an 
humiliating  rout. 

1  Ewart  to  Jackson,  April  14,  Rose,  Pitt,  p.  617. 

2  Rose,  ibid.,  p.  621;  Salomon,  Pitt,  i",  pp.  521  f. 

3  Precisely  when  this  resolution  was  taken  it  is  difficult  to  say;  at  the  very 
latest  it  was  by  May  6.  See  the  secret  instructions  to  Fawkener  of  that  date, 
Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  410;  also  Rose,  Pitt,  pp.  617  f. 


CATHERINA   CONST ANS  INVICTA  1 89 

At  first,  indeed,  matters  did  not  go  badly.  Frederick  William 
received  Ewart  and  Fawkener  with  unexpected  cordiality,  readily 
accepted  the  new  English  propositions,  and  agreed  to  support 
them  at  St.  Petersburg.  Just  at  that  time  he  had  made  a  change 
in  his  ministry,  which  also  promised  well.  Hertzberg,  latterly  so 
bitter  against  '  the  British  despotism,'  had  lost  all  influence  and 
was  about  to  receive  his  dismissal.  Foreign  affairs  had  been 
entrusted  to  Counts  Schulenburg  and  Alvensleben,  along  with 
the  aged  Finckenstein,  all  of  whom  seemed  devoted  to  '  the  Eng- 
lish system.'  It  appeared  then  that  the  alliance  was  not  only  not 
shaken  but  stronger  than  before.1  The  fact  was  that  Frederick 
William  was  not  fully  informed  of  the  change  that  had  come  over 
English  policy.  He  was  not  displeased  at  the  more  moderate 
terms  now  proposed  from  London,  for  they  would  diminish,  or  at 
least  postpone,  the  danger  of  a  war  which  he  had,  at  bottom, 
always  viewed  with  apprehension.  But  he  expected  as  a  matter 
of  course  that  the  Allies  would  back  up  these  new  terms  with  a 
show  of  force  by  land  and  sea,  since  that  was  the  only  means  of 
bringing  the  Empress  to  accept  an  honorable  compromise.  It 
was  only  at  the  beginning  of  June,  when  he  learned  that  England 
absolutely  refused  to  make  any  naval  demonstrations  whatever, 
that  the  King  at  last  fully  grasped  the  situation.2  Then  he  saw 
that  his  ally  had  abandoned  him,  that  there  was  nothing  to  do 
but  to  beat  a  retreat  with  what  grace  he  could,  that  all  his  exer- 
tions and  expenditures  of  the  past  four  years  had  served  only  to 
draw  down  upon  him  the  wrath  of  the  Empress  and  a  series  of 
humiliations  before  the  eyes  of  all  Europe.  Naturally  he  was 
rilled  with  anger  against  such  a  worthless  and  craven  ally.  He 
would  still  act  with  England  until  the  wretched  Oriental  affair 
was  over;  but  after  that  he  would  go  his  own  way  and  seek  other 
connections. 

Under  the  circumstances  Fawkener  at  St.  Petersburg  wore  very 
much  the  air  of  an  ambassador  of  the  vanquished.  Catherine 
treated  him  with  a  certain  condescending  indulgence,  but  could 
not   refrain   occasionally   from   venting   her   exultation   at   his 

1  Cf.  Ewart  to  Pitt,  and  to  Auckland,  April  30,  Dropmore  Papers,  ii,  pp.  61,  68  f. 

2  Cf.  Salomon,  Pitt,  ii!,  pp.  524  f. 


I90  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

expense.  "  How  can  I  be  afraid,"  she  once  wrote  to  him,  "  at  the 
head  of  a  nation  which  has  beaten  all  its  enemies  for  nearly  a  hun- 
dred years  ?  Je  crains  Dieu,  cher  Fawkener,  et  n'ai  point  d'autre 
crainte."  x  One  day  in  her  garden,  a  propos  of  a  vociferous 
puppy,  she  remarked  to  him,  "  Dogs  that  bark  do  not  always 
bite."  2  Her  triumph  was  increased  by  the  appearance  at  her 
court  of  an  ambassador  of  the  English  Opposition,  Robert  Adair, 
who  had  been  sent  by  Fox  with  assurances  of  his  devotion  —  a 
pleasant  parallel  to  the  embassies  which  she  was  accustomed  to 
receive  from  the  '  well-intentioned  '  in  Poland.3  As  for  the 
negotiation,  the  English  and  Prussian  envoys  simply  surrendered 
on  every  point.  On  July  26  they  formally  gave  their  consent  to 
the  acquisition  by  Russia  of  Oczakow  and  the  entire  territory 
between  the  Bug  and  the  Dniester,  subject  only  to  the  condition 
that  no  restrictions  should  be  placed  on  the  navigation  of  the 
latter  river.  Utterly  insignificant  as  this  concession  was,  the 
English  were  vastly  surprised  to  obtain  even  that,  and  they  were 
in  no  position  to  resent  the  tone  of  "  impertinence  and  persiflage  " 
in  which  Catherine  had  couched  her  final  declaration.4 

A  few  weeks  later,  the  Turks,  abandoned  by  their  protectors 
and  beaten  by  land  and  sea,  gave  in  and  signed  the  Preliminaries 
of  Galatz  (August  11,  1791),  by  which  they  too  consented  to  the 
cession  of  Oczakow  and  its  district.  On  this  basis  peace  was  con- 
cluded between  Russia  and  the  Porte  at  Jassy,  January  9,  1792. 

Catherine  had  thus  won  a  complete  victory,  perhaps  the  most 
brilliant  of  her  reign,  thanks  to  her  own  splendid  courage  and 
constancy.  In  spite  of  her  one  false  step  in  March,  Grimm  could 
justly  acclaim  her  "  Die  Mutter  der  unerschrockenen  Stand- 
haftigkeit."  But  for  Poland  the  outcome  of  the  crisis  was  un- 
fortunate in  the  extreme.    From  the  standpoint  of  Polish  interests 

1  Martens,  Traites  conclus  par  la  Russie,  ix,  pp.  349  f. 

2  Herrmann,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  413. 

3  The  very  ancient  controversy  as  to  whether  Adair  came  to  Russia  on  his  own 
responsibility  or  with  a  commission  from  Fox  —  a  question  which  so  recent  a 
writer  as  Rose  attempts  to  answer  with  an  exculpation  of  the  great  Whig  leader  — 
would  seem  to  be  settled  in  a  sense  extremely  damaging  to  Fox  by  Vorontsov's 
letter  to  his  brother  of  April  26,  1791,  Apx.  Bop.,  ix,  pp.  196  f. 

4  Whitworth  to  Grenville,  July  21,  Auckland  to  Grenville,  August  9,  Dropmore 
Papers,  ii,  pp.  134,  160. 


CATHERINA   CONSTANS  IN  VICT  A  191 

it  is  probably  greatly  to  be  regretted  that  the  threatened  general 
war  did  not  take  place.  Such  a  conflict  might,  indeed,  have  in- 
volved terrible  dangers  to  the  Republic  —  a  servile  revolt,  a 
deluge  of  Cossacks,  perhaps  a  repetition  of  the  horrors  of  1768. 
But  a  struggle  for  independence  against  Russia  was  bound  to 
come  sooner  or  later,  and  Poland's  chances  would  have  been  far 
better  in  1791,  with  the  numerous  allies  which  she  then  had,  than 
they  were  in  the  following  year,  when  she  was  left  to  fight  her 
battle  alone.  Moreover,  if  we  may  be  allowed  to  speculate  so  far 
on  what  might  have  been,  a  general  war  at  that  time,  if  it  did  not 
once  for  all  put  an  end  to  Catherine's  power  of  aggression,  might 
at  least  have  left  such  animosities  between  the  three  neighbors  of 
Poland  that  for  many  years  to  come  they  could  not  have  united 
amicably  for  a  dismemberment  of  the  Republic.  As  it  was,  Pitt's 
defeat  on  the  Eastern  Question  involved  the  ruin  of  all  the  other 
plans  which  he  had  been  pursuing  in  foreign  policy.  Deserted  by 
Prussia  and  discredited  with  the  other  states,  England  for  a  time 
withdrew  altogether  from  Continental  affairs.  Thus  perished  the 
Federative  System,  the  one  combination  of  these  years  that 
had  seemed  to  promise  most  for  the  security  of  Poland. 

The  full  extent  of  the  loss,  however,  was  not  immediately  felt  at 
Warsaw,  for  during  the  last  months  of  the  Oriental  crisis  two 
great  events  had  come  to  renew  Polish  hopes.  The  one  was  the 
Revolution  of  the  Third  of  May:  the  other,  the  conclusion  of  the 
Austro-Prussian  alliance. 


CHAPTER  DC 

The  Revolution  of  the  Third  of  May  and  the 
Formation  of  the  Austro-Prussian  Alliance 


It  is  not  entirely  creditable  to  the  Poles  that,  granted  the  oppor- 
tunity furnished  by  the  Eastern  war,  they  delayed  for  nearly 
three  years,  and  only  at  the  eleventh  hour  nerved  themselves  to 
put  through  —  by  revolutionary  means,  as  if  in  desperation  — 
a  great  and  sweeping  act  of  reform.  Of  the  many  charges  brought 
against  the  Great  Diet,  that  of  wasting  a  vast  amount  of  invalu- 
able time  is  only  too  well  founded.  There  were  many  reasons  for 
this  procrastination.  One  must  remember  the  fatal  passion  for 
oratory  so  characteristic  of  the  nation,  the  prevailing  aversion  to 
limiting  freedom  of  speech  by  any  hard-and-fast  rules  of  order, 
the  constant  efforts  of  the  reactionaries  to  hold  back  the  majority 
by  obstructionist  tactics,  the  inexperience  of  this  "  body  of  Solons 
aged  twenty-five,"  the  natural  tendency  of  such  an  assembly  to 
be  swayed  by  gusts  of  passion  or  sentiment,  to  be  easily  led  aside 
into  digressions  or  trivialities,  to  stumble  about  rather  helplessly 
amid  the  mass  of  questions  clamoring  for  solution.  One  will  be 
inclined  to  judge  such  faults  less  rigorously,  if  one  compares  this 
Diet  with  the  contemporary  assembly  on  the  Seine,  which  was 
also  toiling  to  regenerate  a  nation.  The  Constituante  suffered 
from  the  same  furor  loquendi,  the  same  variability ,  the  same  lack 
of  order,  foresight,  and  economy  of  time;  it  also  was  accused 
of  wasting  months  over  syllables,  and  then  in  a  few  hours  up- 
setting the  whole  ancient  order  of  the  kingdom.  Such  defects 
are  common  to  all  green  legislative  bodies.  Moreover,  there  was 
in  Poland  one  special  reason  for  the  slow  progress  of  the  reformers: 
the  fact  that  much  time  was  required  to  educate,  solidify,  and 
inflame  public  opinion  as  a  preliminary  to  thoroughgoing  changes. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Diet  the  ideas  of  even  the  leaders  were 


192 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  1 93 

but  vague  and  half-formed.     It  was  only  after  three  years  of 
intense  political  discussion,  after  countless  questions  had  been 
threshed  out  by  long  debates  in  the  Diet  and  by  the  flood  of 
books,  pamphlets,  and  counter-pamphlets  which  poured  from  the 
press,  that  the  great  and  salutary  reforms  of  179 1  became  possible. 
One  chief  difficulty  lay  in  the  wide  diversity  of  principles  and 
tendencies  that  had  to  be  faced.    At  one  extreme  were  the  bigoted 
champions  of  '  golden  liberty,'  and  szlachta  omnipotence,  who 
revolted  at  the  thought  of  sacrificing  a  particle  of  the  privileges 
bequeathed  to  them  by  their  '  virtuous  ancestors  ' ;   who  main- 
tained, with  incredible  blindness,  that  the  trouble  with  Poland 
was  an  excess,  not  of  anarchy,  but  of '  despotism  ' ;  and  who  were 
inclined,  many  of  them,  to  push  their  aristocratic  republicanism 
so  far  as  to  favor  the  suppression  of  the  kingship  altogether. 
Then  there  were  the  admirers  of  the  English  system  of  govern- 
ment, and  those  who  advocated  a  constitution  similar  to  the  one 
which  was  just  then  being  elaborated  in  France.     Finally,  there 
were  the  advanced  reformers,  who,  attentively  following  events  on 
the  Seine,  tended  more  and  more  to  appropriate  the  principles, 
the  language,  and  to  some  extent  the  methods  of  the  Parisian 
radicals.     These   people    took   up   particularly    the   slogan   of 
'  equality,'  denouncing  the  privileges  and  the  exclusiveness  of  the 
szlachta,  exalting  the  Third  Estate  in  the  manner  of  Sieyes,  and 
demanding  the  political  and  economic  emancipation  of  the  towns- 
men and  peasantry.    The  growing  political  activity  of  the  bour- 
geoisie;   the  unprecedented  episode  of  November,   1789,  when 
deputies  from  almost  all  the  cities  of  Poland  came  together  at 
Warsaw  to  discuss  their  situation,  and  to  petition  the  King  and 
Diet  for  the  restoration  of  their  ancient  rights;   the  intense  and 
highly  organized  agitation  in  favor  of  democratic  principles  con- 
ducted from  the  house  of  Hugo  Kolla,taj,  the  '  smithy  '  of  the 
new  ideas;   the  proceedings  at  the  '  Constitutional  Club  '  in  the 
Radziwill  Palace  —  the  Warsaw  counterpart  of  the  Jacobin  Club 
—  whose  orators  nightly  proclaimed  '  the  Rights  of  Man,'  and 
whose  ringleader  closed  every  speech  with  the  words:  "  Whatever 
is  exalted  shall  be  abased,  and  whatever  is  abased  shall  be  exalted": 
all  this  was  calculated  to  make  old-fashioned  people  stand  aghast, 


/ 


194  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

and  to  lead  even  enlightened  men  to  fear  that  the  reform  move- 
ment was  getting  out  of  hand. 

In  the  face  of  such  divergent  views  and  such  a  clash  of  opinions, 
it  is  not  strange  that  the  leaders  of  the  Patriotic  party  long  hesi- 
tated. The  wonder  is  rather  that  they  at  last  adopted  a  plan  of 
constitutional  reform  which  contained  so  happy  a  blend  of  liberal- 
ism and  conservatism,  which  ran  so  contrary  to  many  of  their 
instincts  and  prejudices,  and  which  contained  so  many  things  of 
a  kind  which  it  is  not  easy  or  popular  for  statesmen  to  propose. 
Adherents  as  they  were  of  '  the  French  principles,'  they  still 
refused  to  apply  them  in  blind  doctrinaire  fashion.  Aristocrats, 
they  demanded  heavy  sacrifices  from  their  own  class,  while 
championing,  as  far  as  was  prudent,  the  interests  of  the  other 
classes.  Republicans  by  inheritance  and  education,  they  made 
the  central  point  in  their  program  the  establishment  of  a 
strong  royal  power.  In  an  age  marked  by  its  passion  for  '  free- 
dom '  and  hatred  of  '  despots,'  they  undertook  a  reform  quite 
opposite  in  character  to  the  one  then  proceeding  in  France  —  a 
monarchical  revolution.  To  a  nation  extraordinarily  attached  to 
its  '  liberties,'  they  preached  '  national  existence  first,  and  fiber- 
ties  afterwards.' x 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  as  soon  as  the  struggle  to  cast 
off  Russian  control  was  over,  in  July,  1789,  the  leaders  of  the 
dominant  party  resolved  to  bring  to  the  front  the  question  of  a 
new  form  of  government  and  the  hereditary  succession.  On 
September  7  the  Diet  appointed  a  commission  to  draw  up  a 
constitution.  The  affair  progressed  slowly,  however,  since  in 
the  following  months  military  and  financial  questions  and  then 
matters  of  foreign  policy  absorbed  the  attention  of  the  reformers. 
In  December  the  Diet  did,  indeed,  adopt  a  first  instalment  of 
the  new  constitution,  as  a  preliminary  to  the  Prussian  alliance; 
but  this  was  hardly  more  than  an  enunciation  of  the  general 
principles  on  which  the  future  form  of  government  was  to  be 
based.    Then  public  interest  seized  upon  one  particular  consti- 

1  The  classic  study  of  the  evolution  of  ideas  in  Poland  at  this  time  is  Roman 
Pilat,  0  literaturze  politycznej  sejmu  czteroletniego.  See  also,  Niewenglowski,  Les 
Idees  politiques  et  Vesprit  public  en  Pologne  d  la  fin  du  XVIIP  siecle;   Smolensky 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  1 95 

tutional  question  to  the  exclusion  of  all  others:  the  question  of 
hereditary  monarchy  versus  the  elective  kingship.  The  battle 
over  that  issue  filled  the  year  1790;  it  led  both  reformers  and 
reactionaries  to  bring  their  heaviest  controversial  artillery  into 
the  field;  it  helped  powerfully  to  spread  sound  political  ideas 
and  to  clear  up  the  mind  of  the  nation. 

Soon  after  Reichenbach  the  leaders  of  the  Diet  determined  to 
force  on  a  decision  at  once,  at  least  with  regard  to  the  immediate 
choice  of  a  successor  to  the  throne,  and  also,  if  possible,  with 
regard  to  the  hereditary  principle.  A  considerable  number  of 
candidates  for  the  crown  came  under  discussion.  Supporters  were 
found  for  the  claims  of  the  brother  or  the  nephew  of  Stanislas 
Augustus,  for  the  Duke  of  York,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and 
various  minor  German  princes.  Gustavus  III,  whose  head 
swarmed  with  fantastic  schemes,  was  suddenly  smitten  with 
the  ambition  to  become  king  of  Poland,  and  long  persecuted 
his  reluctant  envoy  at  Warsaw  with  orders  to  work  for  that 
chimerical  project.1  The  Marshal  Ignacy  Potocki  for  a  time 
seemed  to  favor  the  choice  of  a  Hohenzollern,  and  at  one  moment 
talked  even  of  a  personal  union  between  Poland  and  Prussia. 
In  August,  1790,  he  sent  his  confidant,  the  Italian  Piattoli,  to 
Berlin  to  offer  the  succession  to  a  Prussian  prince,  preferably  to 
the  King's  second  son,  Prince  Louis.  Possibly  this  was  done 
chiefly  with  the  aim  of  restoring  the  already  shaken  alliance  by 
flattering  Frederick  William,  for  it  is  certain  that  the  King  had 
long  caressed  the  idea  of  placing  his  son  upon  the  Polish  throne. 
At  any  rate,  the  Prussian  ministers,  now  for  the  first  time  con- 
sulted about  this  project,  protested  strongly  against  it;  and  the 
negotiation  produced  no  result  except  to  frighten  the  Courts  of 
Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg,  and  to  drive  the  '  Republican '  party  in 
Poland,  from  fear  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  to  rally  to  the 

Kuznica  Kollqlajowska,  and  his  Przewrot  umyslowy  w  Polsce  XVIII  w.;    Kalinka, 
Der  polnische  Reichstag,  ii,  pp.  410-51 1;   Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  ii,  passim. 

1  For  details  as  to  this  Polish  project,  which  haunted  Gustavus  from  the  autumn 
of  1790  until  the  3d  of  May  (1791),  see,  Odhner,  Gustaf  III  och  Katarina,  pp.  163 
ff.;  Gustavus'  letters  to  Armfelt,  in  Historiska  Handlingar,  xii,  pp.  172-177; 
Engestrom,  Minnen  och  Anteckningar ,  i,  pp.  169  f.,  290-304;  Schinkel-Bergman, 
Minnen,  ii,  pp.  175  ff.,  309-312. 


I96  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

cause  of  the  Elector  of  Saxony,  whom  the  great  majority  of  the 
nation  already  favored.1 

At  the  end  of  September  the  Diet  decided  to  refer  to  the  country 
(i.  e.,  to  the  Dietines)  the  question  whether  a  successor  to  the 
throne  should  be  designated  in  the  lifetime  of  the  present  King, 
and  to  recommend  the  choice  of  the  Elector  of  Saxony.  In 
November  the  Dietines  almost  unanimously  answered  the  ques- 
tion in  the  affirmative,  and  also  declared  in  favor  of  the  Saxon 
candidacy.  Only  a  small  number,  however,  pronounced  decidedly 
for  the  hereditary  succession.  At  any  rate,  the  Patriots  might 
well  be  satisfied  with  this  result;  and  the  more  so  because  in  the 
partially  renewed  Diet  (made  up  of  the  members  of  the  old  one 
together  with  an  equal  number  of  new  deputies  chosen  at  the 
same  November  Dietines),  the  reactionaries  were  now  reduced 
to  a  very  small  minority.  In  December  the  long-desired  rap- 
prochement between  the  King  and  the  Patriot  leaders  was 
effected.  The  reformers  were  now  in  a  position  to  proceed  boldly 
with  their  projects. 

Early  in  1791  there  began  to  be  held  regular  secret  meetings, 
in  which  the  King,  Piattoli,  Potocki,  the  Marshal  Malachowski, 
and  a  few  others  participated,  at  which  the  plan  for  a  new  con- 
stitution was  worked  out.  Stanislas  himself  seems  to  have  drawn 
up  the  project  which  served  as  the  basis  for  discussion,  taking 
the  English  system  as  his  model.  So  radical  were  the  changes  pro- 
posed in  this  sketch,  so  far  did  they  go  beyond  what  past  experi- 
ence gave  reason  to  hope  for,  that  the  King  presented  his  draft  to 
his  fellow-conspirators  with  the  apology  that '  these  were  only  the 
dreams  of  a  good  citizen  ';  but  his  friends  replied  unanimously 
and  enthusiastically  that  this  was  not  a  dream,  but  an  excellent 
constitution,  which  with  energy  and  good  will  could  easily  be  put 

1  On  this  affair  of  the  Hohenzollern  candidacy,  see  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  86-89, 
216;  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  ii,  p.  540;  Dembihski,  Documents,  i,  p.  415, 
and  his  monograph  on  Piattoli,  Bulletin  de  VAcadentie  de  Cracovie,  Juin-Juillet, 
1905;  F.  K.  Wittichen,  in  F.  B.  P.G.,  xvii,  pp.  253-262,  and  Preussen  und  die 
Revolutionen  in  Belgien  und  Luttich,  p.  119;  Heigel,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i,  pp.  379 
ff.;  Catherine's  "  Remarques  sur  les  candidats  proposes  pour  la  succession  au 
trone  de  Pologne,"  sent  to  Warsaw  for  use  with  the  '  well-intentioned,'  October 
17/28,  1790,  P.  A.,  X,  71. 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  1 97 

through.1  The  great  point  was  to  lose  no  more  time.  The 
Oriental  crisis  was  obviously  drawing  near  its  close,  and  the 
Patriots  were  resolved  that  the  end  of  the  war  should  not  find 
Poland  still  without  a  stable  and  well-organized  government. 
Realizing  that  at  the  rate  at  which  the  Diet  worked  it  would 
take  years  to  pass  the  new  constitution  in  the  ordinary  way,  the 
reformers  undertook  to  introduce  it  and  have  it  voted  by  a 
coup  de  theatre  in  a  single  session.  By  the  end  of  April  the  prepa- 
rations for  the  great  stroke  were  completed.  About  sixty  persons 
had  now  been  initiated  into  the  scheme;  a  majority  in  the  Diet 
seemed  assured;  and  the  temper  of  the  public  appeared  to  be 
all  that  could  be  desired.  In  the  last  days  of  the  month  the 
news  arrived  that  Pitt  was  beginning  to  back  down  on  the  Eastern 
Question,  and  then  came  the  betrayal  of  the  hitherto  well-guarded 
secret  to  Bulgakov,  the  Russian  minister  at  Warsaw.  That  was 
enough  to  convince  the  conspirators  that  they  must  strike  at 
once,  and  that  it  was  now  or  never.2 

On  the  second  of  May  the  Diet  reassembled  after  the  Easter 
recess.    The  Patriots  had  taken  good  care  to  call  in  their  partisans, 

1  Vom  Entstehen  und  V titer gauge  der  polnisclien  Konstitution  vom  3.  May,  i,  pp. 
170  f. 

2  Our  knowledge  of  the  origin  and  development  of  the  plan  which  was  crowned 
with  success  on  the  Third  of  May,  is  extremely  scanty.  The  chief  source  is  still 
the  book,  The  Rise  and  Fall  of  the  Polish  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May,  iygi 
(in  German  translation,  Leipsic,  1793),  the  apology  of  the  reformers  themselves.  See 
also  Kalinka,  op.  cit.,  iii  (a  volume  which,  unfortunately,  remained  only  a  torso, 
owing  to  the  death  of  the  author) ;  the  Memoirs  of  Oginski;  Dembinski's  monograph 
on  Piattoli,  cited  above;  the  account  given  by  the  King  himself  in  a  long  letter  to 
Glayre  of  June  21,  1791,  in  Mottaz,  Statiislas  Poniatowski  et  Maurice  Glayre,  pp. 
250-268;   Bartoszewicz,  Ksicga  pamiqtkowa  konstytucyi  3.  Maja. 

It  is  one  of  the  most  curious  features  of  this  affair  that  the  secret  was  kept  so 
long.  Since  February  Bulgakov  had  had  a  secret  agent  in  the  immediate  entourage 
of  Ignacy  Potocki  (probably  the  latter's  secretary,  Parendier,  as  Kalinka  and  Smol- 
enski  suspect,  although  Askenazy  has  doubts  of  this).  From  this  spy  the  Russian 
minister  continually  received  copies  of  Potocki's  confidential  papers,  and  especially 
of  the  notes  exchanged  with  Piattoli.  Naturally  the  envoy  was  led  to  conclude 
that  some  great  scheme  was  under  discussion,  presumably  one  for  the  establish- 
ment of  a  '  dictatorship  '  in  Poland  in  case  of  a  general  Furopean  war;  but  he  was 
apparently  not  much  alarmed  until  the  last  week  of  April.  Then  he  began  to  fear 
a  revolution.  On  the  28th  he  learned  the  essence  of  the  whole  project  through 
the   treachery  of   the   Polish   Chancellor,   Jacek   Malachowski,    whom   the  King 


198  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

while  the  Opposition,  despite  the  summons  hastily  sent  out  at 
the  last  moment  by  Bulgakov  and  his  friends,  had  returned  only 
in  small  numbers.  By  this  time  the  plan  of  the  conspirators  had 
become  an  open  secret.  The  English,  Dutch,  and  Prussian 
ministers  were  apprised  of  it,  and  were  already  protesting  against 
it.  On  the  evening  of  the  2nd,  at  a  large  gathering  in  the  Radzi- 
will  Palace,  the  new  constitution  was  read  to  all  comers,  and 
greeted  with  shouts  of  approval.  All  Warsaw  knew  that  some 
great  event  was  coming  on  the  morrow. 

Early  on  the  morning  of  the  3rd  the  streets  of  the  capital  and 
the  approaches  to  the  castle  were  crowded  with  expectant  and 
agitated  throngs.  The  galleries  of  the  hall  of  the  Diet  were 
packed,  and  the  session  began  amid  tense  excitement.  First  on 
the  order  of  the  day  came  a  report  from  the  Deputation  of  Foreign 
Interests.  In  its  name  the  eloquent  Matuszewicz  read  a  number 
of  dispatches  from  the  envoys  at  Vienna,  Paris,  Dresden,  the 
Hague,  and  St.  Petersburg,  showing  various  ominous  develop- 
ments in  the  general  situation  of  Europe,  the  menacing  designs 
of  Russia,  and  the  danger  of  a  new  partition  unless  before  the 
end  of  the  Eastern  war  Poland  had  given  herself  a  strong  govern- 
ment. The  effect  was  all  that  could  have  been  hoped  for.  After 
some  moments  of  silence,  the  Marshal  Potocki  called  upon  the 
King  to  suggest  the  means  of  saving  the  country.  Stanislas  pro- 
duced the  draft  of  the  new  constitution,  which  was  read  aloud. 
Cries  of  '  zgodal  zgoda! '  (agreed!  agreed!)  resounded  from  all 
sides.  But  here  the  handful  of  reactionaries  broke  out  into  wild 
obstruction.  For  hours  there  were  storms  of  eloquence  and  also 
tragi-comic  scenes  —  as,  for  instance,  when  one  republican  fanatic 
raised  his  young  son  in  his  arms  and  threatened  to  stab  him 
on  the  spot,  in  order  that  he  might  not  live  to  see  the  despotism 
which  this  constitution  was  preparing  for  Poland.  At  last  a 
happy  interposition  of  the  King  saved  the  situation;  the  ques- 
tion was  put,  and  with  hardly  a  dozen  dissenting  voices,  amid 
tumultuous  enthusiasm,  the  great  project  was  passed  en  bloc. 
Rising  on  his  throne  Stanislas  at  once  took  the  oath  to  the  new 

had  unwisely  acquainted  with  the  plan  (Bulgakov's  reports  of  February-April, 
M.  A.,  HojiBHia,  III,  62,  63). 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  1 99 

constitution,  and  then  King,  senators,  deputies,  and  people  went 
in  joyful  procession  to  the  nearby  Church  of  St.  John,  to  sing  the 
Te  Deum.  That  night  all  Warsaw  illuminated  and  celebrated. 
Thus  ended  the  bloodless  '  revolution  '  of  the  Third  of  May,  the 
one  altogether  glorious  and  splendid  day  in  the  life  of  Stanislas 
Augustus,  the  last  great  day  of  radiant  joy  and  hope  that  Old 
Poland  was  to  know.1 

If  there  had  been  some  anxiety  as  to  how  the  country  at  large 
would  accept  the  new  constitution,  these  fears  were  quickly  dis- 
pelled. In  the  weeks  following  the  Third  of  May,  letters,  addresses, 
and  deputations  with  warm  expressions  of  approval,  praise,  and 
thanks  flowed  in  from  all  the  provinces.  The  other  cities  vied 
with  Warsaw  in  celebrations;  the  nation  seemed  intoxicated  with 
joy.  From  abroad  came  gratifying  tributes.  Burke  compared 
the  French  and  the  Polish  revolutions,  greatly  to  the  advantage 
of  the  latter,  and  passed  a  noble  eulogy  upon  the  new  constitu- 
tion. It  was  difficult,  wrote  Middleton,  to  describe  the  favorable 
impression  created  at  the  Hague.  Count  Bernstorff  declared  that 
no  unprejudiced  man  could  fail  to  view  this  happy  transformation 
with  joy;  and  Hertzberg,  who  was  not  of  the  unprejudiced  class, 
affirmed  gloomily  that  the  Polish  revolution  was  one  of  the  great- 
est events  of  the  century,  and  would,  in  his  opinion,  have  even 
greater  results  than  the  revolution  in  France.2 

What  then  was  this  much-lauded  constitution  of  the  Third  of 
May  ?  It  was  essentially  an  attempt  to  transform  a  state  of  a 
thoroughly  mediaeval  and  antiquated  pattern  into  a  constitutional 
and  parliamentary  monarchy  of  the  modern  type.  It  abolished 
the  worst  abuses  from  which  Poland  had  for  centuries  been  sick 
and  dying:  the  Liberum  Veto,  the  right  of  Confederation,  elections 
to  the  throne,  the  personal  responsibility  of  the  King  to  the  Diet, 

1  For  the  events  of  the  Third  of  May,  see  the  works  mentioned  in  the  preced- 
ing note;  also  Wegner,  Dzieje  dnia  trzeciego  i  piqtego  maja;  Herrmann,  op.  cit., 
Vl>  PP-  348-358;  Solov'ev,  Geschichte  des  Falles  von  Polen,  pp.  246-251;  KoCTOMa- 
poBi,  Eocii^Hie  rom  PiiH-IIocnojiHTOH,  i,  pp.  450-493;  Smitt,  Suworow,  ii,  pp. 
234-265.  The  best  appreciation  of  the  constitution  is  that  of  Balzer,  "  Reformy 
spoleczne  i  polityczne  konstytucyi  trzeciego  maja,"  Przeglqd  Polski,  1891,  ii, 
and  separate. 

2  Smolenski,  Oslatni  rok  sejmu  wielkiego,  pp.  1-2 1;  Hertzberg  to  Lucchesini, 
May  28,  1791,  in  Dembinski,  Documents,  i,  p.  453. 


200         .     THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

and  the  lack  of  any  effective  executive  power.  The  succession 
was  assured  to  the  Elector  of  Saxony  and  to  his  male  heirs,  or 
in  case  he  should  leave  no  sons,  to  his  daughter  (proclaimed  '  the 
Infanta  of  Poland  ')  and  her  heirs.  The  prerogatives  of  the 
monarch  were  largely  extended.  The  executive  power  was 
lodged  in  his  hands,  to  be  exercised  through  a  council  of  minis- 
ters (the  Straz),  resembling  a  modern  cabinet.  If  the  principle 
of  ministerial  responsibility  was  not  clearly  asserted,  it  was 
approximated  by  the  provisions  that  every  act  of  the  King  must 
be  countersigned  by  a  minister,  and  that  ministers  were  not  only 
criminally  but  also  politically  responsible  to  the  Diet,  since  they 
might  be  removed  at  any  time  by  a  two-thirds  vote  of  that  body. 
The  administration  was  to  be  carried  on  through  four  Commis- 
sions (Army,  Finance,  Police,  and  Education),  acting  under  the 
direction  of  the  King  and  Council,  but  elected  by  and  responsible 
to  the  Diet  (a  rather  unfortunate  concession  to  the  old  fear  of 
despotism).  As  regards  the  legislative  power,  the  chief  inno- 
vations were  these:  that  the  Chamber  of  Deputies,  as  the  direct 
representative  of  the  nation,  was  given  a  decided  preponderance 
over  the  Senate,  which  was  confined  to  the  advisory  and  moder- 
ating role  proper  to  an  appointive  Upper  House;  and,  secondly, 
that  the  Lower  Chamber,  which  had  hitherto  been  essentially  a 
federal  congress  of  ambassadors  from  the  various  provinces,  re- 
ceived an  entirely  new  character  through  the  declaration  that 
each  deputy  was  the  representative  of  the  whole  country  and 
was  thus  —  by  implication  —  not  to  be  bound  by  imperative 
mandates  from  his  local  constituents.  While  a  thoroughgoing 
social  and  economic  reform  would  have  been  at  that  moment 
quite  impracticable,  the  constitution  went  as  far  in  that  direction 
as  was  prudent;  and  it  held  up  a  program,  an  ideal  for  the 
future.  The  economic  barriers  between  nobles  and  bourgeoisie 
were  broken  down;  the  townsmen  recovered  their  judicial  auton- 
omy, and  received  a  number  of  political  rights,  especially  that 
of  admission  to  many  of  the  higher  offices  and  magistracies  (such 
as  the  four  great  administrative  commissions).  Above  all,  the 
gates  to  the  Diet  were  once  more  opened  —  after  two  centuries  — 
to  the  deputies  of  the  Polish  cities,  although  this  representation, 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  201 

unfortunately,  was  still  confined  within  modest  limits.1  Finally, 
the  peasantry,  so  long  left  without  any  recourse  against  the  arbi- 
trary will  of  their  masters,  were  now  taken  under  the  protection 
of  the  law. 

Through  the  abolition  of  the  most  crying  political  evils  of  the 
old  regime,  the  formation  of  a  strong  executive,  and  the  granting 
of  increased  freedom  of  action  to  the  middle  and  lower  classes,  this 
constitution  marked  a  great  advance  upon  all  previous  attempts 
at  reform  in  Poland.  In  its  wise  conservatism,  its  adaptation  of 
foreign  norms  so  far  as  they  were  applicable,  its  refusal  to  follow 
blindly  the  abstract  political  theories  of  the  day,  it  compares 
most  favorably  with  the  work  of  the  contemporary  constitution- 
makers  at  Paris.  It  was  not,  indeed,  free  from  serious  defects; 
the  jurist  will  find  in  it  much  to  criticize;  but  it  must  be  remem- 
bered that  this  was  a  popular  work,  framed  in  a  crisis  to  meet 
quite  peculiar  conditions  and  prejudices,  and  that  on  several 
points  its  arrangements  were  never  intended  to  be  final.  When 
all  is  said,  this  constitution  did  afford  the  possibility  of  a  new, 
sound,  and  progressive  national  life.  It  may  have  been  impolitic 
to  attempt  such  great  changes  at  that  moment,  in  view  of  the 
probable  attitude  of  the  neighboring  Powers;  but  at  any  rate, 
this  heroic  breach  with  the  past,  this  abjuration  of  the  ancient 
sins,  this  renunciation  of  the  idolized  '  golden  liberty  '  throws  an 
immortal  gleam  over  the  last  dark  years  of  the  Republic. 

II 

The  revolution  of  the  Third  of  May  essentially  altered  the 
views  of  the  outside  world  upon  the  Polish  Question.  Hitherto 
foreign  observers  had  followed  the  activity  of  the  Four  Years' 
Diet  with  skepticism  and  a  certain  ironical  indifference.  The 
Poles  were  regarded  as  noisy,  troublesome,  and  childish  people, 
outlandish  in  their  ideas,  fickle  in  temper,  and  incapable  of  great 
and  decisive  deeds.    The  main  problem  was  whether  they  should 

1  The  (royal)  cities  obtained  the  right  of  sending  21  (later  24)  representatives 
to  the  Diet,  as  against  204  deputies  elected  by  the  szlachla  in  the  Dietines.  The 
city-deputies  might  speak  on  all  matters,  but  vote  only  on  municipal  and  commercial 
questions. 


202  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

live  under  the  tutelage  of  Russia  or  Prussia,  provided  they  did 
not  lose  their  political  existence  altogether.  But  after  the  Third 
of  May  the  world  began  to  take  the  Poles  more  seriously.  It  was 
now  the  general  belief  that  the  nation  would  after  all  effect  its 
regeneration,  if  only  it  were  allowed  to  work  out  its  destinies 
undisturbed.  The  great  question  now  was  whether  the  neighbor- 
ing states  would  permit  a  revival,  which  would  in  so  many  ways 
alter  the  old  balance  of  power,  and  which  would  cut  short  so 
many  long-cherished  ambitions.  Would  they  allow  the  new 
constitution  to  stand  ?  Of  the  Powers  most  concerned  Prussia 
and  Austria  were  the  first  to  express  themselves  on  this  question; 
and  for  quite  diverse  reasons  both  pronounced  in  a  sense  un- 
expectedly favorable  to  Poland. 

The  first  tidings  of  the  new  constitution  reached  Berlin  through 
a  dispatch  from  Goltz  of  April  30. l  The  ministers  at  once  drew 
up  a  report  to  the  King  urging  that  if  Poland  were  to  become  an 
hereditary  monarchy,  it  could  not  fail  to  prove  extremely  dan- 
gerous, and  perhaps  even  destructive  to  Prussia.  Goltz  must 
therefore  be  ordered  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  dissuade  the  '  well- 
intentioned  '  party  from  their  plan,  if  it  had  not  already  been 
carried  out.2  The  King  approved,  but  before  the  appropriate 
instructions  could  be  sent  off  there  arrived  the  news  of  the  events 
of  the  Third  of  May,  along  with  a  letter  from  Stanislas  Augustus 
formally  announcing  the  promulgation  of  the  new  constitution. 
It  was  then  a  case  of  making  bonne  mine  a  mauvais  jeu.  The 
cardinal  fact  in  the  situation  was  that  at  this  moment  —  and 
until  the  end  of  May  —  Frederick  William  regarded  a  war  with 
Russia  as  quite  within  the  range  of  possibilities,  and  hence  he 
desired  not  to  antagonize  the  Poles  and  the  Elector  of  Saxony. 
Perhaps  the  influence  of  Ewart  and  Bischoflwerder,  who  were 

1  In  the  early  days  of  the  conspiracy,  it  was  the  plan  of  the  Polish  leaders  to 
send  the  Marshal  Potocki  to  Berlin  to  secure  the  secret  approval  of  Prussia  in 
advance.  This  plan  was  not  carried  out,  perhaps  because  Potocki  disliked  to 
absent  himself  from  Warsaw  at  so  critical  a  moment. 

2  The  ministerial  proposals  of  May  6  are  given  at  some  length  in  Hausser, 
Deutsche  Geschichte,  i,  pp.  304  f.  It  has  again  and  again  been  stated  that  these 
proposals  were  made  after  the  news  of  the  completed  coup  d'etat  arrived,  but  in 
fact  that  news  reached  Berlin  only  on  the  7th. 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  203 

still  preaching  the  Federative  System,  counted  for  something 
here; r  perhaps  the  King's  mind  was  still  susceptible  to  the 
charms  of  posing  as  the  patron  of  revolutions  and  the  liberator  of 
nations;  at  any  rate  he  now  declared  himself  with  a  cordiality 
and  effusiveness  that  surpassed  all  expectations.  In  his  reply  to 
Jablonowski,  the  Polish  envoy,  in  rescripts  to  his  ministers  at 
Warsaw  and  St.  Petersburg,  in  letters  to  Stanislas  Augustus  and 
the  Elector  of  Saxony,  Frederick  William  expressed  his  satisfac- 
tion, approval,  and  admiration  with  regard  to  the  new  constitu- 
tion, which  he  held  to  be  "  indispensable  to  the  happiness  of  the 
Polish  nation."  The  conferring  of  the  crown  upon  the  Saxon 
House  would,  he  wrote,  "  confirm  for  ages  the  close  friendship 
and  harmony  existing  ,:  [between  Prussia  and  Poland].2  These 
declarations  were  within  twelve  months  to  receive  a  bitterly 
ironical  commentary. 

Although  the  statement  was  made  at  that  time  3  and  has  since 
been  championed  by  a  great  German  historian,4  there  is  no 
evidence  to  prove  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  was  informed  in 
advance  of  the  plan  which  was  carried  out  on  the  Third  of  May. 
Doubtless  Austro-Polish  relations  had  improved  considerably 
since  the  preceding  summer.  Leopold's  separation  from  Russia 
by  the  Convention  of  Reichenbach,  his  pacific  tendencies,  the 
assurances  of  his  warm  goodwill  towards  the  Republic  brought 
back  by  all  the  Poles  who  visited  Vienna,  the  still  half-credited 
tale  that  he  had  refused  a  Prussian  proposition  for  a  new  partition, 

1  Cf.  Ewart's  account  of  his  intervention  here,  Dropmore  Papers,  ii,  pp.  75  f. 

2  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  126  f.,  224  ff. 

3  Bulgakov's  Vienna  correspondent,  May  16,  1791:  "Si  je  ne  juge  pas  mal 
des  choses,  le  ministere  autrichien  s'attendoit,  a  quelque  chose  de  pareil,  et  je  ne 
peux  meme  en  douter,"  M.  A.,  IIojiMiia,  III,  63. 

4  Sybel.  There  can  be  no  need  to  enter  here  into  the  controversy  so  warmly 
conducted  between  Sybel  and  Herrmann  fifty  years  ago  regarding  the  Polish  policy 
of  Leopold  II.  The  dispute  raged  chiefly  about  Sybel's  theses:  (1)  that  Leopold 
had  a  hand  in  preparing  the  coup  d'etat  of  the  third  of  May;  (2)  that  he  then  exerted 
himself  actively  to  secure  the  general  recognition  of  the  new  constitution  by  the 
Powers;  (3)  that  he  originated  the  plan  for  the  permanent  union  of  Poland  and 
Saxony.  It  is  now  clear  that  Sybel  was  wrong  on  the  first  and  third  of  these  points, 
but  quite  right  regarding  the  second.  Later  researches,  especially  Beer's,  have 
deprived  the  controversy  of  practical  interest. 


204 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


all  this  combined  to  inspire » more  confidence  in  Austria  than 
had  previously  been  felt  at  Warsaw.1  Both  Republicans  and 
Patriots  had  begun  to  form  some  hopes  of  gaining  the  Em- 
peror's patronage.  In  February,  1791,  Rzewuski,  one  of  the 
leading  reactionaries,  fruitlessly  proposed  at  Vienna  to  form  a 
Counter-confederation  under  Austrian  protection  2  very  similar 
to  that  which  was  later  organized  under  Catherine's  auspices. 
About  the  same  time  one  of  the  most  active  among  the  Polish 
reformers  advanced  the  idea  that  in  view  of  the  untrustworthi- 
ness  of  Prussia  the  Republic  would  do  well  to  seek  support 
rather  in  the  friendship  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  It  was  un- 
doubtedly proposed  to  sound  Leopold  in  advance  regarding  the 
plan  for  a  new  constitution  and  a  coup  d'etat;  but  apparently 
the  proposal  was  not  carried  out.3  Down  to  the  Third  of  May 
no  real  connection  existed  between  the  Warsaw  reformers  and 
the  Austrian  cabinet;  and  there  was  still  no  Austrian  party 
in  Poland. 

The  news  of  the  coup  d'etat  was  received  at  Vienna  with  almost 
universal  approbation.  In  the  salons  people  lauded  '  the  Polish 
revolution  '  to  the  skies,  by  way  of  showing  their  horror  for 
the  French  one.4  Kaunitz,  too,  was  extremely  well  pleased.  The 
new  constitution,  he  was  sure,  was  directly  opposed  to  all  the 
interests,  plans,  and  desires  of  Prussia:  hence  he  highly  approved 
of  it.  The  old  anarchy,  the  factions,  the  interregna  had  offered 
a  fine  field  to  the  intrigues  of  Berlin;  and  now,  it  was  to  be  hoped, 
all  that  was  done  away  with.    Under  hereditary  monarchs  and  a 

1  Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  363  f.;  Goltz's  report  of  April  13,  1701,  in  Herr- 
mann, op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  568  {.;  Zaleski,  Zywot  Czartoryskiego,  pp.  258  f. 

2  Rzewuski's  plan  is  to  be  found  among  the  Vortrdge  of  1791  in  the  Vienna 
Archives,  accompanied  by  an  undated  note  from  Leopold  to  Kaunitz,  asking  his 
opinion,  and  by  the  Chancellor's  reply,  dated  February  8  —  a  scathing  condem- 
nation of  so  unholy  a  project. 

3  The  proposal  was  made  by  Piattoli  in  a  Memoire  of  March  4,  1791 :  see  Smolka, 
"  Genezya  konstytucyi  3.  maja,"  in  Bulletin  International  de  VAcademie  des 
Sciences  de  Cracovie,  Comptes  rendus  des  seances  de  I'annee  i8gi,  pp.  350-354. 
Smolka  believed  that  Leopold  was  really  sounded  on  the  subject  before  the  Third 
of  May,  but  Dembinski  argues  convincingly  against  this  view  in  his  above-cited 
monograph  on  Piattoli. 

4  Bulgakov's  Vienna  correspondent,  May  14,  18,  28,  M.  A.,  Ilojitma,  III,  63. 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  205 

stronger  executive,  Poland  might  recover  sufficient  force  to  main- 
tain her  integrity;  that  was  all  he  required  of  her;  he  reflected 
that  there  would  always  remain  enough  of  the  old  republican 
leaven  to  prevent  this  state  from  becoming  dangerous  to  its 
neighbors,  and  he  believed  that  in  the  long  run  a  revived  Poland 
would  see  that  its  true  interest  lay  in  cleaving  to  the  Imperial 
Courts.  For  the  present,  the  revolution  had  come  very  much 
a  propos  to  increase  the  embarrassments  of  His  Prussian  Majesty 
over  the  Eastern  Question.  If  Austria  and  Russia,  by  taking 
the  new  constitution  under  their  protection,  could  win  over  Po- 
land and  Saxony  immediately,  that  would  add  the  crowning  blow 
to  the  discomfiture  of  Berlin.1  This  was,  indeed,  only  a  continua- 
tion of  the  Chancellor's  previous  policy.  Of  any  new  departure, 
of  any  independent  and  specifically  Austrian  system  towards 
Poland  apart  from  or  in  opposition  to  Russia,  there  was  at  that 
time  no  thought. 

Leopold  at  first  judged  the  events  at  Warsaw  less  accurately 
than  Kaunitz  had  done.  He  suspected  that  the  King  of  Prussia 
had  had  a  hand  in  this  affair,  and  that  he  was  scheming  to  marry 
a  Hohenzollern  to  the  '  Infanta,'  or  else  to  realize  his  ambitions 
upon  Dantzic;  he  also  feared  that  the  revolution  might  lead  to 
new  disturbances  in  the  Republic.2  But  Kaunitz's  report  of 
May  12,  together  with  a  reassuring  letter  from  Frederick  William, 
soon  removed  these  suspicions;  and  henceforth  the  Emperor  and 
his  Chancellor  were  agreed  in  approving  the  salutary  change  in 
Poland.3 

1  These  ideas  in  Kaunitz's  dispatches  to  Cobenzl  of  May  25,  and  his  report  to 
the  Emperor  of  May  12,  V.  A.,  Exped.,  Russland,  and  Vortrdge,  1791. 

2  Leopold  to  Kaunitz,  May  20,  the  first  expression  of  the  Emperor's  opinion 
on  the  Polish  revolution  that  has  come  to  light  (printed  in  Beer,  Joseph  II,  Leopold 
II,  und  Kaunitz,  pp.  404  f.).  This,  together  with  his  letters  to  Marie  Christine  of 
June  2  and  9  (Wolf,  Leopold  II  und  Marie  Christine,  pp.  231  ff.)  show  how  un- 
expected and  perplexing  the  news  was  to  Leopold. 

3  The  Emperor's  apostil  to  Kaunitz's  report  of  May  12;  Frederick  William  to 
Leopold,  May  21,  Vivenot,  op.  tit.,  i,  p.  133;  cf.  Elgin's  reports  of  May  25  and  26, 
F.  z.  D.  G.  v,  pp.  255  ff. 

Sybel's  contention  that  Leopold's  suggestion  to  Elgin  on  May  9  about  a  general 
guarantee  of  the  Polish  constitution  related  to  the  new  constitution,  is  quite  un- 
tenable. The  news  of  the  coup  d'etat  at  Warsaw  reached  Vienna  only  on  the  ioth, 
and  Leopold  was  then  in  Florence. 


206 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Meanwhile,  even  before  getting  Leopold's  orders,  Kaunitz 
had  felt  sure  enough  of  his  sovereign's  views  to  act.  Immediately 
after  the  news  of  the  revolution  arrived,  he  hastened  to  order 
de  Cache  at  Warsaw  and  Hartig  at  Dresden  to  express  the  Em- 
peror's complete  approval  of  the  new  constitution  and  of  the 
succession  in  the  Saxon  House.1  This  friendly  advance  encour- 
aged the  Elector  Frederick  Augustus  to  turn  to  Leopold  directly 
for  advice  as  to  the  acceptance  of  the  proffered  crown.  He  was 
unable  to  form  a  decision,  he  declared,  until  the  constitution  of 
the  Republic  and  its  relations  with  the  neighboring  Powers  had 
been  arranged  in  such  a  way  as  would  enable  him  to  fulfil  both 
the  obligations  imposed  by  the  crown  of  Poland  and  his  duties 
to  his  hereditary  states.  The  Emperor  replied  with  a  very 
friendly  letter,  approving  the  Elector's  scruples  and  assuring 
him  of  his  own  favorable  attitude,  which  he  believed  he  could 
state  was  shared  by  the  other  Powers.  Kaunitz  began  to  make 
a  great  show  of  zeal  on  behalf  of  the  Court  of  Dresden,  but  he 
did  not  press  it  for  an  immediate  decision.  It  was  enough  for  the 
moment  to  bind  Saxony  to  Austria;  the  final  settlement  of 
Polish  affairs  would  have  to  wait  until  he  had  arrived  at  a 
thorough  understanding  with  Russia.2 

In  his  dispatches  to  Louis  Cobenzl  of  May  24  and  25,  the 
Austrian  Chancellor  made  the  first  of  what  was  destined  to  be  a 
long  series  of  efforts  to  win  Catherine's  approval  for  the  new  con- 
stitution of  Poland.  With  great  expenditure  of  cleverly  chosen 
arguments  he  labored  to  prove  that  the  strengthening  of  the 
Republic  was  now  as  much  to  the  advantage  of  Russia  as  its 
weakening  might  formerly  have  been;  that  the  maintenance  of 
the  old  anarchy  could  serve  only  the  insidious  schemes  of  the 
Court  of  Berlin;    that  even  under  the  new  regime  Russia  could 

1  Instructions  to  de  Cache  of  May  14,  repeated  the  25;  instructions  to  Hartig, 
May  11,  V.  A.,  Exped.,  Polen  and  Sachsen,  1791. 

2  Frederick  Augustus  to  Leopold,  May  27,  and  the  Emperor's  reply,  June  11, 
Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  147,  166  f.;  Kaunitz  to  Hartig,  June  4.  This  seems  to  have 
been  the  first  correspondence  between  the  two  sovereigns  with  regard  to  the 
Polish  crown.  The  document  printed  in  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  106  —  ostensibly  a 
letter  from  Leopold  to  the  Elector  of  March  24,  1791  —  is  the  draft  of  a  letter  which 
in  all  probability  was  never  sent. 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  207 

always  exercise  as  much  influence  in  Poland  as  she  needed ;  while 
if  she  found  it  necessary  to  make  some  small  changes  in  the  con- 
stitution, means  and  opportunities  would  assuredly  not  be  lacking 
before  the  new  order  of  things  had  had  time  to  get  thoroughly 
established.  The  great  thing  at  present  was  to  outbid  Prussia  at 
Warsaw  and  Dresden.  It  would  be  a  capital  stroke  if  the  Imperial 
Courts  could  confront  the  would-be  dictators  of  Europe  with  a 
quadruple  alliance  of  Russia,  Austria,  Saxony,  and  Poland.1  It 
was  a  program  in  Kaunitz's  best  style,  clear,  logical,  compre- 
hensive, imposing.  Nothing  could  be  more  adapted  to  the  cardi- 
nal principle  of  the  Austrian  policy  of  the  past  fifty  years,  for 
what  more  formidable  barrier  could  be  reared  against  Prussian 
ambition  than  a  reinvigorated  Poland  backed  by  all  the  might  of 
Austria  and  Russia  ?  It  was  the  last  of  Kaunitz's  great  combina- 
tions against  Prussia,  and  like  so  many  of  his  choicest  creations  it 
had  one  very  serious  defect.  He  was  badly  in  error  regarding  the 
real  sentiments  that  reigned  on  the  Neva. 

When  the  news  of  the  Third  of  May  first  reached  St.  Peters- 
burg, Cobenzl  found  the  Empress,  Potemkin,  and  all  the  minis- 
ters filled  with  anger  and  alarm.  There  was  talk  of  a  concert  of 
the  three  neighboring  Powers  to  undo  this  work  of  revolution,  of 
a  Counter-confederation,  of  a  new  partition.2    After  the  first 

1  The  dispatches  of  May  24-25  are  printed  in  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  138-145. 

2  Cobenzl's  report  of  May  13,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1701. 

Cobenzl  wrote:  "  J'ai  trouve  l'lmperatrice,  le  Prince  Potemkin  et  le  Comte 
Ostermann  .  .  .  fort  affectes  de  l'ldee  que  la  Pologne  pourroit  prendre  une  Con- 
sistence reelle,  tandis  qu'on  regarde  ici  comme  l'lnteret  de  toutes  les  Puissances 
voisines,  qu'Elle  reste  dans  son  Etat  de  Nullite.  S.  M.  me  fit  la  grace  de  me  dire, 
qu'il  est  essentiel  de  se  concerter  avec  Nous  a  cet  egard.  J'ai  assure  cette  Princesse, 
que  Nous  etions  toujours  prets  sur  tous  les  objets  possibles.  Mais,  me  dit  l'lmpera- 
trice, puis-je  compter  sur  vous  ?  J'ai  repondu  a  S.  M.  que  des  que  Nous  aurons  le 
moyen,  l'Empereur  ne  connoissoit  aucuns  bornes  a  desirer  de  l'employer  pour  la 
cause  de  la  Russie;  a  quoi  S.  M.  a  repondu,  il  me  faut  dans  ce  moment-ci  quelque 
chose  de  plus  positif.  .  .  ."  Vorontsov  believed  "  que  si  la  chose  s'est  faite  contre 
le  gr6  du  Cabinet  de  Potsdam,  il  en  sera  d'autant  plus  dispose  a.  un  nouveau  Traite 
de  Partage,  qui  mettroit  fin  a  tout,  bien  entendu  que  les  deux  Cours  Imp£riales 
agissent  en  cela  comme  en  tout  d'un  parfait  concert.  .  .  ."  "  On  ne  seroit  pas 
fach6  s'il  resultoit  de  ce  que  le  Roi  de  Pologne  a  entrepris,  une  scission  dans  la 
Nation  Polonoise  et  des  Troubles.  Le  Prince  Potemkin  est  assez  port6  pour  l'id6e 
de  former  une  Confederation  dans  les  Provinces  Polonoises,  qui  avoisinent  la 
Russie,  et  on  m'assure  que  tout  le  Monde  y  est  disposeV' 


208  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

flush  of  anger  was  over,  however,  Ostermann  began  to  alter  his 
tone.  After  all,  he  declared,  the  revolution  offered  many  advan- 
tages to  the  Imperial  Courts,  especially  the  chance  to  form  an 
alliance  with  Poland  and  Saxony,  which  would  be  a  stinging  blow 
to  Prussia.  He  was  very  curious  to  know  what  the  Court  of 
Vienna  thought  of  this  change,  and  prodigal  of  assurances  that 
Russia  would  take  no  action  in  the  matter  except  in  closest  agree- 
ment with  Austria.1  When  Kaunitz's  dispatches  arrived,  the 
Vice- Chancellor  affirmed  that  they  accorded  perfectly  with  what 
he  himself  had  already  proposed  to  the  Empress;  but  he  could 
not  yet  say  what  Her  Majesty's  final  decision  would  be.  Potem- 
kin  also  declared  that  he  agreed  entirely  with  Kaunitz.2  Other 
questions  at  this  time  seemed  to  absorb  the  attention  of  the 
Russian  ministry,  which  was  then  in  the  throes  of  the  final 
negotiation  with  England  and  Prussia.  It  was  only  in  the  middle 
of  July  that  Cobenzl  received  a  half-way  definite  answer  on 
Polish  affairs,  which  was  to  the  effect  that  the  Empress  would 
postpone  a  decision  regarding  the  new  constitution  until  the 
close  of  the  Turkish  war,  and  would  then  concert  her  future 
course  of  action  with  Austria.3  With  that  the  matter  rested. 
Both  Cobenzl  and  Kaunitz  remained  for  some  time  in  the  com- 
fortable conviction  that  on  the  Polish  question  the  Russian  point 
of  view  was  not  far  removed  from  the  Austrian.  What  the 
Empress'  real  intentions  were,  we  shall  have  occasion  to  see 
later.  Meanwhile  it  is  necessary  to  take  up  the  long-dropped 
thread  of  the  negotiation  for  the  Austro-Prussian  alliance. 

Ill 

Since  Bischoffwerder's  return  from  the  Austrian  capital  in 
March,  the  plan  which  had  formed  the  object  of  his  journey  had 
been  at  a  standstill.  The  pretence  of  negotiating  about  it  had 
been  kept  up  through  a  fitful  exchange  of  memorials  and  opinions 
between  Berlin  and  Vienna;  but  the  great  question  of  the  admis- 
sion of  Russia  to  the  proposed  union  seemed  to  offer  an  insur- 

1  Cobenzl's  reports  of  May  17  and  June  4,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit. 

2  Cobenzl's  report  of  June  27,  ibid. 

3  Cobenzl's  report  of  July  19,  ibid. 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  209 

mountable  obstacle,  and  at  least  on  the  Austrian  side  there  was 
little  eagerness  to  carry  the  matter  further  ac  present.  Kaunitz 
was  still  eloquently  opposed  to  the  project;  and  the  Emperor  was 
well  content  to  delay  the  affair,  as  long  as  there  was  danger  of  a 
war  between  his  present  and  his  prospective  allies.  What  first 
gave  a  new  impetus  to  the  plan  was  the  mission  of  Lord  Elgin  to 
Leopold,  already  mentioned  in  connection  with  England's  back- 
down on  the  Eastern  Question.  During  May  and  June  this 
irrepressible  young  gentleman  pursued  the  Emperor  around  Italy, 
persecuting  him  with  offers  for  an  alliance  with  England  and 
Prussia,  and  with  appeals  for  aid  in  bringing  the  Tsarina  to 
reason.  Leopold  was  not  inclined  to  exert  himself  overmuch 
merely  in  order  to  save  Pitt's  imperiled  bark  from  shipwreck;  he 
made  no  binding  promises;  but  he  did  not  mind  giving  pleasant 
assurances  of  a  general  character,  which  kept  Elgin  in  high  hopes 
and  led  him  to  send  the  most  optimistic  bulletins  to  London  and 
Berlin.  From  one  of  these  reports,  communicated  by  Ewart,  the 
Prussian  government  was  informed  of  the  Emperor's  wish  to  have 
a  confidential  agent  sent  to  him  by  the  King,  and  of  his  particular 
desire  to  see  "  the  excellent  Colonel  Bischoffwerder  "  again.1 

Frederick  William  at  once  determined  to  comply  with  so 
flattering  a  suggestion.  At  this  time  —  near  the  end  of  May  — 
the  King  still  believed  in  the  possibility  of  war  with  Russia;  and 
he  was  encouraged  by  Elgin's  reports  to  hope  that  Leopold  could 
be  drawn  over  to  the  side  of  the  Triple  Alliance,  or  at  least  in- 
duced to  promise  his  neutrality.  Besides,  he  did  not  mean  to  let 
England  be  the  first  to  conclude  an  alliance  with  the  Emperor; 
the  principal  role  belonged  to  himself,  since  he  had  originally 
taken  the  initiative  in  this  matter.  In  the  lengthy  instructions 
drawn  up  by  the  Prussian  ministers,  Bischoffwerder  was  ordered 
first  of  all  to  make  sure  that  Leopold  would  actively  support  the 
new  terms  of  peace  proposed  by  the  Triple  Alliance  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  also  that  he  would  immediately  put  a  stop  to  the 
chicaneries  by  which  Kaunitz  was  insidiously  protracting  the 
Austro-Turkish  peace  congress  at  Sistova.  Once  assured  on 
these  points,  the  envoy  was  authorized  to  conclude  a  treaty  of 

1  See  Appendix  VI,  1. 


2IO  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

alliance,  preferably  one  between  Austria  and  Prussia  alone,  to 
which  England  might  later  be  invited  to  accede.  Under  no  cir- 
cumstances was  Russia  to  be  admitted  to  the  new  union;  Leopold 
must  promise  to  remain  neutral  in  case  of  war  between  the  King 
and  the  Empress;  and  in  fact  the  whole  tenor  of  the  instructions 
shows  clearly  that  opposition  to  Russia  was  intended  to  be  the 
cardinal  principle  of  the  Austro-Prussian  alliance.  It  was  quite  in 
accordance  with  that  tendency  that  Bischoffwerder  was  ordered 
to  stop  en  route  at  Dresden  and  urge  the  Elector  to  accept  the 
Polish  crown  immediately,  contenting  himself  with  the  approval 
of  Prussia,  England,  and  Austria,  and  paying  no  attention  to 
Russia.1 

The  envoy  set  out  from  Berlin  May  30,  tarried  two  days  in  the 
Saxon  capital,  where  his  zealous  exhortations  failed  to  shake 
Frederick  Augustus  out  of  his  cautious  reserve,  and  arrived  on 
June  9  at  Milan,  where  the  Emperor  was  then  staying.  Leopold 
was  somewhat  glacial  at  the  first  meeting,  apparently  for  the 
purpose  of  showing  that  it  was  not  he  who  was  courting  allies. 
But  immediately  afterwards  his  tone  changed,  he  became  all 

1  Instructions  of  May  28,  1791,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172. 

Art.  8  of  the  instruction:  "  II  est  de  la  plus  grande  importance  d'ecarter  toute 
participation  de  la  Cour  de  Russie  a  la  Negociation  et  au  Traite  a  conclure,  sur 
laquelle  le  Prince  Kaunitz  et  ses  Adherens  ne  manqueront  pas  d'insister,  mais  qui 
seroit  entierement  incompatible  avec  les  interets  du  Roi  et  la  Situation  actuelle  des 
choses,  et  que  l'Empereur  lui-meme,  selon  les  assurances  du  Lord  Elgin,  paroit 
regarder  comme  telle.  .  .  ." 

Art.  7:  "  Comme  la  garantie  de  la  Pologne  dans  ses  frontieres  actuelles  et  le 
maintien  de  la  constitution  libre  et  independante  de  la  Pologne  paroit  tenir  fort  a 
cceur  a  ce  Monarque  [Leopold]  et  n'est  pas  moins  conforme  aux  vues  et  aux  interets 
de  Sa  Majesty,  rien  n'empeche  que  le  Colonel  Bischoffwerder  n'y  accede  tout  de 
suite.  ..." 

Art.  2:  "  Le  Colonel  de  Bischoffwerder  etant  charge  de  prendre  sa  route  par 
Dresde  afin  de  profiter  du  sejour  qu'il  y  fera  pour  fixer  les  irresolutions  de  l'Electeur 
de  Saxe  sur  Pacceptation  du  throne  de  Pologne,  il  cherchera  a  se  menager  une 
audience  aupres  de  ce  Prince  pour  rectifier  ses  idees  et  celles  des  personnes  les 
plus  influentes  de  sa  Cour  sur  cette  matiere.  ...  II  semble  que  la  considera- 
tion qui  resultera  pour  la  Saxe  meme  de  l'acceptation  du  throne  de  Pologne  par 
l'Electeur;  les  suites  facheuses  qu'un  refus  ou  meme  la  simple  vacillation  de  ce 
Prince  pourroient  avoir  en  Pologne  .  .  . ;  enfin  la  suret6  qui  resulte  pour  l'Elec- 
teur de  l'Amitie  et  de  l'Alliance,  s'il  en  est  besoin,  de  la  Prusse  et  de  l'Angleterre, 
seront  les  principaux  motifs  qu'on  pourra  faire  valoir  pour  inspirer  de  la  fermete 
a  ce  Prince. 


1  •  t 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  211 

affability,  and  '  the  worthy  Colonel '  was  soon  completely  under 
the  spell.  The  explanation  of  Leopold's  altered  attitude  is  to  be 
found  in  a  startling  piece  of  news  which  had  reached  him  imme- 
diately after  Bischoffwerder's  arrival.  On  June  12  came  a  letter 
from  Marie  Antoinette,  announcing  that  the  French  royal  family 
were  about  to  attempt  their  escape  from  Paris;  and  the  Emperor 
saw  before  himself  the  prospect  of  having  to  undertake  armed 
intervention  on  their  behalf.1  In  such  a  case,  the  assistance  of 
Prussia  would  be  indispensable.  The  alliance  at  once  became 
an  urgent  and  pressing  matter.  Hence  he  hastened  to  give 
Bischoffwerder  all  the  assurances  required  that  peace  should 
promptly  be  concluded  at  Sistova;  both  were  agreed  in  thrusting 
Elgin  aside  and  negotiating  the  alliance  between  themselves 
alone;  and  the  exact  provisions  of  the  treaty  furnished  no  great 
difficulties.  After  but  slight  resistance,  Bischoffwerder  gave  way 
on  the  question  of  inviting  the  adhesion  of  Russia,  and  he  entered 
with  the  greatest  readiness  into  Leopold's  proposals  with  regard 
to  French  affairs.  After  a  few  conferences,  the  two  found  them- 
selves agreed  on  the  principal  points,  and  it  remained  only  to  put 
their  arrangements  on  paper  after  the  return  to  Vienna.2  The 
conclusion  of  the  formal  treaty  of  alliance  was,  indeed,  to  be  post- 
poned until  after  the  final  pacification  in  the  East;  but  a  pre- 
liminary convention  containing  the  essential  articles  was  to  be 
signed  at  once. 

On  arriving  at  Vienna  about  the  middle  of  July,  Bischoffwerder 
fell  into  the  toils  of  the  Austrians  more  hopelessly  than  ever.  He 
was  flattered  by  the  Emperor's  show  of  confidence;  he  was  over- 
whelmed with  attentions  by  Cobenzl  and  Spielmann,  and  even  by 
Kaunitz  himself;  for  the  old  Chancellor,  having  once  made  up  his 
mind  to  what  he  could  no  longer  prevent,  had  now  developed  an 
astonishing  zeal  for  '  the  new  system,'  and  delivered  the  most 
edifying  disquisitions  on  this  alliance,  which  would  startle  the 

1  Marie  Antoinette  to  Leopold,  June  1,  and  his  reply  of  June  12,  Arneth, 
Marie  Antoinette,  Joseph  II  und  Leopold  II,  pp.  166  f.,  177  ff.;  Feuillet  de  Conches, 
op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  72,  78. 

2  The  above  chiefly  from  Bischoffwerder's  reports  of  June  14  and  18,  B.  A.,  R.  1, 
Conv.  172,  and  from  the  "Journal  iiber  die  Verhandlungen  mit  Bischoffwerder," 
printed  in  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  176-181. 


V 


212  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

world  and  eclipse  even  the  wondrous  Treaty  of  Versailles.1 
Never  did  a  negotiation  pass  off  more  smoothly;  never  was  dip- 
lomat more  trustful,  more  compliant,  more  facile  than  '  the 
excellent  Colonel  Bischoffwerder.'  Two  conferences  sufficed  for 
everything.  At  the  first,  the  Prussian  envoy  submitted  his  prop- 
ositions, there  was  general  discussion,  and  Spielmann  promised 
to  draw  up  the  articles  of  the  convention.  At  the  second,  Kau- 
nitz  presented  the  completed  draft;  whereupon  Bischoffwerder, 
although  he  had  heard  it  for  the  first  time,  and  although  it 
differed  greatly  from  the  propositions  he  had  made,  signed  it  at 
once,  "  seeing,"  as  he  wrote  to  his  King,  "  that  it  was  the  ne  plus 
ultra  of  what  I  could  obtain,  that  there  was  nothing  in  it  disad- 
vantageous to  Your  Majesty,  and  that  I  should  spoil  everything 
by  showing  any  lack  of  confidence."  2  In  truth,  it  was  a  bargain 
in  which  the  Austrians  had  carried  every  point.  Bischoffwerder 
agreed  to  the  future  admission  of  Russia  to  the  alliance,  and  to  the 
omission  from  the  treaty  of  every  phrase  that  might  wound  the 
Empress'  susceptibilities;  he  consented  to  an  article  providing 
for  mutual  assistance  in  case  of  internal  disturbances,  and  to 
another  which  guaranteed  the  Austrian  rights  to  Lusatia  in  case  of 
the  extinction  of  the  male  line  of  Saxony;  he  accepted  an  article 
providing  for  a  concert  on  the  affairs  of  France. 

Particularly  important  were  the  stipulations  of  the  convention 
regarding  Poland.  The  'separate  article'  on  that  subject  ran: 
"  As  the  interests  and  tranquillity  of  the  Powers  which  are  neigh- 
bors of  Poland  render  infinitely  desirable  the  establishment  of 
such  a  concert  between  them  as  will  remove  all  jealousy  or  appre- 
hension of  preponderance,  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  will 
agree,  and  will  invite  the  Court  of  Russia  to  agree  with  them,  not 
to  undertake  anything  contrary  to  the  integrity  and  to  the  main- 
tenance of  the  free  constitution  of  Poland ;  never  to  seek  to  place 
a  prince  of  their  respective  Houses  upon  the  throne  of  Poland, 

1  Bischoffwerder's  journal  of  his  negotiation  (passim),  B.  A.,  R.  i,  Conv.  172; 
Kaunitz  to  Leopold,  July  26,  V.  A.,  Vorlrdge,  1791.  The  Chancellor  wrote  that  this 
alliance  "  fait  a.  peu  pres  le  second  Tome  du  Traite  de  Versailles,  qui  a  etonne  toute 
l'Europe  dans  son  temps,  et  a  sauve  alors  la  Monarchic  Autrichienne." 

2  Bischoffwerder's  reports  of  July  22  and  25,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit.;  Spielmann  to 
the  Emperor,  July  23,  V.  A.,  Vorlrdge,  1791. 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  21 3 

either  by  a  marriage  with  the  Princess  Infanta  or  in  case  of  a  new 
election;  and  not  to  employ  their  influence  in  either  of  these  latter 
cases  to  determine  the  choice  of  the  Republic  in  favor  of  another 
prince,  save  by  a  common  agreement  among  themselves." 

The  significance  of  this  article  has  been  much  disputed.  On  the 
one  hand,  it  has  been  taken  for  a  guarantee  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  Third  of  May,  and  a  declaration  that  could  only  be  regarded 
as  an  insult  at  St.  Petersburg; l  and  on  the  other  hand,  it  has  been 
called  a  virtual  surrender  of  Poland  to  Russia,  the  first  sign  of  the 
abandonment  of  the  Republic  by  its  Prussian  ally.2  Both  these 
interpretations  are  probably  erroneous.  This  article  was  a 
restatement  of  the  one  proposed  by  Bischoffwerder  in  February, 
modified  in  accordance  with  the  circumstances  and  with  certain 
considerations  urged  by  the  Austrians.  The  original  Prussian 
proposal  had  had  for  its  chief  aim  to  prevent  Russia  from  recover- 
ing her  former  predominance  in  Poland ;  and  it  had  also  contained 
a  virtual  guarantee  of  the  existing  constitution  of  the  Republic. 
In  July  the  Austrian  ministers  insisted  on  toning  down  this  article 
in  such  a  way  as  to  render  it  ostensible  and  fit  to  be  presented  for 
Catherine's  acceptance.  They  fully  agreed  with  Bischoffwerder 
that  the  main  object  was  to  uphold  the  new  constitution  and  to 
prevent  Poland  from  again  falling  under  the  control  of  Russia  or 
any  other  foreign  Power;  but  Spielmann  urged  that  it  was  both 
imprudent  and  unnecessary  to  use  terms  that  would  lead  the 
Empress  to  think  that '  they  were  trying  to  prescribe  laws  to  her,' 
or  meant  to  extort  her  consent  to  the  new  regime  in  Poland  by 
force.  Moderate  language  and  courteous  forms  would  be  far 
more  likely  to  bring  Catherine  to  accept  the  Austro-Prussian 
standpoint.3  Hence  an  article  the  terms  of  which  had  been  soft- 
ened down  until  they  had  wellnigh  lost  all  clearness  and  vigor,  but 
the  underlying  spirit  of  which  was  undeniably  favorable  to  Poland. 

The  provision  as  to  "  the  free  constitution  "  was  indefinite, 
indeed,  but,  coupled  with  that  regarding  the  Infanta,  it  implied 

1  Sybel,  //.  Z.,  xxiii,  pp.  77  f. 

2  Herrmann,  Erganzungsband,  p.  40,  and  F.  z.  D.  G.,  v,  pp.  239  f.;  Askenazy, 
op.  cit.,  pp.  150  ff. 

3  Spielmann's  report  to  the  Emperor,  July  23,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit.;  Bischoffwerder's 
journal  of  his  negotiation,  July  22,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


214 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


a  recognition  of  the  new  constitution,  and  was  so  interpreted 
both  at  Warsaw  and  St.  Petersburg.  There  was  no  guarantee  of 
the  new  form  of  government,  but  the  Poles  had  lately  been  de- 
claiming a  great  deal  about  the  irksomeness  of  such  foreign 
guarantees.  The  exclusion  from  the  Polish  throne  of  members 
of  the  reigning  houses  of  the  three  neighboring  states  was  in 
conformity  with  the  interests  of  the  Republic;  and  —  it  may  be 
added  —  it  involved  the  sacrifice  of  certain  plans  that  Frederick 
William  had  long  taken  very  seriously.  The  fact  that  Russia 
was  to  be  invited  to  join  in  the  concert  on  Polish  affairs  did  not 
imply  that  the  other  two  Courts  were  at  that  time  ready  to  con- 
cur with  Russian  plans  hostile  to  Poland.  The  attitude  which 
the  Empress  would  finally  assume  towards  the  new  constitution 
was  quite  unknown  at  Berlin  and  Vienna;  indeed  Cobenzl's 
latest  reports  had  led  the  Austrians  to  hope  that  she  would  adopt 
their  ideas  on  that  subject.  The  one  part  of  the  article  that  could 
hardly  be  reconciled  with  a  strict  regard  for  the  independence  of 
Poland  was  that  which  suggested  the  possibility  of  a  future  con- 
cert of  the  three  Powers  with  respect  to  the  succession  to  the 
throne;  for  that  implied  that  the  contracting  parties  had  not 
altogether  renounced  interfering  in  the  internal  affairs  of  the 
Republic.  But  taken  as  a  whole  these  provisions  were  of  a  nature 
to  give  satisfaction  at  Warsaw.  Their  essential  significance  lay 
in  this :  that  at  a  time  when  the  fate  of  the  new  Polish  constitu- 
tion hung  in  the  balance,  Austria  and  Prussia  had  agreed  to  recog- 
nize that  constitution,  to  abstain  from  all  enterprises  against  it 
themselves,  and  to  attempt  to  induce  Russia  to  adopt  the  same 
attitude.1 

The  PreHminary  Convention  of  Vienna  was  signed  July  25, 
and  forwarded  the  next  day  to  Berlin  for  ratification.  The  Prus- 
sian ministry  were  filled  with  indignation  when  they  received 
this  masterpiece  of  Bischoffwerder's  diplomacy.  They  found 
that  he  had  been  completely  the  dupe  of  the  Austrians;  that  he 
had  agreed  to  articles  on  which  he  had  never  had  any  instructions 
(especially  that  relating  to  the  concert  on  French  affairs);  and 
that  he  had  acted  in  flat  violation  of  his  instructions  in  signing 

1  Some  further  discussion  of  this  article  will  be  found  in  Appendix  VI,  2. 


THE   THIRD  OF  MAY  21 5 

any  convention  without  first  submitting  the  draft  of  it  to  the 
King.  Frederick  William,  however,  was  apparently  well  pleased. 
He  was  not  averse  to  the  French  enterprise,  and  he  was  delighted 
to  have  secured  at  last  —  on  whatever  terms  —  an  alliance  which 
would  free  him  from  the  English  bondage  and  furnish  the  basis 
for  a  new  forward  policy.  With  scarcely  a  word  of  explanation, 
and  without  asking  for  their  opinion,  he  ordered  his  ministers 
to  send  back  the  act  of  ratification  at  once,  though  under  the 
condition  that  it  should  not  be  presented  until  peace  had  been 
concluded  at  Sistova.1  This  provision,  however,  occasioned  no 
delay,  for  the  treaty  between  Austria  and  Turkey  was  signed  on 
August  4.  Austria  restored  her  conquests  of  the  late  war,  but 
by  virtue  of  certain  ancient  claims  secured  the  cession  of  Old 
Orsova,  and  thus  a  partial  mitigation  of  the  terms  of  Reichen- 
bach.  Bischoffwerder  could  then  put  the  crown  on  his  work  by 
proceeding  to  the  exchange  of  ratifications  (August  15).  Thus 
was  virtually  consummated  an  alliance  which  astonished  the 
world  as  much  as  did  the  famous  diplomatic  revolution  of  1756, 
or  as  much  as  would  an  alliance  between  France  and  Germany 
today. 

With  the  almost  simultaneous  conclusion  of  the  Vienna  Con- 
vention, the  Peace  of  Sistova,  and  the  Preliminaries  of  Galatz, 
the  long  Oriental  crisis  had  reached  its  end.  It  was  an  unsatis- 
factory, a  dull  and  prosaic  finale.  For  four  years  there  had  been 
wars  and  rumors  of  wars,  mobilizations,  coalitions,  congresses, 
negotiations,  diplomatic  activity  almost  unparalleled;  and  the 
result  was  that  none  of  the  great  issues  had  been  settled,  none 
of  the  great  plans  had  been  realized.  Out  of  it  all  had  come 
only  the  slightest  changes  of  territory,  but  a  considerable  shifting 
in  the  positions  of  the  various  European  Powers.  The  connection 
between  the  Imperial  Courts  was  loosened;  the  Triple  Alliance 
was  practically  dissolved ;  and  through  the  rapprochement  sealed 
by  the  Vienna  Convention  Austrian  and  Prussian  policy  had 
received  a  new  basis  and  struck  out  into  new  paths.    But  the 

1  The  King  to  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs,  July  31,  Schulenburg  and 
Alvensleben  to  the  King  on  the  same  date,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172;  Alvensle- 
ben's  Proces-verbal  of  August  11  (see  Herrmann,  Erganzungsband,  pp.  40  ff.,  and 
F.  z.  D.  G.,  v,  pp.  277  f.).    Cf.  Appendix  VI,  3. 


2l6 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


greatest  legacy  of  the  Oriental  crisis  was  the  reopening  of  the 
Polish  Question. 

It  was  during  those  four  years  of  turmoil  that  the  seeds  of  the 
Second  Partition  were  sown.  The  old  system,  which  had  seemed 
to  assure  the  existence  of  the  Republic,  had  collapsed;  the  great 
breach  with  Russia  had  taken  place,  and  remained  unforgotten 
and  unforgiven  at  St.  Petersburg;  and  a  new  spirit  had  appeared 
in  Poland  that  made  the  permanent  restoration  of  Russian  domi- 
nation in  the  old  form  impossible.  But,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
Poles  had  seized  too  late  the  opportunity  for  internal  reforms, 
they  had  lost  the  chance  to  satisfy  the  ambitions  of  Prussia  by  a 
peaceful  bargain,  and  they  had  seen  their  best  chances  for  securing 
aid  from  without  vanish  one  after  the  other.  The  three  neighbor- 
ing Powers  had  at  the  last  moment  failed  to  come  to  blows,  and 
were  now  about  to  unite,  and  their  union  had  always  been  fatal 
to  Poland.  But  if  the  causes  go  back  to  the  Oriental  crisis,  the 
form  which  the  catastrophe  was  to  take  was  determined  by  the 
struggle  in  which  Austria  and  Prussia  now  became  involved 
against  the  French  Revolution. 


CHAPTER  X 

The  Development  of  the  French  and  Polish 
Questions  to  the  Death  of  Leopold  II 

I 

It  is  well  known  that  immediately  after  learning  of  the  flight  and 
recapture  of  the  French  royal  family,  the  Emperor  Leopold 
issued  the  Circular  of  Padua  (July  6,  1791),  inviting  the  chief 
European  Powers  to  common  action  for  the  purpose  of  ensuring 
the  safety  of  the  King  and  Queen  of  France  and  the  maintenance 
of  monarchical  government  in  that  country.  Of  all  the  sover- 
eigns invited  into  the  concert,  the  Empress  of  Russia  alone 
showed  an  ardent  zeal  for  the  cause.  Nothing  could  have  suited 
Catherine  better  than  to  see  the  other  Powers  embarked  in  the 
French  enterprise,  partly  because  she  detested  the  Revolution  on  \yS 
principle,  but  even  more  because  she  wanted  a  free  hand  in  her 
own  corner  of  Europe.  As  soon  as  the  danger  of  the  Oriental 
crisis  was  over,  she  began  the  mise-en-scene  of  her  next  great  act 
on  the  European  stage.  Already  in  May  and  June  she  was  doing 
her  utmost  to  persuade  her  quixotic  cousin  of  Sweden  to  head  a 
counter-revolution  in  France,  while  she  also  commenced  to  sound 
the  Austrian  cabinet  on  the  same  subject.1  She  received  Leo- 
pold's proposals  of  July  with  the  warmest  approval  and  regretted 
only  that  the  measures  suggested  were  not  more  vigorous.  Hence- 
forth the  Empress  was  aflame  for  '  the  cause  of  all  sovereigns.' 

Frederick  William's  attitude  was  also  distinctly  favorable,  but 
his  ministers  succeeded  in  inserting  into  his  reply  certain  condi- 

1  Even  in  February,  1791,  Catherine  made  vague  hints  about  an  intervention 
in  France  to  Austria  and  Sweden  (Cobenzl's  report  of  February  22,  V.  A.,  Russ- 
land,  Berichte;  Schinkel-Bergman,  Minnen,  ii,  pp.  151  ff.)  For  her  later  overtures 
to  those  Powers:  Cobenzl's  report  of  June  11,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit.;  Ostermann  to  Golitsyn, 
May  30/June  10,  1791,  M.  A.,  ABcrpifl,  III,  51;  Odhner,  Gustaf  III  och  Kata- 
rina,  pp.  173  ff.;  Geffroy,  Gitstave  ITT  el  la  Cour  de  France,  ii,  pp.  no  ff.;  Catherine's 
letters  to  Stackelberg,  in  the  PyccKaa  CTapHHa,  iii;  Dembinski,  Rosya  a  reuiolucya 
francuska,  ch.  iii. 

217 


218 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


V 


tions  —  especially  about  the  cooperation  of  England  —  that 
made  it  wellnigh  declinatory.  What  was  particularly  char- 
acteristic of  the  Prussian  standpoint  was  the  insistence  that  any 
declarations  to  be  addressed  to  the  National  Assembly  must  be 
backed  up  by  force,  and  that  if  military  intervention  was  to  be 
attempted,  the  Powers  must  first  come  to  an  understanding  on 
the  subject  of '  conquests.' *  With  all  his  generous  sympathy  for 
a  fellow-sovereign  in  distress,  Frederick  William  saw  in  the 
French  enterprise  first  and  foremost  a  chance  to  make  handsome 
acquisitions. 

At  Vienna  there  was  little  thought  of  conquests  and  no  real 
eagerness  for  action  of  any  kind.  Neither  a  dismemberment  of 
France  nor  a  complete  restoration  of  the  old  monarchy  seemed 
desirable  to  the  Austrian  statesmen.  Provided  they  could  secure 
a  decent  existence  to  the  French  royal  family  and  suitable  com- 
pensation to  the  German  princes  dispossessed  in  Alsace,  they 
would  have  been  well  content  to  leave  France  in  impotence  and 
anarchy.  Universal  principles  have  seldom  exercised  much  in- 
fluence over  the  policy  of  Vienna,  and  Leopold  II,  with  his 
constitutional  ideas  and  strong  common  sense,  was  the  last  man 
to  feel  any  sentimental  enthusiasm  for  '  the  cause  of  all  sover- 
eigns.' When  the  answers  received  from  the  various  Courts 
sufficiently  indicated  that  no  effective  concert  of  all  the  Powers 
could  be  hoped  for,  the  Austrian  cabinet  began  to  think  chiefly  of 
retreating  from  an  embarrassing  position.  This  tendency  was  not 
arrested  by  the  meeting  held  by  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of 
Prussia  at  Pillnitz  as  the  guests  of  the  Elector  of  Saxony  towards 
the  close  of  August;  for  while  French  affairs  were  discussed  at 
length  on  this  occasion,  Leopold's  prudence  prevailed  over  Fred- 
erick William's  zeal  for  action  and  over  the  importunities  of  the 
Count  of  Artois.  The  resulting  declaration  issued  in  the  name  of 
the  two  monarchs  aroused  indignation  in  France,  but  it  bound  its 
authors  to  nothing  whatever.  The  negotiations  for  the  concert  of 
the  Powers  continued  for  a  time  in  a  perfunctory  way;  but  when 
Louis  XVI  subscribed  to  the  new  constitution,  Leopold  hastened 
to  inform  the  other  Courts  that  since  the  King  had  recovered  his 

1  Rescript  to  Jacobi  of  July  28,  Herrmann,  Erganzungsband,  pp.  50-58. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  219 

freedom  and  had  voluntarily  accepted  his  new  position,  there  was 
nothing  to  be  done  save  to  await  the  further  course  of  events  in 
France.1  The  coalition  against  the  Revolution  seemed  to  be 
definitely  abandoned. 

II 

This  lull  in  French  affairs  gave  the  Imperial  cabinet  the  oppor- 
tunity to  take  up  the  hardly  less  important  Polish  question. 
The  fate  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May  was  still  un- 
decided; and  the  longer  the  suspense  lasted,  the  more  the  political 
constellation  seemed  to  change  to  the  detriment  of  the  Poles. 
Within  the  Republic,  indeed,  all  was  quiet;  it  was  clear  that  the 
malcontents  were  few  in  numbers  and  unable  to  stir  without 
foreign  assistance;  but  the  cloud  on  the  eastern  horizon  grew 
ever  larger  and  darker.  The  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  maintained 
an  ominous  silence,  avoided  any  explanation  with  Austria  on 
Polish  affairs,  and  hastened  forward  its  peace  with  the  Turks. 
Kaunitz  grew  suspicious  that  the  Empress'  extraordinary  zeal 
for  a  crusade  against  France  was  based  solely  on  a  desire  to  divert 
the  attention  of  Austria  and  Prussia  from  Poland.2  There  were 
also  disquieting  symptoms  at  Berlin.  At  Pillnitz  Leopold  and 
Frederick  William  had  again  agreed  to  urge  upon  the  Elector  the 
acceptance  of  the  Polish  crown; 3  but  this  was  the  last  occasion 
when  the  King  showed  any  real  inclination  to  favor  the  new  order 
of  things  in  the  Republic.  Since  then  Kaunitz  had  had  reason  to 
convince  himself  that  the  Prussians  were  at  bottom  opposed  to 
the  new  constitution,  embarrassed  by  the  approval  which  they 

1  Austrian  circular  of  November  12,  1791,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  270  f. 

2  Kaunitz  to  the  Emperor,  November  5,  V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1791.  The  Austrians 
still  had  no  absolute  certainty  of  this.  I  have  been  unable  to  find  any  authority 
for  the  statement  made  by  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  389,  and  Heigel,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  454,  that 
about  this  time  Golitsyn  told  Kaunitz  that  each  of  the  Imperial  Courts  had  its 
counter-revolution  to  effect,  the  one  at  Paris,  the  other  at  Warsaw;  and  I  am 
strongly  inclined  to  doubt  the  story.  Golitsyn's  reports  show  that  he  had  not  the 
faintest  knowledge  of  his  sovereign's  intentions  about  Poland,  and  he  was  hardly 
the  man  to  hazard  such  statements  on  his  own  responsibility.  The  story  is  probably 
a  bit  of  gossip  retailed  by  Jacobi,  the  Prussian  envoy  at  Vienna. 

3  Spielmann  to  Kaunitz,  August  31,  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  238;  Schlitter,  Marie 
Christine,  p.  lxvi. 


220 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


had  been  forced  to  give  to  it,  and  inclined  to  seize  the  first  oppor- 
tunity to  repair  the  blunder. 

To  make  the  situation  even  more  critical,  the  Elector  was  still 
unable  to  decide  either  to  accept  or  to  reject  the  Polish  throne. 
Honorable  and  well-meaning,  but  cautious  and  irresolute  in  the 
extreme,  Frederick  Augustus  was  torn  between  his  desire  for  a 
crown  which  two  of  his  ancestors  had  worn  and  which  his  mother 
had  always  planned  to  win  for  him,  and  his  fear  that  this  Polish 
connection  might  again  bring  disaster  upon  his  beloved  Saxony. 
His  ambition  was  spurred  on  by  his  wife  and  by  the  not  incon- 
siderable '  Polish  party  '  at  his  court;  but  on  the  other  hand  his 
ministers  abhorred  all  political  adventures  and  regarded  a 
system  of  pure  passivity  as  the  Alpha  and  Omega  of  Saxon  state- 
craft. Deterrent  also  were  the  reports  from  Warsaw  of  his 
resident,  the  hypochondriac  Essen,  which  contained  nothing  but 
the  most  dismal  jeremiads  against  the  depraved  Polish  nation. 
So  for  months  the  Elector  vacillated.  He  could  not  bring  himself 
to  refuse  the  honor,  as  some  of  his  ministers  advised  him  to  do; 
but  he  was  also  unwilling  to  accept  without  the  fulfilment  of 
several  conditions.  Various  changes  must  be  made  in  the  new 
constitution,  extending  the  royal  prerogatives  still  further;  and 
he  would  have  preferred  to  see  the  succession  pass  to  his  brother 
rather  than  to  his  daughter,  so  that  Saxony  and  Poland  should  be 
permanently  united.  Above  all,  he  was  determined  not  to  commit 
himself  until  assured  that  there  would  be  no  opposition  from  any 
one  of  the  great  neighboring  Powers. 

In  spite  of  the  warm  expressions  of  friendship  and  support 
received  from  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  Prussia,  Frederick 
Augustus  remained  suspicious  of  both  of  them,  and  likewise  of  the 
King  of  Poland.  The  repeated  efforts  of  the  government  at 
Warsaw,  the  mission  of  Bischoffwerder  to  Dresden  at  the  end  of 
May,  the  interview  at  Pillnitz  did  not  avail  to  draw  the  Elector 
out  of  his  irresolution.  Every  day  that  brought  nearer  the  peace 
between  Russia  and  the  Porte  increased  the  danger  to  Poland,  but 
that  consideration  only  made  Frederick  Augustus  the  more 
cautious  and  reserved.  By  October  the  Poles  had  obtained  from 
him  nothing  more  than  the  consent  to  open  negotiations  for  the 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  221 

purpose  of  clearing  up  the  difficulties  which  he  found  in  the  new 
constitution.  At  Warsaw  this  concession  was  taken  for  more 
than  it  was  worth,  and  it  was  hoped  that  a  speedy  negotiation 
would  end  the  Elector's  scruples  and  secure  an  immediate  accept- 
ance. In  November  Prince  Adam  Czartoryski  set  out  for 
Dresden  to  undertake  the  mission,  on  which,  as  the  Poles  be- 
lieved, the  fate  of  their  constitution  depended. 

The  Austrian  cabinet  also  attached  great  importance  to  this 
negotiation,  and  they  found  themselves  impelled  by  several  other 
incidents  to  undertake  immediate  action  in  Polish  affairs.  In 
October  the  government  at  Warsaw,  encouraged  by  Leopold's 
friendly  attitude  to  abandon  the  reserve  which  it  had  been  accus- 
tomed to  maintain  towards  Austria,  at  last  made  a  formal 
communication  of  the  new  constitution  at  Vienna,  and  requested 
the  Emperor's  good  offices  to  secure  for  it  the  approval  of  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg.  About  the  same  time  the  Elector  turned 
to  Leopold  with  a  new  appeal  for  advice.1  The  Austrians  desired 
nothing  so  much  as  to  see  Frederick  Augustus  accept  without 
further  loss  of  time;  but  they  hesitated  to  declare  themselves 
openly  at  Dresden  and  Warsaw  out  of  regard  for  Russia.  Co- 
benzl's  reports  now  left  little  hope  that  the  Empress  would  ever 
give  her  approval  to  the  work  of  the  Third  of  May,  and  they 
pointed  to  the  grave  danger  to  the  alliance,  in  case  she  adopted  a 
policy  towards  Poland  which  would  be  accepted  by  Prussia,  but 
rejected  by  Austria.  And  this  was  not  the  only  peril  ahead.  The 
Empress  and  her  ministers  were  storming  for  action  against 
France,  criticizing  Leopold's  conduct  openly  and  bitterly,  and 
praising  Frederick  William's.  The  spectre  of  a  rapprochement 
between  Prussia  and  Russia  and  the  shipwreck  of  the  alliance 
between  the  Imperial  Courts  haunted  the  minds  of  the  ambassa- 
dor and  his  superiors.2 

In  this  delicate  situation,  in  full  realization  of  the  danger  of  an 
estrangement  from  Russia,  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  still  decided  to 
make  anew  attempt  to  save  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of 
May.      To    this  end  they  determined  to   bind    the   hands   of 

1  Kaunitz  to  Leopold,  November  25,  V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1791. 

2  L.  Cobenzl's  reports  of  October  4,  7,  and  13,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1701. 


222 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Prussia  by  turning  the  Convention  of  Vienna  into  a  formal  treaty 
of  alliance  as  soon  as  possible,1  to  make  a  last  effort  to  convert 
Russia  to  their  views  on  Polish  affairs,  and  to  send  a  secret  nego- 
tiator to  Dresden  to  persuade  the  Elector  to  accept  the  crown  at 
once. 

As  far  as  Prussia  was  concerned,  the  plan  had  somewhat  the 
nature  of  a  stratagem.  Kaunitz  was  quite  convinced  that  the 
internal  consolidation  of  Poland  was  directly  opposed  to  Prussian 
interests  and  was  so  regarded  at  Berlin;  but  he  reckoned  that 
Frederick  William  had  so  bound  his  own  hands  by  his  unlucky 
Polish  policy  of  the  past  three  years,  by  the  assurances  given  to 
the  Elector,  and  especially  by  the  Convention  of  Vienna,  that  if 
Frederick  Augustus  would  only  accept  the  crown  at  once,  and  if 
the  Convention  were  turned  into  a  formal  treaty,  Prussia  would 
not  only  have  to  consent,  bon  gre  mal  gre,  to  the  establishment  of 
the  new  order  in  Poland,  but  would  even  have  to  contribute  to  it.2 
Probably  the  Chancellor  also  reflected  that  it  was  important  to 
cement  the  union  with  the  Court  of  Berlin  at  once  in  order  to 
prevent  the  latter  from  throwing  itself  into  the  arms  of  Russia 
and  possibly  coming  to  an  agreement  with  Catherine  on  Polish 
affairs  without  the  knowledge  of  Austria.  Hence  in  their  discus- 
sions with  the  Prussian  envoy  the  Imperial  ministers  emphasized 
the  necessity  of  settling  the  Polish  question  by  a  concert  of  the 
three  Courts,  and  avoided  laying  too  much  stress  on  the  solution 
which  they  themselves  preferred.    There  was  no  need  to  alarm 

1  That  this  decision  to  hasten  the  alliance  with  Prussia  was  not  due  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  French  question,  as  is  generally  assumed,  appears  from  the  fact 
that  the  proposal  was  sent  to  Berlin  along  with  the  circular  announcing  the  sus- 
pension of  the  concert  on  French  affairs.  In  view  of  the  fact  that  the  new  repre- 
sentations in  favor  of  the  Polish  constitution  were  dispatched  to  St.  Petersburg  the 
same  day  (November  12),  and  that  in  general  throughout  November  Austrian 
statesmen  were  preeminently  occupied  with  this  latter  question,  one  may  safely 
assume  that  it  was  the  Polish  crisis  that  led  to  the  resumption  of  the  negotiation 
for  the  alliance.  Heidrich  is,  I  think,  the  only  writer  who  has  remarked  this  (Preus- 
sen  im  Kampfe  gegen  die  franzosische  Revolution,  pp.  29  f.). 

Landriani's  mission  to  Dresden  was  first  formally  proposed,  it  appears,  in  a 
report  of  Kaunitz  to  the  Emperor  of  November  25,  but  one  would  judge  from  the 
Chancellor's  note  to  Spielmann  of  November  2  that  it  had  been  practically  a  settled 
matter  since  the  beginning  of  the  month  (V.  A.,  Vorirage,  1791). 

2  Kaunitz's  Vortrag  of  November  25,  V.  A. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  223 

the  Prussians  until  the  net  was  firmly  fastened  around  them.1 
In  accordance  with  the  proposals  made  through  Reuss,  the  pre- 
liminary discussion  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  was  at  once  begun 
between  Berlin  and  Vienna; 2  and  although  the  delays  inherent 
in  such  a  method  of  negotiating  and  the  pressure  of  other  business 
prevented  rapid  progress,  still  Kaunitz  could  well  be  satisfied 
with  this  part  of  his  program. 

The  new  attack  at  St.  Petersburg  was  launched  through  the 
voluminous  instructions  sent  to  Louis  Cobenzl  on  November  12. 
In  these  notable  dispatches  Kaunitz  urged  that  it  was  imperative 
for  the  Imperial  Courts  to  define  their  attitude  towards  Poland  at 
once,  since  in  the  present  critical  condition  of  the  Republic  further 
delay  must  result  in  the  gravest  dangers  to  the  general  tranquil- 
lity. He  pointed  out  with  some  asperity  that  the  Court  of  Vienna 
had  communicated  its  views  on  Polish  affairs  as  early  as  May,  and 
had  waited  vainly  for  six  months  for  a  similar  confidence  from 
Russia.  In  the  meantime  it  had  been  obliged  to  express  itself  in  a 
general  way  regarding  the  new  constitution  to  Prussia  and  to  the 
Elector,  and  it  could  only  assume  that  its  declarations  had  not 
been  displeasing  to  the  Court  of  Petersburg,  since  otherwise  the 
latter  would  have  remonstrated.  If  the  Empress,  however,  were 
now  to  adopt  a  policy  towards  Poland  contrary  to  that  to  which 
she  had  allowed  her  ally  to  commit  itself,  the  Court  of  Vienna 
would  be  placed  in  the  most  embarrassing  position,  and  the  world 
would  draw  the  most  unfortunate  inferences  as  to  the  lack  of 
harmony  between  the  two  allies.    But  the  more  he  considered  the 

1  In  the  face  of  such  decisive  documents  as  Kaunitz's  Vortrag  of  November  25, 
the  orders  to  L.  Cobenzl  of  November  12,  and  the  instructions  to  Landriani,  the 
casual  remarks  of  the  Austrian  ministers  to  Jacobi  or  the  dubious  surmises  of  the 
Saxon  and  Polish  envoys  have  no  great  significance  for  the  interpretation  of  Austrian 
policy  on  this  question.  Hence  I  cannot  assent  to  Heigel's  view  {op.  cit.,  i,  p.  490, 
note  2)  that  there  was  no  great  difference  between  the  attitudes  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  regarding  Poland  at  this  time.  Both  were  indeed  agreed  that  a  concert  of 
the  three  neighboring  Powers  was  necessary;  but  the  concert  that  Prussia  had  in 
mind  was  one  in  which  Russia  should  speak  the  decisive  word  against  the  new  con- 
stitution, while  that  intended  by  the  Austrians  was  to  have  no  other  business  than 
to  approve  a.  fait  accompli  —  the  Elector's  acceptance  of  the  crown  and  the  definitive 
establishment  of  the  new  regime  in  Poland. 

2  Orders  to  Reuss  of  November  12,  his  report  of  November  19,  V.  A.,  Preussen, 
Exped.  and  Bcrichte,  1791. 


224  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

situation,  Kaunitz  continued,  the  more  he  was  convinced  that  in 
this  question  the  interests  of  both  Courts  were  identical.  Both 
were  equally  concerned,  on  the  one  hand,  to  shield  the  Republic 
from  the  Prussian  lust  for  aggrandizement,  and,  on  the  other,  to 
prevent  it  from  becoming  strong  enough  to  endanger  its  neigh- 
bors. Neither  Court  could  desire  further  acquisitions  of  territory 
in  this  quarter,  since  their  frontiers  were  already  so  admirably 
rounded  out.  From  this  it  followed  that  a  new  partition  of  Po- 
land would  redound  only  to  the  advantage  of  Prussia,  and  to  the 
positive  detriment  of  the  Imperial  Courts;  that  it  was,  indeed, 
necessary  that  the  royal  power  should  remain  limited,  and  that 
the  old  republican  spirit  among  the  szlachta  should  not  be  allowed 
to  die  out;  but  that  it  was  quite  as  important  that  Poland  should 
cease  to  be  the  theatre  of  constant  disturbances  and  a  field 
always  open  to  Prussian  schemes  of  aggrandizement,  as  it  had 
been  under  the  old  constitution.  The  new  constitution  was 
admirable  in  that  it  promised  to  make  the  Republic  just  strong 
enough,  and  not  too  strong.  The  change  from  an  elective  to  a 
limited  hereditary  monarchy  was  especially  commendable,  not 
only  because  it  would  put  an  end  to  the  periodical  outbreaks  of 
anarchy  inseparable  from  '  free  elections/  but  also  because  from 
an  hereditary  sovereign  the  Imperial  Courts  could  expect  a  more 
constant  and  sincere  attachment  than  from  any  elected  king,  who 
was  always  sure  to  be  blind  to  his  own  interests,  or  else  powerless 
to  follow  them.  Moreover,  if  Poland  were  not  allowed  a  stronger 
monarchical  government  and  a  certain  amount  of  reforms,  it  was 
to  be  feared  that  the  French  democratic  principles  would  take 
root  there,  and  Warsaw  become  a  second  Paris.  All  these  con- 
siderations led,  of  course,  to  the  conclusion  that  the  Imperial 
Courts  must  at  once  declare  themselves  openly  and  clearly  in 
favor  of  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May.1 

From  the  Austrian  point  of  view,  these  dispatches  were  a  mas- 
terpiece. The  appeal  to  the  old  principles  so  long  agreed  upon 
between  the  Imperial  Courts  —  the  integrity  of  Poland,  the  dan- 
ger of  allowing  Prussia  further  aggrandizement,  the  desirability 

1  The  dispatches  to  L.  Cobenzl  of  November  12  are  printed  in  part  in  Vivenot, 
i,  pp.  271-283. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  225 

of  an  Austro-Russo-Polish  league;  the  appeals  to  the  Empress' 
surviving  resentment  against  Frederick  William  and  to  her  new 
hatred  for  '  the  French  ideas  ';  the  not  unsuccessful  attempt  to 
demonstrate  the  innocuousness  of  the  new  constitution  —  these 
were  the  arguments,  if  any,  which  might  have  persuaded  Cath- 
erine. But  with  all  his  belief  in  the  power  of  his  own  dis- 
patches, one  must  doubt  whether  Kaunitz  cherished  any  great 
hope  that  the  Empress  would  allow  herself  to  be  persuaded;  and 
the  fact  that  he  took  this  decided  step  in  spite  of  Louis  Cobenzl's 
warnings  shows  how  strongly  he  and  Leopold  desired  to  uphold 
the  new  order  of  things  in  Poland. 

The  third  part  of  the  November  program,  the  mission  to 
Dresden,  was  entrusted  to  the  Chevalier  Landriani,  a  clever 
Italian,  half  diplomat  and  half  scientist,  a  confidant  of  the 
Emperor  and  a  man  favorably  known  at  both  the  Saxon  and  the 
Polish  courts.1  Taking  advantage  of  these  connections,  he  was 
ordered  to  negotiate  directly  with  the  Elector  or  with  the  favorite 
Marcolini,  avoiding  the  ill-disposed  Saxon  ministers  as  far  as 
possible,  and  surrounding  his  actions  with  the  utmost  secrecy,  so 
as  not  to  compromise  his  Court  with  Russia  or  Prussia.  The 
confidential  instruction  made  out  for  him  is  a  document  of  much 
interest;  for  here,  freed  from  the  precautions  and  reticences 
necessary  in  communications  to  Berlin  or  St.  Petersburg,  Kaunitz 
lays  bare  the  fundamental  ideas  and  inmost  wishes  that  guided 
the  Polish  policy  of  Austria  at  that  time.2  From  it  appears  the 
Chancellor's  strong  conviction  that  the  firm  establishment  of  the 
new  regime  in  Poland  was  peculiarly  an  Austrian  interest,  and  an 
Austrian  interest  of  the  first  magnitude.  He  desired  the  consoli- 
dation of  the  new  constitution  because  it  would  enable  the 
Republic  to  free  itself  from  all  danger  from,  or  dependence  upon, 

1  Landriani  was  an  intimate  friend  of  the  Elector's  favorite  Marcolini.  He  en- 
joyed the  confidence  of  Stanislas  Augustus  to  such  a  degree  that  the  King  several 
times  tried  to  get  him  appointed  Austrian  minister  at  Warsaw. 

2  The  voluminous  Instruction  pour  M.  le  Chevalier  de  Landriani,  V.  A.,  F.  A.  62, 
dated  December  12,  and  the  other  papers  relating  to  his  mission  have  hitherto 
escaped  the  attention  of  the  numerous  investigators  who  have  worked  through  this 
period  in  the  Austrian  archives.  Very  interesting,  too,  is  the  Vortrag  of  Kaunitz 
to  the  Emperor  of  November  25,  analyzed  in  Beer,  Leopold  II,  Franz  II,  und  Catha- 
rina,  pp.  114-117. 


226  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

either  Russia  or  Prussia.  He  approved  of  the  Saxon  succession, 
because  the  Court  of  Dresden  was  always  likely  to  be  more  de- 
voted to  Austria  than  to  the  other  Powers.  Best  of  all,  he 
thought,  would  be  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  personal 
union  between  Saxony  and  Poland,  as  Frederick  Augustus  de- 
sired; for  there  would  thus  be  constituted  a  fairly  strong  state 
which  would  naturally  seek  the  alliance  of  Austria,  as  the  one 
neighbor  with  whom  it  had  most  in  common,  and  from  whom 
it  had  least  to  fear.  But  Austrian  interests  also  demanded  that 
the  revival  of  Poland  should  not  be  carried  beyond  a  certain 
point;  for  if  the  Republic  became  strong  enough  to  undertake 
aggressive  enterprises,  it  might  cast  its  eyes  on  Galicia.  Hence 
Kaunitz  desired  that  the  royal  prerogatives  should  not  be  ex- 
tended beyond  the  limits  fixed  by  the  new  constitution. 

In  accordance  with  these  general  ideas,  the  primary  object  of 
Landriani's  mission  was  to  persuade  the  Elector  to  accept  the 
Polish  crown  immediately.  That  would  place  Russia  and  Prussia 
before  a  fait  accompli,  which  they  could  not  with  good  grace 
attempt  to  reverse.  In  order  to  overcome  the  Elector's  irresolu- 
tion, the  envoy  was  equipped  with  all  manner  of  arguments,  some 
of  which  did  not  bear  the  stamp  of  perfect  sincerity.  For  in- 
stance, he  was  to  conceal,  as  far  as  possible,  the  fears  entertained 
at  Vienna  as  to  the  attitude  of  Russia,  and  to  insinuate  rather 
that  the  Empress  was  really  not  opposed  to  the  new  constitution; 
if  she  remained  silent,  it  was  only  because  the  Turkish  war  pre- 
vented her  from  giving  serious  attention  to  the  subject,  or 
because  the  conduct  of  the  present  Diet  towards  her  must  na- 
turally lead  her  to  adopt  a  certain  reserve.  Landriani  was  also 
charged  to  persuade  the  Elector  to  abandon  his  demand  for 
further  changes  in  the  Polish  constitution,  on  the  ground  that 
such  changes  would  involve  an  unfortunate  delay  and  could 
better  be  effected  at  some  future  time.  As  for  Frederick  Augus- 
tus' desire  to  have  the  succession  arranged  in  such  a  way  as  to 
ensure  the  permanent  union  of  Poland  and  Saxony,  the  envoy  was 
ordered  to  do  what  he  could  secretly  to  further  the  project,  but 
without  showing  his  hand  openly.  There  was  a  peculiar  reason 
for  this  caution  regarding  a  plan  so  warmly  approved  of  at 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  227 

Vienna.  Prince  Anton,  the  Elector's  brother  and  prospective 
heir  in  Saxony,  was  Leopold's  son-in-law.  To  have  advocated 
openly  the  extension  of  the  Saxon  law  of  succession  to  Poland 
would  have  exposed  the  Emperor  to  the  suspicion  of  working  for 
personal  and  dynastic  ends.  Hence  Leopold  felt  bound  to  dis- 
play a  reserve  which  led  many  people  at  that  time,  and  has  led 
many  historians  since,  to  conclude  that  he  was  averse  to  the 
projected  union  of  Saxony  and  Poland.1 

On  his  arrival  at  Dresden  (December  18),  Landriani  found  the 
negotiations  between  the  Saxon  ministers  and  the  Polish  com- 
missioners already  begun  but  not  progressing.  The  Elector 
insisted  on  constitutional  changes  which  the  Poles  professed 
themselves  utterly  unable  to  grant;  and  he  was  still  determined 
not  to  accept  the  crown  without  the  consent  of  all  the  neighboring 
Powers.  Under  such  circumstances  Landriani  soon  convinced 
himself  that  no  amount  of  exhortations  or  arguments  could 
extort  the  immediate  acceptance  which  he  had  been  sent  to 
obtain.  Nevertheless  he  threw  himself  with  the  greatest  zeal 
into  the  task  of  smoothing  out  the  difficulties  between  Frederick 
Augustus  and  the  Poles  over  constitutional  questions,  and  here 
he  attained  a  fair  measure  of  success.  Largely  through  his  inter- 
vention, it  would  seem,  the  Polish  commissioners  agreed  to 
recommend  at  Warsaw  the  alteration  of  the  law  of  succession,  so 
as  to  ensure  the  permanent  union  of  Poland  and  Saxony;  and 
they  were  also  induced  to  promise  various  extensions  of  the  royal 
prerogatives  in  accordance  with  the  Elector's  wishes.2  By  the 
end  of  January  matters  seemed  to  be  going  forward  so  satis- 
factorily, the  Elector  appeared  so  eager  to  wear  the  crown  and  the 
Poles  so  ready  to  make  concessions,  that  Landriani  was  at  a  high 
pitch  of  optimism.  Given  a  fair  amount  of  time,  he  was  sure  that 
Frederick  Augustus  would  in  the  end  accept.3 

Meanwhile,  the  Austrian  diplomat  had  been  displaying  a 
talent  scarcely  inferior  to  Lucchesini's  for  gaining  the  confidence 
of  the  Poles.    The  circles  nearest  to  Stanislas  Augustus  came  to 

1  See  Appendix  VII. 

2  Landriani's  reports  of  December  30,  January  9  and  14,  February  22,  V.  A., 
F.A.  62. 

3  Reports  of  January  20  and  February  4,  V.  A.,  F.  A.  62. 


228  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

base  their  hopes  of  success  at  Dresden  on  '  our  Landriani,'  '  the 
honest  co-worker,'  '  the  Assisting  Angel.'  They  were  en- 
couraged by  him  to  dream  of  a  quadruple  alliance  between 
Austria,  Prussia,  Poland,  and  Saxony,  a  league  that  should 
relegate  Russia  to  the  rank  of  an  Asiatic  Power.  This  glittering 
project  was  to  be  brought  to  realization  by  a  new  mission  of 
Bischoffwerder  to  Dresden  and  Vienna  and  the  coming  of  Lan- 
driani to  Warsaw.1  But  while  the  Poles  were  building  these 
air-castles  and  the  Elector  continued  his  interminable  delays,  the 
face  of  affairs  had  once  more  been  changed  through  the  revival  of 
the  danger  from  the  west. 

Ill 

Since  the  end  of  November  the  war  fever  had  been  steadily 
rising  at  Paris.  The  exchange  of  notes  then  begun  with  the  Aus- 
trian government,  first  on  the  subject  of  the  emigres,  and  then 
regarding  Leopold's  supposed  counter-revolutionary  plans,  led 
only  to  embitterment  on  both  sides.  Early  in  December  Louis 
XVI  secretly  addressed  to  the  Powers  an  urgent  plea  for  armed 
intervention.  The  danger  of  a  French  attack,  the  spread  of 
'  Jacobin  ideas  '  in  the  Belgic  provinces,  the  complaints  made  by 
Marie  Antoinette  at  other  Courts  about  her  brother's  inaction  — 
all  this  combined  to  force  Leopold  and  Kaunitz  to  resume  in 
January,  1792,  the  plan  for  a  concert  of  the  Powers  against  the 
Revolution.  They  did  not  intend  to  venture  forward  a  step 
without  a  general  concert,  and  even  if  the  concert  came  into  being, 

1  The  hold  which  Landriani  soon  won  over  the  Poles  is  shown  in  the  letters  of 
Stanislas'  confidant  Piattoli  at  Warsaw  to  Mostowski  at  Dresden,  in  which  the 
Austrian  envoy  is  almost  always  referred  to  as  L'Ange  Subsidiaire.  For  a  specimen 
of  the  tone  of  this  correspondence  one  may  take  the  passage  in  Piattoli's  letter  of 
February  3:  "  Depuis  cette  epoque  la  condition  de  l'Ange  Subsidiaire  devenant 
celle  d'un  Esprit  lumineux  et  brillant  de  toute  sa  clarte,  il  n'y  a  rien  que  nous  ne 
devions  attendre  de  son  heureuse  influence."  (These  curious  letters  are  in  the 
archive  of  Count  Maurice  Zamojski-Ordynat  at  Warsaw.) 

As  to  the  idea  of  the  Quadruple  Alliance,  which  aroused  great  hopes  for  a  time 
at  Warsaw  and  which  was  regarded  as  Leopold's  '  own  system  ':  Bulgakov's  diary, 
January-March,  passim,  M.  A.,  Iloabraa,  III,  66;  Cassini  to  Popov,  February 
25  and  March  3  (Imperial  Public  Library,  Petrograd,  Papers  of  V.  S.  Popov); 
Lucchesini's  reports  of  January  7  and  n,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  229 

they  were  not  inclined  to  undertake  a  complete  restoration  of  the 
old  regime  in  France,  such  as  was  preached  so  vehemently  at 
Coblenz  1  and  St.  Petersburg.  They  hoped  rather  by  mere  de- 
monstrations and  threats  to  intimidate  the  National  Assembly 
and  so  to  procure  for  Louis  XVI  the  conditions  of  a  tolerable 
existence;  in  which  event  they  would  have  been  content  to  see 
France  remain  in  a  state  of  "  fluctuation,  internal  weakness,  and 
external  nullity."  2 

The  whole  calculation  about  the  concert  was  sufficiently 
erroneous;  but  it  was  a  yet  greater  mistake  that  even  before  the 
enterprise  was  launched  Kaunitz  saw  fit  to  read  biting  rebukes  to 
the  National  Assembly  and  to  admonish  the  French  nation  con- 
cerning its  internal  affairs  in  a  manner  that  could  only  be  taken 
as  an  insult  at  Paris.3  Whether  the  great  Revolutionary  War 
might  have  been  avoided  is  a  question  one  need  not  assume  to 
answer;  but  beyond  a  doubt  the  arrogant  and  challenging  tone 
adopted  by  the  Austrian  government  in  this  crisis  greatly  facili- 
tated its  outbreak.  By  his  failure  to  understand  the  character 
and  force  of  the  Revolution,  by  his  unhappy  trust  in  the  coercive 
power  of  his  "  strong  declarations,"  Kaunitz  was  largely  respon- 
sible for  involving  Austria  in  that  disastrous  struggle,  which, 
apart  from  its  consequences  in  the  west,  threw  the  Court  of 
Vienna  into  dependence  upon  its  rapacious  allies,  Russia  and 
Prussia,  and  forced  it  to  sacrifice  Poland.4 

The  first  result  of  the  new  crisis  in  Austro-French  relations  was 
an  effort  on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  cabinet  to  come  to  a  thor- 
ough understanding  with  Prussia  on  all  the  pending  questions. 
At  the  beginning  of  January,  Reuss  was  sent  a  draft  of  the  treaty 
of  alliance,  with  full  powers  to  conclude  the  matter  and  instruc- 

1  The  headquarters  of  the  French  emigr6s. 

2  From  the  proposals  of  the  State  Chancellery  to  the  ministerial  Conference, 
January  12,  1792,  Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  330-341. 

3  The  Austrian  notes  of  December  21,  1791,  and  February  17,  1792. 

4  The  best  characterizations  of  Austrian  policy  in  this  connection  are,  I  think, 
those  of  Glagau  (Die  franzbsische  Legislative  und  der  Ursprung  der  Revolutions- 
kriege,  ch.  vi),  and  Lenz  ("  Marie  Antoinette  im  Kampfe  mit  der  Revolution,"  in 
Preussische  Jahrbiicher,  lxxviii).  See  also:  Ranke,  Ursprung  und  Beginn  der  Revolu- 
tionskriege,  pp.  128  ff.;  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  32  ff.;  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  342  ff.; 
Heigel,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  495  ff. 


y 


230  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

tions  to  hasten.1  Towards  the  end  of  the  month  the  proposals 
for  the  concert  on  French  affairs  were  dispatched  to  Berlin,  with 
the  categorical  inquiry  whether  the  King  was  ready  to  accept  the 
Emperor's  views  and  to  offer  military  cooperation  in  case  the 
concert  came  into  existence.2  Throughout  the  month  constant 
discussions  also  went  on  between  the  two  Courts  regarding  the 
Polish  question.  The  more  pressing  grew  the  danger  on  the  west, 
the  more  necessary  Kaunitz  found  it  to  settle  Polish  affairs  at 
once.  The  more  he  became  convinced  that  Russia  was  invincibly 
opposed  to  the  new  constitution,  the  more  anxiously  he  strove 
to  win  Prussia  to  his  principles  before  the  Empress  had  time  to 
declare  herself. 

Prussia,  however,  regarded  both  the  French  and  the  Polish 
questions  from  a  standpoint  very  different  from  the  Austrian  one. 
While  the  Imperial  cabinet  had  only  been  driven  perforce  to 
resume  the  plan  for  a  concert  of  the  Powers,  and  would  always 
have  preferred  to  get  off  with  mere  declarations  and  demonstra- 
tions, Frederick  William  wanted  to  bring  on  a  war.  He  con- 
sented readily  to  the  Austrian  proposals,  but  constantly  urged 
the  necessity  of  agreeing  at  once  on  the  military  measures  to  be 
employed  to  back  up  the  joint  declarations.  The  Austrian  plan 
for  the  concert  reached  Berlin  on  January  31,  and  five  days  later 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick  had  already  been  summoned  to  discuss 
plans  for  a  campaign.  The  only  additional  diplomatic  step  that 
was  suggested  by  Prussia  was  one  that  seemed  specially  designed 
to  make  war  inevitable.  It  was  the  demand  that  the  French 
government  repress  by  the  most  vigorous  measures  the  machina- 
tions of  the  society  of  the  Amis  de  la  Constitution,  and  of  every 
other  association  tending  to  propagate  in  other  countries  prin- 
ciples subversive  of  order  and  tranquillity.3  When  it  appeared 
that  the  Austrian  ministry  inclined  more  and  more  to  a  peaceful 
course,  Frederick  William  made  one  effort  after  another  to  spur 
them  on  to  action.  The  extreme  importance  of  not  letting  '  the 
democrats '  think  the  two  Courts  feared  a  war,  the  urgent  necessity 

1  Kaunitz  to  Reuss,  January  4,  1792,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  305  ff. 

2  Kaunitz  to  Reuss,  January  25,  ibid.,  i,  pp.  344-350. 

3  The  cabinet  ministry  to  the  King,  February  3,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  G.;  note 
presented  to  Reuss,  February  5,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte,  1792. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  23  I 

of  putting  an  end  to  the  troubles  in  France,  the  dangerous  spread 
of  the  infectious  principles  of  '  insubordination  and  license,'  the 
sad  plight  of  the  emigres  and  the  German  princes  dispossessed  in 
Alsace  —  one  sees  that  there  were  arguments  enough  in  the 
repertory  of  Berlin.1  But  it  was  not  these  edifying  reasons  nor  a 
purely  sentimental  zeal  for  '  the  cause  of  all  sovereigns,'  that  led 
the  King  of  Prussia  to  labor  so  ardently  to  bring  on  a  war.  From 
the  first  moment  when  the  enterprise  against  France  appeared 
possible,  Frederick  William's  dominant  aim  —  the  first  and  last 
word  of  his  policy  —  was  territorial  aggrandizement. 

The  idea  appeared,  as  we  have  seen,  in  September,  1790,  and  in 
July,  1 791;  and  from  January,  1792  onward  it  formed  the  invari- 
able refrain  of  every  Prussian  communication  on  French  affairs.2 
The  ill-sounding  word  '  conquests  '  was,  indeed,  avoided  as  far  as 
possible;  the  Prussians  preferred  to  speak  of  '  indemnities  '  and 
'  compensation  for  the  expenses  of  an  intervention,'  with  the 
mental  reservation  that  in  view  of  the  state  of  French  finances 
such  indemnities  could  be  taken  only  in  land.  In  response  to  a 
note  from  Berlin  of  January  13,  the  Austrian  ministry  had  recog- 
nized the  justice  of  the  principle  that  the  Powers  which  took  part 
in  an  active  intervention  in  France  were  entitled  to  compensa- 
tion for  their  expenditures;  and  a  confidential  communication  of 
the  King's  views  was  requested.3  The  Court  of  Berlin  replied 
that  the  first  step  to  be  taken  was  to  request  a  secret  but  formal 
promise  from  Louis  XVI  to  repay  the  costs  of  the  intervention; 
but  that  if  such  an  engagement  could  not  be  obtained  or  fulfilled, 
the  conquests  which  the  allied  Courts  would  probably  make, 

1  Rescripts  to  Jacobi,  February  6  and  9,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  169;  instructions  to 
BischofTwerder  of  February  18,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172;  reports  of  Reuss,  February, 
passim. 

2  One  could  hardly  attempt  to  point  out  all  the  occasions  when  the  claim  for 
'  indemnities  '  was  brought  forward  on  the  Prussian  side  at  this  time.  It  will 
suffice  here  to  refer  to  Frederick  William's  letter  to  Louis  XVI  of  January  13,  1792; 
Schulenburg  to  Breteuil,  January  13  and  February  13;  the  notes  presented  to 
Reuss,  January  13  and  February  5;  the  rescripts  to  Jacobi  of  January  14  and  to 
Goltz  at  St.  Petersburg,  February  10;  Reuss'  report  of  January  14,  Alopeus'  of 
January  9/20  and  11/22;  the  dispatch  of  Carisien  accompanying  the  letter  of  Gus- 
tavus  III  to  Fersen  of  February  6,  in  Klinckowstrom,  Le  Comic  de  Fersen  et  la 
Cour  de  France,  ii,  pp.  164  f. 

3  Kaunitz  to  Reuss,  January  25,  P.  S.  3,  Vivenot,  i,  p.  353. 


y 


232  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

would  furnish  the  most  natural  means  of  compensation.  The 
Prussians  had,  indeed,  already  entered  into  secret  negotiations 
with  Louis'  agent  Breteuil,  who  had  not  hesitated  to  promise 
reimbursement  in  money;  but  it  is  uncertain  whether  his  master 
ever  formally  consented  to  the  agreement.1  The  Austrians  fol- 
lowed this  example  by  making  similar  proposals  to  the  King  of 
France  through  Count  Mercy;  but  the  matter  was  so  long  de- 
layed through  the  reluctance  of  the  French  royal  family  to  commit 
themselves  to  a  formal  engagement,  that  before  anything  definite 
had  been  arranged,  the  intervening  Powers  had  agreed  upon  a 
very  different  plan  for  their  '  indemnities.' 2 

With  regard  to  Poland,  Frederick  William's  sentiments  had 
changed  greatly  since  the  previous  spring.  In  the  early  part  of 
May,  1 791,  he  had  openly  expressed  warm  approval  of  the  new 
constitution;  at  the  end  of  the  month  he  was  still  not  against  it; 
but  when,  at  the  beginning  of  June,  he  learned  that  no  effective 
aid  was  to  be  expected  from  England  in  the  Eastern  crisis,  his 
attitude  towards  Poland  began  to  alter  immediately.  Having 
now  renounced  the  policy  of  opposition  to  Russia,  he  no  longer 
saw  any  reason  for  seeking  the  friendship  of  the  Republic.  One 
of  the  first  signs  of  the  change  was  a  rescript  to  Goltz  of  June  10, 
1 791,  in  which  the  King  prophesied  that  the  Empress  would 
never  approve  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May,  and  ordered 
the  envoy  to  take  care  not  to  rebuff  the  Russian  ministers  if  they 
should  make  any  friendly  overtures  on  that  topic.3  As  the  Poles 
saw  the  storm  gathering  in  the  east,  they  made  repeated  efforts 
to  induce  Frederick  William  to  promise  his  support  in  case  of  a 
Russian  attack.  But  henceforth  the  constant  tenor  of  every 
Prussian  declaration  at  Warsaw  was  that  the  King,  while  remain- 
ing loyal  to  the  engagements  contained  in  the  alliance  treaty,  was 
in  no  way  bound  to  guarantee  or  defend  a  constitution  estab- 
lished without  his  knowledge  and  subsequent  to  the  conclusion  of 
the  alliance.    The  Poles  —  to  their  great  misfortune  —  continued 

1  Details  in  Flammermont,  Negotiations  secretes  de  Louis  XVI  el  du  Baron  de 
Breteuil  avec  la  Cour  de  Berlin. 

2  Kaunitz  to  Mercy,  February  19,  Mercy  to  Kaunitz,  February  29,  March  13, 
April  17,  and  23,  V.  A.,  Frankreich,  F.  261. 

3  Salomon,  Das  politische  System  des  jiingeren  Pitt,  p.  64. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  233 

to  cherish  some  hopes  of  Prussian  support,  partly  because  they 
imagined  that  the  language  of  the  Berlin  ministry  did  not  repre- 
sent the  King's  true  sentiments,  partly  because  Lucchesini,  now 
returned  to  Warsaw,  exhibited  himself  as  such  a  Proteus  among 
diplomats  that  it  was  difficult  to  tell  exactly  what  he  was  charged 
to  say; x  but  these  hopes  were  built  on  sand.  It  was  now  the 
fixed  policy  at  Berlin  to  remain  entirely  passive  in  Polish  affairs 
until,  as  was  confidently  expected,  Russia  should  come  out  in 
opposition  to  the  new  constitution.  The  opportunity  would  then 
be  given  to  a  form  a  concert  of  the  three  neighboring  Powers, 
which  would  overthrow  the  hereditary  succession  and  the  other 
dangerous  innovations  of  the  Third  of  May,  and  would  restore 
the  Republic  to  a  becoming  state  of  nullity.  Exactly  how  this 
beneficent  work  was  to  be  accomplished  was  not  yet  certain;  but 
one  may  suspect  that  Schulenburg  disclosed  his  master's  arriere- 
pensee,  when  in  August  (1791)  he  prophesied  to  the  English  envoy 
a  new  partition  of  Poland.2 

It  was  favorable  to  the  success  of  such  plans  that  the  relations 
between  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  were  slowly  improving.  The 
estrangement  produced  by  the  Eastern  crisis  lingered,  indeed, 
throughout  the  summer  of  1791.  Frederick  William  was  deter- 
mined not  to  take  the  first  step  towards  a  reconciliation  with  the 
Empress;  and  as  late  as  September  she  betrayed  her  surviving 
resentment  by  revelling  in  sarcasms  at  his  expense.3  It  was 
French  affairs  that  gave  the  first  impetus  to  a  rapprochement,  the 
earliest  sign  of  which  was  the  letter  addressed  by  Catherine  to 
Frederick  William  about  the  middle  of  October.    This  encouraged 

1  Lucchesini's  dispatches  are  full  of  solemn  assurances  that  his  language  con- 
formed exactly  to  his  instructions;  but  the  reports  of  the  Russian,  Austrian,  and 
Saxon  envoys  combine  to  show  that  his  utterances  varied  amazingly  from  day  to 
day.  At  one  moment,  he  would  be  insinuating  that  all  the  neighbors  of  the  Republic 
were  about  to  unite  against  it;  at  another,  he  would  be  firing  the  Poles  with  hopes 
for  the  formation  of  a  quadruple  alliance  in  their  defence.  Bulgakov  wrote  in  his 
diary  (December  6/17,  1791):  "  This  Lucchesini  in  one  and  the  same  room  tells 
five  people  five  different  tales,  and  when  he  is  caught  contradicting  what  he  has 
just  told  someone  else,  he  excuses  himself  with  the  plea:  '  Qu'il  faut  parler  a  chacun 
selon  sa  ported,  mais  le  vrai  est  ce  que  je  vous  dis.'  "     M.  A.,  Ilojitnia,  III,  66. 

s  Ewart's  report  of  August  4,  Herrmann,  Erganzungsband,  p.  72. 

3  Rescript  to  Goltz  of  August  27,  in  Salomon,  op.  cit.,  p.  66,  note  1.  Cobenzl's 
reports  of  September  2,  6,  13,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1791. 


234 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


the  Prussians  to  make  counter-advances.  At  the  end  of  the 
month  Bischoffwerder  suggested  to  Alopeus  that  as  it  might  be 
repugnant  to  the  Empress  to  accede  to  the  future  Austro-Prussian 
alliance,  it  would  depend  only  upon  her  to  conclude  a  separate 
alliance  directly  with  the  King.1  In  December  the  royal  favorite 
returned  to  the  charge.  He  regretted,  he  said,  that  the  alliance 
with  Russia  could  not  precede  that  with  Austria;  but,  at  any  rate, 
it  would  be  better  to  abandon  all  idea  of  a  mere  accession,  and  to 
arrange  a  treaty  directly  between  their  two  Courts.  He  would  be 
delighted  to  go  to  St.  Petersburg  and  negotiate  it  himself,  if 
Alopeus  would  only  propose  that  to  the  Prussian  ministry  as  his 
own  idea.2  These  insinuations  produced  no  direct  response  from 
St.  Petersburg;  but  still  by  the  close  of  the  year  Goltz,  the  Prus- 
sian envoy,  began  to  find  himself  treated  with  more  considera- 
tion: the  Empress  spoke  to  him  for  the  first  time;  the  Grand 
Duke  knew  him  again.3  As  far  as  the  delicate  subject  of  Poland 
was  concerned,  Schulenburg  did  his  utmost  by  hints  and  sarcastic 
comments  to  show  Alopeus  that  the  King  was  hostile  to  the  new 
constitution,  and  Bischoffwerder  repeatedly  asked  that  envoy 
directly  what  his  Court  thought  about  Polish  affairs.4  Russia 
remained  absolutely  silent  on  that  question,  but  the  Prussians 
were  not  discouraged.  When  the  Empress  finally  got  ready  to 
speak,  they  were  sure  that  an  agreement  between  the  two  Powers 
would  come  of  itself. 

Under  such  circumstances,  Kaunitz's  attempt  to  win  over  the 
Court  of  Berlin  to  his  Polish  policy  was  doomed  to  failure.  In 
their  note  of  January  13,  the  Prussian  ministry  urged  that  while 
the  King,  like  the  Emperor,  was  far  from  wishing  to  oppose  the 
new  constitution  or  the  succession  of  the  Elector,  still  it  would  be 
a  very  delicate  matter  to  take  any  steps  in  this  affair  until  the 
sentiments  of  Russia  were  known;  and  that  while  the  Court  of 
Vienna  seemed  to  regard  the  separate  article  of  the  July  Conven- 

1  Alopeus'  report  of  October  19/30,  M.  A.,  Ilpyccia,  III,  27. 

2  Alopeus  to  Bezborodko,  December  12/23,  M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  26. 

3  Cf.  Heidrich,  Preussen  im  Kantpfe  gegen  die  franzosische  Revolution,  p.  173. 

4  Alopeus'  reports  of  November  15/26,  November  22/December  3,  Decem- 
ber 16/27,  January  17/28,  February  3/14,  and  10/21,  M.  A.,  Ilpyccia,  III,  27 
and  29. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  235 

tion  as  referring  specifically  to  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of 
May,  they  had  always  understood  it  to  refer  only  to  any  free  con- 
stitution, i.  e.,  one  not  imposed  by  any  foreign  Power.  Hence 
they  desired  to  avoid  ambiguities  by  omitting  from  the  treaty  of 
alliance  all  mention  of  the  constitution  of  Poland  and  promising  to 
maintain  only  "  the  liberty  and  independence  of  that  Kingdom." 
The  ominous  significance  of  the  proposed  change  was  quite 
appreciated  at  Vienna.  But  immediately  after  the  Prussian  note 
there  arrived  still  more  exasperating  communications  from  St. 
Petersburg.  The  Empress  had  seen  fit  to  read  Leopold  a  new  and 
impertinent  lecture  on  his  slackness  in  French  affairs,  and  to  pro- 
pose a  plan  of  action  which  only  showed  how  little  she  understood 
the  situation  or  troubled  herself  about  the  interests  of  her  ally. 
The  indignation  of  the  Austrians  was  increased  by  the  fact  that 
these  dispatches  did  not  contain  the  long  and  anxiously  awaited 
response  on  Polish  affairs,  but  only  a  request  that  the  Emperor 
would  take  no  step  regarding  them  '  which  might  hinder  the 
freedom  of  the  future  joint  deliberations.'  '  The  delay,'  it  was 
added,  '  was  not  only  without  inconvenience,  but  even  necessary 
in  view  of  the  confusion  and  irresolution  still  prevailing  in  the 
minds  of  the  Poles  regarding  the  delicate  and  important  innova- 
tions which  had  been  and  were  still  being  introduced.'  l  The 
inference  to  be  drawn  from  this  was  only  too  obvious.  Putting  it 
alongside  the  answer  received  from  Berlin,  the  Austrians  found 
themselves  in  danger  of  being  isolated  on  the  Polish  question. 
What  the  result  of  an  agreement  between  Russia  and  Prussia  on 
that  subject  would  be,  seemed  equally  clear.  It  would  be  a  new 
partition.  Doubtless  under  other  circumstances  the  Court  of 
Vienna  would  have  tried  to  avoid  such  a  disaster  by  reverting  to 
its  old  policy  of  1781,  by  giving  Russia  a  free  hand  in  Poland, 
providing  she  agreed  to  keep  the  Prussians  out.  But  now  the 
danger  from  France  rendered  the  friendship  of  Prussia  all- 
important;  and  moreover,  the  Austrians  were  so  indignant  against 
their  old  ally  that  they  began  to  regard  the  restoration  of  Russia's 
exclusive  predominance  in  Poland  as  among  the  worst  of  evils. 
Hence  they  fell  back  on  the  concert  with  Prussia,  in  the  vain  hope 

1  Ostermann  to  Golitsyn,  December  25/January  5,  M.  A.,  ABCtpifl,  III,  51. 


236 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


that  eloquent  exhortations  and  small  concessions  might  induce 
Frederick  William  to  oppose  Catherine's  projects  and  thereby  to 
deprive  himself  of  the  chance  to  gain  a  long-sought  acquisition. 

In  the  dispatches  of  January  25,  Reuss  was  authorized  to  give 
way  on  the  article  relating  to  Poland;  but  at  the  same  time  in  an 
ostensible  postscript  Kaunitz  earnestly  and  forcibly  pointed  out 
how  dangerous  it  would  be  to  the  new  friendship  of  the  two 
Courts,  how  inconsistent  with  the  whole  spirit  of  their  alliance,  if 
Prussia  were  now  to  embark  upon  schemes  for  violent  aggrandize- 
ment at  the  expense  of  the  Republic.1  The  Chancellor's  warnings 
were  only  too  well  grounded.  Without  throwing  the  entire 
blame  for  what  followed  upon  Prussia,  one  may  still  surmise  that 
many  later  disasters  might  have  been  avoided,  and  especially  that 
the  great  contest  with  revolutionary  France  might  have  taken  a 
very  different  turn,  if  the  Court  of  Berlin  could  only  have  brought 
itself  to  postpone  the  realization  of  its  designs  on  Poland  to  a 
more  propitious  time.  But  Kaunitz's  admonitions  fell  on  deaf 
ears  at  Berlin. 

At  any  rate,  the  difficulty  about  the  treaty  of  alliance  was  now 
removed.  It  was  agreed  that  the  article  respecting  Poland  should 
pledge  the  two  Courts  "  to  undertake  nothing  contrary  to  the 
maintenance  of  a  free  constitution  "  in  that  country,  in  place  of 
the  old  phrase  which  referred  to  "  the  free  constitution."  It  was  a 
change  of  but  a  single  word,  but  it  indicated  the  momentous 
alteration  that  had  come  about  in  the  Polish  policy  of  Prussia 
since  the  previous  summer.  In  other  respects  the  treaty  con- 
formed in  substance  to  the  Vienna  Convention  of  July  25,  while 
in  form  it  was  modeled  —  significantly  enough  —  after  the 
Treaty  of  Versailles  of  1756.  With  its  signature  at  Berlin  on 
February  7,  1792,  the  Austro-Prussian  alliance  was  at  last  an 
accomplished  fact.2 

1  These  dispatches  are  printed  in  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  353,  358  ff. 

1  The  treaty  is  printed  in  Neumann,  Recueil,  i,  pp.  470-475;  Martens,  Recueil 
de  Traites  des  Puissances  de  I' Europe,  v,  pp.  301-305 ;  the  secret  articles  in  Vivenot, 
i,  pp.  370  f. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  237 


IV 

In  accordance  with  the  wish  expressed  by  the  Emperor  early  in 
January,  it  had  already  been  agreed  that  Bischoffwerder  should 
undertake  a  new  mission  to  Vienna  to  arrange  the  measures  to  be 
adopted  against  France.  On  February  16  a  conference  was  held 
at  Potsdam,  at  which  the  Kong,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  Bischoff- 
werder, Schulenburg,  and  Manstein  were  present,  to  decide  upon 
a  plan  of  campaign.  It  appears,  however,  that  other  matters 
were  also  discussed,  and  that  a  new  project  of  the  utmost  impor- 
tance was  broached  here,  perhaps  for  the  first  time.  The  day 
before,  a  courier  had  arrived  from  St.  Petersburg  with  news  that 
must  have  seemed  to  the  Prussians  like  the  opening  of  the 
heavens. 

Goltz  reported  that  through  a  secret  channel  he  had  learned  the 
contents  of  a  note  from  the  Empress  to  her  favorite,  Zubov,  in 
which  she  declared:  "  After  all  has  been  arranged  with  the  Turks, 
I  wish  Prince  Repnin  to  go  to  the  main  army,  collect  as  many 
troops  as  he  can  —  which,  according  to  my  calculation,  will 
amount  to  130,000  men  —  and  with  them  march  by  way  of 
the  Ukraine  into  Poland.  If  Austria  and  Prussia  oppose,  as 
is  probable,  I  shall  propose  to  them  either  compensation  or 
partition."  1 

This  was  the  first  definite  information  about  the  Empress' 
plans  that  had  reached  Berlin;  and  no  news  could  have  been 
more  welcome.  Immediately  the  idea  was  brought  forward  at  the 
Potsdam  conference  of  combining  the  settlement  of  Polish  affairs 
with  the  French  enterprise,  in  the  way  that  Prussia  should  take 
her  '  indemnities  '  for  the  expense  of  the  intervention  in  the  west 
by  wrenching  territory  from  her  unfortunate  eastern  neighbor. 
Nothing  final  was  decided  upon;  nothing  could  be  until  the 
intentions  of  Russia  were  more  fully  known;  but  one  may  safely 
assert  that  from  the  middle  of  February  on,  from  the  moment 
when  the  first  favorable  news  arrived  from  St.  Petersburg,  the 

1  Goltz's  report  of  February  3,  printed  in  Herrmann,  Ergdnzungsband.,  pp. 
231  f.     See  Appendix  VIII. 


238  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Prussians  were  hoping  and  planning  for  a  new  partition  of  Poland, 
for  which  the  intervention  in  France  might  perhaps  furnish  the 
pretext.1 

The  first  result  of  the  Potsdam  deliberations  was  that  a  few 
days  later  Bischoffwerder  visited  Alopeus  and,  drawing  the  con- 
versation upon  Poland,  assured  him  that  the  King  was  not  in  the 
least  inclined  to  support  the  new  constitution,  but  that  he  re- 
garded any  '  explosion  '  in  the  Republic  as  dangerous,  as  long  as 
French  affairs  were  not  terminated.2  Although  Bischoffwerder's 
subtlety  was  lost  on  the  Russian,  the  aim  of  this  hint  seems  clear 
enough.  If  the  Empress  was  ready  to  propose  a  partition,  in  case 
the  other  Powers  offered  opposition  to  the  execution  of  her  plan 
—  very  well:  the  Prussians  would  offer  such  an  appearance  of 
opposition  as  would  not  deter  her  from  her  essential  aim,  but 
would  lead  her  to  take  them  into  partnership. 

The  effect  of  the  news  from  St.  Petersburg  is  also  seen  in  the 
instructions  drawn  up  for  Bischoffwerder's  mission  to  Vienna. 
The  article  regarding  Poland  contained  first  of  all  the  usual  pro- 
testations that  the  King's  engagements  with  the  Republic  were 
in  no  sense  applicable  to  the  new  constitution,  and  that  he  in- 
tended to  act  in  the  most  perfect  harmony  with  the  Emperor  on 
Polish  affairs.    It  was  denied  that  there  had  been  any  discussions 

1  We  have  very  few  documents  through  which  to  trace  these  developments  of 
February.  My  account  is  based  chiefly  on  the  Duke  of  Brunswick's  letter  to 
Bischoffwerder  of  February  19:  "  Die  Entschadigungs-Angelegenheit  wird  grosse 
Verlegenheit  herbeifuhren,  wenn  man  den  Kaiser  nicht  vermogen  kann,  seine  Ein- 
willigung  zu  den  Veranderungen  in  Polen  zu  geben.  Ich  gebe  den  Erwerbungen, 
die  man  in  Polen  zu  machen  hofft,  den  Vorzug  vor  den  Eroberungen  in  Frankreich. 
.  .  .  Alles  kommt  darauf  an,  dass  man  sich  mit  dem  Kaiser  erklare."  (Translation 
from  the  French  in  Massenbach,  Memoiren,  i,  p.  267.)  Since  Goltz's  dispatch 
came  February  15,  and  the  Potsdam  conference  took  place  the  16th,  while  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick  arrived  from  his  capital  that  morning,  departed  homeward  that 
evening,  and  wrote  the  letter  to  Bischoffwerder  almost  immediately  after  his  return, 
it  may  safely  be  presumed  that  he  learned  of  the  "  Erwerbungen  die  man  in  Polen 
zu  machen  hofft  "  during  the  discussions  at  Potsdam.  His  championship  of  the 
idea  of  a  new  partition  of  Poland  is  referred  to  in  a  letter  from  the  King  to 
Bischoffwerder  of  March  14:  "  II  paroit  que  les  vues  de  l'lmperatrice  touchant  la 
Pologne  pourroit  [sic]  amener  l'evenement  que  le  Due  de  Bronsviq  souhaite  de  voir 
arriver  et  dont  il  parle  dans  la  lettre  que  je  Vous  envoye  [sic]  a  Dresde,"  B.  A.,  R.  i, 
Conv.  172. 

2  Alopeus'  report  of  February  10/21,  M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  29. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  239 

on  the  subject  between  Russia  and  Prussia,  and  especially  that 
the  Empress  had  made  any  overtures  about  projects  of  aggran- 
dizement in  Poland,  "  although,"  it  was  added,  "  one  doubtless 
cannot  guarantee  that  this  sovereign  may  not  have  plans  of  that 
kind."  If  the  King  received  any  hints  on  that  topic  from  Russia, 
he  would  not  fail  to  communicate  them  frankly  to  the  Emperor, 
in  the  conviction  that  in  a  similar  case  the  Court  of  Vienna  would 
act  in  the  same  way  towards  him.  "These  cordial  assurances,"  it 
was  said,  "  will  furnish  General  Bischoffwerder  the  most  natural 
occasion  to  convince  the  Imperial  Court  that  ...  in  order  to 
obtain  in  full  the  advantages  which  the  union  happily  existing 
[between  the  two  Courts]  ought  to  procure  them,  it  is  essential 
that  the  most  unlimited  confidence  in  one  another  should  animate 
both  in  all  that  concerns  their  respective  interests;  and  that  they 
should  thus  from  the  beginning  remove  by  frank  and  amicable 
explanations  all  that  might  later  sow  distrust  between  them  and 
alter  their  complete  harmony."  These  words  were  not  merely 
conventional  expressions  of  loyalty  and  confidence  towards  an 
ally.  They  were  a  direct  reply  to  Kaunitz's  recent  warning  that 
the  friendship  between  the  two  Courts  would  be  exposed  to  grave 
peril,  if  Prussia  entered  upon  plans  for  aggrandizement  in  Poland. 
They  were  designed  to  pave  the  way  for  an  understanding  on  the 
basis  of  a  partition,  as  soon  as  Russia  had  uttered  the  expected 
word. 

It  may  at  first  sight  appear  a  contradiction  to  that  which  has 
just  been  said,  that  in  the  article  of  the  instruction  which  dealt 
with  the  subject  of  '  indemnities,'  the  old  plan  —  Alsace  and  Lor- 
raine for  Austria,  Juliers  and  Berg  for  Prussia  —  was  once  more 
recommended.  Probably  this  was  because  it  seemed  necessary  to 
keep  up  the  claim  for  an  acquisition  in  the  West  as  long  as  the 
prospects  for  making  one  in  the  East  were  still  uncertain.  Fur- 
thermore, the  Prussian  ministry  could  hardly  have  wished  to  dis- 
close their  hand  to  Austria  too  fully  until  Russia  had  spoken. 
But,  to  all  appearances,  they  no  longer  entertained  serious  plans 
for  a  dismemberment  of  France.  Bischoffwerder  seems  to  have 
displayed  little  zeal  for  that  project  while  in  Vienna;  and  at  the 
end  of  February  Louis  XVI's  agent  at  Berlin  was  joyfully  re- 


240 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


porting  that  there  was  no  more  talk  of  demanding  a  territorial 
indemnity  from  his  master.1 

Charged  with  these  equivocal  instructions  respecting  Poland, 
which  showed  that  Prussia  was  veering  further  and  further  away 
from  the  Austrian  standpoint  on  that  question,  Bischoffwerder 
was  also  the  bearer  of  proposals  regarding  the  French  problem 
that  were  but  little  in  harmony  with  the  Emperor's  wishes.  The 
main  object  of  his  mission  was,  indeed,  to  shake  the  Imperial 
cabinet  out  of  its  too  pacific  temper,  to  inveigle  Leopold  into 
armed  intervention  in  France,  and  to  arrange  the  plan  of  cam- 
paign.2 

Bischoffwerder  arrived  in  the  Austrian  capital  on  February  28; 
but  this  time  he  was  not  to  see  that  Imperial  friend  who  had  so 
charmingly  received  him  and  smilingly  outwitted  him  on  his  two 
previous  visits.  At  this  crucial  moment,  when  both  the  long- 
gathering  storms  were  about  to  burst  in  East  and  West,  when  an 
experienced  hand  was  needed  more  than  ever  at  the  helm, 
Leopold  II  died  suddenly,  after  an  illness  of  only  three  days 
(March  1,  1792).  His  death  was  an  irremediable  loss  to  Austria, 
and  perhaps  to  Europe.  Whether  he  could  have  carried  on  with 
success  the  struggle  against  revolutionary  France  must  remain 
uncertain;  but  he  was  assuredly  the  one  sovereign  of  that  time 
least  unfitted  for  that  task.  Quite  certainly  he  could  not  have 
averted  the  Russian  attack  on  Poland,  but  he  might,  not  improb- 
ably, have  prevented  a  new  partition. 

It  is  true  that  at  the  close  of  Leopold's  reign  his  own  Polish 
policy  was  crumbling.  His  effort  to  hold  Prussia  firm  in  defence 
of  the  new  constitution  had  failed.    Fruitless,  too,  had  been  his 

1  Cf.  Fersen  to  Gustavus  III,  February  29,  and  the  directly  contrary  opinion 
held  at  the  beginning  of  that  month,  Gustavus  to  Fersen,  February  6,  Klinckow- 
strom,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  182  and  165. 

2  Stripped  of  its  verbiage,  the  first  article  of  his  instruction  certainly  means  this 
and  nothing  else.  Compare  Carisien's  report  in  Taube,  Svenska  Beskickningars 
Berdttelser,  pp.  95  f.;  Fersen  to  Gustavus  III,  March  4,  1792,  Klinckowstrom, 
op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  193;  Alopeus'  report  of  February  10/21,  M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  29. 
Bichoffwerder  himself  speaks  of  "  le  parti  vigoureux  que  j'ai  a  proposer  "  (Report 
of  February  29,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172). 

Bischoffwerder's  instructions  are  printed  in  Ranke,  Ursprung  und  Beginn  der 
Revolutionskriege,  pp.  351-359. 


THE  POLICY  OF  LEOPOLD  II  24 1 

attempt  to  extort  a  quick  acceptance  of  the  crown  from  the  Elec- 
tor. At  the  beginning  of  March  the  interminable  negotiation  at 
Dresden  still  dragged  on  —  or  rather  it  was  about  to  be  trans- 
ferred to  Warsaw  —  with  no  prospects  of  an  immediate  decision. 
War  with  France  was  now  very  nearly  inevitable;  and  in  that 
case  Austria  would  necessarily  be  quite  unable  to  assert  her  voice 
effectively  in  Polish  affairs.  Above  all,  Catherine  had  at  last 
spoken.  At  the  time  of  the  Emperor's  death  couriers  were  speed- 
ing westward  from  St.  Petersburg  with  news  that  confirmed  well- 
nigh  all  that  was  hoped  at  Berlin  and  all  that  was  feared  at 
Vienna.  That  pronouncement  from  Russia  was  the  ruin  of  Leo- 
pold's Polish  system.  It  may,  indeed,  be  doubted  whether  his 
policy  in  this  connection  did  any  good  either  to  Austria  or  to  the 
Republic.  On  the  one  hand,  it  had  deeply  offended  Catherine, 
weakened  the  alliance  of  the  Imperial  Courts,  and  contributed  to 
the  rapprochement  between  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg;  and  on  the 
other  hand,  it  had  lulled  the  Poles  with  false  hopes  of  support 
from  without,  which  led  them  sadly  to  neglect  their  own  prepara- 
tions for  self-defence.  It  won  Leopold  golden  opinions  only  at 
Warsaw. 

At  the  end  of  his  reign  the  Emperor  enjoyed  a  popularity 
among  the  Poles  such  as  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  not  possessed 
for  many  years.  This  was  due  in  part  to  his  mild  treatment  of  his 
Galician  subjects;  to  the  often  very  exaggerated  reports  spread 
at  Warsaw  about  the  provisions  in  favor  of  Poland  contained  in 
the  July  Convention  and  the  February  treaty  of  alliance;  possibly 
to  certain  assurances  sent  from  Vienna  through  secret  channels; l 
but  above  all,  to  the  general  confidence  felt  in  the  Emperor's  love 
of  peace,  justice,  and  moderation,  and  to  the  indefatigable  activity 
of  Landriani.  Leopold  had  come  to  occupy  much  the  same  posi- 
tion in  the  minds  of  the  Poles  as  had  once  been  held  by  Frederick 
William.2    They  relied  on  his  beneficent  influence  at  Dresden  and 

1  Bulgakov,  reporting  to  the  Empress  the  causes  of  Leopold's  popularity  at 
Warsaw,  claimed  to  know  on  good  authority  that  a  secret  correspondence  went  on 
between  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of  Poland  through  Corticelli,  the  former  Polish 
minister  at  Vienna,  Spielmann,  and  Manfredini  (another  confidant  of  Leopold's). 
Report  of  March  6/17,  M.  A.,  IloJbraa,  III,  66. 

2  Lucchesini's  report  of  March  n,  1792:    "Leopold  II  et  le  Chevalier  Lan- 


242 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Berlin;  and  on  him  many  of  them  based  their  hopes  of  security 
against  Russia.  It  was  reported  that  he  intended  to  build  up  a 
quadruple  alliance  of  Austria,  Prussia,  Poland,  and  Saxony. 
"  His  political  system,"  it  was  said  in  the  patriotic  conventicles  at 
Warsaw  "  was  to  establish  the  general  tranquillity  on  a  perma- 
nent basis,  and  to  exclude  Russia  from  the  circle  of  European 
states."  Nowhere  was  his  death  more  regretted  than  at  Warsaw. 
People  declared  that  the  nation  had  lost  its  friend,  its  powerful 
protector,  its  support.1  And  in  truth  the  nation  had  lost  the  one 
foreign  sovereign  who  had  done  his  best  to  uphold  the  work  of  the 
Third  of  May,  and  who  was  sincerely  well-disposed  towards 
Poland. 

driani  avoient  herite  de  la  confiance  qu'on  avoit  cidevant  place  en  Votre  Majeste  et 
moi,"  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27. 

1  For  the  above:  Bulgakov's  report  to  the  Empress  of  March  6/17,  M.  A., 
IloJibma,  III,  66;  Lucchesini's  reports  of  January  7  and  11,  February  22,  March 
7,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27;  de  Cache's  of  March  10  and  14,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1792. 


CHAPTER  XI 

The  Outbreak  of  War  in  East  and  West 


At  the  time  of  Catherine's  first  Turkish  war,  Sweden  had  seized 
the  opportunity  to  free  itself  from  her  grasp  by  the  revolution  of 
1772,  which  had  reformed  a  constitution  almost  as  vicious  as  the 
Polish  one,  concentrated  the  power  of  the  state  in  the  hands  of 
the  monarch,  and  closed  the  door  to  further  foreign  interference. 
Catherine  had  not  seen  fit  to  go  to  war  about  it.    During  her 
second  conflict  with  the  Turks,  Poland  had  tried  to  do  precisely 
the  same  thing  as  the  Swedes  had  done,  by  means  of  a  coup 
d'etat  consciously  modeled  upon  that  of  Gustavus  III.    At  the 
close  of  the  Oriental  crisis,  it  was  long  believed  at  Warsaw  that 
the  Empress  would  ultimately  bow  to  the  accomplished  fact,  as 
she  had  done  in  the  case  of  Sweden.    She  might  sulk,  she  might 
intrigue,  she  might  even  make  demonstrations  on  the  frontier, 
but  it  was  not  thought  probable  that  she  would  go  further.    An 
attempt  to  reimpose  the  Russian  yoke  by  force  seemed  scarcely 
likely  to  be  tolerated  by  the  German  Powers,  one  of  whom  was 
now  the  warm  friend  of  Poland,  and  the  other  its  ally,  pledged  to 
defend  its  independence.     Moreover,  how  could  the  Empress 
consistently  attack  the  Poles  for  having  established  a  monarchical 
form  of  government,  at  a  time  when  she  was  preaching  to  all 
sovereigns  the  necessity  of  taking  up  the  sacred  cause  of  mon- 
archy in  France  ?    H«w  could  she  face  the  odium  of  going  to  war 
with  her  neighbors  simply  because  they  wished  to  reform  their 
institutions;    of  overthrowing  by  force  of  arms  a  constitution 
which  the  whole  nation,  with  few  exceptions,  had  gladly  accepted, 
and  which  had  received  the  applause  of  all  Europe  ?    Neverthe- 
less, as  soon  as  her  peace  with  the  Turks  was  signed,  Catherine 
proceeded  to  undertake  precisely  this  graceless  task;    and  one 
hardly  knows  whether  to  wonder  the  more  at  the  unscrupulous- 
ness  or  at  the  skill  with  which  the  enterprise  was  carried  out. 

»43 


244 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Although  for  nearly  three  years  the  Empress  had  maintained 
an  outwardly  passive  attitude  and  an  ostentatious  show  of  indif- 
ference towards  Poland,  she  seems  never  for  a  moment  to  have 
wavered  in  the  determination  not  to  permit  that  country  to 
escape  permanently  from  her  control.  Vindictiveness  for  the 
slights  and  injuries  inflicted  upon  her  during  the  Turkish  war  may 
have  had  some  part  in  influencing  her  resolution;  but  she  was, 
undoubtedly,  guided  chiefly  by  the  firm  conviction  that  the  vital 
interests  of  her  Empire  and  all  the  traditions  of  Russian  policy 
required  that  Poland  should  be  kept  under  its  old  republican 
constitution  and  in  its  old  state  of  perfect  impotence.  The  Poles 
might  fret  and  strut,  they  might  inveigh  against  her  and  intrigue 
with  her  enemies,  they  might  make  and  mar  their  institutions  to 
suit  their  fancy  for  the  present;  but  they  should  pay  for  it  in  the 
end.  Her  time  for  action  would  come  as  soon  as  the  Turks  were 
off  her  hands;  and  the  program,  marked  out  long  in  advance, 
was  a  Confederation  under  Russian  auspices.1 

All  hopes  that  the  nation  would  of  its  own  accord  return  to  the 
side  of  its  ancient  protector  were  shattered  by  the  events  of  the 
Third  of  May.  Catherine  was  furious  at  the  news.  '  The  Poles 
had  outdone  all  the  follies  of  the  Parisian  National  Assembly/ 
she  wrote  to  Grimm;  '  they  must  indeed  be  possessed  of  devils  to 
act  in  a  manner  so  contrary  to  their  own  interests  and  to  the  very 
conditions  of  their  existence.'  The  morning  after  the  tidings 
arrived,  she  informed  Bezborodko :  "  The  question  now  is  whether 
Poland  wishes  to  be  ruled  by  the  mob  of  Warsaw.  If  we  see  the 
slightest  inclination  for  a  Counter-confederation,  we  must  bring 
one  about  without  further  delay.  There  you  have  my  opinion."  2 
The  Council  of  the  Empire,  when  asked  for  its  advice,  replied 
that  the  new  form  of  government,  if  once  firmly  established, 
could  only  prove  harmful  to  the  neighboring  Powers,  and  especi- 
ally to  Russia;  but  that  as  long  as  it  was  uncertain  whether  the 
King  of  Prussia  had  had  a  hand  in  the  revolution,  and  as  long  as 
the  Turkish  war  lasted,  it  was  impossible  to  decide  upon  any 

1  One  of  her  earliest  definite  utterances  on  the  subject  is  in  the  letter  to  Potem- 
kin  of  September  30/October  11,  1790:  "When  God  grants  peace,  then  we  shall 
form  a  Counter-confederation,"  etc.,  C6opHHKi>,  xlii,  p.  no. 

2  To  Grimm,  C6opHHKi,  xxiii,  pp.  534  f.;   to  Bezborodko,  ibid.,  xlii,  p.  152. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  245 

course  of  action.1  After  the  first  flush  of  anger  was  over,  the 
Empress  too  came  around  to  this  standpoint.  Orders  were  ac- 
cordingly sent  to  Bulgakov,  her  envoy  at  Warsaw,  to  continue 
the  same  passive  conduct  as  before,  but  in  private  to  assure  the 
friends  of  freedom  —  if  such  there  still  were  —  that  Russia  would 
always  be  ready  to  help  them  recover  their  liberty,  as  soon  as 
they  showed  a  desire  for  it  not  only  by  words  but  by  deeds.2 
Henceforth  it  was  the  Empress'  first  and  foremost  aim  to  over- 
throw this  thoroughly  obnoxious  constitution.  Henceforth  she 
had  a  tolerable  pretext  for  action,  inasmuch  as  she  had  by  the 
treaties  of  1768  and  1775  guaranteed  to  the  Republic  its  old  form 
of  government.  Henceforth  if  her  aid  were  invoked,  she  could 
color  her  intervention  before  the  world  by  the  plea  that  she  was 
legally  and  morally  bound  to  defend  the  '  liberty  '  of  Poland,  and 
that  she  could  not  refuse  to  succor  the  allied  nation  now  groaning 
under  a  '  despotism  '  imposed  by  conspiracy,  fraud,  and  violence. 
Determined  as  the  Empress  was  to  act  with  vigor  when  the 
proper  time  came,  it  was  difficult  for  her  to  satisfy  Potemkin.  It 
has  already  been  noted  that  that  restless  schemer  had  come  to  the 
capital  in  the  spring  of  1791  to  press  his  own  aggressive  projects 
against  the  Republic.  As  usual,  he  had  several  irons  in  the  fire. 
The  favorite  plan  was  still  that  of  raising  an  Orthodox  rebellion 
in  the  Ukraine  and  robbing  Poland  of  its  richest  provinces;  but 
he  also  talked  at  times  of  a  new  partition  on  a  gigantic  scale,  and 
again  he  urged  the  immediate  formation  of  a  Confederation 
among  the  Poles  themselves.  For  this  last  plan  he  hoped  to  find  a 
ready  instrument  in  his  friend  Felix  Potocki,  and  a  pretext  in  the 
revolution  of  the  Third  of  May.  These  projects  did  not  entirely 
square  with  those  of  his  sovereign.  Catherine  had  always  re- 
garded the  Ukraine  scheme  with  misgivings;  if  she  approved  of 
the  idea  of  a  Counter-confederation,  she  did  not  mean  to  be 
rushed  into  the  enterprise  precipitately ;  and  she  apparently  felt 
at  this  time  a  growing  distrust  regarding  Potemkin's  dreams  of 
personal  aggrandizement.  Moreover,  she  was  vexed  with  him 
because  of  his  hostility  to  the  reigning  favorite  Zubov,  and  be- 

1  Protocol  of  May  12/23,  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  p.  853. 

2  Rescript  to  Bulgakov,  May  25/June  5,  M.  A.,  IIojii>ma,  III,  63. 


246 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


cause  of  his  interminable  delay  about  returning  to  the  army.  It 
was  probably  mainly  in  order  to  get  rid  of  him  that  at  the  end 
of  May  she  gave  him  a  secret  rescript  once  more  approving  in 
general  terms  his  plan  of  the  preceding  year  for  the  seizure  of  the 
Ukraine,  but  limiting  its  execution  by  so  many  conditions  as  to 
render  the  concession  quite  illusory.  On  the  other  hand,  the  pro- 
ject of  forming  a  Confederation  was  sanctioned,  and  the  Prince 
was  directed  to  work  out  the  scheme  in  detail. 

Shortly  afterwards  Potemkin  received  a  letter  from  Felix 
Potocki  containing  quite  definite  proposals  for  a  Confederation 
to  be  formed  in  the  southeastern  palatinates  under  Russian 
protection  for  the  overthrow  of  the  new  constitution.1  Armed 
with  this,  the  Prince  returned  to  the  charge;  and  after  long  delays 
he  secured  one  more  '  most  secret  rescript/  this  time  of  a  less 
fictitious  and  more  satisfactory  character  than  the  preceding  one. 
It  was  true  that  the  execution  of  the  Ukraine  project  was  again 
relegated  to  the  dim  future;  but  the  plan  for  a  Confederation  was 
approved  in  terms  that  showed  the  Empress  resolved  to  proceed 
with  that  in  earnest.  Potemkin  was  authorized  to  invite  Potocki 
and  the  other  leading  Polish  malcontents  to  his  headquarters;  to 
assure  them  of  Russia's  most  efficacious  aid  and  protection;  and 
to  settle  with  them  the  details  of  the  future  undertaking,  subject 
to  the  Empress'  approval.  If  they  insisted  on  forming  their 
Confederation  at  once,  Catherine  was  willing  to  begin  action 
immediately;  but  she  preferred  to  postpone  her  intervention 
until  after  the  peace  with  the  Turks,  which  at  that  time  —  the 
end  of  July,  after  the  complete  backdown  of  the  Triple  Alliance 
and  Repnin's  brilliant  victory  at  Macin  —  seemed  to  be  very 
close  at  hand.  The  return  of  the  Russian  armies  from  Moldavia 
through  Poland  would  then  afford  the  best  opportunity  to  strike 
the  great  blow.  While  outlining  with  remarkable  foresight  the 
means  and  methods  to  be  employed,  Catherine  also  showed  her- 
self fully  conscious  of  the  momentous  consequences  of  the  enter- 
prise on  which  =^°  was  embarking.     "It  is  difficult  now,"  she 

.arliest  d 
1  Potockjnber  30/Cmkin,  May   14,    1791,   M.  A.,  Ilojbraa,  II,   7.     Appendix 
IX  contains  tr-confxt  of  this  letter,  of  which  only  the  existence  has  hitherto  been 
known,  and  to  which  may  be  traced  the  origins  of  the  Confederation  of  Targowica. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  247 

wrote,  "  to  predict  the  end  to  which  this  policy  will  lead;  but  if 
with  the  aid  of  the  Almighty  it  is  crowned  with  success,  two 
advantages  may  result  for  us.  In  the  one  case,  we  shall  be  able  to 
overthrow  the  present  constitution  and  to  restore  the  old  Polish 
liberty;  and  thereby  we  shall  gain  complete  security  for  our 
Empire  for  all  time.  Or  in  case  the  King  of  Prussia  should  dis- 
play an  invincible  covetousness,  we  shall  find  ourselves  obliged, 
in  order  to  put  an  end  to  these  troubles  and  disturbances  once  for 
all,  to  agree  to  a  new  partition  of  Poland  in  favor  of  the  three 
allied  Powers.  From  this  there  will  result  the  advantage  that  we 
shall  extend  the  boundaries  of  our  Empire,  augment  by  so  much 
its  security,  and  win  new  subjects  of  the  same  faith  and  blood  as 
ourselves.  Poland,  on  the  other  hand,  will  be  reduced  to  such 
limits  that  whatever  be  the  strength  of  its  government,  it  can 
offer  no  dangers  to  the  neighboring  Powers,  and  will  form  only  a 
sort  of  barrier  between  them."  1 

Potemkin,  however,  was  not  to  reap  the  fruits  of  all  these  years 
of  planning  and  intriguing.  He  left  St.  Petersburg  at  the  begin- 
ning of  August  sullen  and  depressed,  and  died  in  Moldavia  two 
months  later  —  the  victim  of  a  fever,  due  to  the  effects  of  an 
ill-regulated  life,  and  perhaps  to  the  chagrins  occasioned  by  his 
last  stay  at  court.  Unfortunately,  his  death  was  not  to  be  the 
end  of  his  oft-confirmed  and  much  delayed  plans. 

II 

Deprived  of  a  helper  who  towards  the  last  had  become  a  trifle 
burdensome,  the  Empress  now  took  Polish  affairs  more  directly 

1  The  two  famous  rescripts  to  Potemkin  of  May  16/27  and  July  18/29,  I79I> 
are  printed  in  the  Pyc.  Apx.,  1874,  ii,  pp.  246-258,  281-289;  also  by  Kalinka  in 
Polish  translation  in  his  "  Polityka  dworu  austryackiego,"  in  Przeglqd  Polski,  1873, 
pp.  82-85,  88-92;  and  by  Liske  in  German  in  //.  Z.,  xxx,  pp.  286-301.  On  Potem- 
kin's  shaken  position  at  court  at  the  time  of  his  last  visit  to  St.  Petersburg,  see: 
Pyccofl  CTapnua,  xiv,  pp.  241  ff.;  ^epasaBnui,  3airacKH,  pp.  304-308;  BpHKnept, 
IIoTeMKHHT.,  pp.  194  ff.  In  view  of  the  rather  strained  relations  then  existing 
between  the  Empress  and  the  Prince,  Askenazy  seems  inclined  to  deny  to  both 
rescripts  any  importance  as  an  expression  of  Catherine's  real  intentions  (Przymierze 
polsko-pruskie,  pp.  162  f.).  I  should  agree  that  the  first  rescript  was  very  much  of 
a  sham;  but  that  the  second  was  not  appears  —  best  of  all  —  from  the  fact  that 
almost  every  plan  there  announced  was  duly  carried  out  the  next  year. 


248  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

into  her  own  hands,  with  her  usual  vigor  and  with  a  sureness  in 
the  choice  of  persons,  means,  and  occasions  that  has  rarely  been 
surpassed.  The  fiery  ardor  with  which  she  preached  the  counter- 
revolution in  France  to  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Sweden,  her  well- 
calculated  and  nicely  measured  rapprochement  to  the  Court  of 
Berlin,  her  masterly  silence  towards  Vienna  on  the  Polish  ques- 
tion —  all  this  was  designed  only  to  secure  her  a  free  hand  in  the 
Republic.  If  she  had  originally  planned  to  take  the  Emperor 
into  her  confidence,1  she  soon  abandoned  the  idea.  Kaunitz's 
efforts  on  behalf  of  the  new  Polish  constitution  threw  her  into 
transports  of  rage,  while  the  Emperor's  slackness  in  French 
affairs  aroused  her  far  from  disinterested  indignation.  By  the 
end  of  the  year  she  and  all  the  Russians  in  chorus  after  her  were 
coming  to  declaim  on  every  occasion  that  Leopold  II  was  a 
timid,  nay  a  craven,  prince,  whose  soul  knew  naught  of  honor  or 
dignity  or  magnanimity  or  any  other  of  the  virtues  that  were 
supposed  to  characterize  peculiarly  the  Court  of  Petersburg. 
That  meant  that  the  Emperor  had  presumed  to  have  an  opinion 
of  his  own  on  both  the  French  and  the  Polish  questions  —  an 
unpardonable  offence  in  an  ally  of  the  great  Catherine.  She  was 
coming  to  see  in  him  the  main  obstacle  to  the  realization  of  her 
plans.  But,  far  from  being  daunted,  she  insisted  all  the  more 
vigorously  on  going  ahead  with  the  Polish  project,  regardless  of 
the  wishes  of  Austria  and  Prussia.  "  I  inform  the  members  of  the 
College  of  Foreign  Affairs,"  she  wrote  in  December,  "  that  we  can 
do  everything  that  we  please  in  Poland,  and  the  contradictory 
demi-volontes  of  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  will  oppose  us 
only  with  a  stack  of  paper  objections,  and  we  shall  settle  our 
affairs  in  Poland  ourselves.  I  am  hostile  only  to  those  who  try  to 
intimidate  me.  Catherine  II  has  often  made  her  enemies  tremble, 
but  I  have  not  heard  that  Leopold's  foes  have  ever  feared  him."  2 
When  one  of  her  ministers  objected  that  nothing  should  be  done 
until  they  had  built  up  a  party  in  Poland  and  made  at  least  some 
overtures  to  the  German  Powers,  she  wrote:  "  But  I  say  that  we 

1  See  the  ahove-cited  rescripts  to  Potemkin,  especially  that  of  July  18/29. 

2  Notes  written  a  propos  of  Kaunitz's  dispatches  to  Cobenzl  of  November  12, 
1791,  P.  A.,  X,  75. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  249 

do  not  have  to  utter  a  word  to  the  other  Courts;  and  a  party  will 
always  be  found  when  it  is  needed.  It  is  impossible  that  there 
should  not  be  people  who  prefer  the  old  order.  Volhynia  and 
Podolia  offer  many  different  pretexts;  one  has  only  to  choose."  l 
The  party,  or  the  nucleus  of  one,  had,  indeed,  already  been 
found.  The  two  most  prominent  of  the  Polish  malcontents,  Felix 
Potocki  and  Seweryn  Rzewuski,  had  come  to  Jassy  at  Potemkin's 
invitation  in  the  middle  of  October,  precisely  at  the  moment  of 
the  Prince's  death;  and  they  were  followed  shortly  after  by 
another  promising  recruit,  the  Crown  Hetman  Branicki.  These 
three  men,  under  Catherine,  were  to  be  the  main  authors  of  the 
Confederation  of  Targowica.  In  them  the  worst  vices  of  Old 
Poland  stand  incorporated.  Enormously  rich,  able  to  count  his 
villages  by  the  score  and  his  '  subjects  '  by  the  thousand,  accus- 
tomed to  live  in  truly  royal  magnificence,  Potocki  represents  the 
typical  provincial  kinglet,  who  could  brook  no  superior,  no  re- 
striction, no  abridgment  of  golden  liberty.  Honest  and  well- 
meaning,  perhaps,  and  virtuous  according  to  his  lights,  he  was 
also  narrow-minded  and  obstinate,  and  consumed  by  pride  and 
vanity.  Capable  of  seeing  but  one  idea  at  a  time,  he  was  now 
obsessed  by  the  thought  that  the  glorified  Republic  of  his  ances- 
tors was  doomed  to  perish,  overthrown  by  '  despotism,'  unless  he, 
the  one  blameless  man,  could  save  it  —  with  the  aid  of  foreign 
bayonets.  Rzewuski,  Field-Hetman  of  the  Crown,  was  the  best 
head  in  this  group  of  reactionaries.  He  had  always  posed  as  the 
argus-eyed  guardian  of  liberty,  the  model  of  republican  virtue, 
the  Cato  of  Poland ;  and  of  a  Cato  he  had  at  least  all  the  unlovely 
qualities.  Branicki  was  simply  the  dashing  adventurer,  a  rioter 
and  a  brawler,  gifted  indeed  with  many  of  the  arts  that  command 
popularity,  but  guided  solely  by  private  interest,  regardless  of 
loyalty,  patriotism  or  duty  —  a  man  whose  life  was  a  succession 

1  Catherine  to  Bezborodko,  December  4/15,  printed  in  the  CSopnuKii,  xxix, 
pp.  176  f.,  and  Solov'ev,  Geschichte  des  Falles  von  Polen,  p.  265.  The  German  trans- 
lator of  Solov'ev  has  erroneously,  I  think,  rendered  the  first  part  of  the  last  sentence: 
"  Volhynien  und  Podolien  zu  nehmen,  sind  Vorwande  genug  vorhanden."  If  this 
version  were  correct,  it  would  indicate  that  the  Empress  had  already  decided  upon 
a  partition.  But  the  Russian  text  printed  in  the  C6opHHKi  gives  little  warrant  for 
such  a  translation. 


250 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


of  treasons.  Doubtless  these  magnates  had  no  conception  of  the 
ruin  they  were  bringing  upon  their  country.  Morally  they  were 
no  worse  than  those  princes  and  gentlemen  of  France  who  at  this 
same  time  were  inviting  all  Europe  to  arms  against  their  father- 
land. But  never  did  traitors  leave  behind  them  so  terrible  a 
monument  as  did  the  men  of  Targowica.  In  Polish  history  their 
names  are  branded  with  infamy. 

Count  Bezborodko,  sent  down  by  Catherine  after  Potemkin's 
death  to  conduct  the  peace  negotiations  with  the  Turks,  was  also 
authorized  to  assure  the  Polish  leaders  of  the  Empress'  favor  and 
protection,  and  to  receive  their  plans  and  proposals.  In  the  con- 
ferences held  at  Jassy  from  November  to  February,  the  main 
points  of  the  enterprise  were  discussed  at  length,  although  the 
final  decisions  were  left  to  be  made  at  St.  Petersburg.  After  the 
usual  fashion  of  emigres,  the  Polish  magnates  were  lavish  with 
assurances  that  the  great  mass  of  their  countrymen  were  on  their 
side;  it  was  only  the  terrorism  of  the  dominant  -  faction  '  at  War- 
saw that  prevented  the  nation  from  manifesting  its  true  senti- 
ments. "  A  single  spark  would  suffice  to  set  the  whole  country 
ablaze;  thousands  and  thousands  of  adherents  would  rally  to  the 
good  cause  at  the  first  opportunity."  Still,  when  they  were  called 
upon  to  name  men  of  prominence  whose  support  might  be  relied 
upon,  the  magnates  could  scarcely  indicate  a  dozen;  and  they  had 
to  confess  that  it  would  require  at  least  100,000  Russian  troops  to 
enable  the  country  to  express  its  real  opinions.  They  proposed, 
however,  to  form  a  Confederation  as  soon  as  the  Empress'  forces 
had  crossed  the  frontier;  the  '  royalist '  army,  they  affirmed, 
could  be  easily  surrounded  and  captured,  if  it  did  not  voluntarily 
come  over  to  the  side  of  the  republicans;  the  Confederates  would 
then  take  possession  of  the  whole  government  of  the  country,  and 
effect  a  radical  resettlement  in  accordance  with  principles  to  be 
fixed  in  agreement  with  the  Empress.  The  new  constitution  and 
all  the  illegal  works  of  the  present  Diet  were  to  be  summarily 
annulled ;  but  what  was  to  be  put  in  their  place  was  a  question  on 
which  the  magnates  could  not  agree  even  among  themselves. 
Rzewuski  wished  to  restore  the  constitution  of  1773,  with  certain 
modifications  designed  especially  to  place  the  real  control  of  the 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  25 1 

state  in  the  hands  of  the  four  hetmans,  of  whom  he  happened  to 
be  one.  Potocki,  on  the  other  hand,  proposed  a  scheme  no  less 
revolutionary  in  character  than  were  the  changes  introduced  on 
the  Third  of  May.  The  country  should  be  reorganized  as  a  federal 
republic  under  the  name  of  "  The  Independent  and  United  Prov- 
inces of  Poland,"  on  the  Swiss  or  the  Dutch  model;  each  prov- 
ince was  to  possess  its  own  army,  treasury,  administration,  and 
judiciary;  the  King  was  to  be  deposed  and  replaced  by  a  Presi- 
dent elected  for  two  years.  All  the  Poles  agreed  that  the  first  act 
of  the  liberated  Republic  should  be  to  conclude  an  '  eternal 
alliance  '  with  Russia;  and  all  of  them  insisted  that  the  Empress 
must  guarantee  in  the  most  solemn  manner  the  territorial  integ- 
rity of  their  country.1 

Bezborodko,  while  pleased  with  the  eagerness  of  the  Poles  to 
make  themselves  the  tools  of  Russia,  was  not  strongly  enamored 
of  their  projects.  When  early  in  February  he  submitted  to  the 
Empress  a  final  report  on  the  Jassy  conferences,  he  urged  that  the 
first  and  most  essential  point  in  undertaking  the  settlement  of 
Polish  affairs  was  to  attain  a  confidential  understanding  with  the 
German  Powers,  or  at  least  with  the  Court  of  Berlin.  From 
Austria  no  serious  opposition  was  to  be  expected,  since  the 
Emperor  could  not  afford  to  throw  away  the  friendship  of  Russia 
for  love  of  the  Poles.  But  with  Prussia  the  case  was  different. 
Frederick  William's  engagements  with  the  Republic  were  so  clear 
and  unequivocal  that  unless  he  were  won  over  in  advance,  he 
might  feel  bound  to  come  to  the  aid  of  his  assailed  ally.  Besides, 
the  liberation  of  Poland  had  been  so  largely  his  work  that  he 
might  be  inclined  to  defend  it  out  of  sheer  amour-propre.  Hence 
it  was  advisable  to  enter  into  a  concert  with  the  King  on  Polish 
affairs,  and  even  into  an  alliance.  Otherwise,  an  intervention  in 
Poland  would  probably  lead  to  a  war  with  Prussia,  a  danger 
which  Russia,  exhausted  by  five  years  of  constant  fighting,  could 
not  afford  to  risk.    An  alliance  with  Frederick  William,  on  the 

1  For  the  above:  F.  Potocki  to  Potemkin,  May  14,  1791;  Rzewuski  to  Bez- 
borodko, December  7;  plan  general  submitted  by  Potocki  and  Rzewuski  early 
in  December;  memorial  of  Branicki;  Potocki  to  Bezborodko,  December  17; 
plan  submitted  by  Potocki  and  Rzewuski  early  in  1792,  M.  A.,  ApxHBi.  Bap- 
maBCKoii  Maccin. 


252  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

other  hand,  would  really  bind  the  Empress  to  nothing;  it  would 
be  of  great  assistance  in  the  settlement  of  the  Polish  question; 
later  on  it  would  make  Russia  the  arbiter  between  Austria  and 
Prussia,  so  that  after  a  period  of  rest  and  recuperation  she  could 
safely  take  up  any  aggressive  enterprises  that  seemed  useful  and 
advantageous.  A  danger  might,  indeed,  arise  from  the  King  of 
Prussia's  "  thirst  for  Dantzic  and  Thorn";  but  —  Bezborodko 
concluded  —  "  His  Majesty  must  realize  that  his  ambitions  could 
not  be  satisfied  save  by  an  agreement  of  the  three  neighboring 
Powers  for  a  partition  of  Poland  on  the  basis  of  the  most  complete 
equality  "  (of  advantages).1 

Had  these  counsels  been  accepted  in  toto,  a  bargain  for  a  new 
partition  might  probably  have  been  the  preliminary,  rather  than 
the  sequel,  to  the  Empress'  intervention  in  Poland.  But  during 
Bezborodko's  long  absence  from  the  capital  the  management  of 
the  Polish  enterprise  had  passed  into  the  hands  of  a  small  clique, 
who,  acting  of  course  under  the  Empress'  supervision,  conducted 
it  henceforth  with  few  interruptions  down  to  the  very  end.  This 
inner  '  ring  '  was  made  up  of  Zubov,  a  very  young  man,  without 
talent  or  experience,  who  was  beginning  to  essay  the  role  of 
Potemkin;  Markov,  a  member  of  the  College  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
who  aspired  to  rise  on  the  wings  of  the  favorite;  and  Popov,  the 
former  head  of  Potemkin's  chancellery,  whose  chief  political 
capital  was  his  intimate  knowledge  of  the  ideas  of  the  late 
lamented.2  With  these  advisers,  the  Empress  had  already  decided 
the  most  essential  questions  while  Bezborodko  was  still  in  the 
south.  They  meant  to  begin  the  enterprise  as  soon  as  possible; 
they  were  not  at  all  disposed  to  hold  the  troops  idle  while  they 
were  negotiating  with  Berlin  and  Vienna;  and  it  was  still  less  to 
their  state  to  take  the  other  Courts  into  partnership.  Neverthe- 
less, it  was  impossible  to  invade  Poland  without  at  least  some  kind 

1  Bezborodko  to  the  Empress,  January  25/February  5,  1792,  M.  A.,  Typnia, 
IX,  14.  This  voluminous  report,  which  throws  so  much  light  upon  the  ideas  with 
which  the  Russians  embarked  upon  their  Polish  enterprise,  and  especially  upon  their 
attitude  towards  Austria  and  Prussia,  has  hitherto  remained  unknown  to  historians. 
The  text  of  it  is  printed  in  part  in  Appendix  X. 

2  As  to  this  clique  see  the  letters  of  Rostopcin,  Bezborodko  and  Zavadovski  to 
S.  R.  Vorontsov,  Apx.  Bop.,  viii,  pp.  52  f.;  xiii,  pp.  255  f.;  xii,  pp.  75  f. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  253 

of  explanation  to  the  German  Powers.  Whatever  Catherine  may 
have  intended  in  December,  towards  the  end  of  February  — 
perhaps  as  a  result  of  Bezborodko's  exhortations  —  she  decided 
to  make  certain  preliminary  communications  to  Berlin  and 
Vienna,  which,  without  limiting  her  own  freedom  of  action,  might 
still  prevent  opposition  on  the  part  of  her  neighbors. 

On  the  28th  of  February,  1792,  the  first  official  revelations  as  to 
the  Empress'  momentous  projects  were  made  to  Cobenzl  and  to 
Goltz,  the  Prussian  envoy.  To  Cobenzl  Ostermann  read  a  dis- 
patch addressed  to  the  ambassador  Golitsyn  in  Vienna,  which 
contained  the  long  awaited  response  on  the  Polish  question.  The 
nine-months'  delay  was  excused  with  the  brazen  plea  that  until 
the  recent  peace  with  the  Turks  the  Court  of  Petersburg  had  not 
had  leisure  to  form  an  opinion  on  Polish  affairs.  The  various 
arguments  advanced  on  the  Austrian  side  on  behalf  of  the  new 
constitution  were  refuted  or  ignored  in  a  manner  that  could 
only  be  taken  as  open  scorn  at  Vienna.  The  Empress,  it  was 
said,  was  irrevocably  determined  no  longer  to  allow  the  Poles  to 
violate  arbitrarily  their  engagements  with  her;  she  intended  to 
overthrow  the  recent  innovations  in  the  Republic,  so  detrimental 
to  all  the  neighboring  Powers;  and  she  invited  the  Courts  of 
Vienna  and  Berlin  to  concur  with  her  in  that  enterprise,  especially 
by  means  of  vigorous  declarations  at  Warsaw.  It  was  to  be  ex- 
pected that  in  the  face  of  such  a  manifestation  of  solidarity  the 
Poles  would  give  way  without  further  difficulty;  but  should  it 
prove  necessary  to  resort  to  force,  the  efforts  required  could  not 
in  any  case  be  considerable  enough  to  prevent  the  three  Courts 
from  pursuing  at  the  same  time  the  concert  against  France.  In 
the  heated  discussions  that  followed  the  reading  of  this  dispatch, 
every  argument  was  exhausted  on  both  sides,  the  Russians  laying 
most  stress  on  the  idea  that  if  the  new  constitution  were  allowed 
to  subsist,  it  would  infallibly  lead  either  to  the  establishment  of  an 
absolute  monarchy  or  to  the  rise  of  a  democracy  even  more 
dangerous  than  the  French.  Cobenzl  retorted  with  some  force 
that  he  failed  to  see  how  the  growth  of  democracy  could  be 
checked  by  destroying  the  monarchical  power  and  restoring  the 
country  to  anarchy;  but  he  was  given  to  understand  that  what- 


254 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


ever  the  Austrians  might  think,  they  were  bound  by  the  treaty  of 
alliance  to  uphold  the  ancient  constitution  (which  was  true),  and 
that  if  they  stood  out  for  the  new  regime  they  would  be  alone  in 
their  opinion,  since  Prussia  would  certainly  adopt  the  Russian 
standpoint.  In  vain  the  ambassador  remonstrated  that  this 
enterprise  would  surely  end  with  a  new  partition.  The  Russians 
replied  with  the  most  solemn  assurances  that  the  Empress  would 
never  give  her  consent  to  such  an  arrangement.  Nothing  was 
said  about  a  Confederation.  The  Russian  ministers  refused  to 
state  just  what  measures  their  sovereign  intended  to  employ,  if 
it  proved  necessary  to  use  force  against  the  Poles;  but  Cobenzl 
was  informed  that  in  such  a  case  the  Empress  would  willingly 
take  the  disagreeable  work  of  coercion  upon  herself,  in  order  that 
her  two  allies  might  be  the  more  free  to  direct  their  attention  to 
the  other  great  common  enterprise,  the  counter-revolution  in 
France.1  The  irony  of  this  suggestion  lent  the  crowning  touch  to 
a  communication  than  which  nothing  more  inconsiderate,  harsh, 
and  dictatorial  could  well  be  imagined. 

The  insinuation  verbale  made  the  same  day  to  Goltz  was 
friendly  enough  in  tone,  but  even  vaguer  than  the  overtures  to 
Cobenzl.  It  merely  called  the  attention  of  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment to  the  dangers  arising  from  the  new  Polish  constitution, 
and  suggested  a  concert  to  regulate  matters  in  accordance  with 
the  common  interests  of  the  two  Powers.  Not  a  word  was  said  as 
to  the  nature  or  the  final  aim  of  the  concert;  and  Goltz,  who  was 
not  on  the  same  intimate  footing  with  the  Russians  as  Cobenzl, 
did  not  dare  ask  questions.  Still,  combining  his  conjectures 
with  the  note  to  Zubov  which  had  so  excited  his  imagination 
some  weeks  before,  he  wrote  to  his  Court  that  beyond  a  doubt  the 
Russians  would  presently  come  forward  with  proposals  for  a  new 
partition.2 

Thus  the  sphinx-like  silence  which  the  Empress  had  so  long 
maintained  on  Polish  affairs  was  at  last  broken;  the  veil  which 
had  enshrouded  her  projects  was  at  least  partially  raised.  Her 
immediate  object  was  clear,  although  her  plan  of  action  and  her 

1  Cobenzl's  report  of  February  29,  V.  A.,  Russlattd,  Berichte,  1792. 

2  Goltz's  report  of  February  29,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russlattd,  133. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  255 

ultimate  goal  were  still  an  enigma  to  the  other  Courts.  It  re- 
mained to  be  seen  whether  the  German  Powers  would  raise  a 
hand  in  defence  of  Polish  independence,  whether  they  would 
allow  the  Republic  to  become  once  more  a  Russian  province,  or 
whether  they  would  insist  on  a  division  of  the  spoils. 

Ill 

The  Empress'  plans  were  not  a  little  facilitated  by  the  change 
of  ruler  that  had  taken  place  at  Vienna.  The  new  King  of  Hun- 
gary and  Bohemia,  soon  to  be  known  as  the  Emperor  Francis  II, 
was  a  sickly  young  man  of  twenty-four,  sadly  lacking  in  experi- 
ence, talents,  independence,  and  initiative;  fitfully  inclined  to  a 
bolder  policy  than  that  of  the  late  reign;  easily  tempted  by 
prospects  of  aggrandizement,  but  without  his  uncle's  energy,  or 
his  father's  prudence,  or  the  firmness  of  will  and  definiteness  of 
purpose  which  alone  could  justify  the  ventures  he  undertook :  in 
short,  a  feeble  and  colorless  personality,  a  ruler  singularly  ill- 
fitted  to  guide  the  Monarchy  through  the  stormy  age  of  the 
French  Revolution.  Nor  was  the  complexion  of  the  ministry 
more  promising.  The  octogenarian  Kaunitz  remained  nominally 
at  the  helm;  but  he  was  losing  touch  with  affairs,  and  was  more 
and  more  thrust  aside  by  pupils  who  fancied  themselves  cleverer 
than  "  the  old  papa."  These  ambitious  subordinates,  Philip 
Cobenzl  and  Spielmann,  had  enjoyed  a  large  measure  of  the  late 
Emperor's  confidence  and  had  identified  themselves  thoroughly 
with  his  policies,  especially  with  the  Prussian  alliance.  Under 
the  new  monarch  they  aspired  to  play  the  leading  roles,  although 
neither  of  them  possessed  talents  rising  above  a  finished  medi- 
ocrity. To  make  matters  worse,  these  two  ministers,  and  partic- 
ularly the  parvenu  Spielmann,  were  the  object  of  the  special 
aversion  of  the  members  of  the  State  Conference,  a  body  of  old 
grumblers  who  seemed  to  find  their  chief  function  in  criticizing, 
hampering,  and  thwarting  all  the  operations  of  the  State  Chancel- 
lery. The  new  reign  began,  therefore,  with  no  happy  auguries 
for  vigor  and  unity  in  the  administration.1 

1  The  Staatskonferenz  was  at  this  time  made  up  of  Marshal  Lacy,  Prince  Star- 
hemberg,  Prince  Rosenberg,  Count  Colloredo-Wallsee,  Cobenzl,  and  Spielmann. 


256  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

If  it  had  been  anticipated  that  the  young  sovereign,  as  the 
pupil  of  Joseph  II,  would  lean  more  towards  Russia  than  towards 
the  Court  of  Berlin,  it  soon  appeared  that  the  tendency  was  quite 
the  contrary.  While  the  new  King  hastened  to  inform  both  the 
Empress  and  Frederick  William  of  his  desire  to  maintain  and 
strengthen  the  existing  alliances,  the  Court  of  Vienna  remained 
silent  towards  that  of  St.  Petersburg  on  all  important  questions 
for  more  than  a  month,  while  a  lively  discussion  was  carried  on 
with  Prussia.  The  Austrian  ministers  overwhelmed  Bischoff- 
werder  and  Jacobi  with  assurances  of  confidence  and  friendship; 
Kaunitz  professed  to  see  in  the  Prussian  alliance  the  greatest 
achievement  of  his  career;  Spielmann  called  it  "  the  universal 
panacea."  x  It  seemed  that  the  new  government  would  follow 
strictly  in  the  paths  of  the  late  reign  and  attempt  to  settle  both 
the  French  and  the  Polish  questions  in  closest  concert  with 
Prussia. 

Quite  in  accordance  with  the  policy  of  Leopold,  the  first  effort 
was  to  dispose  of  the  latter  question  before  taking  up  the  former. 
In  the  early  days  of  March,  while  still  ignorant  of  the  revelation 
that  was  coming  from  St.  Petersburg,  Spielmann  set  to  work  to 
devise  a  new  scheme  for  harmonizing  the  interests  of  all  three  of 
the  neighboring  Powers  with  respect  to  the  Republic.  The  main- 
tenance of  the  new  constitution,  though  stripped  of  some  of  its 
objectionable  features;  the  establishment  of  a  permanent  per- 
sonal union  between  Poland  and  Saxony;  the  limitation  of  the 
Polish  army  to  forty  or  fifty  thousand  men;  the  perpetual  neutra- 
lization of  Polish  territory;  the  incorporation  of  all  these  arrange- 
ments in  a  treaty  between  the  three  great  Powers,  Saxony,  and  the 
Republic:  such  were  the  chief  provisions  of  the  plan  by  which  the 
minister  sought  to  save  the  essential  parts  of  the  late  Emperor's 
system,  while  making  not  inconsiderable  concessions  to  Russia 

Kaunitz  never  attended,  although  of  course  entitled  to  do  so.  Interesting  light  on 
the  characters  of  the  Austrian  ministers  is  afforded  by  Arneth's  "  Graf  Philipp 
Cobenzl  und  seine  Memoiren,"  in  Archiv  fur  osterr.  Geschichte,  lxvii,  and  by  his 
"  Relationen  der  Botschafter  Venedigs  iiber  Oesterreich  im  18.  Jht."  F.  R.  A.,  II, 
xxii,  pp.  349  ff.;  also,  the  anonymous  memoire  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  467-474,  and 
Zinzendorf's  Diary,  preserved  in  manuscript  in  the  Vienna  Archives.  See  also, 
Schlitter,  Kaunitz,  Philipp  Cobenzl  und  Spielmann. 

1  Bischoffwerder's  report  of  March  13,  1792,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  2$  J 

and  Prussia.  The  ever-complaisant  Bischoffwerder  having  ex- 
pressed his  perfect  approval,  it  was  decided  to  send  the  project 
to  Berlin  by  courier;  if  Frederick  William  and  the  Elector  of 
Saxony  agreed  to  it,  the  three  German  Courts  would  then  present 
it  at  St.  Petersburg  with  "  a  very  polite  but  firm  declaration  " 
that  they  insisted  on  this  plan  and  would  accept  no  other.  The 
poor  Empress!  She  would  have  to  give  in,  Spielmann  reckoned, 
for  she  could  not  refuse  without  admitting  that  she  had  other 
plans  aiming  at  exclusive  domination  in  the  Republic,  not  to 
speak  of  the  terror  into  which  she  would  be  thrown  by  the  polite 
but  firm  declaration  of  the  high  allies.1 

Unfortunately,  however,  on  the  very  day  when  the  plan  was 
read  to  Jacobi  and  Bischoffwerder  in  final  form,  a  courier  arrived 
with  Ostermann's  dispatch  to  Golitsyn  of  February  28  —  the 
formal  announcement  that  Russia  would  never  tolerate  the 
Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May.  The  effect  must  have  been  as 
painful  as  possible.  After  all  the  confidential  communications 
made  by  the  Austrian  cabinet  at  Dresden  and  Berlin,  it  was 
bitterly  humiliating  to  think  of  bowing  before  this  imperious  fiat. 
But  the  strength  of  the  Empress'  will  was  sufficiently  known  at 
Vienna.  The  Austrians  can  hardly  have  doubted  that  their 
solution  of  the  Polish  question  had  now  lost  all  chance  of  success. 
From  that  moment  they  must  have  abandoned  the  hope  of  realiz- 
ing the  Polish  plan  of  the  late  Emperor. 

Henceforth  the  essential  thing  was  to  find  a  basis  on  which  the 
Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin  could  agree,  in  order  to  prevent 
Russia  from  acquiring  a  too  exclusive  control  in  Poland.  If,  in 
accordance  with  the  previous  agreement,  Spielmann's  plan  was 
still  sent  to  Berlin,  it  was  accompanied  by  the  intimation  that 
Austria  did  not  insist  on  this  project,  but  was  willing  to  accept  any 
other  which,  in  the  King  of  Prussia's  opinion,  might  lead  to  the 
desired  goal.2    Doubtless  the  main  object  of  the  '  expedition  '  was 

1  Bischoffwerder's  reports  of  March  6,  10,  13,  17-18,  the  first  printed  in  Ranke, 
Ut sprung  und  Beginn  der  Revolutionskriege,  pp.  360-363;  Jacobi's  reports  of  March 
3,  6,  14,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  169;  Vivenot,  i,  p.  417.  -The  plan  itself,  in  the  form 
of  seventeen  articles,  as  it  was  finally  sent  to  Berlin,  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  i,  pp. 
418  ff.,  and  by  Herrmann,  F.  z.  D.  G.,  iv,  pp.  430  ff. 

2  Kaunitz  to  Reuss,  March  17,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  422  ff. 


258  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  induce  Prussia  to  explain  her  views  clearly  and,  perhaps,  to 
come  forward  with  her  own  proposals.1  And  even  the  faintest 
hope  that  the  Court  of  Berlin  would  accept  Spielmann's  plan  must 
have  been  dispelled  by  the  orders  which  reached  Bischoffwerder 
just  before  the  courier  left  Vienna.  Without  waiting  to  get  the 
plan  into  his  hands,  Frederick  William  had  decisively,  irrevocably 
rejected  it. 

On  March  11  the  King  had  received  a  report  from  Bischoff- 
werder containing  the  news  that  Spielmann  was  working  out  a 
project,  the  chief  features  of  which  were  the  advocacy  of  the 
Saxon-Polish  personal  union  and  certain  limitations  on  the  mili- 
tary forces  of  the  Republic.  That  sufficed  not  only  to  make 
Frederick  William  reject  the  scheme  in  advance,  but  even  to 
arouse  in  his  mind  suspicions  as  to  the  secret  aims  of  Austria.  A 
rescript  to  Bischoffwerder  was  at  once  drawn  up  declaring  that 
the  plan  appeared  infinitely  dangerous,  since  nothing  in  the 
world  would  be  more  contrary  to  the  major  interests  of  Prussia 
than  the  proposed  Saxon-Polish  union;  the  King  could  never 
acquiesce  in  it  under  any  conditions  whatsoever.2 

Immediately  afterward  came  Goltz's  report  of  February  29, 
with  the  long  awaited  overtures  from  Russia.  It  did  not  require 
the  unpleasant  plan  brought  forward  by  Austria  to  make  the 
King  accede  with  joy  to  the  Empress'  proposals.     In  spite  of 

1  Jacobi's  dispatch  of  March  18,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  169. 

2  Rescript  of  March  13 : 

"  Rien  au  monde  ne  scauroit  [sic]  etre  plus  contraire  aux  interests  [sic]  majeurs 
de  mes  Etats  et  de  leurs  Souverains  futurs,  que  l'existence  d'une  Puissance  telle 
qu'on  la  formeroit  par  la  reunion  permanente  de  la  Pologne  a  la  Saxe,  qui  parta- 
geant  pour  ainsi  dire  en  deux  le  Corps  de  la  Monarchie  Prussienne,  et  s'elevant 
peutetre  de  plus  en  plus  par  Pinfluence  de  sa  position  locale  et  de  son  nouveau 
Gouvernement,  seroit  sans  contredit  le  voisin  le  plus  redoutable  de  mes  etats. 
Ajoutes  a  cela  que  la  Pologne  avec  sept  million  [sic]  d'habitants,  reunie  a  la  Saxe 
qui  en  a  deux,  produiroient  [sic]  une  masse  de  population  de  neuf  millions,  et 
qu'une  Puissance  de  cette  force  dans  la  position  geographique  ou  elle  se  trouve, 
exposeroit  aux  plus  grands  dangers,  soit  la  Prusse  .  .  .  soit  mes  Etats  de  Silesie. 
.  .  .  En  vain  allegueroit-on  les  conditions  et  restrictions,  auxquelles  on  preten- 
droit  assujettir  les  Polonois,  pour  leurs  troupes  et  leur  commerce.  Quelles  qu'elles 
fussent,  il  me  semble  impossible  que  Ton  puisse  veiller  avec  asses  de  soin  a  leur 
observation  exacte.  .  .  .  En  un  mot,  je  ne  puis,  et  ne  pourrois  dans  aucun  cas 
acquiescer  a  un  plan  de  cette  nature.  .  .  ." 

B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  259 

much  that  has  been  said,  the  documents  at  hand  afford  no  traces 
of  any  conflict  at  this  moment  in  Frederick  William's  breast 
between  the  desire  for  aggrandizement  on  the  one  hand,  and  a 
sense  of  loyalty  to  his  engagements  with  the  Republic  or  regard 
for  Austria  on  the  other.  His  decision  was  made  in  a  moment; 
and  it  was,  as  a  great  historian  has  declared,  the  death-sentence  of 
Poland.  Immediately  upon  receiving  Goltz's  dispatch,  without 
waiting  to  consult  his  ministers,  the  King  wrote  to  Schulenburg 
that  Russia  was,  apparently,  not  far  removed  from  thinking  of  a 
new  partition,  which  would  certainly  be  the  surest  means  of 
setting  "  just  limits  "  to  the  power  of  a  king  of  Poland,  whether 
elective  or  hereditary;  it  might  be  difficult  to  find  a  satisfactory 
indemnity  for  the  Court  of  Vienna,  but  if  one  could  be  found,  the 
"  Russian  project  "  would  be  the  most  advantageous  and  desir- 
able for  Prussia.  The  most  suitable  frontier  for  the  acquisitions 
which  he  himself  might  make,  would  be  the  left  bank  of  the  Vis- 
tula. Schulenburg,  it  is  needless  to  say,  was  full  of  admiration 
for  '  the  luminous  manner  in  which  His  Majesty  judged  the 
affairs  of  Poland.' * 

The  Prussians  were  clear  as  to  the  goal  they  wished  to  attain, 
but  it  was  not  so  easy  to  lead  up  to  it.  They  had  absolutely  no 
certainty  that  the  Empress  was  inclined  to  a  partition,  since  that 
conjecture  rested  only  on  Goltz's  surmises  and  on  the  possibly 
apocryphal  note  to  Zubov  reported  by  the  envoy  in  February. 

1  Frederick  William's  note  of  March  12,  Schulenburg's  reply  of  the  same  date. 

The  King  wrote:  "  Par  la  derniere  depeche  du  Ct.  de  Goltz  de  Russie  il  paroit 
que  les  vues  de  l'lmperatrice  concernant  les  afaires  de  Pologne  sont  fort  diferente 
de  ce  que  le  Ct.  Rosomowski  supose  .  .  .  et  que  la  Cour  de  Russie  ne  seroit  peut 
etre  pas  eloignee  de  penser  a  un  nouveau  partage  de  la  Pologne,  ce  qui  seroit  cer- 
tainement  le  moien  le  plus  sur  pour  mettre  de  juste  borne  au  pouvoir  dun  Roi  de 
Pologne,  fut  il  electif  ou  hereditaire;  mais  come  un  projet  pareille  renforceroit 
singulierement  la  position  des  Russes  de  cotS  d'Oczakow  je  doute  que  Ton  put 
trouver  une  indemnisation  pour  la  Cour  de  Vienne  dont  celle-ci  voudroit  se  con- 
tenter.  ...  Si  Ion  pouvoit  trouver  une  compensation  pour  l'Autriche  dont  elle 
fut  satisfaite  le  projet  Russe  seroit  le  plus  favorable  pour  la  Prusse  et  le  plus  a 
desirer  bien  entendu  quelle  feroit  alors  lacquisition  de  la  rive  gauche  de  la  Vistulc, 
et  que  cette  longue  lisiere  de  frontiere  actuellement  aussi  dificile  a  defendre  se 
trouveroit  alors  bien  couverte.  Tel  est  mon  jugement  sur  les  afaires  de  Pologne." 
B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

(I  have  tried  to  reproduce  the  spelling  and  punctuation  of  the  original.) 

See  also  Appendix  XI. 


260  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

They  were  not  minded  to  propose  a  partition  themselves,  for  they 
recognized  that  there  was  a  great  difference  between  making  and 
accepting  such  propositions.  They  still  had  too  much  regard  for 
Austria  and  too  little  confidence  in  Russia  to  throw  themselves 
unreservedly  into  the  arms  of  the  Court  of  Petersburg.  Hence 
the  reply  delivered  to  Alopeus  on  March  13  was  friendly  but 
cautious.  It  stated  merely  that  the  King  would  gladly  enter  into 
the  concert  on  Polish  affairs  proposed  by  the  Empress,  and,  con- 
fident of  her  approval,  was  inviting  his  ally,  the  King  of  Hungary, 
to  accede  to  it  as  well;  that  he  was  ready  to  come  to  an  under- 
standing with  her  at  once  as  to  the  policy  to  be  adopted  towards 
Poland,  and  the  means  to  be  employed;  but  that  it  was  highly 
important  for  him  to  know  her  views  more  in  detail.1 

Having  thus  gone  as  far  as  they  dared,  the  Prussians  longingly 
awaited  further  communications  from  the  Empress,  in  the  hope 
that  she  would  presently  come  forward  and  offer  them  Great 
Poland.  It  was  a  bad  miscalculation.  St.  Petersburg  once  more 
relapsed  into  heavy  silence.  Goltz  was  put  off  with  demonstra- 
tions of  friendship  and  the  excuse  that  no  further  explanations 
could  be  given  until  an  answer  had  been  received  from  Vienna.2 
On  their  side,  the  Prussians  lost  no  opportunity  to  parade  their 
friendship  for  the  Empress  and  to  offer  her  occasions  for  new 
overtures.  Schulenburg  declaimed  to  Alopeus  of  the  common 
interests  of  the  two  Powers  in  Poland,  and  the  necessity  of  head- 
ing off  the  strange  predilection  of  Austria  for  the  Saxon-Polish 
union.  If  Russia  and  Prussia,  he  kept  repeating,  were  once 
agreed  on  a  program,  the  Court  of  Vienna  would  have  to 
acquiesce.  The  seat  of  the  concert  on  Polish  affairs,  he  suggested, 
might  best  be  fixed  at  Berlin,  as  that  city  was  midway  between 
the  other  two  capitals.3  But  such  bits  of  finesse  proved  quite 
fruitless.  Reports  began  to  flow  in  that  the  Russian  armies  were 
about  to  enter  Poland.  The  Prussian  ministry  were  keenly  dis- 
quieted.   Still  they  continued  obstinately  to  maintain  —  as  if  in 

1  Alopeus'  report  of  March  3/14,  with  the  accompanying  Prussian  insinu- 
ation verbale,  M.  A.,  Ilpyccia,  III,  29. 

2  Goltz's  report  of  March  27,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

3  Alopeus  to  Ostermann,  March  9/20  and  19/30,  to  Bezborodko,  April  8/19, 
M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  29. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  26 1 

a  desperate  effort  to  convince  themselves  of  it  —  that  the  Em- 
press, after  once  proposing  a  concert,  would  not  disavow  her  own 
words  by  undertaking  to  settle  Polish  affairs  single-handed. 
And  thus  the  Prussians  remained,  standing  with  folded  hands 
and  eyes  fixed  on  St.  Petersburg,  looking  for  a  new  dispensation 
of  Imperial  grace,  waiting  for  '  the  concert,'  down  to  the  moment 
when  Catherine  was  ready  to  pour  her  troops  into  the  Republic. 


IV 

Austrian  policy  meantime  was  taking  a  new  direction.  Within 
four  days  after  those  first  disturbing  tidings  from  St.  Petersburg 
there  came  the  news  that  Frederick  William  had  vetoed  Spiel- 
mann's  Polish  plan  and  had  given  a  favorable  answer  to  the  pro- 
posals of  Russia.1  Among  the  chagrins  occasioned  by  these 
successive  blows,  not  the  least  was  the  suspicion  that  there  was 
something  behind  this  ready  adhesion  of  the  Court  of  Berlin  to 
the  Empress'  wishes,  that  perhaps  Austria's  two  allies  had  already 
come  to  a  secret  agreement  between  themselves.  The  conviction 
had  long  existed  at  Vienna  that  if  the  King  of  Prussia  acquiesced 
in  Catherine's  designs  on  Poland,  it  would  be  only  on  condition 
that  he  himself  might  realize  his  territorial  ambitions  in  that 
quarter.2  But  if  such  was  his  aim,  was  it  possible  to  oppose  it  at  a 
moment  when  his  cooperation  was  imperatively  necessary  in  view 
of  the  dangerous  trend  of  French  affairs  ?  Leopold's  Polish 
system  had  collapsed ;  a  return  to  Joseph's  was  wellnigh  out  of  the 
question,  owing  to  the  changed  relations  between  Austria  and  the 
other  Powers ;  and  the  idea  was  exceedingly  obvious  that  the  best 
way  out  of  the  hopelessly  confused  situation  would  be  to  allow 
Prussia  the  long-sought  acquisitions  in  Poland,  providing  Austria 
could  secure  a  corresponding  aggrandizement.  That  in  such  a 
case  Austria  could  not  find  it  profitable  to  take  her  share  of  the 
spoils  in  Poland,  was  recognized  from  the  outset  both  at  Vienna 

1  March  14-18. 

2  E.  g.,  the  dispatch  to  Reuss  of  January  25.  This  suspicion  turns  up  again  in 
Kaunitz's  dispatch  to  Landriani  of  March  25,  in  Jacobi's  report  of  March  21,  and 
in  Bischoffwerder's  of  March  24. 


262  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

and  at  Berlin.1  It  was  natural  that  Spielmann  turned  his  thoughts 
to  that  favorite  project  which  had  haunted  the  minds  of  Austrian 
statesmen  for  almost  a  century  —  the  exchange  of  the  Belgian 
provinces  for  Bavaria. 

As  we  have  already  noted,  there  is  some  reason  to  think  that  as 
early  as  1787  Cobenzl  and  Spielmann,  discussing  this  plan  with 
Joseph  II,  hoped  to  realize  it  by  combining  it  with  a  Prussian 
acquisition  in  Poland.  The  next  known  occasion  on  which  it 
cropped  out  was  at  the  meeting  of  the  State  Conference  on 
January  17,  1792,  when  the  subject  of  '  indemnities  '  for  the 
expenses  of  a  possible  intervention  in  France  was  brought  under 
deliberation.  It  was  then  proposed,  probably  by  Spielmann, 
that  the  Imperial  Court  should  seek  its  compensation  in  the  ex- 
change of  Belgium  for  Bavaria.2  The  Conference  did  not  formally 
accept  or  reject  this  idea,  but  held  it  advisable  to  let  the  other 
Powers  be  the  first  to  broach  the  question  of  indemnities.  When 
that  topic  was  first  discussed  between  Bischoffwerder  and  Spiel- 
mann at  the  end  of  February,  the  Prussian  gained  the  impression 
that  the  Austrians  intended  to  revive  their  old  Exchange  plan.3 
Then  in  March,  almost  simultaneously  with  the  decisive  news 
from  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg,  there  arrived  dispatches  from 
Munich  which  must  have  encouraged  Spielmann  to  take  up  the 
project.  Count  Lehrbach,  the  Austrian  envoy  to  Bavaria, 
reported  that  the  Elector  was  once  more  possessed  with  his 
ancient  hankering  to  become  a  king;  that  he  thought  to  sell  his 
vote  at  the  coming  Imperial  election  for  the  price  of  a  crown;  and 
that  since  Bavaria  did  not  possess  all  the  qualifications  of  a 
kingdom,  he  was  willing  to  consent  to  an  exchange,  in  order  to 
obtain  a  "  sovereign  district."  4  The  sovereign  district  in  ques- 
tion could  be,  of  course,  only  the  Austrian  Netherlands,  the 
oft-projected  '  Kingdom  of  Burgundy.'     At  that  moment  the 

1  Spielmann's  discussion  with  Jacobi  of  March  21,  mentioned  below;  Frederick 
William's  note  to  Schulenburg  of  March  12. 

2  See  the  Vorlage  of  the  State  Chancellery,  dated  January  12,  and  the  protocol 
of  the  Conference  of  January  17,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  327-341. 

3  Bischoffwerder's  report  of  February  29,  1792,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172. 

4  Lehrbach's  reports  of  March  10  and  16,  printed  in  Schrepfer,  Pfalzbayerns 
Pulitik  im  Revolutionszeitalter ,  pp.  110-113. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  263 

Austrian  cabinet  could  give  no  definite  promises,  but  it  took 
pains  not  to  cut  off  the  Elector's  hopes.  Lehrbach  was  ordered  to 
scatter  assurances  of  his  master's  desire  to  oblige  His  Serene 
Highness,  but  to  add  that  the  realization  of  these  plans  must 
depend  on  time  and  circumstances.1 

In  these  eventful  March  days  in  Vienna,  when  all  the  great 
questions  were  clamoring  for  solution,  in  innumerable  con- 
ferences Austrian,  Prussian,  and  Russian  diplomats  were  sounding 
each  other,  tentatively  throwing  out  pregnant  hints,  developing 
new  and  far-reaching  combinations.  Scanty  as  are  the  sources 
of  our  information,  it  seems  clear  that  in  these  '  conversations  ' 
the  ideas  were  broached,  discussed,  matured,  out  of  which  grew 
the  plan  for  the  Second  Partition  of  Poland.  For  example, 
Bischoffwerder  and  Simolin,  the  former  Russian  envoy  at  Paris, 
fell  one  day  to  discussing  the  Elector  of  Bavaria's  desire  to  wear  a 
crown;  the  Russian  hazarded  the  suggestion,  "  Why  not  make 
him  King  of  Burgundy,  as  it  was  once  proposed  to  do  ?  " ;  and  the 
Prussian  replied  that  he  believed  his  master  would  consent,  if  he 
could  obtain  in  return  Dantzic,  Thorn,  and  the  adjacent  districts.2 
Even  more  interesting  are  the  discussions  of  Bischoffwerder  with 
Razumovski,  the  Russian  envoy  to  the  Court  of  Vienna.  The 
latter  had  frequently  tried  to  sound  the  Prussian  diplomat  on  the 
Polish  question,  and  on  one  occasion  threw  out  the  idea  that 
the  best  way  to  keep  the  Republic  in  bounds  would  be  to  partition 
it  once  more.  Bischoffwerder  was  at  first  cautious  and  reserved, 
but  soon  after  getting  the  orders  of  March  14  (in  which  Frederick 
William  indicated  very  clearly  his  desire  for  some  such  happy 
consummation),  he  threw  off  the  mask  and  told  Razumovski 
frankly  that  he  believed  a  new  dismemberment  would  be  the 
only  means  of  attaining  the  common  goal  of  the  three  Powers 
with  regard  to  both  France  and  Poland.  If  the  Empress,  he 
added,  wished  to  come  to  an  understanding  with  his  master  for 

1  Kaunitz  to  Lehrbach,  March  20,  V.  A.,  Bayern,  Expcd.,  1792. 

2  L.  Cobenzl  to  Ph.  Cobenzl,  May  19,  1792,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Fasc.  139,  a 
private  letter  relating  the  story  as  Simolin  told  it  on  his  return  to  St.  Petersburg; 
L.  Cobenzl's  official  report  of  July  21,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1792;  Alopeus' 
report  of  May  8/19,  1792,  giving  Bischoffwerder's  later  allusion  to  the  conversation, 
M.  A.,  Ilpyccia,  III,  29. 


264  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

common  aggrandizement  in  Poland,  they  could  satisfy  Austria  by 
reviving  the  Bavarian  Exchange  plan  in  her  favor.  He  denied 
having  any  instructions  from  the  King  on  this  subject,  but 
repeated  frequently  that  the  proposition  would  cause  his  sover- 
eign great  satisfaction.1  Here  was  already  outlined  in  all  definite- 
ness  the  plan  which,  it  has  hitherto  been  supposed,  was  conceived 
only  two  months  later :  the  plan  for  combining  the  French  enter- 
prise with  the  affairs  of  Poland  in  such  a  way  that  Austria  should 
secure  her  indemnity  for  the  intervention  in  the  West  by  means 
of  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  while  the  other  two  Powers  took  theirs 
at  the  expense  of  the  unfortunate  Republic.  Finally,  it  appears 
that  Bischoffwerder,  perhaps  as  a  sequel  to  his  conversation  with 
Razumovski,  suggested  this  same  project  to  Spielmann.2 

The  Bavarian-Polish  plan  was,  then,  in  the  air,  when  on  March 
2 1  Spielmann  broached  to  Jacobi  —  for  the  first  time  in  the  official 
intercourse  between  the  two  German  Powers  —  the  idea  of  a  new 
partition  of  Poland.  He  declared  that  if  the  King  of  Prussia 
decided  that  the  plan  submitted  to  him  by  Austria  for  the  settle- 
ment of  the  Polish  question  did  not  conform  to  his  interests,  it 
rested  with  him  to  propose  another  plan  in  its  stead,  to  which  the 
King  of  Hungary  would  reply  with  the  same  frankness  and 
loyalty  as  heretofore.  If  Frederick  William  desired  to  profit  by 
circumstances  to  obtain  an  acquisition  in  Poland,  the  Court  of 
Vienna  would  never  oppose,  for  it  recognized  that  Prussia  could 
secure  a  suitable  arrondissement  only  in  that  quarter.  What  his 
master  would  claim  in  return,  Spielmann  did  not  clearly  say; 
but  he  intimated  that  Austria  could  not  wish  to  extend  her  fron- 
tiers on  the  side  of  Poland,  but  could  easily  find  a  desirable 

1  Razumovski  to  the  Empress,  March  11/22,  1792,  M.  A.,  ABcrpifl,  III,  52. 
This  conversation  took  place  the  21st.  It  is  uncertain  whether  Razumovski  was 
authorized  to  make  any  such  insinuation.  There  are  no  instructions  on  the  subject 
in  Ostermann's  dispatches  of  this  period;  but  on  the  other  hand,  it  is  perhaps  signifi- 
cant that  the  envoy  in  his  report  to  the  Empress  made  no  apologies  for  having 
hazarded  a  suggestion  of  such  far-reaching  importance.  It  is  not  improbable  that 
he  may  have  been  authorized  to  make  such  insinuations  through  private  letters 
from  Zubov  or  Markov,  with  whom  he  maintained  a  regular  correspondence. 

2  Razumovski  to  Bezborodko,  July  4,  1792,  from  Spielmann's  later  confidential 
disclosures,  M.  A.,  ABdpifl,  III,  54.  A  number  of  documents  illustrating  these 
'  conversations  '  at  Vienna  will  be  found  in  Appendix  XII. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  265 

arrondissement  elsewhere;  and  he  suggestively  declared  that  there 
was  hardly  a  plan  in  the  world  which  the  two  Courts  could  not 
realize,  if  they  were  only  thoroughly  agreed  and  sincerely  resolved 
upon  it.  Finally,  he  did  not  tire  of  repeating  that  the  policy  to  be 
adopted  by  the  two  allies  towards  Poland  was  left  entirely  to 
Frederick  William's  decision.  That  was  virtually  inviting  the 
King  of  Prussia  to  come  forward  and  propose  Exchange  and 
Partition.1  The  Court  of  Berlin,  however,  was  still  too  cautious 
to  show  its  hand  so  openly.  It  contented  itself  with  expressing 
its  gratitude  and  pointing  to  the  necessity  of  awaiting  further 
communications  from  Russia; 2  and  thus  the  question  of  indem- 
nities rested  for  the  time  being.  At  any  rate,  the  ground  had 
been  prepared  for  a  revolutionary  change  in  the  Polish  policy  of 
Austria.  The  seeds  had  been  sown  from  which  sprang  the  momen- 
tous agreements  of  two  months  later. 

While  Spielmann  was  more  or  less  independently  evolving  these 
dangerous  and  alluring  projects,  his  chief,  the  Chancellor,  was 
slower  to  adapt  himself  to  the  new  situation.  Although  there 
could  no  longer  be  any  expectation  of  saving  the  Constitution  of 
the  Third  of  May,  Kaunitz  did  not  cease  to  lavish  confidences  and 
good  advice  upon  the  Court  of  Dresden,  and  he  allowed  Landriani 

1  Jacobi's  report  of  March  21,  Bischoffwerder's  of  March  27,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  169, 
and  R.  1,  172. 

Jacobi  reported  that  Spielmann,  speaking  of  Poland,  had  said: 
"...  que  s'il  s'agissoit  de  profiter  des  Circonstances  pour  s'arrondir,  Votre 
Majeste  pourroit  etre  tres  sure  qu'Elle  ne  trouveroit  jamais  le  Roi  de  Hongrie  dans 
son  chemin,  qu'on  reconnoissoit  ici  que  rien  que  la  Pologne  pourroit  offrir  a  la 
Prusse  des  arrondissements  convenables  et  propres  a  donner  encore  plus  de  solidite 
et  de  consistence  a  la  Monarchic  Prussienne,  que  dans  le  cas  que  Votre  Majeste 
trouvat  ce  parti  preferable  a.  tout  autre,  il  ne  doutoit  nullement  que  les  Cours  de 
Vienne  et  de  Berlin  etant  bien  d'accord,  et  sincerement  resolues  de  pousser  leur 
poinle,  on  ne  parvient  a  s'arranger,  .  .  .  qu'il  s'entendoit  que  les  portions  d'ag- 
grandissement  devoient  etre  egales  pour  les  deux  parties,  qu'il  ne  vouloit  pas  me 
cacher  que  la  Cour  de  Vienne  ne  pourroit  jamais  trouver  de  sa  convenance  d'etendre 
ses  Etats  vers  la  Pologne,  que  ce  seroit  plutot  s'affoiblir,  mais  qu'il  y  auroit  d'autres 
moyens  pour  s'arrondir.  ...  II  finit  la  Conversation  sur  cette  matiere  par  me 
t6moigncr  son  impatience  extreme  d'apprendre  quel  seroit  le  plan  que  Votre  Majesty 
trouveroit  bon  de  substituer  a  celui  parti  dimanche  dernier  par  le  Courier  du 
General  de  Bischoffswerder." 

2  Rescript  to  Jacobi  of  March  24,  and  in  similar  tone  throughout  April,  B.  A., 
R.  1,  Conv.  169. 


266  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  continue  to  fire  the  Poles  with  hopes  that  could  never  be 
realized.  In  spite  of  the  pressure  from  Berlin,  in  spite  of  Louis 
Cobenzl's  admonitions,  a  month  went  by  before  a  reply  was  made 
to  Golitsyn's  communications.  And  then  what  a  reply!  Cobenzl 
was  instructed,  on  the  one  hand,  to  give  the  strongest  assurances  of 
the  devotion  of  the  new  King  of  Hungary  to  the  Russian  alliance, 
and  to  dispel  any  feelings  of  distrust  or  displeasure  that  might 
have  arisen  at  St.  Petersburg;  but  on  the  other  hand,  he  was 
ordered  to  "  make  the  Russian  Court  ashamed  of  its  unseemly 
and  disloyal  conduct,"  and  to  intimate  that  Austria  still  held  — 
in  theory  at  least  —  to  her  former  views  on  the  Polish  question. 
Moreover,  he  was  to  demand  that  the  Empress  should  do  nothing 
in  Poland  until  the  triple  concert  came  into  existence;  that  she 
should  content  herself  with  such  modifications  of  the  new  con- 
stitution as  were  absolutely  necessary;  and  that  she  should  avoid 
recourse  to  violent  measures.1  Stripped  of  its  verbiage,  this 
answer  amounted  to  a  consent  to  the  concert  proposed  by  the 
Empress,  and  to  a  surly  admission  that  the  Constitution  of  the 
Third  of  May  would  have  to  be  sacrificed  in  whole  or  in  part. 
Doubtless  Kaunitz  would  have  done  well  to  swallow  his  pride  and 
approve  with  good  grace  what  he  was  powerless  to  prevent.  If  he 
flattered  himself  that  by  delays  and  recriminations  he  could  hold 
back  the  Empress  from  carrying  out  her  plans,  he  was  vastly 
mistaken.  That  the  Court  of  Vienna  should  do  anything  really 
effective  in  defence  of  Poland  was  almost  out  of  the  question, 
owing  to  the  cardinal  necessity  of  maintaining  the  Russian 
alliance,  and  in  view  of  the  equivocal  attitude  of  Prussia.  And 
whatever  slight  chances  of  such  action  there  might  have  been 
vanished  entirely  when  —  only  a  week  after  the  sending  of  the 
reply  to  St.  Petersburg  —  on  April  20  France  declared  war  on 
Austria. 

V 

With  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolutionary  War  we  have  no  con- 
cern here  except  in  so  far  as  it  influenced  the  development  of  the 
Polish  question.    But  since  the  fate  of  Poland  was  soon  bound  up 

1  Instructions  to  L.  Cobenzl  of  April  12,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  437-448. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND   WEST  267 

with  the  question  of  indemnities  for  this  war,  and  as  that  ques- 
tion in  less  than  a  year  became  confused  by  a  bitter  dispute  about 
the  nature  of  the  war,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  briefly  the  cir- 
cumstances under  which  Austria  and  Prussia  entered  upon  the 
great  struggle. 

If  it  was  later  maintained  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  went  into 
the  war  only  in  order  to  vindicate  '  the  cause  of  all  sovereigns,' 
the  statement  was,  to  say  the  least,  hardly  a  half-truth.  Down 
to  the  moment  when  it  became  convinced  that  an  attack  from 
France  was  impending  —  that  moment  may  be  fixed  about  the 
10th  of  April,  —  the  Austrian  government  had  done  nothing  but 
temporize,  in  the  hope  that  there  would  be  no  necessity  for  any 
serious  action.  It  was  only  on  April  13  that  the  dispatch  of 
50,000  troops  to  the  frontier  was  decided  upon,  and  even  this  was 
essentially  a  defensive  measure.1  It  was  only  on  April  21  that 
the  long  delayed  invitations  to  the  general  concert  were  sent  out.2 
It  was  only  on  the  28th  that,  yielding  to  the  pressure  from  Berlin 
and  to  the  necessities  of  self-defence,  the  State  Conference 
resolved  upon  aggressive  action.  And  the  reasons  adduced  in  the 
protocol  for  this  last  step  are  highly  significant.  Since  Prussia, 
it  was  said,  would  not  send  her  troops  to  the  front  unless  assured 
that  Austria  agreed  to  take  the  offensive  with  her,  since  the 
defence  of  the  Netherlands  essentially  depended  upon  the  dis- 
patch of  those  troops,  and  since  little  or  no  aid  was  to  be  expected 
from  the  other  Courts,  it  seemed  necessary  that,  without  waiting 
for  a  general  concert  of  the  Powers,  Austria  and  Prussia  should 
present  the  proposed  declaration  at  Paris,  and  in  case  of  an 
unsatisfactory  answer,  proceed  immediately  to  armed  interven- 
tion.3 The  Court  of  Vienna  thus  agreed  to  aggressive  action 
against  France,  ostensibly  for  the  common  cause  of  all  sovereigns; 
but  its  resolution  was  taken  only  at  the  eleventh  hour  —  two 
days  before  the  French  declaration  of  war  was  known  at  the 
Austrian  capital  —  and  it  was  taken  chiefly  in  order  to  secure 
Prussian  aid  against  an  attack  expected  almost  with  certainty. 

1  Conference  protocol  of  April  13,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  456  ff. 

2  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  1-4. 

3  Conference  protocol  of  April  28,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  10  ff. 


y 


268  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

On  the  other  hand,  it  may  be  said  that  the  immediate  cause  of 
the  war  was  the  refusal  of  Austria  to  desist  from  the  concert  on 
French  affairs.  In  this  sense,  Austria  was  drawn  into  the  conflict 
by  her  adherence  to  the  '  common  cause,'  and  had  a  right  to  the 
help  of  those  Courts  which  had  preached  the  anti-revolutionary 
crusade  with  such  ardor. 

If  there  are  moral  rights  in  politics,  seldom  has  an  attacked 
Power  had  stronger  claims  of  that  nature  to  the  support  of 
another  Power,  than  Austria  had  to  the  support  of  Prussia. 
Frederick  William  had  not  only  approved  each  of  the  fateful 
replies  of  Kaunitz  to  the  French  government,  but  had  con- 
stantly urged  stronger  and  more  aggressive  measures.  One  need 
not  be  deceived  by  the  occasional  Prussian  declarations  that  the 
King  was  far  from  wishing  to  force  Austria  into  a  war;  and  that 
he  sought  only  to  establish  the  principle  that  it  was  necessary 
either  to  leave  French  affairs  severely  alone,  or  else  to  intervene 
vigorously.  Nothing  would  have  grieved  him  more  than  to  see 
Austria  adopt  the  former  alternative.  When  at  times  she 
seemed  likely  to  do  so  —  especially  after  Leopold's  death  —  the 
Court  of  Berlin  took  all  imaginable  pains  to  prevent  the  abandon- 
ment of  the  enterprise.1  From  January  on,  the  constant  refrain 
of  Prussian  communications  was  the  necessity  that  the  two  Courts 
agree  at  once  upon  vigorous  measures  against  France.2  The 
Prussians  attached  very  little  importance  to  a  general  concert. 
They  doubted  as  much  as  did  the  Austrians  that  it  would  ever 
come  into  being.  They  wanted  to  interfere  in  France  whether  the 
concert  was  established  or  not.  If  they  occasionally  pressed  for 
the  sending  out  of  the  invitations  to  the  other  Powers,  the  reason 
was  simply  this:  that  if  Austria  and  Prussia  carried  out  the 
French  enterprise  without  any  kind  of  agreement  with  the  other 
Courts,  the  latter  —  especially  England  and  Russia  —  might 
try  to  deprive   them  of  "  more  or    less   of  their  just  indem- 

1  Cf.  Bischoffwerder's  instructions;  the  rescripts  to  him  of  March  6  and  13, 
and  to  Jacobi  of  February  6  and  9  and  March  3. 

2  Rescript  to  Jacobi  of  January  5 ;  notes  to  Reuss  of  January  13  and  February 
5;  rescripts  to  Bischoffwerder  of  March  6,  13,  15,  19,  24,  to  mention  only  a  part  of 
the  evidence  at  hand. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  269 

nities."  1    Of  the  active  cooperation  of  the  other  Powers  there  is 
hardly  any  serious  suggestion  in  the  Prussian  dispatches. 

How  to  drive  Austria  into  action  without  waiting  for  a  chimeri- 
cal general  concert,  was  for  months  the  problem  before  Berlin. 
In  March  Bischoffwerder  reported  dismally  that  nothing  short  of 
a  French  attack  would  suffice;  and  he  confided  to  Razumovski 
his  plan  for  provoking  such  an  aggression  on  the  part  of  c  the 
democrats.' 2  It  was,  therefore,  with  no  little  jubilation  that  the 
Prussians  received  the  news  that  the  French  were  planning  to 
invade  the  Empire.3  That  would  end  the  intolerable  delays  of  the 
Court  of  Vienna.  Frederick  William  much  preferred  to  have  the 
enemy  assume  the  role  of  aggressor:  '  they  would  thereby,'  as  his 
ministers  wrote,  '  put  the  game  into  the  hands  of  the  other 
Powers,  and  give  the  latter  a  clearer  right  than  ever  to  demand 
indemnities  at  the  end  of  the  war.' 4  So  great  was  the  King's 
ardor  that  his  advisers  had  difficulty  in  restraining  him  from  going 
ahead  without  waiting  for  the  resolutions  of  Austria.5  And  if  any 
further  proof  were  needed  that  Prussia  did  not  draw  the  sword 
merely  in  defence  of  her  ally,  it  could  be  found  in  the  fact  that 
towards  the  end  of  April,  when  it  was  thought  at  Berlin  that 
France  was  not  going  to  attack  after  all,  the  King  was  still  re- 
solved to  await  only  the  final  decision  of  Austria  before  sending 
his  troops  to  the  front  and  beginning  action.6  He  was  firmly 
determined  upon  a  course  that  could  lead  only  to  war,  before  the  V 
news  of  the  French  declaration  arrived  in  Berlin. 

This  declaration  did  not  alter  Frederick  William's  conception 
of  the  nature  of  his  participation  in  the  enterprise.  As  early  as  the 
middle  of  April,  Reuss  had  raised  the  pregnant  question  of  the 

1  Rescripts  to  Bischoffwerder  of  April  5  and  to  Jacobi,  April  6,  B.  A.,  R.  i,  172 
and  169. 

2  Bischoffwcrder's  reports  of  March  6,  9,  27,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  172;  Razumovski's 
report  of  February  28/March  10,  M.  A.,  ABCTpia,  III,  53. 

s  Rescripts  to  Bischoffwerder,  April  5,  and  Jacobi,  April  6,  B.  A. 

4  Rescripts  to  Jacobi,  April  16  and  30,  May  9,  ibid. 

6  Schulcnburg  to  Brunswick,  April  20,  22, 24  (P.  S.),  B.  A.,R.  XI,Frankreich,  Sgb. 

6  Schulenburg  to  Brunswick,  April  24  (P.  S.);  the  cabinet  ministry  to  the  King, 
April  25,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  C;  rescript  to  Jacobi,  April  28,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  169. 

Schulenburg  to  Brunswick,  April  24:  the  Duke's  letter  "  ne  pouvoit  arriver 
plus  a  propos  pour  affermir  Sa  Majeste  dans  les  dispositions  ou  j'avois  tadiS  de  la 


^ 


270  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

form  of  the  King's  cooperation  in  case  of  a  French  attack  upon 
Austria,  and  had  received  the  answer,  '  that  it  was  hardly  to  be 
supposed  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  would  wish  to  regard  such  an 
attack  as  a  mere  casus  foederis ,  on  the  same  plane  as  an  aggression 
of  other  Powers.'  The  Prussian  ministry  '  believed  rather  that 
Austria  would  much  prefer  to  hold  to  the  basis  of  the  broader 
engagements  and  stipulations  of  the  concert.' l  In  a  rescript  to 
Jacobi  a  few  days  later,  the  King  was  made  to  express  himself  in 
the  same  sense.  "  I  persist,"  he  said,  "  in  the  most  invariable 
resolution  to  act  in  this  case  [in  the  event  of  a  French  attack]  .  .  . 
according  to  the  engagements  which  I  have  undertaken,  on  a 
footing  of  complete  equality  with  the  Court  of  Vienna."  2  The 
engagements  which  the  King  chose  to  regard  as  involved,  were 
not  those  of  the  February  alliance,  but  those  of  the  concert  agreed 
upon  between  the  two  Courts  for  an  intervention  in  France.  The 
reason  is  perfectly  obvious.  Not  by  sending  the  small  auxiliary 
corps  stipulated  in  the  alliance  treaty,  but  only  by  taking  part 
in  the  war  with  forces  equal  to  those  of  Austria,  could  Prussia 
claim  in  the  end  an  indemnity  completely  equivalent  to  that  of 
her  ally.  Furthermore,  on  receiving  the  news  of  the  French 
declaration  of  war,  the  King  sent  to  Vienna  the  significant  de- 
claration: "  I  accept  with  real  satisfaction  the  assurance  that  His 
Apostolic  Majesty  will  act  against  France  in  concert  with  me  and 
with  the  greatest  vigor,  even  if,  contrary  to  expectation,  the  other 
Courts,  and  especially  Russia,  should  refuse  their  cooperation."  3 
If  at  the  same  time  he  recommended  that  the  Court  of  Vienna 
should  base  its  counter-declaration  against  France  on  the  injustice 
of  the  French  attack,  while  he  would  justify  his  own  intervention 
by  the  hostile  measures  of  France  against  the  Germanic  Empire, 

mettre,  d'agir  dans  cette  importante  occasion  avec  la  circonspection  necessaire  a 
l'egard  des  intentions  et  des  vues  toujours  fort  protegees  de  la  Cour  de  Vienne." 

Rescript  to  Jacobi,  April  28:  "  Je  crois  que  par  toutes  les  circonstances  .  .  . 
on  peut  regarder  dans  ce  moment  une  invasion  des  Francois  comme  de  la  derniere 
in  vraisemblance. ' ' 

The  Cabinet  Ministry  to  the  King,  April  25:  "  II  nous  paroit  done,  qu'il  ne 
s'agit  plus  que  d'attendre  l'indication  du  terme  precis  ou  toute  l'armee  autrichienne 
sera  rendue  au  lieu  de  sa  destination,  et  en  etat  de  commencer  les  operations." 

1  Rescript  to  Jacobi,  April  12,  ibid. 

2  Rescript  of  April  16,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  169.       3  Rescript  to  Jacobi,  May  9,  ibid. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND   WEST  27 1 

this  was  only  another  illustration  of  the  same  point  of  view.  It 
was  not  in  virtue  of  the  treaty  of  alliance,  and  not  as  a  member  of 
a  nebulous  general  concert  which  still  remained  unformed,  that 
Prussia  went  into  the  Revolutionary  War.  It  was  rather  in 
accordance  with  engagements  contracted  with  Austria  before  the 
war  for  a  joint  intervention  by  the  two  German  Powers,  engage- 
ments of  which  Frederick  William  himself  had  been  the  principal 
author. 

Unfortunately,  however,  these  engagements  had  never  been 
drawn  up  in  proper  form.  The  communications  between  the  two 
Courts  had  been  for  the  most  part  purely  oral.  At  one  moment, 
indeed,  Austria  was  not  far  from  securing  a  formal  written  de- 
claration which  might  later  have  served  her  in  good  stead.  On 
April  18  the  Prussian  ministry  submitted  to  the  King  two 
alternative  drafts  for  a  note  to  Reuss,  in  both  of  which  was  the 
stipulation:  "  that  whether  the  French  attack  took  place  or  not,  the 
allied  armies  should  take  the  offensive  as  soon  as  they  were  assembled, 
and  [the  two  Powers]  should  not  lay  down  arms  except  by  common 
accord,  when  the  aim  of  the  concert  had  been  attained,  and  the 
expenses  of  the  intervention  had  been  repaid  or  at  least  their  repay- 
ment assured. "  It  was  probably  due  to  Schulenburg  that  a  much 
less  definite  and  significant  note  was  finally  drawn  up  and  pre- 
sented to  the  Austrian  envoy.1  As  matters  stood  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war,  the  chief  agreements  arrived  at  were  that  the  two 
Courts  should  employ  equal  forces  and  act  on  the  offensive.  As 
for  the  aim  of  the  war,  no  program  existed  save  that  laid  down 
for  the  general  concert;  and  there  was  no  obligation  to  adhere  to 
that.2  The  idea  that  one  Power  might  abandon  the  struggle 
without  the  consent  of  the  other  had  not  even  been  discussed. 
Doubtless  there  was  on  both  sides  quite  too  much  optimism  about 
the  enterprise;  but  it  was  an  unpardonable  fault  in  the  Austrian 
ministers  that  they  made  no  effort  to  secure  any  binding  engage- 
ments on  this  point  from  Prussia. 

1  Schulenburg  to  the  King,  April  19,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  G.\  and  to  Brunswick, 
April  20,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  Sgb. 

2  Cf.  the  rescript  to  Jacobi  of  May  9:  "  l'aggression  des  Francois  .  .  .  nous 
met  dans  le  cas  de  n'avoir  plus  besoin  de  nous  Her  les  mains  en  nous  en  tenant 
strictement  aux  reclamations  precedement  proposees,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


272  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Scarcely  less  unfortunate  was  the  fact  that  no  very  definite 
agreement  had  been  reached  on  the  subject  of  indemnities. 
The  principle  that  compensation  was  to  be  demanded  for  the 
costs  of  the  enterprise  had,  indeed,  been  agreed  upon;  and  it  was 
accepted  on  both  sides  that  the  indemnities  of  both  Courts  were 
to  be  exactly  equal.1  This  followed  from  the  principle  of  parity 
of  efforts,  which  was  the  cornerstone  of  the  concert,  as  well  as 
from  that  of  strict  equality  in  all  '  advantages,'  which,  as  Fred- 
erick William  said,  was  the  basis,  and  would  always  be  the  firmest 
support,  of  the  alliance.2  In  general,  however,  the  subject  of 
indemnities  was  little  discussed  during  the  critical  month  pre- 
ceding the  outbreak  of  the  war.  At  the  beginning  of  May,  when 
Austria  found  herself  attacked  and  needed  to  show  her  ally  the 
utmost  complaisance,  Spielmann  took  up  the  topic  again  with 
Jacobi,  while  Reuss  was  authorized  to  say  that  his  Court  left  it 
entirely  to  Prussia  to  decide  whether  they  should  generously 
renounce  all  claim  to  indemnities,  or  demand  reimbursement  in 
money,  or  seek  compensation  through  conquests.3  Disinterested- 
ness was  no  longer  Frederick  William's  role.  He  replied  that  he 
could  not  conceive  that  the  two  Courts  could  afford  to  go  without 
indemnities;  he  did  not  believe  that  His  Apostolic  Majesty  could 
make  such  a  sacrifice  without  detriment  to  his  monarchy.4  This 
anxiety  for  the  interests  of  the  Austrian  monarchy  is  almost 
comic,  when  one  remembers  that  a  year  later  Prussian  statesmen 
were  denying  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  any  rights  to  an 
indemnity  at  all,  or  at  least  any  rights  that  could  be  put  on  the 
same  plane  with  those  of  Prussia.  As  to  what  form  of  compensa- 
tion he  preferred,  Frederick  William  promised  to  explain  later  on. 

There  was  one  Prussian  minister,  indeed,  who  had  sought  to 
have  the  matter  definitely  settled  before  embarking  upon  the  war. 

1  Instructions  to  Bischoffwerder,  February  18,  Art.  4;  Kaunitz's  declara- 
tions to  Bischoffwerder  reported  by  the  latter  March  13,  and  approved  by  the 
King  of  Prussia  March  19;  Spielmann's  remarks  to  Jacobi,  reported  by  the  latter 
March  21,  etc.  (B.  A.,  R.  1,  172  and  169). 

2  Rescript  to  Jacobi,  March  26,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  169. 

3  Jacobi's  report  of  May  3,  B.  A.,  loc.  (At.;  Kaunitz  to  Reuss,  May  4,  printed 
in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  23  ff. 

4  Rescript  to  Jacobi,  May  9,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  273 

Alvensleben  repeatedly  proposed  to  Schulenburg  that  the  King 
should  join  in  the  struggle  only  in  case  the  Imperial  Courts 
allowed  him  to  occupy  immediately  the  coveted  territories  in 
Poland.1  How  such  a  demand  could  have  been  reconciled  with 
Prussia's  engagements  and  declarations,  it  is  difficult  to  see. 
On  the  Austrian  side,  Spielmann  later  claimed  that  it  was  not  his 
fault  that  his  Court  had  not  reached  a  definite  agreement  with 
Prussia  regarding  the  indemnities  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war.2 
That  this  had  not  come  about  was  probably  due  chiefly  to 
Kaunitz,  who,  disliking  the  idea  of  a  Prussian  acquisition, 
avoided  discussing  indemnities  as  far  as  he  could;  and  also  to  the 
Nestors  of  the  State  Conference,  who  found  it  the  height  of  wis- 
dom to  postpone  the  topic  until  Prussia  had  spoken  first.3  Doubt- 
less in  April,  in  view  of  Frederick  William's  burning  impatience 
to  begin  the  enterprise,  it  would  have  been  easy  to  secure  from 
him  a  formal  declaration  on  the  subject,  or  at  least  a  guarantee  of 
the  principle  of  strict  parity  in  future  acquisitions.  As  it  was,  the 
two  Powers  entered  upon  the  war  with  insufficient  agreements, 
insufficient  conceptions  of  the  magnitude  of  the  task,  insufficient 
forces,  and  —  as  was  soon  to  be  shown  —  with  insufficient  con- 
fidence in  one  another.4 

1  See  Alvensleben's  well-known  Proces-verbal  of  October  1,  1793,  in  Herrmann, 
Erganzungsband,  pp.  404-409. 

2  See  the  letter  of  Thugut  to  Colloredo-Wallsee  of  November  i,  1792,  in  Vivenot, 
Vertrauliche  Briefe  des  Freiherrn  von  Thugut,  i,  pp.  4-8. 

3  Cf.  the  rescript  of  Kaunitz  to  Stadion  of  April  18,  1792,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  464- 
467;   and  the  decision  of  the  Conference  on  January  17,  1792,  already  mentioned. 

4  On  the  roles  played  by  Austria  and  Prussia  in  connection  with  the  outbreak 
of  the  Revolutionary  War,  see,  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  171  ff.,  especially  pp.  184  f., 
192-195;  Heigel,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  495  ff.;  Hausser,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  327-341;  Sorel, 
op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  351  ff.,  especially  pp.  366-369,  373-376,  424-427,  442-448;  Ranke, 
Ursprung  und  Beginn  der  Revolutionskriege,  pp.  125  ff.;  Glagau,  Die  franzosische 
Legislative  und  der  Ursprung  der  Revolutionskriege,  pp.  157  ff.,  especially  pp.  174- 
!77,  257-259;   Heidrich,  op.  cit.,  pp.  31  ff.,  especially  pp.  33-36,  158-162. 

Heidrich's  account  seems  to  me  the  most  satisfactory,  and  it  is  the  only  one 
based  on  a  complete  study  of  the  Prussian  records.  It  brings  out  strongly  the 
aggressive  character  of  Prussia's  policy,  which  I  have  also  emphasized  in  the 
text.  Glagau's  attempt  to  prove  a  somewhat  similar,  though  a  less  decidedly 
aggressive,  tendency  in  Austrian  policy  seems  hardly  successful.  Doubtless,  in  his 
conversations  with  Jacobi  and  Bischoffwerder  and  in  some  of  his  numerous  memo- 
rials Kaunitz  occasionally  used  rather  bold  language;   but  from  a  thorough  study 


V 


274  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

VI 

The  outbreak  of  the  struggle  in  the  West  came  marvelously  a, 
propos  to  serve  the  designs  of  Catherine  II.  For  many  months 
she  had  been  —  according  to  her  well-known  confession  to  her 
secretary  —  '  racking  her  brains  to  push  the  Courts  of  Vienna 
and  Berlin  into  the  French  enterprise,  so  that  she  might  have  her 
elbows  free.'  x  Now,  through  no  particular  merit  of  her  own  but 
simply  through  the  good  luck  that  so  constantly  attended  her, 
she  saw  her  neighbors  nicely  embarked  on  that  tremendous  under- 
taking, just  at  the  moment  when  she  most  needed  to  have  them 
fully  occupied.  The  French  declaration  of  war  greatly  facilitated, 
although  it  did  not,  as  is  often  said,  determine  the  Empress' 
onslaught  upon  Poland.2 

The  Polish  malcontents  had  already  presented  themselves  at 
St.  Petersburg,  at  Catherine's  invitation,  in  the  latter  part  of 
March.3  They  numbered  hardly  more  than  a  dozen.  Apart 
from  the  three  leaders,  almost  all  of  them  were  men  without 
standing  or  repute  at  home,  mere  clients  and  dependents  of 
Potocki.  For  this  handful  of  emigres  to  set  themselves  up  as  the 
true  representatives  of  the  Polish  nation,  the  sole  and  sufficient 
embodiment  of  the  Republic,  was  nothing  short  of  ludicrous;  but 
it  was  enough  for  the  Empress'  purposes  to  have  any  sort  of  a 
figurehead  behind  which  she  might  act.  Her  guests  were  lodged 
at  her  expense,  feted,  caressed,  and  overwhelmed  with  attentions. 
Their  leaders  were  honored  with  daily  private  audiences  with 
Catherine  and  Zubov,  in  which  the  details  of  the  future  Con- 
federation were  settled. 

The  Empress  presented  to  the  Poles  a  scheme  for  the  reorgan- 
ization of  their  country  which  she  herself  had  worked  out.  Drawn 

of  the  Austrian  acts  one  cannot  escape  the  conviction  that  he  was  at  bottom 
extremely  anxious  to  avoid  a  war,  and  that  when  he  or  any  of  the  other  Austrian 
ministers  expressed  themselves  in  more  or  less  bellicose  terms,  it  was  due  either  to  a 
momentary  outburst  of  wrath  against  the  National  Assembly  or  to  the  desire  to 
satisfy  the  Prussians. 

1  XpanoBHirKifi,  ^HeBHHKt,  December  14/25,  1791. 

2  The  news  of  the  French  declaration  reached  St.  Petersburg  only  May  9,  long 
after  the  final  orders  for  the  attack  on  Poland  had  been  sent  off. 

3  Potocki  and  Rzewuski  arrived  the  15th,  Branicki  the  29th. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  275 

up  in  the  form  of  twenty-three  articles,  which  were  to  be  added  to 
the  Pacta  Conventa,  it  must  have  convinced  her  guests  of  her 
sterling  republican  principles,  for  she  had  provided  for  the 
annulment  of  every  useful  act  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet  and  for  the 
restoration  of  every  monstrosity  of  the  old  regime.1  It  appears, 
however,  that  no  definite  arrangements  were  made  at  that  time 
for  the  future  government  of  the  Republic.  The  Poles  could  not 
agree  among  themselves;  and  on  one  occasion,  at  the  very  close 
of  their  stay  in  St.  Petersburg,  they  almost  came  to  blows  with 
one  another  in  Zubov's  chamber,  when  they  fell  to  discussing  the 
delicate  subject  of  the  restoration  of  the  power  of  the  hetmans.2 

The  immediate  plan  of  action,  however,  was  fixed  with  little 
difficulty.  The  Act  of  Confederation  was  drawn  up  with  Popov's 
assistance,  and  apparently  in  accordance  with  an  old  scheme  of 
Potemkin.  It  was  signed  and  sworn  to  by  the  Poles  on  April  27 
at  St.  Petersburg,3  but  for  the  sake  of  appearances  was  lyingly 
dated  "  May  14,  Targowica."  In  other  words,  it  was  designed  to 
create  the  impression  that  the  Confederation  had  arisen  on  Polish 
soil,  and  on  that  date  when  it  could  first  safely  begin  its  activity 
under  cover  of  the  invading  Russian  troops.  The  Act  itself  was 
worthy  of  its  signatories.  It  consisted  mainly  of  a  prolix,  turgid, 
and  muddled  indictment  of  "  the  usurpers  "  at  Warsaw,  who  by 
conspiracy  and  violence,  and  especially  by  "  the  audacious 
crime  "  of  the  Third  of  May,  had  "  overthrown  all  the  cardinal 
laws,"  abolished  the  liberty  and  equality  of  the  nobility,  spread 
"  the  contagion  of  democratic  ideas,"  following  "  the  fatal  ex- 
amples set  at  Paris,"  imposed  "  the  shackles  of  slavery  "  upon 
the  nation  —  in  short,  destroyed  the  Republic  and  established  a 
"  despotism."  Wherefore  the  undersigned  "  senators,  ministers 
of  the  Republic,  officers  of  the  Crown,"  etc.,  etc.,  united  to  form  a 
free  Confederation  in  defence  of  the  Roman  Catholic  religion,  the 

1  These  articles  are  printed  in  the  instruction  for  Baron  Biihler  in  the  C6opHHKi, 
xlvii,  pp.  303  ff.  They  are  also  to  be  found  in  various  slightly  divergent  drafts 
among  Catherine's  papers  in  the  Petrograd  Archives,  X,  70. 

2  Biihler  to  Zubov,  November  19/30,  1792,  M.  A.,  HoJiBnia,  IX,  3;  Rze- 
wuski  to  Catherine,  August  19,  1792  and  July  8,  1794,  M.  A.,  ITojibina,  II,  7. 

3  As  to  the  place  and  date,  see  Smoleriski,  Konfcderacya  targowicka,  pp.  30  f., 
and  the  Rescript  to  Kakhovski  of  April  16/27,  C6opnnKi>,  xlvii,  p.  275. 


276  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

liberty  and  equality  of  the  szlachta,  the  territorial  integrity  of  the 
state,  and  the  ancient  republican  form  of  government.  They 
annulled  all  that  had  been  done  at  the  present  Diet  contrary  to 
liberty  and  the  laws;  they  declared  that  they  would  pursue  all 
those  who  in  any  way  sought  to  defend  the  Constitution  of  the 
Third  of  May;  they  ordered  all  ministers,  senators,  and  deputies 
to  send  in  within  two  months  a  formal  disavowal  of  all  adhesion  to 
that  illegal  constitution;  and  they  invited  all  '  their  brothers  in 
the  provinces  '  to  accede  to  the  present  Confederation.  Since  the 
faction  at  Warsaw  had  usurped  control  of  the  armed  forces  of  the 
state,  so  that  "  the  subjugated  Republic  "  could  not  defend  its 
own  cause,  there  remained,  it  was  said,  no  other  course  than  to 
appeal  for  aid  to  "  the  great  Catherine."  "  The  justice  of  our 
prayers,"  the  Act  concluded,  "  the  sanctity  of  the  treaties  which 
unite  Russia  to  Poland,  and  above  all  the  Empress'  own  grandeur 
of  character  give  us  a  well-grounded  hope  of  her  disinterestedness 
and  her  magnanimity,  in  a  word,  of  her  worthy  assistance  to 
our  cause."  1 

This  masterpiece  was  supplemented  by  a  formal  reclamation  for 
aid,  addressed  by  "  the  confederated  Polish  nation  "  to  that 
"  immortal  Sovereign,"  who  although  "  ruling  over  half  the 
hemisphere  "  and  '  filling  the  universe  with  her  renown  '  was 
even  more  fitted  by  her  heroic  and  godlike  qualities  to  become 
"  the  refuge  of  peoples  and  of  kings  "  and  "  the  tutelary  divinity  " 
of  Poland.2 

In  preparation  for  the  glorious  role  thus  thrust  upon  her,  the 
Empress  had  already  made  the  necessary  military  arrangements. 
Early  in  April  full  instructions  were  sent  to  Generals  Kakhovski 
and  Krecetnikov,  the  former  commanding  the  army  still  quar- 
tered in  Moldavia  and  the  other  forces  in  the  south,  the  latter  the 
troops  massed  on  the  frontiers  of  Lithuania.  The  date  for  begin- 
ning action  was  fixed  at  the  middle  of  May,  the  time  set  for  the 
evacuation  of  Turkish  territory.  According  to  the  elaborate  plan 
of  operations  drawn  up  by  General  Pistor,  four  Russian  corps 
were  to  pour  suddenly  into  the  Ukraine  from  three  sides;  it  was 

1  The  Act  of  the  Confederation  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  Recueil,  pp.  262-274. 

2  This  document  is  printed  in  the  C6opHHKT>,  xlvii,  pp.  310-316. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  277 

expected  that  the  small  Polish  army,  most  of  which  was  scattered 
about  in  that  region,  could  easily  be  outflanked,  surrounded,  dis- 
persed, or  captured ;  and  thereupon  Kakhovski  was  to  go  straight 
for  Warsaw,  while  Krecetnikov  rapidly  bore  down  upon  the 
capital  from  the  northeast.  Nearly  100,000  troops  were  assigned 
to  the  enterprise,  although  the  Russians  looked  forward  to  a 
military  promenade  rather  than  a  serious  campaign.1 

While  we  are  but  imperfectly  informed  of  what  went  on  behind 
the  scenes  at  St.  Petersburg  during  these  months,  it  is  clear  that 
there  were  not  a  few  differences  of  opinion  about  the  undertaking 
in  Poland.  Zubov  and  Markov,  into  whose  hands  the  manage- 
ment of  the  affair  had  passed,  made  all  their  plans  with  the  utmost 
secrecy  and  intended  to  begin  action  without  once  consulting  the 
Council  of  the  Empire  and  without  further  communications  to 
the  other  Courts.  In  this,  however,  they  encountered  the  lively 
opposition  of  Bezborodko,  who  after  being  summoned  to  return 
to  the  capital  in  haste,  on  his  arrival  found  himself  completely 
thrust  aside.  Naturally  the  veteran  statesman  was  full  of  con- 
tempt for  the  political  operations  of  the  twenty-six  year  old 
favorite  and  his  clique,  and  full  of  indignation  that  such  a  coterie 
should  be  able  to  plunge  the  state  into  a  new  war  without  the 
knowledge  or  advice  of  the  Empress'  responsible  ministers.2  He 
insisted  that  the  whole  Polish  enterprise  should  be  laid  before  the 
Council.  He  was  also  particularly  determined  that  nothing 
should  be  done  until  an  understanding  had  been  reached  with  the 
German  Powers,  or  at  least  with  Prussia.3  Bezborodko  must  have 
recognized  that  such  an  understanding  would  probably  lead  up  to 
a  new  partition.  His  report  from  Jassy  in  February  had  already 
hinted  at  such  an  arrangement;  and  on  his  return  to  St.  Peters- 

1  See  the  rescripts  to  the  two  commanding  generals  of  March  14/25,  April 
1/12,  etc.,  in  the  C6opHHKT>,  xlvii,  pp.  241  ff.;  also  the  discussion  of  the  Russian 
military  plans  in  Soplica,  Wojna  polsko-rosyjska,  pp.  9-18. 

2  Cf.  Bezborodko  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  May  15/26,  1792,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  pp. 

255  i- 

3  That  had  been  his  opinion  from  the  very  outset;  cf.  his  letter  to  Potemkin 
of  August  12/23,  J791!  CGopHHKt,  xxix,  p.  124;  to  A.  R.  Vorontsov,  December  3/14, 
ibid.,  p.  174;  report  of  January  25/February  5  to  the  Empress,  M.  A.,  Typrrifl,  IX, 
14;  Cobenzl's  reports  of  March  23  and  July  6,  1792,  V.  A.,  Rnsslatid,  Berichte. 


278  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

burg  he  seems  to  have  urged  upon  the  Empress  the  necessity  of 
acquiring  for  Russia  the  Ukraine  and  other  Polish  territories  x  — 
an  acquisition  that  would  inevitably  involve  equivalent  advan- 
tages for  Austria  and  Prussia. 

It  is  impossible  to  say  with  certainty  what  was  Catherine's 
attitude  towards  a  new  partition  at  the  moment  when  she  began 
her  enterprise  in  Poland.  It  is  probable,  however,  that  she  was 
by  no  means  averse  to  the  idea.  From  the  rescript  to  Potemkin 
of  July  18/29,  1791,  and  from  her  conduct  in  the  latter  part  of 
1792,  it  appears  that  she  was  not  inclined  to  stand  out  in  opposi- 
tion, in  case  the  other  Powers  insisted  upon  a  new  dismember- 
ment of  the  Republic.  There  is  some  reason  to  think  that  she 
even  tried  to  hasten  such  a  denouement  by  subtle  insinuations  to 
Austria  and  Prussia;  although  naturally  she  was  not  disposed  to 
take  upon  herself  the  onus  of  proposing  it  formally  and  openly.2 
That  she  was  quite  alive  to  the  advantages  to  be  expected  from 
the  annexation  of  the  Ukraine,  appears  from  the  oft-cited  rescript 
to  Potemkin;  and  it  is  perhaps  worthy  of  notice  that  in  1793 
one  of  her  ministers  wrote  that  for  "  several  years  "  her  mind  had 
been  filled  with  the  thought  of  acquiring  this  territory  and  of  the 
glory  and  profit  to  be  gained  thereby.3    Nevertheless,  at  the  time 

1  Cf.  Bezborodko's  memorial  to  the  Empress,  of  June  30/ July  11,  1793 
(C6opHHK'b,  xxix,  pp.  236-239),  reviewing  his  past  services,  and  reminding  her  that  he 
had  given  this  advice  about  making  acquisitions  from  Poland  "  at  the  first  moment 
when  an  opportunity  for  making  them  began  to  dawn."  From  the  context  it  would 
seem  that  the  reference  was  to  the  time  immediately  after  his  return  to  St.  Peters- 
burg from  Jassy.  Such  is  also  the  opinion  advanced  by  Smolehski,  Ostatni  rok 
sejmu  wielkiego,  pp.  313  f. 

2  I  am  not  referring  here  to  the  famous  note  to  Zubov  reported  by  Goltz  in 
February,  1792.  Although  that  has  been  almost  universally  taken  as  a  hint,  or 
even  an  invitation,  to  Prussia  to  come  forward  with  proposals  for  a  partition,  I 
regard  it  as  quite  uncertain  whether  the  note  was  genuine,  and  whether  Goltz  came 
to  be  informed  of  it  by  Catherine's  intention  or  otherwise.  What  I  have  in  mind 
in  the  statement  in  the  text  is:  first,  the  very  curious  and  subtle  overtures  to 
Prussia  on  the  subject  of  indemnities,  contained  in  the  instructions  to  Alopeus 
of  June  10/21,  1792  (to  be  analyzed  later  on);  and  secondly,  the  pregnant  insinu- 
ations made  by  Razumovski  to  Bischoffwerder,  as  already  noticed,  in  March,  1792, 
and  repeated  in  much  more  definite  form  to  Cobenzl  and  Spielmann  at  the  end  of 
June.  That  Razumovski  could  have  ventured  so  far  without  being  in  some  manner 
informed  of  his  sovereign's  wishes,  seems  scarcely  conceivable. 

3  Zavadovski  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  July  27/August  7,  1793,  Apx.  Bop.,  xii,  p.  90. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  279 

now  under  consideration,  she  seems  to  have  hesitated  to  disclose 
her  inmost  thoughts  even  to  her  closest  advisers.1  Officially  and 
before  the  world  she  professed  to  have  no  object  in  view  in  Poland 
except  the  overthrow  of  the  new  constitution  and  the  vindication 
of  her  treaties  with  the  Republic. 

Bezborodko's  exertions  had  at  least  this  result,  that  the 
Empress  was  induced  to  lay  the  whole  plan  for  the  Polish  enter- 
prise before  the  Council  of  the  Empire.  While  approving  it  in  the 
main,  that  body  raised  objections  on  some  points;  and  especially 
they  urged  the  necessity  of  communicating  their  projects  to 
Austria  and  Prussia  and  securing  the  consent  of  those  Courts. 
They  were,  indeed,  little  disquieted  by  the  known  predilections  of 
Austria,  but  they  feared  that  without  a  preliminary  understand- 
ing Frederick  William  would  not  remain  a  passive  spectator.  The 
Empress  was  indignant  at  what  she  considered  a  criticism  of  her 
own  policy.2  Nevertheless,  on  April  21  new  dispatches  were  sent 
to  Vienna  and  Berlin,  communicating  in  substantially  identical 
terms  the  plan  for  a  Confederation  and  an  armed  intervention  in 
Poland,  and  requesting  both  Courts  to  support  these  measures, 
when  the  time  came,  by  appropriate  and  vigorous  language  at 
Warsaw.  It  was  a  far  cry,  indeed,  from  the  concert  proposed  in 
February  to  the  arbitrary  and  irrevocable  resolutions  thus 
announced ;  but  the  slight  was  glossed  over  with  the  excuse  that 
it  was  absolutely  necessary  for  Russia  to  act  at  once,  as  her  troops 
were  bound  to  return  from  Moldavia  through  Poland  in  May; 
and  it  was  also  alleged  that  if  the  Empress  had  not  confided  her 

1  Cf.  the  two  undated  notes  to  Bezborodko  and  Zubov,  which  may  not  im- 
probably have  been  written  about  this  period,  CSopHHRt,  xlii,  pp.  245  f.,  338.  To 
Bezborodko  she  wrote:  "  La  proposition  est  incongrue;  car  par  cette  belle  proposi- 
tion nous  attirerions  non  seulement  tout  l'odieux  de  la  part  des  polonais,  mais  outre 
cela  nous  agirions  contre  nos  propres  traites  et  notre  garantie  en  £gard  a  Danzig 
specialement.  J'opine  pour  laisser  tomber  la  proposition."  To  Zubov  (in  Russian): 
"  Your  wish  will  never  succeed  with  the  present  Courts  of  Vienna  and  Berlin.  I 
remember  the  partition  of  Poland  with  Maria  Theresa  and  Frederick,  how  it  went 
off  as  smooth  as  butter.  The  comparison  is  not  to  the  advantage  of  the  former  " 
(the  present  Courts). 

2  See  the  protocol  of  the  Council,  March  29/April  9,  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  906- 
910;  Catherine's  note  to  Bezborodko,  CfiopHHKi,  xlii,  p.  224;  XpanoBHUKifi,  op.  cit., 
April  3/14;  Bezborodko  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  May  15/26,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  pp.  255  f. 


280      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

intentions  earlier,  it  was  because  she  was  waiting  for  the  long 
delayed  reply  of  Austria  to  her  first  communications.  Some  show 
of  regard  for  the  other  Courts  was  made  at  least;  and  Bezbo- 
rodko's  intervention  may  have  averted  rather  embarrassing 
complications. 

Two  weeks  later  the  Russian  declaration  which  was  to  be 
presented  at  Warsaw,  was  also  forwarded  to  Vienna  and  Berlin, 
along  with  some  additional  explanations.  At  the  same  time  a 
pretence  was  made  of  replying  to  the  Austrian  dispatches  of 
April  12.  It  could  scarcely  soothe  Kaunitz's  irritation  that,  far 
from  being  stricken  with  shame  for  its  "  unseemly  and  disloyal 
conduct,"  the  cabinet  of  Petersburg  passed  over  all  his  arguments 
and  recriminations  without  the  shadow  of  a  response,  and  simply 
reminded  its  ally  of  the  long-standing  engagement  between  the 
Imperial  Courts  to  maintain  the  Polish  constitution  of  1773. 
In  the  dispatch  to  Berlin,  it  was  emphatically  declared  that  the 
Empress  had  no  other  aim  or  project  in  Poland  than  to  restore 
the  old  form  of  government.  That  was  not  the  declaration 
the  Prussians  were  hoping  for,  as  the  Russians  were  probably 
aware.1 

Having  thus  set  the  stage,  having  organized  the  Confederation 
which  was  to  serve  as  her  puppet,  having  formed  her  plans 
without  admitting  her  neighbors  to  consultation  or  deliberation 
—  in  spite  of  the  proposal  for  a  concert  —  having  then  an- 
nounced to  those  neighbors  what  she  meant  to  do  at  the  eleventh 
hour  when  they  no  longer  had  time  for  counter-representations, 
Catherine  was  ready  for  action.  On  May  18  Bulgakov  presented 
at  Warsaw  the  declaration  exposing  the  reasons  which  impelled 
his  sovereign  to  intervene  on  behalf  of  Polish  liberties  and  in 
defence  of  violated  treaties  against  the  usurping  Diet  and  the 
illegal  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May.2  On  the  night  of  the 
18-19,  the  Russian  troops  crossed  the  frontier. 

Thus  at  almost  the  same  moment  there  burst  forth  in  East  and 
West  the  two  storms  which  the  prudent  diplomacy  of  Leopold  II 

1  Dispatches  to  Razumovski  and  Alopeus  of  April  23/May  4,  M.  A.,  ABdpifl, 
III,  52  and  Ilpyccifl,  III,  28. 

2  The  declaration  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  Recneil,  pp.  274-281. 


WAR  IN  EAST  AND  WEST  28 1 

had  foreseen  and  vainly  striven  to  avert.  The  ardor  of  the 
Girondists  to  revolutionize  Europe  combined  with  the  no  less 
aggressive  and  revolutionary  designs  of  Catherine  II  and  with  the 
insatiable  Prussian  thirst  for  aggrandizement  to  plunge  wellnigh 
the  whole  Continent  into  the  vortex  of  war.  France  and  Poland, 
the  two  states  which  had  simultaneously  been  attempting  sweep- 
ing reforms  and  national  regeneration,  found  themselves  exposed 
—  each  isolated  and  without  connection  with  the  other  —  to  the 
onslaught  of  the  great  military  monarchies  of  Eastern  Europe. 
These  two  conflicts  could  not  fail  to  work  back  upon  each  other  in 
innumerable  ways.  Their  influence  upon  each  other  can  hardly 
be  overestimated.  Broadly  speaking,  the  results  of  this  interplay 
may  be  described  as  highly  favorable  to  France,  and  ruinous  to 
Poland.  If  the  struggle  brought  to  the  former  glory  and  conquests 
unparalleled  in  her  history,  and  to  the  latter  political  annihila- 
tion, the  difference  is  not  altogether  due  to  the  genius  of  the  one 
nation  and  the  weakness  of  the  other. 

Without  attempting  to  trace  here  all  the  ways  in  which  the 
conflict  in  the  West  affected  the  fate  of  Poland,  it  is  incumbent  to 
point  out  the  chief  form  which  that  interaction  took.  Vastly 
different  as  were  the  pretexts  for  the  two  wars  —  since  France 
was  being  attacked  for  turning  a  monarchy  into  a  republic,  and 
Poland  for  converting  a  republic  into  a  monarchy  —  neverthe-  \ 
less,  the  diplomacy  of  the  predatory  Powers  succeeded  in  finding 
a  common  formula  to  justify  the  two  utterly  contradictory  enter- 
prises, and  in  establishing  a  subtle  connection  between  them. 
Both  were  ranged  in  the  category  of  '  counter-revolutions,' 
benevolently  undertaken  by  the  three  allied  Courts  in  the  inter- 
ests of  order,  stability  and  the  general  tranquillity  of  Europe. 
Both  were  integral  parts  of  a  great  common  work;  although  for 
the  sake  of  an  equitable  division  of  labor,  the  intervention  in  the 
West  was  entrusted  to  Austria  and  Prussia  alone,  while  that  in  the 
East  was  reserved  for  Catherine.  Once  this  insidious  theory  was 
established,  the  deduction  was  obvious.  Pooling  the  stakes,  the 
three  Powers  would  soon  be  pooling  the  profits.  What  was  in- 
vested in  one  quarter  could  be  recouped  in  the  other.  Such  a 
combination  had  already  been  clearly  foreshadowed  in  the  dis- 


282 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


cussions  between  the  diplomats  at  Vienna  in  March,  at  a  time 
when  both  the  French  and  the  Polish  enterprises  were  still  only- 
uncertain  contingencies  of  the  future.  By  May  both  had  become 
realities.  It  remained  only  to  see  whether  the  two  joint  ventures 
would  yield  results  capable  of  leading  up  to  a  gigantic  and  mu- 
tually satisfactory  distribution  of  dividends. 


CHAPTER  XII 

The  Russian  Reconquest  of  Poland 


Catherine's  abrupt  attack  caught  the  Poles  in  a  state  of  terrible 
unreadiness.  Down  to  the  eleventh  hour  they  had  refused  to 
believe  that  there  was  any  serious  danger.  This  disastrous 
optimism  was  due  in  part  to  the  Prussian  alliance,  which,  in  spite 
of  the  unmistakable  coldness  of  Berlin,  still  seemed  to  afford  a 
guarantee  against  a  direct  aggression  from  without;  in  part,  it 
was  based  upon  the  friendly  attitude  of  Austria,  upon  the  engage- 
ments which  the  two  German  Powers  were  thought  to  have  con- 
tracted to  defend  the  independence  and  the  free  constitution  of 
the  Republic,  and  upon  the  hopes  aroused  by  Landriani  of  a 
quadruple  alliance  about  to  be  erected  as  a  barrier  against  Russia. 
Hence,  although  Catherine's  opposition  to  the  new  constitution 
grew  more  and  more  evident,  although  since  the  autumn  there 
had  been  reports  of  suspicious  movements  of  her  troops  along  the 
frontier,  although  the  visit  of  the  malcontents  to  Jassy  was  known 
at  Warsaw  and  its  purpose  could  easily  be  divined,  nevertheless 
for  many  months  the  Poles  continued  to  flatter  themselves  that 
the  Empress  would  not  venture  upon  open  hostilities. 

Confidence  was  increased  by  the  quiet,  unity,  and  harmony 
that  reigned  throughout  the  country.  Patriotic  ardor,  the  enthu- 
siasm for  reforms,  the  progress  of  enlightened  political  and  social 
ideas  —  in  short,  the  hope  and  promise  of  a  brighter  future  —  had 
never  seemed  so  great  as  during  the  year  that  followed  the 
inauguration  of  the  new  constitution.  When  at  the  Dietines, 
held  in  February,  1792,  for  the  first  time  since  the  revolution  the 
szlachta  had  the  opportunity  to  express  their  full  opinion  about 
what  had  occurred,  the  result  was  a  signal  triumph  for  the  reform- 
ing party.  All  the  provincial  assemblies  swore  loyalty  to  the 
constitution,  and  appointed  delegates  to  thank  the  King  and 

283 


284      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

the  Estates.  The  Diet  meanwhile  busied  itself  with  completing  the 
reorganization  of  the  government,  with  questions  of  finance,  the 
judiciary,  a  new  law-code,  the  municipalities,  religion,  Courland 
—  in  fact,  with  all  sorts  of  questions  except  the  most  important 
of  all,  the  military  one. 

The  awakening  from  this  fancied  security  began  towards  the 
close  of  March,  when  reports  arrived  from  St.  Petersburg  and 
Vienna  revealing  Catherine's  aggressive  plans  and  the  communi- 
cations she  had  made  to  Austria.  In  the  next  few  weeks  the  news 
grew  steadily  more  and  more  alarming.  It  could  no  longer  be 
doubted  that  the  Empress  meant  to  attack.  Warsaw  trembled 
with  excitement,  but  not  with  consternation.  In  the  streets,  the 
salons,  the  clubs  there  was  but  one  voice:  resistance  to  the  last, 
100,000  troops  to  the  front,  the  rising  of  the  whole  nation  in  arms, 
if  need  be.  Better  a  new  partition,  said  the  Marshal  Potocki,  than 
the  abandonment  of  the  constitution.1  On  April  16  and  21  the 
Diet  in  secret  session  decided  upon  the  measures  necessary  to  put 
the  country  in  a  state  of  defence.  The  army  was  to  be  raised  at 
once  to  100,000  men.  The  King  was  authorized  to  engage  ex- 
perienced generals,  artillery  officers,  and  engineers  from  abroad, 
to  negotiate  a  loan  for  30,000,000  florins,  and  to  employ  9,000,000 
florins  then  in  the  treasury  for  military  preparations.  These 
measures  were  to  be  communicated  to  the  friendly  Powers, 
especially  to  the  Courts  of  Berlin,  Vienna,  and  Dresden,  along 
with  a  declaration  that  the  Republic  was  determined  to  defend 
itself  in  case  of  foreign  invasion.2  Energetic  and  worthy  of  the 
moment  these  decisions  were;  but  they  represented  a  desperate 
and  belated  attempt  to  effect  what  ought  to  have  been  done  three 
years  earlier. 

In  spite  of  the  suddenly  darkened  horizon,  on  the  3rd  of  May 
the  anniversary  of  the  revolution  was  celebrated  with  elaborate 
and  splendid  fetes.  "  Warsaw  was  never  more  thronged  or  more 
brilliant,"  wrote  a  contemporary:  "  that  was  the  last  day  of 
Pompeii,  dancing  over  a  volcano."  3    Two  weeks  later  (the  18th), 

1  Kraszewski,  Polska  w  czasie  trzech  rozbiordw,  iii,  pp.  124  f. 

2  Smolenski,  Ostatni  rok  sejmu  wielkiego,  pp.  348-354. 

3  Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  127. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  285 

Bulgakov  presented  his  declaration,  confirming  the  worst  that  had 
been  anticipated. 

At  the  next  session  of  the  Diet  (the  21st),  before  densely  packed 
galleries,  the  Russian  note  was  read.  Deep  silence  greeted  it;  but 
at  the  passage  which  announced  that  the  Empress  was  sending  her 
troops  into  the  country  in  order  to  restore  the  liberties  of  the 
Polish  nation,  there  were  groans  and  laughter.  The  King  spoke 
with  his  usual  eloquence.  He  exhorted  his  people  to  manly 
courage  and  determination,  pledging  his  own  best  efforts  and 
enumerating  the  available  means  of  defence.  He  referred  to  the 
Empress  in  flattering  terms,  expressing  the  hope  that  when  better 
informed,  she  would  decide  not  to  proceed  to  extremities.  He 
spoke  with  confidence  of  the  aid  to  be  expected  from  the  King  of 
Prussia,  the  ally  with  whose  knowledge  and  approval  all  the  most 
important  acts  of  the  present  Diet  had  been  effected.  He  advised 
soliciting  the  good  offices  of  Austria  and  Saxony;  and  '  if  any 
other  means  could  be  found  for  settling  the  issue  rather  with  the 
pen  than  with  the  sword,  assuredly  none  ought  to  be  disdained, 
none  ought  to  be  neglected.'  And  he  ended  with  the  brave 
declaration:  "  Believe  me,  if  there  be  need  for  sacrificing  my  own 
life,  assuredly  I  shall  not  spare  it."  x  It  was  a  moving,  an  in- 
spiring speech;  but  behind  the  phrase  "  rather  with  the  pen  than 
with  the  sword,"  lurked  an  intimation  of  where  the  King's 
thoughts  really  lay. 

In  the  following  week  the  final  resolutions  of  the  Diet  were 
taken.  Stanislas  Augustus  was  appointed  commander-in-chief  of 
all  the  armed  forces  of  the  Republic.  Save  for  the  right  of  con- 
cluding peace,  reserved  to  the  Diet,  he  was  virtually  invested 
with  a  military  dictatorship  —  a  thing  unparalleled  in  Polish 
history.  War  taxes  were  voted;  arrangements  were  made  for 
enlisting  regiments  of  volunteers;  and  the  government  was 
authorized,  in  case  of  need,  to  decree  a  national  levee  en  masse. 
Finally  the  Assembly  sanctioned  a  counter-declaration  to  Russia, 
which  was,  unfortunately,  too  conciliatory  and  apologetic  to  be 
quite  effective;  a  bold  and  spirited  proclamation  to  the  army; 
and  an  address  of  the  King  and  the  Estates  to  the  nation.2    These 

1  Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  398  ff.  2  Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  408-413. 


286 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


were  the  last  acts  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet.  Not  wishing  to 
hamper  the  activity  of  the  executive  power  by  continuing  its 
deliberations,  on  May  29  the  assembly  adjourned.  It  had  done 
all  that  was  possible  for  it  to  do  at  that  late  hour  to  provide  for 
the  needs  of  the  crisis.  The  rest  depended  on  the  King,  to  whom 
the  whole  direction  and  the  whole  responsibility  for  the  national 
defence  had  been  entrusted. 


II 

If  the  struggle  were  not  to  be  utterly  unequal,  Poland  impera- 
tively needed  to  secure  aid  from  outside.  Naturally  she  turned 
first  of  all  to  the  allied  Court  of  Berlin,  to  whose  assistance  she 
had  every  right  that  solemn  engagements  could  give.  By  the 
treaty  of  1790,  the  continued  validity  of  which  was  unquestioned, 
Frederick  William  had  pledged  himself  to  render  military  aid  '  in 
case  any  foreign  Power,  by  virtue  of  any  previous  acts  or  stipula- 
tions .  .  .  should  seek  to  assert  the  right  to  interfere  in  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  the  Republic.'  No  stipulation  could  more  exactly 
have  fitted  the  situation  of  1792.  Nevertheless,  for  many  months 
past  the  Prussian  government  had  maintained  an  attitude  so  cold 
and  forbidding  as  almost  to  preclude  all  hope  of  its  assistance. 
When  the  Diet's  first  resolution  to  resist  a  Russian  invasion  was 
communicated  to  Berlin,  Lucchesini  replied  with  a  stiff  note  to 
the  effect  that  his  master  could  not  take  cognizance  of  these 
decisions,  since  they  related  to  matters  utterly  foreign  to  him. 
Orally  the  envoy  added  that  as  the  King  of  Prussia  had  had  no 
share  in  the  revolution  of  the  Third  of  May,  he  did  not  consider 
himself  bound  to  render  assistance,  in  case  the  Patriotic  party 
wished  to  defend  its  work  by  force  of  arms.1 

Ominous  as  was  this  reply,  it  was  long  before  the  Poles  could 
convince  themselves  that  the  Court  of  Berlin  would  be  as  bad  as 
its  word.  Of  the  hostility  of  the  Prussian  ministry  there  could 
be  no  doubt;  but  the  world  had  often  been  taught  that  the  policy 
of  that  ministry  did  not  always  coincide  with  that  of  its  master; 
and  it  was  reported  from  many  sources  that  such  was  the  case  at 

1  Note  of  May  4,  Lucchesini's  report  of  the  5th,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  287 

present.1  At  any  rate,  faint  as  was  the  hope,  no  resource  should 
be  left  untried.  Hence,  immediately  after  the  Russian  declaration 
the  Polish  government  formally  demanded  that  Prussia  should 
recognize  the  casus  foederis,  and  furnish  the  aid  provided  for  in 
the  treaty  of  alliance.  And,  as  the  value  of  ministerial  notes  was 
sufficiently  known,  it  was  decided  to  send  a  special  envoy  to 
Berlin  to  approach  Frederick  William  personally,  to  make  a 
supreme  appeal  to  his  loyalty  and  sense  of  honor,  and  at  least  to 
find  out  definitely  whether  he  would  do  anything  whatever  on 
behalf  of  Poland.  The  painful  mission  was  entrusted  to  the 
Marshal  Potocki,  who  had  been  the  author  and  the  foremost 
supporter  of  the  Prussian  alliance. 

No  visitor  could  have  been  more  unwelcome  at  Berlin,  and  no 
demands  more  embarrassing.  Frederick  William  had  no  time  or 
inclination  to  consider  his  engagements  with  the  Republic,  for  he 
was  already  immersed  in  a  negotiation  for  dismembering  that 
allied  state.  Potocki  was,  indeed,  favored  with  two  audiences 
with  the  King  and  a  conference  with  Schulenburg;  but  Frederick 
William  merely  stammered  out  a  few  platitudes  and  hastened  to 
make  his  escape,  while  his  minister  took  refuge  behind  such 
flimsy  pretexts  as:  that  the  Poles  themselves  had  provoked  hos- 
tilities by  their  warlike  resolutions  of  April;  that  the  indepen- 
dence and  integrity  of  the  Republic  were  not  endangered  by  the 
Russian  invasion,  and  therefore  there  was  no  occasion  for  Prussia 
to  intervene;  or  that  the  alliance  had  been  concluded  with  a 
republic,  Poland  was  now  a  monarchy,  and  therefore  the  treaty  no 
longer  held.  Potocki  soon  had  to  recognize  that  there  was  abso- 
lutely no  hope.  Frederick  William's  last  word  was  contained  in 
his  reply  to  Stanislas  Augustus,  in  which  he  flatly  refused  to 
render  aid,  on  the  ground  that  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of 
May,  which  was  subsequent  to  the  alliance  treaty,  had  so  altered 
the  situation  that  his  engagements  were  in  no  way  applicable  to 
the  present  circumstances.2  That  meant  definitely  that  in  the 
moment  of  Poland's  supreme  need  her  ally  had  left  her  in  the 

1  Details  as  to  these  reports  in  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  175,  233. 

2  The  text  of  this  letter  (of  June  8)  is  printed  in  part  in  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  p.  246. 
Potocki's  detailed  account  of  his  audiences  with  the  King  and  his  discussions  with 
Schulenburg,  ibid.,  pp.  237-253. 


288  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

lurch.  Such  conduct  can  be  characterized  only  as  a  flagrant 
breach  of  faith,  an  act  of  treachery  with  few  parallels  in  history. 

At  Dresden  and  Vienna  the  efforts  of  the  Poles  were  equally 
fruitless.  The  Elector  would  give  only  vague  promises  of  his  good 
offices;  and  Austria,  while  secretly  expressing  her  sympathy, 
alleged  that  in  the  existing  situation  it  was  utterly  impossible  for 
her  to  do  anything  effective  in  behalf  of  the  Republic.  The 
mission  of  Prince  Czartoryski  to  Vienna,  which  was  the  counter- 
part of  Potocki's  to  Berlin,  proved  no  more  successful.1  By  the 
middle  of  June  it  was  evident  that  no  aid  whatever  was  to  be 
expected  from  any  neighboring  Power.  Poland  was  thrown 
entirely  upon  her  own  resources. 

Those  resources  were  meagre  enough.  Although  the  size  of  the 
army  had  been  trebled  since  the  beginning  of  the  Four  Years' 
Diet,  at  the  outbreak  of  the  war  it  amounted  to  only  57,000  men; 
and  deducting  the  reserves  and  the  garrisons  of  various  fortresses, 
there  were  barely  45,000  men  available  for  field-service.2  These 
troops,  moreover,  were  but  recently  organized,  imperfectly 
trained,  and  utterly  inexperienced;  they  were  inadequately 
equipped  with  arms,  ammunition,  and  uniforms;  and  the  com- 
missariat and  the  field-hospital  service  left  much  to  be  desired.3 
In  short,  the  army  lacked  almost  everything  except  courage  and 
patriotic  enthusiasm.  In  spite  of  all  deficiencies  its  spirit  was 
excellent.  Granted  a  little  experience  and  proper  leadership,  it 
was  capable  of  giving  a  good  account  of  itself. 

The  leadership,  however,  was  also  not  of  the  highest  order. 
The  command  of  the  forces  in  the  Ukraine,  on  which  the  brunt  of 

1  Kaunitz  to  King  Francis,  June  1,  V.  A.,  Vortrdge,  1792,  and  to  de  Cache, 
June  6,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1792;  Haugwitz's  report  of  June  2,  B.  A.,  R.  1, 
Conv.  170. 

2  Smolenski,  Konfederacya  targowicka,  p.  45. 

3  There  is  some  difference  of  opinion  on  these  points  among  Polish  historians. 
Korzon  (Wewnetrzne  dzieje,  v,  pp.  133-137)  attempts  to  prove  that  in  spite  of 
momentary  disorders  and  deficiencies,  and  in  spite  of  the  complaints  constantly 
made  by  the  commanders,  the  army  was  adequately  supplied  and  equipped.  In  a 
somewhat  similar  sense,  G6rski,  Historya  piechoty  polskiej,  pp.  194  f.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  general  view  advanced  in  the  text  is  maintained  by  the  most  recent  his- 
torian of  the  war,  Soplica,  Wojna  polsko-rosyjska,  pp.  50  f.,  and  by  Smolenski, 
Konfederacya  targowicka,  pp.  46,  167. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  289 

the  fighting  would  fall,  had  been  given  to  the  King's  nephew, 
Prince  Joseph  Poniatowski,  an  inexperienced  young  man  of 
twenty-nine,  who,  with  all  his  gallantry  and  devotion,  had  not  yet 
matured  those  talents  that  were  to  win  him  a  great  reputation  as 
a  marshal  of  Napoleon.  Accepting  the  command  against  his  will, 
weighed  down  by  the  sense  of  responsibility  and  the  presentiment 
of  failure,  he  displayed  throughout  the  campaign  a  deplorable  lack 
of  initiative,  an  inability  to  seize  what  opportunities  presented 
themselves,  and  an  exaggerated  unwillingness  to  take  risks. 
Among  the  other  officers,  only  one  showed  signs  of  real  genius. 
That  was  Kosciuszko;  and  he,  unfortunately,  was  subordinated 
to  Prince  Joseph,  and  constantly  fettered  by  the  latter's  excessive 
caution. 

Between  the  18th  and  the  22nd  of  May,  four  Russian  corps 
invaded  the  Ukraine  from  the  east,  the  south,  and  the  southwest, 
while  four  others  pressed  into  Lithuania.  In  the  latter  quarter 
there  was  no  really  effective  resistance.  The  Polish  forces, 
numbering  14,500  men,  incapably  led  and  faced  by  32,000  Rus- 
sians,1 could  only  retreat  steadily,  fighting  occasional  unsuccessful 
rear-guard  actions.  In  the  south  Prince  Joseph  and  Kosciuszko, 
with  about  17,000  men,  were  pitted  against  Kakhovski's  64,00c2 
In  the  face  of  such  an  enormous  disparity  of  numbers,  the  best 
chance  for  the  Poles  would  seem  to  have  lain  in  concentrating  all 
their  available  forces  and  hurling  them  upon  one  or  another  of  the 
widely  separated  Russian  corps  before  the  latter  had  time  to 
unite.  That  proposal  was  made  by  Kosciuszko  at  the  very  be- 
ginning of  the  campaign,  but  rejected  by  Prince  Joseph  on  the 
ground  that  with  such  quite  inexperienced  troops  the  issue  of  a 
pitched  battle  would  be  hazardous,  and  with  no  reserves  at  hand 
a  defeat  would  be  ruinous.3  The  Prince  was  determined  to  hold 
strictly  to  the  defensive,  keeping  his  irreplaceable  army  intact, 
and  maintaining  his  communications  with  the  capital.  The 
Russians,  on  their  side,  were  confident  of  their  ability  to  cut  his 
line  of  retreat,  surround  him,  and  capture  his  whole  army.  As 
they  were  constantly  able  to  outflank  him,  he  was  obliged  to  fall 

1  Smolensk.!,  op.  cit.,  pp.  45  f.  2  Ibid. 

3  Korzon,  Kosciuszko,  p.  227. 


290  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

back  continually  before  them,  abandoning  one  strong  position 
after  another.  The  campaign  turned  into  a  sort  of  chase,  in  the 
course  of  which  Kakhovski  more  than  once  allowed  the  enemy  to 
slip  through  his  fingers,  while  the  Poles  displayed  a  certain 
dexterity  in  eluding  their  pursuers,  and  occasionally  turned  and 
struck  back  with  good  effect.  Thus  on  June  18  at  Zielence, 
when  a  Russian  corps  under  General  Markov,  advancing  too 
ardently  and  incautiously,  suddenly  found  itself  faced  by  the 
bulk  of  Prince  Joseph's  army,  the  Russians  were  rudely  repulsed 
and  forced  to  evacuate  the  battle-field,  although  the  Polish  com- 
mander failed  to  follow  up  his  victory,  as  he  should  have  done,  by 
crushing  Markov  completely. 

After  more  than  a  month  of  this  game  of  hare  and  hounds,  by 
early  July  Prince  Joseph  had  retired  behind  the  line  of  the  Bug, 
which  he  hoped  to  be  able  to  defend.  On  the  18th  all  the  Polish 
positions  were  attacked  by  the  enemy.  The  hardest  righting 
came  at  Dubienka,  where  Kosciuszko  with  6,000  Poles  and  10 
guns  held  at  bay  for  three  or  four  hours  19,000  Russians  with  76 
guns.1  This  was  the  fiercest  and  bloodiest  battle  of  the  war. 
Under  cover  of  darkness  Kosciuszko  did  indeed  withdraw,  on 
learning  that  the  passage  of  the  river  had  been  forced  at  several 
other  points;  but  at  any  rate,  his  men  had  covered  themselves 
with  glory,  and  he,  whose  name  had  hitherto  been  little  known, 
now  became  almost  in  a  moment  the  national  hero. 

From  the  Bug  the  army  fell  back  through  Lublin  to  the  Vistula. 
On  July  25  it  stood  at  Kurow  on  the  right  bank  of  that  river, 
some  distance  to  the  south  of  the  capital.  The  army  of  Lithuania 
was  posted  on  the  lower  Bug,  almost  due  east  of  Warsaw.  These 
were  the  positions  at  the  moment  when  hostilities  ended. 

The  situation  was  not  absolutely  desperate.  In  some  ways  it 
was  even  more  favorable  than  in  the  earlier  stages  of  the  cam- 
paign. The  richest  palatinates  and  the  greater  part  of  the  territory 
of  the  Republic  had  indeed  been  overrun  by  the  enemy,  and  the 
Russians  had  penetrated  almost  to  the  gates  of  Warsaw.  But 
the  more  the  scene  of  operations  moved  to  the  west,  the  farther 
the  invaders  were  drawn  away  from  their  base,  and  the  more 

1  Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  177  f. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  29 1 

difficult  it  became  for  them  to  protect  a  terribly  long  and  exposed 
line  of  communications.  On  the  other  hand,  the  various  Polish 
forces  were  constantly  getting  closer  together  and  better  able  to 
assist  one  another.  The  Vistula  offered  a  relatively  strong  line  of 
defence;  and  behind  it  were  the  still  undrained  resources  of  the 
western  palatinates.  There  were  30,000  regular  troops  yet 
available;  and  volunteers  were  flocking  in  daily.  The  army  had 
not  been  really  defeated  once.  Only  two  considerable  battles  had 
been  fought,  the  one  a  Polish  victory,  the  other  not  a  genuine 
defeat.  The  troops,  green  at  the  start,  were  getting  hardened  and 
experienced  and  sure  of  themselves;  and  in  spite  of  the  constant 
retreats,  they  were  far  from  discouraged.  Officers  and  men  were 
thirsting  for  more  fighting,  eager  to  repeat  the  exploits  of  Zielefke 
and  Dubienka.  Kosciuszko  later  wrote  bitterly:  "  The  fighting 
spirit,  ardor,  and  patriotism  were  universal.  .  .  .  The  means  of 
beating  the  Russian  army  were  still  in  our  hands.  .  .  .  But  we 
didn't  make  use  of  them."  l  That  they  were  not  made  use  of, 
that  the  resistance  collapsed  at  this  moment,  was  not  the  fault  of 
the  army;  it  was  due  to  the  tremors  and  terrors  of  the  cowardly 
King. 

Ill 

Stanislas  Augustus  had  often  sworn  that  he  would  never  aban- 
don the  new  constitution  while  life  remained.  He  had  solemnly 
declared  that  he  would  lead  his  people  to  battle  and,  if  necessary, 
die  with  them.  He  had  promised  again  and  again  to  go  to  the 
field  with  the  army ;  and  indeed  he  made  all  the  preparations,  as  if 
he  meant  to  go.  It  is  doubtful,  however,  whether  he  ever  had  any 
serious  intentions  of  fighting.  It  is  probable  that  no  cause  in  the 
world  and  no  conceivable  disgrace  could  ever  have  induced  this 
King  to  sacrifice  his  fife,  his  crown,  or  even  his  personal  comfort. 
When  pressed  to  go  to  the  camp,  he •  inquired  anxiously  whether 
he  would  find  there  "  a  proper  cuisine."  2 

From  the  very  outset  his  program  was,  "  rather  with  the  pen 
than  with  the  sword."     The  thought  of  settling  everything  by 

1  Soplica,  op.  cit.,  p.  401.  On  the  "  comparatively  favorable  situation  "  at  that 
time,  ibid.,  pp.  401  ff. 

2  Soplica,  op.  cit.,  p.  222. 


292  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

negotiations  was  in  his  mind  even  before  the  Russian  declaration 
arrived l ;  and  after  war  had  actually  begun,  he  took  pains  to  keep 
the  Russian  envoy  in  Warsaw,  and  his  own  in  St.  Petersburg  — 
anomalous  as  such  a  situation  was  —  in  order  to  leave  all  chan- 
nels open.  The  first  shot  had  hardly  been  fired  when  through  the 
Chancellor  Chreptowicz  and  the  Danish  minister  Stanislas  began 
to  sound  Bulgakov  about  the  possibility  of  entering  into  negotia- 
tions.2 

The  failure  of  the  missions  to  Berlin  and  Vienna,  the  military 
disasters  in  Lithuania,  and  the  rapid  advance  of  the  Russians 
everywhere  only  confirmed  the  King  in  the  opinion  that  resist- 
ance in  arms  was  hopeless.  His  sister,  his  mistress,  and  others  in 
his  entourage  continually  dinned  into  his  ears  that  he  was  on  the 
verge  of  ruin,  and  that  he  must  free  himself  from  the  perfidious 
counsels  of  the  Potockis,  the  hereditary  enemies  of  his  family. 
Apparently  he  fell  into  a  perfect  panic.  He  saw  nothing  in  the 
world  but  his  crown.  He  dreaded  nothing  so  much  as  to  lose 
that.  He  was  willing  to  do  anything  to  save  it.3  It  can  readily 
be  imagined  how  the  defence  of  the  country  fared  at  the  hands  of 
a  commander-in-chief  who  shut  himself  up  in  his  palace  in  mortal 
terror,  thought  of  nothing  except  placating  the  enemy,  and 
seemed  actually  displeased  at  the  news  of  a  victory,  from  fear 
that  it  would  irritate  the  Empress.4 

By  the  middle  of  June  nothing  could  hold  back  the  King  any 
longer  from  starting  negotiations.  At  a  session  of  the  Council  of 
War  on  the  18th,  after  the  reading  of  various  extremely  black 
reports  from  the  front,  he  succeeded  in  putting  through  a  decision 
authorizing  Prince  Joseph  to  propose  an  armistice  to  Kakhovski, 
which  was  to  last  until  the  Polish  government  should  have  had 

1  See  his  letter  to  Bukaty  of  May  9,  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii,  pp.  217  f. 

2  Bulgakov's  report  of  May  22/June  2,  M.  A.,  Ilojibiiia,  III,  66.  Already 
on  May  12/23  the  Russian  envoy  noted  in  his  diary  that  the  King  wanted  to 
negotiate,  and  was  only  waiting  for  the  Diet  to  go  home  and  leave  him  a  free  hand. 
The  same  opinion  was  current  in  the  diplomatic  corps  at  Warsaw  (Lucchesini's 
report  of  June  2,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27). 

3  Bulgakov's  diary,  June  10/21,  M.  A.,  loc.  cit.;  Cassini  to  Popov,  June  27,  July 
4  and  7  (Papers  of  V.   S.  Popov,  Imperial  Public  Library,  Petrograd). 

4  Vom  Entstehen  una1  V 'titer gange  der  polnischen  Konstitutionvom  3.  May,  1791,  ii, 
p.  131;  Smolefiski,  Konfederacya  targowicka,  pp.  140  f. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  293 

time  to  communicate  with  St.  Petersburg.  That  same  day  the 
indispensable  Chreptowicz,  who  had  always  belonged  to  the 
Russian  party,  hastened  to  his  good  friend  Bulgakov  to  disclose 
the  King's  propositions.  His  Majesty  meant  to  beg  the  Empress 
to  take  Poland  back  into  her  good  graces,  give  the  country  her 
younger  grandson  Constantine  for  its  future  king,  and  "  improve 
the  constitution  "  according  to  her  superior  wisdom,  adding  or 
rejecting  what  she  pleased.  Bulgakov,  somewhat  moved  by  these 
signs  of  repentance,  suggested  the  draft  of  a  letter  from  the  King 
to  his  sovereign.1 

The  next  day  all  these  matters  were  laid  before  the  cabinet 
(the  Straz).  Everyone  present  seems  to  have  recognized  the 
desirability  of  proposing  a  truce  and  of  appealing  to  the  Empress 
to  end  hostilities.  Even  the  Marshal  Potocki,  just  at  that 
moment  returned  from  Berlin  in  downcast  mood,  approved  of 
this;  but  he  strongly  opposed  the  humiliating  propositions  out- 
lined between  Chreptowicz  and  Bulgakov.  The  result  of  the 
discussion  was  that  a  courier  was  sent  to  Prince  Joseph  with 
orders  relating  to  the  armistice  (which  Kakhovski,  however,  pro- 
fessed himself  unable  to  grant),  while  the  King's  letter  to  the 
Empress  was  to  be  couched  in  the  bolder  and  firmer  tone  recom- 
mended by  Potocki.2 

When  Chreptowicz  presented  the  document  to  Bulgakov,  how- 
ever, the  Russian  envoy  declared  flatly  that  this  would  never  do; 
it  did  not  contain  the  propositions  previously  agreed  upon  be- 
tween them;  the  tone  was  all  wrong;  the  King  must  simply 
throw  himself  on  the  mercy  of  the  Empress.  Thereupon,  appar- 
ently without  consulting  his  cabinet,  and  contrary  to  the  sense  of 
that  body  as  manifested  at  its  last  session,  Stanislas  composed  a 
new  letter,  which  Bulgakov  was  willing  to  accept.  If  Potocki  had 
recommended  treating  as  one  independent  power  with  another, 
the  King's  tone  was  that  of  a  suppliant.  He  '  begged  and 
conjured  '  the  Empress  to  grant  an  armistice  immediately.  He 
implored  her  not  to  carry  out  in  their  full  rigor  the  intentions 
announced  in  her  declaration,  while  admitting  that  she  had  the 

1  Bulgakov's  report  of  June  11/22,  M.  A.,  IloJibina,  III,  66. 

2  Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  p.  134. 


294 ""     THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

material  power  to  do  whatever  she  pleased.  The  essence  of  the 
arrangement  that  he  had  to  propose  was  that  the  succession 
should  be  assured  to  the  Grand  Duke  Constantine,  and  that 
Poland  should  be  attached  to  Russia  by  an  "eternal  alliance," 
while  being  allowed  to  enjoy  "  a  better  organized  government  than 
heretofore,"  and  especially  freedom  from  the  perpetual  danger  of 
interregna.  It  will  be  noticed  that  the  King  did  not  yet  offer  to 
renounce  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May  entirely.  Not  a 
word  was  said  about  the  Confederation  of  Targowica.  Indeed, 
the  letter  was  essentially  an  attempt  to  bribe  the  Empress,  by 
various  advantages  to  herself,  into  throwing  overboard  that  Con- 
federation, allowing  at  least  a  part  of  the  new  constitution  to 
stand,  and  permitting  the  King  to  retain  at  least  a  part  of  the 
power  he  had  gained  by  it.1 

For  the  next  month  Stanislas  waited  in  morbid  anxiety  for  a 
reply  from  St.  Petersburg.  As  his  appeal  to  the  Empress  had 
been  kept  rigorously  secret,  he  continued  to  maintain  a  pre- 
tense of  zeal  for  the  war.  He  went  on  with  the  old  manoeuvre 
of  preparing  to  go  to  the  army,  and  never  going.  He  repeated 
over  and  over  his  hypocritical  vow  to  die  for  his  country.  On 
July  4  he  at  last  issued  the  long  delayed  summons  for  a  national 
uprising  —  an  act  which  might  have  produced  great  results,  had 
it  come  at  the  beginning,  instead  of  almost  at  the  end,  of  the 
war. 

The  Empress'  reply  arrived  on  July  22.  It  was  cold,  inflexi- 
ble, imperious,  as  only  Catherine  knew  how  to  write.  Every  one 
of  the  King's  proposals  was  rejected.  He  was  simply  advised  — 
or  rather  ordered  —  to  accede  to  the  Confederation  of  Targowica 
without  further  delay,  if  he  wished  to  avert  the  direst  conse- 
quences to  his  country,  and  —  it  was  hinted  —  to  himself.2 
Stanislas  was,  or  pretended  to  be,  overwhelmed  with  grief  and 
despair  at  these  inexorable  terms;  nevertheless,  before  the  end  of 
the  day  he  had  arranged  with  Bulgakov  the  form  in  which  his 

1  The  King's  letter  of  June  22  is  printed  in  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii,  pp.  74  ff.; 
Solov'ev,  Geschichte  des  Falles  von  Polen,  pp.  284  f.;  Smitt,  Suworow,  ii,  pp.  461  ff., 
and  elsewhere. 

2  This  letter,  dated  July  2/13,  is  printed  in  Kalinka,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  76  f.,  and 
elsewhere. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  295 

accession  was  to  be  made.  It  remained  only  to  save  appearances, 
as  far  as  that  could  still  be  done. 

For  this  purpose  and  no  other,  it  would  seem,  on  the  23rd  the 
King  called  together  an  extraordinary  council.  He  had  taken 
pains  to  supplement  the  ordinary  cabinet,  in  which  he  might  not 
have  had  a  clear  majority  on  his  side,  by  the  addition  of  various 
high  officials,  on  whose  subservience  he  doubtless  knew  that  he 
could  count.  Before  this  carefully  picked  body  he  read  the 
Empress'  letter,  and  then  proceeded  to  set  forth  the  situation  of 
the  country  —  naturally  in  the  blackest  of  terms.  There  could 
be  no  doubt,  he  said,  that  the  neighboring  Powers  were  leagued 
together  against  Poland.  Further  resistance  would  lead  to  the 
immediate  invasion  of  the  Prussian  armies  already  massed  on  the 
frontier.  Further  resistance  was  impossible  in  any  case,  because 
of  the  utter  lack  of  money  and  the  overwhelming  superiority  of 
the  hostile  forces.  No  one  could  be  more  grieved  than  he  at  the 
terms  laid  down  by  the  Empress ;  he  would  willingly  give  his  life 
for  the  maintenance  of  the  constitution;  but  the  sense  of  an  obli- 
gation higher  than  self-love,  compelled  him  to  consider  whether 
any  desperate  resolution  could  now  bring  the  country  any  real 
advantage.  He  therefore  put  the  question  whether  it  would  not 
be  better  to  accede  to  the  Confederation  of  Targowica  in  accord- 
ance with  the  wishes  of  the  Court  of  Petersburg. 

The  King's  brother,  the  Primate,  devoted  to  Russia  from  of  old, 
chimed  in  with  the  assertion  that  it  was  impossible  to  save  the 
constitution,  but  imperative  to  save  the  country.  Others  spoke 
in  the  same  sense,  including  even  Kollataj,  hitherto  always  the 
boldest  and  most  radical  of  the  reformers.  Only  Malachowski, 
the  Marshal  of  the  Great  Diet,  Ignacy  Potocki,  and  two  others 
stood  out  unshakeably  for  resistance  to  the  bitter  end.  Potocki 
denied  that  the  military  situation  was  hopeless.  He  described 
the  enthusiasm  and  devotion  of  the  troops.  He  conjured  the  King 
to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the  army  and  thereby  set  an  example 
that  would  surely  inspire  the  nation  to  rise  as  one  man;  or  if  he 
would  not  do  that,  let  him  at  least  lay  down  the  crown  and  leave 
the  country,  rather  than  stoop  to  associate  himself  with  a  band  of 
traitors.    Ostrowski  pointed  to  the  overwhelming  odds  in  the  face 


296  THE   SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  which  the  Dutch  had  successfully  carried  through  their 
struggle  for  independence  against  Philip  II;  and  he  called  upon 
the  King  to  emulate  the  bravery  and  constancy  of  John  Casimir, 
under  whom  Poland  had  been  almost  miraculously  delivered 
from  extremities  worse  than  the  present.  But  all  such  manly 
counsels  were  wasted.  Stanislas  Augustus  leaving  his  palace,  his 
concerts,  his  mistresses,  his  '  proper  cuisine,'  for  the  rough  life  of 
the  camp  —  that  was  something  inconceivable. 

Eight  of  those  present  had  spoken  in  favor  of  submitting  to  the 
Empress'  demands  and  four  against.  After  Potocki  had  made  his 
last  appeal,  there  was  a  moment's  silence.  Then  the  King  an- 
nounced that,  having  no  more  hope  of  saving  a  constitution  dear 
to  him  personally,  and  desiring  to  spare  the  country  useless  blood- 
shed, complete  devastation,  and  perhaps  a  new  dismemberment, 
he  had  decided  to  conform  to  the  opinion  of  the  majority  and 
accede  to  the  Confederation.1  The  following  day  (the  24th)  his 
accession  was  sent  to  Bulgakov,  while  the  army  was  ordered  to 
cease  hostilities,  recognize  the  Confederation,  and  leave  the  road 
to  Warsaw  open  to  the  Russians. 

The  King's  shameful  desertion  produced  an  indescribable 
feeling  of  rage,  grief,  and  consternation  in  the  capital,  the  army, 
and  the  country  at  large.  Nevertheless  it  immediately  ended  all 
resistance  to  the  invaders.  For  some  few  days  it  did  indeed 
appear  likely  that  there  would  be  a  general  uprising  at  Warsaw 
and  a  repetition  of  the  scenes  then  familiar  at  Paris.  Crowds 
gathered  in  the  streets  and  squares,  fiercely  denouncing  the  King, 
threatening  to  string  up  to  the  lamp-posts  the  advisers  who  had 
misled  him,  and  overwhelming  with  ovations  those  who  had  stood 
up  for  the  constitution.  Inflammatory  pamphlets  and  pasquils 
were  everywhere  spread  abroad.  The  police  felt  obliged  to  patrol 
the  city  in  heavy  squads  with  loaded  muskets,  breaking  up 
gatherings  in  the  streets  and  suppressing  demonstrations.  The 
guard  at  the  castle  was  doubled;  and  the  King,  trembling  and 
quaking,  looked  forward  to  the  advent  of  the  Russians  as  to  a 
deliverance.     But,  whether  it  was  for  fear  of  the  oncoming  enemy, 

1  Bulgakov's  report  of  July  16/27,  M.  A.,  ITojbma,  III,  68;    Cassini  to  Zubov, 
July  25  (papers  of  V.   S.  Popov);  Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  210-216. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  297 

or  because  of  the  lack  of  leadership,  or  because  the  Warsaw  mob 
had  not  the  courage  or  the  violent  instincts  of  the  Parisians,  at  all 
events  no  serious  outbreak  took  place.1 

The  Patriotic  leaders,  unwilling  to  start  a  civil  war  against 
their  King  and  feeling  that  for  the  present  their  cause  was  lost, 
determined  to  leave  the  country.  The  Marshals  of  the  late  Diet 
issued  a  formal  protest  against  the  Confederation  of  Targowica. 
Those  members  of  the  party  who  held  high  offices,  resigned.  Soon 
practically  all  those  who  were  called  '  the  men  of  the  Third  of 
May  '  had  departed  for  Leipsic,  Venice,  or  other  havens  of  refuge. 
The  roads  from  Warsaw  to  the  frontier  were  choked  with  the 
exodus. 

In  the  army  there  was  some  talk  of  continuing  the  struggle  in 
spite  of  everything.  Many  of  the  officers,  including  Kosciuszko, 
urged  upon  Prince  Joseph  the  bold  plan  of  abducting  the  King 
and  holding  him  a  prisoner  in  the  camp,  while  the  fight  for  inde- 
pendence was  carried  on  in  his  name;  but  the  Prince  could  not 
bring  himself  to  such  an  act  of  violence  against  his  uncle.2  There- 
upon, rather  than  betray  the  cause  they  had  sworn  to  defend, 
Prince  Joseph,  Kosciuszko,  and  several  dozen  other  officers 
resigned,  and  many  of  them  retired  abroad. 

Meanwhile  the  Russian  troops  arrived  at  Warsaw  and  en- 
camped just  outside,  to  hold  down  '  the  factious  city.'  Most  of 
the  provinces  were  similarly  garrisoned.  The  Polish  army,  after 
being  obliged  to  take  the  oath  to  the  Confederation,  was  parcelled 
out  in  small  detachments  about  the  country,  wherever  it  could  do 
least  harm  to  its  new  masters.  The  King,  in  spite  of  his  submis- 
sion, was  kept  almost  a  state  prisoner.  The  Confederates  would 
have  deposed  him  outright,  had  the  Empress  been  willing  to 
allow  it.  Forbidden  that  satisfaction,  they  treated  him  like  a 
convicted  criminal,  subjecting  him  to  all  the  humiliations  in  their 
power,  and  denying  him  any  influence  whatever  in  public  affairs. 

The  whole  machinery  of  government  was  now,  nominally  at 
least,  in  the  hands  of  the  men  of  Targowica.    Their  role  had  been 

1  As  to  the  scenes  in  the  capital  in  these  days,  Cassini  to  Zubov,  July  25,  and 
to  Popov,  July  26;    Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  219  ff. 

2  On  this  plan,  see  Soplica,  op.  cit.,  pp.  419  ff.;  Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  226  f. 


298 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


insignificant  enough  while  the  war  lasted.  Returning  to  their 
country  under  the  protection  of  the  invading  army,  and  following 
at  a  safe  distance  in  the  rear  of  the  Russians,  they  had  done  their 
utmost  to  produce  a  popular  uprising  in  their  favor,  and  they  had 
failed  utterly.  In  vain  they  had  attempted  to  debauch  the  army 
that  was  fighting  so  valiantly  for  the  nation's  independence.  In 
vain  they  had  tried  to  create  an  army  of  their  own.  Without  a 
strong  guard  of  Cossacks  they  hardly  dared  show  themselves. 
Their  proclamations,  appeals,  orders,  and  menaces  produced  little 
or  no  response  from  their  fellow-countrymen.  If  they  succeeded 
in  forming  local  confederations  here  and  there  in  the  conquered 
provinces,  it  was  with  the  utmost  difficulty,  and  often  only  by  the 
use  of  violence  and  constraint.  It  was  true  that  after  the  King's 
accession  the  situation  was  considerably  changed  in  this  respect. 
As  the  Constitutionalist  cause  seemed  hopelessly  lost  while  the 
men  of  Targowica  appeared  to  have  the  game  in  their  hands,  their 
ranks  were  soon  swollen  by  the  adhesion  of  all  those  who,  regard- 
less of  honor  or  patriotism,  were  eager  to  be  on  the  winning  side. 
The  formation  of  confederations  in  each  palatinate  and  the  union 
of  all  these  local  associations  in  a  '  general  Confederation  '  then 
went  forward  without  much  trouble.  Still  it  cannot  be  said  that 
the  men  of  Targowica  ever  acquired  a  really  considerable  popular 
following.  The  mass  of  the  nation  held  aloof,  despising  and  exe- 
crating them  as  a  pack  of  traitors.  Even  the  Russian  officers 
hardly  concealed  their  contempt  for  their  proteges.  Without  the 
Empress'  support  the  Confederation  could  not  have  held  its  posi- 
tion a  single  day.  Without  her  advice  and  approval  its  leaders 
dared  not  raise  a  hand.  In  short,  the  Confederation  remained 
what  it  had  been  from  the  outset,  a  mere  figurehead  behind  which 
Russia  could  exercise  sovereign  rights  over  the  Republic. 

Thus  Poland  was  once  more  prostrate  before  her  old  oppressors. 
After  enjoying  a  few  brief  years  of  glorious,  exhilarating  freedom, 
after  attempting  to  play  once  more  the  part  of  an  independent  and 
active  power  in  Europe,  after  striving  so  hard  to  purge  itself  of 
the  ancient  errors  and  weaknesses  and  to  lay  the  foundations  for  a 
sound  and  progressive  national  life,  the  country  suddenly  found 
itself  plunged  back  under  the  old  detested,  anarchical  regime  and 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  299 

into  the  old  servitude  to  the  foreigner.  A  more  bitter  history  it 
would  be  hard  to  imagine,  were  it  not  that  the  immediate  future 
had  even  worse  disasters  in  store. 

IV 

The  rapid  and  complete  success  of  Catherine's  Polish  enter- 
prise would  hardly  have  been  possible  but  for  the  strange  passi- 
vity of  the  two  German  Powers.  Their  inactivity  was  not  due  to 
whole-hearted  approval  of  her  conduct.  Both  Courts  had  been 
not  a  little  ruffled  when  at  the  beginning  of  May,  instead  of  form- 
ing the  proposed  concert,  she  had  simply  called  upon  them  to 
acquiesce  in  her  high-handed  measures  and  to  give  her  virtually 
carte  blanche  in  Poland.  Although  Prussia  was  anything  but  dis- 
pleased at  the  prospect  of  seeing  the  work  of  the  Third  of  May 
overthrown,  and  Austria  had  at  last  made  up  her  mind  to  accept 
that  as  inevitable,1  still  neither  Court  wished  to  allow  Russia  to 
regulate  Polish  affairs  single-handed,  or  to  attain  a  quite  exclusive 
predominance  in  the  Republic. 

In  view  of  the  French  war,  however,  downright  opposition  to 
the  Empress  was  hardly  possible,  and  in  any  case  both  Powers 
attached  too  much  importance  to  her  good  graces  to  be  willing  to 
attempt  it.  Even  to  make  polite  remonstrances  was  a  matter  for 
serious  hesitation.  It  required  much  ingenuity  to  devise,  and  not 
a  little  courage  to  propose,  measures  that  would  check  the  de- 
signs, without  too  much  wounding  the  susceptibilities,  of  the 
great  lady  in  St.  Petersburg.  Neither  Court  aspired  to  the  honor 
of  being  the  one  to  pull  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire.  For  some 
time  each  contented  itself  with  begging  the  other  to  confide  its 
inmost  thoughts  about  what  was  to  be  done. 

The  Prussians  really  preferred  to  do  nothing  at  all  for  the  pres- 
ent. They  hoped  that  if  there  should  be  a  negotiation  between 
the  Empress  and  the  government  at  Warsaw,  they  would  have  a 
chance  to  interpose  their  '  good  offices  ' ;    and  if,  on  the  other 

1  As  late  as  May  9,  Cobenzl  was  ordered  to  urge  the  Russians  to  delay  resorting 
to  violent  measures.  It  was  only  on  June  9  that  the  ambassador  was  instructed  that 
his  master  agreed  entirely  with  the  Empress  on  the  desirability  of  restoring  the  old 
constitution  in  Poland.    Vivenot,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  31  f.,  88  f. 


300  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

hand,  there  was  a  protracted  struggle,  they  might  find  a  pretext 
for  armed  intervention.  For  a  time  they  played  with  the  idea  of 
drawing  a  cordon  across  the  Polish  territory  adjacent  to  their 
frontier,  without,  however,  finding  the  courage  to  take  even  so 
half-way  energetic  a  step.  Painfully  anxious  to  avoid  all  that 
might  possibly  give  umbrage  at  St.  Petersburg,  they  preferred  to 
stand  idle,  consoling  themselves  with  the  thought  that  sooner  or 
later  —  perhaps  in  the  course  of  the  pending  negotiation  for  a 
Russo-Prussian  alliance  —  the  Empress  would  offer  them  a  parti- 
tion. Goltz  was  still  strong  in  the  faith  that  that  was  her  inten- 
tion. Doubtless  there  have  been  happier  examples  of  political 
sagacity.  It  is  hard  to  see  how  the  Prussian  ministers  could  have 
expected  Catherine  to  make  so  huge  a  bid  for  their  support,  when 
they  were  already  conceding  to  her  practically  all  she  desired  of 
them.  From  what  we  know  of  the  sentiments  prevalent  at  St. 
Petersburg  at  this  time,  it  seems  almost  certain  that  had  Prussia 
taken  a  more  vigorous  tone  and  insisted  on  getting  the  price  of 
her  complaisance,  she  could  have  secured  easily  then  and  there  all 
that  she  obtained  with  so  much  difficulty  six  or  seven  months 
later. 

It  was  from  the  Austrian  side  that  the  first  proposals  for  action 
were  made.  Kaunitz  had  determined  to  checkmate  the  Empress 
by  taking  up  the  idea  of  the  triple  concert,  which  she  herself  had 
suggested  and  then  apparently  abandoned,  and  making  it  a 
reality.  He  meant  to  enforce  the  principle  that  Polish  affairs 
could  not  be  regulated  definitively  save  by  the  joint  action  of  all 
three  of  the  neighboring  Powers.  In  accordance  with  that  prin- 
ciple, the  Confederation  of  Targowica  must  be  induced  to  request 
the  protection  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  as  it  had  already  invoked 
that  of  Russia.  The  envoys  of  the  three  Courts  at  Warsaw  must 
act  together.  Above  all,  the  Empress  must  be  invited  to  sign  a 
convention  by  which  each  of  the  three  Powers  should  bind  itself 
to  undertake  nothing  in  Poland  without  the  consent  of  the  other 
two.  By  such  arrangements  Kaunitz  hoped  to  prevent  the 
Republic  from  becoming  once  more  a  mere  province  of  Russia;  to 
win  for  Austria  an  influence  in  Polish  affairs  such  as  she  had  sel- 
dom possessed  in  the  past;  and  also  to  guard  against  that  danger 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  30 1 

which  had  been  feared  at  Vienna  ever  since  the  beginning  of  the 
crisis  —  an  agreement  between  Russia  and  Prussia  for  a  new 
partition  without  the  knowledge  of  their  common  ally.1 

About  the  middle  of  May  the  Chancellor  explained  to  Jacobi, 
the  Prussian  envoy,  his  ideas  about  setting  bounds,  by  the  means 
just  indicated,  to  the  Empress'  activity  in  Poland.  Having 
reported  to  his  Court,  Jacobi  received  a  reply  which  was,  to  say 
the  least,  far  from  clear,  but  from  which  he  concluded  that  his 
master  fully  approved  of  Kaunitz's  suggestions.  He  could  only 
have  been  confirmed  in  this  impression  by  a  previous  rescript,  in 
which  the  Prussian  ministry  had  declared  that  the  most  essential 
thing  at  present  was  to  prevent  Russia  from  acquiring  exclusive 
control  in  Poland,  and  that  this  aim  might  be  attained  by  insist- 
ing continually  on  a  triple  concert.2  It  is  not  surprising,  there- 
fore, that  the  envoy  took  up  Kaunitz's  idea  with  some  energy. 
Just  at  this  moment  Jacobi  was  performing  the  last  acts  of  his 
ministry  at  Vienna  and  initiating  his  successor,  Count  Haug- 
witz  3  into  current  affairs.  The  latter,  inexperienced  and  zealous, 
threw  himself  into  the  scheme  under  discussion  with  a  vigor  not 
uncommon  with  beginners  in  diplomacy,  but  at  that  moment 
quite  inconvenient  for  his  Court. 

On  getting  the  ambiguous  orders  of  May  21,  the  two  Prussian 
envoys  began  to  assail  the  Austrians  with  demands  for  a  definite 
declaration  to  be  presented  by  the  allied  Courts  at  St.  Peters- 
burg. Spielmann,  who  had  probably  already  received  a  secret 
proposal  from  Berlin  of  a  very  different  sort,  met  their  suggestions 
rather  coolly.    He  professed  himself  convinced  of  the  purity  of 

1  This  idea  of  a  quasi-permanent  triple  concert  on  Polish  affairs  was  only  a 
development  of  the  principle  laid  down  in  the  Vienna  Convention  of  July  25,  1791, 
and  in  the  February  alliance  treaty.  It  first  appears  in  fairly  definite  form  in  a 
note  of  Kaunitz  to  Ph.  Cobenzl  of  May  4,  1792  (printed  in  Schlitter,  Kaunitz, 
Ph.  Cobenzl  und  Spielmann,  p.  59).  Cf.  the  note  of  Kaunitz  of  May  18,  printed  in 
Vivenot,  ii,  p.  47. 

2  Jacobi's  report  of  May  16,  rescripts  to  him  of  May  18  and  21,  B.  A.,  R.  1, 
Conv.  169. 

3  Haugwitz,  who  here  began  his  ill-fated  public  career,  had  been  destined  since 
October  to  the  post  at  Vienna,  which  he  owed  not  only  to  his  personal  credit  with 
Frederick  William  (he  was  of  the  Rosicrucian  Society),  but  also  to  his  friendship 
with  the  late  Emperor,  and  to  his  supposed  sympathy  for  the  Austrian  alliance,  to 
which  Jacobi  had  never  been  able  to  adapt  himself. 


302 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


the  Empress'  intentions,  and  too  busy  —  on  the  eve  of  his 
departure  for  the  coronation  at  Buda  —  to  undertake  to  draw  up 
the  desired  declarations.  Haugwitz  and  Jacobi,  not  to  be  re- 
buffed, thereupon  announced  that  they  would  compose  the  draft 
themselves,  and  presently  they  returned  with  one  at  which  Spiel- 
mann  was  fairly  aghast.  It  contained,  for  example,  the  astonish- 
ing demand  that  the  Empress  should  arrest  the  advance  of  her 
troops  until  the  three  Courts  had  agreed  upon  the  measures  to  be 
taken  in  common.  Haugwitz  was  quite  aware  that  such  a  demand 
would  have  to  be  backed  up  by  military  demonstrations  and 
threats,  but  he  did  not  shrink  from  that  prospect.  Spielmann, 
however,  protested  emphatically  and  outlined  a  much  more 
moderate  declaration,  which  the  Prussians  then  accepted  and  at 
once  put  upon  paper.1 

Haugwitz  next  presented  this  draft  to  Kaunitz,  who,  finding  in 
it  his  own  ideas,  was  highly  pleased,  declaring  that  if  by  this 
means  they  could  gain  their  great  object,  it  would  be  a  political 
stroke  of  the  rarest  sort.  The  court  having  gone  to  Buda,  it 
required  some  time  to  obtain  the  royal  assent  to  the  project;  but 
this  having  been  secured,  the  Chancellor  proceeded  to  tone  down 
still  more  the  terms  of  the  declaration,  and  to  add  a  draft  for  the 
proposed  convention,  by  which  the  three  Powers  were  to  bind 
themselves  to  do  nothing  in  Poland  henceforth  except  conjointly 
and  by  common  accord.  If  the  Empress  entered  upon  this  agree- 
ment, recognized  the  principle  of  "  a  just  community  of  in- 
fluence," and  took  steps  to  induce  the  Confederation  to  request 
the  support  of  Austria  and  Prussia,  the  latter  were  in  return  to 
present  declarations  at  Warsaw  analogous  to  Bulgakov's,  and 
also,  in  case  of  need,  to  render  active  military  assistance  to  the 
Russians.  On  June  20  the  projects  for  the  joint  declaration  and 
the  convention  were  sent  to  Berlin.2 

1  Jacobi's  report  of  May  28,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  160.  Haugwitz's  readiness 
to  use  measures  of  coercion  against  the  Empress  appears  again  in  his  report  of 
June  2,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  170.  Spielmann's  coldness  towards  the  plan  must  have 
been  due  in  great  part  to  the  fact  that  he  had  probably  just  received  Schulenburg's 
secret  overture  regarding  a  new  partition.  That  proposal  was  made  through  a 
letter  of  May  22.  The  post  between  Berlin  and  Vienna  ordinarily  took  five  days, 
and  Spielmann's  conferences  with  Jacobi  and  Haugwitz  took  place  the  28th. 

2  For  the  above:    Haugwitz's  reports  of  June  2,  n,  15,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  303 

The  Prussian  ministry  had  been  much  irritated  ever  since  learn- 
ing of  the  independent  step  of  their  two  envoys.  They  foresaw  that 
the  declaration  would  not  please  the  Empress,  and  that  the  Court 
of  Vienna,  or  rather  its  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg,  would  prob- 
ably try  to  throw  the  blame  upon  them.  They  had  been  led  into 
sanctioning  the  plan,  however,  on  the  receipt  of  Jacobi's  first 
dispatches,  which  made  it  appear  that  the  declaration  proposed 
by  the  two  envoys  awaited  only  the  King  of  Hungary's  approval 
to  be  sent  off  at  once  to  St.  Petersburg.  When  more  correctly 
informed  on  that  point,  they  did  not  spare  hints  to  Reuss  that 
they  would  much  prefer  not  to  take  this  step  at  present,  although 
constantly  repeating  that  they  would  abide  by  the  decisions  of 
their  ally.  They  probably  breathed  a  sigh  of  relief  when  the  draft 
prepared  by  Kaunitz  reached  Berlin;  for  the  Chancellor  had 
moderated  the  language  and  eliminated  every  suggestion  of 
coercion  exactly  as  they  would  have  desired.  Frederick  William 
and  his  ministers  approved  it  therefore,  because  it  ■  contained 
absolutely  nothing  contrary  to  their  interests  and  intentions,' 
without  attaching  any  great  hopes  to  it,  as  Kaunitz  had  done.  In 
transmitting  it  to  Goltz,  they  took  care  to  emphasize  that  this 
was  really  the  handiwork  of  the  Viennese  cabinet,  and  not  theirs; 
and  the  envoy  was  instructed  not  to  thrust  himself-  unduly  for- 
ward in  conducting  this  affair.1 

On  receiving  their  dispatches,  neither  Cobenzl  nor  his  colleague 
quite  knew  what  to  do  with  the  declaration.     It  provided  for  a 

170;  Kaunitz  to  the  King,  May  30,  to  Reuss  and  L.  Cobenzl,  June  21,  the 
Austrian  draft  of  the  declaration  and  convention,  and  the  Jacobi-Haugwitz  draft, 
Vivcnot,  ii,  pp.  67  f.,  99-103,  105  ff.  In  his  letter  to  the  King  of  May  30, 
Kaunitz  vehemently  accused  Spielmann  of  advising  their  sovereign  against  the 
plan  simply  because  it  was  not  his  own  idea.  On  June  5  the  Referendary 
replied  (V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1792),  calling  the  King  to  witness  that  he  had  never  spoken 
a  word  about  it  to  him  either  pro  or  contra,  and  adding  that  he  had  himself  dictated 
the  draft  of  the  declaration  word  for  word  to  Jacobi  and  Haugwitz,  and  that  in  its 
present  form  he  thoroughly  approved  of  it.  It  follows  from  this  that  Spielmann, 
although  he  had  received  the  original  propositions  of  the  Prussians  rather  coldly 
cannot  be  said  to  have  opposed  the  project,  as  Sybel  declares  {op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  213). 

1  Rescript  to  Jacobi  of  June  3,  and  to  Haugwitz,  June  7,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv. 
170;  Reuss  to  Kaunitz  and  to  Spielmann,  June  9,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte,  and 
Vortrage,  1792;  Schulenburg  and  Alvensleben  to  the  King,  June  27,  and  Frederick 
William's  reply  of  the  28th,  rescript  to  Goltz,  June  27,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


304  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

formal  convention,  and  yet  neither  minister  had  received  powers 
to  sign  such  an  act.  They  agreed  to  present  the  declaration 
jointly,  made  some  half-hearted  representations,  and  went  no 
further.  Each  regarded  the  other  with  dislike  and  suspicion; 
neither  wished  to  be  the  one  to  bell  the  cat.  Under  such  circum- 
stances their  '  joint  action  '  could  scarcely  be  very  effective. 

The  Russians  were  not  slow  to  size  up  the  situation.  Markov 
told  Goltz  that  his  Court  showed  too  much  deference  to  that  of 
Vienna.  Ostermann  remarked  to  Cobenzl  that  Austria  had  just 
given  a  very  great  proof  of  her  intimacy  with  Prussia.1  Playing 
off  the  one  German  Power  against  the  other  had  always  been 
Russia's  forte,  and  nothing  could  have  been  more  unwelcome  at 
St.  Petersburg  than  to  encounter  their  united  and  determined 
opposition.  Nothing  could  have  been  less  to  the  Empress'  taste 
than  a  formal,  permanent  concert  on  Polish  affairs,  or  the  admis- 
sion of  the  other  Powers  to  an  equal  share  in  guiding  and  control- 
ling the  Republic.  She  delayed  her  answer,  however,  for  many 
weeks,  until  the  complete  triumph  of  her  armies  had  removed  the 
chief  pretext  for  Austro-Prussian  intervention.  Then  in  a  note  (of 
August  25),  which  was  not  without  a  touch  of  irony,  she  thanked 
the  two  Courts  for  their  willingness  to  render  assistance  that  was 
no  longer  needed.  She  promised  to  employ  her  good  offices  to 
induce  the  Confederation  to  invoke  the  support  of  Austria  and 
Prussia  —  as  soon  as  that  body  had  become  more  firmly  estab- 
lished. She  politely  refused  the  proposed  convention  as  super- 
fluous, in  view  of  the  engagements  contained  in  the  treaties  of 
alliance  which  she  had  just  concluded  with  both  the  German 
Powers.  The  Russo-Prussian  treaty  did,  in  fact,  contain  a  pro- 
vision for  a  concert  of  the  three  Courts  to  settle  the  affairs  of 
Poland;  and  although  the  corresponding  stipulation  in  the 
Austro-Russian  one  made  no  mention  of  Prussia,  the  cabinet  of 
St.  Petersburg  professed  its  willingness  to  amend  that  article.2 

This  vague,  evasive,  and  almost  sarcastic  reply  would  prob- 
ably alone  have  sufficed  to  put  a  damper  upon  Kaunitz's  project. 

1  For  the  above:  Goltz's  report  of  July  27,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133;  Cobenzl's 
of  the  2 1  st,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1792. 

2  Cobenzl's  and  Goltz's  reports  of  August  28,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1792 
and  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  305 

But  by  this  time  the  German  Powers  themselves  had  lost  all  real 
interest  in  the  matter.  Another  plan  of  a  very  different  kind 
relating  to  Poland  was  already  in  full  negotiation  between  them. 
Hence  the  proposed  convention  was  relegated  to  the  archives. 
Nothing  more  was  heard  of  that  triple  Areopagus  which  was  to 
have  presided  over  the  destinies  of  the  Republic.  Thus  ended  the 
one  joint  effort  made  by  Austria  and  Prussia  to  check  the  Em- 
press' victorious  course,  and  to  prevent  her  from  recovering  her 
old  exclusive  control  in  Poland.  The  episode  illustrates  admira- 
bly the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  any  effective  common  action  on 
the  part  of  these  Powers  in  opposition  to  Catherine.  Each  Court 
was  far  too  eager  to  stand  high  in  her  favor  to  be  willing  to  adopt 
a  really  firm  attitude.  Each  was  reluctant  to  take  the  lead,  for 
fear  that  it  would  draw  all  the  blame  upon  itself.  Each  hung 
back,  while  trying  to  thrust  the  other  forward.  Each  was  mor- 
tally afraid  that  its  ally  would  outstrip  it  in  Catherine's  good 
graces.  Under  such  circumstances  the  Empress  could  go  her  way 
unimpeded. 

V 

How  little  the  two  German  Powers  thought  of  serious  opposi- 
tion to  Russia  is  shown  by  the  fact  that  in  this  summer  of  1792 
both  were  engaged  in  concluding  alliances  with  her.  It  has 
already  been  noted  that  by  the  Vienna  Convention  and  the 
Treaty  of  Berlin  Austria  and  Prussia  had  agreed  to  invite  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg  to  accede  to  their  new  union.  When  in 
April  the  two  monarchs  came  to  carry  out  this  promise,  the  forms 
adopted  in  both  letters  suggested  not  so  much  a  simple  accession 
to  the  existing  treaty,  as  the  establishment  of  similar  engagements 
between  the  Empress  and  the  King  of  Prussia.1     This  latter 

1  Francis  to  Catherine,  April  12,  1792  (Beer,  Leopold  II,  Franz  II,  und 
Catharina,  pp.  170  f.  In  Vivenot,  i,  p.  409,  dated  erroneously  as  "  ce  (7-8?) 
mars  "):  "  Sa  Majeste  Prussienne  se  dispose  ...  a  L'inviter  incessamment  a  des 
engagemens  analogues  a  ceux  dont  Je  Lui  fais  part  par  la  presente  "  [the  Treaty  of 
Berlin].  .  .  .  He  wishes  to  inform  her  of  "  les  ouvertures  que  le  Roi  de  Prusse  est 
a  la  veille  de  Lui  faire,"  and  adds:  "  je  ne  saurois  me  dispenser  de  Lui  temoigner 
en  meme  terns  la  satisfaction  infinie  que  je  ressentirois  en  Lui  voyant  adopter  les 
memes  principes."     This  is  vague  enough,  and  probably  designedly  so,  as  the 


306 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


method  was  quite  to  Catherine's  taste.  She  had  never  liked 
triple  alliances,  for  in  such  associations  one  might  be  outvoted. 
In  an  alliance  a  deux,  on  the  other  hand,  she  was  always  sure  to  be 
the  dominant  partner.  Hence  she  replied  to  the  Austrians  that 
certain  clauses  in  the  Treaty  of  Berlin  (especially  that  mentioning 
the  Infanta  of  Poland,  which  implied  a  recognition  of  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  Third  of  May)  prevented  her  from  acceding  to  it; 
but  that  she  was  confident  that  she  would  be  conforming  to  the 
intentions  of  His  Apostolic  Majesty  in  making  a  separate  treaty 
with  Prussia,  which  would  be  based  on  the  same  principles  as  the 
Austro-Prussian  one,  and  which  would  be  communicated  at 
Vienna  immediately  after  its  conclusion.1  In  the  meantime, 
although  its  term  had  not  expired,  she  offered  to  renew  her  alli- 
ance with  Austria  for  another  eight  years.2  To  the  Prussians,  on 
the  other  hand,  the  highly  welcome  reply  was  given  that  the 
Empress  was  willing  to  contract  directly  with  the  King  an  alli- 
ance based  on  the  former  treaties  between  the  two  Courts;  and 
that  she  preferred  this  procedure  as  characterizing  more  per- 
fectly the  return  of  both  parties  to  the  old  ideas  about  the  utility 
of  a  liaison  between  them.  Ostermann  remarked  significantly  to 
Goltz  that  it  would  be  much  better  for  them  to  unite  "  without 
admitting  certain  people  "  (i.  e.,  the  Austrians).3  Doubtless  this 
had  been  the  wish  of  the  Prussians  from  the  outset.4 

It  could  hardly  give  unalloyed  pleasure  at  Vienna  to  see  that 
Leopold's  loyalty  to  Russia  and  his  steadfast  refusal  to  enter  into 
any  connection  into  which  his  ancient  ally  could  not  be  invited, 

Austrians  were  far  from  eager  to  have  the  Empress  accede  to  the  alliance.  Freder- 
ick William  to  Catherine,  April  15,  1792:  "  Je  ne  balance  done  pas  de  L'inviter  a  y 
concourir  en  Lui  proposant  des  engagemens  defensifs  analogues  a  ceux  du  susdit 
Traite,"  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

1  Catherine  to  Francis,  May  2/13,  1792,  Beer,  op.  cit.,  pp.  175  f. 

2  Ostermann  to  Razumovski,  May  4/15,  M.  A.,  ABCrpia,  III,  52;  Cobenzl's 
report  of  May  19,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berkhte,  1792.  Heidrich  is  wrong  in  declaring 
{op.  cit.,  p.  207)  that  the  proposal  for  the  renewal  of  the  alliance  was  made  from 
the  Austrian  side,  and  that  the  Russians  "  wondered  at  the  strange  demand." 

3  Catherine  to  Frederick  William,  May  3/14,  Goltz's  report  of  May  17,  B.  A., 
R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

4  Cf.  Bischoffwerder's  overtures  to  Alopeus  of  the  previous  autumn.  Goltz  was 
highly  delighted  at  the  "adroit  manner  "  in  which  the  Empress  had  avoided  acced- 
ing directly  to  the  Austro-Prussian  treaty. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  307 

had  resulted  only  in  paving  the  way  for  a  separate  Russo-Prussian 
alliance.  There  was  a  certain  irony  in  the  fact  that  Austria,  who 
for  years  had  made  it  her  business  to  prevent  any  connection 
between  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin,  had  now  become  the  medium 
for  a  reunion  of  those  two  Courts.  The  Viennese  statesmen  were 
not  a  little  chagrined  at  the  role  they  had  been  obliged  to  play, 
and  not  a  little  disquieted  over  the  possible  results  of  the  rap- 
prochement which  they  had  sponsored.  At  any  rate,  there  was 
all  the  more  reason  to  tighten  their  own  connection  with  Russia. 
Cobenzl  was  at  once  provided  with  full  powers  to  renew  the  exist- 
ing alliance;  and  he  rushed  through  the  treaty  with  a  haste 
which  the  jealous  Goltz  found  positively  "indecent."  There  was, 
indeed,  no  occasion  for  delay,  since  it  was  merely  a  question  of 
renewing  the  engagements  of  1781,  with  a  very  few  slight  modi- 
fications. The  separate  article  which  concerned  Poland  con- 
tained the  mutual  guarantee  of  the  constitution  of  1773,  of  the 
'  fundamental  laws,'  and  of  the  boundaries  of  the  Republic  as 
fixed  at  the  time  of  the  Partition.  Austria  thereby  abandoned 
the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May  formally  and  completely. 
On  July  14,  1792,  the  Austro-Russian  treaty  was  signed.1 

The  negotiation  between  Russia  and  Prussia  was  not  quite  so 
simple  a  matter.  The  draft  of  a  treaty,  prepared  at  St.  Peters- 
burg on  the  basis  of  the  treaty  of  alliance  of  1769,  encountered 
some  objections  at  Berlin,  especially  the  clauses  relating  to 
Poland.    The  Russians  had  proposed  a  concert  of  the  two  Courts 

1  The  Empress'  decision  to  conclude  this  treaty  was  in  no  way  influenced  by 
the  Austrian  proposal  of  the  Bavarian-Polish  plan,  as  one  might  judge  from  Sybel's 
account  {op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  163).  Razumovski's  courier,  who  brought  this  proposal, 
reached  St.  Petersburg  three  days  after  the  treaty  was  signed. 

Heidrich  says  the  treaty  "  kennzeichnet  sich  gerade  durch  die  Geschwindigkeit 
seines  Abschlusses  gelegentlich  einer  Landpartie  von  Cobenzl  mit  Bezborodko  als 
vollig  bedeutungslos  "  {op.  cit.,  p.  207).  As  to  how  far  it  was  '  vollig  bedeutungslos,' 
a  word  will  be  said  in  the  text;  but  it  deserves  to  be  pointed  out  here:  (1)  that 
the  chief  reason  for  haste  lay  in  the  necessity  of  concluding  before  the  Imperial 
coronation  at  Frankfort,  so  as  to  avoid  the  usual  controversy  about  precedence 
between  the  two  Imperial  Majesties;  (2)  The  Landpartie  in  question  (which 
took  place  on  the  nth)  had  nothing  in  the  world  to  do  with  it,  as  the  whole  affair 
was  previously  settled  with  the  exception  of  a  couple  of  utterly  insignificant  points 
—  the  wording  of  one  phrase  and  the  question  of  naming  France  as  one  of  the  allies 
of  Austria  (Cobenzl's  report  of  July  21,  V,  A.), 


308  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  reestablish  the  ancient  order  of  things  in  the  Republic.  The 
Prussian  ministry  demanded  the  inclusion  of  Austria  in  the  con- 
cert, and  they  named  as  the  common  aims  the  reestablishment 
and  maintenance  of  the  Polish  government  on  approximately  the 
old  bases.  The  Russians  were  far  from  eager  to  take  Austria  into 
the  partnership,  as  they  were  opposed  on  principle  to  threefold 
ententes;  but  Goltz  stood  firm,  and  after  a  month  of  haggling, 
on  August  7,  1792,  the  treaty  was  signed  at  St.  Petersburg,  sub- 
stantially in  accordance  with  the  modifications  proposed  at 
Berlin.1 

While  it  has  sometimes  been  asserted,  it  seems  hardly  accurate 
to  say  that  by  this  treaty  Catherine  went  over  from  the  Austrian 
to  the  Prussian  system.  Undoubtedly  the  relations  between  the 
Imperial  Courts  were  no  longer  so  intimate  as  in  the  days  of 
Joseph  II;  Leopold's  independent  and  pacific  policy  had  aroused 
dislike  and  distrust  on  the  Neva;  and  since  his  death  the  reti- 
cence, the  delays,  the  reluctant  concessions,  and  "the  petty 
finasseries''''  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  often  produced  no  little 
irritation.  But  in  spite  of  all,  the  conviction  was  deeply  rooted  in 
Russian  minds  that  the  alliance  with  Austria  was  a  '  natural '  and 
a  necessary  system.  Moments  of  discontent  and  coolness  might 
occur,  but  these  would  be  only  passing  shadows.  The  renewal  of 
the  alliance  was  by  no  means  a  mere  hollow  formality.  Though 
its  immediate  object  was  to  allay  suspicions  at  Vienna  regarding 
the  Empress'  rapprochement  with  Prussia,  it  also  bore  witness  to 
the  abiding  belief  of  the  Russian  statesmen  in  the  permanent 
utility  of  the  older  connection,  and  to  their  resolution  to  wait 
patiently  until  the  Austrians  returned  to  a  sounder  appreciation 
of  their  true  interests.2 

The  Prussian  alliance,  on  the  other  hand,  owed  its  conclusion 
chiefly  to  the  exigencies  of  the  moment:  the  need  of  conciliating 
the  Court  of  Berlin  until  Polish  affairs  were  settled,  and  the  neces- 

1  Printed  in  Martens,  Traites  conclus  par  la  Russie,  vi,  pp.  148-158. 

2  For  the  above:  Bezborodko  to  the  Empress,  January  25/February  5,  1792, 
M.  A.,  Typiiia,  IX,  14;  Markov  to  Razumovski,  March  9/20,  April  10/21, 
October  9/15,  1792,  October,  1793,  P.  A.,  XV,  576.  Numerous  examples  of  the 
same  ideas  might  be  cited  from  the  Vorontsov  correspondence. 


THE  RUSSIAN  RECONQUEST  OF  POLAND  309 

sity  of  preventing  a  revival  of  the  Anglo-Prussian  league.1  The 
conviction  of  permanent  common  interests  which  formed  the 
strength  of  the  Austrian  system  was  lacking  here.2  The  best 
proof  of  this  is  the  fact  that  as  soon  as  the  Polish  question  seemed 
to  be  settled,  the  Prussian  alliance  lost  all  reality,  while  the  Aus- 
trian one  continued  with  growing  intimacy  down  to  the  time  of 
the  Empress'  death.  But  for  the  present  the  new  liaison  with 
the  Court  of  Berlin  was  of  the  greatest  value.  For  it  gave  Cather- 
ine a  comparatively  free  hand  in  Poland,  offered  her  the  chance  to 
mediate  between  Austria  and  Prussia  in  the  indemnity  ques- 
tion, and  afforded  the  desired  security  against  too  close  a  con- 
nection between  the  German  Powers. 

At  the  close  of  the  summer  the  Empress  held  a  truly  command- 
ing position.  She  had  brought  to  a  successful  conclusion  the 
Polish  enterprise  which  most  observers  had  believed  she  would 
never  dare  risk.  Whatever  the  moral  aspects  of  that  affair,  she 
had  achieved  a  spectacular  triumph  of  the  rarest  sort.  With 
Poland  at  her  feet,  with  both  the  German  Powers  attached  to  her 
by  alliances  and  competing  for  her  favor,  with  her  own  hands  free 
while  her  neighbors  were  just  undertaking  an  enormous,  an  im- 
possible task,  she  could  well  afford  to  sit  back  and  watch  events 
confidently  and  serenely.  "  My  part  is  sung,"  she  wrote  to 
Rumiantsov.  "  It  is  an  example  of  how  it  is  not  impossible  to 
attain  an  end  and  to  succeed  if  one  really  wills  it."  3 

1  Cf.  the  protocols  of  the  Council  of  the  Empire  of  April  22/May  3  and  May  31/ 
June  11,  1792,  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  912  ff.,  920  f. 

2  Cf.  Markov  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  January  17/28,  and  July  27/August  7,  1793, 
Apx.  Bop.,  xx,  pp.  34  ff.,  52.  Although  he  was  writing  to  a  man  of  strong  pro- 
Austrian  views,  Markov's  declarations  may  probably  be  accepted  at  their  face 
value,  as  they  were  abundantly  corroborated  by  the  later  course  of  Russian  policy. 

3  Letter  of  October  29/November  9,  1792,  PyccKaa  CrapiiHa,  lxxxi2,  p.  158. 


CHAPTER  XIII 

Austria  and  Prussia  Agree  upon  a  Partition 


That  the  upheaval  precipitated  by  Catherine's  violent  interven- 
tion in  Poland  would  end  with  a  new  partition  was,  in  the  opinion 
of  many  observers,  almost  a  foregone  conclusion  from  the  mo- 
ment the  Empress  began  her  enterprise.1  For  such  a  denouement 
the  situation  was  altogether  favorable.  The  close  union  of  the 
three  Eastern  Powers,  the  effacement  of  England,  the  assassina- 
tion of  the  restless  King  of  Sweden,  and  the  exhaustion  of  Turkey 
provided  a  political  constellation  of  the  most  auspicious  character. 
Recent  events  suggested  the  necessity  of  taking  drastic  measures 
to  check  the  alarming  recrudescence  of  Polish  vitality;  and  no 
measure  could  be  quite  so  effective  as  a  repetition  of  the  political- 
surgical  operation  performed  with  such  success  twenty  years 
before.  The  appetftes  of  the  Eastern  Powers,  which  throughout 
the  protracted  Oriental  crisis  had  been  constantly  whetted  but 
never  satisfied,  could  not  much  longer  be  restrained;  and  the 
principle  that  indemnities  must  be  found  somewhere  for  the  ex- 
penses of  the  French  war  supplied  a  convenient  pretext. 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  the  idea  of  taking  these  indem- 
nities in  Poland  was  discussed  at  Potsdam  as  early  as  February  of 
1792,  and  that  in  March  at  Vienna  there  was  talk  of  combining 
this  project  with  that  of  the  Bavarian  Exchange.  It  was  not  until 
May,  however,  that  these  plans  were  made  the  subject  of  a  nego- 
tiation.    The  initiative  was  taken  by  Prussia. 

From  the  12th  to  the  15  th  of  May  conferences  were  held  at 
Potsdam  between  the  King,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  Schulenburg, 
Bischoffwerder,  and  Reuss.     In  the  intimate  discussions  which 

1  Cf.  Cobenzl's  prophecies  to  the  Russians  in  January  and  March,  1792,  already 
cited;  the  warnings  addressed  by  the  British  government  to  Berlin  and  Vienna  in 
March,  Salomon,  Pitt,  ili,  p.  540;  the  forecast  of  Gustavus  III,  Odhner,  op.  cit., 
pp.  204  f. 

310 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  311 

then  took  place,  the  Prussian  plan  of  action  was  probably  decided 
upon;  *  at  any  rate,  immediately  afterward  the  first  fairly  defi- 
nite overtures  looking  to  a  partition  were  made  both  to  Russia  and 
to  Austria.  It  was,  of  course,  an  infinitely  delicate  subject  to  lead 
up  to;  and,  as  will  appear  in  the  sequel,  the  Prussians  went  about 
it  with  all  conceivable  caution. 

A  convenient  pretext  for  sounding  the  Russians  was  furnished 
by  a  dispatch  from  Goltz,  which  arrived  in  the  midst  of  the  dis- 
cussions at  Potsdam.  The  envoy  wrote  that  he  feared  the  Court 
of  St.  Petersburg  wished  to  combine  the  affairs  of  France  too 
much  with  those  of  Poland.  The  single  word  '  bon  '  scrawled  on 
the  dispatch  opposite  this  passage,  sufficiently  shows  that  Goltz's 
superiors  were  far  from  sharing  his  disquietude.2  Soon  after  his 
return  to  Berlin,  Schulenburg  hunted  up  Alopeus  and  confided  to 
him  that  he  heard  from  all  sides  that  the  Empress  wished  to  com- 
bine French  and  Polish  affairs;  he  personally  could  not  at  all 
understand  what  this  meant,  and  was  curious  to  be  informed. 
The  Russian  envoy,  unfortunately,  could  not  enlighten  him,  and 
Schulenburg  did  not  see  fit  to  speak  plainly.3 

Bischoffwerder,  however,  was  less  reserved.  Having  written 
from  Potsdam  to  request  an  interview,  he  met  Alopeus  on  the 
1 8th  at  Charlottenburg,  guided  the  conversation  to  the  subject  of 
Poland,  and  presently  threw  out  the  suggestion  that  in  order  to 
remove  all  occasions  for  controversy  between  the  three  Eastern 
Powers,  it  would  be  best  to  reduce  the  Republic  to  so  insignificant 
a  size  that  it  could  safely  be  left  free  to  choose  whatever  form  of 
government  it  pleased.  If  this  idea  were  once  adopted,  he  added, 
it  would  be  easy  enough  to  come  to  an  understanding;  and  the 
principal  role  in  directing  the  affair  would  naturally  be  reserved 

1  In  a  letter  to  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  of  May  6,  Schulenberg  mentioned  com- 
bining French  and  Polish  affairs,  and  promised  to  go  into  details  in  case  he  was 
summoned  to  the  conference  at  Potsdam.    B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  b. 

2  Goltz's  report  of  May  1,  received  the  14th,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133.  Cf. 
Appendix  XIII  (documents  illustrating  the  earliest  discussions  between  Russia 
and  Prussia  regarding  a  new  partition). 

3  Alopeus'  report  of  May  8/19,  M.  A.,  Ilpyccifl,  III,  29.  Goltz  was  also 
ordered  (May  17)  to  find  out  how  the  Russian  Court  thought  to  combine  two 
questions  between  which  the  Prussian  ministry  pretended  to  see  no  great  connec- 
tion.   B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


312  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

for  the  Empress.  Alopeus  reported  to  his  Court  that  he  had 
merely  listened  and  said  nothing.1  It  was  apparently  the  first 
time  that  a  Prussian  had  broached  the  topic  of  a  partition  to  him. 

A  week  or  so  later  Schulenburg  favored  the  Russian  envoy  with 
a  long  disquisition  on  the  subject  of  indemnities  for  the  French 
enterprise,  insisting  strongly  that  his  master  must  receive  com- 
pensation of  some  sort,  and  begging  for  a  communication  of  the 
Empress'  views  on  that  matter.2  Putting  together  these  various 
overtures,  the  Court  of  Petersburg  could  hardly  be  badly  at  a  loss 
to  divine  the  object  of  Prussia's  aspirations. 

While  thus  paving  the  way  for  a  future  understanding,  Freder- 
ick William  and  his  advisers  did  not  at  that  time  mean  to  go 
further  than  hints  with  Russia.  Their  purpose  was,  first  of  all,  to 
make  sure  of  Austria,  and  then  with  the  suport  of  their  ally  to 
drive  the  best  bargain  they  could  with  the  Empress. 

Schulenburg  proceeded  to  initiate  his  action  at  Vienna  with  one 
of  those  little  tricks  so  beloved  in  eighteenth  century  diplomacy: 
a  negotiation  behind  the  back  of  the  Austrian  Chancellor,  quite 
on  a  par  with  Leopold's  and  Kaunitz's  intrigues  with  BischorT- 
werder.  As  to  which  of  the  Viennese  ministers  to  approach  first, 
there  could  hardly  be  a  question.  The  one  among  them  who  was 
known  to  be  the  most  ardent  champion  of  the  Prussian  connec- 
tion, was  Spielmann.  Accordingly,  on  May  21  Schulenburg 
confided  to  Reuss  certain  ideas  on  which  he  desired  a  very  secret 
and  frank  exchange  of  opinions  with  the  State  Referendary.  In 
view  of  the  unexpected  and  high-handed  action  of  Russia  in 
Poland,  he  declared,  it  behooved  Austria  and  Prussia  to  consider 
measures  to  safeguard  their  own  interests  and  prestige.  If  the 
Empress  continued  to  conceal  her  real  intentions,  while  her 
armies  went  steadily  forward,  he  would  suggest  that  the  two 
Courts  should  send  corps  of  observation  across  the  frontier,  with- 
out declaring  themselves  for  or  against  anyone,  and  thus,  on  the 
pretext  of  providing  for  their  own  security,  establish  themselves 
in  Polish  territory.  Such  a  demonstration  would  probably  force 
Russia  at  last  to  reveal  her  true  aims.    From  many  indications  he 

1  Alopeus'  report  of  May  8/19.    M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  29. 

2  Alopeus'  report  of  May  17/28. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  313 

thought  it  likely  that  the  Empress  greatly  desired  to  appropriate 
the  Ukraine.  If  that  supposition  proved  correct,  it  might  facili- 
tate a  settlement  of  the  indemnity  question:  for  in  that  case 
Prussia,  too,  might  take  a  part  of  Poland,  while  Austria  found 
compensation  on  the  Rhine.  In  conclusion  he  begged  that  this 
plan  should  be  kept  in  the  utmost  secrecy  until  it  had  been  agreed 
upon  by  both  Courts,  and  until  the  moment  for  its  execution 
arrived.1 

On  receiving  this  momentous  overture,  Spielmann  seems  to 
have  had  little  hesitation  about  entering  into  the  project,  which 
fitted  in  well,  indeed,  with  ideas  that  he  had  had  in  mind  since 
March  or  even  January.  With  the  approval  of  King  Francis,  he 
replied  by  a  letter  to  Reuss,  in  which  he  declared  himself  agreed 
with  Schulenburg  on  the  main  principle.  If  Russia,  he  said, 
coveted  Polish  territory,  of  which,  however,  he  had  as  yet  seen 
no  indication,  she  could  doubtless  make  no  more  suitable  acqui- 
sition than  Courland  or  the  Ukraine.2  He  was  convinced  that 
the  Court  of  Berlin  could  nowhere  else  find  more  desirable  ag- 
grandizement than  in  Poland ;  and  Austria  would  assuredly  con- 
sent to  such  a  Prussian  acquisition  not  only  without  envy  or 
jealousy,  but  with  a  truly  friendly  readiness  to  assist  in  the 
matter.  But  it  could  never  suit  the  Court  of  Vienna,  he  protested, 
to  seek  its  indemnity  on  the  Rhine;  for  of  what  value  were 
remote  and  precarious  acquisitions,  which  could  be  retained  only 
by  immense  efforts,  and  which  would  expose  their  possessor  to 
the  odium  of  having  been  the  only  Power  to  take  part  in  a  dis- 
memberment of  France  ?  Moreover,  to  seek  compensation 
through  conquests  in  the  west  would  involve  prolonging  the  war 
beyond  the  present  year  —  and  the  allies  hoped  to  finish  the 
struggle  within  that  time  —  or  else  altering  the  whole  plan  of 
campaign.  He  was  therefore  of  the  opinion  that  the  only  means 
of  realizing  Schulenburg's  ideas  would  be  a  plan  based  on  the 

1  Reuss  to  Spielmann,  May  22,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  55  f.  This  highly  important 
correspondence  was  first  published  by  Adolf  Beer  in  the  Historische  Zeilschrift,  xxvii 
(1872),  and  then  more  fully  by  Vivenot. 

2  Schulenburg  had  not  mentioned  Courland.  Probably  Spielmann  threw  out 
the  suggestion  in  the  hope  of  transferring  the  Russian  acquisition  from  the  south 
to  the  north  —  away  from  the  frontiers  of  Austria  and  towards  those  of  Prussia. 


314  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

exchange  of  the  Austrian  Netherlands  for  Bavaria  and  the  Upper 
Palatinate.  He  knew  very  well,  he  said,  what  an  anathema  had 
been  laid  on  this  project  at  Berlin  during  Hertzberg's  ministry; 
but  he  believed  that  the  circumstances  and  the  relations  between 
the  two  Courts  had  now  changed  so  entirely  that,  with  a  minister 
of  Schulenburg's  insight  and  high-mindedness,  a  few  hours'  con- 
versation would  suffice  to  bring  about  a  perfect  agreement.  As 
for  the  means  proposed  by  Schulenburg  for  executing  his  plan, 
Spielmann  objected  with  much  reason  that  anything  which  con- 
veyed the  least  suggestion  of  coercion  produced  on  the  Empress 
of  Russia  an  effect  exactly  contrary  to  that  which  was  desired. 
Instead  of  an  armed  demonstration  in  Poland,  he  proposed  that 
after  the  two  Courts  had  come  to  an  agreement  among  them- 
selves, they  should  at  once  lay  their  plan  frankly  before  the  Em- 
press with  the  assurance  that  they  were  willing  to  consent  to 
whatever  she  might  demand  for  herself.  The  fact  that  she  seemed 
inclined  to  cooperate  in  the  French  enterprise  made  it  probable 
that  she  would  readily  agree  to  this  method  of  indemnifica- 
tion.1 

Schulenburg  professed  to  be,  and  doubtless  was,  delighted  with 
this  reply.  Never,  he  told  Reuss,  had  ministers  of  two  Courts 
acted  towards  each  other  with  such  sincerity  as  he  and  Baron 
Spielmann.  He  readily  gave  his  assent  to  the  modifications  of  his 
original  proposals  which  Spielmann  had  suggested.  He  agreed 
as  to  the  inadvisability  of  a  military  demonstration  in  Poland, 
although  he  was  thereby  renouncing  for  his  Court  the  prospect 
of  taking  immediate  possession  of  its  proposed  acquisition.  He 
not  only  accepted  the  Bavarian  Exchange  plan,  but  declared  that 
he  had  all  along  shared  Spielmann's  ideas  on  that  subject 2 
(although  this  involved  the  sacrifice  of  one  of  the  most  sacred 
of  the  traditions  handed  down  from  Frederick  the  Great).  In- 
vited by  Spielmann  to  indicate  the  precise  acquisition  that  would 
suit  his  Court,  Schulenburg  could  only  point  to  the  Polish  district 
that  separated  Silesia  from  East  Prussia,  adding  that  its  size  must 

1  Letter  of  May  29,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  63-67. 

2  This  was  doubtless  true,  for  Schulenburg  could  hardly  have  remained  ignorant 
of  Bischoffwerder's  discussions  at  Vienna  on  that  topic. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  315 

depend  on  the  lot  claimed  by  Russia  and  could  not  be  definitely- 
fixed  in  advance.1 

A  few  days  later,  on  the  King's  return  from  Pomerania,  the 
Prussian  minister  reported  that  his  sovereign  agreed  to  the  Ba- 
varian Exchange  and  offered  to  use  his  good  offices  with  both  the 
Elector  and  his  heir,  the  Duke  of  Zweibrucken;  that  he  could  not, 
indeed,  think  of  resorting  to  coercion  in  order  to  secure  the  assent 
of  those  princes,  in  view  of  a  promise  he  had  once  made;  but 
that  he  flattered  himself  that  the  King  of  Hungary  would  not 
expect  such  extreme  measures  of  him.  As  both  monarchs  had 
now  given  their  consent  to  the  combined  Bavarian-Polish  plan, 
Schulenburg  requested  that  the  affair  should  at  once  be  brought 
into  the  regular  ministerial  channel,  in  order  to  take  advantage 
of  the  pending  negotiations  with  Russia.2 

Spielmann,  who  received  Reuss'  last  two  letters  only  on  June  18 
while  at  Buda,  replied  with  assurances  that  nothing  was  more 
justified  than  the  King's  aversion  to  coercive  measures  against 
the  Duke  of  Zweibrucken;  he  was  convinced  that  there  would 
be  no  need  of  them.  He  was  overflowing  with  joy  at  the  happy 
course  the  negotiation  had  taken,  and  at  the  confidence  shown 
by  Schulenburg  in  him  personally.  He  did  not  doubt,  he  added, 
that  all  the  details  of  the  plan  could  be  satisfactorily  arranged  at 
the  approaching  meeting  of  the  two  sovereigns.3 

II 

The  first  step  in  bringing  the  affair  into  the  regular  minis- 
terial channel  was  to  reveal  the  secret  to  Kaunitz.  This  Spiel- 
mann and  the  King  proceeded  to  do  by  letters  written  shortly 
before  their  return  from  Buda.  To  the  old  Chancellor,  already 
jealous  of  his  subordinate,4  this  negotiation,  carried  on  with  the 
approval  of  the  monarch  behind  his  back,  was  a  staggering  blow. 
In  his  reply  of  June  25  he  poured  out  his  wounded  feelings  in 

1  Reuss  to  Spielmann,  June  4,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  80  ff. 

2  Reuss  to  Spielmann,  June  9,  ibid.,  pp.  89  IT. 

3  Spielmann  to  Reuss,  June  22,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  no  f. 

4  Zinzendorf's  Diary,  June  6:  "  Le  vieux  [Kaunitz]  s'est  brouille'  avec  Spiel- 
mann. ...    II  a  pense  a.  faire  sauter  Spielmann."     (V.  A.) 


3i6 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


terms  that  few  ministers  would  have  dared  address  to  their 
sovereigns.  He  found  the  plan  which  the  King  had  sanctioned, 
"  a  chimera,"  an  insult  to  the  Austrian  Court,  utterly  unjustifiable 
—  at  least  in  so  far  as  it  concerned  Poland,  —  and  contrary  to  all 
existing  treaties  and  engagements.  He  doubted  very  strongly 
whether  the  Bavarian  House  would  ever  give  its  consent;  and  he 
was  almost  sure  that  the  Maritime  Powers  would  oppose;  and 
they  would  be  right  in  doing  so.  At  any  rate,  the  Austrian 
indemnity  would  be  left  dependent  on  a  long  and  uncertain 
negotiation,  while  Prussia  could  at  any  moment  take  possession 
of  her  share.  What  security  was  there  that  the  Imperial  Court, 
after  being  inveigled  into  assenting  to  the  gains  of  its  allies,  would 
not  come  forth  empty-handed  ?  What  reliance  could  be  placed  on 
the  proffered  good  offices  of  Prussia  with  the  Elector  and  his 
heir  ?  It  was  obvious  that  although  the  Court  of  Berlin  had  no 
scruples  about  robbing  the  allied  Republic  of  Poland,  it  still 
objected  to  using  sufficiently  earnest  language  to  secure  the  con- 
sent of  those  princes.  "I  see  then  in  this  whole  policy,"  the 
Chancellor  wrote,  "  nothing  but  covetousness,  and  principles 
which  can  inspire  little  confidence  in  future  times  and  which 
therefore  promise  little  good.  Such  a  political  morality  is  not 
in  accordance  with  my  principles,  and  should  .  .  .  never  be  ac- 
cepted by  a  great  Power  which  respects  itself,  and  recognizes  the 
value  of  its  good  name.  .  .  .  From  evil  no  good  can  ever  result; 
it  is  therefore  .  .  .  my  only  wish  and  my  only  hope  that  nothing 
can  and  will  come  of  this."  * 

However  much  personal  feelings  may  have  influenced  Kaunitz's 
reply  and  whatever  may  be  thought  of  his  right  to  plume  himself 
on  his  exalted  political  morality,  it  must  be  admitted  that  his 
objections  and  warnings  were  only  too  well  grounded.  On  the 
other  hand,  it  is  difficult  to  blame  Spielmann  unreservedly.  An 
indemnity  had  to  be  found  for  Prussia  somewhere,  and  in  that 
case  Austria  could  not  afford  to  dispense  with  an  equivalent 
advantage.  To  seek  compensation  at  the  cost  of  France  involved 
prolonging  the  war  indefinitely,  covering  the  two  Courts  with 

1  The  King  to  Kaunitz,  June  21,  the  Chancellor's  reply  of  the  25th,  and  his 
appended  "  Reflections,"  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  107  f.,  114  f. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  317 

odium,  and  raising  an  insurmountable  barrier  to  the  restoration 
of  Louis  XVI.  To  refuse  Prussia  the  so  ardently  desired  acquisi- 
tion in  Poland  meant  to  loosen  the  alliance  and  to  drive  the  Court 
of  Berlin  into  the  arms  of  Russia.  On  the  other  hand,  by  consent- 
ing, Austria  could  gain  what  seemed  a  unique  chance  to  realize 
that  exchange  project  which  had  been  pursued  with  such  efforts 
for  almost  a  century;  she  might  secure  what  was  doubtless  the 
most  valuable  acquisition  the  Hapsburg  Monarchy  could  make, 
while  at  the  same  time  getting  rid  of  distant  possessions  which 
exposed  the  state  to  ceaseless  trouble  and  to  a  galling  dependence 
on  foreign  Powers.  The  success  of  the  plan  depended,  indeed,  on 
the  consent  of  a  prince  who  had  hitherto  shown  himself  strongly 
opposed  to  the  Exchange  —  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken;  but  it 
may  well  have  seemed  that  he  could  no  longer  refuse  when 
Prussia,  hitherto  his  chief  support,  urged  his  acceptance.  On  the 
Elector's  consent  Spielmann  might  fairly  count,  both  because  of 
his  previous  attitude  and  in  view  of  his  overtures  to  Lehrbach  in 
March.  Undoubtedly  the  war  introduced  a  great  element  of 
uncertainty  into  the  calculation;  but  one  must  remember  the 
exaggerated  reports  then  universally  current  about  the  disorgani- 
zation and  impotence  of  France,  and  the  general  belief  in  the 
speedy  triumph  of  the  allied  arms.  Spielmann's  course  is,  then, 
intelligible  enough.  And  yet  none  of  his  hopes  were  to  be  realized ; 
all  of  Kaunitz's  prophecies  were  to  be  fulfilled. 

The  Chancellor's  objections  produced  no  change  in  the  King's 
resolutions.  The  only  result  was  a  severe  tension  in  the  relations 
between  monarch  and  minister.  It  was  widely  noted  at  Vienna 
that  at  his  departure  for  the  Imperial  coronation  at  Frankfort, 
the  young  King  failed  to  pay  Kaunitz  the  customary  visit. 
Malicious  tongues  had  it  that  the  attention  had  been  omitted  for 
prudential  reasons :  the  old  man  had  proposed  to  teach  his  sover- 
eign a  salutary  lesson.1  In  his  note  of  June  25  the  Chancellor  had 
begged  the  King,  if  he  adhered  to  the  Schulenburg-Spielmann 
plan,  to  excuse  him  from  taking  part  in  the  affair,  '  in  order  that 
he  might  not  be  obliged,  against  his  own  conviction,  to  end  his 
ministry  by  such  a  step.'    On  this  point  he  was  gratified,  for  not 

1  Zinzendorf's  Diary,  July  6  (V.  A.). 


3  l8  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

only  the  negotiation  over  the  indemnities,  but  all  important  busi- 
ness henceforth  passed  through  other  hands.  In  August  the  old 
man  insisted  on  resigning  his  functions  altogether.  It  was  vir- 
tually the  end  of  Kaunitz's  long  and  honorable  career. 


Ill 

Almost  immediately  after  the  return  of  the  King  and  Spielmann 
from  Buda  an  opportunity  presented  itself  for  entering  into 
negotiations  with  Russia  concerning  the  new  plan.  Razumovski, 
the  Empress'  ambassador,  saw  fit  to  force  a  confidential  dis- 
closure of  the  secret.  In  a  familiar  conversation  with  Cobenzl 
(June  30),  he  took  occasion  to  dwell  at  length  on  his  sovereign's 
invariable  attachment  to  the  alliance  and  on  her  great  interest  in 
the  prosperity  of  the  House  of  Austria,  and  thus  led  up  to  the  sug- 
gestion that  this  might,  perhaps,  be  the  most  favorable  moment 
to  effect  the  Bavarian  Exchange  plan,  to  which  the  Empress  had 
formerly  lent  so  willing  a  support.  Cobenzl  objected  that  even 
now  the  Court  of  Berlin  would  not  fail  to  oppose,  unless  it  received 
a  corresponding  advantage.  Razumovski  pointed  to  Dantzic  and 
Thorn.  The  Empress,  he  said,  had  formerly  opposed  Prussian 
aggrandizement  in  that  quarter  solely  out  of  regard  for  Austria. 
"  But  do  you  think,"  said  Cobenzl,  "  that  to-day,  if  we  found  such 
a  plan  to  our  advantage,  the  Empress  would  consent  to  it  without 
desiring  any  acquisition  for  herself?"  "Oh  no!"  said  the 
Russian,  "  I  think  that  in  that  case  she,  too,  would  wish  to  get 
something."  "  But,"  replied  the  Austrian,  "  what  is  there  that 
would  suit  her  ?  She  can  make  acquisitions  of  value  to  Russia 
only  in  Poland."  "  Precisely  in  Poland,"  said  Razumovski;  "  the 
acquisition  of  the  Ukraine  would  be  very  useful  to  us."  "  Yes, 
the  Ukraine  or  Courland,"  said  Cobenzl,  throwing  out  the  same 
idea  that  Spielmann  had  advanced  to  Schulenburg.  The  ambas- 
sador considered,  however,  that  the  annexation  of  Courland 
would  be  of  no  value  to  his  Court,  since  that  Duchy  was  already 
totally  dependent  on  Russia;  an  advantageous  acquisition  could 
be  found  only  in  the  Ukraine.  As  for  the  pretext,  he  was  sure 
there  would  be  no  difficulty;  there  were  plenty  of  available  titles 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  319 

in  the  archives.  Cobenzl  then  hazarded  a  suggestion  that  showed 
the  persistence  of  the  ideas  of  Leopold.  The  Poles,  he  said,  were 
so  infatuated  with  their  new  constitution  that  they  might,  per- 
haps, consent  to  territorial  sacrifices,  in  order  to  obtain  its  con- 
firmation from  the  neighboring  Powers.  Razumovski  replied, 
however,  that  after  restoring  the  old  regime,  the  Powers  could 
easily  obtain  the  desired  cessions  from  the  well-disposed  party. 
That  day  the  conversation  went  no  further.  Both  diplomats  had 
been  profuse  in  compliments;  Razumovski  had  amused  his  friend 
by  building  air-castles;  it  was  apparently  only  harmless  specula- 
tion. 

Cobenzl  hastened,  however,  to  inform  the  King  and  Spielmann. 
The  next  day,  at  the  close  of  the  Sunday  audience  of  the  ambas- 
sadors, he  drew  Razumovski  aside  and  confided  to  him  that  he 
had  penetrated  their  secret,  or  rather  that  there  could  be  no 
secrets  between  such  allies.  With  the  King's  authorization  he 
then  set  forth  the  whole  plan  for  the  Bavarian  Exchange  and  the 
Prussian  acquisition  in  Poland,  though  without  mentioning  the 
fact  that  negotiations  on  this  subject  had  already  been  opened 
with  Prussia.  It  is  strange  that  with  all  his  assurances  that  the 
project  would  be  left  entirely  to  the  good  pleasure  of  the  Em- 
press, he  failed  to  suggest  that  she,  also,  should  share  in  the  spoils. 
Razumovski  protested  profusely  about  his  sovereign's  inclination 
to  anything  that  promised  advantages  to  her  allies;  but  he  felt 
bound  to  intimate  that  her  interests  must  also  be  provided  for. 
Immediately  afterward  Spielmann  confirmed  to  the  ambassador 
all  that  Cobenzl  had  said.  It  was  thereupon  agreed  that  Razu- 
movski should  send  off  a  courier  to  St.  Petersburg  with  a  dis- 
patch of  his  own,  and  one  to  Louis  Cobenzl.1 

The  instruction  drawn  up  by  the  Vice-Chancellor  for  his" 
cousin  2  is  interesting,  as  showing  how  recent  events,  especially 
those  of  the  Oriental  crisis,  had  convinced  Austrian  statesmen  of 
the  impossibility  in  the  long  run  of  defending  Poland's  integrity 
against  Prussia.     It   also   reveals   a   curious   attitude   towards 

1  On  the  above  see  Appendix  XIV,  where  the  text  of  Razumovski's  report  of 
his  discussions  with  Cobenzl  is  printed. 

2  Dispatch  of  July  2,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  i2off. 


320  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Russia.  The  Empress,  Cobenzl  wrote,  could  not  justly  demand 
an  acquisition,  since  the  whole  burden  of  the  French  war  was 
borne  by  Austria  and  Prussia,  and  since  all  the  advantages 
gained  through  the  alliance  of  the  Imperial  Courts  had  hitherto 
fallen  to  Russia.  He  thought  that  if  the  Court  of  Petersburg 
consented  to  the  indemnities  demanded  by  the  German  Powers 
for  themselves,  they  might  in  return  offer  to  excuse  it  from  all 
cooperation  in  the  war  with  France,  and  to  assist  it  in  the  com- 
plete restoration  of  the  old  regime  in  Poland.  But  if,  in  spite  of 
all,  the  Russians  manifested  a  very  strong  desire  to  make  acquisi- 
tions, the  ambassador  was  ordered  not  to  contest  the  claim 
directly,  nor  to  show  any  open  signs  of  disinclination  to  such  a 
demand.  The  Vice-Chancellor  added  that  the  whole  plan  was 
only  a  new  idea,  about  which  he  desired  to  learn  the  Empress' 
opinion.  Much  more  precise  instructions  would  be  sent  to  St. 
Petersburg  after  the  meeting  of  the  Emperor-elect  and  the  King 
of  Prussia.  Unsettled  as  the  plan  might  be  at  that  time,  one  can- 
not repress  a  gasp  of  astonishment  that  an  experienced  Austrian 
statesman  could  have  imagined  for  a  moment  that  the  Empress 
would  renounce  a  share  in  the  general  distribution  of  indemni- 
ties. One  sees  again  that  the  Viennese  ministers  were  by  no 
means  eager  to  have  the  Russian  eagles  approach  the  frontiers  of 
Galicia. 

IV 

It  is  uncertain  whether  Razumovski,  in  making  his  far-reaching 
suggestions  to  the  Austrians,  was  acting  in  accordance  with 
directions  from  St.  Petersburg.  There  are  no  instructions  on  this 
subject  among  Ostermann's  dispatches  to  him  of  this  period;  and 
in  his  report  to  Bezborodko  the  ambassador  expressed  the  hope 
that  his  step  would  not  be  disapproved,  since  he  had  sought  only 
to  verify  a  suspicion  which  he  had  long  felt,  that  the  Court  of 
Vienna  desired  to  revive  the  Exchange  project.  The  realization 
of  the  plan  depended  solely  on  the  Empress,  he  added;  it  could  be 
arrested  by  a  single  word  from  her,  in  case  it  did  not  conform  to 
her  views.  In  spite  of  this  apology,  however,  it  is  difficult  to 
suppose  that  he  would  have  ventured  to  go  so  far  without  at 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  321 

least  a  hint  from  some  of  the  persons  in  power  at  St.  Petersburg, 
presumably  from  Zubov  or  Markov.  The  suspicion  that  Russian 
diplomacy  was  at  work  at  this  moment  pulling  the  most  secret 
wires  in  order  to  bring  a  partition  upon  the  order  of  the  day,  is 
strengthened  by  the  fact  that,  almost  simultaneously  with 
Razumovski's  strange  performance,  his  government  took  the 
initiative  in  provoking  very  similar  explanations  from  the  Court 
of  Berlin. 

Schulenburg's  advances  to  Alopeus  on  the  subject  of  indemni- 
ties served  as  the  point  of  departure.  The  Russians  must  have 
been  highly  gratified  by  those  overtures,  both  because  they  thus 
obtained  a  chance  to  take  a  hand  in  a  matter  in  which  they  were 
keenly  interested,  and  because  they  probably  desired  to  give  the 
indemnity  question  a  turn  adapted  to  their  own  special  views. 
As  a  participant  in  the  French  enterprise  (by  paying  subsidies), 
and  still  more  as  being  accustomed  to  take  the  leading  role  in  all 
great  affairs,  the  Empress  could  not  look  on  indifferently  while 
her  neighbors  collected  war  indemnities  or  annexed  provinces. 
Nothing  could  be  more  vexatious  to  her  than  to  have  Austria  and 
Prussia  arranging  everything  between  themselves,  instead  of 
referring  humbly  to  the  grand  court  of  arbitration  at  St.  Peters- 
burg. She  would  not  have  been  Catherine  II,  had  she  not  tried 
to  get  the  indemnity  question  into  her  own  hands,  so  that  in  the 
end  she  might  appear  on  the  stage  to  award  the  prizes,  while 
incidentally  appropriating  the  largest  for  herself.  Now  it  was 
clearly  not  to  her  interest  that  the  indemnities  should  take  the 
form  of  conquests  from  France,  for  in  that  quarter  there  were  no  '' 
particularly  desirable  acquisitions  to  be  found  for  Russia.  It  is 
not  improbable  that  the  idea  may  very  early  have  been  adopted 
at  St.  Petersburg,  as  at  Berlin,  of  allowing  Poland  to  pay  the 
costs.1   That  would  be  far  more  convenient  for  Russia  and  Prussia, 

1  In  Cobenzl's  report  of  June  n,  1791,  relating  Ostermann's  first  overtures 
to  him  about  an  intervention  in  France,  there  is  an  enigmatic  but  suggestive  pas- 
sage. Ostermann  said  that  the  Empress  desired  an  understanding  with  Austria  on 
the  French  question  "  d'autant  plus  qu'il  ne  seroit  peutetre  pas  impossible  de  lier 
ces  affaires-la  avec  celles  qui  occupoient  d'ailleurs  les  deux  Cours  Imp£riales."  At 
a  time  when  the  Oriental  crisis  was  practically  past,  and  the  revolution  of  the 
Third  of  May  was  very  fresh  in  the  minds  of  the  Russians,  the  "  affairs  which 


d 

\/li 


322  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

and  Austria  could  doubtless  be  provided  for  somewhere.  By 
June  of  1792,  the  Empress  must  have  been  sufficiently  well  aware 
that  this  idea  corresponded  to  the  wishes  of  the  German  Powers. 
Since  Razumovski's  report  of  March  and  Alopeus'  of  May,  she 
could  hardly  have  been  in  doubt  as  to  the  direction  in  which  the 
ambitions  of  Austria  and  Prussia  would  turn.1  In  view  of  all 
this,  Ostermann's  reply  to  the  above-mentioned  overtures  of 
Schulenburg  is  highly  significant. 

In  his  dispatches  to  Alopeus  of  June  10/21,  the  Vice-Chancellor 
eclared  that  the  Empress  entirely  approved  of  Frederick  Wil- 
liam's claim  for  compensation,  and  would  hasten  to  lend  her 
support,  if  it  were  needed,  as  soon  as  she  was  informed  of  the 
nature  and  form  of  the  projected  indemnities.  She  expected  that 
a  similar  demand  for  compensation  would  probably  be  raised  by 
the  other  Courts  cooperating  in  the  French  enterprise  (i.  e., 
Austria,  Sardinia,  and  Russia) .  She  felt  obliged,  however,  to  urge 
upon  the  King's  consideration  that  if  France,  weakened  and  ex- 
hausted by  anarchy,  were  now  to  be  subjected  to  a  dismember- 
ment, as  well  as  burdened  with  a  form  of  government  that  would 
never  allow  the  country  to  recover  its  strength  (i.  e.,  a  constitu- 
tional government,  instead  of  the  absolute  monarchy  which  she 
had  vainly  advised  the  allies  to  restore),  this  state  would  dis- 
appear completely  from  the  political  balance  of  Europe.  She  left 
it  to  the  King  to  decide  whether  that  would  be  to  the  general 
advantage.  —  The  inference  from  this  is  obvious.  If,  as  Oster- 
mann  plainly  hinted,  the  indemnities  were  not  to  be  taken  in 
France,  there  was  practically  only  one  other  place  in  which  to 
seek  them.  There  was  only  one  quarter  in  which  the  Empress' 
proffered  aid  in  securing  acquisitions  for  Prussia  could  be  needed 
or  could  be  of  value.  Catherine  was  virtually  inviting  the  King 
to  confide  to  her  how  much  of  Poland  she  could  help  him  to 

occupied  the  Imperial  Courts  elsewhere,"  and  which  were  to  be  combined  with  the 
French  enterprise,  could  hardly  have  been  other  than  those  of  Poland  (V.  A., 
Russland,  Berichte,  1791). 

1  Cf.  Schulenburg  to  Frederick  William,  June  30:  "  Apres  les  insinuations  in- 
directes  qui  lui  ont  6te  faites,  elle  [Russia]  ne  peut  ignorer  le  fonds  de  Ses  [the 
King's]  idees  a  cet  egard  "  [a  partition  of  Poland],  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  323 

appropriate.  Anything  less  than  that  these  '  ostensible  '  dis- 
patches could  scarcely  have  meant.  This  was  also  the  sense  in 
which  they  were  understood  by  the  Prussian  ministry,  whose  joy 
can  easily  be  imagined.1 

Only  a  few  days  before,  in  reply  to  a  note  in  which  the  King 
had  impatiently  inquired  what  was  to  be  done  to  bring  "  the 
principal  aim"  (the  Polish  acquisition)  to  the  front,  Schulenburg 
had  urged  that  it  was  still  advisable  to  await  further  advances 
from  Russia,  since  if  they  (the  Prussians)  announced  their  desires 
openly,  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  might  betray  everything  to 
the  Poles  in  order  to  win  the  whole  nation  to  its  side.2  The 
furthest  he  had  yet  dared  to  go,  was  to  tell  the  Prince  of  Nassau, 
Catherine's  agent  in  French  affairs,  who  was  then  in  Berlin,  that 
France  had  no  money,  and  yet  that  an  indemnity  in  money  was 
the  only  suitable  compensation  that  Russia  and  Prussia  could 
find  "in  that  quarter."  As  usual,  the  irresponsible  Bischoffwerder 
did  not  stop  there,  but  proceeded  to  confide  to  Nassau  the  entire 
plan  for  the  Bavarian  Exchange  and  the  Prussian  acquisition  in 
Poland  —  in  the  certain  knowledge  that  it  would  be  reported 
straight  to  the  Empress.3 

A  few  days  later  (July  1)  Alopeus  presented  the  thrice  welcome 
dispatches  of  June  21  regarding  the  indemnities.  Soon  after  the 
Russian  envoy  sought  out  Schulenburg  with  the  direct  intention 
of  provoking  a  confidence,  precisely  as  Razumovski  had  done. 

1  Ostermann  to  Alopeus,  June  10/21,  M.  A.,  Upyccia,  III,  28:  Schulen- 
burg to  the  King,  July  1,  Schulenburg  and  Alvensleben  to  the  King,  July  3,  Fred- 
erick William's  reply  of  July  4,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  G.  I  am  strongly  tempted 
to  see  a  connection  between  these  Russian  advances  to  Prussia  and  Razumovski 's 
simultaneous  manoeuvres  with  the  Austrians.  Alopeus'  reports  of  May  8/19  and 
17/28  must  have  reached  St.  Petersburg  not  later  than  June  10  or  1 2.  They  brought 
pretty  full  indications  as  to  the  designs  of  Prussia  and  provoked  the  decisive  action 
which  Russia  then  undertook  at  Berlin.  It  seems  not  improbable  that  the  courier 
who  left  St.  Petersburg  for  Vienna  on  June  16,  may  have  carried  secret  and  private 
directions  to  Razumovski  to  draw  out  the  Austrians  on  the  same  subject. 

2  Frederick  William  to  Schulenburg,  June  28,  the  minister's  reply  of  the  30th, 
B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  G. 

3  Alopeus'  report  of  June  19/30,  Nassau  to  the  Empress,  July  11,  both  referring 
to  Nassau's  conversation  of  the  29th  of  June  with  Schulenburg  and  Bischoffwerder, 
M.  A.,  Ilpyccifl,  III,  29,  and  {ibid.)  France,  IX,  Princes  el  Emigres,  1792. 


324  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Schulenburg  resisted  temptation  no  better  than  the  Austrians. 
Encouraged  by  Ostermann's  so  favorable  response,  he  revealed 
the  whole  Bavarian-Polish  plan,  including  the  acquisition  of  the 
Ukraine  for  Russia,  pretending,  indeed,  not  to  know  his  master's 
views  on  the  subject,  but  announcing  that  he  meant  to  ascertain 
them  at  once.1  On  July  5  he  reported  that,  as  a  result  of  the 
recent  friendly  overtures  of  the  Empress,  the  King  would  now 
enter  into  definite  negotiations  with  the  Court  of  Vienna  on  the 
indemnity  question,  and  would  inform  her  of  the  results  with  all 
loyalty  and  frankness.2  In  order  to  open  the  way  to  negotiations 
at  St.  Petersburg,  Goltz  was  next  initiated  into  the  secret,  and 
provided  with  a  memorandum,  in  which  the  various  possible 
kinds  of  indemnity  were  discussed  and  it  was  urged  that  the 
Bavarian-Polish  plan  was  the  only  feasible  one.3  This  document, 
however,  was  represented  to  be  only  "first  thoughts"  on  the  sub- 
ject; Goltz  was  directed  not  to  show  it  but  to  advance  the  ideas 
contained  in  it,  in  case  Ostermann  brought  up  the  topic.  Thus 
within  a  surprisingly  short  time  the  ice  had  been  broken  in  every 
quarter.  The  Prussian  initiative  had  met  with  the  readiest  of 
responses  from  Austria;  and  although  the  Empress  had  not  yet 
committed  herself,  her  attitude  might  seem  distinctly  encourag- 
ing. Frederick  William  and  his  advisers,  however,  were  not  quite 
free  from  fear  that  she  might  merely  be  lulling  them  with  false 
hopes  until  such  time  as  she  had  ended  her  enterprise  in  Poland. 
Decided  caution  towards  Russia  was  still  the  watchword  at 
Berlin,  and  the  first  article  in  the  Prussian  program  was  to 
secure  a  precise  and  definite  agreement  with  Austria. 

That  agreement  was  to  be  effected,  as  was  confidently  reckoned 
on  both  sides,  at  the  meeting  of  the  two  sovereigns  to  be  held 
immediately  after  the  Imperial  coronation  at  Frankfort.    In  the 

1  Alopeus'  report  of  June  22/July  3,  M.  A.,  Ilpycciji,  III,  29.  From  the 
much  more  reserved  tone  of  Schulenburg's  and  Alvensleben's  report  to  the  King 
of  July  3,  one  would  judge  that  the  former  minister  did  not  see  fit  to  reveal  to  his 
colleague  how  far  he  had  gone  with  Alopeus.  This  conversation  was  on  July  2. 
B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  G. 

2  Alopeus'  report  of  June  26/July  7,  M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  29. 

3  Rescript  to  Goltz  of  July  10,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  AGREE  325 

first  week  of  July,  from  Vienna  and  Berlin  there  was  a  gen- 
eral exodus  towards  the  Rhine.  The  Emperor-elect,  all  the 
Austrian  Conference  ministers  save'  Kaunitz,  the  King  of 
Prussia,  BischofTwerder,  Schulenburg,  Haugwitz,  Alopeus,  Reuss, 
Nassau  —  the  whole  diplomatic  and  military  world  was  off  to 
attend  either  the  great  spectacle  at  Frankfort  or  '  the  promenade 
to  Paris.' 


CHAPTER  XIV 

Austria  and  Prussia  Disagree  about  the 
Partition 


On  July  14,  1792,  at  Frankfort,  the  world  saw  for  the  last  time 
the  faded  splendors  of  the  coronation  of  a  Holy  Roman  Emperor. 
Five  days  later  the  successor  of  the  Caesars  and  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, '  the  modern  Agamemnon,'  held  their  meeting  at  Mainz. 
Amid  all  the  gorgeous  festivities,  while  the  public  was  celebrating 
the  anticipated  triumph  over  the  Jacobins,  the  ministers  of  the 
allied  Courts  were  already  disputing  over  the  prospective  spoils. 
Even  before  the  departure  from  Vienna,  clouds  had  begun  to 
appear  on  the  horizon.  When  the  Bavarian-Polish  plan  was  con- 
fided to  the  Austrian  Conference  ministers,  there  were  murmurs 
that  this  was  no  time  to  revive  the  Exchange  project.1  Probably 
the  cry  had  already  been  raised  that  although  by  the  Exchange 
Austria  would,  indeed,  round  out  her  territories,  she  would  suffer 
an  actual  loss  in  revenue,  while  Prussia  was  to  gain  in  both  ways. 
Much  as  he  clung  to  his  original  plan,  Spielmann  had  been  obliged 
to  urge  upon  Haugwitz  the  necessity  of  finding  some  '  supple- 
ment,' some  additional  acquisition  that  would  offset  the  financial 
loss  in  question  and  establish  a  perfect  equality  between  the 
respective  indemnities.  As  one  means  to  that  end,  he  had  sug- 
gested that  in  case  the  two  Lusatias  should  revert  to  Austria, 
they  might  be  exchanged  for  the  Franconian  Margraviates, 
Ansbach  and  Baireuth,  which  had  recently  fallen  to  Prussia.2 

1  Cf.  Rosenberg's  volum  at  the  Frankfort  conference:  "  Ueber  den  2.  Punkt  des 
Conferenzialgegenstandes,  habe  ich  meine  Meinung  in  Wien  und  hier  dahin  geaus- 
sert,  dass  mir  der  nun  gegenwartige  Zeitpunkt  keineswegs  der  gemessenste  scheine, 
die  Negociation  des  Austausches  zu  entamiren,"  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  142. 

2  Haugwitz  to  the  King,  July  26,  referring  to  his  conversations  with  Spiel- 
mann before  his  departure  from  Vienna,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  155  E.  Spielmann  had  left 
the  door  open  to  such  claims  for  a  '  supplement,'  when  in  his  first  reply  to  Schulen- 

326 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  327 

After  the  coronation,  on  July  17,  the  Emperor  held  a  meeting 
of  the  State  Conference  at  Frankfort  to  decide  upon  the  exact 
propositions  to  be  made  to  the  Prussians  at  the  approaching 
interviews.  Spielmann  had  presented  a  memorandum,  which  set 
forth  the  history  of  the  Exchange  plan,  summed  up  the  advan- 
tages of  the  project,  and  attempted  to  refute  the  objections  that 
were  already  being  raised.  Amid  all  the  absurdities  that  were  put 
on  paper  by  Austrian  ministers  in  those  days,  it  is  refreshing  to 
find  one  statesman  who  realized  that  Prussia  was  sure  to  insist 
upon  an  indemnity;  that  any  attempt  to  oppose,  or  even  the 
failure  to  show  real  willingness  to  assist,  would  not  only  end  all 
support  from  that  Power  against  France,  but  would  ruin  the 
friendship  built  up  with  such  exertions;  that  the  Court  of  Berlin 
was  in  a  position  to  secure  its  indemnity  anyway,  through  an 
understanding  with  Russia  or  England;  and  that  the  only  ques- 
tion was  whether  Austria  would  seize  the  opportunity  to  extract 
a  counter-concession  from  Prussia,  or  would  bargain  and  delay 
until  too  late.  Spielmann  admitted  that  the  Bavarian  Exchange 
would  involve  a  temporary  loss  of  from  two  to  three  millions  in 
revenue;  but  he  argued  that  the  Monarchy  would  gain  so  much 
in  territorial  compactness  and  in  freedom  of  movement,  such  great 
improvements  might  be  made  in  the  financial  administration  of 
Bavaria,  so  much  could  be  saved  by  getting  rid  of  the  costly  and 
precarious  Belgic  possessions,  that  the  loss  would  be  more  than 
made  up.  The  Exchange  might  possibly  be  combined  with  other 
acquisitions,  but  he  urged  that  insistence  on  additional  advan- 
tages and  the  resulting  delays  might  involve  the  failure  of  the 
whole  plan.1 

burg  he  urged  the  financial  loss  involved  in  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  and  represented 
the  latter  project  as  only  ''the  chief  basis  "  of  the  prospective  arrangement.  Possibly 
he  had  already  had  to  face  the  opposition  of  some  one  of  his  sovereign's  confidential 
advisers,  Colloredo,  for  instance. 

1  This  memorandum  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  134-141,  as  of  July  18,  1792, 
i.  e.,  the  day  after  the  meeting  of  the  Conference.  In  the  original,  which  is  pre- 
served among  the  Vortrdge  for  1792  in  the  Vienna  Archives,  the  date  is  written  in 
pencil  and  is  not  exactly  clear;  but  it  is  almost  certainly  the  16th,  rather  than  the 
1 8th.  Besides,  the  whole  context  of  the  memorandum  corresponds  to  the  supposi- 
tion that  it  was  written  before  the  meeting  of  the  Conference.  Had  it  been  written 
afterwards,  the  historic  resume  with  which  it  begins  could  not  have  failed  to  mention 


328  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Unfortunately  these  warnings  made  little  impression  on  most  of 
the  members  of  the  Conference.  Field  Marshal  Lacy  declared 
that  if  the  Bavarian  Exchange  were  to  be  undertaken  at  all,  it 
must  be  supplemented  by  the  acquisition  of  Ansbach  and  Baireuth 
from  Prussia,  the  latter  Power  to  be  compensated,  perhaps,  with 
Juliers  and  Berg  or  with  additional  territory  in  Poland.  He 
inclined  to  the  opinion  that  the  Exchange  plan  should  not  even 
be  discussed  at  the  interview  at  Mainz,  out  of  regard  for  the 
foreign  Courts  (England) ,  and  in  view  of  the  internal  conditions  in 
the  Netherlands.  Prince  Rosenberg,  who  was  in  general  bitterly 
opposed  to  Spielmann  and  Cobenzl,  joined  in  the  attack.  He  did 
not  believe  the  moment  fitted  for  reviving  the  Bavarian  project; 
but  since  it  had  been  revived,  he  opined  at  least  that  they  should 
not  attempt  to  execute  it  without  securing  the  consent  of  England. 
He  also  found  it  as  clear  as  day  that  the  realization  of  the  Ex- 
change without  a  '  supplement '  would  entail  an  incalculable  loss 
to  Austria.  Colloredo  agreed  entirely  with  Lacy  and  Rosenberg. 
The  discussion  waxed  hot.  Overwhelmed  with  criticisms  and 
accusations,  Spielmann  was  enraged  to  the  point  of  demanding  his 
own  dismissal.1    Finally  the  battle  ended  with  a  compromise. 

It  was  decided  to  go  on  with  the  plan  for  the  Bavarian  Ex- 
change, which  the  Conference  recognized  as  in  itself "  the  summum 
bonum  "  of  the  Austrian  Monarchy,  but  also  to  make  every 
possible  effort  to  secure  such  further  advantages  as  would  render 
the  Austrian  gains  absolutely  equal  to  those  of  Prussia.  A 
graded  series  of  propositions  to  the  Court  of  Berlin  was  drawn  up, 
and  first  on  the  list  stood  the  demand  for  the  Franconian  Mar- 
graviates — in  return  for  which  Prussia  might  receive  the  Duchy  of 
Berg  from  Bavaria.  If  none  of  these  supplementary  advantages 
could  be  obtained,  the  majority  of  the  Conference  agreed  to  adhere 
to  the  Exchange  pure  and  simple.  If  even  that  proved  impracti- 
cable, two  contingencies  were  to  be  considered :  if  Prussia  secured 

the  important  decisions  of  the  17th.  Beyond  a  doubt,  this  is  the  '  memoire  '  which 
was  read  at  the  beginning  of  the  meeting,  according  to  the  Conference  protocol, 
and  not,  as  is  commonly  assumed,  an  act  drawn  up  by  Spielmann  after  the  meeting, 
as  a  sort  of  protest  against  what  had  taken  place. 

1  Schulenburg  to  Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben,  July  30,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frank- 
reich,  89  g. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  329 

her  acquisition  in  Poland,  Austria  must  claim  an  arrondissement 
in  French  Flanders  and  Hainault;  in  the  contrary  case,  both 
Powers  should  return  to  the  original  plan  of  demanding  a  money 
indemnity  from  France.  The  Emperor  approved  these  resolu- 
tions, with  the  reservation  that  the  consent  of  the  other  Courts, 
and  especially  of  England,  must  be  obtained  before  attempting 
the  realization  of  the  Exchange,  and  that  in  case  of  the  slightest 
opposition,  the  project  was  to  be  abandoned  at  once.1 

It  has  been  the  general  opinion  of  historians  that  the  confer- 
ence at  Frankfort  marked  a  disastrous  turn  in  Austrian  policy. 
It  is  true  that  Lacy  and  Rosenberg  were  not  far  wrong  in  holding 
it  an  unfavorable  moment  for  bringing  up  the  Bavarian  Exchange 
plan,  and  in  declaring  the  consent  of  England  necessary;  there 
was  also  some  justification  for  their  view  that  it  was  not  exactly 
a,  propos  to  divide  the  skin  of  the  bear  before  he  was  caught;  but 
they  failed  utterly  to  reckon  with  the  main  factor  in  the  situation, 
Prussia.  Since  that  Power  insisted  on  obtaining  securities  for  its 
indemnity  in  advance,  and  since  its  aid  was  at  that  moment 
indispensable,  there  was  no  other  sound  policy  than  to  accede  to 
its  demands  and  to  avoid  wounding  its  susceptibilities.  The 
decisions  of  Frankfort  were  so  disastrous,  not  because  they  put 
the  Exchange  plan  in  danger  —  for  in  view  of  the  later  turn  of  the 
war,  it  is  hardly  probable  that  that  project  could  ever  have  been 
carried  out  —  but  because  they  produced  the  first  rift  in  the 
coalition  and  began  the  alienation  of  the  ally,  without  whose 
cordial  cooperation  a  successful  prosecution  of  the  war  and  the 
acquisition  of  an  indemnity  of  any  kind  were  wellnigh  hopeless. 

It  was  under  no  favorable  auspices  that  the  conferences  be- 
tween the  Austrian  and  Prussian  ministers  were  opened  at  Mainz. 
On  the  one  side,  Spielmann  and  Cobenzl  found  themselves  obliged 
to  champion  demands  of  which  both  at  bottom  disapproved.2  On 
the  other  side,  Schulenburg,  who  was  to  conduct  the  negotiation 

1  Conference  protocol  and  the  separate  vota  of  Lacy  and  of  Rosenberg  and 
Colloredo,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  132  ff.,  141  f. 

2  Of  Spielmann's  point  of  view,  it  is  unnecessary  to  speak  further.  For  Cobenzl's, 
see  his  memorial  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  142-145  (here  erroneously  entitled 
"  Beilage  zum  Protokoll  der  Frankfurter  Conferenz,  Juli,  1792."  It  was  in  reality 
presented  with  a  Vortrag  of  August  3,  V.  A.). 


330  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

for  Prussia,  could  hardly  be  in  the  mood  for  concessions.  His 
two  colleagues,  who  remained  in  Berlin,  had  already  fallen  to 
bemoaning  the  disadvantages  of  permitting  the  Bavarian  Ex- 
change: the  sacrifice  of  the  traditions  of  the  great  Frederick,  the 
loss  of  Prussia's  proud  position  as  the  protector  of  the  small  states 
of  Germany,  the  immense  increase  of  Austrian  power  and  in- 
fluence, the  violation  of  the  Peace  of  Teschen,  etc.,  etc.  If  the 
hated  project  must  absolutely  be  allowed,  they  insisted  that  their 
Court  must  receive  a  huge  aggrandizement,  which  would  enable 
it  henceforth  to  dispense  with  the  support  of  the  German  princes, 
and  would  justify  its  abandonment  of  a  policy  that  had  hitherto 
formed  the  glory  and  the  security  of  Prussia.1  Furthermore, 
Haugwitz,  who  enjoyed  great  credit  with  Frederick  William,  had 
come  to  attend  the  King  from  Hochheim  to  Mainz,  and  had 
seized  the  opportunity  to  combat  the  system  recently  adopted, 
and  Schulenburg's  policies  in  particular.  If  we  may  believe 
Haugwitz's  later  assertion,  the  King  was  already  discontented 
with  his  leading  minister,  and  especially  with  the  too  modest 
indemnity  which  the  latter  was  disposed  to  claim.2  On  both  sides, 
then,  the  personal  position  of  the  negotiators  rendered  concessions 
to  the  other  party  difficult,  if  not  impossible. 

The  subject  of  the  indemnities  was  brought  up  for  discussion 
at  the  conference  of  July  21.  Schulenburg  readily  agreed  to  the 
principle  that  the  respective  acquisitions  were  to  be  exactly  equal, 
both  with  regard  to  their  utility  as  arrondissements,  and  in '  intrin- 
sic value.'  The  Austrians  then  brought  forward  their  claim  for  a 
'  supplement '  to  offset  the  losses  involved  in  the  Bavarian  Ex- 
change. Schulenburg  seems  to  have  admitted  —  after  not  a 
little  argument  —  that  the  claim  was  in  itself  just;  but  when 
informed  of  the  concrete  demand  based  upon  it  —  the  cession 
of  the  Margraviates,  the  sacrifice  of  Prussian  territory  to  satisfy 
the  appetites  of  this   ravenous   Court  of  Vienna  —  there   he 

1  These  considerations  from  a  letter  of  Alvensleben  and  Finckenstein  of  July  27, 
i.  e.,  written  after  they  had  learned  of  the  propositions  made  by  Austria  at  Mainz. 
That  they  had,  however,  advanced  these  same  ideas  even  earlier,  appears  from  then- 
letters  to  Schulenburg  of  August  12,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  g. 

2  Ranke,  Hardenberg,  ii,  p.  277;  "  Fragment  des  mgmoires  inSdits  du  Comte  de 
Haugwitz,"  in  Minerva,  clxxxiv  (1837),  p.  4. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  33  I 

balked.  His  sovereign,  he  protested,  placed  a  quite  peculiar 
value  on  these  territories,  which  were  the  ancient  home  of  his 
dynasty.  Repeatedly  he  begged  the  Austrians  to  devise  some 
other  combination.  Spielmann  insisted  that  no  other  plan  was 
possible:  if  the  King's  aversion  to  the  proposed  cession  was 
insuperable,  both  Courts  would  have  to  renounce  their  intended 
acquisitions.  From  the  meagre  words  of  the  protocol  it  is  im- 
possible to  reconstruct  the  course  of  what  was  undoubtedly  a 
very  warm  debate ;  but  it  appears  that  at  last  Schulenburg 
consented  to  take  the  demand  for  the  Margraviates  ad  referen- 
dum, and  even  to  indicate  the  territories  that  his  master  would 
claim  in  case  he  agreed  to  that  proposition.  They  included 
the  palatinates  of  Posen,  Gnesen,  Cujavia,  and  Kalisz,  with  a 
part  of  Sieradz,  an  allotment  considerably  smaller  than  that 
which  fell  to  Prussia  some  months  later.  These  claims  the 
Austrians  in  their  turn  accepted  only  ad  referendum.  Finally, 
Schulenburg  agreed  without  difficulty  that  his  Court  should 
undertake  to  secure  the  consent  of  England  and  of  the  Duke  of 
Zweibriicken  to  the  Exchange.  The  conference  ended  amicably, 
but  with  nothing  definite  accomplished.1  The  great  opportunity 
for  a  solid  agreement  on  the  original  basis  had  been  lost.  The  full 
extent  of  the  harm  done  in  the  way  of  disappointing,  exasperat- 
ing, and  embittering  the  Prussians,  appeared  only  a  little  later. 


II 

On  the  homeward  journey  from  Mainz  the  Emperor  stopped 
several  days  at  Munich,  to  visit  the  Elector.  It  had  not  been 
intended,  apparently,  to  broach  the  great  plan  of  the  day  on  this 
occasion,  but  the  Elector  seems  to  have  outrun  the  wishes  of  his 
guests.  In  a  moment  of  effusiveness,  he  assured  the  Emperor 
that  he  entertained  for  him  the  same  sentiments  that  he  had 
cherished  for  Joseph  II,  and  that  he  did  not  exclude  even  his 
willingness  to  consent  to  the  Exchange.    Encouraging  as  this  was, 

1  Protocol  of  the  conference,  Vivenot,  ii.  pp.  146-149;  Ph.  Cobenzl  to  Kaunitz, 
July  31,  and  to  the  Emperor,  August  3,  ibid.,  pp.  155-158;  Schulenburg  to  Finck- 
enstein  and  Alvensleben,  July  21,  printed  in  Ranke,  Ursprung  und  Beginn,  pp.  364  f. 


332      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

the  Austrians  do  not  appear  to  have  taken  advantage  of  it.    They 
were  not  yet  ready  to  begin  a  formal  negotiation  at  Munich.1 

At  the  end  of  July  the  court  arrived  at  Prague  for  the  Bohemian 
coronation.  It  was  only  then  that  the  Austrian  statesmen  began 
to  cast  up  the  situation  produced  by  the  conference  at  Mainz. 
In  the  report  presented  by  the  Vice-Chancellor  to  the  Emperor  on 
August  3,  the  tone  was  sufficiently  hopeful.  The  main  thing  at 
present,  he  declared,  was  to  await  the  replies  of  the  Courts  of 
Berlin  and  Petersburg.  If  the  latter  answered  unfavorably,  then 
the  Prussian  acquisition  in  Poland  would  fall  through,  as  well  as 
the  Bavarian  Exchange;  and  in  such  a  case  the  Emperor  could 
easily  console  himself.  One  sees  again  that  the  Austrians,  unlike 
their  allies,  had  by  no  means  set  their  hearts  upon  aggrandize- 
ment; 2  they  had  virtually  been  driven  into  the  indemnity  project 
in  order  to  preserve  the  balance  of  power.  As  for  the  counter- 
proposals to  be  expected  from  Prussia,  Cobenzl  anticipated  that 
the  King  would  offer  not  only  the  Exchange,  to  which  he  had 
irrevocably  committed  himself,  but  also  some  additional  advan- 
tages —  either  the  Margraviates  or  acquisitions  elsewhere. 
Evidently  the  Vice-Chancellor  had  been  encouraged  by  Schulen- 
berg's  acceptance  of  the  abstract  principle  of  '  the  supplement,' 
and  did  not  suspect  the  indignation  and  repugnance  which  the 
demands  made  at  Mainz  had  aroused  in  the  Prussian  ministry. 
Still  he  obviously  did  not  feel  the  ground  quite  secure  under  his 
feet,  for  he  thought  it  necessary  to  add  a  long  memorial  rehearsing 
all  the  advantages  of  the  Exchange  project.  The  reason  may  have 
been  that  he  feared  that  the  Emperor's  inclination  to  the  plan  had 
been  shaken  by  the  opposition  at  Frankfort;  or  possibly  that  he 

1  For  the  incident  at  Munich,  Razumovski  to  Bezborodko,  September  2/13, 
on  the  basis  of  what  Spielmann  had  told  him,  M.  A.,  ABCTpia,  III,  54.  Cf.  Ph. 
Cobenzl  to  Mercy,  March  26,  1793:  "  Wie  sehnlich  der  Herr  Kurfiirst  diesen 
Tausch  allezeit  gewunscht  hat  (und  die  Fortdauer  dieses  Wunsches  haben  noch  im 
Juli  v.  J.  positive  Aeusserungen  bestatigt)  ist  Jedermann  bekannt "  (Vivenot,  ii,  p. 
532  —  the  italics  are  mine).  Lehrbach,  the  Austrian  envoy  at  Munich,  was  not 
informed  until  the  spring  of  1793  that  his  Court  had  revived  the  Exchange  project; 
and  no  formal  negotiation  was  ever  undertaken  on  the  subject  with  the  Bavarian 
government  in  these  years. 

2  Spielmann  was  probably  an  exception,  but  the  statement  applies,  I  believe, 
to  the  other  ministers. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  333 

was  trying  to  prepare  the  way  for  a  return  to  Spielmann's  original 
project,  in  case  the  demand  for  a  supplement  occasioned  too  great 
difficulties  or  delays.  At  any  rate,  the  memorial  labored  to  show 
that  the  deficit  caused  by  the  Exchange  would  be  only  temporary, 
and  that  the  security  and  freedom  of  action  to  be  gained  by  the 
realization  of  the  plan  were  far  more  precious  than  any  acquisi- 
tions or  any  mere  increase  of  revenue.1 

A  few  days  later  a  report  arrived  from  Louis  Cobenzl  that 
must  have  afforded  considerable  satisfaction.  Immediately  upon 
receiving  the  orders  of  July  2nd,  the  ambassador  had  taken  up 
the  new  project  (the  Exchange)  with  his  usual  zeal,  although  he 
had  grave  doubts  about  the  success  of  the  plan,  and  was  not  a 
little  pained  at  being  obliged  to  champion  those  ambitions  of 
Prussia  which  for  years  he  had  made  it  his  business  to  combat.2 
The  Russian  ministers  received  his  propositions  with  all  gracious- 
ness.  They  could  express  only  their  private  opinions,  since  all 
must  be  referred  to  the  Empress'  decision,  but  each  of  them  in 
turn  assured  Cobenzl  that  she  would  surely  do  everything  possible 
to  assist  '  her  most  intimate  ally,'  just  as  she  had  done  in  1784. 
The  ambassador  was  given  to  understand  that  the  Exchange 
project  would  meet  with  no  difficulties  whatsoever  from  Russia, 
but  as  to  the  Prussian  acquisition  the  situation  was  different. 
Bezborodko,  indeed,  thought  that  in  view  of  the  present  circum- 
stances the  claims  of  the  Court  of  Berlin  would  have  to  be 
admitted;  but  the  other  ministers  raised  profuse  objections  and 
unanimously  declared  that  this  was  a  subject  that  required  the 
maturest  deliberation.  Markov  asserted  that  the  King  of  Prussia 
had  no  right  whatever  to  demand  an  indemnity  for  "  the  half- 
campaign"  he  was  making,  and  ought  to  be  told  so  plainly.  The 
last-named  minister  was  also  the  only  one  who  broached  the 
topic  of  an  acquisition  for  his  own  Court.  If  it  were  a  question  of 
gains  for  Austria  alone,  he  declared,  the  Empress  would  act  as 
disinterestedly  as  Joseph  II  had  done  at  the  time  of  the  Crimean 
affair;  but  if  Prussia  absolutely  must  get  something  too,  that  was 
quite  a  different  matter:   then  the  balance  of  power  must  be  pre- 

1  Vortrag  of  August  3,  V.  A.    The  memorial,  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  142-145. 

2  L.  Cobenzl  to  Ph.  Cobenzl,  July  21  (private  letter),  V.  A.,  Russland,  Fasc.  139. 


334  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

served.  Cobenzl's  instructions  did  not  allow  him  to  discuss  this 
latter  point,  but  he  did  not  think  fit  to  offer  the  petty  concessions 
suggested  in  the  orders  of  July  2  to  take  the  place  of  a  Russian 
acquisition.  It  is  probable  that  his  failure  to  propose  that  the 
Empress  should  take  her  share  along  with  the  rest,  had  something 
to  do  with  the  fact  that  on  this  occasion  he  secured  nothing  but 
general  assurances  of  good  will.  His  sovereign  would  be  unable 
to  reply  definitely,  Ostermann  declared,  until  she  learned  of  the 
results  of  the  interview  between  the  Emperor  and  the  King  of 
Prussia.1 

Unsubstantial  as  was  his  success,  Cobenzl  had  still  progressed 
much  further  than  his  Prussian  colleague.  The  excessively  pru- 
dent Goltz,  bound  by  extremely  cautious  instructions,  had  failed 
utterly  to  bring  the  Russians  to  speech.  Not  daring  to  make  his 
proposals  openly,  and  not  being  on  sufficiently  intimate  terms 
with  the  Russian  ministers  to  draw  them  out  in  familiar  conversa- 
tion, the  envoy  was  no  nearer  to  learning  the  intentions  of  the 
Empress  now  than  he  had  been  five  months  earlier.  He  and 
Cobenzl  received  their  orders  about  the  indemnity  project  at 
almost  the  same  time;  yet  so  great  was  their  mutual  distrust 
that  instead  of  joining  forces  in  a  common  effort,  each  assured 
the  other  that  he  had  no  definite  instructions  on  this  subject.2 

The  news  from  St.  Petersburg  —  the  advance  gained  by 
Cobenzl  over  Goltz,  the  favorable  reception  accorded  by  the 
Russians  to  the  Exchange  project,  and  their  apparent  repugnance 
to  the  Prussian  claims  —  all  this  furnished  the  Austrian  ministry 
with  an  excellent  opportunity  to  return  to  the  attack  on  the 
subject  of  the  Margraviates.  Accordingly,  on  August  8  a  dis- 
patch was  sent  to  Reuss  ostensibly  for  the  purpose  of  communi- 
cating the  results  of  Cobenzl's  overtures.  The  Prussians  were  to 
be  given  to  understand  that  the  obstacles  that  stood  in  the  way  of 
their  demands  at  St.  Petersburg,  could  probably  be  removed  only 

1  L.  Cobenzl  to  Ph.  Cobenzl,  July  21  (official  report),  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte, 
1792. 

2  Goltz's  report  of  July  20,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133;  Cobenzl's  of  August  24, 
V.  A.,  lot.  cit.  Cobenzl's  '  duplicity  '  towards  Goltz  furnished  the  Prussian  ministry 
with  a  theme  for  frequent  jeremiads;  but  the  duplicity  was  about  equal  on  both 
■sides. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  335 

through  the  earnest  intervention  of  the  Emperor;  and  that  this 
intervention  could  easily  be  had  —  at  the  price  of  Ansbach  and 
Baireuth.  If  the  two  Courts  were  once  agreed  on  this  latter 
point,  it  was  said,  they  could  immediately  begin  a  joint  negotia- 
tion with  Russia  with  good  hopes  of  success.1 

At  the  same  time  Spielmann  took  up  a  high  tone  in  his  discus- 
sions with  Haugwitz.  Without  the  cession  of  the  Margraviates, 
he  constantly  declared,  the  whole  Bavarian-Polish  plan  would 
have  to  be  given  up;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  if  the  King  consented 
to.  part  with  those  possessions,  Prussia  might  have  whatever  she 
might  desire  in  Poland.  Haugwitz,  however,  knew  a  clever 
counter-thrust.  If  the  Bavarian-Polish  plan  were  abandoned,  he 
said,  the  two  Courts  would  have  to  return  to  the  old  idea  of 
seeking  their  indemnities  from  France;  and  in  that  case  his 
sovereign  would  claim  Juliers  and  Berg.  Spielmann  protested 
vigorously  that  if  the  Elector  had  to  part  with  his  possessions  on 
the  Lower  Rhine  the  Exchange  would  be  rendered  forever  im- 
possible; and  he  added  gloomily  that  in  the  end  the  allies  would 
have  to  fall  back  on  taking  their  indemnities  in  French  assignats 
—  an  idea  which  filled  Haugwitz  with  horror.2 

The  debate  moved  around  in  a  vicious  circle.  Still  it  appears 
that  Haugwitz  did  not  express  himself  on  the  subject  of  the 
Margraviates  with  sufficient  firmness  to  destroy  the  hopes  of  the 
Austrians.  It  was  rather  the  answer  given  to  Reuss  that  first 
enlightened  the  Imperial  ministry  on  what  was  to  be  expected 
from  Prussia. 

Ill 

The  Ansbach-Baireuth  proposition  had  not  appeared  to  Schu- 
lenburg  particularly  exorbitant  and  offensive  at  the  moment  when 
it  was  first  brought  forward.  It  was  only  the  day  after  the 
conference  of  July  21,  after  long  rumination,  that  he  convinced 
himself  that  the  demand  was  thoroughly  unjustifiable  and  inadmis- 
sible. Then  the  suspicion  awoke  in  him  that  the  Court  of  Vienna 
was  systematically  trying  to  strew  the  negotiation  with  difficulties 

1  Ph.  Cobenzl  to  Reuss,  August  8,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  159  ff. 

2  Haugwitz  to  Frederick  William,  August  16,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  170. 


I 


336  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

in  order  to  thwart  the  whole  indemnity  project;  that  it  preferred 
to  dispense  with  compensation  for  the  war  altogether,  out  of  a 
Machiavellian  calculation  that  fifty  millions  more  of  debts  would 
not  ruin  a  state  with  the  resources  of  Austria,  while  the  same 
loss  would  be  fatal  to  Prussia.1  Even  the  complaisance  of  the 
Austrians  in  other  matters  filled  him  with  distrust.  This  proud 
Court  of  Vienna  was  not  wont  to  be  so  courteous,  so  pliable:  it 
must  certainly  have,  some  vast,  mysterious,  and  insidious  design 
on  foot.2 

In  this  harrowing  state  of  suspicion  and  uncertainty,  Schulen- 
burg  clung  all  the  more  firmly  to  one  principle  and  framed  one 
momentous  resolution.  Whatever  might  happen,  Prussia  must 
obtain  an  indemnity  for  the  cost  of  the  war;  and  since  Austria 
had  failed  him,  he  decided  that  the  vital  point  at  present  was  to 
reach  an  understanding  with  Russia.  After  the  Prussian  indem- 
nity had  thus  been  ensured,  it  would  be  time  to  consider  the 
demands  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Austria  might  then  be  allowed 
to  effect  the  Exchange,  and,  if  it  were  clearly  proved  that  a  deficit 
would  result,  she  might  be  permitted  to  make  up  the  loss  by 
certain  acquisitions  from  France;  but  the  claim  for  the  Margra- 
viates  must  be  categorically,  once  and  finally,  rejected.  This  was 
a  turning-point  in  Prussian  policy.  Hitherto  Schulenburg's  cardi- 
nal principle  had  been  the  concert  with  Austria.  Now  he  looked 
for  salvation  only  to  Russia.3 

If  he  had  found  the  Ansbach-Baireuth  proposition  "inadmis- 
sible," his  colleagues  at  Berlin  declared  it  "  alarming,  not  to  say 
insolent,"  and  even  "  revolting."  Both  of  them  had  long  been 
discontented  with  the  reigning  policies;  and  they  now  found  a 
chance  to  give  their  anti-Austrian  proclivities  full  vent.  It  was 
bad  enough,  they  held,  to  have  to  consent  to  the  Bavarian 
Exchange;  but  to  undertake  to  urge  it  at  London  and  Zwei- 
briicken  was  out  of  the  question.    It  could  not  be  permitted  at 

1  Schulenburg  to  Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben,  July  21,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frank- 
reich,  89  g. 

2  Alopeus'  report  of  July  13/24,  based  on  Schulenburg's  confidences  to  him, 
M.  A.,  Ilpyccia,  III,  30. 

3  Schulenburg  to  Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben,  July  22,  in  Ranke,  Ur sprung 
und  Beginn  der  Revolutionskriege,  p.  365. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  337 

all,  unless  Prussia  obtained  a  very  handsome  acquisition  in  Po- 
land. Though  without  great  hopes  with  respect  to  the  Empress' 
attitude,  they  agreed  entirely  with  Schulenburg's  idea  as  to  the 
necessity  of  seeking  first  of  all  an  understanding  with  Russia.  If 
that  could  be  attained,  the  King  ought  to  take  possession  of  his 
acquisition  at  once,  and  then  tell  the  Court  of  Vienna  that  he 
would  do  what  he  could  for  it.  That  was  the  only  way  to  deal 
with  Austria,  the  two  ministers  declared.  In  1771  and  1772  the 
Court  of  Vienna  had  also  affected  an  attitude  of  disinterestedness ; 
but  when  it  saw  Russia  and  Prussia  agreed  and  determined  to 
have  their  way,  it  had  hastened  to  throw  off  the  mask  and  beg 
for  a  share  of  '  the  cake.' 

The  idea,  it  must  be  said,  was  luminous  enough,  except  that 
there  was  this  difference  between  1772  and  1792:  in  the  latter 
year  Prussia  was  bound  to  Austria  by  an  alliance,  the  basis  of 
which  was  equality  in  all  advantages;  and  she  was  engaged  along 
with  that  Power  in  a  joint  war,  the  success  of  which  depended 
upon  complete  mutual  confidence.  The  alliance  and  the  common 
enterprise  were  doomed,  the  moment  Prussia  attempted  to  carry 
out  behind  the  back  of  her  ally  a  coup  like  that  proposed  by  the 
Berlin  ministry.  Doubtless  the  Imperial  Court  had  rendered 
an  agreement  difficult  by  its  exorbitant  demands,  but  to  seize 
the  coveted  lands  in  Poland  without  a  preliminary  understanding 
and  then  to  present  Austria  with  an  insulting  fait  accompli  was 
to  turn  the  alliance  to  scorn.  The  project  did  not,  indeed,  come 
to  execution  at  this  time,  as  the  sphinx  at  St.  Petersburg  could 
not  be  brought  to  speak;  but  in  the  ideas  here  proposed  by 
Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben,  and  approved  by  Schulenburg, 
one  can  see  the  germs  of  the  Note  of  Merle,  the  Second  Partition 
Treaty,  and  the  disruption  of  the  First  Coalition.1 

1  For  the  above:  Alvensleben's  and  Finckenstein's  notes  to  each  other  on 
Schulenburg's  letter  of  July  21/22,  their  joint  reply  to  him  of  July  27,  his  letter 
to  them  of  August  2,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  g. 

Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben  wrote:  "...  Nous  sommes  tout  a.  fait  du  senti- 
ment de  V.  Exc.  que  pour  nous  procurer  du  cote'  de  la  Pologne  le  dedommagement 
qui  fait  notre  objet,  le  consentement  de  la  Russie  est  un  prealable  absolument 
n£cessaire  avant  de  pouvoir  faire  aucune  demarche  de  poids  du  c6te  de  l'Autriche. 
.  .  .  L'affaire  une  fois  de  regie  avec  la  Russie,  nous  pensons  qu'il  faudra  la  terminer 
sans  perte  de  tems  par  nous  mettre  en  possession  le  plut6t  qu'il  se  pourroit  sans 


338  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

'  Unanimous  as  was  the  opinion  of  the  cabinet  ministry,  the 
King  did  not  at  first  display  the  same  repugnance  to  the  idea  of 
ceding  the  Margraviates;  and  Haugwitz  was  at  bottom  inclined 
to  it.  In  a  report  to  his  sovereign  of  July  26,  the  envoy  urged 
that  the  Court  of  Vienna  might,  indeed,  be  induced  to  content 
itself  with  the  Exchange  alone,  but  in  that  case  it  would  probably 
raise  great  difficulties  about  the  Polish  affair;  whereas  if  it  were 
promised  Ansbach  and  Baireuth,  all  assistance  and  good  will 
might  be  expected  from  it.  Before  Schulenburg  could  intervene, 
Frederick  William  replied  with  a  letter  in  which  he  showed  him- 
self not  entirely  unwilling  to  make  the  proposed  cession,  if  in 
return  he  could  get  for  himself  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Vistula.1 
Schulenburg  was  almost  in  despair  over  the  royal  indiscretion. 
He  did  what  he  could  to  mend  matters  by  a  private  letter  to 
Haugwitz,  begging  him  in  Heaven's  name  not  to  let  the  faintest 
suspicion  transpire  that  their  master  could  ever  conceive  of  the 
possibility  of  such  a  cession.  In  public  Haugwitz  was  to  express 
as  his  own  opinion  that  the  King's  aversion  to  the  sacrifice  de- 
manded of  him  was  wellnigh  invincible.  For  the  envoy's  private 
instruction,  Schulenburg  added  that  it  was  only  in  the  last 
extremity  and  only  in  return  for  immense  acquisitions  in  Poland, 
that  Prussia  could  consent  to  give  up  the  Franconian  principali- 
ties; and  he  personally  would  never  lend  a  hand  to  such  a  trans- 
action save  with  infinite  repugnance.2 

meme  trop  s'apesanter  sur  un  arrangement  exact  des  demarcations  .  .  .  et  cela 
fait,  dire  a  la  Cour  de  Vienne  que  telle  est  notre  indemnity  et  que  nous  sommes 
prets  a  lui  en  procurer  une  de  la  meme  valeur,  en  autant  que  la  chose  dependroit 
de  nous.  C'est  la  vraie  maniere  a  notre  avis  de  traiter  en  pareil  cas  avec  l'Autriche. 
Lors  du  demembrement  de  la  Pologne  en  1771  et  1772  elle  suivit  a  peu  pres  la 
meme  marche  qu'aujourd'hui,  jouant  la  desinteressee  .  .  .  ;  mais  lorsqu'elle  nous 
vit  d'accord  avec  la  Russie  et  les  deux  Allies  disposes  a  aller  leur  chemin,  quelque 
parti  que  Ton  prit  a  Vienne,  elle  revint  d'elle  meme  a  nous  pour  avoir  sa  part  au 
gateau.  .  .  .  Nous  .  .  .  avons  ete  vraiment  revokes  en  apprenant  que  les  Min- 
istres  Autrichiens  ont  ose  proposer  la  cession  des  Principautes  de  Franconie.  .  .  . 
V.  Exc.  a  bien  raison  de  nommer  le  projet  d'une  telle  cession  insoutenable  et  in- 
admissible. .  .  .  Nous  sommes  ainsi  bien  d'accord  tous  trois  que  dans  tous  les  cas 
il  faut  rejetter  haut  a  la  main  une  proposition  aussi  inacceptable  sous  tous  les 
rapports,  et  qui  ne  sauroit  meme  faire  un  objet  de  discussion  entre  les  deux  Cours." 

1  Frederick  William  to  Haugwitz,  July  28,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  155  E. 

1  Schulenburg  to  Haugwitz,  July  30,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  K. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  339 

With  that,  however,  the  evil  was  not  quite  undone.  The 
King's  "  indifference  "  to  the  "  revolting  proposition,"  did  not 
cease  to  alarm  the  cabinet  ministry.  They  trembled  at  the 
thought  that  if  the  Court  of  Vienna  but  suspected  the  weakness 
of  their  position,  it  would,  with  its  usual  perseverance,  return 
again  and  again  with  offers  of  advantages  and  equivalents  of  all 
sorts,  until  finally  the  King  succumbed.1  The  secret  of  that 
report  of  Haugwitz's  and  the  replies  made  to  it,  Schulenburg 
wrote,  must  be  concealed  like  murder.  What  if  Bischoffwerder 
should  learn  of  it,  with  his  Austrian  propensities ! 2  It  was  a  try- 
ing moment  for  the  Prussian  ministers.  They  feared  the  weak- 
ness of  their  own  sovereign;  they  had  ceased  to  expect  anything 
good  from  Austria ;  they  found  their  hands  bound  with  regard  to 
France  by  the  declaration  in  which  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  was 
made  to  deny  that  the  allied  Powers  had  any  designs  upon  the 
territory  of  that  kingdom.  Not  only  the  Prussian  acquisition  in 
Poland,  but  a  Prussian  acquisition  anywhere,  seemed  to  be  in 
grave  jeopardy. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  the  Austrian  cabinet 
delivered  its  new  attack  through  the  dispatches  to  Reuss  of 
August  8.  Nevertheless,  the  communication  of  Cobenzl's  report 
failed  to  work  the  wonders  expected.  This  time  Schulenburg  was 
the  first  to  gain  the  King's  ear,  and  he  succeeded  in  putting 
through  an  answer  after  his  own  heart.  The  reply  given  to  Reuss 
declared  clearly  and  emphatically  that  Prussia  could  never  think 
of  ceding  the  Margraviates,  except  in  exchange  for  Lusatia,  if 
that  should  ever  return  to  Austrian  hands;  that  whereas  Cobenzl 
reported  only  the  private  opinions  of  the  Russian  ministers,  it 
was  indispensable  to  learn  as  soon  as  possible  the  sentiments  of 
the  Empress;  that  meantime  the  King  desired  to  know  whether 
the  Emperor  would  accept  the  Bavarian  Exchange  as  equivalent 
to  the  Prussian  acquisition  in  Poland,  and  if  not,  and  in  case  a 
partition  were  found  impossible,  what  were  his  ideas  regarding 
the  indemnities  that  would  then  have  to  be  sought  at  the  expense 

1  Schulenburg  to  his  colleagues,  July  30,  their  reply  of  August  4,  B.  A.,  R.  XI, 
Frankreich,  89  g. 

2  To  Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben,  August  n,  ibid. 


34-0  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  France.  To  this  formal  response,  Schulenburg  added  orally 
that  his  sovereign  fully  accepted  the  principle  of  a  '  supplement ' 
for  Austria,  and  would  assuredly  be  willing  to  cooperate  in  pro- 
curing one  for  his  ally.  His  (Schulenburg's)  personal  opinion 
was  that  such  an  acquisition  could  best  be  found  in  Alsace.  The 
honest  Reuss  was  quite  moved  by  such  zeal  for  the  interests  of 
the  Imperial  Court,  and  reported  with  touching  simplicity  that 
it  was  plainly  not  Schulenburg's  fault,  if  the  King  refused  to 
cede  the  Margraviates.  The  divergence  between  Schulenburg's 
'  personal '  utterances  and  his  formal,  ministerial  declarations, 
BischofTwerder's  profuse  sympathy,  and  the  probable  ambiguity 
of  Haugwitz's  interpretations  of  orders  with  which  he  did  not 
agree,  may  well  have  had  something  to  do  with  the  fact  that  the 
Austrian  ministry  still  refused  for  some  time  to  consider  the 
King's  decision  about  the  Margraviates  as  final.1 

The  Prussian  ministers,  too,  were  not  yet  thoroughly  assured 
that  the  Ansbach-Baireuth  question  was  dead  and  buried.  Haug- 
witz  continued  even  into  September  to  recommend  the  cession, 
in  order  to  secure  a  very  generous  acquisition  in  Poland;  and 
this  in  spite  of  Schulenburg's  efforts  to  "  indoctrinate  him,"  and 
in  spite  of  the  fulminations  of  the  Berlin  ministry  against  the 
very  idea.2    The  King's  mind,  however,  seemed  henceforth  fixed. 

The  Austrian  communications  through  Reuss  produced  the 
very  reverse  of  the  desired  effect  on  the  Prussian  ministry.  The 
latter,  instead  of  seeking  the  proposed  concert  with  the  Imperial 
Court,  now  hastened  their  advances  to  Russia.  Goltz,  who  had 
hitherto  been  confined  to  generalities  and  hints,  was  at  last 
ordered  to  enter  into  full  and  frank  explanations.3 

1  For  the  above:  Reuss'  report  of  August  17,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte,  1792; 
Schulenburg  to  Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben,  August  14,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich, 
89  g.  It  is  to  be  noted  that  Schulenburg  did  not  mention  to  his  colleagues  bis 
declarations  regarding  a  '  supplement,'  and  yet  Reuss  reports  them  so  positively 
that  one  can  hardly  doubt  his  word,  especially  in  view  of  the  fact  that  he  was 
admittedly  one  of  the  most  truthful  and  honest  of  diplomats. 

2  Haugwitz  to  the  King,  August  16,  20,  September  4,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170;  Schulen- 
burg to  Haugwitz,  August  15,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  g,  and  September  2, 
B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  K;  Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben  to  Haugwitz, 
passim,  August  20  and  September  n  especially,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170. 

3  Rescripts  to  Goltz  of  August  20  and  24,  September  1  and  4,  B.  A.,  R.  XI, 
Russland,  133. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  34 1 

Before  these  instructions  reached  St.  Petersburg,  matters  had 
already  begun  to  progress  in  that  quarter,  largely,  it  would  seem, 
as  a  result  of  new  communications  from  Vienna.  On  August  8 
Philip  Cobenzl  had  sent  off  to  his  cousin  dispatches  containing 
a  report  of  the  interviews  at  Mainz.  Until  the  question  of  the 
Margraviates  was  settled,  the  Austrians  were  far  from  desiring  to 
start  a  formal  negotiation  at  St.  Petersburg;  and  hence  the 
object  of  the  new  communications  was  only  to  keep  the  Russians 
informed  and  in  good  humor.  But  the  dispatches  contained  one 
novelty.  By  this  time  the  Viennese  ministers  had  convinced  them- 
selves that  it  would  be  impossible  to  avoid  giving  the  Empress 
a  share  of  the  spoils;  and  so  in  order  not  to  be  outdone  in  gener- 
osity by  the  Prussians,  and  in  order  to  accumulate  merits  for  his 
own  Court,  the  Vice-Chancellor  here  mentioned  for  the  first  time 
that,  as  a  matter  of  course,  Russia,  too,  should  get  something.1 
When  Louis  Cobenzl  read  these  dispatches  to  Ostermann,  the 
latter's  face  lighted  up  with  pleasure  when  it  came  to  the  passage 
about  an  acquisition  for  Russia.  "  Well  and  good,  in  that  case 
the  thing  can  go  through,"  he  declared;  "  it  was  impossible  that 
we  alone  should  get  nothing."  2  Without  yet  being  in  a  position 
to  speak  ministerially,  he  gave  Cobenzl  to  understand  that  the 
Empress  agreed  to  the  principle  of  the  indemnity  plan,  and  that 
the  only  question  was  as  to  the  quo  modo.  Goltz,  who  arrived  for 
his  conference  immediately  afterward,  found  that  day  —  for  the 
first  time  —  a  ready  listener.  Ostermann  repeated  to  him  the 
assurance  just  given  to  Cobenzl,  that  his  sovereign  would  cer- 
tainly not  oppose  an  arrangement  for  the  advantage  of  all  three 
Courts  and  wished  only  to  be  informed  of  the  plan  in  more 
detail.3 

Now  at  last  the  Prussian  ministry  could,  as  they  expressed  it, 
see  a  little  couleur  de  rose  in  what  had  been  so  black  a  cloud.  In 
accordance  with  Goltz's  suggestion,  they  at  once  begged  the  King 
to  fix  the  precise  extent  of  the  acquisition  to  be  demanded  in 

1  Ph.  Cobenzl  to  L.  Cobenzl,  August  8,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  164-169. 

2  "  So  recht,  so  kann  die  Sache  gehen,  denn  es  war  nicht  moglich  dass  wir  die 
einzigen  leer  ausgehen." 

3  Cobenzl's  and  Goltz's  reports  of  August  24,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichle,  1792, 
B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


342  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Poland,  so  that  the  envoy  might  be  enabled  to  bring  matters  to 
a  definite  agreement.1  Hitherto  the  Prussians  had  been  by  no 
means  clear  as  to  the  exact  boundaries  that  they  meant  to  claim. 
The  King  had  several  times  spoken  longingly  of  the  whole  left 
bank  of  the  Vistula,2  and  he  had  found  Schulenburg's  ideas  too 
modest.  Haiigwitz,  on  leaving  Frankfort,  seems  to  have  been 
charged  to  go  to  Silesia  and  collect  topographical  information 
bearing  on  the  problem.  In  the  middle  of  August,  he  reported 
his  conclusions.  In  case  of  the  cession  of  the  Margraviates,  he 
proposed  to  demand  the  whole  left  bank  of  the  Vistula  except 
Mazovia;  in  the  contrary  case,  a  boundary  might  be  drawn  from 
Cz^stochowa  through  Piotrkow  and  Rawa  to  the  confluence  of 
the  Bug  and  Vistula,  and  thence  across  to  the  East  Prussian 
frontier  at  Soldau.  This  latter  proposal  is  worth  noting:  it  is  the 
first  appearance  of  the  line  of  demarcation  adopted  in  the  Second 
Partition  Treaty  (with  very  slight  changes).3  Haugwitz's  ideas, 
however,  were  apparently  too  bold  to  suit  his  superiors  at  Berlin, 
and  in  the  instructions  now  forwarded  to  Goltz  the  size  of  the 
acquisition  in  Poland  was  cut  down  to  much  the  same  limits  as 
had  been  proposed  by  Schulenburg  at  Mainz.4  In  any  case,  the 
road  was  thus  paved  for  a  formal  negotiation  at  St.  Petersburg, 
and  the  will  was  not  lacking  in  the  Prussian  ministry  to  close 
V  with  Russia  at  once,  without  waiting  a  moment  for  Austria. 
Unless  the  Court  of  Vienna  hastened  to  present  a  really  accept- 
able proposition,  it  was  likely  to  find  itself  isolated  and  ignored. 
Meantime  the  Austrian  ministers  were  casting  around  desper- 
ately for  their  '  supplement,'  hopelessly  unable  to  meet  the 
impending  danger. 

1  Finckenstein  and  Alvensleben  to  Schulenburg,  September  10,  B.  A.,  R.  XI, 
Frankreich,  89  g. 

2  In  his  note  to  Schulenburg  of  March  12,  and  his  letter  to  Haugwitz  of  July  28. 

3  Haugwitz  to  the  King,  August  16,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170. 

4  Rescript  to  Goltz  of  September  28,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133.  The  line 
indicated  ran  from  the  frontier  of  East  Prussia  southward  through  Lip6w  and 
Bolkowa  to  Plock  on  the  Vistula;  thence  via  Gostyn,  Sleszyn  and  Grzegorzow  to 
the  Warta;  then  up  that  stream  through  Uniej6w  and  Sieradz,  and  across  country 
via  Wielkie  to  the  Silesian  frontier  near  Gorz6w.  It  thus  included  the  whole  of 
the  palatinates  of  Gnesen,  Posen,  Kalisz,  and  Cujavia,  about  one-third  of  that  of 
Sieradz,  and  also  the  cities  of  Dantzic  and  Thorn. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  343 

IV 

Apart  from  its  obstinate  insistence  on  the  impossible  demand 
for  the  Margraviates,  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  done  nothing 
throughout  the  whole  month  of  August,  the  last  month  in  which 
by  prudent  concessions  an  agreement  with  Prussia  on  advanta- 
geous terms  might  still  have  been  reached.  The  Imperial  cabinet 
presented  a  sad  spectacle  of  ever-growing  feebleness,  incoherency, 
and  internal  dissensions.  Now  that  Kaunitz  had  finally  retired, 
the  direction  of  foreign  affairs  had  passed  nominally  into  the 
hands  of  Cobenzl,  an  amiable,  easy-going  bureaucrat,  who  scribbled 
and  stuttered  placidly  through  life  without  displaying  an  excess 
of  imagination,  initiative,  or  energy.  Spielmann  was  a  more  vig- 
orous personality,  but  the  ground  was  already  shaking  under  his 
feet.  If  at  the  beginning  of  the  reign  he  had  passed  for  the  new 
monarch's  most  confidential  adviser,  by  this  time  the  hatred  of 
the  aristocrats  for  this  parvenu,  the  discontent  of  all  classes  with 
a  war  of  which  he  was  popularly  supposed  to  be  the  author,  the 
rankling  jealousy  of  Kaunitz  towards  his  presumptuous  pupil, 
the  violent  opposition  in  the  Conference  —  all  this  had  combined 
to  place  his  position  in  grave  danger.  And  with  him  the  Bavarian- 
Polish  project  stood  or  fell.  In  the  Conference  the  parties  were 
equal:  Spielmann,  Cobenzl,  and  Starhemberg,  the  advocates  of 
the  Exchange,  against  Lacy,  Rosenberg,  and  Colloredo.  But 
even  Cobenzl,  whether  from  jealousy  of  his  colleague  or  from  a 
natural  inclination  to  steer  with  the  wind,  varied  in  his  attitude 
towards  the  project,  sometimes  apparently  going  so  far  as  to 
place  the  '  supplement '  above  the  Exchange  itself.1  As  for  the 
opponents  of  the  plan,  they  had  nothing  to  put  in  its  place.  To 
escape  from  the  war  as  soon  as  possible;  to  free  themselves  from 
an  irritating  dependence  on  Prussia;  to  avoid  compromising  the 
Emperor's  good  name  by  complicity  in  a  new  dismemberment  of 
Poland:  such  seems  to  have  been  the  height  of  their  desires. 
Without  any  perception  of  the  real  situation,  without  plan  or 
system,  without  moderation  in  their  demands  or  prudence  in  the 

1  Cf.  his  memorial  written  in  the  last  days  of  August,  Vivenot,  Zur  Genesis  der 
zweilen  Theilimg  Polens,  pp.  43-47. 


344  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

choice  of  means,  these  gentlemen  of  the  Conference  found  their 
chief  function  in  criticizing,  obstructing,  and  tearing  down;  and 
their  activity  resulted  only  in  hampering  and  thwarting  the 
policy  of  the  Emperor's  responsible  ministers. 

The  arrival  of  the  reply  given  to  Reuss  threw  the  whole  in- 
demnity project  into  doubt.  Spielmann  told  Haugwitz  that  '  he 
was  at  the  end  of  his  Latin ' ;  if  the  King  absolutely  refused  to 
cede  the  Margraviates,  there  could  be  no  more  talk  of  either 
Bavaria  or  Poland.1  Cobenzl  felt  bound  to  advise  that  the 
matter  should  be  brought  before  the  Conference.2  Accordingly, 
on  September  3  another  great  ministerial  field  day  was  held  in 
the  Emperor's  presence  at  Schonbrunn. 

This  time  the  victory  rested  with  Spielmann.  In  spite  of  the 
renewed  efforts  of  the  opposition  and  especially  of  Lacy,  it  was 
decided  to  keep  on  with  the  Exchange  plan,  and  to  make  a  new 
attempt  to  reach  an  understanding  with  Prussia  about  a  '  supple- 
ment.' In  accordance  with  an  idea  brought  forward  by  Spiel- 
mann, the  Conference  resolved  to  propose  once  more  the  cession 
of  the  Margraviates,  this  time  in  return  for  the  promise  of  an 
eventual  cession  of  Lusatia  whenever  that  territory  should  lapse 
to  Austria.  But  as  a  new  refusal  was  to  be  expected  here,  the 
State  Chancellery  had  suggested  that  the  '  supplement '  might 
be  found  either  in  Alsace  or  in  Poland.  Rosenberg  championed 
the  former  alternative,  but  the  Emperor  decided  in  favor  of  the 
latter;  and  Lacy  was  charged  to  draw  up  the  boundaries  of  a 
desirable  acquisition  in  that  quarter.  It  was  the  first  occasion  on 
which  the  Austrians  had  seriously  taken  up  the  idea  of  demand- 
ing a  share  in  the  new  dismemberment  of  Poland.  Here,  too, 
they  discussed  for  the  first  time  a  possibility  that  was  just  begin- 
ning to  loom  up  on  the  horizon.  The  Bavarian  Exchange  could 
hardly  be  effected  until  after  the  peace  with  France,  and  in  the 
meantime  the  definite  settlement  of  Polish  affairs  could  not  well 
be  long  delayed.  What  if  Russia  and  Prussia  should  seize  their 
acquisitions  before  Austria  had  gained  any  securities  for  hers  ? 
The  Conference  decided  that  in  such  a  case  the  Imperial  Court 

1  Haugwitz's  report  to  the  King  of  August  25,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  g. 

2  Vortrag  of  August  27  (V.  A.). 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  345 

must  occupy  a  district  in  Poland  equivalent  to  that  claimed  by 
Prussia,  and  retain  it  as  a  guarantee  until  the  Bavarian  Exchange 
and  the  acquisition  of  the  '  supplement '  had  been  effected. 
Finally,  the  Emperor  announced  his  intention  of  sending  Spiel- 
mann  to  the  King  of  Prussia's  headquarters  to  present  these 
propositions  and  to  negotiate  a  definitive  agreement.  The  news 
from  the  front  was  favorable;  it  seemed  probable  that  the  allied 
armies  would  soon  be  in  Paris;  it  was  urgently  necessary  to 
settle  the  indemnity  question  at  once.1 

Though  much  chagrined  by  the  results  of  this  Conference,2  the 
opposition  were  not  yet  ready  to  acknowledge  themselves  beaten. 
In  the  next  few  days  they  sent  in  written  vota  repeating  their 
objections,  especially  to  the  idea  of  joining  in  the  spoliation  of 
Poland,  with  such  force  that  the  Emperor  was  apparently  shaken 
in  his  previous  resolution.  Moreover,  on  the  question  of  the 
supplement,  Cobenzl  now  went  over  to  their  side,  thus  giving 
them  the  majority  in  the  Conference.3  One  other  incident  also 
occurred  to  render  a  reconsideration  of  the  recent  decisions  desir- 
able. Haugwitz,  learning  of  Spielmann's  mission,  took  the  occa- 
sion to  declare  that  he  should  regret  it,  were  the  Referendary 
sent  in  the  supposition  that  the  cession  of  the  Margraviates 
could  ever  be  conceded,  since  he  had  recently  had  cause  to  doubt 
more  strongly  than  ever  the  feasibility  of  such  a  project.4  Hence 
on  the  7th  the  Conference  met  again,  this  time  in  the  absence  of 
the  Emperor,  who  did  not  enjoy  long  discussions. 

1  Conference  protocol  of  September  3,  and  the  '  separal-vota,'  Vivenot,  ii, 
pp.  180-186.  It  seems  highly  probably  that  Spielmann's  remarks  on  Reuss' 
reports,  which  are  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  172-176,  were  prepared  to  serve  as 
the  basis  of  discussion  at  this  conference,  and  represent  the  Vorlage  usually  sub- 
mitted on  such  occasions  by  the  State  Chancellery. 

2  Zinzendorfs  Diary,  September  6 :  "  Rosenberg  a  honte  d'etre  de  la  conference  " 
(V.  A.). 

3  Cobenzl's  desertion  evidently  took  place  after  the  Conference  of  September  3. 
Otherwise  the  party  in  favor  of  taking  the  supplement  in  Alsace  rather  than  in 
Poland  would  have  been  in  the  majority  that  day,  whereas  it  appears  from  the 
protocol  of  September  7  that  it  was  only  the  separat-vota  submitted  on  the  5  th 
and  6th  which  showed  them  to  be  in  a  majority. 

4  This  from  the  Conference  protocol  of  September  7,  V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1792. 
Haugwitz  gives  a  somewhat  more  vigorous  tone  to  his  declaration  in  his  report  of 
the  same  day,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  170. 


346  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Once  more  the  question  of  Alsace  or  Poland  was  hotly  fought 
over.  Rosenberg  again  advocated  the  former  plan,  on  the  ground 
that  it  was  more  honorable  to  take  a  just  indemnity  from  a  con- 
quered enemy  than  to  join  in  dismembering  a  friendly  state, 
and  also  because  of  the  superior  value  of  this  acquisition,  which, 
combined  with  Bavaria  and  the  Austrian  lands  in  Swabia,  would 
give  the  Imperial  Court  a  decided  preponderance  in  South  Ger- 
many. To  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  conquering  and  defending 
such  a  province,  Rosenberg  seemed  completely  blind.  With  less 
appeal  to  principle  or  sentiment,  but  with  far  more  common 
sense,  Starhemberg  argued  that  the  Austrian  indemnities  must 
be  rendered,  as  far  as  possible,  independent  of  the  fortunes  of 
war,  just  as  were  the  Russian  and  Prussian  ones;  that  an  acquisi- 
tion in  Poland  would  be  easy  and  safe,  while  one  in  Alsace  would 
be  quite  the  reverse ;  and  as  for  the  odium  of  joining  in  a  partition 
of  the  Republic,  the  Imperial  Court  would  only  be  following  the 
example  of  its  two  allies,  and  even  if  it  did  not  take  an  open  hand 
in  the  affair,  the  world  would  never  believe  that  it  had  not  given 
its  consent  in  order  to  secure  advantages  elsewhere.  The  Con- 
ference contented  itself  that  day  with  elucidating  the  arguments 
on  both  sides,  which  were  to  be  submitted  to  the  Emperor. 
Regarding  the  other  great  point  at  issue,  the  ministers  recom- 
mended making  a  final  effort  to  win  the  Margraviates  by  offering 
a  special  arrangement  by  which  the  Bavarian  House  should  cede 
Juliers  and  Berg  to  Prussia.1 

Two  days  later  the  Emperor  gave  his  decision.  Characteristi- 
cally enough,  he  tore  up  his  own  resolution  adopted  only  six  days 
before,  and  pronounced  in  favor  of  just  the  opposite  course:  he 
would  take  his  supplement  in  Alsace,  and  not  in  Poland.  One 
may  doubt  whether  this  decision  had  quite  the  world-historic 
importance  that  has  sometimes  been  given  to  it; 2  but  it  would 
seem  to  have  been  a  fresh  blunder  for  Austria  to  renounce  the  one 
acquisition  that  she  had  any  chance  of  making,  in  order  to  launch 
forth  on  schemes  for  impossible  conquests  from  France.     It  is 

1  Protocol  of  September  7,  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  186-190. 

2  Sybel  {op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  355  f.)  finds  that  it  changed  the  whole  character  of  the 
war  by  turning  the  enterprise  of  the  allies  into  a  war  for  conquests  on  a  grand  scale. 


AUSTRIA  AND  PRUSSIA  DISAGREE  347 

more  to  the  credit  of  the  Emperor's  judgment  that  he  vetoed  the 
Juliers-Berg  project,  thus  finally  consigning  the  wretched  ques- 
tion of  the  Margraviates  to  oblivion.1 

Armed  with  these  new  and  by  no  means  modest  propositions, 
Spielmann  set  out  on  the  morning  of  September  12,  accompanied 
by  the  high  hopes  of  the  Vice-Chancellor  that  the  grand  affair 
would  at  last  be  settled  to  the  great  advantage  of  Austria.2  The 
wonder  and  the  curiosity  of  the  diplomatic  world  rose  one  pitch 
higher,  when  on  the  same  day  Count  Haugwitz  also  departed  in 
the  same  direction.3  All  eyes  in  Vienna  were  now  turned  toward 
the  Prussian  headquarters.  "  Judging  by  what  Prince  Reuss 
has  just  reported,"  Cobenzl  wrote  to  Spielmann,  "  your  letters 
will  probably  soon  be  dated  from  Paris."  It  was  the  day  of 
Valmy.4 

1  Cobenzl's  Vertrag  of  September  9,  and  the  Imperial  apostil,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp. 
191  f. 

2  Cobenzl  to  Spielmann,  September  9,  V.  A.,  Mission  in  das  preussische  Haupt- 
quartier  de  1792,  A. 

3  The  reasons  for  Haugwitz's  journey  are  not  quite  certain.  He  had  received  a 
letter  from  the  King  appointing  him  cabinet  minister  and  informing  him  of  Schu- 
lenburg's  impending  return  to  Berlin,  but  not,  apparently,  summoning  him  to  the 
army.  He  seems  to  have  undertaken  on  his  own  initiative  to  go  to  Frankfort,  in 
the  expectation  that  he  would  then  be  called  to  the  royal  headquarters  to  take 
Schulenburg's  place  in  conducting  the  negotiation  with  Spielmann.  The  letter  to 
the  King  (of  September  5),  in  which  he  explained  his  reasons  for  taking  this  step, 
is  apparently  lost.  To  Schulenburg  he  excused  himself  on  the  plea  that  he  had 
grounds  for  suspecting  that  Spielmann  was  charged  to  renew  the  proposition  about 
the  Margraviates,  and  that  hence  he  had  determined  to  go  to  Frankfort,  in  order 
to  be  near  the  King  and  strengthen  the  royal  resistance  to  such  a  demand,  suppos- 
ing that  Schulenburg  would  already  have  left  the  army.  (Letter  of  September  30, 
B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  K.)  Alopeus  reported  (doubtless  on  the  basis  of  what 
Lucchesini  had  told  him)  that  Spielmann  had  asked  Haugwitz  to  accompany  him, 
because  he  wished  to  negotiate  with  a  minister  in  whom  he  had  confidence  and 
with  whom  he  was  accustomed  to  deal.  (Report  of  September  11/22,  M.  A., 
Ilpyccia,  III,  30.)  This  is  quite  probable,  since  if  Haugwitz  had  not  been  present, 
Spielmann  would  have  had  to  negotiate  with  the  much  distrusted  Lucchesini.  At 
any  rate,  it  is  clear  that  Haugwitz's  trip  was  undertaken  without  orders  from 
anyone. 

*  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  211  f. 


CHAPTER  XV 

The  Note  of  Merle 


Spielmann  reached  Frankfort  on  September  18,  closely  followed 
by  Haugwitz.  As  the  latter  had  just  received  the  King's  order  to 
come  to  the  army,  the  two  continued  on  the  journey  together  as 
far  as  Luxemburg.  On  the  way  Spielmann  applied  himself  with 
all  his  skill  to  win  Haugwitz  over  to  his  propositions;  and  he 
seems  to  have  found  a  very  ready  hearer.  Haugwitz,  it  must  be 
remembered,  had  always  been  in  favor  of  allowing  Austria  a 
'  supplement,'  in  order  to  obtain  for  his  own  Court  a  particularly 
large  slice  of  Poland.  He  now  showed  himself  so  complaisant 
that  Spielmann  ventured  to  claim  for  his  sovereign  not  only  the 
Bavarian  Exchange,  but  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  far  as  the  Moselle 
—  an  acquisition  such  as  the  Conference  had  never  dared  to 
demand  in  even  its  wildest  moments.  Haugwitz  accepted  the 
proposition,  without  objections  apparently,  and,  leaving  Spiel- 
mann at  Luxemburg,  went  on  to  Verdun  (the  26th)  to  find  the 
King  and  receive  his  orders  regarding  the  Austrian  demands  and 
the  counter-claims  to  be  advanced  for  Prussia.1 

But  just  at  this  moment  there  began  that  rapid  series  of  dis- 
asters which  ruined  the  hopes  of  the  invaders  of  France  and  gave 
an  entirely  new  face  to  the  situation.  After  Valmy  (September 
20)  came  Dumouriez's  negotiation  with  Manstein;  September  29 
the  retreat  of  the  allied  army  was  decided  upon;   October  8  the 

1  Haugwitz  to  Schulenburg,  September  30,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  K; 
Spielmann  to  Cobenzl,  September  27,  V.  A.,  Mission  in  das  preussische  Haupt- 
quartier,  and  October  15,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  272-277. 

Haugwitz  wrote:  "  La  Cour  de  Vienne  demandera  pour  sa  part  l'echange  de  la 
Baviere  .  .  .  et  ils  proposeront  d'ajouter  au  lot  de  l'Autriche  l'Alsace  et  une  partie 
de  la  Lorraine  jusqu'a  la  Moselle,  ce  qui  comprend  les  possessions  francoises  entre 
le  Rhin  et  la  Moselle  depuis  les  sources  de  cette  derniere  jusqu'a  Remiez  [Remich], 
tout  le  long  de  la  riviere  en  y  comprenant  les  villes  et  forts  situ6s  sur  la  Moselle  " 
[i.  e.,  Toul,  Metz,  Thionville,  etc.]. 

348 


THE  NOTE  OF  MERLE  349 

Prussians  renewed  the  sham  negotiation;  on  the  12th  Verdun  was 
abandoned,  on  the  22nd  Longwy;  and  in  the  next  few  days  the 
last  German  troops  evacuated  the  soil  of  France.  Meanwhile 
Custine  had  made  his  bold  raid  down  the  Rhine,  seizing  Spires 
September  30,  Mainz  October  21,  and  the  next  day  Frankfort. 
After  the  high  hopes  with  which  the  allies  began  the  '  promenade 
to  Paris,'  these  unthinkable  catastrophes  were  doubly  crushing. 
Of  42,000  Prussians  who  had  entered  France,  hardly  20,000 
recrossed  the  frontier,  and  of  these  more  than  half  were  sick.1 
A  soldier  who  lived  through  the  horrors  of  181 2,  later  declared 
that  the  Prussians  during  the  retreat  from  Champagne  were  per- 
haps a  more  terrible  sight  than  even  the  wrecks  of  the  Grand 
Army.2  The  effect  upon  Frederick  William's  impressionable  and 
glory-loving  mind  can  easily  be  imagined.  He  who  throughout 
his  reign  had  had  to  stand  the  comparison  with  his  illustrious 
predecessor,  had  played  away  in  an  expedition  as  ill-fated  as 
mismanaged  the  prestige  and  the  nimbus  of  invincibility  which 
had  hitherto  clung  to  the  army  of  the  great  Frederick.  Little 
wonder  that  the  King  was  eager  to  wipe  out  the  shame  by  a  new 
campaign  in  the  following  year,  and  that  he  was  even  more 
anxious  to  rehabilitate  himself  in  the  eyes  of  his  subjects  by  secur- 
ing immediately  an  acquisition  that  would  balance  all  his  losses. 
Under  these  circumstances,  Haugwitz  met  his  sovereign  on 
October  8  at  Consenvoye,  reported  what  he  supposed  to  be  the 
aims  of  Spielmann's  mission,  and  obtained  definite  instructions 
as  to  the  share  which  the  King  intended  to  demand  in  Poland. 
On  the  map  of  the  Republic  Frederick  William  traced  the  line 
Czgstochowa-Rawa-Soldau,  which  henceforth  formed  the  basis  of 
the  Prussian  claims.  Haugwitz  was  directed  to  go  back  to  Ver- 
dun, where  Spielmann  had  now  arrived,  to  receive  the  definite 
propositions  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.3  On  his  return,  however,  he 
found  the  Austrian  minister  on  the  point  of  retiring  to  Luxem- 

1  Chuquet,  La  Catnpagne  de  VArgonne  (1792),  pp.  476  f. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  475. 

3  Haugwitz  to  Schulenburg,  October  15,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankrekh,  89  K.  The 
fact  that  the  King  at  this  time  gave  definite  orders  as  to  his  claims  in  Poland,  and 
traced  the  line  of  demarcation  on  the  map  with  his  own  hand,  appears  from  Haug- 
witz's  great  report  of  May  6,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H. 


350  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

burg,  as  the  evacuation  of  Verdun  had  just  been  decided  upon. 
During  the  brief  conversation  that  then  took  place,  Spielmann 
learned  only  that  the  King  expressed  great  willingness  not  only 
to  assist  in  the  realization  of  the  Exchange,  but  to  secure  for  the 
Imperial  Court  a  rich  '  supplement '  in  lieu  of  the  Margraviates.1 
On  reaching  Luxemburg  on  the  12th,  the  Referendary  fell  ill  with 
a  fever,  so  that  although  Haugwitz  arrived  the  following  day,  the 
negotiation  had  to  be  still  further  delayed. 

The  situation  had  changed  so  greatly  that  Spielmann  weighed 
the  question  whether  he  could  negotiate  at  all  on  the  basis  of 
instructions  drawn  up  on  quite  different  presuppositions.  Haug- 
witz urged,  indeed,  that  the  King  was  resolved  to  make  a  second 
campaign,  if  the  Court  of  Vienna  agreed,  and  was  anxious  to 
settle  the  indemnity  question  at  once.  But  the  Prussian  minister 
also  threw  out  an  ominous  hint  of  the  kind  of  settlement  his 
master  had  in  mind,  when  in  a  lively  discussion  (on  the  14th)  he 
declared  that  the  King  must  have  his  acquisition  in  Poland,  no 
matter  how  other  affairs  turned  out,  and  that  he  could  not  leave 
it  dependent  on  the  uncertain  course  of  future  events.  In  other 
words,  the  King  meant  to  make  sure  of  his  indemnity  at  once, 
although,  in  view  of  the  disastrous  turn  of  the  war,  the  realization 
of  the  Exchange  seemed  still  very  far  in  the  future.  The  prin- 
ciple, hitherto  accepted  on  both  sides,  that  the  respective  indem- 
nities must  proceed  pari  passu,  was  in  danger  of  being  repudiated. 
Spielmann  did  his  best  to  combat  so  insidious  an  idea;  but 
Haugwitz  maintained  that  his  own  personal  standing  depended 
on  the  realization  of  his  master's  wishes.2  It  was  the  beginning  of 
a  decisive  turn  in  Prussian  policy. 

Nevertheless,  after  long  cogitation,  Spielmann  determined  to 
go  ahead  even  without  instructions,  and  to  make  such  arrange- 
ments as  were,  on  the  one  hand,  required  by  the  dangerous  posi- 
tion of  affairs,  and  would,  on  the  other  hand,  satisfy  the  desires  of 
Frederick  William.  He  recognized  clearly  that  the  continuation 
of  the  war  was  far  more  indispensable  to  Austrian  than  to  Prus- 
sian interests;   the  King  was  eager  at  present  to  make  a  second 

1  Spielmann  to  Cobenzl,  October  15,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  272-277. 

2  Spielmann  to  Cobenzl,  October  15. 


THE  NOTE  OF  MERLE  35  I 

campaign;  but  if  Austria  showed  any  disinclination  to  it,  or  to 
settling  the  indemnity  affair  at  once,  it  was  only  too  greatly  to  be 
feared  that  his  good  dispositions  would  grow  cold,  and  that  he 
would  retire  from  the  war  altogether.  No  doubt  the  Jacobins 
would  build  him  'bridges  of  gold';  and  in  the  loss  of  the  Austrian 
Netherlands,  Prussian  statesmen  might  find  a  sufficient  gain  for 
themselves,  even  if  they  got  nothing  in  Poland.1  With  these 
reflections  in  mind,  Spielmann  drew  up  a  plan  for  an  agreement 
about  the  indemnities,  in  which  he  advanced  for  his  own  Court 
those  none  too  modest  claims  to  which  Haugwitz  had  already  lent 
so  willing  an  ear,  while  he  added  certain  stipulations  adapted  to 
the  altered  circumstances  and  to  the  wishes  of  the  King  of  Prussia. 
Though  it  was  destined  to  an  early  grave,  this  plan  is  too  remark- 
able to  be  passed  over  without  some  description. 

Frederick  William  desired  to  make  a  second  campaign;  Spiel- 
mann had  no  definite  orders  on  that  point,  but  he  knew  that  the 
interests  of  his  Court  imperatively  demanded  it:  hence  the  first 
article  of  the  proposed  agreement  provided  that  the  two  Powers 
should  make  a  second  campaign  with  forces  as  large  as  had  been 
employed  in  the  present;  that  neither  should  consent  to  a  truce 
or  a  negotiation  without  the  consent  of  the  other;  and  that  both 
should  endeavor  to  induce  England,  Russia,  and  the  Germanic 
Empire  to  join  actively  in  the  war.  The  struggle  was  to  be  con- 
tinued in  common  until  monarchical  government  had  been 
restored  in  France,  or  until  the  spread  of  revolutionary  principles 
had  been  sufficiently  and  permanently  checked.  The  King  of 
Prussia  would  thus  find  his  first  wish  gratified,  and  himself  nicely 
bound,  too,  if  he  consented  to  all  this.  Frederick  William  also 
desired  to  occupy  his  Polish  acquisition  at  once,  without  leaving 
it  to  the  uncertain  chances  of  war.  Spielmann  was  ready  to  grant 
this  also  —  on  certain  conditions.  First  of  all,  the  Bavarian  Ex- 
change must  be  ensured  immediately.  If  the  King  would  at  once 
send  Haugwitz  to  win  the  consent  of  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken, 
while  Austria  simultaneously  began  negotiations  at  Munich;  if 

1  These  reflections  in  Spielmann's  letter  to  Cobenzl  cited  above.  At  the  end  of 
this  report  he  declared  that  he  would  later  send  in  the  plan  by  which  he  had  deter- 
mined to  proceed.    The  plan  followed  in  his  next  report  of  November  6. 


352  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

a  formal  treaty  was  concluded  with  the  Bavarian  House  (the 
execution  to  be  deferred  till  the  time  of  the  peace  with  France) ; 
if  Prussia  would  guarantee  the  Exchange  against  all  obstacles 
from  foreign  Powers  (England  and  Holland):  then  Frederick 
William  might  proceed  to  the  occupation  of  his  lot  in  Poland,  the 
territory  bounded  by  the  line  Cze^stochowa-Rawa-Soldau.  But 
the  Austrian  '  supplement '  must  also  be  brought  under  cover. 
Here  Spielmann  reverted  to  the  idea  approved  by  the  Conference 
on  September  3  and  discarded  four  days  later.  He  proposed  that 
simultaneously  with  the  Prussian  occupation  in  Poland  the 
Emperor  should  also  occupy  a  district  there  equivalent  to  the 
respective  acquisitions  of  his  allies,  and  should  retain  this  as  a 
guarantee  until  Bavaria  and  Alsace-Lorraine  as  far  as  the  Moselle 
were  in  his  hands.  Thus  all  contingencies  would  be  provided  for, 
every  interest  of  Austria  would  be  ensured,  the  King  of  Prussia's 
chief  desires  would  be  complied  with :  in  short,  a  basis  seemed  to 
have  been  found  on  which  the  two  Powers  could  finally  agree. 

When  Spielmann  presented  this  plan  to  Haugwitz,  the  latter 
readily  acquiesced,  as  far  as  his  personal  opinion  was  concerned, 
in  all  its  points  save  one.  He  objected  to  the  proposed  Austrian 
occupation  in  Poland.  If  the  Court  of  Vienna  must  join  in  that 
banquet,  there  would  not  be  enough  to  go  round.  He  agreed, 
however,  to  report  all  to  the  King;  and  one  would  judge  from  the 
tone  of  a  letter  of  that  moment  that  he  was  by  no  means  dis- 
inclined to  the  project.1 

But  immediately  afterward  events  began  to  play  havoc  with 
Spielmann's  plan.  On  leaving  Verdun  he  seems  to  have  thought 
that  the  allies  would  retreat  only  beyond  the  River  Chiers  and 
would  still  occupy  winter  quarters  in  France.  But  in  fact  the 
retreat  from  Verdun  turned  into  a  rout,  the  combined  forces 
poured  over  the  frontier  in  the  most  sorry  plight,  French  soil  was 

1  Spielmann's  plan  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  348-354.  The  other  sources 
relating  to  it  are  the  Referendary's  report  of  November  6,  and  Haugwitz's  letters 
to  Schulenburg  of  October  19  and  27,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  K.  The 
account  given  in  the  text  differs  greatly  from  those  of  previous  writers,  owing 
to  the  fact  that  I  have  placed  this  plan  in  the  middle  of  Spielmann's  negotiation, 
while  Sybel  put  it  at  the  very  end,  and  Heidrich  at  the  very  beginning.  The  ques- 
tions at  issue  are  discussed  in  Appendix  XV. 


THE  NOTE  OF  MERLE  353 

completely  evacuated;  and  in  the  meantime  the  mysterious 
negotiations  of  the  Prussians  with  the  enemy  aroused  in  Spiel- 
mann,  as  in  all  the  Austrians  present,  the  vehement  suspicion 
that  there  was  treachery  afoot.  Under  these  circumstances,  the 
Referendary  redoubled  his  efforts  to  bring  Haugwitz  to  a  cate- 
gorical declaration  as  to  the  King's  intentions,  but  he  can  scarcely 
have  concealed  from  himself  the  fact  that  the  fateful  turn  of 
events  allowed  little  chance  of  success  to  the  plan  he  had  pre- 
sented only  a  few  days  before.1 

II 

Frederick  William,  for  more  than  one  reason,  was  angry  with 
the  Austrians.  The  common  disasters  had  not  failed  to  bring 
forth  dissensions  among  the  allies;  and  the  refusal  of  the  Im- 
perial general  Hohenlohe  (Kirchberg)  to  defend  Longwy,  fol- 
lowed by  his  precipitate  retreat  into  Belgium,  had  capped  the 
climax.2  The  few  supporters  of  the  Austrian  system  had  fallen 
from  favor.  Schulenburg,  who,  patriot  as  he  was,  had  meant  to 
deal  loyally  with  the  Court  of  Vienna,  had  returned  to  Berlin 
discredited  and  disillusioned.  Bischoffwerder  was  in  semi-dis- 
grace and  entirely  without  influence  on  foreign  policy.  Of  the 
men  who  now  enjoyed  the  most  credit,  the  royal  adjutant  Man- 
stein  —  the  sometime  friend  and  present  rival  of  Bischoffwerder 
—  and  Lucchesini,  who  had  been  called  to  the  army  to  direct  the 
anticipated  negotiations  with  France,  were  united  in  the  desire 
for  peace  and  for  the  dissolution  of  the  Austrian  alliance.  Haug- 
witz, though  unsteady  and  pliable,  had  formerly  inclined  to  much 
the  same  principles,  and  now  under  Lucchesini's  influence  re- 
turned to  them.  It  was  Lucchesini  who  strove  most  effectually 
to  dampen  the  King's  ardor  for  the  war,  persuaded  him  out  of 
proposing  an  '  offensive  league  '  to  the  Court  of  Vienna,  and 
continually  urged  upon  him  the  necessity  above  all  things  of 

1  Cf.  his  report  of  November  6,  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  338. 

2  Cf.  Frederick  William's  outburst  to  Bischoffwerder  after  this  incident:  "  Voila 

les  f alli6s  que  vous  m'avez  donneV,   je  suis  pres  de  rompre  avec  eux,"  and 

his  complaints  to  Nassau,  Feuillet  de  Conches,  Louis  XVI,  Marie  Antoinette  el 
Madame  Elisabeth,  vi,  pp.  367  f.,  372  ff.,  392-396. 


354 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


attending  to  his  indemnity.1  It  was  Lucchesini,  apparently,  who 
originated  the  plan  embodied  in  the  Note  of  Merle. 

This  plan  was,  substantially,  to  take  advantage  of  the  disas- 
trous campaign,  the  danger  threatening  the  Austrian  Nether- 
lands, the  peril  menacing  the  Empire  itself,  to  demand  an 
immediate  acquisition  in  Poland  as  the  price  of  continuing  the 
war.  Austria's  necessity  must  be  Prussia's  opportunity.  The 
settlement  of  the  indemnity  question  had  been  so  long  delayed 
and  had  been  so  much  obstructed  by  the  pretensions  of  the 
Imperial  Court,  that  the  chance  was  not  to  be  lost  to  use  the  lever 
thrust  into  Prussian  hands.  There  could  be  no  doubt  that 
Austria  stood  greatly  in  need  of  further  assistance,  and  that,  as 
far  as  the  French  were  concerned,  Frederick  William  was  free  to 
/  withdraw  from  the  contest  whenever  he  pleased.  It  was,  indeed, 
true  that  according  to  the  spirit  of  their  original  engagements, 
neither  of  the  allied  Powers  had  the  right  to  withdraw  without  the 
other.  As  late  as  October  15  that  principle  was  plaintively 
reasserted  by  the  Prussians  themselves,  when  they  feared  for  a 
moment  that  Austria  might  be  on  the  point  of  backing  out  of  the 
contest  and  leaving  them  in  the  lurch.  On  that  date  the  ministers 
at  Berlin  wrote  to  Lucchesini  that  since  the  two  Powers  had 
undertaken  this  enterprise  at  their  common  expense,  in  the  same 
spirit  and  for  the  same  aim,  there  could  be  no  question  of  the  one 
abandoning  the  other;  the  struggle  must  necessarily  be  pursued 
with  united  efforts  until  both  Courts  could  simultaneously  make 
an  honorable  peace.  Neither  the  ministers  at  Berlin  nor  Haug- 
witz  seem  at  first  to  have  perceived  the  opportunity  created  by 
the  new  situation.  It  may  be  doubted  whether  even  Lucchesini 
would  have  ventured  to  recommend  taking  so  high  a  tone  despite 
all  previous  engagements,  if  he  had  expected  to  meet  with  the 
united  opposition  of  the  Imperial  Courts.  But  just  at  this 
moment  he  felt  fairly  sure  of  encountering  no  obstacles  from 
Russia. 

Goltz  had  recently  reported,  in  a  tone  of  assurance  quite  un- 
common with  him,  that  the  Russian  ministers  showed  the  best  of 

1  Lucchesini  to  Finckenstein,  Schulenburg,  and  Alvensleben,  October  15,  23-26, 
B.  A.,  R.  92,  Lucchesinis  Nachlass,  No.  14.  The  papers  from  this  collection  are 
henceforth  cited  L.  N. 


THE  NOTE  OF   MERLE  355 

intentions  on  the  indemnity  question,  and  that  he  was  convinced 
that  the  Empress  desired  a  new  partition  of  Poland,  provided 
only  that  Austria  was  not  allowed  to  take  anything  from  the 
Republic.1  Alopeus  had  also  come  to  the  camp  at  Consenvoye  to 
present  a  dispatch  from  Ostermann,  which  announced  that  the 
Empress  was  disposed  to  oblige  her  allies  as  soon  as  she  knew 
their  precise  plans,  and  which  pressed  for  a  speedy  communica- 
tion of  the  King's  views  at  St.  Petersburg.2  Such  invitations 
were  not  to  be  neglected.  They  also  gave  reason  to  think  that 
the  effect  of  the  reply  would  not  be  spoiled  by  a  mild  threat. 

Frederick  William  made  haste,  then,  to  respond  with  a  letter  to 
the  Empress  (written  from  Longuyon,  October  17),  in  which  he 
referred  to  the  definite  and  detailed  communications  which  Goltz 
was  charged  to  make,  and  intimated  politely  but  clearly  that  he 
could  not  decide  to  undertake  a  second  campaign  until  assured  of 
his  indemnities  not  only  for  the  expenses  of  the  past,  but  for  those 
to  be  incurred  in  the  future. 

It  remained  to  deal  with  Austria.  From  that  Power  little  good 
will  was  to  be  expected,  but  —  thanks  to  Brunswick's  generalship 
—  Prussia  was  in  a  position  to  dictate  her  terms.  To  prepare  the 
Austrians  for  the  blow,  the  King  invited  the  three  ministers, 
Spielmann,  Mercy,  and  Thugut  (the  latter  two  had  been  sent  to 
conduct  the  expected  negotiations  with  France)  to  his  head- 
quarters near  the  village  of  Merle  (October  24),  and  after  dinner 
received  them  in  audience  in  his  tent.  Though  he  treated  them 
graciously  enough  and  spoke  warmly  of  his  desire  to  maintain  the 
alliance,  he  indicated  sufficiently  clearly  the  determination  that 
he  had  reached.  At  the  close  he  announced  that  Haugwitz 
would  present  his  intentions  in  writing.  Spielmann  understood 
what  was  coming,  and  already  told  his  friends  that  he  was  a  lost 
man.3  The  following  evening  the  Referendary  received  the 
promised  '  declaration  '  from  Haugwitz. 

1  Report  of  September  25,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

2  Ostermann  to  Alopeus,  September  3/14,  Alopeus'  report  of  October  8/19, 
M.  A.,  Ilpyccia,  III,  28  and  30. 

3  Lucchesini  to  the  ministers  at  Berlin,  October  26,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14; 
Spielmann's  report  of  November  6.  All  sources  agree  in  placing  this  audience  on 
the  24th  of  October,  and  not  the  25th  as  in  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  360. 


y 


356  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

The  famous  note,  dated  from  Merle,  October  25,  is  hardly  a 
model  of  clearness  and  precision,  as  neither  the  King  nor  Haug- 
witz,  who  drew  up  the  document,  had  at  that  moment  a  chan- 
cellery at  their  disposal.  Nevertheless,  these  few  paragraphs,  so 
vague  in  part,  were  to  be  the  Law  and  the  Prophets  for  Prussian 
ministers  in  the  following  year;  they  were  to  be  held  up  as  the 
complete  exposition  of  the  nature  of  the  King's  participation  in 
the  war,  and  as  the  sole  basis  and  measure  of  his  engagements. 

The  note  may  be  divided  into  two  parts.  The  first  related  to 
the  theory  of  Prussia's  further  participation  in  the  war.  The 
King  was  ready,  it  was  said,  to  continue  his  exertions  either  as  a 
member  of  a  concert  of  all  the  European  Powers,  or  in  case  the 
Diet  of  Ratisbon  declared  war  on  France,  as  a  member  of  the 
Empire,  i.  e.,  with  the  small  quota  due  from  him  as  a  Reichs- 
stand.  The  first  case  was  obviously  unthinkable;  and  the  aid 
promised  in  the  second  would  clearly  be  inacceptable  to  Austria. 
These  offers  were,  then,  only  phrases,  intended  to  lead  up  to  the 
third  case.  If  the  Emperor,  the  note  went  on,  saw  fit  to  con- 
tinue the  war  with  all  his  forces,  even  if  some  or  all  of  the  other 
Powers  refused  to  join  with  him,  the  King  agreed  to  assist  him  in 
the  next  campaign  with  the  same  forces  as  had  been  employed 
in  the  present  one  —  under  one  condition.  That  is  to  say,  all  of 
the  previous  engagements  had  been  swept  out  of  existence;  and 
if  the  King  went  on  with  the  war,  it  would  be  only  in  order  to  aid 
Austria,  and  at  the  price  which  he  was  about  to  name.  It  was  the 
beginning  of  the  theory  that  Austria  was  partie  principale  et 
attaquee,  and  Prussia  partie  accessoire  et  auxiliaire,  a  theory  which 
then  became  the  favorite  thesis  of  the  statesmen  at  Berlin, 
although  it  stood  in  glaring  contradiction  to  the  agreements  with 
which  the  two  Courts  began  the  war. 

But  now  for  the  condition  of  Prussia's  further  cooperation, 
which  formed  the  principal  part  of  the  note.  "  Since  the  present 
campaign,"  it  was  said,  "  has  caused  so  considerable  an  expense 
and  so  great  a  loss  of  life,  and  the  continuation  of  the  war  must 
involve  a  still  greater  expenditure,  His  Prussian  Majesty  feels 
himself  justified  in  expecting  a  complete  and  speedy  compensa- 
tion and  indemnity  for  the  expenses  already  incurred;  and  before 


THE  NOTE  OF  MERLE  357 

the  King  takes  further  part  in  the  continuation  of  the  war,  he 
considers  himself  bound  by  his  duty  to  his  realm  to  demand  an 
indemnity  for  the  expenses  of  the  next  campaign.  He  therefore 
expects  that  the  arrondissement  in  Poland,  with  regard  to  which 
he  has  already  made  overtures  to  the  Emperor,  will  be  assured  to 
him  by  the  Courts  of  Austria  and  Russia,  and  actually  taken  into 
his  possession." 

All  this  might  have  been  said  more  precisely,  but  the  drift  was 
clear.  The  King  must  have  laid  his  hands  upon  his  indemnities 
both  for  the  past  and  for  the  future,  before  he  could  begin  a  second 
campaign.  And  with  that,  the  whole  previous  plan  for  the  joint 
indemnification  was  thrown  overboard.  Hitherto  both  Powers 
had  always  recognized  the  principle  of  complete  parity:  the 
respective  indemnities  were  to  be  equal ;  they  were  to  be  gathered 
in  simultaneously;  if  the  one  proved  impracticable,  the  other 
must  also  be  abandoned.  Doubtless  the  King  and  some  of  his 
advisers  were  still  sincerely  willing  to  help  Austria  to  the  acquisi- 
tion of  Bavaria;  but  the  Exchange  was  obviously  impossible  at 
that  moment,  and  not  to  be  realized  for  a  long  time  to  come;  and 
at  all  events  Prussia  meant  to  have  her  booty  at  once,  whether 
Austria  ever  got  anything  or  not.  That  was  the  beginning  of  the 
thesis  that  if  the  Court  of  Vienna  had  any  titles  to  an  indemnity 
at  all,  they  were  not  to  be  placed  on  the  same  line  with  those  of 
Prussia.  The  latter  were  absolutely  independent  of,  and  infinitely 
more  valid  than,  the  Austrian  claims.  That  was  the  crowning 
blow  to  the  theory  of  a  common  enterprise.  It  was  also  the  ruin 
of  an  alliance,  the  primary  basis  of  which  was  complete  equality 
in  all  advantages. 

But  if  the  rights  were  mostly  in  favor  of  the  Austrians,  the  facts 
were  all  on  the  side  of  Prussia.  Whatever  the  aims  and  nature  of 
the  war  had  been  originally,  in  view  of  the  recent  events  the 
allied  Powers  could  no  longer  have  any  other  object  than  to  repel 
the  victorious  Revolutionary  armies  and  to  exact  such  ven- 
geance as  they  were  able.  In  this  the  interests  of  Austria  were 
very  much  more  at  stake  than  were  those  of  Prussia.  And  if  the 
altered  nature  of  the  war  lent  some  color  to  the  new  Prussian 
theory,  the  King's  demand  with  regard  to  Poland  was  also  not 


358  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

without  justification  in  the  circumstances  of  the  moment.  The 
Empress  could  not  long  defer  settling  Polish  affairs  in  one  way  or 
another;  she  seemed  strongly  inclined  to  a  partition  at  present; 
but  it  was  to  be  doubted  whether  her  good  dispositions  would 
last,  if  the  King  long  delayed  the  matter.  There  was  reason  for 
haste  then,  and  an  admirable  opportunity,  if  seized  in  time.  To 
ask  the  Prussian  statesmen  to  relinquish  or  to  postpone  a  hand- 
some acquisition  that  seemed  within  their  reach  at  that  moment, 
simply  out  of  regard  for  a  jealous  ally  or  out  of  respect  for  pre- 
vious engagements,  would  be  to  expect  a  self-denial  and  a  loyalty 
not  very  common  in  history.1 

Ill 

Spielmann  was  filled  with  indignation  and  dismay  by  the  Prus- 
sian declaration.  Taken  together  with  the  slack  conduct  of  the 
recent  campaign  and  the  suspicious  negotiations  with  the  enemy, 
it  seemed  to  him  to  indicate  a  deep-laid  design  to  "  put  the  knife 
to  the  throat  of  Austria."  In  two  days  of  heated  discussions  with 
Haugwitz,  he  endeavored  to  prove  that  the  principles  of  the  note 
violated  all  those  invariably  agreed  upon  between  the  two  Courts, 
and  ran  contrary  to  all  loyalty,  fairness,  and  justice.  But  irrefut- 
able arguments  were  powerless  against  Haugwitz,  who  had  facts 
on  his  side.  After  weighing  the  situation  carefully  with  Mercy, 
Spielmann  decided  to  make  the  best  of  it,  not  insisting  too 
strenuously  on  the  old  principles,  but  rather  trying  to  drive  a  new 
bargain  on  the  basis  of  the  Prussian  note. 

The  Referendary  now  directed  his  main  efforts  towards  making 
sure  of  the  King's  earnest  cooperation  in  effecting  the  Exchange. 
On  that  point  Haugwitz  was  satisfactory  enough.  He  gave  the 
most  solemn  assurances  that  his  sovereign  was,  and  would 
remain,  sincerely  disposed  to  further  the  Exchange  to  the  best  of 
his  ability;  he  would  gladly  employ  his  good  offices  with  the 
Duke  of  Zweibriicken;  he  would  even  guarantee  the  realization 
of  the  project  against  all  hindrances  whatsoever.    But  as  it  was 

1  The  Note  of  Merle  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  292  f.  On  it  cf.  Sybel, 
op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  359  ff.;  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  128  f.;  Hausser,  op.  ciL,  i,  pp.  398  ff., 
435  ff.;  Heidrich,  op.  cit.,  pp.  397-402. 


THE  NOTE  OF  MERLE  359 

clear  that  not  only  the  Exchange  itself,  but  even  the  negotiation 
with  the  Bavarian  House,  must  still  be  postponed  for  an  indefinite 
period,  Spielmann  again  proposed  the  plan  for  an  interimistic 
Austrian  occupation  in  Poland,  the  district  in  question  to  be 
restored  to  the  Republic  in  case  the  acquisition  of  Bavaria  and 
of  a  suitable  '  supplement '  should  later  be  effected.  On  this 
point,  too,  Haugwitz  seems  to  have  shown  himself  complaisant; 
at  least  Spielmann  reported  that  on  this  occasion  the  Prus- 
sian minister  made  no  objection  to  the  idea,  but  asked  only  to 
know  definitely  what  acquisitions  Austria  desired  to  make  in  that 
quarter.1 

The  matter  seemed  so  important,  however,  that  in  order  to  get 
the  minister's  utterances  confirmed,  Spielmann  sought  and 
obtained  through  Bischoffwerder  an  audience  with  the  King 
(October  2  7) .  Frederick  William  approved  all  that  Haugwitz  had 
said.  In  a  tone  which  must,  as  Spielmann  reported,  inspire 
nothing  but  confidence,  if  such  a  thing  as  good  faith  existed  in  the 
world,  the  King  expressed  his  readiness  to  guarantee  the  Ex- 
change and  to  negotiate  at  Zweibriicken,  and  even  added  the 
suggestion  that  in  view  of  the  provoking  conduct  of  the  Elector 
of  Bavaria,  they  might  in  his  case  adopt  a  tone  other  than  that  of 
mere  persuasion.  Spielmann  encountered  some  opposition  at 
first  on  the  subject  of  the  Austrian  occupation  in  Poland,  but 
believed  that  in  the  end  he  had  succeeded  in  winning  the  King's 

1  Spielmann's  report  of  November  6,  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  346.  Heidrich  holds  {op. 
cit.,  p.  405,  note  2)  that  Spielmann's  statement  here  is  not  accurate,  and  that 
he  was  confusing  his  conversation  with  Haugwitz  with  the  assurances  given  him 
immediately  afterward  by  the  King.  This  view  Heidrich  bases  on  Haugwitz's 
declaration  (in  a  letter  to  Schulenburg  of  October  27)  that  he  had  rejected  the 
proposition  about  an  Austrian  acquisition  in  Poland.  I  think  it  deserves  to  be 
pointed  out,  however,  that  in  the  letter  to  Schulenburg  Haugwitz  was  referring  to  a 
previous  discussion  of  this  question  with  Spielmann  on  the  occasion  of  the  '  mem- 
oire  '  presented  to  him  by  the  Referendary  about  a  week  before  the  Note  of  Merle. 
Spielmann  readily  admits  that  on  that  occasion  Haugwitz  had  opposed  the  idea, 
but  states  positively  that  he  did  not  raise  the  slightest  objection  on  the  later  occa- 
sion. It  is  quite  possible  that  Haugwitz,  who  was  now  doing  his  best  to  sweeten 
the  bitter  taste  of  the  Note  of  Merle,  showed  himself  this  time  more  compliant  on 
the  subject.  At  any  rate,  since  his  statement  does  not  refer  to  the  later  conversa- 
tion, and  Spielmann's  does,  I  should  prefer  to  trust  the  latter,  quite  apart  from  the 
question  of  the  comparative  veracity  of  the  two  men. 


360  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

consent.  It  is  not  surprising,  then,  that  on  leaving  Frederick 
William  he  declared  to  Bischoffwerder  that  the  audience  had 
revived  all  his  hopes  and  cured  all  his  sorrows.1  The  Note  of 
Merle  would  indeed  lose  its  terrors,  if  Austria  were  assured  of 
the  Prussian  guarantee  of  the  Exchange,  the  King's  good  offices  at 
Zweibriicken,  and  a  real  security  besides  in  the  shape  of  a  Polish 
province. 

It  remained  to  hear  the  verdict  of  Vienna.  Haugwitz  was 
destined  to  return  temporarily  to  his  old  post,  in  order  to  receive 
the  reply  to  the  Note  of  Merle,  and  to  make  sure  of  the  Austrian 
consent  to  an  immediate  Prussian  occupation  in  Poland.  On 
October  30  he  left  Luxemburg  on  the  road  to  Cologne,  and  some 
hours  later  Spielmann  followed. 

On  arriving  in  that  city  the  two  had  further  discussions. 
Spielmann's  attention  seems  to  have  been  called  by  Reuss  to  a 
new  plan  of  a  bold  and  promising  character.  The  King  of  Prussia 
and  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  had  suggested  that  if  the  Elector  of 
Bavaria  continued  his  more  than  equivocal  relations  with  the 
French,  the  Imperial  Court  should  adopt  violent  measures  against 
him.  The  Lower  Palatinate  and  the  fortress  of  Mannheim  were 
too  important  to  be  left  in  danger  of  falling  into  hostile  hands.2 
Spielmann  was  favorably  impressed  with  the  idea.  The  Elector's 
sins  and  shortcomings  might  furnish  the  Emperor  with  an  admir- 
able excuse  for  putting  himself  in  possession  of  Bavaria  at  once.3 
Haugwitz  was  straightway  approached  on  the  subject,  and 
hurried  back  to  Coblenz,  where  the  King  had  now  arrived,  to  take 
his  orders.    Apart  from  the  military  grounds,  Frederick  William 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  ministers  at  Berlin,  December  14,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  L.  N.  14. 

2  Reuss'  report  of  November  6,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte,  1792.  On  the  Elector's 
conduct  in  this  connection,  see  Schrepfer,  Pfalzbayerns  Politik  im  Revolutions- 
zeitalter,  pp.  50  ff . 

3  Reuss  does  not  expressly  say  that  he  suggested  the  idea  to  Spielmann,  but  on 
the  one  hand  he  was  very  ardent  for  the  project  and  brings  it  up  continually  in  his 
reports  of  November;  and  on  the  other  hand  Haugwitz  refers  to  it  as  a  proposition 
brought  forward  by  Reuss  (Report  of  December  1,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170).  The  ministers 
at  Berlin  replied  (December  6)  that  they  understood  that  Spielmann  originated 
this  idea  (and  Heidrich,  op.  cit.,  p.  407,  note  3  accepts  their  opinion);  but  it  seems 
that  Haugwitz,  who  was  on  the  spot,  was  likely  to  be  better  informed  than  they 
were. 


THE  NOTE  OF  MERLE  36 1 

now  had  another  motive  for  approving  the  idea.  The  latest  news 
from  St.  Petersburg  was  by  no  means  so  favorable  as  the  Prussians 
had  hoped  for.  It  began  to  appear  that  Austrian  aid  might  be 
required  in  order  to  induce  the  Empress  to  agree  to  the  partition. 
Hence  the  King  decided  to  allow  the  Court  of  Vienna  to  occupy 
Bavaria,  but  only  after  the  united  efforts  of  the  Prussian  and 
Austrian  envoys  had  extorted  the  Russian  consent  to  the  imme- 
diate entry  of  the  Prussian  troops  into  Poland.1  A  new  demand 
was  thus  made  upon  Austria  over  and  above  those  contained  in 
the  Note  of  Merle;  but  this  was  little  compared  to  the  flattering 
prospect  offered  to  the  Imperial  Court  of  taking  possession  of  its 
indemnity  at  the  same  time  that  the  Prussians  occupied  theirs,  of 
finally  getting  this  long-sought  and  so  elusive  Bavaria  into  its 
grasp.  Spielmann  might  well  congratulate  himself  upon  the  last 
phase  of  his  negotiation.  He  had  almost  wrung  victory  from 
defeat.  But  his  new  plans  and  expedients  had  still  to  be  sub- 
mitted to  the  timorous,  querulous,  rancorous,  quarrelsome 
gentlemen  of  the  State  Conference.  On  November  25  he  and 
Haugwitz  arrived  in  Vienna. 

1  Lucchesini's  report  to  the  King,  November  8,  the  cabinet  ministry  to  Haug- 
witz, November  20,  and  to  Goltz,  November  17,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.N.  12;  R.  1,  170; 
and  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


CHAPTER  XVI 

Haugwitz's  Final  Negotiation  at  Vienna 


The  first  effect  produced  at  the  Austrian  capital  by  the  disasters 
of  the  campaign  had  been  an  outburst  of  exasperation  and  indig- 
nation against  the  Prussians.  The  sober  second  thought  was  that 
the  war  must  be  continued  with  all  the  strength  the  Monarchy 
possessed,  and  that  Frederick  William's  aid  was  indispensable. 
Before  the  end  of  October  preparations  were  begun  for  placing  the 
entire  army  on  a  war  footing  and  for  hurrying  fresh  troops  to 
the  defence  of  the  Netherlands.  At  the  beginning  of  November, 
the  Prussian  resident,  Caesar,  was  able  to  give  positive  assur- 
ance that  his  master  was  firmly  resolved  to  pursue  the  common 
enterprise  in  complete  accord  with  the  Emperor.1  The  battle  of 
Jemappes  and  the  loss  of  all  the  Belgian  provinces  save  Luxem- 
burg did  not  diminish  the  determination  of  the  Imperial  govern- 
ment to  continue  the  war  with  redoubled  vigor. 

Another  result  of  the  recent  calamities  was  to  revive  the  attacks 
upon  the  leading  ministers,  and  especially  upon  Spielmann.2 
The  opposition  in  the  Conference  would  gladly  have  seen  the 
whole  Bavarian-Polish  project  at  last  abandoned.  When,  in  reply 
to  Spielmann's  report  of  October  15,  Cobenzl  prepared  new  in- 
structions authorizing  the  Referendary  to  continue  the  indemnity 
negotiation  in  spite  of  the  changed  circumstances,  Lacy,  Rosen- 
berg, and  Colloredo  persuaded  the  Emperor  to  have  the  instruc- 
tions altered  to  the  effect  that  for  the  present  the  two  Powers 
must  occupy  themselves  with  nothing  save  the  vigorous  prosecu- 
tion of  the  war.  One  can  easily  imagine  the  effect  on  the  Prussians 

1  Caesar's  report  of  November  3.  This  unconditional  declaration  was  au- 
thorized by  the  ministry  at  Berlin  when  they  were  still  ignorant  of  the  Note  of 
Merle  and  feared  that  Austria  might  desert  the  common  cause  (rescript  of  October 
26,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170). 

2  Zinzendorf's  Diary,  October  13  and  27  (V.  A.);  Caesar's  reports  of  October 
17,  November  7  and  10,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170. 

362 


THE  FINAL  NEGOTIATION  AT   VIENNA  363 

had  Spielmann  attempted  to  carry  out  these  orders,  had  he 
insisted  that  the  indemnity  question  should  be  postponed 
indefinitely.  For  once,  however,  the  Emperor's  vacillation  served 
to  good  purpose.  When  Cobenzl,  after  sending  off  the  revised 
instructions,  took  the  liberty  to  remonstrate  against  their  import, 
his  sovereign  protested  that  neither  he  nor  the  Conference 
ministers  had  meant  that  the  indemnity  negotiation  must  be 
abandoned:  the  Vice-Chancellor  was  told  that  he  had  simply 
misunderstood.  Hence  a  second  courier  was  sent  flying  after  the 
first,  with  dispatches  authorizing  Spielmann  to  go  on  with  the 
negotiation.  It  was  a  pitiful  spectacle,  this  comedy  between 
the  Emperor  and  the  Vice-Chancellor;  but  nothing  came  of  it 
save  perhaps  a  weakening  of  Cobenzl's  personal  credit.1 

The  Note  of  Merle  reached  Vienna  only  on  November  20,  at  a 
moment  when  the  news  from  Belgium  was  of  the  very  worst. 
Serious  resistance  to  the  Prussian  demands  was  therefore  hardly 
to  be  thought  of,  and,  after  all,  those  demands  were  not  so  terrify- 

1  Cobenzl's  first  draft  of  the  instructions  to  Spielmann,  October  26,  Vivenot, 
ii>  PP-  300~3°9>  the  Emperor  to  Cobenzl  and  Lacy,  October  29,  Cobenzl  to  the 
Emperor  the  same  day,  Vortrag  of  October  30,  and  the  revised  instructions, 
ibid.,  pp.  313-321;  Cobenzl  to  the  Emperor,  November  1,  the  Imperial  reply  of 
November  3,  Cobenzl's  answer  of  the  same  day,  the  new  instructions  to  Spiel- 
mann of  November  5,  ibid.,  pp.  323,  337  f.  There  is  in  the  Vienna  Archive  another 
note  of  the  Emperor  to  Cobenzl,  of  October  29,  which  is  much  sharper  in  tone  than 
those  printed  in  Vivenot  (Vortrage,  1792).  Caesar  reported,  November  7,  that 
Cobenzl's  influence  had  recently  been  impaired,  and  that  he  had  been  exposed  for 
a  moment  to  his  sovereign's  displeasure,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170. 

I  think  there  can  be  no  question  that  the  Vice-Chancellor  had  rightly  understood 
the  vota  of  the  Conference  ministers;  and  the  Emperor,  in  approving  the  instruc- 
tions of  October  30,  had  certainly  sanctioned  the  alterations  that  Cobenzl  had 
accordingly  made.  The  explanation  vouchsafed  the  Vice-Chancellor  four  days  later 
was,  therefore,  only  an  awkward  attempt  to  conceal  the  Emperor's  hopeless  vacil- 
lation.   Cf.  Sybel's  severe  but  very  fitting  judgment,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  357  f. 

Sybel  is  wrong,  however,  in  representing  Lacy  and  associates  as  putting  through 
their  opinion  at  a  meeting  of  the  Conference.  Caesar  does,  indeed,  report  such  a 
meeting  (November  3  and  7),  but  he  was  probably  mistaken;  for  the  Austrian 
records  speak  only  of  the  instructions  to  Spielmann  being  put  into  '  ministerial 
circulation,'  i.  e.,  sent  around  to  the  various  ministers  to  receive  their  written 
comments.  Quite  in  accordance  with  this,  there  is  no  mention  of  a  protocol,  but 
only  of  the  several '  vota.'  Several  weeks  before,  Colloredo  had  obtained  an  order 
from  the  Emperor  that  all  important  correspondence  with  ministers  abroad  should 
regularly  be  put  in  circulation  in  this  way.  (Colloredo  to  Cobenzl,  October  15, 
V.  A.,  Frankreich,  F.  261.) 


364  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

ing.  The  Note  of  Merle  was  not  extremely  precise.  While  the 
King  had  demanded  to  be  assured  of  his  indemnity  at  once,  he  had 
not  specified  the  exact  form  of  assurance  required.  One  could 
distinguish  between  a  mere  occupation  and  a  formal  annexation. 
The  latter  operation  could  hardly  follow  immediately  upon  the 
former,  as  it  would  take  some  time  to  prepare  the  stage  in  Poland 
for  the  last  great  act.  Meanwhile  the  details  of  the  indemnity 
arrangements  would  have  to  be  discussed  at  length  between  all 
three  of  the  participating  Powers,  and  embodied  in  a  formal 
treaty.  It  seemed  probable,  therefore,  that  the  final  settlement 
of  the  affair  would  suffer  not  a  little  delay,  and  meanwhile  Austria 
might  find  means  and  opportunities  to  provide  for  her  own  inter- 
ests. The  essential  thing  was  to  satisfy  the  King  of  Prussia  at  the 
lowest  possible  price,  to  be  outwardly  all  good  will,  and  to  make 
the  most  of  his  ardor  for  the  war. 

It  is  probable  that  Spielmann  brought  back  with  him  the  con- 
viction that  however  much  Frederick  William  desired  his  acqui- 
sition in  Poland,  he  was  even  more  eager  to  make  a  second 
campaign.1  The  King's  conduct  lent  some  color  to  that  idea; 
for  without  waiting  for  the  reply  to  the  Note  of  Merle,  he  ordered 
fresh  troops  to  the  Rhine,  and  pressed  Reuss  for  the  sending  of  an 
Austrian  general  with  full  powers  to  settle  the  plan  for  the  next 
campaign  —  to  the  lively  chagrin  of  his  ministers.2  The  Aus- 
trians  were  tempted  to  surmise  that  Frederick  William  would  not 
stand  firmly  by  the  principles  of  the  note,  but  would  allow  himself 
to  be  put  off  with  half-concessions.  Hence  the  interminable  de- 
lays of  the  Imperial  cabinet  in  December,  the  conditional  and 
ambiguous  acquiescence  in  the  Prussian  designs  on  Poland,  the 
show  of  confidence  and  complaisance  in  other  matters,  and  the 
attempt  to  inveigle  the  King  into  committing  himself  at  once  to 
the  continuation  of  the  war.3    It  is  highly  characteristic  of  the 

1  Lucchesini  wrote  to  the  ministers  at  Berlin  (December  14)  that  he  knew  Spiel- 
mann had  that  belief  when  he  left  Luxemburg.    B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

2  The  ministers  at  Berlin  to  Lucchesini,  November  14,  the  latter's  reply, 
December  14,  the  King  to  Haugwitz,  December  13,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14  and  R.  96, 
155  E.  Reuss'  dispatches  of  November  and  December  were  full  of  assurances  of 
the  King's  lively  desire  to  take  the  field  again  in  the  following  year. 

3  Cobenzl  to  Reuss,  December  4,  10,  18,  Francis  II  to  Frederick  William, 
December  17,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  387  f.,  398  ff. 


THE  FINAL  NEGOTIATION  AT  VIENNA  365 

reign  of  Frederick  William  II  that  the  Powers  who  had  to  deal 
with  him  continually  reckoned  that  his  generosity,  his  enthu- 
siasms, or  his  feebleness  would  prevail  over  the  less  altruistic 
counsels  of  his  ministers  —  a  calculation  that  was  sometimes 
justified,  but  very  often  proved  fallacious. 

Another  circumstance  that  essentially  influenced  Austrian 
policy  at  this  time  was  the  fact  that  since  the  French  conquest  of 
Belgium,  England  suddenly  manifested  a  disposition  to  take  a 
hand  in  Continental  affairs.  Whether  the  British  government 
wished  only  to  mediate  peace  or  was  seriously  minded  to  join  in 
the  war,  was  still  uncertain;  but  in  either  case  its  intervention 
could  not  be  unwelcome  to  Austria.  Towards  the  end  of  Novem- 
ber, Pitt  had  addressed  inquiries  to  the  Courts  of  Vienna  and 
Berlin  regarding  the  plans  for  indemnities  which  those  Powers 
were  known  to  be  pursuing.  The  question  aroused  only  suspicion 
and  ill  humor  in  the  Prussian  ministry,  who  could  not  doubt 
Pitt's  opposition  to  a  new  partition  of  Poland;  but  it  was  favor- 
ably received  by  the  Imperial  cabinet,  which  hoped  to  win  the 
consent  of  the  British  government  to  the  Exchange,  and  regarded 
that  consent  as  indispensable  to  the  realization  of  that  plan. 
Possibly,  too,  they  may  have  counted  on  England  to  delay  the 
Prussian  occupation  in  Poland,  although  there  is  no  clear  proof 
of  this  in  the  Austrian  records.  At  any  rate,  the  new  activity  of 
England  was,  from  the  Austrian  standpoint,  the  most  hopeful 
sign  in  a  generally  dismal  situation. 

II 

The  policy  which  the  Imperial  Court  was  to  pursue  for  the 
next  few  months,  was  marked  out  at  the  meetings  of  the  State 
Conference  on  November  29  and  30.  It  was  the  unanimous 
opinion  of  that  body  that  peace,  although  desirable,  was  almost 
unattainable,  and  therefore  that  every  effort  must  be  made  both 
to  conduct  the  next  campaign  with  vigor  and  to  gain  the  assist- 
ance of  Prussia,  Russia,  and  England.  With  regard  to  the  indem- 
nity question,  it  was  decided  to  give  the  King  of  Prussia  all 
assurances  of  the  Emperor's  willingness  to  cooperate  both  at  St. 


366 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Petersburg  and  in  Poland  in  order  to  secure  him  his  acquisition, 
but  to  intimate  that  its  size  could  be  fixed  only  by  the  concert  to 
be  established  with  Russia.  The  principle  that  the  respective 
acquisitions  were  to  be  made  at  the  same  time  could  no  longer  be 
upheld,  for  it  was  clear  that  not  only  the  Exchange  itself,  but  even 
the  negotiation  with  the  Bavarian  House,  would  have  to  be  post- 
poned for  an  indefinite  period;  but  meanwhile  every  precaution 
must  be  taken  to  ensure  the  ultimate  acquisition  of  an  indemnity 
somewhere.  To  that  end  the  Conference  resolved  to  demand  that 
the  other  two  Powers  should  either  consent  to  a  temporary  Aus- 
trian occupation  in  Poland,  or  else  formally  guarantee  the 
realization  of  the  Exchange.  In  offering  these  alternatives,  the 
Imperial  ministers  were  well  aware  of  the  aversion  of  their  allies 
to  seeing  the  Austrian  troops  enter  the  Republic.  If  the  Court  of 
Vienna  occupied  a  district  in  Poland,  even  if  only  temporarily, 
the  shares  of  the  other  Powers  would  have  to  be  cut  down  pro- 
portionately. The  Austrians  themselves  had  no  real  desire  to 
take  such  a  step,  which  would  involve  them  in  the  odium  of  the 
partition  and  would  require  a  considerable  military  force.  They 
imagined,  however,  that  the  threat  of  such  an  occupation  would 
render  their  allies  much  more  willing  to  accept  the  second  alterna- 
tive, the  formal  guarantee  of  the  Exchange.  Neither  proposal,  it 
must  be  confessed,  does  great  credit  to  the  insight  of  the  Viennese 
statesmen.  The  demand  to  be  allowed  to  occupy  a  district  in 
Poland  could  only  irritate  both  Prussia  and  Russia.  The  idea  of 
a  guarantee  of  the  realization  of  the  Exchange  was  not  a  little 
difficult  to  fathom,  for  how  could  the  other  two  Powers  guarantee 
an  arrangement  which  admittedly  depended  on  the  voluntary 
consent  of  the  parties  directly  interested  ?  To  find  any  sense  in  it 
at  all,  one  is  driven  to  conjecture  that  the  proposal  meant  a 
guarantee  of  the  acquisition  either  of  Bavaria  or  of  an  equivalent. 
One  means  there  was  by  which  the  Imperial  Court  might  have 
entered  into  possession  of  its  indemnity  at  the  same  time  as  its 
allies :  this  was  to  adopt  Spielmann's  and  Reuss'  plan  of  seizing 
Bavaria  under  pretext  of  punishing  the  Elector  for  his  unpatriotic 
and  disloyal  conduct.  It  is  impossible  to  say  whether  this  plan 
was  discussed  at  the  conferences  of  November  29  and  30,  but  at 


THE  FINAL  NEGOTIATION  AT   VIENNA  367 

^iny  rate  there  is  no  mention  of  it  in  the  protocol.  Apparently  the 
Emperor  and  his  advisers  could  not  make  up  their  minds  to  so 
drastic  and  ruthless  a  measure.  The  Austrians  did  not  lack 
appetite,  but  they  had  not  the  bold  unscrupulousness  that  was 
necessary  in  order  to  keep  pace  with  such  Powers  as  Russia  and 
Prussia. 

The  second  main  point  resolved  upon  in  the  Conference  was  to 
answer  England  in  a  friendly  but  cautious  manner,  and  especially 
to  confide  the  plan  for  the  Exchange.  It  was  decided  to  consult 
Prussia  about  this  reply  and  to  suggest  that  she  should  make  a 
similar  communication  at  London  regarding  her  ambitions  in 
Poland;  but  even  if  the  Court  of  Berlin  refused  to  take  such  a 
step,  the  majority  of  the  Conference  held  that  Austria  should 
take  England  into  the  secret  with  respect  to  her  own  hopes  for  an 
indemnity.  Finally,  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  was  to  be  fully 
informed  of  the  negotiations  with  England  and  Prussia,  and  to 
be  begged  to  do  its  utmost  for  the  interests  of  its  hard-pressed 
and  '  most  intimate  '  ally.1 

After  the  conferences  of  November  29  and  30,  almost  two  weeks 
elapsed  before  the  answer  to  the  Note  of  Merle  was  ready. 
Haugwitz  urged  and  stormed;  Razumovski  added  his  exhorta- 
tions; but  the  Austrians  were  not  to  be  hurried.  Nothing  was 
effected  by  this  delay  except  that  the  Prussians  were  irritated, 
and  the  Empress  of  Russia  lost  all  patience  waiting  for  the  long 
promised  courier  from  Vienna.  The  answer,  approved  by  the 
Conference  on  December  6,  was  at  last  presented  to  Haugwitz 
on  the  nth.  In  accordance  with  the  decisions  just  described, 
this  note  recognized  the  justice  of  the  Prussian  demand  for  an 
acquisition  in  Poland,  and  promised  Austrian  support  for  it  at 
St.  Petersburg;  it  referred  to  the  principle  invariably  agreed  upon 
between  the  two  Courts,  of  complete  equality  in  the  respective 
indemnities,  and  expressed  the  confident  hope  that  the  King 
would  cooperate  in  the  realization  of  the  Exchange;  finally,  it 
requested  either  consent  to  an  Austrian  occupation  in  Poland  or  a 
guarantee  of  the  Exchange  by  Prussia  and  Russia.  The  most 
salient  feature  of  the  reply  was  the  fact  that  while  the  Note  of 

1  Conference  protocol  and  Separat-voten,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  377-382. 


368 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


Merle  was  answered  article  by  article,  its  last  clause,  which  con- 
tained the  demand  that  Austria  should  consent  to  the  King's 
immediate  occupation  of  his  prospective  acquisition,  was  passed 
over  without  a  word.1 

The  impression  produced  on  the  Prussians  was  unfortunate  in 
the  extreme;  the  more  so  because  Reuss  had  previously  been 
ordered  to  announce  that  the  reply  would  be  entirely  satisfac- 
tory.2 Lucchesini  and  the  ministers  at  Berlin  vied  with  each 
other  in  expressing  their  feelings  of  horror  and  revolt  at  such  dis- 
loyal conduct.  Their  indignation  was  especially  aroused  by 
"  the  abominable  snare  "  (cheville),  that  lurked  behind  the  prop- 
osition about  an  Austrian  occupation  in  Poland.  That  insidious 
demand,  combined  with  the  Court  of  Vienna's  desire  to  take 
England  into  the  secret  of  the  indemnity  plan,  seemed  to  an- 
nounce the  design  of  thwarting  the  partition  entirely.  Either 
proposition  might  furnish  the  Empress  with  a  sufficient  excuse,  if 
she  wanted  one,  for  throwing  over  the  whole  project.  There  was 
only  one  means  of  staving  off  such  a  disaster :  the  King  must  hold 
inflexibly  to  the  terms  of  the  Note  of  Merle,  and  force  both 
Imperial  Courts  to  recognize  that  not  a  single  Prussian  soldier 
would  take  the  field  until  the  Prussian  demands  were  granted.3 
These  conditions  and  stipulations  to  safeguard  the  Austrian 
indemnities  were  not  to  be  thought  of.  The  Prussian  ministers 
quite  realized  the  embarrassment  of  their  allies;  they  observed 
with  grim  satisfaction  that  the  recovery  of  Belgium  was  hardly 
probable,  and  the  consent  of  the  Bavarian  House  to  the  Exchange 
still  less  so;  but  the  Austrians  must  recognize  that  their  salvation 
depended  on  the  continuation  of  aid  from  Prussia,  and  must  con- 
tent themselves  with  such  indemnities  as  "  events  would  permit 
them  to  obtain."  4  Doubtless  these  would  not  be  very  extensive, 
if  the  Prussian  ministers  had  their  way.     But  whatever  hap- 

1  This  note  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  293  ff.    The  date  should  be  December  9. 

2  Cobenzl  to  Reuss,  December  4?  ibid.,  ii,  pp.  387  f. 

3  The  ministers  at  Berlin  to  Lucchesini,  December  17  and  19,  to  Haugwitz 
the  17th,  to  the  King  the  19th,  Lucchesini  to  the  ministers,  December  17,  B.  A., 
R.  92,  L.  N.  14;  R.  96,  147  G;  R.  1,  170. 

4  The  cabinet  ministry  to  Haugwitz,  December  17,  and  to  the  King,  December 
19,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170,  and  R.  96,  147  G. 


THE  FINAL  NEGOTIATION  AT  VIENNA  369 

pened,  the  Austrians  must  make  no  indiscreet  pretensions  that 
would  interfere  with  the  plans  of  their  allies. 

Though  apparently  not  so  much  incensed  as  his  colleagues, 
Haugwitz  found  the  Austrian  note  quite  insufficient.  He  could 
not  be  "reassured,"  he  told  Cobenzl  and  Spielmann,  until  he  had 
seen  absolutely  satisfactory  instructions  sent  off  at  once  to  the 
Austrian  ambassador  at  St.  Petersburg.  The  Imperial  ministers 
promised  and  procrastinated.  The  delay  in  this  case  was,  indeed, 
more  intelligible,  for  the  '  expeditions  '  in  preparation  for  London 
and  St.  Petersburg  were  extremely  voluminous,  and  had,  besides, 
to  be  sent  the  rounds  of  the  Conference.  Haugwitz,  however, 
grew  impatient  and  suspicious.  He  later  declared  that  at  this 
time  he  abandoned  the  ordinary  tone  of  a  diplomat  for  that  of  a 
minister  who  announces  the  peremptory  will  of  his  master.1  His 
reports  picture  him  relentlessly  beating  down  the  resistance  of  the 
Austrians,  ordering  and  disposing  in  sovereign  fashion;  and  yet 
later  events  were  to  prove  this  negotiation  such  a  medley  of 
misunderstandings  that  one  is  driven  to  doubt  whether  Haug- 
witz's  language  was  quite  so  peremptory  and  unequivocal  as  he 
himself  made  out. 

Ill 

The  '  expedition  '  to  London  is  the  first  case  in  point.  Cobenzl 
had  drawn  up  a  long  ostensible  dispatch  to  Stadion  (the  Austrian 
ambassador  to  the  Court  of  St.  James),  explaining  the  aims  of  the 
allied  Powers  in  the  war  against  France,  and  several  postscripts 
in  which  the  Exchange  plan  was  set  forth  at  length  with  some 
allusions  to  the  Russian  and  Prussian  designs  on  Poland.2  Sta- 
dion was  expressly  ordered,  however,  to  omit  all  reference  to  the 
last-named  subject  in  case  his  Prussian  colleague,  Jacobi,  was  not 
instructed  to  make  similar  communications.3  Haugwitz's  atti- 
tude on  this  occasion  is  far  from  clear.    In  his  own  dispatches  he 

1  Report  to  the  King,  May  6,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H. 

2  The  dispatches  to  Stadion  of  December  22  are  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  406- 
425. 

3  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  423.  This  fact  deserves  to  be  mentioned  the  more,  because  the 
Austrian  government  has  often  been  charged  with  insidiously  betraying  the  plans 
of  its  allies  —  a  reproach  that  is  hardly  justified. 


370  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

claimed  to  have  protested  against  making  any  confidences  to 
England  at  present  with  regard  to  the  indemnity  plans;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  Cobenzl  reported  to  the  Emperor  that  the  Prus- 
sian envoy  had  not  only  failed  to  raise  the  slightest  objection  to 
these  dispatches,  but  had  declared  that  his  own  Court  could  not 
do  better  than  to  give  Jacobi  entirely  analogous  instructions,  and 
that  he  meant  to  send  off  a  courier  to  Berlin  to  bring  this  about.1 
The  contradiction  is  flat  and  glaring. 

The  same  phenomenon  appears  in  the  case  of  the  instructions 
to  Louis  Cobenzl.  The  Vice-Chancellor  had  prepared  several 
ostensible  dispatches  to  his  cousin  intended  to  satisfy  Haugwitz. 
In  one  of  these  it  was  said  that  the  Emperor  earnestly  wished  and 
begged  that  the  Empress  of  Russia  would  at  once  "  enter  into  a 
concert  "  for  arranging  and  carrying  out  the  proposed  partition  of 
Poland  and  the  "  prise  de  possession  eventuelle  "  so  much  desired 
by  the  King  of  Prussia;  and  hence  that  she  would  specify  the 
acquisitions  that  might  be  found  suitable  for  her  Empire.  For 
the  security  of  the  Austrian  indemnities  the  same  demands  were 
advanced  as  in  the  reply  to  Prussia:  namely,  that  the  Emperor 
must  be  allowed  to  occupy  a  district  in  Poland  unless  before  the 
effectuation  of  the  Prussian  acquisition  his  two  allies  had  found 
means  to  assure  the  realization  of  the  Exchange.  He  would  con- 
sider such  security  as  existing  if  the  Empress  and  the  King  of 
Prussia  would  undertake  the  guarantee  of  the  Exchange;  and 
in  this  case  he  would  claim  nothing  in  Poland,  even  if  he  found 
himself  unable  to  obtain  a  '  supplement '  elsewhere.  If  the  Ex- 
change proved  impossible,  however,  he  would  have  no  alternative 
but  to  seek  his  indemnity  at  the  expense  of  the  Republic  along 
with  his  allies. 

With  all  these  conditions,  the  ostensible  dispatches  still  com- 
plied to  some  extent  with  the  wishes  of  Prussia.  But  the  Austrian 
ministry  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to  try  to  diminish  the 
evil  by  a  subterfuge  that  was  neither  honorable  nor  dexterous  nor 

1  Haugwitz's  reports  of  December  18  and  21,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170;  Cobenzl  to  the 
Emperor,  December  21,  V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1792,  and  a  similar  statement  in  the 
2d  P.  S.  to  Stadion  (Vivenot,  ii,  p.  423)  and  in  the  dispatch  to  Reuss  of  December 
30  {ibid.,  ii,  p.  448). 


THE  FINAL  NEGOTIATION  AT   VIENNA  371 

effective.  It  is  probable  that  they  did  not  need  to  have  the  idea 
suggested  to  them,  but  they  may  well  have  been  encouraged  in  it 
-by  one  of  Louis  CobenzPs  recent  reports.  In  the  latter  part  of 
-November,  when  Frederick  William's  exploits  in  Champagne  were 
still  exciting  lively  ill  humor  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  Russian  min- 
isters had  spoken  with  irritation  of  the  size  of  the  Prussian  de- 
mands in  Poland,  paraded  their  own  devotion  to  the  interests  of 
Austria,  and  suggested  that  if  the  partition  took  place  at  all,  its 
execution  at  least  ought  to  be  delayed  for  some  time.1  This  fitted 
in  admirably  with  the  wishes  of  the  Austrian  ministry.  Accord- 
ingly, alongside  the  dispatches  shown  to  Haugwitz,  the  Vice- 
Chancellor  prepared  a  secret  instruction  for  Louis  Cobenzl,  in 
which  he  declared  that  the  Imperial  Court  had  never  consented 
to  the  present  exorbitant  territorial  demands  of  Prussia;  that  it 
was  not,  however,  in  a  position  to  contest  them  openly;  but  that 
it  relied  upon  Russia  to  cut  down  the  Prussian  lot  in  accordance 
with  the  principle  proclaimed  by  Zubov  himself,2  that  Poland 
must  remain  large  enough  to  form  a  real  buffer  state.  Doubtless 
it  would  be  the  most  desirable  solution,  the  dispatch  continued, 
if  the  three  Powers,  while  resolving  upon  the  partition  now, 
should  postpone  its  execution.  But  in  view  of  the  impatience 
and  importunities  of  Prussia,  the  Court  of  Vienna  felt  obliged  to 
propose  that  the  two  German  Powers  should  simultaneously 
occupy  equivalent  districts  in  Poland,  under  the  pretext  of 
maintaining  order  or  repressing  Counter-confederations.  The 
Empress  was  begged,  however,  to  assume  the  responsibility  of 
inducing  the  Prussians  to  defer  a  formal  annexation  until  a  more 
convenient  time,  when,  as  it  was  hoped  at  Vienna,  the  Bavarian 
Exchange  might  also  be  effected.  Finally,  the  Vice-Chancellor 
added  the  urgent  entreaty  that  Russia  should  consent  to  the 
Prussian  aggrandizement  only  under  the  double  condition  that 
the  King  should  continue  the  war  with  all  vigor,  and  that  the  Ex- 
change should  be  assured  at  once  and  realized  as  soon  as  peace 
was  made.  The  Austrian  government  thus  entrusted  its  cause 
entirely  to  the  merciful  protection  of  the  Empress.    It  appealed 

1  Cobenzl's  reports  of  November  13,  16,  20,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1792. 

2  Cobenzl's  report  of  November  20,  V.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


372  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  her  to  tame  the  ally  whom  it  dared  not  oppose  openly.    It 
appointed  her  arbiter  of  the  whole  indemnity  question.1 

When  the  ostensible  dispatches  to  Louis  Cobenzl  were  com- 
municated to  Haugwitz,  the  latter  found  them  somewhat  more 
satisfactory  than  the  note  of  December  9,  but  he  objected  to  the 
term  prise  de  possession  eventuelle,  instead  of  actuelle,  and  still 
more  to  the  condition  attached  to  that  concession,  the  Austrian 
occupation  in  Poland.  In  his  reports  to  his  government,  he  claims 
that  he  then  redoubled  his  efforts  to  remove  these  last  difficulties, 
and  that  within  a  few  days  he  had  vanquished  every  obstacle. 
On  December  24  he  wrote  that  he  had  obtained  a  formal  oral 
declaration  from  the  Emperor's  ministers  that  their  sovereign 
1  would  address  the  most  urgent  representations  to  the  Empress 
of  Russia  in  order  to  secure  her  consent  to  the  Prussian  prise  de 
possession  actuelle,  without  adding  any  condition  relative  to  an 
Austrian  occupation  in  Poland,  but  contenting  himself  solely 
with  the  demand  that  the  Empress  and  the  King  should  jointly 

1  The  dispatches  to  L.  Cobenzl  are  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  425-435.  Sybel's 
account  of  the  origin  of  this  '  expedition  '  is  far  from  accurate.  He  conjectured 
(op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  179  ff.)  that  the  secret  instructions  were  decided  upon  at  the  meet- 
ing of  the  Conference  on  December  19,  and  that  this  unfortunate  step  was  forced 
upon  Ph.  Cobenzl  by  the  Emperor  himself,  guided  perhaps  by  Count  Colloredo. 
The  basis  of  this  assumption  he  found  in  the  Emperor's  note  to  the  Vice-Chancellor 
of  December  21  (Vivenot,  ii,  p.  405)  in  which  the  Conference  of  the  19th  is  mentioned 
and  Cobenzl  rebuked  for  his  slowness  in  getting  off  the  dispatches  to  London  and 
St.  Petersburg.  Sybel  deplored  the  fact  that  Vivenot  did  not  publish  the  protocol 
of  "  this  most  important  session  "  of  the  Conference.  Vivenot  is  quite  excusable. 
No  protocol  of  the  19th  is  to  be  found  in  the  Vienna  Archives.  And  apparently 
that  is  no  great  loss.  From  certain  other  documents  not  printed  in  Vivenot,  it 
appears  that  except  for  the  parts  relating  to  the  reply  to  England,  the  dispatches 
to  L.  Cobenzl  were  already  completed  and  had  received  the  sanction  of  the  Con- 
ference ministers  (having  been  '  circulated  '  among  them)  by  December  15.  At 
the  session  of  the  19th  only  "  slight  changes  and  additions  "  were  made,  and  one 
further  postscript  to  Stadion  was  agreed  upon  (doubtless  the  4th,  printed  in  Vive- 
not, ii,  p.  425),  as  Cobenzl  himself  relates  in  a  note  to  the  Emperor  of  December  21 
(V.  A.,  Vortrdge,  1792).  If  the  conference  of  the  19th  had  resolved  upon  anything 
so  important  as  the  secret  instructions  to  L.  Cobenzl,  it  is  hardly  possible  that  the 
Vice-Chancellor  would  not  have  mentioned  it  in  this  note,  in  which  he  sums  up  the 
reasons  for  his  previous  delays.  It  appears,  then,  that  this  meeting  had  little  or 
no  importance.  I  do  not  think  there  is  the  slightest  evidence  to  show  where  the 
responsibility  for  the  secret  instructions  rests.  Sybel's  view  may  be  admitted  as  a 
pure  hypothesis;  but  the  Vice-Chancellor's  delays  may  equally  well  be  ascribed  to 
his  natural  slowness,  timidity,  and  indecision. 


THE  FINAL  NEGOTIATION  AT  VIENNA  373 

guarantee  their  consent  to  the  Bavarian  Exchange.' 1  With  that 
he  considered  his  negotiation  finished,  and  prepared  to  return  to 
Berlin  to  assume  his  new  post  as  cabinet  minister.  At  his  final 
audience  (December  23),  the  Emperor  assured  him  that  his  only 
fear  was  that  in  spite  of  his  own  consent  and  the  orders  he  had 
sent  to  St.  Petersburg,  the  Empress  of  Russia  might  still  refuse 
to  agree  to  the  Prussian  demands.2  Nothing  apparently  could  be 
more  amicable  or  loyal.  Haugwitz  left  Vienna  affirming  his 
conviction  that  the  Imperial  Court  was  acting  in  good  faith  and 
was  sincerely  disposed  to  further  his  master's  acquisition.3 

If  he  really  had  secured  the  oral  declaration  he  reported,  he 
might  indeed  congratulate  himself  on  a  complete  diplomatic 
victory.  In  that  case,  Austria  had  yielded  to  every  Prussian 
demand,  in  return  for  a  single  concession  of  the  flimsiest  and  most 
meaningless  sort.  For  that  phrase  '  guarantee  of  consent '  was 
vagueness  itself:  anyone  could  interpret  that  at  his  good  pleas- 
ure. The  Berlin  ministry  hastened  to  inform  Caesar  (who  had 
been  left  as  charge  at  Vienna)  that  they  accepted  the  engagement, 
if  it  meant '  promise  of  consent,'  but  that  they  would  never  allow 
it  a  broader  significance.4  A  promise  of  consent  the  King  had 
already  given,  and  as  long  as  its  fulfilment  was  postponed,  his 
ministers  were  not  greatly  embarrassed  by  it.  A  guarantee  of 
the  realization  of  the  Exchange  would  be  quite  a  different  matter. 

The  question  inevitably  presents  itself:  did  Haugwitz  really 
secure  such  complete  and  momentous  concessions  ?  If  so,  why 
did  he  not  insist  on  the  alteration  of  the  dispatches  to  Louis 
Cobenzl,  which  were  based  on  quite  different  principles  ?  Why 
did  he  content  himself  with  a  mere  verbal  assurance  ?  How 
explain  the  fact  that  the  Austrian  records  contain  not  the  slightest 
trace  of  the  promise  he  claimed  to  have  received,  and  that  the 
Austrian  ministers  continued  to  act  as  if  such  a  promise  had  never 
been  given  ?    We  find,  for  instance,  that  on  January  3  the  Con- 

1  Haugwitz's  reports  of  December  21  and  24,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170.  See  Appendix 
XI,  1. 

2  Haugwitz's  retrospective  report  of  May  6,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H.  See 
Appendix  XVI,  3. 

*  Letter  to  Lucchesini,  December  25,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  31. 
4  Rescript  of  December  29,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  170. 


374 


TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


ference  met  to  decide  what  Polish  territories  should  be  occupied 
by  the  Imperial  Court,  in  case  the  other  Powers  failed  to  furnish 
a  sufficient  guarantee  of  the  Exchange.1  Cobenzl  continually 
spoke  to  the  astonished  Caesar  of  the  alternative  —  occupation 
or  guarantee  —  as  quite  a  matter  of  course.2  Such  positive 
language  is  unintelligible  —  assuming  Haugwitz's  report  to  be 
accurate  —  except  on  the  hypothesis  that  Cobenzl  and  Spielmann 
had  been  driven  into  concessions  which  they  dared  not  reveal  to 
their  colleagues,  or  on  the  supposition  that  they  did  not  know  the 
meaning  of  the  terms  in  question.  Or  did  Haugwitz  misunder- 
stand them  ?  Or  did  he,  in  his  haste  to  finish  the  affair,  content 
himself  with  assurances  much  less  positive  and  satisfactory  than 
those  which  he  reported  ? 

In  favor  of  this  last  hypothesis,  we  have  the  testimony  of  one 
witness  who  was  fairly  well  acquainted  with  the  course  of  the 
negotiation  and  sufficiently  intimate  with  all  the  negotiators. 
Razumovski  had  frequently  discussed  the  matters  here  in  ques- 
tion with  Haugwitz,  Cobenzl,  and  Spielmann,  and  he  understood 
from  them  that  it  was  entirely  settled  that  Austria  should  occupy 
a  district  in  Poland,  unless  Russia  and  Prussia  furnished  the 
desired  guarantee  of  the  Exchange.  Moreover,  when  Caesar, 
much  disturbed  over  the  affair,  read  to  him  Haugwitz's  final  dis- 
patch of  December  24,  Razumovski  wrote  to  Ostermann  that 
Haugwitz,  in  order  to  facilitate  his  negotiation,  had  shown  far 
more  condescendance  in  his  conferences  with  the  Austrians  than 
in  his  reports.3 

If  the  Russian  ambassador's  view  was  correct,  it  would  point 
to  nothing  exceptional  in  Haugwitz's  first  year  of  diplomatic 
activity.  It  will  be  remembered  how  facile  the  latter  had  shown 
himself  towards  the  Austrians  in  May,  in  the  affair  of  the  joint 
declaration  at  St.  Petersburg;  in  July  and  August,  in  the  affair 
of  the  Margraviates;  in  October,  in  connection  with  SpielmannV 
'plan.'     If  one  compares  his  reports  with  the  Austrian  ones 

1  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  457. 

2  Caesar's  reports  of  Jan.  30,  Feb.  6  and  25,  1793,  R.  A.,  R.  1,  174. 

3  Razumovski's  report  of  January  21/February  1,  1793,  Caesar's  report  of 
January  30,  M.  A.,  ABCTpia,  III,  54,  and  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174.  Razumovski's  re- 
port is  printed  in  part  in  Appendix  XVI,  2. 


THE  FINAL  NEGOTIATION  AT  VIENNA  375 

relative  to  the  negotiation  at  Luxemburg  and  to  the  dispatches 
to  Stadion  in  December,  and  still  more  if  one  studies  his  long  re- 
port of  May  6,  1793,  reviewing  the  whole  course  of  the  indemnity 
affair,  one  sees  that  his  conduct  as  represented  to  his  Court  was 
very  much  more  energetic,  decided,  '  peremptory,'  than  it  ap- 
peared to  those  with  whom  he  negotiated.  It  must  be  remem- 
bered that  he  was  only  a  beginner  in  diplomacy.  He  later  wrote 
of  this  negotiation  at  Vienna:  "  These  were  the  preliminaries  that 
were  to  serve  as  my  schooling."  l  The  suspicion  lies  very  near  at 
hand  that  perhaps  the  novice  did  not  pass  the  test  so  triumph- 
antly as  he  reported.  At  any  rate,  mysterious  as  is  the  whole 
affair,  one  may  perhaps  surmise  that  the  Austrian  ministers  had 
agreed  to  acquiesce  in  all  that  Prussia  demanded  for  herself,  and 
to  renounce  their  own  project  of  an  occupation  in  Poland,  on 
condition  of  receiving  a  guarantee  of  the  Exchange  (meaning  the 
realization  of  the  Exchange) ;  and  that  Haugwitz  either  misunder- 
stood them,  or  deliberately  misrepresented. 

The  consequences  were  momentous  for  the  future  course  of  the 
affair.  The  Austrian  cabinet  continued  to  act  on  the  principles 
embodied  in  the  dispatches  to  Louis  Cobenzl;  continued  to  re- 
gard their  assent  to  the  Prussian  demands  as  conditional  upon 
their  securing  safeguards  for  the  Exchange  either  through  an 
occupation  in  Poland  or  through  the  guarantee  of  the  other 
Courts;  continued  to  view  the  final  settlement  of  the  indemnity 
question  as  dependent  upon  a  concert  of  the  three  Powers,  into 
which  England  might  also  possibly  be  taken.2  But  the  Imperial 
ministry  seems  to  have  framed  no  clear  idea  as  to  the  form  which 
this  concert  was  to  take.  Although  they  knew  that  Goltz  was 
authorized  to  conclude  a  definite  treaty  with  Russia,3  they  took 
no  steps  to  provide  Louis  Cobenzl  with  similar  powers.  They 
thus  condemned  themselves  to  be  excluded  from  a  negotiation 

1  Ranke,  Hardenberg,  ii,  p.  306. 

2  Cf .  Caesar's  report  of  January  23 :  "  Tout  se  reduit  done  a  l'id6e  qu'on  parott 
toujours  avoir  ici  que  l'etendue  de  l'arrondissement  de  V.  M.  en  Pologne,  ainsi  que 
les  formes  de  l'echange  de  la  Baviere  et  du  nouvel  etablissement  de  la  maison  Pala- 
tine, seront  d6finitivement  arrangees  du  concours  de  toutes  les  Puissances  contract- 
antes  par  les  negociations  futures  de  la  paix,"  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174.  It  was  a  sort  of 
Congress  of  Vienna  that  the  Austrians  thus  prematurely  imagined. 

3  L.  Cobenzl's  report  of  November  23,  1792,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichle. 


376 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


that  concerned  their  most  vital  interests,  with  a  lack  of  foresight, 
prudence,  and  consistency  that  is  almost  unintelligible. 

The  Prussians,  on  their  side,  viewed  the  agreements  of  Decem- 
ber only  in  the  light  of  Haugwitz's  final  dispatch,  and  so  con- 
cluded —  quite  justifiably  —  that  Austria  had  given  them  a 
perfectly  free  hand  in  Poland.  The  King  was  satisfied  and 
/  grateful,  but  he  was  almost  alone  in  his  opinion.  The  long 
delays,  the  bad  grace  with  which  the  Imperial  Court  had  yielded, 
and  the  snares  and  subterfuges  which  they  detected  in  all  its 
utterances,  had  convinced  the  Prussian  ministers  that  no  confi- 
dence was  to  be  placed  in  the  good  will  of '  their  faithful  allies  ' 
and  '  natural  rivals.'  "  I  see  more  and  more  clearly,"  Lucchesini 
wrote  to  the  ministers  at  Berlin,  "  that  if  we  had  had  to  expect 
our  indemnity  from  the  Court  of  Vienna,  we  should  never  have 
obtained  it."  x  At  that  moment  their  indemnity  no  longer  de- 
pended on  Austria.    The  Empress  had  spoken  at  last. 

1  Letter  of  January  4,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 


CHAPTER  XVII 

The  Russo-Prussian  Partition  Treaty 


It  can  hardly  be  doubted  that  when  in  July,  1792  Austria  and 
Prussia  brought  forward  the  Polish-Bavarian  plan  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, they  were  but  anticipating  the  inmost  wishes  of  the  Russians. 
It  was,  indeed,  in  response  to  Russian  hints  at  Berlin  and  Vienna 
that  these  first  overtures  were  made.  Bezborodko  confessed  to 
Cobenzl  that  his  Court  had  expected  something  of  this  sort.1  He 
himself  hastened  to  lay  before  the  Empress  a  memorial  emphasiz- 
ing strongly  the  advantages  that  would  accrue  to  Russia  from  a 
new  partition.  A.  R.  Vorontsov  likewise  championed  the  project. 
If  Markov  at  first  raised  objections,  pointing  out  the  inconven- 
ience of  granting  Prussia  so  considerable  an  aggrandizement,  he 
allowed  himself  to  be  won  over  without  too  much  difficulty.2  As 
for  the  Empress,  one  of  her  closest  advisers  observed  3  that  the 
Austro-Prussian  plan  caused  her  a  secret  pleasure,  but  that  she 
hesitated  to  express  clearly  her  opinion.  At  any  rate,  her  senti- 
ments may  be  inferred  from  her  conduct. 

She  would  not  show  her  hand  too  early.  She  would  manifest 
no  undue  eagerness.  Her  '  moderation  '  and  '  magnanimity  ' 
required  that  she  should  make  enormous  annexations  only  with 
an  air  of  reluctance  and  ostensibly  out  of  sheer  deference  for  her 
allies.  The  other  Powers  must  take  upon  themselves  the  initia- 
tive, and  with  it  the  odium,  of  the  transaction.  An  attitude  of 
reticence  was  the  more  advisable  because  Austria  long  main- 
tained  an   ungracious   silence   regarding   any   acquisitions   for 

1  L.  Cobenzl's  report  to  Ph.  Cobenzl  of  July  21,  V.  A.,  Rus stand,  Berichte,  1792. 

2  Cf.  his  retrospective  letter  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov  of  July  27/August  7,  1793, 
Apx.  Bop.,  xx,  p.  48.  Markov's  statements  as  to  his  own  attitude  and  that  of  his 
two  colleagues  receive  some  confirmation  from  Cobenzl's  reports,  especially  that 
of  July  21,  1792. 

8  Markov  in  the  letter  just  cited. 

377 


378  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Russia,  while  Goltz  was  authorized  to  present  the  indemnity  plan 
only  in  the  guise  of  '  speculations,'  avoiding  '  all  that  might  give 
his  overtures  the  appearance  or  the  form  of  a  proposition  made 
officially  or  according  to  orders.' l 

During  the  month  following  the  initial  advances  from  Berlin 
and  Vienna,  the  Russian  ministers  would  say  no  more  than  that 
the  affair  deserved  mature  deliberation,  that  the  Empress  was  in 
general  disposed  to  oblige  her  allies,  but  that  she  could  not 
express  herself  definitely  until  the  German  Courts  had  composed 
their  differences  and  communicated  their  ideas  in  more  detail. 
But  when  towards  the  end  of  August  it  became  clear  that  the 
allies  were  willing  to  allow  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  an  equal 
share  in  the  spoils,  and  when  appearances  had  been  provided 
for  by  a  due  amount  of  procrastination,  signs  multiplied  that 
the  Russians  were  warming  to  the  project.  Goltz  and  Cobenzl 
were  given  to  understand  that  the  main  question  was  practically 
decided  in  their  favor,  and  that  it  remained  only  to  settle  the 
details  and  '  the  quo  modo.'  Both  envoys  gained  the  conviction 
that  in  spite  of  this  air  of  pretended  indifference,  the  Russians 
eagerly  desired  the  realization  of  the  plan.2    How  correct  this 

1  Instructions  to  Goltz  of  July  9,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

2  Cobenzl's  reports  of  August  24,  September  n,  28,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte, 
1792;  Goltz's  reports  of  August  28,  September  25  and  28,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland, 

133- 

Cobenzl  reported  (September  n):   "  Le  Comte  Woronzow  .  .  .  m'a  temoigne 

etre  tout  a  fait  porte  pour  ce  que  j'aiete  charge  de  proposer  en  date  du  8  Aout  .  .  .   : 

il  dit  qu'il  faut  seulement  observer  dans  les  acquisitions  que  feroit  la  Russie  d'eviter 

tout  voisinage  immediat  avec  les  Puissances  copartageantes." 

On  September  28:  "  II  me  paroit  qu'on  ne  le  desire  [the  realization  of  the  Bavar- 
ian-Polish project]  pas  moins  ici,  et  Marcow  me  dit  a  cette  occasion,  qu'outre 
l'echange  pour  egaliser  la  chose  nous  devrions  prendre  un  dedommagement  du 
meme  cote  ou  nous  la  destinons  aux  deux  autres  cours." 

Goltz  wrote  on  August  28:  "A  en  juger  d'apres  les  vues  de  ses  [Catherine's] 
Ministres,  il  ne  paroit  pas  douteux,  qu'on  entrera  avec  plaisir  aux  vues  des  autres 
Puissances." 

On  September  25:  "  Quoique  l'on  continue  toujours  a  affecter  la  plus  grande 
indifference,  je  suis  cependant  sur  que  ce  n'est  que  cela  et  qu'on  n'en  desire  pas 
moins  vivement  de  realiser  le  projet  d'un  nouveau  partage  de  la  Pologne." 

On  September  28:  "  II  ne  me  reste  rien  a  dire  sur  le  plan  de  dedommagemens, 
tous  les  Ministres  ici  m'assurant  que  l'lmperatrice  consentira  volontiers  a  la  chose, 
mais  qu'on  attend  toujours  le  Courier  de  Vienne,  pour  pouvoir  s'expliquer  sur  le 
comment." 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION   TREATY         379 

surmise  was,  is  best  shown  by  the  fact  that  when  the  indemnity 
project  seemed  in  danger  of  being  held  up  or  even  completely 
frustrated  by  the  dissensions  between  the  German  Powers,  the 
Empress  intervened  to  remedy  and  to  expedite  matters.  In  the 
middle  of  September,  Razumovski  and  Alopeus  were  ordered  to 
urge  upon  the  Austrian  and  Prussian  cabinets  the  need  of  haste: 
the  final  settlement  of  Polish  affairs,  it  was  said,  could  not  be  long 
postponed,  and  delay  was  the  more  embarrassing  because  the 
maintenance  of  the  Russian  armies  in  the  Republic  cost  immense 
sums;  the  Empress  therefore  desired  that  her  allies  should  adjust 
as  soon  as  possible  the  questions  at  issue  between  them  and  then 
provide  their  envoys  at  St.  Petersburg  with  the  instructions  and 
powers  necessary  for  concluding  a  formal  convention.1  A  three- 
fold arrangement  on  the  analogy  of  the  treaties  of  1772  was  then 
the  Russian  program.  Of  the  exclusion  of  Austria  there  was, 
and  could  at  that  time  be,  no  thought.2  That  the  negotiation 
should  be  conducted  at  St.  Petersburg,  where  the  Empress  could 
most  easily  guide  and  control  it,  was  assumed  as  a  matter  of 
course. 

A  final  explanation  from  Vienna  was  expected  with  the  ratifica- 
tion of  the  Austro-Russian  treaty  of  alliance.  Instead,  however, 
the  courier  brought  only  the  news  of  Spielmann's  mission  to  the 
King  of  Prussia,  and  the  promise  that  the  agreements  about  to  be 
concluded  would  be  promptly  communicated.3  Hitherto  Austria 
had  taken  the  lead  in  the  negotiations  at  St.  Petersburg:  here 
began  that  three  months'  silence  on  the  part  of  the  Court  of 
Vienna,  which  was  to  prove  so  disastrous  for  it. 

Meanwhile  Goltz  had  at  last  received  definite  instructions, 
which  allowed  him  to  quit  the  realm  of  pure  '  speculations,'  and 
to  state  precisely  the  acquisitions  desired  by  his  Court.4  From 
mid-October  on,  he  began  to  urge  that  Russia  and  Prussia  should 
come  to  an  agreement  at  once  without  waiting  further  for  the 

1  Ostermann's  dispatches  to  Razumovski  and  Alopeus,  September  3/14,  1792, 
M.  A.,  ABCTpifl,  III,  52,  and  Elpyccia,  III,  28. 

2  Cf.  Markov  to  Razumovski,  October  4/15,  Wassiltchikow,  Les  Razoumowski, 
ii,  4e  partie,  p.  162. 

3  Ph.  Cobenzl  to  L.  Cobenzl,  September  13,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  197-201. 
*  The  instructions  of  September  28,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


38o 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


dilatory  resolutions  of  Austria.  The  Court  of  Vienna,  he  declared, 
was  sufficiently  informed  of  his  master's  views;  its  allies  would 
not  neglect  its  interests;  but  they  would  be  in  far  better  position 
to  provide  for  them  after  they  had  duly  attended  to  their  own. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  month  he  had  even  advanced  to  the  point 
of  pressing  for  consent  to  the  immediate  entry  of  the  Prussian 
troops  into  Poland.1 

Although  still  professing  not  to  know  their  sovereign's  inten- 
tions, and  protesting  that  nothing  could  be  decided  until  the 
results  of  Spielmann's  negotiation  were  known,  the  Russian 
ministers  received  these  propositions  with  unmistakable  favor. 
In  a  highly  significant  note  to  a  colleague,  Bezborodko  declared 
that  Ostermann  and  he  were  agreed  that  their  Court  ought  not  to 
oppose  the  King  of  Prussia's  desire  to  send  his  troops  into  Poland 
at  once,  since  that  measure  fitted  exactly  into  their  [the  Russian] 
plan,  and  would  certainly  lead  to  the  quickest  denouement  of  the 
affair.2  But  just  at  the  moment  when  matters  seemed  thus  hap- 
pily started,  there  came  a  turn  of  events  which  threatened  to 
blast  the  Prussian  hopes. 

II 

On  the  20th  of  October  the  news  of  the  retreat  of  the  allied 
armies  reached  St.  Petersburg.  In  the  next  few  weeks  every 
courier  brought  tidings  of  disaster:  the  complete  evacuation  of 
France,  the  loss  of  Belgium,  the  irruption  of  "  the  demons  "  into 
the  very  heart  of  Germany.  The  Empress  was  highly  incensed. 
The  "  factious,"  in  repelling  the  invaders,  had  committed  the 
crime  of  Use  Catherine;  the  allies  had  sinned  even  more  atro- 
ciously by  rejecting  all  her  advice  about  the  enterprise;  and 
worst  of  all  were  those  mysterious,  degrading  negotiations  of 
the  Prussians  with  "  the  rebels."  "  I  confess,"  she  wrote  to 
Grimm,  "  I  feel  such  ill  humor  toward  certain  people  that  I 
should  like  to  box  their  ears."  3     Her  letters  and  conversation 

1  Goltz's  reports  of  October  12,  23,  26,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 

2  Bezborodko  to  A.  R.  Vorontsov,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  p.  275.  This  note  is  un- 
dated, but  from  a  comparison  with  Goltz's  dispatches  it  may  be  fixed  with  certainty 
as  of  October  26. 

3  Letter  of  December  7/18,  C6opHHKt,  xxiii,  p.  579. 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION  TREATY        38 1 

of  that  time  are  full  of  outbreaks  and  sarcasms  against  both 
her  high  allies. 

Under  such  circumstances,  the  Empress  was  for  the  time  being 
in  no  mood  to  listen  favorably  to  the  Prussian  importunities  about 
a  new  partition.  "  After  the  brilliant  campaign  the  two  Courts 
have  made,  they  still  dare  to  talk  of  conquests!  "  she  wrote  on 
jthe  margin  of  a  dispatch; !  and  in  another  place:  "  It  seems  to  me 
that  in  real  and  strict  justice  those  who  have  failed  in  their  duties, 
ought  to  have  no  right  to  compensation."  2  This  was  no  time  for 
starting  a  new  set  of  troubles,  when  no  one  could  foresee  the  end 
of  those  already  existing,  and  when  she  was  left  in  perfect  igno- 
rance of  the  other  plans  of  the  high  allies,  who  had  hitherto  done 
diametrically  the  opposite  of  all  that  she  had  proposed  to  them.3 
After  the  miserable  spectacle  they  had  just  made  of  themselves, 
their  primary  concern  ought  to  be  to  deliver  the  Germanic  Em- 
pire out  of  the  hands  of  the  French,  and  to  prepare  for  a  new  and 
more  vigorous  campaign.4  In  an  interesting  set  of  "  rules  "  which 
she  dashed  off  a  propos  of  the  negotiation  with  Prussia,5  we  find 
the  following: 

"  To  postpone  the  partition  of  Poland  as  long  as  possible. 

"  After  a  wretched  campaign,  no  acquisitions. 

"  Not  to  take  up  this  affair  without  the  knowledge  of  the  Court 
of  Vienna. 

"  [We  have]  no  reason  for  aggrandizing  the  King  of  Prussia. 

"  To  do  nothing  contrary  to  honor  and  promises." 

Probably  many  reasons  combined  to  produce  this  revulsion  in 
Catherine's  attitude  towards  a  project  in  which  she  had  ap- 
parently been  keenly  interested.  The  general  situation  and  the 
presuppositions  with  which  she  had  entered  into  the  affair  had 
been  profoundly  altered  by  the  debacle  in  the  West.  It  was  still 
uncertain  how  far  the  successes  of  the  French  would  go ;  how  far 

1  On  Alopeus'  report  of  October  8/19. 

2  Letter  to  Rumiantsov,  Pyc.  Clap.,  lxxxi2,  p.  161. 

3  Note  of  the  Empress  belonging  to  the  papers  of  the  secret  Conference  of  No- 
vember 4/15,  P.  A.,  X,  69. 

4  Note  of  the  Empress  belonging  to  the  papers  of  the  secret  Conference  of 
October  29/Nov.  9,  P.  A.,  loc.  cit. 

5  Papers  belonging  to  the  secret  Conference  of  October  29/November  9.  These 
notes  are  printed  in  Appendix  XVII. 


382  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

the  Prussians  had  really  been  implicated  in  disloyal  intrigues 
with  the  enemy;  whether  Austria  could  now  be  provided  for 
except  by  a  share  in  Poland  —  which  would  not  at  all  fit  in  with 
the  Empress'  wishes;  or  what  would  be  the  attitude  of  England. 
The  machinations  of '  the  Jacobins  '  at  Stockholm  and  Constanti- 
nople were  well  known  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  aroused  at  least  a 
certain  disquietude,  as  was  attested  by  the  rushing  of  fresh  troops 
and  of  no  less  a  commander  than  Suvorov  to  the  southern  fron- 
tier. But  it  may  perhaps  be  doubted  whether  these  considera- 
tions contributed  as  much  to  delaying  the  negotiation  for  the 
partition  as  did  the  Empress'  anger  against  those  allies  who  had 
tarnished  her  glory  by  bungling  an  enterprise  to  which  she  had 
lent  her  patronage  and  her  moral  and  financial  support. 

It  was  under  no  favorable  auspices,  then,  that  the  Prussians 
began  their  grand  assault  at  St.  Petersburg.  In  the  last  days  of 
October,  Goltz  suddenly  found  himself  the  object  of  a  great 
coldness.  He  ceased  to  be  invited  to  the  Hermitage.  Ostermann 
avoided  conversing  with  him.1  When  the  Vice-Chancellor  could 
be  brought  to  speak  at  all,  he  proffered  nothing  but  excuses  for 
delay:  the  uncertain  state  of  French  affairs;  the  danger  of  stirring 
up  new  enemies  at  such  a  moment;  the  alarming  attitude  of  the 
Porte;  the  presence  in  St.  Petersburg  of  a  delegation  from  the 
Confederation  of  Targowica,  come  to  thank  the  Empress  for 
'  liberating  '  the  Republic;  the  impossibility  of  deciding  on  any 
course  of  action  until  the  arrival  of  news  from  Austria.2  The 
cabinet  of  Berlin  pressed  on  the  negotiation  with  restless  haste. 
Courier  after  courier  was  hurried  off  to  Petersburg,  bringing  to 
Goltz  orders  to  present  his  demands  in  the  most  formal  ministerial 
manner,  a  royal  letter  to  the  Empress,  the  new  and  extended 
territorial  claims  which  Frederick  William  had  formulated  at 
Consenvoye,  the  Note  of  Merle,  full  powers  to  conclude  the 
treaty,  and  fresh  supplies  of  arguments  with  which  to  beat  down 
the  Russian  obduracy.  Poland,  it  was  alleged,  was  seething  with 
democratic  agitation  and  with  plots  against  Russia  and  Prussia; 
it  was  superfluous  to  point  out  what  dangers  would  threaten  all 

1  Goltz's  report  of  the  30th,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

2  Goltz's  reports  of  October  30,  November  2,  6,  13,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION  TREATY        383 

the  North  of  Europe  if  this  country  were  allowed  to  become  "  a 
new  theatre  of  revolution  and  fanaticism  ";  the  evil  must  be  cut 
out  at  the  roots,  and  the  most  efficacious  way  of  extirpating  it 
was  to  restrict  the  tumultuous  Republic  within  such  limits  as 
would  forever  prevent  it  from  menacing  its  neighbors.1  If  it  were 
merely  regard  for  Austria  that  held  back  the  Empress,  that 
difficulty,  it  was  said,  was  now  removed,  since  the  King  had  given 
his  consent  to  the  forcible  seizure  of  Bavaria,  which  Spielmann 
had  proposed.2  Even  Cobenzl,  when  informed  of  the  Note  of 
Merle,  took  it  upon  himself,  without  waiting  for  orders,  to  press 
the  Prussian  claims.3  But  Ostermann  remained  immovable  and 
generally  mute.  He  could  accept  Goltz's  constantly  reiterated 
demands  only  ad  referendum;  he  was  chronically  uninformed  as 
to  the  intentions  of  his  sovereign;  he  was  full  of  objections  and 
petty  fears.  So  matters  continued  throughout  November.  The 
Court  of  Berlin  had  exhausted  every  device  and  every  attention 
in  order  to  win  over  the  Russians ;  its  troops  stood  on  the  frontier 
ready  to  enter  Poland  at  a  moment's  notice  from  St.  Petersburg; 
but  it  seemed  as  if  the  word  would  never  come.  The  Prussian 
ministry  grew  quite  out  of  patience.  If  Ostermann  continued  his 
"  tergiversations,"  they  wrote,  Goltz  must  declare  that  the  King 
would  no  longer  think  of  a  second  campaign,  but  would  retire 
from  the  war  altogether.4 

But  just  at  the  moment  when  Prussian  hopes  were  most  de-  v 
pressed,  the  tide  began  to  turn  at  St.  Petersburg. 

Ill 

It  is  probable  that  Catherine  had  never  seriously  intended  to 
abandon  the  plan  for  a  partition:  she  had  meant,  it  would  seem, 
only  to  postpone  its  execution.  About  the  beginning  of  Decem- 
ber, however,  a  number  of  reasons  combined  to  make  further 
delay  inadvisable.  The  Prussian  importunities  could  not  much 
longer  be  denied  without  driving  the  King  to  fulfil  his  threat  of 

1  Instructions  to  Goltz  of  November  3,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

2  Rescripts  to  Goltz  of  November  17  and  22,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 

3  Cobenzl's  reports  of  November  13,  16,  20,  V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1792. 

4  Rescript  of  December  1,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


3§4 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


withdrawing  from  an  enterprise  in  which  the  Empress  strongly 
desired  to  keep  him  engaged.  Moreover,  the  rumor  of  an  impen- 
ding partition  was  circulating  so  widely  and  attracting  so  much 
attention  that  unless  the  great  blow  were  struck  at  once,  the 
opposition  to  be  expected  from  certain  quarters  would  have  time 
to  mature,  and  the  difficulty  of  the  task  would  be  very  materially 
increased.  England  was  already  making  cautious  inquiries  and 
remonstrances  on  the  subject  at  Berlin  and  Vienna.1  The  French 
government  was  trying  to  stir  up  the  Porte  to  interfere  in  Poland.2 
Above  all,  affairs  within  the  Republic  itself  seemed  to  be  ap- 
proaching a  new  crisis. 

The  Confederates  of  Targowica  had  by  this  time  proved  their 
complete  inability  either  to  agree  among  themselves  or  to  win 
over  their  fellow-countrymen  to  their  cause.  After  a  few  months 
of  stupefied  calm  following  the  collapse  of  the  national  defence  in 
the  summer,  the  Polish  public  had  been  electrified  by  the  amaz- 
ing victories  of  the  French.  Valmy  and  Jemappes  supplied  an 
inspiring  example  of  a  free  nation  successfully  defending  itself 
against  a  league  of  despots;  they  aroused  hopes  that  Poland  too 
might  yet  be  saved  by  French  bayonets.  It  does  not  appear  that 
there  was  at  this  time  any  organized  plan  for  a  national  uprising; 
of  any  propaganda  in  favor  of  '  Jacobinism,'  except  in  the  case 
of  a  few  insignificant  individuals,  we  find  no  trace;  but  there  was 
a  wide-spread  and  enthusiastic  sympathy  for  the  French,  which 
could  not  be  prevented  from  manifesting  itself  either  by  the 
presence  of  the  Russian  troops  or  by  the  iron-clad  censorship  and 
the  unprecedented  police  measures  introduced  by  the  champions 
of  liberty  who  now  presided  over  the  government.  Every  act  of 
the  Confederation  was  greeted  with  scorn  and  ridicule.  There 
were  manifold  demonstrations  of  devotion  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  Third  of  May.  The  Empress'  officers  were  almost  boycotted 
by  Warsaw  society.  The  English  resident  reported  that  the 
universal  hatred  of  the  Russians  seemed  to  increase  daily;    it 

1  The  Prussian  government  hastened  to  inform  the  Empress  of  this  step  of 
England  and  to  urge  that  this  made  the  need  of  haste  all  the  greater  (dispatch  to 
Goltz,  November  23,  sent  by  courier,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133).  Cf.  Salomon, 
Pitt,  i",  p.  580;  Lecky,  op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  83  f. 

2  Cf.  Zinkeisen,  op.  cit.,  vi,  pp.  848  ff. 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION  TREATY         385 

was  shown  on  the  streets,  in  the  theatres,  everywhere  to  such  a 
degree  that  he  lived  in  constant  fear  of  an  explosion  and  a  great 
catastrophe.1  There  were  rumors  of  an  approaching  Sicilian 
Vespers.2  Felix  Potocki,  blind  as  usual  to  the  effects  his  words 
would  have,  wrote  desperately  to  St.  Petersburg  that  the  suc- 
cesses of  the  French  had  '  turned  the  heads  of  his  compatriots  ' ; 
'  Jacobin  principles  '  and  those  of  the  Third  of  May  were  making 
terrible  progress;  unless  something  were  done  at  once  to  stop  the 
evil,  he  feared  the  very  worst.3  The  deputation  which  he  had 
sent  to  thank  the  Empress  for  '  liberating  '  their  country,  had  to 
confess  that  the  moment  the  Russian  troops  should  be  withdrawn, 
the  whole  work  of  the  Confederation  of  Targowica  would  be 
overthrown  by  the  nation.4  In  short,  it  appeared  that  matters 
had  come  to  such  a  pass  that  the  only  way  out  of  endless  embar- 
rassments was  a  partition.  This  nation  had  shown  itself  so 
hopelessly  perverse  that  it  must  be  reduced  to  a  state  of  perpetual 
impotence  to  harm  its  neighbors.  And  the  sooner  the  operation 
was  performed,  the  better. 

These  considerations,  reenforced  by  the  long  felt  desire  for 
"  the  finest  acquisition  the  Empire  could  ever  make,"  5  proved 
decisive.  It  was  true  that  the  great  excuse  for  delay  which 
Ostermann  had  always  held  up  to  Goltz,  had  not  been  removed, 
for  nothing  had  yet  been  heard  from  Vienna.  But  it  was  impos" 
sible  to  defer  forever  to  the  incurable  slowness  of  the  Austrian 
cabinet.  Besides,  it  was  distinctly  to  the  advantage  of  Russia 
to  settle  the  affair  with  Prussia  alone  without  the  participation  of 
the  Court  of  Vienna.  From  Prussia  no  opposition  was  to  be 
expected,  no  matter  how  enormous  the  Empress'  claims  might 
be;  but  it  was  to  be  feared  that  Austria  might  resist  the  intended 
extension  of  the  Russian  frontier  to  the  borders  of  Galicia,  and 

1  Gardiner's  report  of  November  14,  1792,  printed  by  K.  Sienkiewicz,  Skarbiec 
historyi  polskiej,  i,  p.  198.  Very  interesting  details  as  to  the  expressions  of  public 
opinion  at  this  time  in  Smolehski,  Konfederacya  targowicka,  pp.  323  ff. 

2  Cf.  Kakhovski's  reports  to  the  Empress  of  October  17/28,  November  1/12 
and  8/19,  CoopuHKi.,  xlvii,  pp.  462-465. 

3  Letters  to  Zubov  of  November  15  and  24,  M.  A.,  ApxiiBT.  BapmaBCKoii  Mnccin. 

4  Instructions  to  Sievers,  December  22/January  2,  M.  A.,  IIojBnia,  III,  66. 

5  Markov  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  November  8/19,  1792,  Apx.  Bop.,  xx,  p.  32. 


386  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

might  also  try  to  obtain  some  portion  of  Poland  for  herself  in 
default  of  the  Bavarian  Exchange.  The  Russians  were  not 
unwilling  to  provide  for  Austrian  interests  in  the  course  of  the 
negotiation,  but  in  that  negotiation  they  no  longer  intended 
to  have  Austria  take  part.1  This  exclusion  of  the  Court  of 
Vienna  was,  furthermore,  quite  in  accordance  with  the  ideas 
of  the  Berlin  cabinet,  as  repeatedly  expressed  at  St.  Petersburg 
since  October. 

In  the  second  week  in  December,  by  the  13th  at  the  latest,  the 
Empress'  final  decision  was  taken.2  On  the  16th  Ostermann 
announced  to  Goltz  that  his  sovereign  consented  to  the  immedi- 
ate occupation  by  Prussia  of  the  entire  territory  demanded  by  the 
King,  and  that  she  claimed  for  herself  an  acquisition  bounded  on 
the  west  by  a  line  drawn  from  the  easternmost  point  of  Courland 
due  south  via  Pinsk  to  the  Dniester  opposite  Choczim,  a  line 
which  ran  for  some  distance  directly  along  the  Galician  frontier. 
The  further  details  of  the  partition  were  to  be  regulated  by  a 
secret  convention  between  the  two  Courts  as  soon  as  the  King 
had  given  his  consent  to  the  acquisition  demanded  by  the  Em- 
press. Ostermann  excused  the  exclusion  of  Austria  by  pointing 
to  the  slowness  of  that  Power  in  communicating  its  intentions, 
and  the  (supposed)  fact  that  Frederick  William  had  already  satis- 
fied its  chief  desire  by  agreeing  to  the  forcible  occupation  of 
Bavaria. 

Goltz  was  naturally  astounded  at  the  enormous  extent  of  the 
Empress'  claims,  but  he  did  not  dare  protest.  It  was  agreed 
that  Cobenzl  should  be  told  only  that  the  Empress  had  consented 
to  an  immediate  Prussian  occupation  in  Poland,  and  nothing 

1  According  to  Markov's  letter  to  S.  R,  Vorontsov  of  July  27/August  7, 1793,  the 
proposal  to  exclude  Austria  from  the  negotiation  was  made  by  Bezborodko,  who 
of  all  the  Russian  ministers  might  pass  for  the  most  pro-Austrian  (Apx.  Bop.,  xx, 
p.  49). 

Sybel's  statement  that  the  Empress'  decision  was  determined  by  Razumovski's 
reports  of  the  early  stages  of  Haugwitz's  negotiation  at  Vienna  {op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  192) 
is  quite  erroneous.  The  first  report  of  the  ambassador  on  that  subject  was  sent 
by  post  December  4,  and  so  could  not  possibly  have  arrived  in  time  to  influence  a 
decision  taken  by  the  13  th  at  the  latest. 

2  Cf.  the  memorandum  of  Bezborodko  of  December  2/13,  printed  in  Solov'ev, 
Geschichte  des  Falles  von  Polen,  p.  305. 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION   TREATY         387 

more.  Goltz  congratulated  himself  that  he  had  avoided,  as  he 
thought,  all  reference  to  the  French  war  in  the  future  convention.1 
The  arrival  of  the  courier  caused  intense  jubilation  at  Berlin. 
Although  likewise  amazed  at  the  Empress'  demands,  the 
ministry  adjured  the  King  to  acquiesce  in  them  rather  than  lose 
the  chance  to  secure  an  acquisition  in  some  respects  the  most 
important  that  the  House  of  Hohenzollern  had  ever  made,  an 
acquisition  that  would  render  Prussia  for  the  first  time  "  a  co- 
herent kingdom."  They  suggested,  however,  that  since  the 
Empress  seemed  determined  on  a  partition  on  a  grand  scale,  it 
might  not  be  mal  a  propos  to  claim  something  more  for  themselves 
—  the  district  of  Polangen,  for  instance,  which  separated  East 
Prussia  from  Courland,  and  which  might  some  day  acquire  some 
commercial  importance.  They  also  recommended  begging  the 
Empress  to  renounce  the  strip  of  territory  along  the  Galician 
frontier;  since  that  acquisition  would  irritate  Austria  —  and 
would  deprive  Prussia  of  precious  facilities  for  importing  horses 
from  Moldavia  for  the  army !  It  was  not  to  be  expected  that  the 
idea  of  excluding  Austria  from  the  negotiation  would  cause  great 
grief  at  Berlin.  The  ministry  recognized  that  the  Court  of  Vienna 
would  probably  show  some  ill  humor  when  the  convention  was 
presented  to  it;  but  after  all  it  would  only  be  paying  the  penalty 
for  all  its  "tergiversations"  and  "  insidious  negotiations."2  They 
were  especially  pleased  by  the  prospect  of  not  having  to  incur  any 
engagements  for  the  continuation  of  the  war.  '  Undoubtedly,' 
they  wrote  to  Goltz,  '  their  continued  cooperation  would  be  a 
tacit  condition  of  their  new  acquisition,  but  there  was  a  great 
difference  between  a  binding  and  formal  agreement  and  a  volun- 
tary cooperation,  which  might  depend  more  or  less  on  circum- 
stances and  convenience.' 3  The  connection  between  French  and 
Polish  affairs  had  been  very  useful  when  it  furnished  a  pretext  for 
acquisitions:  when  it  entailed  obligations,  that  was  quite  a 
different  matter. 

1  Goltz's  report  of  December  16,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 

2  The  cabinet  ministry  to  the  King,  December  27,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland, 
133- 

3  Ministerial  rescript  to  Goltz  of  December  26,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


388  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Frederick  William's  joy  was,  if  possible,  even  greater  than  that 
of  his  ministers.  "  Our  great  aim  is,  thank  God,  fulfilled,"  he 
wrote  to  them:  "  it  required  efforts  to  attain  it,  but  he  who  risks 
nothing  gains  nothing.  The  anxieties  that  your  patriotic  appre- 
hensions have  given  you,  are  now  removed,  and  succeeded  by 
the  satisfaction  of  seeing  your  labors  crowned  with  the  happiest 
success."  l  With  the  King's  complete  approval  of  the  ministerial 
propositions,  the  courier  was  soon  speeding  back  to  St.  Peters- 
burg. 

The  situation  on  the  Neva  had  meanwhile  altered  in  several 
respects.  The  Russian  ministers  were  again  showing  themselves 
ominously  cold  towards  Goltz,  in  order  to  reduce  him  to  a  be- 
coming state  of  anxiety  and  humility.  This  manoeuvre  was 
beautifully  calculated  to  deprive  him  of  the  courage  to  make 
either  new  demands  or  objections.  With  Goltz  the  effect  was 
unfailing.  A  further  new  element  in  the  situation  was  the  fact 
that  the  Austrian  dispatches  of  December  23  had  arrived,  and 
the  Empress'  hand  was  strengthened  in  so  far  as  the  Court  of 
Vienna  had  turned  over  to  her  the  congenial  role  of  arbiter  in  the 
indemnity  question.  From  the  first  the  Russians  gave  Cobenzl 
to  understand  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  cut  down  or  to  post- 
pone the  Prussian  acquisition.  They  were  lavish  in  assurances, 
however,  that  in  the  impending  negotiation  they  would  take  pains 
to  bind  the  King  to  the  continuation  of  the  war,  and  would  in 
general  provide  for  Austrian  interests  as  carefully  as  for  their  own. 
This  appears  to  have  been  the  sole  effect  of  the  secret  instructions 
sent  to  Cobenzl.  For  the  rest,  the  Austrian  communications  to 
England  regarding  the  indemnities  produced  an  extremely  bad 
effect  at  St.  Petersburg:  from  the  Empress  down,  everyone  con- 
sidered those  confidences  premature,  indiscreet,  and  even  insid- 
ious. This  was  one  more  reason  for  hastening  to  settle  with 
Prussia. 

The  negotiation,  which  for  greater  secrecy  was  conducted 
between  Goltz  and  Ostermann  alone,  was  rushed  through  in  less 
than  six  days.     Terrified  by  reports  that  a  large  part  of  the 

1  Frederick  William  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  December  31,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russ- 
land,  135. 


TEE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION   TREATY         389 

Russian  ministry  was  opposed  to  the  partition  altogether,  Goltz 
feared  to  ruin  all  by  delaying  matters  in  any  way.  His  proposi- 
tion about  Polangen  was  curtly  refused  once  for  all,  on  the  pretext 
that  the  Empress  could  not  acquiesce  in  Prussian  claims  more 
extensive  than  those  already  communicated  to  the  Court  of 
Vienna.  Goltz  dared  not  make  the  obvious  retort  that  the  size 
of  the  Russian  acquisition  was  wholly  unknown  to  that  Court. 
Nor  had  he  better  luck  with  his  objections  regarding  the  territory 
along  the  Galician  frontier.  He  was  obliged  to  accept  an  article 
concerning  the  French  war,  which  he  and  his  Court  would  greatly 
have  preferred  to  see  omitted.  In  short,  the  Russians  simply 
dictated  their  own  terms.  January  23  Ostermann,  Bezborodko, 
and  Markov  for  Russia,  and  Goltz  for  Prussia  signed  the  treaty  of 
partition.1 

IV 

The  act,  which  had  been  drafted  by  Markov,  followed  as  far  as 
possible  the  form  and  phraseology  of  the  treaties  of  1772.  This 
time,  indeed,  there  were  no  '  ancient  and  legitimate  rights  '  to 
Polish  territory  that  might  be  invoked;  there  was,  in  fact,  no 
decent  pretext  of  any  kind ;  but  the  difficulty  was  met  in  the  pre- 
amble by  sonorous  allusions  to  "  the  imminent  and  universal 
danger  "  that  threatened  Europe  as  a  result  of  "  the  fatal  revolu- 
tion in  France,"  and  the  need  that  the  Powers  interested  in  the 
maintenance  of  "  order  "  and  "  the  general  tranquillity  "  should 
take  "  the  most  rigorous  and  efficacious  measures  "  to  arrest  the 
progress  of  the  evil.  It  required  something  of  a  tour  de  force  to 
make  Poland  an  accomplice  in  the  guilt  of  France,  but  the 
formula  had  long  before  been  discovered.  It  was  said  that  the 
contracting  parties  had  '  recognized  by  sure  signs  that  the  same 
spirit  of  insurrection  and  dangerous  innovations,  which  now 
reigned  in  France,  was  ready  to  break  out  in  the  Kingdom  of 
Poland,  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  their  own  possessions  ';  they 
had  therefore  '  felt  the  necessity  of  redoubling  their  precautions 

1  For  the  above:  Goltz's  reports  of  January  18,  22,  and  24,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  XI, 
Russland,  135.  The  text  of  the  treaty  is  printed  in  Martens,  Traites  cone! us  par 
la  Russie,  ii,  pp.  228-235;   Vivenot,  ii,  p.  516-519. 


390  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

and  efforts  in  order  to  guarantee  their  subjects  against  the  effects 
of  a  scandalous  and  often  contagious  example  ' ;  and  they  had 
been  obliged  to  combine  those  efforts  in  such  a  way  as  to  obtain 
for  themselves  l  both  present  and  future  security  and  an  indem- 
nity for  the  exorbitant  expenses  which  these  exertions  must 
necessarily  occasion  them.' 

The  partition  being  thus  represented  as  part  of  the  wider 
system  of  measures  for  combating  the  revolutionary  plague;  and 
also  as  an  indemnification  for  such  laudable  services,  it  followed 
that  the  two  Powers  could  not  well  avoid  committing  themselves 
to  some  kind  of  definite  obligations  regarding  the  French  war. 
Catherine  was,  indeed,  delighted  to  seize  the  chance  to  bind  the 
hands  of  the  King  of  Prussia  as  tightly  as  possible  in  this  respect; 
but  as  for  her  own  cooperation,  she  preferred  that  it  should  remain 
of  the  same  purely  moral  and  exhortatory  sort  as  heretofore. 
By  Article  I  of  the  Convention  she  generously  pledged  herself  to 
maintain  her  military  and  naval  forces  "  on  the  same  formidable 
footing  as  at  present,"  so  as  to  be  able  at  all  times  to  protect  her 
own  states  against  any  possible  attack,  to  assist  her  allies  in  the 
cases  stipulated  by  the  treaties,  and  to  repress  any  outbreaks 
that  might  occur  in  Poland.  Prussia,  on  the  other  hand,  was 
obliged  to  promise  to  continue  the  war  in  common  with  the 
Emperor,  and  to  make  no  separate  peace  nor  truce  until  the  two 
sovereigns  '  had  attained  the  aim  announced  by  their  common 
declarations,'  and  forced  "  the  French  rebels  ...  to  renounce 
their  hostile  enterprises  abroad  and  their  criminal  attentats  in  the 
interior  of  the  Kingdom  of  France"  (Art.  IV.).  Taken  in  the 
strict  sense,  this  article  would  have  bound  Frederick  William  to 
an  interminable  war.  Here,  it  must  be  admitted,  the  Empress 
had  effectually  provided  for  the  interests  of  Austria  —  and  inci- 
dentally for  her  own. 

As  an  indemnity  for  the  expense  of  her  armaments,  and  also  for 
the  sake  of  "  the  general  security  and  tranquillity,"  Russia  was  to 
take  possession  of  the  Polish  territories  east  of  the  line  Druja- 
Pinsk-Choczim :  that  is  to  say,  of  virtually  the  whole  eastern  half 
of  the  Republic,  including  the  rich  palatinates  of  the  Ukraine,  the 
granary  of  Poland,  which  had  so  long  formed  the  object  of  Potem- 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION   TREATY         391 

kin's  ambition.  Prussia's  acquisition,  bounded  by  the  line 
Cz^stochowa-Rawa-Soldau,  embraced  the  whole  of  Great  Poland, 
including  the  cities  of  Dantzic,  Thorn,  Posen,  Gnesen,  Kalisz  and 
Sieradz.  The  yawning  gap  in  the  flanks  of  the  Monarchy  was 
thus  filled  in  more  than  generous  fashion,  and  the  Prussian  fron- 
tier advanced  to  within  a  few  miles  of  Warsaw  and  Cracow.  The 
respective  shares  of  the  two  partitioning  Powers  were  glaringly 
unequal.  Russia  gained  over  three  million  new  subjects:  Prussia 
little  more  than  one  million.  In  area  the  Empress'  share  was 
almost  exactly  four  times  as  large  as  the  King's.  The  loss  to 
Poland  was  relatively  far  greater  than  that  in  1772.  While  the 
First  Partition  had  cost  the  Republic  only  twenty-nine  per  cent 
of  its  area  and  thirty-six  per  cent  of  its  population,  the  Second 
Partition  was  to  rob  it  of  fifty-four  per  cent  of  its  remaining 
territory  and  approximately  half  of  its  remaining  population. 
There  was  left  to  the  ruined  state  only  a  long,  narrow  quadri- 
lateral extending  from  Courland  to  Cracow  and  Volhynia.1 

The  formal  annexation  of  the  territories  in  question  was  fixed 
for  the  period  between  the  5th  and  the  21st  of  April  (New  Style). 
The  two  Powers  agreed  to  act  in  the  closest  concert  in  effecting 
the  necessary  "  definitive  arrangement  with  the  Republic  of 
Poland."  Finally,  they  made  certain  specious  provisions  for  the 
interests  of  Austria.  By  Article  VII  they  bound  themselves, 
when  the  time  should  come,  and  when  the  request  had  been  made 
of  them,  '  to  omit  none  of  their  good  offices  and  other  efficacious 
means  in  their  power  to  facilitate  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  while 

1  It  is  impossible  to  offer  any  exact  statistical  data  with  regard  to  the  area  and 
population  affected  by  the  Second  Partition.  According  to  the  calculations  pre- 
sented to  the  Diet  of  Grodno  on  August  21,  1793,  the  Republic  possessed  before 
the  Partition  an  area  of  9,630  (Polish)  square  miles  (  =  206,795  square  miles,  Eng- 
lish) ;  the  share  taken  by  Russia  included  4,157  square  miles  ( =  89,257  square  miles, 
English);  that  taken  by  Prussia  1,062  square  miles  ( =  22,805  square  miles, English) . 

Korzon  estimates  the  area  of  Poland  in  1792  as  only  9,438  geographical  square 
miles  =  200,661  square  miles,  English  (i,  pp.  160  f.).  Sybel  puts  the  Prussian  lot  as 
1,016  square  miles  {op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  222  f.);  Priimers  (Das  Jahr  1793,  p.  76)  at  1,061. 
According  to  the  same  statistics  presented  at  the  Grodno  Diet,  the  population  of 
the  Republic  just  before  the  Partition  was  7,660,787  (but  Korzon  places  it  as  high 
as  8,790,000,  ibid.);  that  of  the  lands  annexed  by  Russia  3,055,900;  that  gained 
by  Prussia  1,136,389  (see  this  whole  set  of  calculations  in  Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  iii, 
p.  336).     These  figures  can  be  regarded  as  only  approximate  at  the  best. 


392  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

adding  to  it  such  other  advantages  as  should  be  compatible  with 
the  general  convenience.'  This  article  might  mean  much  or 
little,  according  as  it  was  interpreted.  The  term  '  efficacious 
means  '  suggested  the  idea  of  coercion  to  bring  about  the  Ex- 
change, but  there  followed  the  limitation  to  '  means  in  their 
power.'  The  '  other  advantages  '  sounded  well,  but  were  bound 
up  with  the  elastic  phrase  about  '  the  general  convenience.' 
Each  concession  or  promise  contained  a  loophole  for  escape. 
Austria  was  really  offered  nothing  more  solid  than  the  eventual 
good  offices  of  the  two  Courts  in  behalf  of  the  Exchange.  Article 
VIII  stipulated  that  after  ratification  the  Convention  was  to  be 
communicated  to  the  Emperor  with  the  request  that  he  should 
formally  accede  to  it  and  guarantee  its  provisions,  the  Empress 
and  the  King  engaging  for  their  part  to  guarantee  the  Exchange  as 
soon  as  it  should  be  effected.  Needless  to  say,  this  was  not  the 
kind  of  guarantee  for  which  the  Austrians  had  asked. 

In  general,  the  treaty  was  an  unsurpassed  triumph  of  Russian 
policy.  The  Empress,  without  having  taken  any  active  part  in 
the  French  enterprise,  awarded  to  herself  an  enormous  '  indem- 
nity ' ;  she  accorded  Prussia  a  lot  one-fourth  as  large  as  her 
own,  under  onerous  conditions;  and  she  provided  chiefly  by  airy 
promises  for  her  '  ancient  ally,'  who  bore  the  main  burden  of 
the  war. 

The  Prussian  ministry  found  the  terms  of  the  Convention  open 
to  more  than  one  objection.  They  were  chagrined  at  getting  no 
additions  to  their  share  and  at  the  obligations  imposed  upon 
them,  but  they  were  far  too  clever  not  to  see  the  various  means 
provided  for  evading  those  obligations.  The  engagement  to 
continue  the  war  was  softened  by  the  stipulation  '  in  common 
with  the  Emperor,'  for  they  were  confident  that  they  could  rely  on 
him  to  abandon  the  enterprise  at  the  first  good  opportunity. 
The  '  efficacious  means  '  to  be  employed  to  further  the  Exchange 
could  and  must  be  interpreted  as  referring  only  to  cooperation 
in  the  recovery  of  the  Netherlands.  At  any  rate,  all  such  captious 
considerations  were  outweighed  by  the  joy  of  having  signed  and 
sealed  the  treaty  which  at  last  "  raised  the  Prussian  Monarchy 
to  that  degree  of  material  power  to  which  it  was  destined  by  the 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION   TREATY         393 

genius  of  its  sovereigns  and  the  vigor  of  its  people."  '    On  Febru- 
ary 28  the  exchange  of  ratifications  took  place  at  St.  Petersburg. 

V 

The  execution  of  the  Partition  was  already  well  under  way. 
On  January  16,  1793,  the  Prussian  envoy  Buchholtz  presented  at 
Warsaw  a  note  announcing  that  his  master  was  about  to  send  a 
corps  of  troops  into  Great  Poland.  As  a  pretext  for  this  step,  it 
was  alleged  that  "  the  self-styled  Patriotic  party  "  (formerly 
known  as  '  the  Prussian  party,'  it  may  be  remarked)  was  '  con- 
tinuing its  secret  machinations,  which  obviously  tended  to  the 
total  subversion  of  order  and  tranquillity,'  and  which  had  exposed 
the  neighboring  Prussian  provinces  to  "  repeated  excesses  and 
violations  of  territory";  that  '  the  spirit  of  French  democracy 
was  taking  deep  root  in  Poland,  so  that  the  manoeuvres  of 
Jacobin  emissaries  were  gaining  powerful  support,  and  already 
several  revolutionary  clubs  had  been  formed,  which  made  open 
profession  of  their  principles  ';  that  the  spread  of  this  "  dangerous 
poison,"  and  the  connection  of  "the  zealots"  with  theFrench  clubs 
placed  the  King  under  the  absolute  necessity  of  providing  for  the 
safety  of  his  own  states,  and  averting  the  danger  of  being  attacked 
in  the  rear  at  the  moment  when  he  was  engaged  in  war  in  the 
west.  As  the  aim  of  the  intended  occupation  was  only  to  repress 
those  who  were  fomenting  troubles  and  insurrection,  to  restore 
and  maintain  order,  and  to  assure  to  honest  citizens  an  efficacious 
protection, '  the  King  flattered  himself  that  he  could  count  on  the 
good  will  of  a  nation  whose  well-being  could  not  be  a  matter  of 
indifference  to  him,  and  to  which  he  wished  to  give  substantial 
proofs  of  his  affection  and  benevolence.' 2  The  sublime  irony  or 
the  brazen  hypocrisy  of  this  declaration  will  rarely  find  a  parallel. 
Barring  a  few  eccentric  and  utterly  unimportant  individuals, 
there  was  at  that  time  in  Poland  no  '  democratic  '  propaganda, 
no  '  Jacobin  emissaries,'  no  '  revolutionary  clubs.' 3     The  King 

1  The  cabinet  ministry  to  the  King,  February  3,  Lucchesini  to  the  Ministry, 
February  7,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H,  and  R.  92,  L.  N.  34. 

2  The  declaration  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  297  ff.,  and  elsewhere. 

3  Cf.  Smolenski,  Konfederacya  targowicka,  pp.  366  ff.    It  is  pathetic  to  find  an 


394  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

of  Prussia  was  threatened  by  no  danger  on  the  east  —  unless  he 
provoked  one  by  undertaking  a  new  partition  and  thus  goading 
the  Polish  nation  into  a  supreme  act  of  desperation.  And  yet  the 
formula,  which  was  henceforth  to  serve  the  robber  Powers  in  all 
their  unholy  operations  against  Poland,  had  been  furnished  by  the 
Poles  themselves;  for  the  men  of  Targowica,  in  their  blind  hatred 
of  their  opponents,  had  long  been  stigmatizing  the  adherents  of 
the  monarchical  constitution  of  1791  as  '  democrats '  and 
'  Jacobins.' 

On  January  24  the  Prussian  troops  under  General  Mollendorff 
poured  over  the  frontier.  The  districts  to  be  annexed  were  oc- 
cupied without  difficulty,  almost  without  resistance.  Dantzic 
alone  closed  its  gates  and  held  out  until,  threatened  with  famine 
and  deprived  of  all  hope  of  succor,  the  Town  Council  surrendered 
the  city  and  begged  for  its  incorporation  with  Prussia  (April  4). 
Even  then  on  the  day  of  the  occupation  the  mob  fired  on  the 
incoming  Prussian  troops. 

In  the  face  of  this  attack,  the  government  of  Poland  —  the 
'  Generality  '  of  the  Confederation,  sitting  at  Grodno  —  pre- 
sented the  most  dismal  spectacle  of  consternation,  impotence, 
and  cowardice.  That  Prussia's  action  had  been  taken  with  the 
Empress'  consent  was  revealed  in  Buchholtz's  declaration;  and 
that  this  action  was  only  the  preliminary  to  a  new  partition, 
agreed  upon  between  the  two  Powers,  was  only  too  obvious. 
Deserted  by  Catherine,  upon  whose  protection  alone  their  power 
had  hitherto  rested,  the  Confederation  saw  themselves  exposed 
to  the  execration  of  a  nation,  half  of  which  regarded  them  as 
dupes,  and  the  other  half  as  traitors.  It  is  characteristic  of  these 
men  that  in  such  a  crisis  they  thought  not  so  much  of  their 
country  as  of  themselves;  for  it  is  clear  that  in  what  few  feeble 
efforts  they  made  to  oppose  the  Prussians,  their  main  aim  was 
only  to  save  appearances  and  to  vindicate,  as  far  as  might  oe, 
their  own  ruined  reputations. 

The  Generality  replied  to  Buchholtz's  declaration  with  a  meek 
protest,  denying  any  need  for  the  entrance  of  the  Prussian  troops 

historian  like  Sybel  attempting  a  vindication  of  the  Prussian  declaration,  and 
asserting  that  "  the  facts  "  alleged  in  it  were  true  {op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  194). 


TEE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION   TREATY         395 

and  requesting  their  withdrawal.  When  Felix  Potocki,  with 
streaming  eyes,  announced  the  news  that  the  invasion  had 
actually  begun,  the  Confederation  could  think  of  nothing  better 
to  do  than  to  dispatch  a  pitiful  appeal  to  St.  Petersburg,  throwing 
themselves  on  the  mercy  of  their  great  Protectress.  While 
awaiting  her  answer,  they  made  some  pretence  of  activity.  They 
issued  a  magniloquent  proclamation,  protesting  "  in  the  most 
solemn  manner  in  the  face  of  the  universe  against  any  usurpation 
of  the  least  part  of  the  Republic's  territory,"  and  swearing  that 
'  they  were  ready  to  shed  the  last  drop  of  their  blood  in  defence 
of  the  liberty  and  integrity  of  the  country.' 1  The  Hetman 
Rzewuski  bustled  about  giving  orders  to  the  troops  to  oppose  the 
advance  of  the  Prussians.  On  February  n  the  Generality  even 
mustered  up  the  courage  to  issue  '  universals  '  instructing  the 
nation  to  hold  itself  in  readiness  for  a  levee  en  masse  (the  so-called 
pos  polite  ruszenie).  How  much  sincerity  there  was  behind  these 
demonstrations  appears  from  the  fact  that  Potocki  and  associates 
hastened  to  assure  the  Russians  that  the  universals  had  been  sent 
out  simply  because  the  Confederation  had  to  do  something  to 
appease  the  public,  and  this  had  seemed  "  the  most  innocent 
means  "  that  they  could  think  of.2 

Any  doubts  as  to  Catherine's  sentiments  and  intentions  were 
very  soon  removed.  General  Igelstrom,  the  new  commander  of 
the  Empress'  forces  in  Poland,  refused  to  allow  a  single  Polish 
regiment  or  a  single  cannon  from  the  Warsaw  arsenal  to  be  sent 
against  the  Prussians.  Baron  Sievers,  who  had  just  arrived  to 
replace  Bulgakov  as  Russian  ambassador,  denied,  indeed,  any 
knowledge  as  to  the  reasons  for  the  Prussian  invasion,  but 
announced  that  it  was  the  Empress'  will  that  the  Generality 
should  attempt  no  resistance,  and  should  in  general  avoid  all 
measures  that  might  stir  up  the  nation  and  disturb  "  the  public 
tranquillity."  3  Roundly  rebuked  for  their  universals  of  February 
11  —  so  grave  a  step  precipitately  taken  without  consulting  him, 
"  the  minister  of  a  friendly  and  allied  state  "  —  the  Confederation 

1  This  document,  dated  February  3,  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  Recueil,  pp.  299-304. 

2  Biihler  to  Zubov,  February  1/12,  M.  A.,  IloJibiua,  IX,  7. 

3  Cf.  Smolenski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  408  f. 


396  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

could  only  issue  a  new  proclamation  practically  canceling  the 
preceding  one  and  informing  the  nation  that  if  there  were  any 
hope  left,  it  could  be  only  in  the  magnanimity  of  the  great  Cath- 
erine.1 With  that  it  was  clear  that  every  thought  of  national  self- 
defence  had  been  abandoned.  Poland  lay  helpless  and  passive 
before  her  despoilers,  while  the  leaders  of  the  Confederation 
thought  only  of  making  their  escape  from  the  scene. 

In  the  middle  of  March,  Potocki  went  off  to  St.  Petersburg, 
ostensibly  in  order  to  implore  the  Empress'  protection  for  the 
Republic.  He  was  to  return  to  the  country  only  after  the  final 
partition  — ■  a  Russian  general.  Branicki  laid  down  his  het- 
man's  staff,  retired  to  the  banks  of  the  Neva,  and  became  a 
Russian  subject.  His  worthy  colleague  Rzewuski  remained  for  a 
time  nominally  in  office,  busying  himself  chiefly  with  attempts  to 
whitewash  himself  before  his  fellow-countrymen  and  with  desper- 
ate and  burning  appeals  to  St.  Petersburg.  In  words  that  well 
sum  up  the  tragedy  of  the  Targowicians,  he  wrote:  "  Today  I  am 
regarded  as  the  opprobrium  of  my  nation,  as  a  man  who  bar- 
gained to  lead  a  people  into  error  and  to  sacrifice  the  whole  coun- 
try to  the  interests  of  Russia.  .  .  .  Woe  to  the  man  who  has  to 
deal  with  you  Russians.  I  thought  to  establish  the  prosperity  of 
the  Republic  on  eternal  foundations:  I  was  wrong.  You  have 
wrought  the  ruin  of  my  country  and  me."  2 

The  King,  too,  would  gladly  have  joined  in  the  general  deban- 
dade.  Foreseeing  what  was  coming,  he  wrote  to  the  Empress 
begging  to  be  allowed  to  abdicate,  if  only  his  debts  were  paid.3 
His  prayer  was  not  granted :  the  Empress  still  had  work  for  him 
to  do. 

On  April  7  the  two  partitioning  Powers  issued  manifestoes 
announcing  the  annexation  of  their  respective  acquisitions  and 
calling  upon  the  inhabitants  to  take  the  oath  of  allegiance  to 
their  new  masters.  Two  days  later  Sievers  and  Buchholtz  pre- 
sented to  the  Generality  at  Grodno  the  long-expected  formal 
declarations  of  "  the  firm  and  irrevocable  decision"  of  their  Courts 

1  Konfederacya  targowicka,  pp.  413  f. 

2  Letter  of  March  11,  1793,  probably  to  Zubov,  M.  A.,  IIo.TBma,  IX,  1. 

3  Letter  of  January  25,  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii,  pp.  80  f. 


THE  RUSSO-PRUSSIAN  PARTITION   TREATY         397 

to  execute  a  new  partition.  The  Polish  nation  was  invited  to 
convoke  a  Diet  "  in  order  to  proceed  amicably  to  the  arrange- 
ments and  measures  necessary  to  attain  the  salutary  aim  which 
Their  Majesties  propose,  that  of  securing  to  the  Republic  a  firm, 
durable,  and  unalterable  peace."  l  It  then  remained  only  to 
coerce  the  Poles  into  formally  surrendering  the  half  of  their 
country,  and  to  provide  against  whatever  opposition  to  the  Parti- 
tion might  be  forthcoming  from  foreign  Powers. 

1  See  the  Russian  declaration,  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  306-309. 


CHAPTER  XVIII 

The  Attitude  of  Austria  Towards  the  Partition 


Although  the  St.  Petersburg  Convention  seemed  to  assume  that 
Austria  had  acquiesced  in  advance  in  all  the  agreements  that 
might  be  concluded  between  her  two  allies,  Russia  and  Prussia 
saw  fit  to  communicate  the  treaty  at  Vienna  only  after  they  had 
virtually  completed  their  arrangements  for  carrying  it  out.  By 
the  express  will  of  the  Empress,1  the  negotiation  had  been  kept 
strictly  secret  from  Louis  Cobenzl,  in  spite  of  the  latter's 
reiterated  and  indignant  protests.  It  was  not  until  March  5  that 
the  ambassador  could  report  that  a  convention  had  been  signed; 
and  its  contents  remained  unknown  to  him  until  after  the  act  had 
been  sent  to  Vienna.2  Meanwhile  during  the  three  months  before 
the  blow  fell,  the  Austrian  cabinet  presented  the  spectacle  of  a 
ministry  vaguely  conscious  of  impending  disaster,  but  helpless  to 
avert  it,  divided  against  itself,  rejecting  or  postponing  plan  after 
plan,  perpetually  waiting  for  a  reply  from  one  quarter  and  a 
courier  from  another,  incapable  of  making  a  vigorous  decision  of 
any  kind. 

In  January  the  main  problem  was  how  to  gain  some  real  secur- 
ity for  the  effectuation  of  the  Exchange,  in  case  Russia  and 
Prussia  refused  to  give  the  precise  guarantees  demanded.  At  the 
ministerial  Conference  of  January  3,  the  Vice-Chancellor  Cobenzl 
proposed  that  as  the  Empress  had  now  given  her  consent  to  the 
entry  of  Prussian  troops  into  Poland,  Austria  also  should  tem- 
porarily occupy  certain  territories  in  that  Republic.  As  usual, 
Lacy  and  his  friends  interposed  a  host  of  objections.  It  would  be 
imprudent,  they  urged,  to  divert  any  considerable  body  of  troops 
to  the  east,  when  all  available  forces  were  needed  for  the  recovery 

1  Goltz's  report  of  January  18,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  135. 

2  Cobenzl's  reports  of  January-February,  passim,  and  of  March  5,  V.  A.,  Russ- 
land, Berichte,  1793. 

398 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  399 

of  the  Netherlands.  It  would  be  impossible  to  decide  upon  the 
territory  to  be  occupied  until  the  exact  size  of  the  lot  claimed  by 
Prussia  was  known.  The  Conference  finally  resolved  that  if  the 
allied  Powers  refused  to  guarantee  the  realization  of  the  Ex- 
change, the  Imperial  Court  should  occupy  only  the  fortresses  of 
Cracow  and  Kamieniec  and  the  intervening  strip  of  territory 
along  the  frontier,  although  later  on,  after  the  precise  area  of  the 
Prussian  acquisition  was  known,  the  occupation  might  be  pro- 
portionately extended.  Owing  to  Lacy's  meticulous  anxiety  not 
to  get  a  single  village  less  than  the  King  of  Prussia,  action  was 
thus  indefinitely  postponed.  The  net  result  of  the  Conference  of 
January  3  was  that  no  effective  measures  whatever  were  taken  to 
obtain  a  security  for  the  Exchange  on  the  side  of  Poland.1 

There  was  one  other  means  by  which  Austria  might  have  safe- 
guarded her  interests  and  entered  into  possession  of  her  indem- 
nity at  the  same  time  as  did  Prussia.  The  highly  suspicious 
conduct  of  the  Court  of  Munich  still  offered  abundant  excuse  for 
carrying  out  the  plan  discussed  two  months  earlier  between  Spiel- 
mann  and  the  Prussians,  the  plan  for  the  forcible  sequestration  of 
Bavaria.  If  Cobenzl  had  had  his  way,  it  is  probable  that  an 
attempt  would  have  been  made  to  carry  out  this  project;  but 
once  more  he  encountered  the  opposition  of  Lacy  and  of  Prince 
Colloredo,  the  Chancellor  of  the  Empire,  who  urged  that  such 
violent  measures  would  alienate  all  the  German  princes  and 
compromise  the  honor  of  the  Imperial  Court.  If  not  definitely 
abandoned,  the  plan  was  at  least  postponed  until  changes  in  the 
military  situation  and  the  fall  of  Philip  Cobenzl  at  last  put  an 
end  to  it.2 

Hampered  and  thwarted  in  both  his  schemes  for  obtaining  some 
tangible  security  for  the  Exchange,  the  Vice-Chancellor  could 
only  fall  back  on  the  uncertain  resources  of  diplomacy;  and  here, 

1  Cobenzl  to  Starhemberg,  January  1,  Lacy's  volum  of  January  2  (erroneously 
given  as  of  January  3  and  as  written  after  the  Conference,  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  459  f.), 
Conference  protocol  of  January  3  and  separat-vola,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  456-461). 

2  For  the  above:  Cobenzl's  correspondence  with  Lehrbach,  January-March 
1793,  passim,  V.  A.,  Bayern,  Expcd.,  and  Berichte,  1793;  Caesar's  reports  of 
January  12,  26,  February  13,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174;  vola  of  Lacy,  Rosenberg,  and  Col- 
loredo of  January  12,   Cobenzl  to  the  Emperor  the  same  day,  V.  A.,  Vortrdge,  1793. 


400  TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

too,  fortune  was  steadily  adverse  to  him.  On  February  19 
Razumovski  communicated  a  dispatch  from  Ostermann  contain- 
ing a  preliminary  announcement  as  to  the  Partition  Treaty. 
After  some  explanation  of  the  reasons  that  had  led  the  Empress  to 
make  a  decision  without  a  final  consultation  with  Austria,  the  dis- 
patch stated  that  she  had  provided  for  the  Emperor's  interests 
in  two  equally  effective  ways,  in  such  a  manner  that  he  could  not 
have  done  better  himself,  as  he  would  be  convinced  as  soon  as  the 
completed  act  should  be  presented  to  him.  She  had,  namely, 
induced  the  King  of  Prussia  to  bind  himself  in  the  most  formal 
and  positive  manner  to  make  common  cause  with  the  Court  of 
Vienna  throughout  the  whole  course  of  the  war,  and  also  to  assist 
powerfully  and  efficaciously  both  in  the  matter  of  the  Bavarian 
Exchange  and  in  procuring  "several  otheradvantages"  to  Austria. 
For  the  rest,  it  was  said  that  it  had  been  impossible  to  cut  down 
the  size  of  the  Prussian  acquisition,  in  view  of  the  consent  pre- 
viously given  by  the  Emperor  to  all  the  King's  demands;  and  no 
direct  reply  was  made  to  the  Austrian  request  for  a  guarantee  of 
the  Exchange.  Immediately  after  Razumovski,  Caesar  made  an 
analogous  communication  in  the  name  of  his  Court. 

Cobenzl  took  these  announcements  with  good  grace.  He 
already  knew  that  Russia  and  Prussia  were  negotiating  a  separate 
convention,  and  he  does  not  seem  at  this  time  to  have  felt  much 
uneasiness  over  the  fact.  In  his  reply  to  Caesar,  however,  he  took 
pains  to  indicate  once  more  the  provision  in  its  favor  to  which 
his  Court  attached  the  most  importance,  and  which  it  confidently 
expected  to  find  in  the  treaty:  namely,  a  clear  and  unequivocal 
guarantee  of  the  realization  of  the  Exchange.1  Reporting  to  the 
Emperor,  the  Vice-Chancellor  declared  that  a  final  judgment  could 
be  formed  only  after  the  receipt  of  a  detailed  report  of  the  Con- 
vention from  the  ambassador  in  St.  Petersburg;  but  meantime 
he  thought  the  prospects  not  unfavorable,  although  the  refusal 
to  reduce  the  Prussian  lot  was  as  unexpected  as  the  reason  alleged 
for  not  doing  so  was,  according  to  the  records,  absolutely  untrue.2 

1  Ostermann's  dispatch  of  January  27/February  7,  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  481- 
484;  Razumovski's  report  of  February  9/20,  M.  A.,  ABCrpia,  III,  54;  Caesar's 
report  of  February  25,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174. 

2  P.  Cobenzl  to  the  Emperor,  February  21,  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  481. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  40I 

This  somewhat  optimistic  mood  must  have  been  disturbed  a 
few  days  later  by  the  arrival  of  an  ominous  report  from  Louis 
Cobenzl  as  to  the  rigid  secrecy  with  which  the  Russians  concealed 
from  him  their  negotiation  with  Prussia.1  The  Austrians  now 
began  to  discover  how  completely  they  had  played  into  the  hands 
of  their  allies;  and  in  the  following  weeks  their  uneasiness  and 
their  suspicions  were  increased  by  the  inexplicable  delay  in  the 
communication  of  the  Convention. 

Almost  at  the  same  time  with  Razumovski's  overtures,  a 
courier  from  London  brought  the  reply  of  the  British  govern- 
ment to  the  Austrian  advances  of  December.  The  response  was 
favorable  enough  in  so  far  as  England,  now  committed  to  the  war 
with  France,  displayed  a  strong  desire  for  a  close  understanding 
with  the  Imperial  Court;  but  as  to  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  Lord 
Grenville  had  raised  so  many  objections  that  there  could  be  little 
doubt  of  the  decided  aversion  felt  at  London  towards  that  pro- 
ject. On  the  other  hand,  he  had  held  out  hopes  that  if  the  Em- 
peror would  renounce  that  plan,  England  would  gladly  help  him 
to  procure  an  indemnity  at  the  expense  of  France.2 

The  British  answer  made  a  deep  impression  at  Vienna,  the 
more  so  in  view  of  the  bad  news  from  St.  Petersburg.  The  con- 
viction was  gaining  ground  that  Cobenzl  and  Spielmann  had 
bungled  sadly;  that  they  had  allowed  themselves  to  be  duped  by 
Russia  and  Prussia;  and  that  by  insisting  further  on  their  im- 
practicable Exchange  project,  they  would  merely  be  alienating 
England,  the  one  ally  from  whom  Austria  might  hope  for  loyal 
assistance  both  in  prosecuting  the  war  and  in  securing  a  suitable 
indemnity  of  some  kind.  Before  the  end  of  February  the  Emperor 
was  undoubtedly  considering  a  change  of  ministry  and  a  change 
of  system.  A  redoubtable  competitor  for  Cobenzl's  position  was 
already  being  brought  to  the  front  by  the  powerful  Colloredo 
family  in  the  person  of  Baron  von  Thugut.3 

1  Report  of  February  13,  which,  being  sent  by  courier,  must  have  reached 
Vienna  about  the  25th-2  7th,  V.  A..  Russland,  Berichte,  1793. 

2  Stadion's  report  of  February  15,  V.  A.,  England,  Berichte,  1793. 

3  In  January  Thugut  had  been  appointed  political  adviser  to  the  commander- 
in-chief,  the  Prince  of  Saxe-Coburg  (Vivenot,  ii,  p.  466),  but  then  the  Emperor  for 
some  unknown  reason  authorized  him  to  delay  his  departure  for  the  army  (Thugut 


4-02  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

In  a  memorial  which  was  probably  presented  to  the  Emperor 
early  in  March,  Thugut  subjected  the  Vice-Chancellor's  policy 
to  a  searching  criticism,  and  outlined  a  new  program.  He  de- 
clared that  under  the  existing  circumstances  it  was  impossible 
to  ensure  the  ultimate  realization  of  the  Exchange  sufficiently  to 
make  that  project  the  basis  of  a  political  system.  On  the  most 
favorable  supposition,  the  Exchange  could  not  be  effected  for  two 
or  three  years  yet ;  and  during  such  a  period  no  one  could  foresee 
what  events  would  occur  to  thwart  a  plan,  the  execution  of  which 
depended  on  so  many  contingencies  and  on  so  many  wills  —  on 
the  consent  of  the  Elector  and  of  all  the  members  of  his  House,  on 
that  of  the  Empire,  Prussia,  Russia,  England,  and  so  many 
others.  Austria  could  not  afford  to  defer  her  indemnity  to  so 
uncertain  a  future,  or  to  rely  on  the  promises  of  Prussia,  when  that 
Power  did  not  hesitate  at  present  to  violate  openly  the  stipula- 
tion which  formed  the  cornerstone  of  the  alliance  —  a  perfect 
equality  in  all  '  advantages.'  The  Emperor's  indemnification 
must  be  based  on  another  plan  less  complicated  and  better  suited 
to  balance  the  dangerous  aggrandizement  of  the  Court  of  Berlin. 
The  precise  nature  of  this  plan  Thugut  did  not  attempt  to  fix  at 
that  moment,  but  he  suggested  conquests  from  France.  The 
abandonment  of  that  mirage,  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  an  effort  to 
free  the  Imperial  Court  from  too  close  dependence  on  a  suspected 
ally,  close  union  with  England,  and  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war  with  the  aim  of  securing  as  soon  as  possible  an  indemnity 
completely  equal  to  that  of  Prussia  —  such  were  the  chief  points 
in  the  new  program.  One  can  hardly  deny  that  whatever  were 
the  later  results,  it  was  better  adapted  to  the  existing  situation 
than  Cobenzl's  system.1 

to  Colloredo,  January  28,  V.  A.,  F.  446).  In  February  the  Baron  began  to  fre- 
quent the  State  Chancellery  daily.  On  the  24th  the  Emperor  ordered  Cobenzl  to 
place  all  important  documents  without  exception  at  Thugut's  disposal,  on  the  pre- 
text of  preparing  him  for  his  diplomatic  mission  (Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  485  f).  In  reality 
Thugut  was  being  prepared  to  take  over  Cobenzl's  position,  as  appears  from  a 
hitherto  unpublished  document  in  the  Vienna  Archives,  written  not  later  than 
February  27  —  a  note  in  Thugut's  hand,  by  which  the  Vice-Chancellor  was  to  be 
informed  of  his  dismissal  (V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1793).  Why  the  note  was  sent  only 
one  month  later  is  not  entirely  certain. 

1  Thugut's  memorial  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  498-501. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  403 

Provided  at  last  with  a  program  and  an  able  spokesman,  the 
party  who  had  long  been  opposing  the  leading  ministers  re- 
doubled their  onslaughts.  At  the  meeting  of  the  Conference  on 
March  11,  the  Vice-Chancellor  found  his  whole  policy  violently 
assailed;  and  when  pressed  to  explain  precisely  how  matters 
stood  with  Russia  and  Prussia,  he  was  very  nearly  driven  to  the 
wall.1  His  critics  affirmed  with  much  justice  that  he  had  practi- 
cally given  the  other  Powers  carte  blanche,  without  taking  any 
effective  steps  to  prevent  a  separate  negotiation  between  them  or 
to  provide  for  Austrian  interests.  Kaunitz  is  said  to  have  de- 
clared to  the  Emperor  that  the  mere  possibility  of  a  Russo-Prus- 
sian  convention  on  Polish  affairs  without  the  participation  of 
Austria  was  an  unpardonable  fault  of  the  Imperial  ministers.2 
Overwhelmed  with  reproaches,  Cobenzl  nightly  poured  out  his 
sorrows  and  anxieties  to  Razumovski,  who  could  only  offer  his 
personal  opinion  that  the  Empress  would  surely  guarantee  the 
Exchange  and  might  even  admit  an  Austrian  acquisition  in 
Poland,  and  who  assured  Caesar  that  he  looked  forward  to  the 
coming  of  his  courier  as  to  the  advent  of  the  Messiah.3  The  town 
was  full  of  rumors  of  the  impending  ministerial  revolution,  which 
was,  indeed,  virtually  decided  upon.  If  the  Emperor  delayed 
announcing  his  intentions,  it  was  apparently  only  because  he 
wished  to  await  the  communication  of  the  Russo-Prussian  Con- 
vention. 

On  March  23  Razumovski  and  Caesar  successively  appeared  at 
the  State  Chancellery  to  present  that  long-expected  treaty.  The 
sensation  was  indescribable.  Cobenzl's  consternation  was  such 
that  he  could  hardly  speak.  He  flew  to  the  map,  stammering 
incoherently:  "  This  changes  the  whole  system  of  Europe  —  the 
French  revolution  is  only  child's  play,  compared  with  this  event 
—  the  Emperor  must  take  a  great  decision  —  this  will  break  my 

1  Conference  protocol  and  vota,  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  489-498.  Caesar  reported 
(March  21)  that  Cobenzl  was  driven  to  declare  —  to  the  amazement  of  the  Confer- 
ence —  that  there  was  as  yet  no  question  of  acquisitions  on  the  part  of  the  two 
Northern  Powers,  but  merely  of  the  military  occupation  of  Polish  territory  (!), 
B.  A.,  R.  1,  174. 

2  Caesar's  report  of  March  21,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174. 

3  Razumovski's  reports  of  March  9/20  and  17/28,  M.  A.,  ABCTpia,  III,  55. 


404  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

neck  and  my  cousin's  too."  When  Razumovski  pressed  for  an 
answer  regarding  the  Emperor's  accession  to  the  treaty,  Cobenzl 
could  reply  only  that  he  was  too  much  agitated  to  speak  of  the 
affair;  he  must  have  time  to  collect  his  ideas  and  to  make  his 
report  to  his  sovereign.1  To  Caesar  the  Vice-Chancellor  de- 
clared that  the  Convention  was  something  so  great,  so  decisive,  so 
different  from  all  the  preceding  agreements  that  he  simply  could 
not  grasp  it;  he  had  been  entirely  ignorant  of  the  extent  of  the 
King's  acquisition;  nothing  had  been  definitely  arranged,  con- 
cluded, or  signed  with  Austria,  as  had  now  been  done  between 
Russia  and  Prussia;  the  previous  negotiations  had  been  mere 
trifles  compared  to  this.  Spielmann  was  hardly  less  confused  and 
dismayed.  Razumovski  and  Caesar  could  get  no  further  reply 
that  day.2 

1  Razumovski's  report  of  March  17/28,  M.  A.,  ABCTpia,  III,  55. 

Describing  the  scene  when  he  presented  the  Convention  to  Cobenzl,  Razumov- 
ski wrote:  "  La  sensation  inexprimable  qu'elle  a  faite  sur  lui,  me  persuade  qu'effec- 
tivement  on  ne  s'etait  pas  doute  le  moins  du  monde  de  sa  teneur.  La  consterna- 
tion du  comte  de  Cobenzl  fut  extreme;  il  se  precipite  a  la  carte  geographique, 
puis  me  balbutia  maintes  phrases  qui  peignaient  l'agitation  de  son  ame  et  la 
confusion  de  ses  idees ;  comme  par  exemple,  '  ceci  change  tout  le  systeme  de 
l'Europe  ...  la  revolution  de  France  n'est  qu'un  enfantillage  en  comparaison 
de  l'importance  de  cet  evenement  .  .  .  il  faut  que  l'Empereur  prenne  un  grand 
parti  .  .  .  voila  qui  me  cassera  le  cou  et  a  mon  cousin  aussi.'  Je  le  laissais  revenir 
a.  lui;  je  reclamais  son  attention  sur  ce  que  j'avais  a  dire  touchant  l'accession,  a 
laquelle  S.  M.  Imperiale  m'ordonnait  d'inviter  l'Empereur.  II  me  repondit  qu'il 
n 'etait  point  en  etat  de  me  rien  dire  a  cet  egard,  qu'il  etait  trop  agite  pour  parler 
de  cette  grande  affaire,  qu'il  lui  fallait  du  terns  pour  reprendre  ses  esprits  et  faire 
son  rapport  a  l'Empereur.  .  .  . 

Avant-hier  je  retournai  chez  le  Comte  de  Cobenzl;  je  ne  le  trouvai  ni  plus  rassure 
ni  mieux  prepare  a  m'entendre.  II  me  repeta  encore  qu'il  ne  pouvait  revenir  de 
son  etonnement;  prenant  ensuite  le  ton  de  la  confiance  et  de  l'amitie,  il  se  plaignit 
toujours  du  mystere  qu'on  leur  avait  fait,  se  lamenta  sur  l'etendue  de  notre  acqui- 
sition et  surtout  sur  l'inconvenient  de  nous  rendre  limitrophes  les  uns  des  autres, 
mais  il  se  recria  encore  plus  amerement  sur  la  portion  enorme  du  Roi  de  Prusse, 
a  laquelle  il  etait  bien  loin  de  s'attendre,  ayant  au  contraire  espere,  d'apres  leurs 
sollicitations  a  notre  Cour,  qu'on  chercherait  a  la  restreindre  plutot  qu'a  l'aug- 
menter.  .  .  ."  Razumovski  replied:  "...  Enfin  Mr.  le  Comte,  la  chose  est  faite, 
pouvez-vous  Pempecher  ?  Des  lors,  je  n'ai  rien  a  dire.  Mais  comme  j'en  doute 
fort,  ne  mettez  done  pas  de  la  mauvaise  grace  a  une  mesure  indispensable,  et  que 
des  retards  inutiles  n'augmentent  pas  le  mecontentement  que  vous  nous  avez  donn^ 
plus  d'une  fois  par  des  lenteurs.  ..." 

2  Caesar's  report  of  March  24,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  40 5 

The  communication  of  the  Convention  sealed  the  fate  of  the 
two  leading  ministers.  On  March  27,  while  the  capital  in  gala 
was  celebrating  the  victory  of  Neerwinden,  Cobenzl  and  Spiel- 
mann  received  notes  from  the  Emperor  dismissing  them  from 
their  posts. 

In  his  memoirs  Cobenzl  ascribed  his  fall  to  a  cabal  formed 
against  him  by  Colloredo,  Rosenberg,  Trautmansdorff,  and 
Thugut.1  Doubtless  personal  rancors  and  intrigues  played  their 
part  in  it,  but  from  the  political  standpoint  the  Emperor's 
decision  seems  fully  justified.  In  judging  the  policy  of  the  two 
ministers  one  must  bear  in  mind  how  constantly  their  better-laid 
plans  were  thwarted  by  their  opponents,  and  how  much  they  had 
to  acquiesce  in  against  their  will;  but  in  spite  of  this  one  can 
hardly  deny  that  they  had  adopted  a  disastrous  political  system, 
and  that  it  had  had  only  too  long  a  trial.  Their  first  great  mis- 
take lay  in  taking  up  the  Exchange  project  at  such  a  time,  and  in 
combining  it  with  the  nefarious  Partition  plan;  their  second  lay 
in  holding  to  the  scheme  through  thick  and  thin,  after  all  the  sad 
experiences  of  the  autumn  and  winter,  to  the  neglect  of  every 
other  consideration.  They  had  also  confided  overmuch  in  Prussia 
and  neglected  Russia.  Finally,  not  the  least  of  their  faults  was 
the  mortal  slowness  of  their  conduct  of  affairs,  their  months  of 
silence  and  indecision,  the  timidity,  the  lack  of  energy,  the  dis- 
organization that  crept  into  the  State  Chancellery  during  their 
year  of  control.  It  was  time  that  their  outworn  system  made  way 
for  something  less  visionary,  time  that  a  strong  and  unfettered 
hand  took  the  helm. 

Ill 

Cobenzl's  successor  was  Baron  von  Thugut,  who  here  began  the 
stormy  and  tragic  ministry  which  ended  at  Marengo.  Thugut  is 
an  enigmatic  figure:  the  "  Austrian  Pitt "  of  some  historians,  the 
"  faunish  Mephistopheles"  or  "  the  modern  Borgia"  of  others.  A 
parvenu  who  had  risen  by  immense  industry,  intelligence,  and 
some  less  creditable  means,  he  far  surpassed  his  immediate  prede- 
cessors in  knowledge  and  experience,  in  the  clearness  and  conse- 

1  Arneth,  Philipp  Cobenzl  und  seine  Memoir  en,  pp.  154  f. 


406  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

quence  of  his  views,  above  all  in  the  strength  of  his  will,  his  ability 
to  dominate  opposition,  his  justly  celebrated  courage.  It  was 
said  of  him  that  he  could  not  have  been  shaken  by  an  earthquake. 
But  he  missed  greatness  by  a  considerable  margin.  In  his  out- 
look upon  life,  his  aims  and  methods,  his  political  morality,  he 
represented  only  too  faithfully  the  sordid,  cynical,  unprincipled 
eighteenth  century  at  its  worst.  As  a  diplomat  of  the  old  school, 
familiar  with  all  the  tricks  of  the  trade,  he  believed  that  territorial 
aggrandizement  was  the  Alpha  and  Omega  of  statecraft,  and  that 
all  means  were  hallowed  by  that  end.  As  a  pupil  of  Kaunitz,  he 
had  no  stronger  passion  than  hatred  of  Prussia.  He  was  the  last 
man  in  the  world  to  be  repelled  by  the  moral  aspects  of  the  parti- 
tion of  Poland,  but  no  one  could  be  more  outraged  than  he  by  a 
transaction  which  glutted  the  cupidity  of  the  other  Powers  while 
leaving  his  own  Court  empty-handed. 

The  first  and  the  foremost  task  of  the  new  '  General  Director  of 
Foreign  Affairs '  was  to  meet  the  situation  created  by  the  St. 
Petersburg  Convention,  to  repair  —  as  far  as  might  be  —  the 
results  of  Cobenzl's  bungling.  And  here,  whatever  might  have 
been  his  own  ideas,  he  could  hardly  have  ventured  to  propose  an 
unconditional  acceptance  of  the  treaty:  the  storm  of  indignation 
at  Vienna  was  far  too  strong.  Throughout  April  and  long  after- 
wards, the  '  political  circles  '  in  the  capital  alternately  abused  and 
execrated  the  late  ministers  —  Kaunitz  referred  to  Spielmann  as 
"  that  scourge  of  Austria  "  —  or  raged  at  the  perfidy  of  the  parti- 
tioning Powers,  who  had  taken  advantage  of  the  confidence  of  the 
Imperial  Court  to  put  through  these  vast  plans,  the  full  extent  of 
which  could  not  even  be  conjectured.  Poland  had  been  anni- 
hilated, it  was  said;  a  partition  of  Austria  would  be  the  next 
project;  Russia  and  Prussia  had  always  been  united  when  it 
was  a  case  of  despoiling  the  Court  of  Vienna;  the  Emperor 
would  probably  be  reduced  to  the  condition  of  a  mere  Elector 
Palatine.1 

The  causes  of  this  '  indescribable  sensation  '  are  easy  to  under- 
stand.    The  partitioning   Powers   had    themselves   foreseen   a 

1  Zinzendorfs  Diary,  March  29,  April  2,  19,  29,  May  3,  19,  June  5  (V.  A.); 
Casti,  Lettere  politiche,  April  25,  June  27,  July  4,   August  8. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  407 

storm.1  In  the  first  place,  the  manner  in  which  this  affair  had 
been  rushed  through  without  the  participation  of  Austria  was 
bad  enough,  and  the  mystery  so  long  made  of  it  was  flatly  in- 
sulting. But  apart  from  the  form  of  the  transaction,  the  sub- 
stance of  the  treaty  did  not  at  all  conform  to  the  expectations  and 
desires  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  The  size  of  the  Russian  acquisi- 
tion might  well  stagger  the  Austrian  ministers:  the  Empress  had 
never  uttered  a  word  to  them  as  to  the  extent  of  her  claims.  It 
had  always  been  a  maxim  of  the  Imperial  Courts  that  Poland  was 
to  be  maintained  as  a  fair-sized  buffer  state,  but  the  Republic  was 
now  to  be  reduced  to  a  mere  shadow.  Another  principle  equally 
accepted  at  all  times  between  the  neighboring  Powers  was  vio- 
lated by  the  new  Russian  frontier,  which  touched  directly  upon 
Galicia;  and  almost  as  much  by  the  Prussian  acquisition  of  the 
fortress  of  Czestochowa,  which  threatened  the  adjacent  unpro- 
tected Austrian  province.  These  grievances  were  clear  and  un- 
deniable, but  they  were  not  the  only  ones  which  the  Emperor's 
advisers  felt  themselves  entitled  to  raise. 

It  was  here  that  the  fatal  misunderstandings  of  December 
began  to  appear  in  the  most  unpleasant  light.  If  Haugwitz  had 
really  received  the  declaration  announced  in  his  final  report  from 
Vienna,  the  Austrian  ministers  were  now  guilty  of  a  gross  breach 
of  faith:  in  the  contrary  case,  they  were  perfectly  justified  in 
taking  their  stand  on  the  text  of  the  note  of  December  9  and  the 
instructions  to  Louis  Cobenzl  of  the  23rd.  From  those  documents 
it  could  easily  be  proved  that  Austria  had  consented  to  an  imme- 
diate Prussian  occupation  in  Poland  only  on  the  understanding 
that  the  details  of  the  convention  were  to  be  arranged  by  a  con- 
cert of  the  three  Courts,  and  on  condition  either  that  the  Em- 
peror should  be  allowed  to  make  a  similar  occupation  temporarily, 
or  else  that  his  allies  should  guarantee  the  realization  of  the  Ex- 
change. As  has  already  been  stated,  it  is  uncertain  whether 
Haugwitz's  assertions  are  accurate,  but  at  any  rate  the  language 
of  the  Austrian  cabinet  in  January  accorded  perfectly  with  the 
view  advanced  at  Vienna  in  April.    If,  on  receiving  the  news  of 

1  The  Prussian  ministry  to  Caesar,  March  15,  17,  24,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174;  Markov 
to  Razumovski,  February  25/March  8,  in  Wassiltchikow,  op.  cit.,  pp.  167  f. 


408  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Catherine's  consent  to  the  immediate  entry  of  the  Prussians  into 
Poland,  the  Emperor  wrote  to  congratulate  the  King  on  the  ful- 
filment of  his  wishes,  the  letter  implied  just  the  converse  of  the 
meaning  later  ascribed  to  it  on  the  Prussian  side:  it  meant  that 
the  Emperor  considered  the  King's  immediate  desires  satisfied  by 
an  occupation  de  surete,  although  the  partition  had  not  been  for- 
mally effected.  One  would  search  in  vain  among  the  Austrian 
utterances  of  December  or  January  for  an  admission  that  the 
Imperial  Court  had  given  Prussia  carte  blanche  to  go  ahead,  con- 
clude a  partition  treaty,  and  execute  it  without  a  further  word 
from  Vienna.  Haugwitz  later  maintained,  indeed,  that  he  had  in 
December  insisted  daily  on  obtaining  Austria's  acquiescence  in 
the  immediate  formal  prise  de  possession  of  the  new  Prussian 
provinces,  and  in  their  immediate  and  complete  incorporation  in 
the  Prussian  Monarchy; x  but  his  reports  of  that  month  speak 
only  of  a  prise  de  possession  effective  or  actuelle,  which  is  by  no 
means  the  same  thing  and  which  would  certainly  not  have  been 
taken  as  such  by  the  Austrians.  Had  Haugwitz  really  employed 
the  language  which  he  later  claimed  to  have  used,  his  master 
would  have  been  bound  not  to  lift  his  hand  towards  the  continua- 
tion of  the  war  until  the  formal  annexation  had  actually  taken 
place.  The  fact  that  Frederick  William  announced  his  readiness 
to  continue  his  cooperation  against  France  as  soon  as  he  was 
assured  of  the  entry  of  his  troops  into  Poland,2  certainly  lent  color 
to  the  Austrian  theory. 

Another  objection  to  the  Convention  raised  at  Vienna  was  that 
the  new  Prussian  acquisition  went  far  beyond  the  limits  pre- 
viously announced  to  the  Imperial  Court.  Here,  also,  one  en- 
counters an  absolute  contradiction  between  the  statements 
advanced  by  the  two  parties  regarding  their  previous  negotiations. 
In  May  Haugwitz  asserted  that  soon  after  the  presentation  of  the 
Note  of  Merle  he  had  shown  Spielmann  the  original  map  upon 
which  Frederick  William  at  Consenvoye  had  traced  the  frontier  of 

1  Report  to  the  King  of  May  6,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H.  (Printed  in  Appen- 
dix XVI,  3). 

2  Reuss'  report  of  December  28,  1792,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte;  ministerial 
rescript  to  Caesar,  January  7,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  409 

his  desired  acquisition.1  I  know  of  only  one  previous  allusion  to 
this:  a  somewhat  similar  but  less  definite  statement  in  a  letter  of 
Haugwitz  to  Lucchesini  of  January  21.2  The  Prussian  envoy's 
reports  of  December  contain  absolutely  no  reference  to  the  exact 
limits  of  his  master's  territorial  claims.  The  Austrian  records  are 
almost  equally  blank.  Spielmann  had,  indeed,  sent  in  from 
Luxemburg  a  map  showing  the  acquisition  desired  by  Prussia  in 
case  of  the  realization  of  the  plan  which  he  and  Haugwitz  had 
agreed  upon  before  the  worst  disasters  of  the  campaign  set  in;  and 
from  a  letter  of  Haugwitz  to  Schulenburg  3  it  appears  that  this 
acquisition  was  identical  with  the  one  assured  to  Prussia  by  the 
Partition  Treaty.  This  plan,  however,  had  been  abandoned  after 
the  presentation  of  the  Note  of  Merle.  After  that  note,  Spiel- 
mann seems  to  have  believed  that  the  King  would  claim  only  the 
arrondissement  proposed  by  Schulenburg  at  Mainz;4  and  that 
idea  is  clearly  conveyed  in  whatever  allusions  we  have  to  the  sub- 
ject in  the  later  Austrian  acts  —  in  the  secret  instructions  to 
Louis  Cobenzl  and  in  the  Conference  protocol  of  January  3?  In 
view  of  the  meticulous  attention  with  which  the  Austrians  were 
accustomed  to  scrutinize  the  territorial  claims  of  Prussia,  it  is 
inconceivable  that  they  would  not  have  noted  —  and  protested 
about  —  the  difference  between  the  acquisition  proposed  at 
Mainz  and  that  bounded  by  the  line  Czgstochowa-Rawa-Soldau, 
if  they  had  known  of  it.  The  difference  was  regarded  by  the 
Prussians  as  a  sufficient  indemnity  for  a  second  campaign,  and 
was  so  great  that  the  Berlin  ministry  hesitated  for  a  time  to  pro- 
pose the  second  line  of  demarcation  at  St.  Petersburg.     Once 

1  The  above-cited  retrospective  report  of  May  6. 

2  B.A.,  R.  92,  N.  L.  31. 

In  this  letter  Haugwitz  wrote:  "  Je  prie  V.  Exc.  instamment  d'assurer  a  Sa 
Majeste  que  le  Consentement  der  Eigenthums-Besitznehmung  des  Arrondissements 
Seiner  Majestat  in  Pohlen,  tel  que  je  l'ai  trace"  au  Baron  de  Spielmann  a  Luxem- 
bourg a  6t6  formel  et  donne"  de  facon  que  la  Cour  de  Vienne  ne  peut  pas  se  r6tracter 
sans  deshonneur." 

3  Letter  of  October  27,  1792,  referring  to  the  earlier  negotiation,  which,  as 
Haugwitz  hastened  to  add,  had  had  absolutely  no  consequences,  B.  A.,  R.  IX, 
Frankreich,  89  A". 

4  See  the  passage  in  his  report  of  November  6,  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  342. 

5  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  429  and  457. 


410  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

more  one  is  driven  to  the  conclusion  that  either  Haugwitz  or 
Spielmann  had  failed  to  inform  their  Courts  correctly  of  what  had 
passed  between  them.  But  if  the  Emperor  and  —  at  least  most 
of  —  his  advisers  had  supposed  that  Prussia's  claims  went  no 
further  than  the  line  proposed  at  Mainz,  had  found  even  those 
demands  excessive,  and  had  begged  Russia  to  reduce  them,  it  is 
easy  to  understand  what  must  have  been  their  astonishment  and 
indignation  to  find  that  the  Empress  had  granted  Prussia  a  vastly 
larger  lot,  of  which  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  had  hitherto  not  been 
informed  at  all.1 

Finally,  the  Convention  of  St.  Petersburg  did  not  accord  to 
Austria  either  of  the  two  securities  which  that  Court  had  de- 
manded as  the  price  of  its  consent  to  the  Prussian  occupation  in 
Poland.  The  promise  of  good  offices  and '  other  efficacious  means ' 
to  facilitate  the  Exchange  was  very  far  from  being  the  desired 
guarantee.  The  promise  of  '  other  advantages  compatible  with 
the  general  convenience  '  was  as  unsubstantial  as  thin  air.  The 
sum  of  the  matter  was  that  the  partitioning  Powers  had  made  sure 
of  their  own  acquisitions,  assumed  the  acquiescence  of  Austria  in 
all  that  they  chose  to  agree  upon  in  secret,  and  offered  her  in 
return  castles  in  Spain.  Little  wonder  that  the  Austrians  felt 
themselves  in  every  way  injured,  deceived,  and  mocked. 

Thugut  presented  his  ideas  about  the  reply  to  be  made  to 
Russia  and  Prussia  in  a  memorial  submitted  to  his  sovereign  on 
April  4.2  In  view  of  considerations  substantially  the  same  as 
those  discussed  above,  he  found  that  the  Emperor's  interests  and 
dignity  forbade  him  to  accede  unconditionally  to  the  Convention, 
although  on  the  other  hand  circumstances  rendered  it  inadvisable 
to  refuse  accession  entirely.  He  therefore  advised  demanding  a 
rectification  of  the  proposed  boundaries,  to  the  end  that  neither 

1  Sybel  declares  that  in  this  matter,  as  in  everything  else  concerning  the  Prussian 
claims,  the  Austrians  had  been  exactly  informed  in  advance  by  Haugwitz  (op.  cit., 
iii,  p.  262).  Heidrich  is  of  the  opinion  that  no  communication  of  the  final  Prussian 
line  of  demarcation  had  been  made  to  the  Austrians,  since  —  as  he,  strangely 
enough,  asserts  —  this  line  did  not  differ  essentially  from  that  previously  announced 
{op.  cit.,  pp.  445  f.). 

2  This  document  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  Thugut  und  sein  politisches  System,  pp. 
378-383. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  411 

acquisition  should  directly  touch,  or  even  approach  too  near, 
Galicia ;  and  he  laid  it  down  as  the  conditio  sine  qua  non  of  the 
Emperor's  accession  that  the  indemnities  of  Austria  must  be 
determined  in  advance  in  a  manner  that  would  ensure  to  the 
Imperial  Court  a  perfect  equality  with  its  allies  with  regard  not 
only  to  the  intrinsic  value  of  its  acquisitions  but  also  to  security 
in  obtaining  them. 

In  Thugut's  opinion  the  Partition  Treaty  had  changed  the  sit- 
uation so  entirely  and  had  gone  so  far  beyond  the  proportions  of 
the  original  indemnity  project  that  it  was  necessary  for  Austria  to 
base  her  indemnification  on  quite  a  new  plan.  The  Bavarian 
Exchange,  he  held,  could  never  be  put  into  the  balance  against 
the  enormous  acquisitions  of  Prussia  and  Russia.  It  would  entail 
a  loss  of  a  million  in  population  and  four  million  florins  in  revenue, 
while  affording  no  advantage  save  that  of  rounding  out  the 
Austrian  frontier.  Prussia's  acquisition,  on  the  other  hand,  com- 
bined absolute  advantages  of  every  kind.  Were  the  original 
indemnity  plan  to  be  realized,  the  balance  of  power  between  the 
two  German  Courts  would  be  shifted  by  almost  three  millions  in 
population  and  eight  or  nine  millions  in  revenue  to  the  advantage 
of  Prussia.  Thugut  therefore  proposed  to  abandon  the  project 
agreed  upon  the  previous  May  between  Schulenburg  and  Spiel- 
mann,  to  return  to  the  original  principle  of  the  concert  —  a  per- 
fect equality  in  the  respective  indemnities  —  and  to  build  up  a 
new  system  on  that  basis.  Precisely  what  the  new  plan  would  be, 
he  was  not  yet  in  a  position  to  say.  It  was  first  of  all  necessary  to 
know  the  exact  value  of  the  acquisitions  of  the  other  Courts. 
Besides,  he  hoped  that  those  Courts  might  be  induced  to  propose 
acquisitions  to  Austria.  His  calculation  —  which  does  not  do 
him  great  credit  —  was,  probably,  that  it  was  more  advantageous 
to  accept  than  to  make  such  propositions.  He  also  seems  to  have 
feared  that  if  he  announced  his  indemnity  plans  too  early,  Prussia 
would  not  fail  to  abuse  his  confidence  and  to  raise  heaven  and 
earth  to  cut  down  the  Austrian  aggrandizement.  In  this  his  intu- 
itions did  not  deceive  him.  The  essential  thing  at  present,  he  held, 
was  to  sound  the  two  allies,  whose  good  intentions  were  open  to 
some  doubts,  and  to  secure,  if  possible,  an  agreement  on  principles. 


412  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

It  had  been  one  of  the  faults  of  Spielmann  and  Cobenzl  that 
they  had  left  questions  of  principle  in  more  or  less  obscurity. 
Thugut  meant  to  follow  a  more  systematic  course,  and  to  advance 
surely  from  step  to  step  by  clear  and  definite  agreements.  Such  a 
course  involved  delays,  and  he  recognized  it.  But  he  believed 
that  the  partitioning  Powers  would  not  be  able  to  carry  out  their 
plans  so  speedily ;  the  least  sign  of  opposition  from  England  would 
probably  encourage  the  Poles  to  a  desperate  resistance;  in  that 
case  the  two  Powers  might  find  themselves  in  need  of  Austria's 
support,  and  the  Emperor  would  be  in  a  position  to  sell  his  acces- 
sion to  the  treaty  at  a  good  price. 

His  sovereign  having  readily  approved  this  program,  Thu- 
gut began  his  campaign  with  the  instructions  sent  on  April  14  to 
Reuss  and  Louis  Cobenzl.1  In  these  dispatches  he  set  forth  the 
reasons  which  prevented  the  Emperor  from  acceding  to  the  St. 
Petersburg  Convention  except  under  conditions  that  would 
properly  safeguard  the  interests  of  Austria;  he  reviewed  the 
whole  history  of  the  negotiation  on  the  indemnity  question,  and, 
without  stating  precisely  what  acquisition  his  Court  now  con- 
templated, labored  to  build  up  his  principle  of  '  equality  '  on  the 
basis  of  the  agreements  entered  into  between  the  allies  at  the 
beginning  of  the  war.  This  historical  excursus  was  not  of  a  nature 
to  please  the  Prussians:  it  was  to  be  the  beginning  of  a  long  liti- 
gation fraught  with  the  most  unhappy  results.  In  general,  how- 
ever, both  replies  were  couched  in  moderate  terms;  there  was 
nothing  to  suggest  threats  or  open  opposition;  on  the  contrary, 
Austria  expressed  the  willingness  to  acquiesce  in  all  that  had  been 
done,  providing  her  allies  showed  her  an  equal  regard.2 

1  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  11-23. 

2  I  am  at  a  loss  to  understand  where  Sybel  got  the  idea  that  on  April  4  Thugut 
made  a  declaration  to  Caesar  and  Razumovski  to  the  effect  that  the  Emperor  refused 
to  accede  to  the  Convention,  renounced  the  Exchange,  demanded  French  territories 
and  a  province  in  Poland,  etc.  (op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  266).  As  can  be  proved  from  the  re- 
ports of  both  envoys,  no  declaration  at  all  was  made  at  this  time  (it  was  only  on 
April  16  that  Thugut  announced  to  the  two  envoys  the  decision  conveyed  in  the 
dispatches  to  Reuss  and  Cobenzl  of  the  14th);  and  it  is  important  to  notice  the 
fact,  since  this  apocryphal  declaration  cannot  be  used  to  justify  certain  proceedings 
which  took  place  on  the  Prussian  side  before  the  Emperor's  reply  was  really  first 
announced  by  Reuss  at  the  King  of  Prussia's  headquarters  on  April  21. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  413 

Thugut  was,  of  course,  well  aware  that  mere  arguments,  how- 
ever well  grounded,  were  not  particularly  effective  at  Berlin  and 
St.  Petersburg.  It  was  necessary  to  supply  the  other  Powers  with 
more  cogent  motives  for  obliging  Austria.  But  here,  if  ever, 
thrice-sealed  secrecy  was  indispensable.  It  was  useless  to  attempt 
action  at  Grodno,  where  the  Polish  Diet  was  about  to  assemble, 
for  a  secret  negotiation  with  the  Poles  was  of  all  things  the  most 
impossible.  Under  the  urgent  pressure  of  Razumovski,  de  Cache 
was,  indeed,  instructed  to  go  to  Grodno,  but  he  was  ordered  to 
maintain  an  entirely  passive  conduct  —  a  role  for  which  he  was 
eminently  fitted,  as  his  Court  had  never  allowed  him  to  play  any 
other.1  It  was  England  to  whom  the  honor  was  to  be  reserved  of 
pulling  the  chestnuts  out  of  the  fire.  On  April  14  Thugut  in- 
structed Mercy  to  communicate  to  the  British  government  as 
much  of  the  Convention  as  seemed  advisable,  and  to  urge  that,  as 
the  Emperor,  although  far  from  wishing  a  new  partition,  was 
unable  to  oppose  one  openly,  it  behooved  England  to  intervene  at 
Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg  with  representations  that  might  at 
least  lead  those  Courts  to  reduce  their  territorial  claims  and  to 
postpone  the  execution  of  their  plans.  He  also  suggested  that 
were  England  to  give  some  slight  signs  of  sympathy  for  the  Poles, 
the  latter  might  be  encouraged  to  resist  the  partition,  and  thus 
much  valuable  time  would  be  gained.2  In  conversation  with  Sir 
Morton  Eden,  the  British  ambassador,  Thugut  expressed  himself 
vigorously  about  the  dangers  resulting  from  the  enormous  ag- 
grandizement and  the  measureless  ambitions  of  Russia  and  Prus- 
sia; and  as  a  bid  for  British  support  against  those  two  Powers,  he 
even  declared  that  the  Emperor  was  ready  to  desist  from  the  plan 
for  the  exchange  of  the  Netherlands  out  of  deference  for  England.3 

1  Orders  to  de  Cache"  of  April  3  and  20,  V.  A.,  Polen.,  Expeditionen,  1793. 
Sybel's  repeated  assertions  (op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  269;  H.  Z.,  xxiii,  p.  93)  that  de  Cache" 
was  ordered  to  stir  up  the  Poles  secretly  to  resistance  are  utterly  unfounded. 

Thugut  to  de  Cache,  April  3:  "  Uebrigens  haben  sich  Ew.  Exc.  iiber  die  vorlie- 
genden  Pohlnischen  Umstande  aller  Aeusserungen  gegen  wen  immer  zu  enthalten, 
und  alle  Anfragen  mit  ganzlichem  Abgang  von  Instructionen  zu  beantworten." 

Thugut  to  de  Cach6,  April  20:  "  Vor  der  Hand  haben  Sie  sich  daselbst  [in 
Grodno]  in  die  Rolle  eines  aufmerksamen  Beobachters  und  ruhigen  Zuschauers 
lediglich  zu  beschranken.  ..."  2  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  24  ff. 

3  Eden  to  Grenville,  April  15,  Herrmann,  Erganzungsband,  pp.  386  ff. 


414  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

The  new  minister  had  thus  begun  his  campaign  by  undertaking 
two  distinct  and  somewhat  contradictory  actions.  On  the  one 
hand,  by  protests,  recriminations,  and  arguments  he  attempted  to 
induce  Russia  and  Prussia  to  modify  their  agreements  in  such  a 
way  as  to  provide  effectively  for  the  Emperor's  interests:  on  the 
other  hand,  by  intrigues  with  England  he  hoped  to  raise  up  such 
obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  partitioning  Powers  as  would  render 
them  more  amenable  to  the  demands  of  Austria.  To  frustrate 
entirely  the  dismemberment  of  Poland  was  something  which  he 
probably  neither  expected  nor  desired  to  do;  but  he  did  intend  to 
impede  and  delay  the  consummation  of  the  partition  until  Russia 
and  Prussia  could  be  brought  to  pay  a  sufficient  price  for  Austria's 
cooperation. 

This  policy,  which  was  to  have  such  unhappy  consequences,  has 
often  been  severely  condemned  by  historians.  It  was,  indeed, 
unfortunate  that  Thugut  began  at  once  with  a  double  game.  His 
insinuations  to  England,  although  quite  in  the  approved  diplo- 
matic style  of  the  period,  were  to  bring  him  no  laurels.  They 
straightway  came  to  the  knowledge  of  Razumovski,  and  one  can 
imagine  the  indignation  they  produced  at  St.  Petersburg.  But 
the  refusal  to  accede  unconditionally  to  the  Partition  Treaty  was 
not  without  much  justification.  It  may  well  be  doubted  whether 
any  Power  not  in  the  last  extremities  would  have  submitted  with- 
out a  word  of  protest  to  such  treatment  as  Austria  had  met  with 
from  her  allies.  At  that  moment,  in  view  of  the  triumphant 
recovery  of  the  Netherlands,  the  Court  of  Vienna  did  not  feel 
itself  in  extremities.  Thugut  had  no  intention  of  breaking  with 
the  partitioning  Powers.  It  may  well  have  seemed  that  with  a 
display  of  firmness  Austria  could  secure  an  acceptable  price  for 
her  accession  to  the  Convention.  The  conditions  proposed  by 
Thugut  were,  in  strict  justice,  sufficiently  well  founded.  To  con- 
demn Austria  for  a  shocking  breach  of  faith  in  not  submitting 
unconditionally,  to  represent  Prussia  as  the  really  aggrieved  party 
in  this  transaction,  seems  a  singular  perversion  of  the  case.1 

1  I  am  referring,  of  course,  to  the  view  advanced  by  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  266  ff., 
and  H.  Z.,  xxiii,  pp.  85  ff .  For  the  contrary  view,  substantially  the  one  I  have  taken, 
see  Hiiffer,  Oestreich  und  Preussen,  pp.  132  ff.,  and  Erganzungsband,  pp.  32-35. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  415 

Whether  Thugut's  policy  was  politically  wise,  is,  of  course, 
another  question.  To  understand  its  consequences,  one  must 
glance  at  the  temper,  plans,  and  calculations  of  the  cabinet  of 
Berlin. 

Ill 

Since  the  conclusion  of  the  St.  Petersburg  Convention  the 
Prussian  ministry  had  been  largely  occupied  with  devising  means 
for  evading  as  far  as  possible  the  obligations  imposed  by  that 
treaty.  How  to  avoid  continuing  the  war  after  the  close  of  the 
present  year,  how  to  thwart  the  Bavarian  Exchange  —  "  that 
fatal  project  "  —  while  still  keeping  up  the  appearance  of  favoring 
it,  how  to  reduce  to  the  minimum  the  '  additional  advantages  ' 
stipulated  for  Austria  in  the  Convention  —  those  were  subjects 
for  maturest  deliberation.  Long  before  the  Court  of  Vienna  had 
announced  its  attitude  towards  the  Partition  Treaty,  the  Prussian 
ministers  were  agreed  that  their  master  could  not  make  a  third 
campaign  without  being  assured  of  still  a  further  '  indemnity  '  in 
territory  or  money; '  they  were  already  sounding  the  alarm  at  St. 
Petersburg  with  regard  to  Austria's  "  insidious  designs  "  on  Alsace 
and  Lorraine; 2  and  they  were  secretly  laboring  to  encourage  the 
Duke  of  Zweibriicken  in  his  opposition  to  the  Exchange,  and  to 
bring  him  into  close  relations  with  England,  which  might  be 
expected  to  stand  forth  openly  as  his  protector.3  This  attempt 
to  play  off  England  against  the  Exchange  was  quite  on  a  par  with 

1  This  appears  from  Haugwitz's  retrospective  letter  to  Lucchesini  of  July  1, 
1793,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  31. 

2  Lucchesini's  letter  to  the  cabinet  ministry  of  April  3,  their  reply  of  April  8, 
B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14;  rescript  to  Goltz  of  the  9th,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  135. 
Cf.  Lucchesini's  memorial  to  the  King  of  March  17,  printed  in  [Schladen's]  Mitihcil- 
ungen  ans  den  nachgelassenen  Paplcrcn  cities  preussischen  Diplomalen,  pp.  155-170. 

3  Lucchesini's  letters  to  the  cabinet  ministers  of  April  9,  15,  16,  22;  their  letter 
to  him  of  the  21st,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

Lucchesini  wrote  (April  15):  "  Le  Due  de  Deux-Ponts  m'a  paru  dispose  de  faire 
quelques  demarches  aupres  de  l'Angleterre  pour  la  determiner  a.  prendre  en  conside- 
ration les  dangers  qu'elle  courroit  ...  si  elle  ne  fesoit  point  tomber  le  projet  du 
troc.  Comme  Mylord  Elgin  va  s'etablir  au  Quartier  General,  et  que  le  Due  de 
Deux-Ponts  est  intentionne  d'y  venir  remercier  Sa  Majeste  de  la  visite  qu'Elle  lui 
a  faite  a.  Manheim,  je  n'ai  pas  cru  devoir  retenir  ce  Prince  de  s'ouvrir  confidentielle- 
ment  a  ce  Ministre  Anglais.  .  .  .   J'ai  meme  juge  etre  de  l'interet  du  Roi  d'appuyer 


416  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Thugut's  nearly  contemporaneous  effort  to  induce  the  same 
Power  to  oppose  the  Partition.  It  is  hard  to  see  that  either  of  the 
high  allies  yielded  to  the  other  in  the  matter  of  duplicity.  At  any 
rate,  there  was  plenty  of  material  on  hand  for  discussion  between 
the  two  Courts.  To  imagine  that  had  the  Emperor  only  acceded 
unconditionally  to  the  Convention  of  St.  Petersburg,  all  trouble 
would  have  been  avoided  and  the  coalition  would  have  advanced 
in  perfect  harmony,  would  be  decidedly  naive. 

After  the  communication  of  that  Convention  at  Vienna,  the 
Prussians  awaited  the  Emperor's  reply  with  a  sort  of  malicious 
curiosity,  but  with  no  trace  of  anxiety.  The  ministers  at  Berlin 
expected  that  in  spite  of  her  jealousy  Austria  would  end  by  acced- 
ing, but  the  more  far-sighted  Lucchesini  prophesied  conditions  and 
long  discussions.  The  situation  was,  however,  quite  to  his  taste. 
"  If  the  Emperor  accedes,"  he  wrote,  "  he  will  subscribe  to  very 
considerable  acquisitions  in  favor  of  other  Powers,  while  obtaining 
for  himself  nothing  but  hopes  exposed  to  the  inexhaustible  chapter 
of  future  accidents.  If  he  refuses  us  his  assent,  the  two  partition- 
ing Courts  will  keep  their  acquisitions  none  the  less,  and  will  find 
themselves  freed  from  all  the  obligations  that  they  have  con- 
tracted in  favor  of  the  Court  of  Vienna."  The  Berlin  ministry 
professed  themselves  charmed  by  Lucchesini's  exposition  of  this 
"admirable  dilemma";  they  assured  him  that  they  meant  to 
improve  to  the  utmost  the  "beautiful  situation  "  resulting  from 
the  expected  embroilments  between  the  Imperial  Courts.1 

On  April  21  Reuss  presented  the  Emperor's  answer  at  Frederick 
William's  headquarters.    The  effect  was  most  unpleasant.    The 

en  mon  particulier  cette  idee,  sans  en  laisser  cependant  aucun  t£moignage  de  mon 
approbation." 

April  16,  Lucchesini  continued:  "  Je  l'ai  mis  [the  Duke]  sur  les  voyes  pour  qu'il 
parvienne  ...  a  avoir  un  entretien  sur  cet  objet  avec  Mylord  Elgin.  .  .  ." 

April  21,  the  ministers  at  Berlin  replied:  "  Nous  applaudissons  .  .  .  aux  en- 
couragemens  indirects  que  V.  Exc.  lui  a  donnes  [the  Duke]  ....  Malgre  toute 
notre  aversion  pour  ce  funeste  projet  [the  Exchange],  nous  n'en  persistons  pas 
moins  a  croire  que  le  Roi  doit  avoir  l'air  de  le  favoriser,  d'apres  les  engagemens 
qu'il  a  contractus.  ...  II  suffiroit  selon  nous  de  mettre  le  Due  de  Deux-Ponts  en 
relation  avec  Mylord  Elgin,  pour  etre  sur  que  sa  proposition  sera  bien  recue.  .  .  ." 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  March  31,  their  replies  of  April  4  and 
11,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  417 

Prussians,  although  prepared  for  objections,  had  not  expected  the 
Imperial  Court  to  disavow  the  engagements  which,  according  to 
Haugwitz,  it  had  contracted  in  December.  From  their  stand- 
point, they  were  quite  justified  in  considering  this  a  gross  breach 
of  faith.  The  ministry  at  Berlin  pronounced  Thugut's  reply  "  a 
veritable  labyrinth  of  false  assertions,  captious  arguments,  and 
insidious  propositions,"  which  deserved  to  be  solidly  refuted.1 
Haugwitz,  as  the  man  whose  honor  was  involved,  was  called  upon 
to  enter  the  lists.  He  drew  up  a  memorial 2  recounting  his  entire 
negotiation  at  Vienna  and  Luxemburg,  and  proving  to  the  satis- 
faction of  his  colleagues  that  the  Austrian  ministry  had  in  Decem- 
ber consented  unconditionally  to  the  immediate  occupation  and 
annexation  of  precisely  those  territories  which  had  been  assigned 
to  the  King  by  the  Partition  Treaty.  Lucchesini,  thus  thrice- 
armed,  then  went  forth  to  confound  the  Austrians. 

His  note  verbale  to  Reuss  of  May  15  is  a  document  which  has 
hitherto  received  little  notice,  but  which  deserves  a  prominent 
place  in  the  history  of  the  disruption  of  the  Austro-Prussian 
alliance.  Thugut  had  invited  a  discussion  on  principles ;  he  had 
sought  especially  to  reassert  that  original  principle  of  perfect 
equality  in  the  respective  indemnities,  which,  as  even  the  Berlin 
ministry  in  confidential  moments  admitted,3  had  been  agreed 
upon  between  the  two  Courts  at  the  beginning  of  the  war.  The 
Prussians  took  up  the  challenge  and  replied  with  the  first  clear 
expression  since  the  Note  of  Merle  of  their  position  on  the  in- 
demnity question.  There  were  two  ways  of  defending  that  posi- 
tion. The  one  hitherto  employed  consisted  in  maintaining  that 
the  unexpected  turn  of  the  war  had  completely  changed  the 
character  of  the  enterprise,  and  that  the  Note  of  Merle  must 
therefore  be  regarded  as  superseding  all  previous  engagements.4 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  April  22,  their  reply  of  the  28th,  B.  A., loc.cit. 

2  Report  to  the  King,  May  6,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H  (printed  in  part  in  Appendix 

XVI,  3). 

3  E.  g.,  in  the  ministerial  rescript  to  Caesar  of  March  8: 

"  Je  suis  bien  loin  de  meconnoitre,  que  dans  l'origine  les  indemnit6s  des  deux 
Cours  devoient  aller  de  pair,  les  miennes  devant  se  trouver  en  Pologne  et  celles  de 
la  Cour  Imp6riale  par  le  troc  de  la  Baviere  ou  par  d'autres  avantages  equivalens." 

4  This  is  the  view  advanced  in  the  rescript  to  Caesar  cited  above. 

"  Mais  depuis  que  des  evenemens  impreVus  .  .  .  nous  ont  oblig6s  de  songer  a 


41 8  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Lucchesini  chose,  however,  the  other  and  bolder  course  of  denying 
the  previous  engagements  altogether.  In  his  note  to  Reuss  he 
declared  that  the  principle  of  parity  had  never  been  explicitly 
recognized  by  Prussia  as  applicable  to  the  indemnity  question;  he 
asserted  —  on  the  strength  of  Haugwitz's  (quite  untrue)  state- 
ment —  that  that  envoy  had  always  maintained,  from  the  very 
beginning  of  his  ministry  at  Vienna,  that  if  Austria  had  any  rights 
to  an  indemnity,  they  could  not  be  placed  in  the  same  category 
with  those  of  Prussia.  The  King  was  merely  partie  accessoire  et 
auxiliaire  in  the  war,  and  was  sacrificing  himself  for  a  cause  not  his 
own  —  for  the  defence  of  Austria;  the  Imperial  Court  ought  to  be 
grateful  that  he  did  not  claim  an  indemnity  at  its  expense,  but 
was  willing  to  seek  one  instead  in  Poland.  If  that  Court  had  any 
titles  of  its  own  to  an  indemnity,  they  could  apply  only  to  France, 
and  could  never  be  admitted  to  be  of  the  same  nature  or  validity 
as,  or  to  stand  in  any  connection  with,  the  rights  of  Prussia.1 

This  note  was  the  counterpart  of  Thugut's  recent  pronounce- 
ment. The  Austrians  denied  the  concessions  relating  to  Poland 
which  Haugwitz  claimed  to  have  received;  the  Prussians  denied 
the  agreements  and  principles  on  which  the  alliance  and  the  con- 
cert against  France  had  been  based.  The  issue  was  thus  squarely 
drawn.  The  two  Powers  proclaimed  quite  contradictory  views 
regarding  their  past  and  their  present  relations.  While  each  held 
to  its  own  standpoint,  a  reconciliation  was  impossible. 

There  were  two  important  omissions  in  the  note  of  May  15.  In 
the  first  place,  no  further  attempt  was  made  to  persuade  Austria 
to  accede  to  the  Partition  Treaty.  The  explanation  is  obvious. 
With  the  probable  exception  of  the  King,  none  of  the  Prussians 
really  desired  the  Emperor's  accession.  They  had  no  fear  that 
Austria  would  be  able  to  prevent  the  execution  of  the  partition, 
and  they  reflected,  as  Haugwitz  wrote  to  Lucchesini:    "  If  the 

une  continuation  de  la  guerre  de  France,  qui  ne  regarde  directement  et  principale- 
ment  que  la  Cour  de  Vienne,  j'ai  du  stipuler  les  conditions  sous  lesquelles  seules 
je  pouvois  me  preter  a  y  concourir  ulterieurement,  .  .  .  et  il  ne  depend  plus  de  la 
Cour  de  Vienne  .  .  .  de  vouloir  en  revenir  a  celui  [the  principle]  d'une  reciprocity 
rigoureuse,  a  laquelle  depuis  ce  changement  de  circonstances,  elle  n'a  certainement 
plus  les  memes  titres." 

1  This  note  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  63-67. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  419 

Court  of  Vienna  had  hastened  to  accede  unconditionally  to  the 
Convention  of  St.  Petersburg,  the  evil  would  be  done,  and  we 
could  no  longer  set  limits  to  our  cooperation  in  the  war.  ..." 
"  This  refusal,  if  we  are  fortunate  enough  to  see  it  maintained, 
delivers  us  from  this  very  onerous  obligation  .  .  .  and  we  shall 
no  longer  be  bound  to  Austria  except  by  the  provisional  promise 
of  cooperation  contained  in  the  Note  of  Merle,  which  relates  only 
to  the  present  campaign." 

Secondly,  Lucchesini's  note  contained  only  the  vaguest  assur- 
ances with  respect  to  the  Austrian  indemnities.  Thugut's  demand 
had  put  the  Prussians  in  a  really  embarrassing  position,  for  it  was 
impossible  for  them  to  press  very  far  the  distinction  which  they 
had  set  up  between  their  own  and  the  Emperor's  rights  to  an 
acquisition,  without  also  invalidating  the  claims  of  Russia. 
Hence  Lucchesini  had  not  dared  to  deny  Austria  an  indemnity 
altogether,  but  had  announced  that  his  master  would  consult 
with  the  Empress  on  that  "  important  subject,"  and  that  '  he 
flattered  himself  that  his  past  conduct  and  his  known  principles 
would  be  a  sufficient  guarantee  of  his  zeal  to  contribute  to  the 
satisfaction  and  the  advantages  of  his  ally.'  In  reality,  the 
Prussian  ministry  hoped  that '  the  Court  of  Russia,  driven  out  of 
patience  by  the  tergiversations  of  Austria,  would  end  by  excluding 
that  Power  entirely  from  the  advantages  stipulated  in  its  favor  by 
the  St.  Petersburg  Convention,  this  consequence  flowing  naturally 
from  the  [Emperor's]  refusal  to  accede.'  Still,  as  they  wrote  to 
Goltz, '  it  was  not  yet  time  to  touch  that  chord.'  They  preferred 
to  let  the  Empress  speak  first  on  so  delicate  a  matter.2 

At  the  first  signs  of  opposition  from  Austria,  the  partitioning 
Powers  had  exchanged  assurances  that  they  would  not  allow 
themselves  to  be  deterred  thereby  in  the  execution  of  their  plans.3 
The  Russians  were  irritated  enough  at  the  —  to  them  —  unex- 
pected stand  taken  by  the  Court  of  Vienna,  but  they  were  by  no 
means  alarmed.  Having  just  cemented  their  relations  with 
England  by  the  convention  signed  March  25  (regarding  a  com- 

1  Letters  of  May  5  and  10,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  31. 

2  Rescript  to  Goltz  of  May  6,  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  135. 

3  Rescript  to  Goltz  of  April  5,  Goltz's  report  of  April  16,  B.  A.,  he.  cit. 


420  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

mon  policy,  if  not  a  common  action,  against  France),  they  found 
Austria  powerless  to  harm  and  themselves  in  position  to  wait 
tranquilly  until  the  Emperor  '  returned  to  reason.' x  Hence 
Cobenzl's  complaints  and  recriminations  fell  upon  deaf  ears. 
The  Russian  ministers  always  replied  that  they  had  consented  to 
a  negotiation  with  Prussia  only  at  the  request  of  Austria;  that 
Goltz  had  repeatedly  assured  them  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  had 
acquiesced  in  all  his  master's  demands;  that  once  the  affair  had 
been  begun,  it  had  been  necessary  to  put  it  through  without 
delay;  that  it  was  impossible  now  to  retrace  their  steps  or  to  alter 
the  terms  of  the  treaty;  that  Kamieniec  and  the  territory  adja- 
cent to  Galicia  could  not  be  restored  to  Poland,  because  the  in- 
habitants had  already  taken  the  oath  of  allegiance  to  the  Empress. 
Cobenzl  soon  convinced  himself  that  it  would  be  utterly  impossi- 
ble to  secure  any  changes  in  the  Convention. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  Russian  ministers  showed  a  real  eager- 
ness to  obtain  the  Emperor's  accession  to  the  treaty,  and  were 
lavish  with  assurances  that  their  sovereign  would  do  anything  in 
her  power  to  provide  an  equal  indemnity  for  Austria.  "  Flanders, 
Lorraine,  Alsace,"  said  Markov,  "  offer  you  a  vast  field  for  ac- 
quisitions, and  you  can  exchange  what  is  not  to  your  convenience. 
The  King  of  Prussia  offers  to  consent  to  the  secularization  of 
some  bishoprics  in  Germany;  take  advantage  of  that.  England 
will  not  be  at  all  averse  to  the  acquisitions  that  you  may  wish  to 
make  at  the  expense  of  France;  perhaps  it  will  not  think  the  same 
of  the  Bavarian  Exchange;  but  by  acceding  to  the  Convention 
you  will  give  us  the  right  to  speak  firmly  and  to  oblige  Prussia 
to  do  likewise."  The  Empress'  generosity  with  other  people's 
property  knew  but  one  limit:  when  Cobenzl  suggested  that  Aus- 
tria might  finally  have  to  take  her  share  in  Poland,  he  was  told 
with  some  emotion  that  there  would  then  be  nothing  left  of  that 
unfortunate  kingdom,  and  that  it  was  the  more  uncalled  for  to 
put  it  out  of  existence  because  if  the  King  of  Prussia  were  once 
"  bound,"  nothing  could  prevent  Austria  from  finding  her  indem- 
nity elsewhere.     In  general,  the  Russian  ministers  were  over- 

1  Markov  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  April  29/May  10,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiv,  pp.  253  f.; 
Ostermann  to  Razumovski,  May  16/27,  M.  A.,  ABdpia,  III,    54. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  42 1 

flowing  with  friendship,  professed  to  love  the  Austrian  alliance  as 
much  as  they  hated  the  Prussian  one,  and  dwelt  with  unction  on 
the  approach  of  the  day  when  the  one  '  natural  system  '  could  be 
established  —  a  combination  of  the  Imperial  Courts  and  Eng- 
land.1 Their  final  answer  was  given,  however,  only  after  they  had 
learned  what  reply  Prussia  had  made  to  Austria.  Then  through 
the  dispatches  to  Razumovski  of  May  16/27  the  Empress  an- 
nounced her  firm  resolution  to  uphold  the  St.  Petersburg  Con- 
vention, and  pressed  vigorously  for  the  Emperor's  accession  — 
for  the  quite  disinterested  reason  that  otherwise  the  Court  of 
Vienna  could  not  obtain  from  that  of  Berlin  the  least  favor  or 
even  strict  justice.  In  truth,  the  Empress  desired  Austria's 
accession  for  the  same  reason  for  which  the  Prussians  would  have 
preferred  to  avoid  it:  without  it  the  Court  of  Berlin  would  have 
an  excuse  for  withdrawing  from  the  war.  In  the  same  dispatches 
the  cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg  invited  the  Emperor  to  choose 
whatever  he  found  to  his  convenience  in  France,  with  assurances 
that  Russia  would  not  oppose.  If  the  Court  of  Vienna  could  be 
induced  to  base  its  hopes  on  conquests  in  the  West,  the  war  would 
last  all  the  longer. 

Through  Alopeus  the  Prussians  were  informed  of  as  much  of 
this  reply  as  they  were  fitted  to  receive,  with  the  reassuring  ex- 
planation that  the  Austrians  were  never  likely  to  make  conquests 
extensive  enough  to  cause  alarm.2  The  Berlin  ministry  were 
delighted  that  the  Empress  had  not  revived  the  Exchange  pro- 
ject; they  resolved  to  follow  her  cue  and  to  divert  the  Court  of 
Vienna  to  the  path  of  conquest,  with  the  mental  reservation  that 
they  would  make  it  their  affair  to  set  just  limits  to  the  Emperor's 
aspiring  course.  Hence  they  now  delivered  through  Caesar  their 
promised  reply  on  the  subject  of  the  indemnities  of  Austria.3 
This  reply  was  couched  in  a  much  friendlier  tone  than  the  note  of 
May  15.  It  expressed  the  King's  continued  readiness  to  do  what- 
ever he  could  to  procure  for  Austria  a  just  indemnity,  either  by 

1  For  the  above:  Cobenzl's  reports  of  April  30,  May  10,  and  31,  V.  A.,  Russ- 
land,  Berichte,  1793. 

2  Ostermann  to  Alopeus,  May  16/27,  M.  A.,  ITpyccifl,  III,  3T. 

3  The  cabinet  ministry  to  Lucchesini,  June  11,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14;  rescript 
to  Caesar,  June  10,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  174. 


422  TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

his  good  offices  in  the  matter  of  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  or,  if  the 
Court  of  Vienna,  considering  the  difficulties  in  the  way  of  that 
project,  preferred  to  take  its  indemnities  at  the  expense  of  France, 
by  cooperation  to  that  end  with  all  means  that  lay  within  his 
power.  His  Majesty  desired  only  to  be  informed  of  the  precise 
extent  of  the  acquisitions  that  the  Emperor  desired  to  make  in 
that  quarter,  and  he  flattered  himself  that  these  acquisitions 
could  be  secured  by  the  end  of  the  present  campaign.  This  last 
phrase  was  intended  at  Berlin,  and  understood  at  Vienna,  as  an 
intimation  that  the  King  did  not  bind  himself  to  continue  the  war 
beyond  the  close  of  that  year.  This  was,  indeed,  the  crux  of 
Prussia's  position.  Chiefly  out  of  regard  for  the  Empress, 
Frederick  William's  ministers  had  not  dared  refuse  Austria  an 
indemnity  altogether;  they  were  mortally  anxious  to  divert  the 
ambitions  of  that  Power  away  from  Bavaria;  but  they  were  no 
less  anxious  that  the  satisfaction  of  those  ambitions  should  not 
involve  a  third  campaign.  How  to  wriggle  out  of  this  embarrass- 
ing situation  was  the  problem  that  occupied  the  cabinet  of  Berlin 
for  the  next  three  months. 

England  had  meanwhile  replied  to  Thugut's  overtures  in  a 
manner  at  least  half  satisfactory.  It  was  true  that  the  British 
ministers  could  offer  little  consolation  with  regard  to  Poland;  for 
while  expressing  freely  their  regret  and  disgust  at  the  proceedings 
of  Russia  and  Prussia,  they  admitted  that  the  French  war  ren- 
dered it  absolutely  impossible  for  them  to  oppose  the  Partition. 
On  the  other  hand,  however,  they  showed  the  utmost  willingness 
to  assist  Austria  to  secure  a  handsome  acquisition  at  the  expense 
of  France,  and  they  left  no  doubt  that  they  were  eager  for  a  close 
alliance  with  the  Imperial  Court.1 

By  the  middle  of  June  Thugut's  first  action  might  be  regarded 
as  at  an  end.  He  had  failed  to  secure  any  modification  of  the 
Partition  Treaty,  or  any  postponement  of  its  execution.  There 
was  nothing  left  to  be  done  except  to  accede  on  as  favorable  con- 
ditions as  could  be  obtained  with  regard  to  the  Austrian  indemni- 
ties.   As  far  as  these  indemnities  were  concerned,  the  replies  from 

1  Stadion's  report  of  May  10,  and  those  of  his  successor,  Starhemberg,  of  May  24 
and  31,  V.  A.,  England,  Berichte,  1793. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  423 

Russia  and  England  were  not  unpromising;  and  Prussia,  although 
denying  the  principle  of  '  parity,'  still  professed  her  eagerness  to 
know  and  to  concur  in  the  Emperor's  desires.  On  the  basis  of 
these  results,  Thugut's  policy  entered  upon  a  new  phase. 


IV 

Since  inaugurating  his  first  action,  the  Director-General  had 
been  busy  planning  a  revision  of  the  map  of  Europe.  The  more 
clearly  he  saw  the  impossibility  of  impeding  the  execution  of  the 
Partition  Treaty,  the  more  passionately  he  clung  to  the  idea  of 
procuring  for  Austria  acquisitions  that  would  fully  counterbalance 
those  of  her  allies.  Aggrandizement  in  one  quarter  or  another 
became  his  first  and  last  thought,  and  he  turned  his  eyes  in  every 
direction  restlessly  seeking  whom  or  what  he  might  devour.  The 
problem  was  not  a  little  difficult. 

The  Bavarian  Exchange  being  now  definitely  abandoned  as 
impracticable,  the  most  obvious  expedient  was  conquests  from 
France  —  a  course  which  all  the  allied  Powers  combined  to  urge 
upon  Austria.  Count  Mercy  had  drawn  up  a  plan  for  an  acquisi- 
tion which  even  he  admitted  was  "  gigantic  " :  it  was  to  include  all 
the  land  as  far  as  the  Meuse  and  the  Somme,  i.  e.,  Alsace,  Lor- 
raine, Artois,  and  half  of  Picardy.  Thugut  was  not  embarrassed 
by  the  extent  of  this  claim,  but  he  was  none  too  sanguine  about 
the  ease  of  making  conquests  in  this  quarter;  and  he  felt  the  need 
of  providing  himself  with  an  alternative,  in  case  France  made  too 
great  difficulties  about  being  partitioned.1  The  last  resort  of  dis- 
appointed conquest-hunters  was  Poland;  and  although  Russia 
and  Prussia  had  shown  a  vexatious  tendency  to  regard  that  realm 
as  their  exclusive  field  of  exploitation,  Thugut  had  not  entirely 
lost  hope  of  picking  up  something  there.  .  At  any  rate,  Poland  was 
not  the  only  neighboring  republic  where  Jacobins  could  be  dis- 
covered at  pleasure:  one  might,  perhaps,  find  a  few  in  Venice. 
The  spoliation  of  that  decayed   state   seemed  both  easy  and 

1  Mercy  to  Starhemberg,  May  31,  and  to  Thugut,  June  15,  Starhemberg, 
to  Thugut  July  12,  Thugut  to  Starhemberg,  August  13,  Thiirheim,  Briefe  des 
Grafen  Mercy,  pp.  86  ff.  and  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  112  f.,  145-148,  184  f. 


424  TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

profitable.1  The  new  program  was,  then,  to  retain  Belgium;  to 
carve  out  an  enormous  acquisition  in  France,  if  possible;  and  if 
this  failed,  to  fall  back  on  Polish  or  Venetian  territories.  The 
realization  of  this  plan  was,  of  course,  far  in  the  future,  but  Thu- 
gut  aimed  to  provide  for  all  eventualities  immediately  by  securing 
guarantees  from  the  allied  Powers.  In  the  case  of  Russia  and 
Prussia,  the  obvious  procedure  was  to  demand  such  guarantees  in 
return  for  Austria's  accession  to  the  Partition  Treaty. 

On  the  Court  of  Berlin  the  Director- General  placed,  indeed,  no 
great  reliance.  He  had  begun  his  ministry  with  a  strong  aversion 
to  Prussia,  and  everything  that  had  happened  since  convinced 
him  that  that  Power  was  aiming  at  the  ruin  of  the  House  of 
Austria.2  On  receiving  Lucchesini's  declaration  of  May  15,  he 
wrote  to  the  Emperor  that  if  there  could  have  been  any  doubts 
before,  this  note  would  have  sufficed  to  reveal  the  hateful  purposes 
of  Prussia  in  the  fullest  light.3  He  found  it  a  document  "  truly 
remarkable  in  the  history  of  diplomacy  "  for  "  the  absurdity  of  its 
principles  "  and  "  the  alteration  of  facts  in  a  manner  not  only 
fabulous  but  incredible  ";  and  its  tone  was  as  provoking  as  its 
substance.  As  it  was  not  a  moment,  however,  for  beginning  a 
guerre  de  plume,  he  decided  to  leave  the  Prussians  to  their  own 
guilty  consciences;  and  he  found  that  their  overtures  of  June 
were  only  the  result  of  their  uncomfortable  reflections.  Even 
these  overtures,  although  "  less  revolting  "  than  the  first  declara- 
tion, were  far  from  satisfactory,  since  they  upheld  in  passing  "  the 
palpable  incongruities  "  of  the  note  of  May  15,  and  because  their 
tone  was  anything  but  frank  and  loyal.4  As  long  as  Prussia 
refused  to  admit  the  sacred  principle  of  '  parity,'  Austria  would 
arrange  her  indemnities  with  the  other  Powers  alone.  These 
indemnities  could,  indeed,  scarcely  be  secured  without  Frederick 
William's  cooperation,  but  Thugut  held  it  dangerous  to  enlighten 
the  King  in  advance  about  his  plans  of  conquest.    Any  project 

1  Thugut  to  Colloredo,  June  4,  1794:  "  Adieu  au  secret  [as  to  "  nos  vues  sur 
Venise  "],  qui  depuis  un  an  a  €te  conserve  avec  tant  de  soins!  "  Vivenot,  Vertrau- 
liche  Brief e,  i,  p.  107  (the  italics  are  mine). 

2  Cf.  his  letters  to  Colloredo  of  May  4  and  11,  ibid.,  i,  pp.  15  f. 

3  Vortrag  of  May  23,  V.  A. 

4  Thugut  to  L.  Cobenzl,  June  30,  Vivenot,  iii,  p.  125. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  425 

tending  to  a  considerable  aggrandizement  of  Austria  would  arouse 
the  Prussian  jealousy  to  the  highest  pitch,  and  the  Court  of 
Berlin  would  hasten  to  raise  up  difficulties  of  every  sort.  Hence 
the  Director-General  desired  to  conceal  his  game,  while  binding 
the  King  to  the  war  through  the  intervention  of  England  and 
Russia,  and  so  leading  him  on  blindly  to  serve  the  interests  of 
Austria.  It  would  be  best  of  all,  he  thought,  if  the  realization  of 
the  Prussian  acquisitions  in  Poland  could  in  some  way  be  post- 
poned and  made  conditional  on  the  vigorous  prosecution  of  the 
war;  for  once  those  acquisitions  were  finally  secured,  the  King 
would  have  no  motive  and  no  desire  for  continuing  his  exertions 
in  France.  Among  Thugut's  various  miscalculations  none  was 
more  persistent  and  disastrous  than  this  idea  that  the  true  way  to 
render  Frederick  William  active  in  the  coalition  was  to  raise  up 
obstacles  in  his  path  in  Poland. 

It  was  upon  Russia  that  the  Director-General  chiefly  relied  for 
bridling  "  the  Prussian  malevolence"  and  assuring  the  indemnities 
of  Austria.  Since  the  middle  of  May  —  that  is,  since  learning 
that  England  would  not  oppose  the  Partition,  and  since  receiving 
Lucchesini's  note — he  had  begun  to  show  Razumovski  all  the  old- 
time  confidence,  to  expatiate  on  his  orthodox  faith  in  the  alliance 
of  the  Imperial  Courts,  and  to  sigh  for  the  coming  of  the  Russian 
courier.  On  June  10  the  ambassador  presented  Ostermann's 
dispatch;  Thugut  professed  himself  greatly  pleased;  and  the 
reconciliation  was  all  the  more  effusive  for  the  recent  estrange- 
ment. When  Razumovski  demanded,  however,  that  the  Emperor 
should  at  once  accede  to  the  Convention  of  St.  Petersburg, 
Thugut  replied  that  there  would  be  no  difficulty  about  that,  but 
that  his  sovereign  must  make  his  accession  dependent  on  more 
precise  and  reassuring  stipulations  regarding  his  indemnities. 
The  ambassador  observed  that  the  real  way  to  captivate  the 
Empress  would  be  to  accede  unconditionally;  after  that  her 
generosity  and  solicitude  would  know  no  bounds.1  But  Thugut 
was  not  to  be  paid  with  such  coin.  He  determined  to  test  the 
generosity  of  the  Court  of  St.  Petersburg  by  a  few  concrete  prop- 
ositions. 

1  The  above  from  Razumovski's  report  of  June  6/17,  M.  A.,  ABCTpia,  III,  55. 


426  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

By  a  dispatch  of  June  16  he  ordered  Cobenzl  to  demand  that 
the  Empress  should  guarantee  Austria  the  right  to  take  her 
indemnity  in  Poland,  in  case  it  should  prove  impossible  to  make 
any  considerable  conquests  from  France.  He  would  not  contest 
the  objection  already  raised  by  the  Russian  ministers  that  in  this 
case  the  Polish  state  would  be  completely  annihilated;  but  he 
found  that  since  the  other  Powers  had  appropriated  such  enor- 
mous acquisitions,  the  total  partition  of  the  Republic  would 
involve  no  great  inconveniences;  besides,  since  the  balance  of 
power  absolutely  required  that  Austria  should  gain  aggrandize- 
ment somewhere,  all  other  considerations  must  give  way  before 
this  "  peremptory  reason."  This  was,  of  course,  only  a  guarantee 
for  the  future  —  for  an  extreme  case;  but  in  the  meantime  the 
Emperor  desired  to  profit  by  the  present  circumstances  to  im- 
prove his  Galician  frontier  by  annexing  a  small  strip  of  territory 
along  the  boundary.  If  the  Empress  acquiesced,  as  was  to  be 
expected,  Thugut  suggested  that  Sievers  should  receive  instruc- 
tions, so  that  the  Republic  might  conclude  the  necessary  treaty 
with  Austria  at  the  same  time  as  those  with  Russia  and  Prussia. 
Finally,  Cobenzl  was  informed  that  in  eight  or  ten  days  full 
powers  would  be  sent  to  him  to  accede  in  the  Emperor's  name 
to  the  St.  Petersburg  Convention.1 

Thugut's  object  in  making  this  move  was  probably  to  gain  a 
foothold  in  Poland  at  once,  before  the  conclusion  of  the  impending 
treaties  at  Grodno,  which  might  contain  guarantees  of  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  remaining  possessions  of  the  Republic.  If  Austria 
could  establish  herself  immediately  on  Polish  soil,  she  could  rely 
on  future  events  to  furnish  opportunities  for  extending  her 
acquisitions. 

As  might  have  been  foreseen,  however,  the  demand  ran  counter 
to  one  of  the  Empress'  firmest  principles.  Regarding  Poland  as 
her  peculiar  property,  she  had  felt  her  late  concession  to  Prussia 
as  a  personal  loss,  and  she  was  not  inclined  to  make  a  new  sacrifice 
of  this  sort  in  favor  of  the  Court  of  Vienna.  Cobenzl  therefore 
encountered  objections  and  subterfuges  of  all  kinds.  He  was  told 
that  it  was  impossible  to  change  the  whole  indemnity  plan  every 

1  Dispatch  of  June  16,  printed  in  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  113-117. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  427 

week;  that  if  Austria  had  demanded  a  share  in  Poland  in  the 
beginning,  she  might  have  obtained  it,  but  that  it  was  too  late 
now;  that  if  the  Empress  had  dreamed  that  it  would  be  a  question 
of  destroying  the  Republic  entirely,  she  would  never  have  con- 
sented to  a  partition.  Above  all,  the  Russian  ministers  took 
refuge  behind  Prussia,  affirming  that  Frederick  William  would  be 
so  enraged  by  this  new  demand  of  Austria  that  he  would  probably 
withdraw  at  once  from  the  coalition,  if  he  did  not  proceed  to 
worse  extremities.  The  most  that  Cobenzl  could  obtain  was  a 
promise  that  the  question  should  be  left  in  suspense  until  the 
arrival  of  the  courier  who  was  to  bring  the  proposals  of  Austria  in 
full  and  instructions  regarding  the  promised  accession  to  the 
Partition  Treaty.1 

That  courier  was  long  in  coming.  The  fact  was  that  Thugut 
was  now  absorbed  in  watching  the  proceedings  at  Grodno,  where 
the  Polish  Diet  was  making  an  unexpectedly  vigorous  resistance 
to  the  demands  of  the  partitioning  Powers.  That  resistance 
revived  his  hope  that  it  might  still  be  possible  to  delay  the  con- 
summation of  the  Partition,  and  thus  '  bind  '  the  King  of  Prussia 
to  the  common  cause.  One  means  of  doing  so  immediately  pre- 
sented itself,  when  the  hard-pressed  Diet  dispatched  a  special 
envoy,  Wojna,  to  Vienna  with  an  urgent  appeal  for  the  good 
offices  of  the  Imperial  Court  as  a  guarantor  of  the  integrity  of 
Poland.  Thugut  refused,  however,  to  allow  himself  to  be  seduced 
into  an  open  intervention.  He  did  not  conceal  from  Wojna  his 
aversion  to  the  Partition,  and  his  conviction  that  Austrian 
interests  were  seriously  menaced  by  it;  but  he  always  ended  by 
pointing  to  the  French  war,  which  rendered  action  against  the 
allied  Powers  impossible.  Wojna's  audience  with  the  Emperor 
was  equally  fruitless;  he  received  plenty  of  sympathy,  and 
nothing  more.2  The  Austrians  were  well  advised  in  committing 
themselves  no  further  with  the  Poles,  for  Wojna's  first  dispatches 
were  read  in  the  open  Diet  —  to  the  lively  chagrin  of  the  Russian 
and  Prussian  envoys.3    But  while  it  is  true  that  Thugut  did  not 

1  Cobenzl's  reports  of  July  2  and  5,  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  128  ff.,  133-137- 

2  Wojna's  reports  of  July  10,  17,  August  7,  10,  M.  A.,  ApxHBi.  U,apcTBa  IIojlb- 
cnaro.   Cnomeuia  ct>  ABCTpieio,  C6.  8. 

3  De  Cache's  report  of  July  28,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1793. 


428 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


encourage  the  Diet  in  its  resistance  —  as  he  has  been  accused  of 
doing  by  Prussian  ministers  at  that  time  and  by  Prussian  histori- 
ans since  —  he  did  endeavor  to  delay  the  Partition  by  a  new 
action  at  St.  Petersburg. 

At  the  moment  when  the  crisis  at  Grodno  was  at  its  height,  the 
Director- General  sent  off  an  appeal  to  Catherine  to  postpone 
the  settlement  of  Polish  affairs  until  after  the  peace  with  France. 
The  Poles,  he  said,  would  not  give  in  without  coercion;  and  the 
use  of  violent  means  would  place  the  allied  Powers  in  the  most 
unenviable  light  before  the  world,  it  might  lead  Turkey  to  declare 
war,  and  it  might,  especially,  so  arouse  public  opinion  in  England 
that  the  British  government  would  be  compelled  to  retire  from 
the  coalition.  And  he  hinted  that  this  was,  indeed,  a  spectacle  to 
shock  all  Europe,  to  see  those  Courts  which  were  waging  war  on 
France  for  the  cause  of  sovereigns  and  the  sanctity  of  treaties, 
simultaneously  overwhelming  an  unfortunate  monarch  with 
indignities  and  tearing  up  their  own  solemn  guarantees.  Some 
delay  in  so  delicate  a  matter  would  involve  no  real  inconveniences, 
for  the  Russians  would  remain  complete  masters  of  Poland;  it 
could  be  cloaked  with  pretexts  that  would  only  lend  added  glory 
to  the  Empress;  and  it  would  be  the  only  means  of  ensuring 
Prussia's  active  cooperation  in  the  war.1 

By  the  time  this  dispatch  reached  St.  Petersburg,  the  Diet  had 
given  in  to  all  the  demands  of  Russia,  but  still  remained  obdurate 
towards  those  of  Frederick  William.  Cobenzl  therefore  applied 
himself  solely  to  the  task  of  holding  up  the  conclusion  of  the 
Prussian  treaty.  Ostermann  objected,  warning  him  with  great 
good  sense  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  deceived  itself  in  imagining 
that  it  could  ensure  the  cooperation  of  the  Prussians  by  keeping 
them  on  tenterhooks  regarding  their  acquisition;  the  King 
would  presently  lose  patience  and  proceed  to  violent  measures, 
which  Russia  could  not  prevent  and  which  would  furnish  him  with 
an  excuse  for  withdrawing  from  the  French  war  altogether. 
Markov,  however,  assumed  quite  the  opposite  tone,  and  assured 
Cobenzl  that  the  Empress  wished  nothing  better  than  to  delay 

1  Thugut  to  L.  Cobenzl,  July  12,  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  141-145. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  429 

the  Prussian  treaty.1  And  this  time  the  deed  followed  the  word. 
Although  it  was  not  entirely  a  result  of  Austria's  insinuations, 
Thugut  had  the  satisfaction  of  seeing  the  Prussian  treaty  held  up 
for  more  than  a  month,  until  there  came  the  inevitable  catas- 
trophe which  Ostermann  had  prophesied  and  which  Thugut 
ought  to  have  foreseen.  This  catastrophe  was  closely  connected 
with  another  negotiation  to  which  it  is  now  necessary  to  turn. 

V 

Determined  as  he  was  to  settle  all  the  great  questions  first  of  all 
with  Russia,  Thugut  had  long  realized  that  it  would  be  impossible 
to  maintain  a  total  silence  towards  the  Court  of  Berlin.  He  there- 
fore resolved  to  send  an  experienced  diplomat,  Count  Lehrbach, 
to  Frederick  William's  headquarters  on  a  mission,  the  primary 
aims  of  which  were  simply  to  gain  time,  to  'amuse'  the  Prussians, 
and  to  sound  them  on  the  subject  of  conquests  from  France.2  The 
instructions  which  Lehrbach  received  —  after  long  delays  —  on 
the  3rd  of  August,  were  based  on  a  rather  complicated  and  peril- 
ous plan.  Thugut  had,  since  April,  repeatedly  promised  the 
British  government  that  the  Emperor  would  abandon  the  Bava- 
rian Exchange  in  return  for  guarantees  from  England  of  definite 
acquisitions  in  France.  This  promise  he  had  carefully  kept  secret 
from  the  Prussians,  for  the  very  good  reason  that  if  they  learned 
of  it,  they  would  hold  themselves  absolved  from  the  engagement 
regarding  the  Exchange  contained  in  the  St.  Petersburg  Conven- 
tion and,  indeed,  from  every  definite  obligation  to  assist  in 
procuring  indemnities  for  Austria.  Furthermore,  Thugut  was  con- 
vinced of  Prussia's  mortal  antipathy  to  the  Exchange  project,  and 
he  knew  more  or  less  of  Lucchesini's  intrigues  with  the  princes  of 
Zweibriicken.  He  believed  that  these  intrigues  had  gone  further 
than. was  really  the  case,  and  that  the  King  had  made  definite 

1  Cobenzl's  reports  of  July  30  and  August  2,  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  156  ff.,  160  f. 

2  The  earliest  mention  I  have  found  of  Lehrbach's  mission  is  in  Thugut's  letter 
to  Colloredo  of  June  4  (Vivenot,  Vertrauliche  Briefe,  i,  p.  20).  As  to  Thugut's  aims 
in  connection  with  this  mission,  see  his  dispatch  to  L.  Cobenzl  of  June  30  (Vivenot, 
iii,  pp.  125  ff.)  and  his  letter  to  Colloredo  of  July  30  (Vivenot,  Vertrauliche  Briefe, 
i,  pp.  25  £.). 


43Q 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


promises  to  those  princes  contrary  to  the  engagements  of  the 
Partition  Treaty.1  Hence  he  formed  the  plan  of  taking  the  Prus- 
sians by  their  weak  side  and  pressing  to  know  in  what  manner 
they  intended  to  fulfil  the  obligations  of  the  Convention;  the 
King,  unable  or  unwilling  to  discharge  those  obligations  or  to 
explain  the  reason  why,  would  be  caught  in  a  trap,  from  which  he 
would  be  glad  to  escape  by  undertaking  the  desired  new  engage- 
ments respecting  Austrian  acquisitions  in  France.  The  plan  was 
not  altogether  badly  conceived.  It  was,  indeed,  indispensable  to 
begin  on  the  basis  of  the  previous  negotiations  and  obligations; 
and  Thugut's  suppositions  about  the  Prussian  attitude  towards 
the  Exchange,  although  somewhat  exaggerated,  were  in  the  main 
correct.  As  for  the  principle  involved  here,  one  may  recall 
Huffer's  remark  that  anyone  who  has  pledges  from  several 
parties  for  the  same  thing,  may  always  release  one  party  from  the 
obligation  without  absolving  another  until  he  has  secured  a 
promise  of  equivalent  advantages  in  return  for  his  renunciation.2 
Thugut's  great  mistake,  however,  was  that  he  did  not  sufficiently 
reckon  with  England. 

Lehrbach  was  charged,  then,  to  bring  up  Bavaria  first  of  all, 
and  thus  to  prepare  the  way  for  the  Austrian  project  for  conquests 
from  France,  or  for  an  acquisition  in  Poland  in  case  of  necessity. 
If  possible,  he  was  to  secure  the  King's  promise  to  continue  the 
war  until  the  Court  of  Vienna's  indemnities  had  been  assured ;  but 
he  was  not  authorized  to  make  definite  propositions  regarding  the 
extent  of  those  acquisitions  until  he  had  received  further  orders. 
On  the  result  of  his  negotiation,  it  was  stated,  the  Emperor's 
accession  to  the  Partition  Treaty  would  depend.3 

A  refinement  of  subtlety,  an  entire  lack  of  confidence,  and  the 
absence  of  any  sincere  intention  of  coming  to  a  definite  agreement 
were  the  outstanding  features  of  these  instructions.  Thugut  was 
only  too  fully  persuaded  that  nothing  good  was  to  be  expected 
from  Prussia,  that  concessions  were  useless,  and  that  confidence 

1  Thugut  to  L.  Cobenzl,  June  16,  to  Starhemberg,  August  31  (P.  S.),  Vivenot, 
iii,  pp.  113-117,  234  f.;   Razumovski's  report  of  June  22/July  3,  M.  A.,  ABCTpia, 

HI,  55- 

2  Huffer,  Oestreich  und  Preussen,  p.  35. 

3  These  instructions  are  printed  in  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  163-169. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  43  I 

would  only  be  abused.  A  negotiation  begun  with  such  presup- 
positions had  little  prospect  of  success. 

But  even  had  Lehrbach  come  in  the  best  of  faith,  it  is  scarcely 
possible  that  he  could  have  effected  an  agreement.  What  decided 
the  course  of  events  more,  perhaps,  than  all  the  dissensions 
between  the  two  allies,  was  the  fact  that  the  limited  resources  of 
the  Prussian  state  rendered  it  infinitely  difficult  for  the  King  to 
undertake  a  third  campaign  at  his  own  expense.  Since  the  spring 
this  thought  had  haunted  the  minds  of  the  Prussian  ministers, 
and  had  formed  the  constant  burden  of  their  reports  to  their 
sovereign.  To  retire  from  the  war  if  possible,  but  if  not,  to  avoid 
continuing  it  without  further  ample  indemnities,  became  their 
first  and  last  thought.  After  much  discussion  they  had  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  since  the  territorial  market  was  somewhat 
depleted,  the  compensation  to  be  demanded  for  a  third  campaign 
must  take  the  form  of  subsidies  from  England,  Austria,  and  the 
Empire.  As  usual,  the  great  element  of  uncertainty  lay  in  the 
fitful  moods  of  Frederick  William  himself,  who,  although  de- 
cidedly cooled  in  his  zeal  for  the  war  since  he  had  got  Great 
Poland  into  his  possession,  was  still  long  subject  to  relapses  of 
military  ardor.  Before  the  end  of  July,  however,  he  had  practi- 
cally succumbed  to  the  importunities  of  his  advisers.  A  cate- 
gorical declaration  that  the  King  could  not  consent  to  make  a 
third  campaign  without  further  indemnities  was  henceforth  re- 
served as  the  Prussian  piece  de  resistance  for  the  negotiation  with 
Lehrbach.1 

This  resolution  about  the  continuation  of  the  war  decided  the 
Prussian  attitude  towards  the  two  closely  related  questions,  the 
Austrian  indemnities  and  the  Emperor's  accession  to  the  Parti- 
tion Treaty.  In  June  the  Court  of  Berlin  would  still  have  pre- 
ferred to  see  Austria  fasten  her  ambitions  upon  France.  It  was 
important  to  ward  off  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  and  at  this  time  it 
seemed  not  impossible  to  make  considerable  conquests  from 

1  Alvensleben  and  Haugwitz  to  Lucchesini,  July  25,  28,  and  August  8,  B.  A., 
R.  92,  L.  N.  14.  Frederick  William's  final  assent  to  the  program  of  his  ministers 
seems  to  have  been  contained  in  a  cabinet  order  of  August  12,  which  I  have  been 
unable  to  find,  but  the  sense  of  which  appears  from  the  report  of  Alvensleben  and 
Haugwitz  of  August  19,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H. 


432 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


France  in  the  course  of  this  campaign.  But  the  more  the  latter 
hope  diminished,  the  less  the  Prussians  were  inclined  to  commit 
themselves  to  furthering  the  Emperor's  ambitions  in  this  direc- 
tion. On  the  other  hand,  they  did  not  yet  see  their  way  clear  to 
avoid  assisting  Austria  to  secure  acquisitions  somewhere.  They 
vacillated  between  repugnance  to  the  Exchange  and  the  dread  of 
a  third  campaign.  They  were  also  frightened  by  the  rumor  that 
Austria  and  England  were  planning  to  transfer  the  Elector  of 
Bavaria  to  Alsace-Lorraine.  The  situation  was  the  more  harrow- 
ing because  the  Court  of  Vienna  maintained  a  profound  silence 
about  its  projects.  Rescue  from  these  embarrassments  came 
from  an  unexpected  quarter. 

On  July  10  Lord  Yarmouth  arrived  at  the  royal  headquarters 
to  conclude  a  convention  relating  to  the  war.  He  soon  became 
confidential  with  Lucchesini,  and  began  to  make  revelations 
about  the  secret  negotiations  between  London  and  Vienna.  By 
deftly  drawing  him  out,  Lucchesini  learned  that  the  Emperor  had 
already  promised  England  to  renounce  the  Bavarian  Exchange.1 
This  was,  indeed,  lux  e  tenebris.  The  chance  to  utilize  this  re- 
nunciation could  not  be  overlooked.  The  ministers  at  Berlin 
adjured  Lucchesini  to  hold  fast  to  the  Exchange  project  in  the 
approaching  negotiation  with  Lehrbach.  "  It  would  be  super- 
fluous," they  added,  "  to  observe  to  Your  Excellence  why  we 
insist  on  the  exchange  of  the  Netherlands.  We  must  hold  to  it 
the  more  strictly  because  it  is  to  be  foreseen  that  England  will 
persist  in  thwarting  it.  If  the  question  were  then  raised  of  sub- 
stituting [for  it]  a  plan  for  conquests,  this  would  be  a  new  order  of 
things,  which  would  have  nothing  in  common  with  the  agreements 
decided  upon  between  Prussia  and  Russia;  and  in  consequence  it 
would  be  necessary  to  begin  the  negotiation  all  over  again,  with- 
out prejudice  to  the  indemnities  that  we  have  already  secured  in 
the  past."  2  Thugut's  previsions  on  this  point  were  nothing  if  not 
accurate. 

Lucchesini  determined  to  seal  the  fate  of  the  Exchange  project 
once  for  all  by  still  another  stroke.    As  Lord  Yarmouth  had  been 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  July  14,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

2  Letter  of  August  8.  Much  the  same  strain  in  a  letter  of  July  28,  B.  A.,  R.  92, 
L.  N.  14. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  433 

instructed  to  draw  Bavaria  into  the  coalition,  the  clever  Italian 
proposed  to  him  that  England  should  conclude  with  the  Elector  a 
subsidy  treaty,  which  should  contain  a  mutual  guarantee  of  the 
present  possessions  of  the  contracting  parties.1  He  also  broached 
the  same  scheme  to  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken,  who  then  went  off 
to  present  it  to  his  uncle,  the  Elector.  Presently  Lucchesini  was 
able  to  report  to  his  colleagues  glorious  news  from  Munich. 
"  Everything  has  succeeded  wonderfully  in  that  quarter,"  he 
wrote;  "  now  I  shall  see  whether  Lord  Yarmouth  is  already  pro- 
vided with  full  powers  in  order  to  profit  by  the  Elector's  good 
dispositions.  If  he  is,  then  all  roads  to  the  acquisition  of  Bavaria 
are  barred  to  the  House  of  Austria,  by  England.  It  remains  only 
to  ask  the  opinion  of  Your  Excellencies  about  the  utility  of  con- 
cluding at  present  a  formal  alliance  between  the  King  [of  Prussia] 
and  the  Duke  of  Zweibriicken."  2  Neither  this  alliance  nor  the 
Anglo-Bavarian  treaty  came  into  existence;  but  it  must  be  con- 
fessed that  Thugut's  much-condemned  duplicity  pales  before 
Lucchesini's  sheer  breach  of  faith.  It  was  surely  irony  of  the 
choicest  sort  to  insist  that  the  Emperor  should  accede  to  the  St. 
Petersburg  Convention  and  content  himself  with  the  promise  of 
Prussia's  good  offices  in  favor  of  the  Bavarian  Exchange,  when  at 
the  same  time  Prussia  was  secretly  doing  everything  in  her  power 
to  make  the  realization  of  that  Exchange  absolutely  impossible. 
It  is  true,  indeed,  that  Frederick  William's  ministers  had  never 
really  desired  Austria's  accession.  They  were  seriously  disquieted 
by  Razumovski's  renewed  importunities  on  that  subject  in  June, 
for  they  hardly  '  dared  flatter  themselves  that  the  Emperor  would 
persist  in  his  refusal.' 3  But  these  fears  presently  showed  them- 
selves groundless.  As  the  moment  of  Lehrbach's  arrival  ap- 
proached, the  Prussian  ministers  began  to  meditate  a  new 
scheme.  Lucchesini  proposed  that  in  case  the  Austrian  diplomat 
brought  only  a  conditional  accession  to  the  Convention,  as  was  to 
be  expected,  they  should  at  once  declare  that  until  the  Court  of 
Vienna  saw  fit  to  keep  its  engagements  (i.  e.,  to  acquiesce  sans 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  July  17,  B.  A..  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

2  Letter  of  September  6,  B.  A.,  loc.  cil. 

3  The  cabinet  ministry  to  Lucchesini,  June  21  and  22,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 


434 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


phrase  in  the  Partition  Treaty),  the  King  could  enter  into  no  dis- 
cussion of  the  Emperor's  indemnities.1  The  ministers  at  Berlin 
thoroughly  approved,  and  added  the  suggestion  that  if  by  the 
time  of  Lehrbach's  arrival  the  treaty  was  not  concluded  at 
Grodno,  the  King  might  declare  that  in  view  of  the  resistance  of 
the  Poles  he  felt  obliged  to  cease  his  operations  on  the  Rhine  in 
order  to  direct  his  attention  towards  securing  his  acquisitions  in 
Poland.  Such  a  threat  seemed  the  more  a  propos  because  it 
might  stop  the  (supposed)  intrigues  of  the  Court  of  Vienna  at  the 
Diet.2  These  ideas  rapidly  matured  until  at  the  moment  Lehr- 
bach  appeared  the  Prussians  had  agreed  on  the  following  plan.  If 
events  went  well  at  Grodno,  the  King  was  to  declare  that  he  no 
longer  demanded  the  Emperor's  accession  to  the  Convention,  and 
that  he  would  take  part  in  the  next  year's  campaign  only  on  con- 
dition of  being  assured  of  a  sufficient  indemnity.  In  the  contrary 
case,  they  would  add  to  the  foregoing  the  declaration  that  the 
King  was  obliged  to  suspend  action  against  France  in  order  to 
attend  to  his  interests  in  Poland  arms  in  hand.  This  would  be 
killing  a  great  many  birds  with  one  stone.  It  would  frustrate  for 
good  and  all  the  danger  of  the  Emperor's  accession;  it  would 
throw  the  blame  for  everything  upon  Austria,  who  had  delayed 
her  adhesion  until  it  could  be  of  no  further  value;  it  would  furnish 
the  pretext  for  retiring,  or  threatening  to  retire,  from  the  French 
war.  One  precaution,  however,  was  still  necessary.  The  minis- 
ters at  Berlin  recommended  some  delay  in  presenting  the  pro- 
posed declaration,  in  the  hope  of  a  favorable  turn  of  affairs  at  the 
Diet.  To  reject  the  Emperor's  accession  before  their  treaty  had 
been  concluded  at  Grodno  would  be  to  expose  themselves  to  the 
redoubled  intrigues  of  Austria;  and  then  there  was  always  the 
danger  of  compromising  themselves  with  the  Empress.3  Thus 
everything  was  prepared  in  advance  to  give  Lehrbach's  negotia- 
tion a  striking  finale.  The  Prussians  had  even  less  desire  for  a 
reconciliation  and  an  amicable  agreement  than  had  the  Austrians: 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  July  19,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

2  Alvensleben  and  Haugwitz  to  Lucchesini,  July  25,  B.  A.,  lot.  cit. 

3  The  cabinet  ministry  to  the  King,  August  20  and  28,   to  Lucchesini,  August 
23,  B.  A.,  R.  96.  147  H,  and  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  435 

instead  they  were  resolved  to  force  on  what  was  virtually  the 
rupture  of  the  alliance. 

Lehrbach  arrived  at  the  royal  headquarters  on  August  18,  and 
three  days  later  held  his  first  conference  with  Lucchesini  at  the 
village  of  Edenkoben.  He  began  with  the  declaration  that  the 
Emperor  had  always  intended  to  accede  to  the  Convention  and 
stood  ready  to  do  so  now  with  pleasure,  but  on  condition  that  the 
King  should  agree  to  procure  for  him  an  indemnity  fully  equal  to 
the  Prussian  one.  After  reviewing  the  history  of  the  previous 
negotiations  and  establishing  the  principle  of  parity,  he  launched 
into  a  discussion  of  the  various  means  of  indemnifying  Austria. 
He  began  with  Bavaria,  spoke  of  the  antipathy  of  the  members  of 
the  House  of  Zweibriicken  to  the  Exchange,  alluded  to  several 
indications  that  these  princes  supposed  themselves  to  be  backed 
up  in  their  opposition  by  Prussia,  and  ended  by  declaring  that 
unless  the  King  could  reassure  the  Emperor  as  to  the  efficacy  of 
the  means  that  he  was  willing  to  employ  in  this  connection,  the 
Exchange  project  must  be  abandoned.  There  would  then  remain 
no  other  course  than  that  of  seeking  conquests  from  France,  as  the 
Court  of  Berlin  had  suggested  by  the  dispatch  to  Caesar  of  June 
10.  Alsace  and  Lorraine  seemed  the  most  desirable  acquisitions 
in  this  quarter.  Lehrbach  then  demanded  formally  that  the  King 
should  agree  to  continue  the  war  until  the  Emperor  was  in  actual 
possession  of  his  indemnity. 

Lucchesini  replied  that  he  would  report  everything  to  his 
sovereign,  but  that  in  the  meantime  he  must  observe  how  sur- 
prised the  King  would  be  that  the  Emperor  had  not  yet  seen  fit  to 
accede  to  the  Convention  of  St.  Petersburg,  which  formed  the 
basis  of  Prussia's  cooperation  in  the  present  campaign.  Wishing 
to  draw  Lehrbach  out,  he  then  asked  whether  the  Court  of  Vienna 
really  foresaw  no  other  obstacles  in  the  way  of  the  Exchange  than 
those  which  had  just  been  mentioned.  Was  there  nothing  to  be 
feared  from  England  ?  Caught  unprepared  by  this  thrust,  Lehr- 
bach hesitated,  and  finally  admitted  that  some  opposition  had 
been  raised  by  the  London  cabinet,  but  said  that  he  had  not  been 
ordered  to  speak  of  it.  Lucchesini  triumphantly  retorted  that  it 
would  have  been  unfair  then  to  place  at  the  King's  charge  the  ill 


436  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

success  of  his  good  offices,  and  to  compromise  His  Majesty  un- 
necessarily with  the  other  Powers.  With  this  the  conference 
ended.1 

All  things  having  fallen  out  as  he  had  foreseen,  Lucchesini 
found  no  reason  for  giving  the  Austrian  a  definite  reply  at  once; 
instead  he  set  out  to  protract  matters  until  the  long  hoped-for 
news  should  arrive  from  Grodno.  Meantime  he  amused  Lehrbach 
with  long-winded  discussions  on  the  origin  and  nature  of  the  war 
—  a  subject  which  might  be  argued  in  saecula  saeculorum  without 
the  slightest  results;  and  he  excused  his  delays  on  the  ground  of 
the  necessity  of  communicating  with  Berlin  and  St.  Petersburg. 
During  this  period  of  waiting  he  made  a  discovery  which  gave 
him  a  final  assurance  of  victory.  Lord  Yarmouth,  probably 
alarmed  by  the  news  that  Lehrbach  had  brought  up  the  subject  of 
the  Exchange,  saw  fit  to  inform  the  Prussian  minister  that  in 
June  a  secret  convention  had  been  signed  in  London,  by  which  the 
Emperor  formally  renounced  alienating  the  Netherlands.  It  is 
quite  certain  that  this  convention  existed  only  in  Yarmouth's 
imagination,  but  this  fact  could  hardly  be  known  to  Lucchesini. 
The  latter's  jubilation  knew  no  bounds.  "  This  transaction,"  he 
wrote  to  the  ministers  at  Berlin,  "  destroys  all  the  obligations 
which  the  Convention  of  Petersburg  imposed  on  the  King  with 
regard  to  Austria's  indemnities;  and  it  serves  as  the  key  to  Count 
Lehrbach's  negotiation.  They  [the  Austrians]  would  like  to  sub- 
stitute new  engagements  about  conquests  in  France  for  those 
which  English  policy  has  forced  them  to  sacrifice.  .  .  .  Your 
Excellencies  will  know  better  than  I  what  use  can  be  made  of  this 
renunciation  at  St.  Petersburg."  2  Lehrbach  thus  saw  his  chief 
weapon  struck  from  his  hands,  his  whole  game  exposed,  his  plan 
of  campaign  confounded  and  upset.  One  may  doubtless  believe 
Lucchesini's  statement  that  the  Count  was  in  despair.3  For  some 
weeks  the  negotiation  was  completely  at  a  standstill.  Then 
the  turn  of  events  at  Grodno  precipitated  the  denouement. 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  August  21,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14;  Lehr- 
bach's report  of  the  same  day,  printed  in  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  198  ff. 

2  Letter  of  August  26,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

3  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  August  31,  B.  A.,  loc.  cit. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  437 

On  September  2  the  Diet  had  finally  agreed  to  the  Prussian 
treaty,  but  only  under  conditions  that  strained  the  patience  of 
Frederick  William's  advisers  to  the  breaking-point.  On  the  14th 
the  ministers  at  Berlin  sent  in  a  report  urging  the  most  prompt 
and  vigorous  measures:  they  implored  the  King  to  suspend  all 
operations  against  France  and  return  with  50,000  men  (out  of  the 
80,000  on  the  Rhine)  to  enforce  his  claims  on  Poland  in  person. 
This  step  was  to  be  accompanied  by  a  fulminating  declaration 
that  should  show  the  Austrians  that  Prussia  was  through  with 
them,  that  she  was  free  of  all  obligations  to  them,  that  for  what- 
ever might  happen  they  had  no  one  to  blame  but  themselves. 
On  receiving  these  proposals,  Lucchesini  and  Manstein  set  to 
work  energetically  to  win  over  the  King.  It  was  no  easy  task,  for 
Frederick  William's  sensibilities  revolted  at  the  thought  of  desert- 
ing the  good  cause  of  all  sovereigns  to  seek  sorry  laurels  in  chastis- 
ing a  few  helpless  Poles.  He  consented,  then  retracted,  and 
finally  gave  in  under  conditions:  he  would  first  of  all  fulfil  his 
promise  to  turn  the  fines  of  Weissenburg;  he  would  then  go  to  the 
east,  but  he  would  leave  almost  his  entire  army  on  the  Rhine, 
under  the  command  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick;  and  he  would 
return  later,  if  possible,  to  finish  the  campaign  with  a  few  brilliant 
feats  of  arms.1  Even  this  concession  might  not,  perhaps,  have 
been  wrung  from  him,  had  he  not  been  incensed  against  the  Court 
of  Vienna  by  disputes  with  General  Wurmser,  by  Lehrbach's 
'  insidious  negotiation,'  by  the  supposed  complicity  of  Austria 
in  the  resistance  of  the  Poles,  and  by  the  suspicion  that  the  Im- 
perial Courts  had  secretly  agreed  to  hold  up  his  treaty  at  Grodno.2 

Lucchesini  was  now  ready  to  unchain  the  lightning.  On 
September  22  he  presented  to  Lehrbach  and  Reuss  a  written 
declaration  which  announced:  (1)  that  as  the  King  was  obliged 
to  go  in  person  to  assure  his  acquisition  in  Poland,  he  would  leave 

1  Lucchesini  to  the  cabinet  ministry,  September  19,  22,  and  26,  B.  A.,  R.  92, 
L.N.  14. 

2  Cf.  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  433  ft".  There  is  not  the  slightest  evidence  that  the 
Austrians  had  done  anything  directly  to  stir  up  the  Poles  to  resistance;  though  this 
is  not  to  deny  that  the  known  antipathy  of  the  Imperial  Court  to  the  Partition 
may  have  encouraged  the  opposition  at  Grodno.  The  Prussians  were  not  far  wrong, 
however,  in  their  suspicions  regarding  Thugut's  intrigues  at  St.  Petersburg. 


/ 


438  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  the  Emperor  the  care  of  attending  to  his  own  indemnities  in 
France;  (2)  that,  respecting  the  motives  which  had  hitherto 
prevented  the  Court  of  Vienna  from  acceding  to  the  St.  Peters- 
burg Convention,  the  King  would  no  longer  insist  on  that  formal- 
ity; (3)  that  his  duty  to  his  subjects  and  the  need  of  husbanding 
the  last  resources  of  his  Monarchy  forbade  His  Majesty's  con- 
tinuing the  war  another  year,  unless  the  allied  Powers  provided 
him  with  the  means  of  doing  so.1  This  declaration  brought  Lehr- 
bach's  mission  to  a  close.  It  ended  the  long  negotiation  between 
he  German  Powers  on  the  indemnity  question.  It  terminated 
the  discussion  between  them  with  regard  to  the  Emperor's  acces- 
sion to  the  Partition  Treaty.  It  dealt  what  was  practically  the 
coup  de  grace  to  the  Austro-Prussian  alliance. 

VI 

In  spite  of  the  disastrous  outcome  of  Lehrbach's  negotiation, 
Thugut  continued  to  treat  of  the  Emperor's  adhesion  to  the  St. 
Petersburg  Convention  with  Russia  —  though  henceforth  with 
Russia  alone.  The  wider  grew  the  breach  with  Frederick  William, 
the  more  ardently  the  Austrian  minister  threw  himself  into  the 
pursuit  of  Catherine's  wonder-working  graces.  Time  did  not 
count  with  Thugut:  though  it  took  ages,  he  would  end  by  pre- 
senting his  sovereign  with  an  acquisition  in  some  quarter  that 
would  conform  in  every  respect  to  the  sacrosanct  principle  of 
'  perfect  parity.'  Into  the  details  of  this  long  negotiation  it  is 
impossible  to  enter  here. 

The  failure  of  his  attempt  during  the  summer  to  secure  the 
Empress'  consent  to  an  Austrian  acquisition  in  Poland  had  for  a 
time  embarrassed  Thugut.  For  some  months  St.  Petersburg  was 
studiously  silent.  In  the  autumn,  however,  especially  after 
Frederick  William's  pronunciamiento,  the  reconcilation  between 
the  Imperial  Courts  proceeded  steadily.  By  December  Thugut 
was  at  last  ready  to  declare  himself  with  all  precision  at  St. 
Petersburg.  The  Court  of  Berlin  having  rejected  Austria's  acces- 
sion —  a  fact  over  which  he  was  not  particularly  grieved  —  he 
announced  that  the  Emperor  desired  to  accede  to  the  Partition 

1  This  declaration  is  printed  in  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  290-295. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  AUSTRIA  439 

Treaty  in  such  a  manner  that  his  adhesion  would  apply  to  Russia 
alone.  In  return  for  this  Thugut  demanded  the  Empress' 
guarantee  for  that  acquisition  in  France  which  Mercy  had  sug- 
gested —  namely,  the  territory  as  far  as  the  Meuse  and  the 
Somme;  and  in  case  these  conquests  could  not  be  effected,  a 
similar  guarantee  for  an  indemnity  to  be  taken  at  the  expense  of 
Venice.  All  claims  for  a  share  in  Poland  were,  in  deference  to  the 
Empress,  at  last  abandoned.1 

These  propositions  were  sufficiently  to  Catherine's  taste. 
Markov  repeatedly  assured  Cobenzl  that,  excluding  Poland,  the 
remains  of  which  she  desired  to  keep  intact,  there  was  no  plan  of 
aggrandizement  that  Austria  might  form  of  which  the  Empress 
would  not  approve.  Encouraged  by  this  reply,  Thugut  proceeded 
to  draft  the  letters  in  which  —  as  was  usual  in  treaties  be- 
tween Austria  and  Russia  —  the  two  sovereigns  were  to  embody 
their  agreement.2  His  proposals  were  about  to  be  formally 
accepted  at  St.  Petersburg,  the  ministers  were  putting  the  final 
touches  upon  the  bargain,  when  the  face  of  things  was  suddenly 
changed  by  the  outbreak  of  the  revolution  in  Poland.  The  Rus- 
sians again  felt  the  need  of  Prussian  cooperation;  a  new  partition 
was  soon  in  prospect;  both  sides  recognized  that  retroactive 
arrangements  about  a  now  ancient  treaty  were  inappropriate. 

The  course  of  the  negotiation  henceforth  belongs  to  the  history 
of  the  Third  Partition.  This  time  Austria  was  the  preferred 
suitor.  Behind  the  back  of  Prussia,  the  Imperial  Courts  con- 
cluded the  secret  convention  of  January  3,  1795,  which  settled 
the  new  partition.  By  the  third  article  the  Emperor  acceded  to 
the  Second  Partition  Treaty,  but  only  in  so  far  as  it  concerned  the 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg.  The  acquisition  secured  for  Austria, 
though  somewhat  larger  than  that  reserved  for  Prussia,  was  not 
sufficient  to  make  up  for  the  defeat  of  1793.  Nevertheless,  the 
long  litigation  over  the  Second  Partition  Treaty  had  ended  in 
what  may  be  considered  a  triumph,  though  hardly  a  justification, 
of  Thugut's  policy. 

1  Thugut  to  L.  Cobenzl,  December  18,  1793,  Vivenot,  Thugut  und  sein  politisches 
System,  pp.  382-392. 

2  Thugut  to  L.  Cobenzl,  February  27,  1794,  ibid.,  pp.  399-403. 


CHAPTER  XIX 

The  Attitude  of  England  and  France  toward  the 

Partition 


"  This,  at  least,  you  cannot  deny,"  wrote  one  of  the  Russian 
ministers  to  a  friend  on  the  eve  of  the  Second  Partition,  "  that  the 
moment  at  which  we  are  making  this  acquisition  is  the  most 
opportune  that  can  be  imagined,  for  no  one  is  able  to  offer  oppo- 
sition; everyone  has  his  hands  full."  1  And  in  fact,  Russia  and 
Prussia  could  never  have  found  a  situation  more  extraordinarily 
favorable  than  that  of  1793  for  perpetrating  a  great  act  of  inter- 
national rapine  without  hindrance  from  the  other  Powers.  If 
Austria,  bound  by  her  past  guilty  bargains  and  by  the  exigencies 
of  war,  was  helpless  to  avert  or  delay  the  Partition,  England  and 
France  were  even  less  in  a  position  to  do  so. 

Pitt  had  formerly  displayed  a  lively  concern  for  the  defence  of 
the  weaker  states  against  the  great  predatory  monarchies;  he  had 
shown  a  particular  interest  in  Poland;  he  had  once  been  willing 
to  risk  a  war  with  Russia  over  so  comparatively  trifling  a  question 
as  that  of  Oczakow  and  its  district.  But  his  experiences  in  1791 
had  taught  him  that  the  British  public  was  not  prepared  to  sup- 
port so  active,  far-sighted,  and  altruistic  a  policy.  Henceforth  he 
avoided  every  enterprise  that  might  lead  to  war,  unless  the  vital 
interests  of  England  were  directly  and  palpably  at  stake.  Hence- 
forth he  seems  to  have  abandoned  the  hope  of  saving  Poland. 
For  a  year  and  a  half  after  '  the  Russian  armament/  he  pursued  a 
policy  of  strict  non-intervention  in  Continental  and  especially  in 
Polish  affairs. 

It  was  true  that  during  the  early  part  of  1792  the  London 
cabinet  discreetly  warned  Prussia  of  the  danger  of  allowing  the 

1  Zavadovski  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  January  27/February  7,  1793,  Apx.  Bop.,  xii, 
pp.  77  f.  (here  erroneously  dated  1792). 

440 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE        44 1 

Empress  to  regain  her  old  '  influence  '  in  Poland.  But  as  these 
counsels  passed  unheeded,  when  the  crisis  came  in  the  summer  of 
that  year,  Pitt  refused  to  take  any  action  on  behalf  of  Poland. 
All  appeals  from  Warsaw  were  met  with  the  excuse  that,  in  view 
of  the  attitude  adopted  by  Prussia,  the  Maritime  Powers  alone 
could  not  intervene,  "  at  least  not  without  a  much  greater  exer- 
tion and  expense  than  the  importance  to  their  separate  interests 
could  possibly  justify."  l  Nor  was  Pitt  moved  from  his  course  by 
the  widespread  sympathy  which  the  Polish  struggle  for  independ- 
ence excited  in  England.  The  Lord  Mayor  of  London  started 
what  was  intended  to  be  a  national  subscription  to  assist  Poland 
against  '  the  infamous  oppression  of  Russia.' 2  The  Whig  news- 
papers were  full  of  tirades  against  their  former  ally,  the  Empress, 
and  the  whole  '  nefarious  association  of  monarchs  '  to  which 
Poland  was  falling  a  victim.  Fox  and  his  friends  now  bitterly 
confessed  how  mistaken  had  been  their  attitude  the  year  before: 
if  Oczakow  had  not  been  abandoned,  Catherine  would  have  had 
neither  the  power  nor  the  inclination  to  attempt  what  she  was 
now  doing.3  In  short,  such  was  the  storm  of  indignation  that  the 
Russian  ambassador  reported  that  if  Poland  had  been  nearer  to 
England,  the  nation  would  have  forced  the  government  to 
intervene.4 

In  view  of  Pitt's  complete  passivity  on  this  occasion,  in  the 
face  of  this  popular  outcry  and  at  a  time  when  his  hands  were 
free,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  he  would  later  on  have  done 
anything  effective  to  prevent  the  Partition,  even  had  he  not 
become  entangled  in  the  conflict  with  France.  At  all  events,  it 
was  only  towards  the  end  of  November  that  he  learned  through 
indirect  channels  of  the  indemnity  plans  of  the  Eastern  Powers; 
and  in  that  same  month  Dumouriez's  conquest  of  Belgium  sud- 
denly produced  that  acute  tension  in  Anglo-French  relations 
which  led  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war  three  months  later.    Repug- 

1  Lord  Auckland  to  Sir  Morton  Eden,  August  14,  1792,  Auckland  Journal,  ii, 
p.  432.  Instructions  to  Col.  Gardiner  at  Warsaw,  August  4,  cited  by  Rose,  Pitt  and 
the  Great  War,  p.  54. 

2  Apx.  Bop.,  ix,  pp.  249,  253  f.;  Parliamentary  History,  xxx,  col.  171. 

3  Burges  to  Auckland,  July  31,  1792,  Auckland  Journal,  ii,  pp.  423  f. 

4  Report  of  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  June  10/21,  Apx.  Bop.,  ix,  p.  241. 


442 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


nant  as  the  schemes  of  the  allies  might  be  —  and  most  English- 
men would  doubtless  have  concurred  in  Sir  Morton  Eden's 
dictum  that  "  such  iniquitous  projects,  in  so  awful  a  moment, 
seem  to  bid  defiance  to  God  and  to  man,"  x  —  nevertheless,  when 
it  became  a  question  either  of  saving  Belgium  and  Holland  from 
the  French  or  of  attempting  to  rescue  far-off  Poland,  the  choice 
of  the  British  government  could  hardly  be  doubtful.  Already  in 
November,  Pitt  began  to  seek  a  rapprochement  with  the  Eastern 
Powers,  and  to  solicit  from  them  a  frank  explanation  of  their 
aims  and  ideas  with  regard  to  the  struggle  with  France. 

In  response  to  this  invitation,  on  January  12, 1793,  the  Austrian 
and  Prussian  ministers  at  London  for  the  first  time  officially 
informed  Lord  Grenville  of  the  Polish-Bavarian  indemnity  project. 
Though  not  entirely  unexpected,  the  announcement  was  vexa- 
tious and  unwelcome  in  the  extreme.  Grenville  made  a  brave 
show  of  virtuous  indignation  over  the  impending  partition  of 
Poland.  '  The  King,'  he  said,  '  would  never  be  a  party  to  any 
concert  or  plan,  one  part  of  which  was  the  gaining  a  compensa- 
tion for  the  expenses  of  the  war  from  a  neutral  and  unoffending 
nation.' 2  According  to  the  Austrian  ambassador,  he  even  went 
so  far  as  to  declare  that  the  project  was  "  screamingly  unjust," 
and  that  "England  could  never  consent  to  it,  much  less  contrib- 
ute to  its  execution."  3  This  protest  was  repeated  soon  after- 
ward by  Sir  James  Murray,  who  was  then  at  the  King  of  Prussia's 
headquarters  on  a  diplomatic  mission,  with  the  additional 
warning  that  in  case  the  Partition  were  actually  carried  out,  the 
British  government  would  feel  obliged  to  issue  a  public  declara- 
tion that  it  had  had  nothing  to  do  with  this  measure  and  highly 
disapproved  of  it.4  At  St.  Petersburg  the  English  envoy  Whit- 
worth,  acting  on  his  own  initiative  and  without  committing  his 
Court,  endeavored  for  some  weeks  to  avert  or  at  least  to  postpone 
the  Partition.5  But  these  few  diplomatic  steps  practically  make 
up  the  sum  of  British  effort  on  behalf  of  Poland. 

1  Dropmore  Papers,  ii,  p.  341.  2  Lecky,  op.  cit.,  vi,  p.  91. 

3  Stadion's  report  of  January  25,  V.  A.,  England,  Berichte,  1793. 

4  Lucchesini  to  the  King,  January  28,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  12. 

6  See  his  reports  of  January  25,  27,  29,  and  February  12,  in  Herrmann,  Erganz- 
ungsband,  pp.  359-364. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE        443 

Pitt  does  not  appear  to  have  thought  seriously  at  any  time  of 
going  further  than  harmless  remonstrances^  And  even  these 
remonstrances  soon  became  singularly  mild.  As  early  as  January 
20,  Murray  was  ordered  to  declare  that  England  had  no  intention 
of  interfering  by  force  in  the  Polish  affair  or  of  hindering  the 
execution  of  the  Partition.1  About  the  same  time  Grenville 
assured  the  Prussian  envoy  that  the  British  government  would 
maintain  a  complete  silence  and  an  entirely  passive  attitude  with 
regard  to  the  dismemberment  of  Poland;  and  such  a  line  of  con- 
duct, the  Berlin  ministry  declared,  was  "  all  that  we  require  from 
England."  2  If  Pitt  had  thus  renounced  the  idea  of  intervention 
in  the  East  even  before  the  French  declaration  of  war  reached 
London  (February  8),  after  that  event  there  could  be  absolutely 
no  thought  of  such  an  action.  Henceforth  the  British  cabinet 
insisted  on  ignoring  everything  that  happened  in  Poland.  How 
little  it  allowed  moral  scruples  to  interfere  with  its  political  friend- 
ships was  shown  by  the  fact  that  at  the  moment  when  the  Parti- 
tion was  about  to  be  proclaimed  to  the  world,  the  treaty  signed  at 
London  on  March  25  announced  the  restoration  of  the  old  close 
liaison  between  England  and  Russia.3 

It  has,  indeed,  been  asserted  by  a  distinguished  historian  that 

1  Salomon,  Das  politische  System  des  jungeren  Pitt,  p.  78. 

2  Schulenburg  and  Alvensleben  to  Lucchesini,  February  4,  commenting  on 
Jacobi's  report  from  London  of  January  22,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

3  No  credence  can  be  given  to  Sybel's  statement  that  about  the  middle  of  Febru- 
ary, 1793,  Catherine  wrote  an  autograph  letter  to  S.  R.  Vorontsov,  her  ambassador 
in  London,  authorizing  him  to  declare  that  if  England  found  means  to  hinder  the 
Partition  of  Poland,  she  would  have  no  objections,  since  she  had  been  forced  into 
this  measure  by  Prussia  (op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  202).  This  astonishing  tale  rests  only  upon 
gossip  retailed  by  Hogguer,  the  Dutch  minister  at  St.  Petersburg;  it  finds  no  corrob- 
oration in  Vorontsov's  voluminous  published  correspondence  (which  includes  many 
letters  written  to  him  by  the  Empress) ;  and  it  is  in  itself  highly  improbable. 

Sybel's  dictum,  "  Der  Streich,  welcher  den  Nacken  Ludwigs  XVI  bedrohte,  war 
zugleich  auch  der  todliche  Schlag  fur  das  nationale  Dasein  Polens  "  (op.  cit.,  iii, 
p.  196)  seems  to  me  misleading,  like  most  historical  epigrams.  Apart  from  the 
question  whether  the  death  of  Louis  XVI  had  any  essential  part  in  bringing  on  the 
war  between  England  and  France,  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  even  without 
that  war  Pitt  would  have  acted  effectively  to  save  Poland.  In  1793,  as  in  the 
preceding  summer,  he  would  probably  have  found  that  an  isolated  intervention 
would  have  involved  more  danger  and  expense  than  English  interests  in  Poland 
would  justify. 


444 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


at  one  moment  Pitt  offered  Austria  his  consent  to  the  Exchange, 
if  she  would  make  .peace  with  France  under  his  mediation  and 
then  unite  with  England  in  opposing  the  Partition  of  Poland.1  In 
reality,  however,  his  policy  seems  to  have  tended  in  quite  the 
opposite  direction.  The  Bavarian  Exchange  might  be  morally 
less  reprehensible  than  the  Partition,  but  it  was,  from  the  stand- 
point of  British  interests,  by  far  the  more  objectionable  of  the 
two  projects.  Hence,  while  the  London  cabinet  refused  from  the 
outset  to  do  anything  effective  to  hinder  the  Partition,  it  evinced 
.an  ever  more  and  more  pronounced  opposition  to  the  Belgian- 
Bavarian  plan.  Unable  to  contest  the  latter  project  openly  in 
the  beginning,  at  a  time  when  the  three  Eastern  Powers  seemed 
to  be  united  in  support  of  it,  England  soon  found  her  opportunity 
when  the  Emperor  fell  out  with  his  two  allies.  Then  the  British 
government,  taking  advantage  of  Austria's  new  dependence  upon 
its  assistance,  succeeded,  as  has  already  been  seen,  in  frustrating 
the  Exchange  project  entirely.  But  on  the  other  hand,  all 
Thugut's  efforts  to  induce  England  to  oppose  the  Partition  were 
fruitless.  The  Austrians  were  told  that  the  British  government 
abhorred  the  conduct  of  Prussia  and  Russia,  but  saw  no  possi- 
bility of  opposing  their  plans  at  a  time  when  it  needed  their 
cooperation  for  the  war  with  France.2  The  moment  for  protest- 
ing against  the  Partition  was  past,  Grenville  declared,  and  the 
only  thing  to  be  done  was  to  take  care  that  such  abuses  should 
not  be  renewed  in  the  future.3  A  little  later,  in  the  midst  of  the 
crisis  at  Grodno,  when  the  Polish  Diet  was  sending  out  agonizing 
appeals  to  the  world  for  aid,  a  British  diplomat  was  assuring  the 
Prussians  that  if  his  government  had  at  one  time  shown  some 
inclination  to  protest  against  the  Partition,  that  was  due  simply 
to  reasons  of  domestic  politics;  and  that  he  was  authorized  to 
declare  that  England  no  longer  took  any  interest  in  Poland,  and 
had  no  intention  of  embroiling  itself  with  Prussia  and  Russia  on 

1  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  195.  Salomon  denies  that  any  traces  of  such  an  offer  are 
to  be  found  in  the  English  records  (op.  cit.,  p.  76),  and  I  have  met  with  none  in  the 
Austrian  diplomatic  correspondence. 

2  Stadion's  report  of  May  10,  V.  A.,  England,  Berichte,  1793. 

3  Starhemberg  (Stadion's  successor)  to  Thugut,  May  24,  Vivenot,  iii,  pp.  77  ff. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE        445 

account  of  the  port  of  Dantzic  and  a  few  Polish  articles  of  mer- 
chandise.1 

.  Under  such  circumstances,  it  mattered  little  that  the  decimated 
Whig  opposition  in  Parliament  indulged  in  virulent  invectives 
against  the  partitioning  Powers — those  "  plunderers,"  "  robbers," 
"  murderers,"  whose  hands  were  "  reeking  with  the  blood  of 
Poland"  —  branded  Frederick  William's  conduct  towards  the 
Republic  as  "  the  most  flagrant  instance  of  profligate  perfidy 
that  had  ever  disgraced  the  annals  of  mankind  ";  denounced  the 
Partition  as  "  one  of  the  foulest  crimes  and  blackest  treacheries  of 
despotism  ";  and  accused  the  government  of  being  an  accomplice 
in  "  spreading  the  gloom  of  tyranny  over  the  Continent."  2  Pitt 
in  general  replied  that  he  had  never  hesitated  to  express  his  dis- 
approval of  the  treatment  Poland  had  suffered;  but  that  •  the 
question  was  whether  they  should  allow  one  act  of  injustice  to 
deprive  them  of  the  assistance  of  the  Eastern  Powers  in  resisting 
a  system  of  intolerable  injustice,  not  merely  existing  in  France, 
but  attempted  to  be  introduced  in  every  other  country.' 3  Other 
speakers  for  the  government  furbished  up  the  well-worn  argu- 
ment that  when  your  own  house  was  on  fire,  you  could  not  afford 
to  go  to  the  assistance  of  your  neighbor;  "  while  we  lament  the 
misfortunes  of  Poland,"  said  Jenkinson,  "  let  us  look  to  our- 
selves ";  and  Burke,  the  one-time  eulogist  of  the  Constitution  of 
the  Third  of  May,  had  now  discovered  that,  in  respect  to  England, 
"  Poland  might  be,  in  fact,  considered  as  a  country  in  the  moon"  4 
Such  was  the  pitiable  ending  of  the  Federative  System. 

1  Lord  Beauchamp's  declaration  to  Lucchesini  on  July  11,  1793:  "Que  si  le 
Ministere  Anglois  s'etoit  cru  oblige,  au  commencement  de  l'hyver  passe  de  montrer 
des  dispositions  a  protester  contre  nos  acquisitions  en  Pologne,  c'avoit  6te  une 
mesure  de  politique  interne  qu'il  a  abandonne  toute  suite  [sic]  apres  que  notre 
partage  a  ete  definitivement  arrets  entre  les  cours  interessees,  et  qu'il  etoit  autorise 
a  assurer  qu'on  ne  songeoit  plus  a.  la  Pologne  et  qu'on  se  garderoit  bien  de  se  brouil- 
ler  avec  la  Prusse  et  la  Russie  pour  le  port  de  Danzig  et  quelques  denrees  de  Po- 
logne," Lucchesini  to  the  ministers  at  Berlin,  July  11,  B.  A.,  R.  92,  L.  N.  14. 

2  Parliamentary  History,  xxx,  coll.  1108,  1468,  1471,  1477  f.,  1485. 

3  This  from  his  speech  of  March  6,  1794,  ibid.,  xxx,  col.  1485. 

4  Ibid.,  xxx,  coll.  1476  and  1009.    The  italics  are  mine. 


446 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


II 

A  classic  tradition,  going  back  at  least  to  Richelieu  and  Maza- 
rin,  ranged  Poland,  along  with  Sweden  and  Turkey,  in  the  group 
of  states,  whose  protection  and  preservation  were  an  essential 
interest  of  France.  It  was  true  that  during  the  last  decades  of  the 
Bourbon  Monarchy,  after  the  Austrian  alliance  had  dislocated 
French  policy  in  Eastern  Europe,  this  tradition  had  been  very 
much  neglected,  if  not  entirely  abandoned;  but  the  memory  of 
the  old  system  was  still  strong  both  in  France  and  in  Poland, 
especially  among  those  Revolutionary  statesmen  who  had  been 
bred  on  the  doctrines  of  Favier  and  in  the  hatred  of  the  '  mon- 
strous '  alliance  of  1756.  And  nothing  might  seem  more  natural 
than  a  return  to  the  classic  tradition  at  a  time  when  France  was 
grappling  with  a  coalition  of  which  Russia  and  Prussia  were 
members:  according  to  all  time-honored  precedents,  it  must  then 
be  the  aim  of  French  diplomacy  to  create  a  diversion  in  the  East 
by  bringing  the  Turks  and  Swedes  into  the  field  and  by  succoring 
hard-pressed  Poland.  The  idea  of  attempting  such  a  diversion 
was  so  obvious  that  it  was  taken  up  with  more  or  less  energy  by 
all  those  who  came  to  the  helm  at  Paris  during  the  first  year  of 
the  Revolutionary  War.  Upon  the  success  of  these  attempts 
Poland's  one  real  chance  of  deliverance  from  without  depended. 
France  was,  indeed,  the  one  great  Power  which  had  neither  the 
need  nor  the  wish  to  court  the  good  graces  of  Catherine;  the  one 
great  Power  whose  situation  not  only  allowed  but  seemed  to 
require  active  intervention  on  behalf  of  Poland.  The  old  fixed 
principles  of  French  foreign  policy,  the  new  maxims  about 
championing  the  cause  of  oppressed  peoples  against  usurping 
despots,  the  exigencies  of  a  war  in  which  the  enemies  of  Poland 
were  also  the  enemies  of  France,  combined  to  suggest  vigorous 
opposition  to  the  Second  Partition. 

Nevertheless,  France  did  nothing  effective  to  save  Poland.  For 
this  there  were  many  reasons.  The  failure  was  not  due  merely  to 
the  tremendous  difficulties  and  dangers  that  beset  the  Revolu- 
tionary government  at  home;  nor  to  the  instability,  the  inexpe- 
rience, or  the  doctrinairism  of  those  who  successively  held  power 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE        447 

at  Paris;  nor  to  the  remoteness  of  Poland;  nor  to  the  undeniable 
lack  of  sympathy  with  which  many  Jacobins  regarded  the  '  aris- 
tocratic '  and  too  conservative  reformers  of  the  Third  of  May.1 
One  of  the  most  potent  factors  in  the  situation  was  the  predilec- 
tion of  the  disciples  of  Favier  for  Prussia.  The  idea  of  detaching 
Frederick  William  from  Austria  and  of  securing  a  separate  peace, 
perhaps  even  an  offensive  alliance,  with  him,  haunted  the  minds 
of  French  statesmen,  generals,  and  publicists.  But  reconciliation 
with  Prussia  and  action  on  behalf  of  Poland  were  two  incompat- 
ible policies.  If  Frederick  William  showed  any  signs  of  recipro- 
cating the  advances  made  to  him,  his  would-be  allies  at  Paris 
were  not  likely  to  scrutinize  too  closely  the  '  crimes  of  despotism  ' 
in  the  East.  Prussia  was,  indeed,  the  pivot  around  which  the 
European  political  system  revolved.  Just  as  the  fear  of  losing 
Frederick  William's  aid  precluded  Austria  and  England  from 
actively  opposing  the  Partition,  so  the  hope  of  inducing  the  King 
to  desert  the  coalition  tempted  France  to  acquiesce  in  that  unholy 
transaction.  This  inhibitory  regard  for  Prussia  crops  out  con- 
tinually in  the  calculations  of  French  diplomacy  in  1792  and 
1793,  strangely  intermingled  with  plans  of  a  rather  different 
character,  in  which  the  deliverance  of  Poland  occasionally  figures. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  Revolutionary  War,  it  was  the  favorite 
project  of  the  dominant  Girondist  party  and  of  Dumouriez,  then 
Foreign  Minister,  to  win  the  alliance  of  Prussia,  and,  if  possible, 
of  England.  Failing  in  this,  they  fell  back  on  the  classic  idea  of 
forming  a  coalition  which  should  include  Sweden,  Poland,  and 
Turkey.  Before  anything  had  been  effected  towards  this  end, 
however,  Poland  succumbed  before  the  Russian  invasion,  while 
the  proposed  mission  of  Semonville  to  Constantinople  came  to 
nothing,  because  the  Porte,  yielding  to  the  vehement  remon- 
strances of  the  three  Eastern  Powers,  refused  to  receive  the  am- 
bassador.2 The  only  part  of  Dumouriez's  program  that  bore 
fruit  was  the  diplomatic  campaign  begun  at  Stockholm. 

1  As  to  the  indifference  or  downright  contempt  felt  by  a  large  part  of  the  French 
public  for  Poland,  see  Askenazy,  "  Upadek  Polski  a  Francya,"  in  Biblioteka  War- 
szawska,  1913,  i,  pp.  16  f. 

2  August  20,  1792.  Cf.  Sorel,  op.  cil.,  ii,  pp.  455  f.;  Grosjean,  "  La  Mission  de 
Semonville  a  Constantinople,"  in  La  Revolution  Francaise,  xii  (1887). 


448      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

There  the  new  French  envoy,  Verninac,  enjoyed  the  experience, 
unique  in  the  annals  of  Revolutionary  diplomacy  at  that  time,  of 
finding  a  court  which  not  only  tolerated  but  welcomed  his  ad- 
vances. The  foreign  policy  of  Sweden  had,  indeed,  undergone  a 
sort  of  revolution  within  a  few  months  after  the  death  of  Gusta- 
vus  III  (March  29,  1792).  The  new  Regent,  the  Duke  of  Soder- 
manland,  was  determined  to  free  himself  from  the  alliance  with 
Russia  formed  by  the  late  King,  which  he  regarded  as  a  galling 
and  dangerous  pact  of  servitude.  For  this  purpose  he  needed  the 
support  of  some  foreign  Power,  both  as  a  guarantee  against  future 
Russian  aggressions,  and  in  order  to  obtain  subsidies  that  would 
enable  him  to  dispense  with  those  that  Catherine  had  hitherto 
paid.  Hence  during  the  summer  of  1792,  while  Russo-Swedish 
relations  grew  steadily  worse,  the  secret  discussions  conducted 
with  Verninac  progressed  so  rapidly  that  by  September  it  was 
agreed  that  a  formal  negotiation  for  a  defensive  alliance  should  be 
opened  at  Paris.  The  French  envoy  then  went  home  to  pave  the 
way  for  this  negotiation,  while  Baron  de  Stael-Holstein,  the 
Swedish  plenipotentiary,  was  to  follow  in  good  season. 

At  this  moment  French  foreign  policy  was  very  near  to  losing 
its  bearings  altogether,  as  a  result  of  the  astonishing  victories  of 
the  republican  arms  during  the  autumn.  Dazzled  and  blinded 
by  success,  the  Girondists  were  now  talking  of  nothing  less  than  a 
general  war  on  kings,  the  deliverance  of  all  nations  from  their 
*  tyrants,'  a  universal  revolution.  Swept  along  by  the  reigning 
enthusiasm,  the  Convention  passed  the  famous  decrees  of  Novem- 
ber 19  and  December  15,1  by  which  it  declared  that  it  would 
(  accord  fraternity  and  aid  to  all  peoples  who  should  wish  to 
recover  their  freedom,'  and  laid  down  a  set  of  rules  for  the  estab- 
lishment of  liberty  and  equality  in  all  the  lands  to  which  the 
armies  of  France  might  penetrate.  Such  sonorous  resolutions 
were  fitted  to  arouse  the  hopes  of  oppressed  nations  like  the 
Poles;  but  they  were  a  reckless  and  extravagant  challenge  to  all 
monarchical  Europe,  widening  the  breach  between  France  and 
her  enemies  and  rendering  difficult  an  agreement  even  with  the 
well-disposed  monarchies.    At  any  rate,  Lebrun,  who  had  suc- 

1  Moniteur  (reimpression),  xiv,  pp.  517,  755  f. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE        449 

ceeded  Dumouriez  as  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  and  who  was  far 
from  sharing  the  Utopian  illusions  of  the  Girondists,  quietly  went 
on  with  the  old  plan  of  seeking  friends  and  building  up  a  counter- 
coalition  in  Eastern  Europe. 

From  November  to  March,  the  liberation  of  Poland  seems  to 
have  been  an  integral  part  of  Lebrun's  political  program.  The 
cardinal  feature  of  his  plans  was  an  offensive  and  defensive  al- 
liance between  France  and  Turkey,  to  which  Sweden,  Poland, 
and  perhaps  Prussia,  might  be  admitted.  If  the  Turks  could  be 
induced  to  declare  war  on  the  Imperial  Courts  and  to  invade  the 
Crimea,  the  Empress  would  be  obliged  to  evacuate  Poland;  the 
Poles  would  then  fly  to  arms  against  their  ancient  oppressors, 
while  the  Swedes  were  to  deliver  an  attack  in  the  Baltic  and  in 
Finland.  If  the  King  of  Prussia  insisted  on  remaining  in  the 
'  despotic  '  coalition  and  carrying  out  his  iniquitous  designs  on 
Poland,  he  might  be  brought  to  reason  and  forced  to  surrender  his 
usurpations  by  a  French  invasion  of  Westphalia,  combined  with  a 
Swedish  attack  on  Pomerania.  To  increase  the  Empress'  em- 
barrassments, Lebrun  hoped  to  provoke  a  revolt  of  the  Cossacks 
and  Tartars,  and  even  to  find  a  hardy  soul  "  to  repeat  Puga- 
chev's  adventure."  l  And  at  times  he  talked  of  supplementing 
all  these  measures  by  sending  French  fleets  to  the  Black  Sea  and 
the  Baltic.2  It  was  a  comprehensive  program,  quite  in  the 
style  of  the  cabinets  of  the  old  regime,  closely  resembling  Pitt's 
plans  of  1 79 1  or  the  projects  of  French  diplomacy  during  the  War 
of  the  Polish  Succession ;  it  could  hardly  have  appeared  chimeri- 
cal at  that  time,  in  view  of  the  amazing  military  successes  of 
the  last  few  months;  and  it  was  infinitely  more  practical  than 
the  contemporary  schemes  of  the  Gironde  for  revolutionizing  the 
universe. 

Lebrun's  activity  reached  its  height  about  the  end  of  Febru- 
ary and  the  beginning  of  March.     At  that  time  a  new  envoy, 

1  I.  e.,  to  set  up  as  a  pretender  to  the  Russian  throne  and  to  start  a  servile 
insurrection. 

2  For  the  above,  see  Lebrun's  instructions  to  S6monville,  probably  drawn  up 
in  November,  1792,  Grosjean,  op.  cit.,  p.  896;  the  instructions  given  to  Descorches 
in  January,  1793,  Sorcl,  L' Europe  el  la  Revolution  franqaise,  iii,  pp.  302  ff.;  Lebrun 
to  Parendier,  February  28,  and  to  Descorches,  March  4,  ibid.,  pp.  305  ff. 


45 O  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Descorches,  was  en  route  for  Constantinople  charged  to  persuade 
the  Turks  to  draw  the  sword  immediately.  Baron  de  Stael  had  at 
last  reached  Paris  (February  25),  eager  to  put  through  the  alliance 
with  Sweden,  and  fearful  only  that  Dumouriez's  victories  would 
render  the  French  indifferent  to  such  connections.1  Through  his 
agent  Parendier,  Lebrun  had  for  some  time  been  in  touch  with  the 
leading  Polish  Patriots,  the  '  men  of  the  Third  of  May,'  who 
gathered  at  Leipsic;  he  knew  of  their  plans  for  a  national  up- 
rising, encouraged  them,  and  promised  them  money.2  At  the  end 
of  January,  Kosciuszko  had  come  to  Paris  to  negotiate  for  French 
support  in  a  new  struggle  for  Polish  independence.  He  was 
authorized  by  the  leaders  of  his  party  to  give  assurance  that  in 
case  the  Patriots  regained  control  in  Poland,  they  would  abolish 
royalty,  episcopacy,  aristocracy,  and  serfdom,  and  establish 
liberty  and  equality  according  to  the  most  approved  Parisian 
standards.  These  promises  are  significant  as  showing,  not  indeed 
that  the  conservative  reformers  of  the  Third  of  May  were  turning 
into  Jacobins,  but  that  they  had  taken  at  their  face  value  the 
recent  decrees  of  the  Convention  and  that  they  were  ready  to 
accept  the  principles  laid  down  on  the  15th  of  December  in  order 
to  secure  the  aid  of  the  triumphant  Republic.  What  Kosciuszko 
chiefly  desired  was  the  landing  of  a  French  army  in  the  Crimea, 
which  in  conjunction  with  the  Turks  should  assist  in  the  liberation 
of  his  country;  after  this  had  been  accomplished  he  promised 
that  Poland  would  unite  with  France,  Sweden,  and  the  Porte  in 
the  final  struggle  against  the  league  of  crowned  despots.3  Kos- 
ciuszko had  several  conferences  with  Lebrun,  and  he  also  met 
such  prominent  personages  as  Brissot,  Vergniaud,  Barere, 
Herault,  and  Robespierre.4  "  The  French  Republic  is  actively 
occupied,"  Lebrun  wrote  to  Parendier  on  February  28,  "  with 
the  great  measures  that  may  release  this  interesting  nation 
[Poland]  from  the  odious  yoke  that  oppresses  it.  .  .  .  Courage, 
energy,  and  perseverance,  and  Poland  will  be  saved."  5 

1  Boethius,  "  Gustav  IV  Adolfs  formyndareregering  och  den  Franska  Revolu- 
tionen,"  in  Historisk  Tidskrift,  xviii,  pp.  182  ff.  2  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  305. 

3  On  the  aims  of  Kosciuszko's  mission,  cf .  Askenazy,  "  Upadek  Polski  a  Francya," 
in  Biblioteka  Warszawska,  1913,  i,  pp.  20  ff . 

4  Ibid.,  p.  23.  6  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  305. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE        45  I 

All  these  hopes  and  plans,  however,  depended  primarily  upon 
the  continued  success  of  the  French  arms,  and  in  March  a  series 
of  terrible  reverses  began:  the  failure  of  the  invasion  of  Holland, 
the  defeat  at  Neerwinden  (March  18),  the  complete  loss  of  Bel- 
gium, the  treason  of  Dumouriez  (April  5),  the  invasion  of  France 
from  all  sides,  and  the  outbreak  of  civil  war  at  home.  This  sud- 
den and  bewildering  change  in  the  situation  necessarily  produced 
momentous  changes  in  policy.  In  the  first  Committee  of  Public 
Safety  (appointed  April  6),  in  which  Danton  was  the  leading 
spirit,  the  tendency  was  to  abandon  that  system  of  cosmopolitan 
idealism,  armed  propaganda,  and  universal  revolution,  by  which 
the  Girondists  had  so  aroused  the  fears  of  sovereigns  and  the 
hopes  of  peoples,  and  instead  to  fall  back  on  a  policy  based 
exclusively  upon  the  practical  needs  and  the  material  interests  of 
France.  While  determined  to  prosecute  the  war  with  all  the  vigor 
necessary  to  defend  the  independence  and  integrity  of  the  Re- 
public, the  new  government  desired  to  make  peace  if  possible, 
and  at  least  to  diminish  the  number  of  its  enemies;  and  for  that 
purpose  it  was  ready  to  adapt  itself  to  the  methods  and  usages  of 
the  older  Europe,  without  allowing  Revolutionary  principles  to 
stand  too  much  in  the  way.1 

Danton  and  his  associates  no  longer  thought  seriously  of  doing 
anything  to  liberate  Poland.  To  undertake  the  defence  of  that 
country  would  mean  prolonging  the  war  indefinitely,  while  the 
French  people  obviously  wanted  peace.  Such  an  attempt  might 
ruin  France  without  saving  Poland.  Besides,  the  impending 
Partition  would  not  be  without  its  advantages  for  France,  since 
it  would  almost  certainly  arouse  jealousies  among  the  three 
Eastern  Powers  and  might  greatly  facilitate  peace  between 
France  and  some  of  them.  Under  the  new  government  the  idea  of 
a  separate  peace  and  an  alliance  with  Prussia  had  become  the 
cardinal  aim  of  French  policy,  and  there  was  no  surer  way  to 
conciliate  Frederick  William  than  to  assent  to  his  designs  on 
Poland.    It  is  highly  probable  that  in  the  secret  conferences  held 

1  Cf .  the  admirable  characterizations  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  first  Committee 
of  Public  Safety  in  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  380  ff.;  Aulard,  "  La  Diplomatic  du  premier 
Comite  de  Salut  Public,"  in  his  £tiidcs  et  leqons  sur  la  Revolution  franqaise,  je  serie. 


452  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

about  this  time  with  the  Prussians,  verbal  assurances  were  given 
that  France  would  not  oppose  the  Partition.1  At  any  rate,  it 
seems  clear  that  from  the  outset  the  Committee  of  Public  Safety 
was  ready,  in  case  of  a  formal  negotiation  with  Prussia,  to  offer, 
not  indeed  an  open  approval,  but  a  tacit  recognition  of  the 
Partition,  and  to  make  capital  out  of  its  acquiescence  in  what  it 
was  unable  to  prevent.2  Thus  France  prepared  to  abandon  Po- 
land just  at  the  moment  when  Russia  and  Prussia  announced  to 
the  world  the  new  Partition. 

The  rest  of  Lebrun's  plans  did  not  long  survive  the  disasters  of 
the  spring.  When  Descorches,  after  protracted  delays,  reached 
Constantinople  (June  7),  he  found  that  the  Turks  had  lost  all 
stomach  for  war,  and  that  nothing  could  tempt  them  out  of  a 
timorous  neutrality.3  With  Sweden  matters  did  for  a  time  pro- 
gress more  favorably.  On  May  17  Lebrun  signed  the  treaty  of 
defensive  alliance  which  he  had  agreed  upon  with  Baron  de  Stael, 
and  which  the  latter  then  sent  home  for  the  approval  of  his 
government.  Although  the  Regent  was  fearful  of  the  conse- 
quences of  the  adventure  and  by  no  means  inclined  to  plunge 
into  the  general  war  if  he  could  avoid  it,  still  he  was  so  badly  in 
need  of  funds  and  his  relations  with  the  Empress  had  reached  so 
acute  a  state  of  tension  that  he  would  probably  have  consented 
to  ratify  the  treaty,  providing  a  few  slight  alterations  were  made 
in  it.  But  meanwhile  Danton  and  Lebrun  had  fallen,  and  the  new 
Committee  of  Public  Safety,  appointed  July  10  (the  second  or 
'  great '  one) ,  had  no  real  desire  for  the  Swedish  alliance.  Accord- 
ing to  the  ideas  of  Robespierre,  who  was  now  the  real  head  of  the 
government,  the  proposed  treaty  was  dangerous  because  it  might 
involve  France  in  wars  in  which  she  had  no  concern;  whereas 
once  liberty  had  been  consolidated  and  the  Republic  recognized, 

1  Aulard,  op.  tit.,  p.  205. 

2  The  best  expressions  of  the  new  French  attitude  towards  Poland  are  to  be 
found  in  the  instructions  to  Descorches  of  April  20  (in  Sorel,  op.  tit.,  iii,  pp.  396 
ff.)  and  the  '  plan  de  pacification,'  drawn  up  in  the  Ministry  of  Foreign  Affairs, 
probably  early  in  May  (cf.  Sorel,  iii,  pp.  394  ff.,  and  Aulard,  op.  tit.,  pp.  205  f.). 

3  Zinkeisen's  very  inaccurate  account  of  Descorches'  negotiation  contains  the 
statement  that  the  French  envoy  actually  succeeded  in  concluding  a  secret  treaty 
of  alliance  with  the  Porte  (Gesch.  d.  osmanischen  Reiches,  vi,  pp.  872  ff.).  The 
true  history  of  the  affair  is  to  be  found  in  Aulard,  op.  tit.,  pp.  229-240. 


THE  ATTITUDE  OF  ENGLAND  AND  FRANCE        453 

the  latter  ought  never  again  to  draw  the  sword  except  to  defend 
itself  and  other  peoples  who  wished  to  shake  off  the  yoke  of 
'  tyrants.'  Through  the  fault  of  France  and  not  of  Sweden  — 
and  for  such  doctrinaire  reasons  —  the  project  of  alliance  was  pres- 
ently dropped  x  (September).  And  with  it  disappeared,  at  least 
for  the  time  being,  all  hope  of  forming  that  'League  of  the  North,' 
that  '  anti-despotic  coalition,'  which  was  the  one  combination 
that  might  have  done  something  in  1793  to  check  the  designs  of 
Catherine  and  Frederick  William  and  to  succor  prostrate  Poland. 
Under  the  second  Committee  of  Public  Safety  France  virtually 
renounced  having  a  diplomacy  or  a  foreign  policy,  save  that  pur- 
sued with  the  sword.  If  Robespierre  desired  any  foreign  connec- 
tion, it  was  only  one  with  the  Swiss  Cantons.2  Switzerland  was 
said  to  be  a  respectable  Republic:  Poland  was  not,  at  least  accord- 
ing to  Jacobin  standards. 

1  By  far  the  best  account  of  this  much-misunderstood  subject,  and  especially 
of  the  causes  for  the  failure  of  the  Swedish  alliance  project,  is  to  be  found  in  Boe- 
thius,  op.  cit.  (which  alone  is  based  upon  both  the  French  and  the  Swedish  Archives). 
Cf.  also  Rene  Petiet,  Guslave  IV  Adolphe  et  la  Revolution  francaise,  pp.  51  f. 

2  Sorel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  436. 


CHAPTER  XX 

The  Diet  of  Grodno  and  the  Consummation  of 

the  Partition 


If  no  resistance  to  the  Partition  was  to  be  expected  from  foreign 
Powers,  Poland  itself  was  quite  without  the  means  of  self-defence. 
No  nation  threatened  with  ruin  was  ever  caught  in  a  more  helpless 
and  prostrate  condition.  One  hundred  thousand  of  the  Empress' 
troops  occupied  the  entire  country,  save  those  western  palatinates 
where  the  Prussians  had  marched  in  and  taken  possession.  War- 
saw, the  hotbed  of  '  Jacobinism '  (i.  e.,  patriotic  feeling),  was 
heavily  garrisoned  with  Russians  and  encircled  by  armed  camps. 
The  Confederation  of  Targowica  had  done  whatever  it  could  to 
render  the  national  army  useless  by  splitting  it  up  into  small 
detachments,  and  scattering  them  about  the  country  in  such  a 
way  that  each  detachment  was  surrounded  by  superior  Russian 
forces;  and  the  Polish  troops  had  also  been  deliberately  deprived 
of  cannon  and  ammunition.1  The  best  men  of  the  nation,  the 
leaders  of  the  Constitutional  party,  were  in  exile.  Whatever 
government  existed  was  in  the  hands  of  a  rapacious,  blind,  and 
cowardly  crew,  equally  despised  by  the  Power  whose  interests 
they  served,  and  by  the  nation  upon  which  they  had  brought 
such  disasters.  When  the  Partition  was  announced,  the  original 
leaders  of  Targowica  hastened  to  desert  the  sinking  ship;  and 
those  who  remained  behind  at  the  head  of  the  Confederation 
were,  with  few  exceptions,  only  those  who  had  no  scruples  about 
exploiting  their  country's  ruin  for  their  private  gain,  and  who 
were  willing  to  render  whatever  services  the  Russian  ambassador 
might  require. 

In  order  that  no  kind  of  misfortune  might  be  lacking,  the  politi- 
cal crisis  was  accompanied  by  an  economic  one.    The  nation  was 

1  Korzon,  Wewnqtrzne  dzieje,  v,  p.  279. 

454 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  455 

suffering  terribly  from  the  exactions  and  depredations  of  the 
Russian  troops,  and  still  more  perhaps  from  the  lawless  operations 
of  the  Targowician  brigands,  under  whom  no  man's  rights  or 
property  were  safe,  and  who  practised  what  even  a  Russian 
ambassador  described  as  "  a  truly  Asiatic  despotism."  l  The 
crowning  blow  came  in  February,  1793,  with  the  failure  of  almost 
all  the  leading  banks,  which  ruined  a  host  of  capitalists,  reduced 
the  richest  families  to  penury,  and  completed  the  economic  pros- 
tration of  the  country.2 

With  calamities  of  all  sorts  following  thick  and  fast  upon  each 
other,  it  is  not  strange  that  while  the  announcement  of  the 
impending  Partition  aroused  vehement  indignation  and  protests, 
it  also  produced  general  consternation  and  despair.  Armed 
resistance  seemed  out  of  the  question;  the  Republic  was  ob- 
viously doomed.  Many  people  were  chiefly  anxious  to  end  the 
tragedy  as  soon  as  possible  by  quiet  submission  to  the  inevitable; 
and  some  regretted  that  the  Powers  had  not  decided  to  partition 
the  country  entirely,  and  thus  spare  the  moribund  state  the 
agonies  of  a  lingering  death.3  It  was  true  that  the  idea  of  a 
national  uprising  and  a  final  struggle  for  independence  was  al- 
ready fermenting  in  the  minds  of  the  emigres  in  Saxony  and  in 
certain  military  and  other  patriotic  circles  in  Poland.4  But  these 
projects  had  assumed  no  definite  form,  nothing  was  yet  ready, 
at  the  time  when  Catherine  set  out  to  finish  her  work  by  extorting 
the  consent  of  the  Republic  to  its  own  dismemberment. 

The  management  of  this  disagreeable  business  had  been  en- 
trusted to  Baron  Sievers,  the  new  Russian  ambassador,  who 
arrived  in  Warsaw  in  February,  1 793 ;  and  perhaps  the  Empress 
could  not  have  made  a  happier  selection.  Sievers  was  a  benevo- 
lent, elderly,  old-fashioned  gentleman,  with  a  dash  of  sentimen- 
tality, pleasant  and  tactful  manners,  a  perpetual  smile,  and  a 

1  Blum,  Sievers  Denkwiirdigkeiten,  iii,  p.  264. 

2  Cf.  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  159  ff.;  Oginski,  Memoires,  i,  pp.  235  ff. 

3  Kraszewski,  Polska  w  czasie  trzech  rozbiordw,  iii,  283;  KocrosiapoBi,  HocirijiHie 
ro^H  PiHH-IIocnoJiHTOH,  ii,  p.  276;  Oginski,  op.  cit.,  pp.  233  ff.;  Buchholtz's  re- 
ports of  March  14,  May  5  and  8,  1793,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1;  de  Cache's  reports  of 
January  23  and  February  9,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1793. 

4  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  176,  v,  p.  276;  Korzon,  KoSciuszko,  pp.  266  ff. 


456  TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

face  that  bespoke  only  candor  and  simplicity.  Behind  this 
appearance  of  patriarchal  bonhomie  there  lay  a  clear,  cool  head, 
an  inflexible  will,  an  independent  and  self-reliant  judgment,  and 
the  readiness  to  use  all  means  that  would  serve  his  purpose.  At 
bottom  he  seems  to  have  felt  not  a  little  disgust  at  his  sordid  task, 
pity  for  the  King  whose  friend  and  companion  he  had  been  forty 
years  before,  and  sympathy  for  the  nation  which  he  had  been  sent 
to  coerce  and  terrorize.  He  would  have  liked  to  avoid  violent 
measures  as  much  as  possible;  to  ameliorate  conditions  in  Poland, 
as  far  as  was  compatible  with  Russian  interests;  to  turn  the 
country  into  a  well-ordered  Russian  satrapy.  Throughout  his 
stormy  embassy,  in  the  midst  of  the  brutalities  which  he  was 
obliged  to  perform  "  with  bleeding  heart,"  as  he  wrote  to  his 
daughters,  he  consoled  himself  with  the  thought  that  he  was  doing 
a  service  to  humanity  by  transferring  millions  of  men  to  the  benefi- 
cent sway  of  the  Empress,  and  by  restoring  order,  justice,  and 
tranquillity  in  what  was  left  of  Poland.1 

Sievers'  first  task  was  to  induce  the  King  to  go  to  Grodno, 
where  by  the  Empress'  orders  the  coming  Diet  was  to  be  held  — 
far  from  the  tumults  and  excitement  of  '  Jacobin '  Warsaw. 
Although  the  ambassador  at  that  time  professed  to  know  nothing 
of  an  impending  partition  and  declared  that  the  chief  aim  of  the 
Diet  was  to  settle  definitively  the  constitution  of  the  Republic, 
still  Stanislas  could  hardly  be  in  doubt  about  what  was  in  the 
wind.  As  usual,  he  sighed,  wept,  expostulated,  ran  the  gamut 
of  the  tragic  emotions.  "  Heavens,"  he  cried  out,  "  will  they 
force  me  to  sign  my  shame,  to  subscribe  to  a  new  partition  ?  Let 
them  throw  me  into  prison,  let  them  send  me  to  Siberia,  but  I 
will  never  sign  !  "  2  But  in  spite  of  these  heroics,  the  King  had 
one  —  to  him  —  irresistible  motive  for  yielding,  a  motive  that 
was  to  make  him  the  pliant  tool  of  Russia  throughout  the  sad 
events  that  followed.  His  debts  had  now  swollen  to  over  thirty 
million  florins; 3  owing  to  the  general  failure  of  the  banks  he  could 

1  See,  e.g.,  Blum,  S^ers,  iii, pp. 84, 94,189, 241, 274.        2  Blum,op.ciL,in,p.ii4. 

3  Sievers  reported  in  February  that  the  royal  debts  amounted  to  30  millions 
(Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  60);  but  that  figure  is  almost  certainly  too  low,  since  the 
detailed  statement  drawn  up  in  September,  1793,  and  signed  by  the  King,  gave  a 
total  of  33,515,236  fl8.    See  Korzon,  Wewnqtrzne  dzieje,  iii,  pp.  89-92. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  457 

borrow  no  more;  the  state  treasury  was  almost  empty;  and  he 
was  absolutely  at  his  wit's  end  to  find  money.  In  these  straits  he 
was  ready  to  descend  once  more  to  the  depths  of  baseness  by 
becoming  the  pensioner  of  Russia  —  at  such  a  moment.  Hence 
in  his  interviews  with  Sievers  patriotic  outbursts  alternated  with 
pleas  for  the  Empress'  assistance  in  paying  his  debts,  to  which 
the  ambassador  replied  that  the  subject  of  the  royal  debts  might 
be  taken  up  at  the  close  of  the  Diet,  i.  e.,  after  the  King  had  done 
all  that  should  be  required  of  him.  Hence,  after  a  month  of 
evasion  and  petty  subterfuges,  Stanislas  consented  to  go  to 
Grodno,  and  accepted  twenty  thousand  florins  from  Sievers  for 
the  expenses  of  the  journey.1  And  hence  he  told  one  of  his  con- 
fidants at  this  time  that  he  would  assuredly  sign  the  partition 
treaty  that  was  to  be  presented  to  him,  although  in  public  he 
continued  to  declare  on  every  occasion  that  he  would  never, 
never  sign.2 

Having  thus  entrapped  the  King,  Sievers  hastened  on  ahead  to 
Grodno,  where  on  April  9  he  and  his  Prussian  colleague  Buch- 
holtz  transmitted  to  the  Generality  of  the  Confederation  the 
manifestoes  of  the  allied  Courts,  announcing  the  Partition  and 
demanding  the  convocation  of  a  Diet  to  settle  the  affair  '  amica- 
bly.' The  Generality,  whose  leading  members  had  known  very 
well  in  advance  what  was  coming,  protested  pro  forma;  but  they 
had  no  more  desire  than  the  King  to  court  the  martyr's  crown  by 
indiscreet  resistance  to  Russia.  They  hesitated,  however,  to 
assume  the  odium  of  summoning  a  Diet,  the  outcome  of  which  was 
only  too  clearly  to  be  foreseen.  They  assured  Sievers  that  they 
were  precluded  from  sending  out  the  '  universals  '  (i.  e.,  the 
letters  of  convocation)  by  the  oath  of  the  Confederation,  which 
bound  them  to  defend  the  integrity  of  the  Republic.  Still,  as  they 
were  men  of  resource,  they  found  a  way  around  this  difficulty  by 
an  ingenious  device.  They  restored  the  Permanent  Council  (an 
institution  established  by  Russia  in  1775,  and  abolished  by  the 
Four  Years'  Diet),  and  entrusted  that  body  with  the  ignominious 

1  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  114,  130  f.,  186. 

2  Blum,  iii,  pp.  131  f.;   Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  309. 


458  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

duty  in  question.1  The  revived  Council  was  packed  with  Sievers' 
creatures,  whom  even  the  Russian  general  Igelstrom  described  as 
"  men  of  the  worst  character,  gamblers,  crooks,  and  brigands."  2 
Its  first  act  was  to  issue  the  universals  for  the  Diet,  which  the 
King  was  forced  to  sign  —  as  a  gratuitous  humiliation  —  on  the 
3rd  of  May. 

The  elections  were  planned  by  the  ambassador  with  great  care, 
and  with  all  the  savoir  faire  which  a  long  experience  in  Poland  had 
taught  the  Russians.  Sievers  gathered  around  him  at  Grodno  an 
unofficial  committee  of  his  Polish  '  friends,'  with  whom  he  settled 
the  details  of  the  campaign,  the  list  of  the  deputies  to  be  elected, 
and  the  instructions  to  be  given  them.  Electioneering  agents, 
mostly  Poles,  were  appointed  to  manage  each  Dietine;  Russian 
troops  were  to  be  everywhere  on  hand  to  overawe  opposition;  and 
no  means  of  persuasion,  bribery,  or  coercion  were  to  be  neglected. 
The  ever-complaisant  Generality  assisted  as  much  as  it  could  by 
issuing  a  couple  of  sancita  (decrees),  which  excluded  from  voting 
or  from  being  elected  all  those  who  had  not '  renounced  '  the  Four 
Years'  Diet;  those  who  had  participated  in  the  establishment  of 
the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May;  those  who  had  not  joined 
the  Confederation  of  Targowica;  and  those  who,  having  joined 
that  Confederation,  had  presumed  to  protest  against  any  of  its 
decisions.3 

After  such  comprehensive  preparations  and  in  view  of  the  utter 
depression  of  the  nation,  it  is  not  surprising  that  the  elections 
passed  off  quietly  and  smoothly.  In  1773,  at  the  time  of  the 
First  Partition,  patriots  had  tried  to  protest  by  preventing  the 
election  of  deputies,  and  at  least  half  of  the  Dietines  had  been 
'  exploded ' ; 4  but  on  this  occasion  most  of  the  better  citizens 
simply  stayed  away  from  assemblies  where  their  presence  could 
do  no  good,  and  where  they  were  exposed  to  every  kind  of  insult 
and  violence.    In  many  cases  those  from  whom  opposition  was 

1  That  this  solution  of  the  problem  emanated  from  the  Poles  themselves  (Bishop 
Kossakowski  and  others)  and  not  from  Sievers,  appears  from  Buchholtz's  report  of 
April  n,  B.  A.,  R.  19,  27,  1. 

2  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  206. 

3  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  236. 

4  Over  thirty  Dietines  (out  of  a  total  of  about  sixty),  Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  92. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  459 

feared,  were  driven  away  from  the  Dietines  by  the  Russian  troops 
or  forcibly  confined  in  their  homes.  In  the  assemblies  thus  effect- 
ually '  purified,'  the  crowds  of  poor  szlachta,  bought  up  at  ten, 
twenty,  or  thirty  florins  a  head,  acclaimed  without  debate  the 
deputies  nominated  by  the  Russian  agents,  and  the  instructions 
approved  by  the  Russian  ambassador,  and  then  adjourned  to  the 
customary  Gargantuan  banquet,  to  drink  the  health  of  the  Em- 
press and  the  King  amid  the  thunder  of  Russian  cannon.1 

Sievers  was  delighted  with  the  outcome.  Writing  to  congratu- 
late the  Empress  on  "  the  complete  success  of  the  Dietines,"  he 
assured  her:  "  Never  has  a  Diet  cost  so  little  as  this  one,  and  there 
never  was  one  that  did  so  much  in  fourteen  days  as  I  shall  do, 
sick  though  I  am.    The  one  of  1772  lasted  three  years."  2 

Soon  afterward  the  ambassador  received  two  highly  signifi- 
cant rescripts  in  which  Catherine  outlined  her  plans  for  the  Diet. 
In  accordance  with  the  procedure  followed  at  the  First  Partition, 
he  was  ordered  to  demand  at  the  outset  the  appointment  of  a 
committee  or  '  delegation,'  with  full  powers  both  to  negotiate 
with  the  two  allied  Courts  (with  Russia  first)  on  the  basis  of  their 
declarations  of  April  9,  and  to  conclude  the  required  treaties  of 
cession.  In  this  negotiation  the  ambassador  was  directed  to 
make  common  cause  with  his  Prussian  colleague.3  But  the  extor- 
tion of  the  territories  in  question  was  only  the  first  part  of  Cathe- 
rine's program;  the  second  half  of  it  reveals  the  fact  that  her 
ambition  was  still  unsatisfied,  and  that  she  was  firmly  determined 
to  rivet  her  chains  upon  what  was  left  of  the  unhappy  Republic. 
For,  as  the  rescript  proceeds  to  suggest,  Poland,  in  the  condition 
to  which  it  would  be  reduced  by  the  Second  Partition,  could  no 
longer  exist  as  an  independent  state;   the  Empress  would  have 

1  For  general  accounts  of  the  Dietines  of  1793,  see,  HiOBaficKift,  Ceihrtrpofl- 
HencKw,  pp.  59  ff.;  KocroMapoBi,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  271  ff.;  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp. 
232  ff.;  Morawski,  Dzieje  narodu  polskiego,  v,  pp.  352  f.;  Kraszewski,  op.  cit., 
iii,  pp.  299  f. 

Ilovaiski  gives  an  interesting  description  of  the  Dietine  of  Lublin  and  the 
instructions  drawn  up  for  the  deputies  of  the  palatinate  of  Troki;  but  for  the  most 
part  we  sadly  lack  detailed  knowledge  of  the  course  of  these  last  Dietines  of  the 
Republic. 

2  Letter  to  the  Empress  of  May  21/June  1,  1793,  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  255  f. 

3  Rescript  of  May  24/June  4,  M.  A.,  Hojituia,  III,  70. 


460  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

been  glad  to  annex  the  whole  country,  but  felt  unable  to  do  so  at 
that  moment  in  view  of  the  jealousy  of  the  neighboring  Powers; 
and  she  had,  therefore,  resolved  to  attain  her  essential  aim  by 
concluding  with  the  Republic  an  alliance  of  so  close  and  intimate  a 
nature  as  to  render  the  two  nations  henceforth  one  and  insepar- 
able. Sievers  was  instructed  to  arrange  matters  so  that  the  pro- 
posal for  this  alliance  should  seem  to  come  spontaneously  from 
the  Poles.  He  was  also  to  take  pains  to  secure  for  himself  a  de- 
cisive influence  in  the  settlement  of  the  Polish  constitution,  and  in 
general  it  was  made  clear  that  however  powerless  and  innocuous 
the  Republic  might  have  become,  the  Empress  did  not  intend  to 
allow  it  a  shadow  of  liberty.  But  in  these  ulterior  arrangements, 
the  Court  of  Berlin  was  to  have  no  voice  whatever.  Once  the 
treaties  of  cession  had  been  disposed  of,  Sievers  and  Buchholtz 
were  to  part  company;  the  Prussians  were  to  be  given  to  under- 
stand that  their  role  was  played  out,  and  they  were  henceforth 
to  be  excluded  from  all  participation  in  Polish  affairs.  Lumi- 
nously summing  up  her  policy  of  that  period  in  a  single  sentence, 
Catherine  declared:  "  We  must  profit  by  the  preoccupations  of 
our  neighbors  in  order  to  arrange  all  our  affairs  with  the  Republic 
on  a  solid  and  stable  basis."  1 

Thus,  according  to  the  Empress'  will,  the  coming  Diet  was 
doomed  not  only  to  cede  away  more  than  half  of  the  national 
territory,  but  also  to  sign  a  bond  of  servitude,  surrendering  what 
remained  of  the  Republic  to  the  guardianship  and  the  scarcely- 
disguised  domination  of  Russia. 

II 

The  Diet  which  met  at  Grodno  on  June  17,  1793,  was  the  last 
and  stormiest  one  in  the  history  of  the  Republic.  The  terrible 
position  in  which  this  assembly  was  placed,  the  unparalleled  acts 
of  violence  to  which  it  was  subjected,  the  eloquent  and  pathetic 
language  in  which  it  poured  forth  its  sufferings  to  the  world 
almost  suffice  to  invest  it  with  the  dignity  of  tragedy;  but  when 
one  considers  the  shameless  venality  shown  by  so  many  of  its 

1  Rescript  of  May  26/June  6,  M.  A.,  Hoabma,  III,  70  (printed  in  Appendix 
XVIII). 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  46 1 

members,  the  contrast  between  their  flaming  speeches  in  public 
and  their  private  bargains  with  the  Russian  ambassador,  the 
frivolity  and  the  passion  for  amusement  that  marked  the  social 
life  at  Grodno  even  at  such  a  moment,  one  is  tempted  to  regard 
the  whole  episode  as  only  an  unholy  and  disgraceful  farce. 

The  great  majority  of  the  deputies  had  been  chosen  at  the 
dictation  of  Russian  agents  and  under  circumstances  that  made  it 
very  difficult  for  honest  men  to  be  elected.  The  Austrian  charge 
d'affaires  declared  that  most  of  them  were  "  men  without  prop- 
erty or  influence  or  decent  reputations,  who  could  be  expected 
to  render  blind  obedience  and  to  look  out  only  for  their  personal 
interests."  l  The  public  from  the  first  derided  them  as  '  hired 
land-ceders.' 2  The  leaders  of  the  assembly  —  the  Hetman 
Kossakowski;  his  brother,  the  Bishop  of  Livonia;  Pulaski  and 
Zabiello,  the  two  Marshals  of  the  Confederation;  Bielifiski,  the 
Marshal  of  the  Diet;  Ozarowski  and  the  rest — were  the  men  who 
had  managed  the  Dietines  for  Russia,  and  who  throughout  the 
Diet  continued  to  draw  the  largest  sums  from  the  caisse  de  seduc- 
tion maintained  by  the  Russian  and  Prussian  ministers  in  com- 
mon. At  least  seventeen  other  deputies  enjoyed  regular  pensions 
from  the  same  source;  while  a  still  larger  number  of  incon- 
spicuous and  impecunious  members  —  how  many  it  is  difficult 
to  say  —  appear  to  have  sold  themselves  for  modest  sums  at  the 
time  of  their  election,  and  to  have  received  occasional  gratuities 
later  on.  The  ambassador  furnished  many  of  them  with  board, 
lodging,  and  carriages,  and  his  own  table  was  constantly  thronged 
by  crowds  of  hungry  hirelings.  In  short,  it  may  safely  be  as- 
serted that  from  one  half  to  two  thirds  of  the  members  of  this 
assembly  were  under  financial  obligations  to  the  Powers  whose 
demands  it  was  their  bounden  duty  and  their  loudly  professed 
intention  to  resist.  One  will  judge  them  less  harshly,  however, 
if  one  remembers  that  the  King  himself  was  foremost  in  setting 
an  evil  example;  for  it  is  certain  that  in  the  course  of  the  Diet 
Stanislas  accepted  not  less  than  thirty-five  thousand  ducats  from 
the  Russian  ambassador.3 

1  De  Cache's  report  of  June  7,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1793. 

2  De  Cache's  report  of  June  23  ("  vermiethete  Landabgeber  "),  V.  A.,  loc.  cit. 

3  On  the  corruption  practised  at  the  Grodno  Diet  and  the  preceding  Dietines: 


462  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

In  view  of  these  facts,  it  is  all  the  more  surprising  that  this 
assembly  should  have  offered  so  violent  and  protracted  a  resis- 
tance to  the  demands  of  the  partitioning  Powers;  a  resistance 
that  astonished  Europe,  confounded  all  the  prophets,  and  forced 
Sievers  to  take,  not  two  weeks,  as  he  had  originally  expected,  but 
three  months,  to  put  through  his  treaties.  A  partial  explanation  is 
doubtless  to  be  found  in  the  natural  desire  of  the  venal  majority 
to  save  their  faces  before  their  own  fellow-countrymen.  In  order 
to  avoid  the  appearance  of  too  gross  collusion  with  the  foreigners, 
it  was  necessary  to  make  a  brave  show  of  resistance.  Besides, 
even  these  men  may  not  have  been  without  some  remnant  of 
patriotism;  and  at  least  they  possessed  the  national  talent  for 
oratory  and  the  sense  of  what  the  dramatic  proprieties  demanded. 
If  they  were  to  consummate  the  dismemberment  of  Poland,  they 
would  do  it  in  the  grand  manner:  with  floods  of  eloquence,  with 
passionate  protests,  with  sighs  and  tears,  with  all  the  appear- 
ances of  yielding  only  to  brute  force,  with  appeals  to  the  civilized 
world  and  to  posterity. 

It  is  also  clear  that  Sievers'  plans  were  often  crossed  by  intrigues 
emanating,  one  might  say,  from  those  of  his  own  household. 
Among  all  the  Polish  satellites  of  Russia,  none  were  warmer  in 
their  professions  of  devotion  than  the  Kossakowskis;  and 
doubtless  that  powerful  family  was  loyal  enough  as  long  as  Russia 
allowed  them  to  exercise  the  monstrous  tyranny  which  they  had 
set  up  in  Lithuania  in  the  name  of  the  Confederation.  But  when 
Sievers,  indignant  at  their  proceedings,  attempted  to  put  a  stop  to 
them  and  also  threatened  to  dissolve  the  Confederation,  the 
Kossakowskis  passed  into  secret  but  none  the  less  active  and 
insidious  opposition  to  him.  The  family  was  not  an  enemy  to  be 
despised;  for  they  controlled  almost  all  the  sixty  deputies  of 
Lithuania,  and  they  had  powerful  Russian  backers,  notably 
General  Igelstrom  *  at  Warsaw  and  the  favorite  Zubov  at  St. 
Petersburg.    Their  great  aim,  apparently,  was  to  effect  the  dis- 

Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  102  f.,  236  f.,  252,  254  ff.,  iv,  pp.  29-35;  Buchholtz's  reports 
of  February  15,  March  6,  May  12,  15,  20,  July  10,  14,  18,  August  3,  September  17, 
B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1;  KocroMapoBt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  272  ff.;  HjiOBaficiufi,  op.  cit., 
pp. 59  ff. 

1  Commander-in-chief  of  the  Empress'  forces  in  Poland. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  463 

ruption  of  the  Diet,  in  order  that  the  Confederation  of  Targowica 
might  remain  the  sole  authority  in  the  Republic,  and  that  they 
themselves  might  continue  to  work  their  evil  will  in  Lithuania. 
Apart  from  that,  they  seem  to  have  tried  to  create  as  many 
difficulties  as  possible  for  Sievers,  with  the  aid  of  their  deputies 
and  their  Russian  friends;  and  it  may  be  noted  in  passing  that 
at  the  close  of  the  Diet,  by  a  particularly  subtle  stratagem,  they 
succeeded  in  bringing  about  his  recall  in  disgrace.1 

The  most  determined  opposition,  however,  came  from  the  small 
group  of  patriots  who  were  known  at  Grodno  as  the  party  of  '  the 
Zealots.'  In  spite  of  all  the  precautions  and  rigors  employed  at 
the  Dietines,  a  few  bold  and  incorruptible  citizens  had  managed 
to  get  elected,  chiefly  in  the  palatinates  of  Mazovia  and  Plock, 
and  had  come  to  the  Diet  with  the  sole  purpose  of  putting  up  a 
desperate  resistance  to  the  Partition.  They  numbered  only  about 
twenty-five,  out  of  a  total  of  one  hundred  and  forty  deputies;  but 
they  were  to  play  a  role  quite  disproportionate  to  their  numbers. 
They  can  hardly  have  expected  to  be  able  to  thwart  the  Partition, 
and  they  could  offer  no  concrete  plan  for  doing  so;  their  one  hope 
lay  in  delaying  matters  until  some  lucky  accident,  some  change 
in  the  European  situation,  might  intervene  to  save  them.  At  any 
rate,  they  insisted  on  fighting  to  the  last  ditch;  they  indignantly 
repudiated  the  favorite  argument  of  the  majority  that  by  con- 
senting to  the  Partition  the  integrity  and  independence  of  what 
was  left  of  Poland  might  at  least  be  assured;  their  watchword 
was:  '  If  we  must  perish,  let  us  perish  with  honor,  not  with 
shame.'  Constantly  in  the  forefront  of  the  battle,  inexhaustible 
in  devices  for  delaying  and  obstructing,  eloquent,  indefatigable, 
and  irrepressible,  they  succeeded  in  making  endless  trouble  for 
Sievers  and  Buchholtz;  they  staved  off  the  inevitable  surrender 
far  longer  than  anyone  had  anticipated ;  and  they  saved  this  Diet 
from  complete  ignominy  by  proving  that  there  were  still  brave 
men  and  honest  men  in  Poland. 

The  turbulent  temper  and  the  probable  course  of  this  assembly 
were  sufficiently  revealed  by  the  opening  sessions.    First  of  all, 

1  On  the  relations  between  Sievers  and  the  Kossakowski  clique  and  Zubov,  cf. 
Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  31  ff.,  215  ff.,  261  ff.,  270,  290  ff.,  358  ff.,  444  ff.;  iv,  pp.  22, 
24  ff.,  28,  136. 


464  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

the  ambassador  put  through,  without  difficulty,  the  election  of 
Stanislas  Bielifiski,  a  ruined  gambler  and  a  notorious  hireling  of 
Russia,  as  Marshal  (i.  e.,  president).  Immediately  afterward, 
however,  the  deputies  fell  to  quarreling  over  the  oath  to  be  taken 
by  the  Marshal,  and  two  days  were  spent  in  tumultuous  and 
fruitless  wrangling.  It  would  seem  that  the  Kossakowski  party, 
the  Zealots,  and  the  King's  friends  united  in  provoking  and  pro- 
longing this  dispute  in  the  hope  of  disrupting  the  assembly;  for, 
according  to  custom,  if  a  Diet  were  not  constituted  within  three 
days  after  meeting,  it  was  considered  dissolved.  Seeing  through 
this  intrigue,  Sievers  promptly  intervened  and  arrested  five  of 
the  disturbers.  Thereupon  the  majority  calmed  down;  the 
Marshal  was  allowed  to  take  the  oath,  and  the  assembly  was 
duly  organized  as  a  Confederated  Diet  (under  the  '  bond  '  of  the 
Confederation  of  Targowica),  with  the  Senate  and  Chamber  of 
Deputies  sitting  together  and  the  operation  of  the  Liberum  Veto 
suspended. 

The  next  day  (June  20)  Sievers  and  Buchholtz  presented 
identical  notes  demanding  the  appointment  of  a  delegation  fully 
empowered  to  negotiate  and  conclude  treaties  with  them  on  the 
basis  of  their  declarations  of  April  9.  After  the  reading  of  these 
notes  before  the  Diet,  the  King  arose  and  made  the  brave-sound- 
ing declaration:  "  I  acceded  to  the  General  Confederation 
guaranteed  by  the  Empress  only  because  its  Act  assured  me  of  the 
integrity  and  independence  of  the  Republic.  I  cannot  free  myself 
from  the  obligations  incurred  by  my  adhesion  to  the  Confedera- 
tion, and  I  have  resolved  under  no  conditions  to  sign  any  treaty 
whatsoever  which  has  for  its  aim  to  deprive  the  Republic  of  even 
the  smallest  part  of  its  possessions.  I  hope  that  the  members  of 
the  Diet,  bound  by  the  same  oath,  will  follow  my  example."  He 
proposed  that  the  Estates  reply  to  these  notes  in  moderate  lan- 
guage requesting  that  the  two  Courts  should  restore  to  the 
Republic  the  lands  they  had  taken,  as  the  Polish  nation  had  given 
no  excuse  for  their  seizure.1  Although  probably  no  one  imagined 
that  the  King  would  stand  by  the  firm  resolution  thus  announced 
—  who  could  forget  how  often  he  had  sworn  to  die  for  the  Con- 

1  KocTOMapoBt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  281. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  465 

stitution  of  the  Third  of  May  ?  —  still  his  speech  was  received 
with  loud  applause;  the  Diet  appeared  to  be  entirely  a  unit,  and 
responses  in  accordance  with  his  suggestions  were  sent  to  the  two 
foreign  ministers. 

Sievers  and  Buchholtz  at  once  reiterated  their  demand  in  more 
emphatic  form.  They  had  anticipated  some  initial  ebullitions  of 
Polish  patriotism,  but  they  were  by  no  means  prepared  for  the 
storm  of  violent  and  impassioned  oratory  that  marked  the  ses- 
sions of  the  next  three  days  (June  24-26).  Unfortunately,  it  soon 
became  apparent  how  illusory  had  been  the  semblance  of  unanim- 
ity at  the  outset.  Although  the  Zealots  demanded  that  the 
Diet  should  resolve  never  to  consent  to  a  partition  or  even  to 
appoint  a  delegation  to  treat  with  the  two  Powers,  although  the 
King  exhorted  the  deputies  to  arm  themselves  with  manly  cour- 
age, the  out-and-out  partisans  of  Russia  were  already  beginning 
to  urge  the  necessity  of  giving  way  in  order  to  save  what  remained 
of  the  fatherland,  and  the  Kossakowskis  offered  a  compromise 
proposal,  which  was  to  negotiate  with  Russia  but  not  at  all  with 
the  Court  of  Berlin.  This  latter  suggestion  had  much  to  com- 
mend it  to  the  majority.  If  there  was  any  feeling  common  to  all 
Poles  at  that  moment,  it  was  bitter  hatred  towards  the  perfidious 
and  perjured  Frederick  William.  On  the  other  hand,  their 
sentiments  towards  Russia  were  moderated  by  the  reflection  that 
after  all  Catherine  had  had  some  grounds  for  complaint  against 
them,  and  that  her  friendship  and  protection  could  best  guarantee 
the  Republic  a  tranquil  existence  in  the  future.  The  Kossakow- 
skis and  their  partisans  talked  of  establishing  some  kind  of  organic 
connection  between  Poland  and  Russia,  like  the  union  between 
Poland  and  Lithuania,  apparently  with  the  idea  that  by  nattering 
the  Empress  with  such  projects  they  could  induce  her  to  renounce 
the  thought  of  a  partition.  Or,  in  case  it  was  necessary  to  satisfy 
her  demands  for  territory,  might  it  not  be  hoped  that  she  would 
then  turn  round  and  protect  the  Republic  against  the  demands  of 
Prussia  ?  Acting  upon  such  calculations,  on  June  26  the  Diet 
voted,  on  the  one  hand  to  appeal  to  the  foreign  Powers  to  use 
their  influence  with  the  Courts  of  St.  Petersburg  and  Berlin  on 
behalf  of  Poland  —  an  appeal  which  proved  perfectly  fruitless  — 


466  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

and  on  the  other  hand  to  appoint  a  deputation  to  negotiate  with 
Russia  and  with  Russia  alone. 

This  attempt  to  separate  the  interests  of  the  partitioning  Powers 
and  to  play  off  one  against  the  other  placed  Sievers  in  a  rather 
embarrassing  position.  Though  alarmed  at  the  unforeseen  course 
that  the  Diet  was  taking,  convinced  that  the  King  was  playing 
him  false,  and  suspicious  that  the  recent  decision  was  only  a  trick 
intended  to  gain  time  and  embroil  the  situation,  still  the  ambassa- 
dor could  not  fail  to  be  gratified  by  the  marked  preference  shown 
to  his  Court,  and  somewhat  tempted  by  the  professed  desire  of  the 
Kossakowski  party  for  a  union  with  Russia.  Reporting  to  the 
Empress  his  conversations  with  the  Bishop  of  Livonia,  he  inti- 
mated that  it  would  not  be  difficult  to  bring  about  the  voluntary 
submission  of  Lithuania,  or  indeed  of  all  Poland.  Should  he  not 
at  least  attempt  to  buy  from  the  Republic  the  overlordship  over 
Courland  ?  From  many  indications  it  appears  that  both  then 
and  later  he  inclined  to  bolder  and  more  ambitious  projects  than 
had  originally  been  contemplated,  and  that  he  would  have  pre- 
ferred not  to  be  satisfied  with  taking  merely  the  half  of  Poland 
when  it  would  be  so  easy  to  take  the  whole  of  it.1  Catherine,  how- 
ever, was  not  to  be  seduced  into  so  radical  and  dangerous  a 
change  of  system.  She  ordered  her  ambassador  to  hold  to  the 
plan  of  action  originally  prescribed;  not  to  raise  the  question  of 
the  suzerainty  of  Courland  now;  to  let  the  Lithuanians  alone, 
and  to  prevent  any  premature  and  indiscreet  movement  in  favor 
of  a  union.2 

Meanwhile  the  Diet  continued  its  dilatory  tactics,  amid  fre- 
quent scenes  of  uproarious  disorder  and  constant  demonstrations 
of  a  wayward  and  refractory  temper.  The  notes  sent  in  by 
Sievers  and  Buchholtz  on  June  28,  protesting  against  the  attempt 
to  separate  the  two  Courts  and  demanding  that  the  Deputation 
be  authorized  to  treat  with  Prussia,  remained  without  effect. 

1  Regarding  Sievers'  attitude  towards  the  proposed  union,  cf .  his  letter  to 
Zubov  of  April  17,  and  his  reports  to  the  Empress  of  June  23,  26,  July  4,  August  13, 
Blum,  op.  cit.,  Hi,  pp.  186,  281  ft,  290,  337;  as  to  Courland,  his  reports  of  May  14, 
25,  June  23,  ibid.,  iii,  pp.  239  f.,  281. 

2  Rescripts  to  Sievers  of  June  15/26  and  June  23/July  4,  M.  A.,  noa&nia,  III, 
70.    The  latter  rescript  is  printed  in  Appendix  XVIII,  2. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  467 

Even  the  preparations  for  a  negotiation  with  Russia  advanced  at 
only  a  snail's  pace.  The  Diet  could  not  be  driven  forward  a  step 
without  continual  resorts  to  coercion.  Sievers  began  by  seques- 
trating the  King's  revenues  —  a  measure  which  promptly  broke 
down  what  slight  powers  of  resistance  Stanislas  possessed,  and 
made  him  throughout  the  rest  of  the  Diet  the  docile  instrument  of 
Russia.  Later  the  ambassador  temporarily  arrested  seven 
deputies  of  the  opposition  by  way  of  making  an  example; 1  he 
deported  two  others  from  Grodno,  heavily  reinforced  the  Russian 
troops  in  and  about  the  city,  and  sequestrated  the  estates  of 
Count  Tyszkiewicz;  finally,  in  one  fulminating  note  after  the 
other  he  threatened  the  assembly  and  the  country  with  the  direst 
disasters,  unless  his  demands  were  immediately  satisfied.  Even 
these  severities  generally  resulted  in  extorting  only  half-conces- 
sions. The  ambassador  was  unable  to  procure  for  the  Deputation 
either  the  instructions  or  the  full  powers  he  desired,  or  to  get  it 
chosen  by  the  method  he  preferred,  or  to  fill  it  entirely  with  his 
creatures  as  he  had  planned.  In  fact,  in  appointing  this  com- 
mittee (on  July  11),  the  Poles  still  pretended  that  they  were 
consenting  to  a  negotiation,  not  about  cessions  of  territory,  but 
about  a  treaty  of  commerce  and  the  '  perpetual  alliance  '  which 
the  Deputation  was  authorized  to  offer  to  the  Empress.2  At  all 
events,  Sievers  was  satisfied  to  have  secured  any  deputation  at 
all,  and  he  intended  to  pay  no  attention  to  the  limited  powers  or 
the  futile  instructions  it  might  have  received. 

The  '  negotiation  '  with  this  committee  was  a  pure  farce.  At 
the  first  meeting  (July  13),  the  ambassador  presented  the  ready- 

1  It  is  characteristic  of  the  diversity  of  statements  in  the  historical  works  dealing 
with  the  Grodno  Diet  that  the  number  of  deputies  arrested  on  July  2  is  given  as 
5,  7,  9,  12,  or  16  by  different  writers.  In  fixing  the  number  at  7,  I  am  following 
Buchholtz's  report  of  July  4,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1. 

2  The  original  draft  of  the  instruction  to  the  Deputation  had  spoken  of  proposing 
to  the  Empress  so  close  an  alliance  that  "  Poland  and  Russia  should  in  future  be 
considered  as  one  indissoluble  body."  This  draft  probably  emanated  from  the 
Kossakowskis.  The  Zealots  had  raised  so  strong  an  opposition  to  this  '  incorpora- 
tion '  of  Poland  with  Russia  that  in  the  final  draft  all  suggestion  of  an  organic  con- 
nection between  the  two  states  had  been  abandoned.  Possibly  the  Kossakowskis 
had  also  learned  from  St.  Petersburg  that  the  Empress  did  not  approve  of  their 
projects  for  a  union.    Cf.  KocroMapoBt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  293  ff. 


468  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

made  draft  of  a  treaty  by  which  the  Republic  was  to  cede  to  the 
Empress  the  lands  she  demanded;  he  added  that  no  changes  or 
additions  would  be  allowed,  and  begged  the  Deputation  to  report 
at  once  to  the  Diet.  The  Polish  counter-proposals  were  scarcely 
honored  with  a  moment's  consideration. 

On  July  15  the  Deputation  reported  to  the  Diet;  the  draft 
presented  by  Sievers  was  read,  and  also  a  note  from  the  ambassa- 
dor demanding  that  the  Deputation  be  authorized  to  conclude 
the  treaty  at  once  as  the  only  means  of  saving  the  country.  The 
crisis  had  now  arrived,  and  it  was  time  for  this  assembly  to  show 
its  mettle.  That  day  and  the  following  no  decision  was  reached, 
but  amid  the  general  flood  of  patriotic  declamation  one  deputy  in 
the  pay  of  Russia,  Lobarzewski,  had  the  temerity  to  present  a 
motion  in  favor  of  yielding  to  the  demands  of  the  ambassador. 
Sievers,  growing  impatient,  sent  in  a  new  note  (on  the  16th), 
threatening  that  if  by  the  close  of  the  next  day  the  Diet  had  not 
granted  the  Deputation  full  powers  to  sign  the  treaty,  he  would 
regard  it  as  a  refusal  to  treat  and  as  a  hostile  declaration;  and  the 
Russian  troops  would  then  do  military  execution  on  the  estates 
of  those  members  of  the  assembly  who  should  be  found  opposing 
"  the  general  will  of  honest  people  and  of  the  nation."  l  The 
King,  the  Kossakowskis,  and  other  dependents  of  Russia  were 
warned  that  they  would  be  held  responsible  for  everything  that 
might  follow. 

The  17th,  then,  was  to  be  the  decisive  day.  At  the  opening 
of  the  session,  the  King  delivered  a  moving  but  rather  ambigu- 
ous speech,2  the  general  tendency  of  which  was  to  counsel  sub- 
mission to  the  inevitable.  But  thereupon  the  Zealots  broke 
loose,  and  for  hours  this  handful  of  strong-lunged  patriots  over- 
awed a  majority  already  determined  to  yield  but  still  afraid  to 
say  so.  One  deputy,  Galezowski,  proposed  replying  to  Sievers 
that  the  Polish  nation  calmly  awaited  the  execution  of  his  threats, 
as  the  Roman  Senate  awaited  the  Gauls.3  Karski  declared  that 
if  there  were  in  the  chamber  anyone  who  would  sign  this  treaty, 

1  This  note  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  Reciml  des  Traites,  pp.  314  ff. 

2  The  text  in  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  316  f. 

3  KocTOMapoBt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  314. 


TEE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  469 

he  would  be  the  first  to  set  an  example  of  how  to  deal  with 
traitors.1  Mikorski  cried  out,  "  Better  for  us  to  perish  with  honor 
than  to  crown  ourselves  with  eternal  infamy  in  the  lying  hope  of 
saving  the  remainder  of  the  country."  2  Kimbar  reproached  the 
King  for  all  his  past  mistakes  and  adjured  him  to  efface  their 
memory  by  giving  one  immortal  example  of  heroism  now.  "  They 
threaten  us  with  Siberia,"  he  added.  "  Let  us  go  to  Siberia  then! 
It  will  not  be  without  charms  for  us;  its  deserts  will  be  our 
Elysian  Fields,  for  everything  .  .  .  will  remind  us  of  our  virtue, 
our  devotion  to  our  country.  .  .  .  Yes,  let  them  send  us  to 
Siberia.  Sire,  lead  us  thither!  "  3  The  Diet,  quick  to  catch  fire, 
joined  in  the  cry,  "  Yes,  to  Siberia!    To  Siberia!  " 

As  the  assembly  was  reaching  a  dangerous  pitch  of  exaltation 
and  he  himself  had  been  personally  attacked,  the  King  spoke 
again,  exerting  all  his  undeniable  eloquence  to  justify  himself 
and  to  moderate  the  chamber.  He  praised  the  patriotism  of  those 
who  feared  neither  prison  nor  desert  nor  death,  but  would  such 
personal  self-sacrifice  save  the  country  ?  Since  they  could  do 
nothing  for  those  compatriots  who  had  already  passed  under  a 
foreign  domination,  their  duty  was  to  their  remaining  country- 
men whom  they  still  might  save.  It  would  be  folly  to  say  to 
Russia:  '  Destroy,  enslave  three  and  a  half  million  more  of  Poles, 
whose  representatives  we  are;  we  will  it,  because  you  have 
already  made  yourself  master  of  fcur  millions  of  our  brothers.' 
He  pictured  the  horrible  state  of  the  country  in  case  the  am- 
bassador were  driven  to  fulfil  his  threats:  devastation,  famine, 
pestilence,  and  universal  misery.  The  Diet  had  already  done 
all  that  was  possible  to  save  the  brothers  wrenched  away  from 
them,  and  now  it  was  necessary  to  renounce  further  resistance, 
which  would  not  only  be  perfectly  fruitless  but  would  plunge 
what  was  left  of  the  state  into  the  most  terrible  disasters.4 

The  King's  speech  made  an  obvious  impression  upon  the  assem- 
bly. Taking  advantage  of  this,  the  partisans  of  Russia  came 
forward  more  boldly  in  favor  of  the  Lobarzewski  motion  of  the 

1  Ibid.  2  ILiOBafi cium,  op.  cit.,  p.  no. 

3  This  speech  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  317  fL;  cf.  ILiOBafiCKift,  p.  in. 

4  This  speech  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  319-322. 


470  TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

preceding  day.  Bishop  Kossakowski  assured  the  Diet  that  their 
patriotic  declarations  alone  would  suffice  to  justify  them  in  the 
eyes  of  Europe  and  of  posterity;  he  advised  signing  the  treaty, 
and  added  that  by  yielding  to  Russia,  the  Poles  might  hope  that 
the  Empress  would  protect  them  against  the  Court  of  Berlin.1 

As  midnight  approached,  the  Marshal  Bielinski  declared  that 
it  had  been  sufficiently  shown  how  indispensable  it  was  to  resort 
to  the  one  means  of  saving  the  rest  of  the  country.  He  directed 
the  secretary  to  read  the  Lobarzewski  motion,  in  spite  of  the 
desperate  efforts  of  the  Zealots  to  prevent  it  by  cries  and  protests. 
The  vote  was  taken,  and  with  only  twenty  dissenting  voices  2  it 
was  resolved  to  authorize  the  Deputation  to  sign  the  treaty.  By 
way  of  justification  for  this  surrender,  the  instruction  to  the 
Deputation  recited  that  since  the  members  of  the  Diet  found 
themselves  under  threat  of  violence,  left  only  to  their  own 
resources,  without  any  hope  of  outside  aid,  with  but  few  troops 
and  the  treasury  quite  empty;  as  humanity  forbade  undertaking 
a  war  which  Poland  could  not  conduct,  and  the  useless  shedding 
of  blood:  therefore,  it  remained  for  them  only  to  call  upon  a  just 
God  to  witness  their  sufferings  and  their  innocence,  and  to  entrust 
the  fate  of  the  country  to  the  magnanimous  Catherine.3 

Five  days  later,  on  July  22,  the  treaty  was  signed  by  Sievers 
and  the  Deputation.  In  return  for  the  cession  of  the  lands 
allotted  to  her  by  the  St.  Petersburg  Convention  of  January  23, 
1793,  the  Empress  guaranteed  the  integrity  of  the  remaining 
possessions  of  the  Republic  (excluding,  however,  by  implication 
the  lands  claimed  by  Prussia) ;  she  bound  herself  not  to  oppose 
any  changes  in  the  form  of  government  which  the  King  and  the 
present  Diet  should  find  it  necessary  to  make,  and  —  as  a  proof 
of  her  friendship !  —  offered  to  guarantee  the  revised  constitution, 
if  she  were  invited  to  do  so.  Vague  allusions  were  made  to  a 
new  commercial  treaty  and  other  new  stipulations  for  mutual 
advantage  (i.  e.,  the  treaty  of  alliance),  with  which  the  Empress 
in  the  near  future  might  reward  the  Poles  for  their  present  sacri- 

1  HjioBaftcKiii,  op.  cit.,  p.  114. 

2  KocTOMapoBt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  316. 

3  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  311  f. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  47 1 

fices.1  Sievers  had  thus  brought  the  first  part  of  his  dismal  task 
to  a  successful  conclusion,  but  the  hardest  work  remained  to  be 
done. 

Ill 

If  the  Russian  treaty  had  encountered  an  unexpectedly  pro- 
tracted resistance,  it  was  universally  recognized  that  the  passing 
of  the  Prussian  one  would  involve  infinitely  more  trouble,  in  view 
of  what  even  Buchholtz  described  as  "  the  hatred  which  a  combi- 
nation of  events  .  .  .  has  inspired  in  the  whole  Polish  nation 
against  the  cabinet  of  Berlin."  2  To  the  Poles  at  that  time 
Catherine's  aggressions  seemed  almost  innocent  compared  with 
the  unexampled  treachery  of  Frederick  William.  Russia  had 
many  partisans  in  the  Diet,  among  them  some  who  served  from 
conviction,  not  for  hire;  but  Prussia  had  scarcely  a  friend  in  the 
assembly.  It  was  the  Russian  ambassador  alone  who  had  in  his 
hands  the  means  of  coercing  the  Diet.  The  success  of  Buchholtz's 
negotiation  depended  therefore  chiefly  upon  Sievers'  willingness 
to  employ  on  behalf  of  the  Court  of  Berlin  the  same  unswerving 
firmness  and  the  same  violent  methods  as  he  had  employed  in 
the  case  of  his  own  treaty;  and  here  some  unpleasant  surprises 
were  in  store  for  the  Prussian  minister. 

Catherine  had  long  before  determined  that  when  the  time  for 
the  Prussian  negotiation  came,  it  would  be  expedient  to  take  the 
cause  of  the  Poles  in  hand.  She  may  have  felt  a  certain  impulse 
to  atone  for  her  own  indignities  to  them  by  protecting  them 
against  the  ravenous  Prussians;  perhaps  she  relished  the  oppor- 
tunity to  show  Frederick  William  how  utterly  dependent  he  was 
upon  her  good  graces;  and  possibly  she  was  not  unwilling  to 
oblige  Austria,  who  had  long  been  begging  her  to  delay  Prussia's 
treaty  at  Grodno  in  order  to  stimulate  that  Power  to  greater 
activity  in  the  French  war.  But  her  chief  motive,  apparently, 
was  the  desire  to  give  the  Poles  a  practical  demonstration  of  the 
value  of  her  friendship,  and  to  pave  the  way  for  that  alliance 
which  was  to  deliver  the  Republic  into  her  permanent  tutelage. 

1  The  text  of  this  treaty  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  322-329. 

2  Buchholtz's  report  of  July  28,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1. 


472  TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Hence  Sievers  was  instructed  that  while  the  Prussian  treaty  must 
indeed  be  put  through,  it  would  be  as  well  to  take  one's  time 
about  it,  and  to  insist  upon  certain  concessions  to  the  unfortu- 
nate Poles.  In  particular,  since  Prussia  had  always  evaded  her 
commercial  obligations  to  Poland  (while  Russia  had  religiously 
observed  hers),  the  ambassador  was  to  insert  into  the  treaty 
substantial  provisions  in  favor  of  Polish  commerce,  together  with 
the  assurance  that  Prussia  would  grant  the  Republic  a  thoroughly 
satisfactory  commercial  treaty  in  the  near  future.1  As  the  Prus- 
sian general  M Ollendorff ,  under  the  pretence  of  *  rectifying  '  the 
new  frontier,  had  occupied  a  very  considerable  amount  of  terri- 
tory not  assigned  to  his  Court  by  the  St.  Petersburg  Convention, 
Sievers  was  ordered  to  sustain  the  Poles  in  demanding  the  restitu- 
tion of  the  land  thus  unjustly  seized.  With  regard  to  the  general 
attitude  which  the  ambassador  was  to  assume  during  Buchholtz's 
negotiation,  the  Empress  wrote:  "  When  the  Prussian  minister's 
turn  comes,  you  will  naturally  establish  yourself  as  arbitrator 
between  him  and  the  Poles.  You  will  employ  only  the  degree 
of  activity  and  energy  analogous  to  the  intention  enunciated 
above,2  leaving  the  field  open  to  Polish  objections,  and  support- 
ing them  even  in  so  far  as  reason  and  justice  demand.  There  will 
be  not  only  no  inconvenience  but  much  advantage  in  gaining 
time  in  this  second  negotiation."  3  It  was  a  dangerous  game 
which  Catherine  was  thus  undertaking,  for  the  Prussians  were 
not  inclined  to  wait  for  their  so  ardently  desired  acquisition,  and 
they  were  in  no  mood  to  be  trifled  with. 

As  soon  as  the  passing  of  the  Russian  treaty  had  been  assured, 
Buchholtz  lost  no  time  in  sending  in  a  note  demanding  that  a 
deputation  should  now  be  authorized  to  treat  with  him  (July  20). 
Sievers  gave  him  his  word  of  honor  that  he  would  act  with  the 
same  vigor  in  this  affair  as  in  his  own  negotiation;  Bishop  Kos- 
sakowski  promised  his  support;  and  the  King  also  secretly 
assured  the  Prussian  envoy  that  he  wished  to  finish  the  matter 

1  Instructions  to  Sievers  of  June  15/26,  M.  A.,  IIoaBma,  III,  70. 

2  This  seems  to  refer  to  the  Empress'  desire  to  put  the  Prussians  into  so  chast- 
ened a  mood  that  they  would  accept  the  conditions  she  proposed  to  insert  in  their 
treaty. 

3  Rescript  to  Sievers,  June  23/July  4.    See  Appendix  XVIII,  2. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  473 

speedily.1  But  when  the  note  was  read  in  the  Diet  (July  23), 
there  burst  forth  such  a  storm  of  opposition  as  even  this  assembly 
had  not  yet  witnessed.  All  parties  joined  in  burning  philippics 
against  Prussia,  the  Power  which  had  been  the  cause  of  all  the 
misfortunes  of  Poland,  which  had  originally  suggested  the  First 
Partition,  which  had  perfidiously  spurred  on  the  nation  against 
Russia  during  the  Four  Years'  Diet,  the  Power  "  whose  business 
it  was  to  betray  and  to  rob."  2  But  as  usual  with  this  Diet,  after 
the  first  flush  of  patriotic  indignation  —  real  or  feigned  —  timid 
or  venal  souls  began  to  talk  of  ineluctable  necessity;  the  King 
(by  prearrangement)  proposed  an  appeal  to  Sievers  for  counsel, 
and  the  latter  responded  with  a  couple  of  notes  urging  the 
assembly  to  proceed  at  once  to  the  negotiation  with  Prussia.  As 
a  result  of  this  pressure,  coupled  with  lavish  promises  of  bribes, 
on  July  31  the  Diet  authorized  the  same  Deputation  which  had 
treated  with  Russia  to  open  conferences  with  Buchholtz,  although 
with  the  injunction  to  take  up  only  commercial  questions  and  to 
entertain  no  proposals  for  any  cessions  of  territory.3 

On  August  5  the  Prussian  minister  began  his  discussions  with 
the  Deputation;  but  for  several  weeks  scarcely  any  progress  was 

1  Buchholtz's  reports  of  July  17  and  24,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1. 

2  Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  hi,  p.  327;  Morawski,  Dzieje  narodu  polskiego,  v,  p.  360. 

3  Buchholtz's  report  of  August  3.  The  Prussian  envoy  ascribed  this  concession 
on  the  part  of  the  Diet  chiefly  to  "  les  soins  tout  a  fait  particuliers  que  nous  avons 
pris  de  monter  les  nonces  et  les  chefs  de  parti."  In  the  same  dispatch  he  furnishes 
an  interesting  but  unpleasant  picture  of  the  operations  that  went  on  behind  the 
scenes  at  Grodno.    He  writes: 

"  Les  Nonces  de  la  diete  engages  pour  quinze  jours  ou  trois  semaines  sont  au 
desespoir.  lis  veulent  tous  partir,  et  comme  la  vie  est  tres  chere  ici,  ils  sont  dans 
la  necessity  de  vendre  leurs  nipes  [sic],  .  .  .  En  consideration  de  ceci  l'Ambassa- 
deur  et  moi,  nous  avons  fait  un  plan,  qui  leur  a  ete  communique  par  Pulawski  et 
le  Commandeur  Mozelewski  [sic],  qui  traitent  avec  eux.  Nous  leur  promettons  de 
les  recompenser  et  indemniser  apres  la  signature  du  Traite  avec  Votre  Majeste, 
mais  pas  plustot  [sic].  Ceci  a  produit  deja  un  bon  effet  et  nous  nous  sommes  meme 
assures  d'un  grand  nombre  de  Nonces  de  l'opposition,  de  facon  que  ces  gens  dans 
l'esp£rance  de  pouvoir  gagner  quelque  chose  poussent  maintenant  a.  la  roue.  On 
avoit  trop  bien  recompense  les  grands  par  de  belles  charges,  et  trop  peu  donn6  aux 
petits,  qui  pourtant  font  le  plus  de  bruit  a  la  Diete.  ...  La  depense  que  ce  plan 
produit,  pourra  aller  a  dix-huit  ou  dix-neuf  mille  Ducats,  pour  chaque  Cour.  Elle 
est  tres  necessaire  pour  nous  conserver  la  plurality.  ...  La  plus  part  [des  Nonces] 
sont  arrives  ici  sans  argent,  et  meme  beaucoup  sans  habits,  mais  tous  ont  cru  qu'ils 
s'enrichiroient  a  cette  occasion.    Comme  cela  n'est  pas  arrive^  ils  se  sont  mis  de 


474  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

made,  owing  to  disputes  over  small  points.  Meanwhile  the  Diet 
enjoyed  a  period  of  rest  and  relaxation.  It  was  at  this  time  that 
the  gaiety  and  the  mania  for  amusements,  which  characterized 
the  social  life  at  Grodno  even  in  the  darkest  moments,  reached 
their  height.  Although  the  town  was  almost  in  a  state  of  siege, 
the  streets  full  of  Russian  soldiers  and  Cossacks,  and  camps, 
pickets,  and  patrols  everywhere  in  evidence,  in  the  houses  of  the 
citizens  there  was  one  continual  round  of  entertainments  and 
celebrations.  Throughout  the  Diet  the  leaders  of  the  majority 
dispensed  the  proverbial  Polish  hospitality,  with  Russian  money. 
The  deputies  flocked  from  the  tragic  scenes  in  the  chamber  to 
balls  and  banquets:  their  mission  was  to  be  alternately  dined 
and  imprisoned  by  the  Russian  ambassador.  The  adulation 
lavished  upon  Sievers  almost  passes  belief .  At  the  close  of  July 
Grodno  society  celebrated  for  eight  days  running  the  name-day 
of  the  man  who  had  just  wrenched  half  its  territory  away  from 
the  Republic.  At  one  evening  assembly  on  this  occasion  a  trans- 
parency was  lighted  with  the  device:  "  Vivat  Jacob  Sievers,  who 
brought  peace  and  order  and  freedom  to  the  Polish  nation."  l 
Abject  servility  could  go  no  further.  "  They  consider  here," 
wrote  one  disgusted  onlooker,  "  that  no  nation  ever  gave  away 
its  lands  and  people  so  merrily  as  the  Poles.  .  .  ."2  The  Republic 
was  perishing  amid  fetes  and  illuminations.3 

While  Sievers'  negotiation  with  the  Deputation  had  not  lasted 
three  days,  that  of  Buchholtz  dragged  on  for  three  weeks,  with 
results  most  disheartening  for  the  Prussian  envoy.  The  Russian 
ambassador,  who  at  the  invitation  of  the  Poles  had  been  admitted 

mauvaise  humeur,  et  ont  voulu  a  toute  force  rompre  la  diete.  .  .  ."  B.  A.,  R.  g, 
27,  1. 

That  Catherine  had  an  equally  low  opinion  of  the  assembly  appears  from  a 
rescript  to  Sievers  (of  July  13/24)  in  which  she  wrote:  "  II  n'est  pas  necessaire 
que  Je  vous  observe  que  de  tous  ceux  qui  se  sont  determines  a  venir  comme  Nonces 
a  la  Diete  actuelle,  il  n'en  est  peut  etre  aucun  qui  y  soit  venu  avec  un  autre  but  que 
celui  de  soigner  ses  propres  interets,"  M.  A.,  IIojiLnia,  III,  70. 

1  Kraszewski,  op.  cit.,  hi,  p.  329. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  337. 

1  Interesting  details  about  the  social  life  at  Grodno  are  to  be  found  in  Kraszewski, 
op.  cit.,  iii,  ch.  vii,  passim;  Blum,  op.  cit.,  hi,  pp.  271  ff.,  315,  328  ff.,  343  ff.;  Fr. 
Schulz,  Reise  eines  Lieflanders,  i,  pp.  39  ff.;  HjiOBaHCKifi,  op.  cit.,  pp.  146  ff. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  475 

to  the  conferences  as  mediator,  did  indeed  persuade  the  Deputa- 
tion to  discuss  the  question  of  territorial  cessions;  but  on  the 
other  hand,  he  warmly  supported  the  contentions  of  the  Poles  in 
regard  to  commercial  matters  and  the  exact  demarcation  of  the 
new  frontier,  while  the  unusual  mildness  of  his  tone  seemed  to 
encourage  the  Deputation  to  raise  new  demands  and  difficulties 
of  all  sorts.  Buchholtz  was  thrown  into  "  the  most  cruel  em- 
barrassment "  by  the  "  feebleness,"  the  "  capriciousness,"  the 
new-found  tenderness  of  his  Russian  colleague  for  the  Poles;  he 
suspected  the  Austrian  and  Swedish  ministers  of  terrible  intrigues 
against  him;  and  he  was  fairly  bewildered  by  the  "perfidy,"  the 
"  immorality,"  and  the  "  horrible  clamors  "  of  the  Deputation. 
He  was  "  alone  in  Lithuania,"  he  wrote  to  his  Court,  face  to  face 
with  a  nation  which  showed  "  an  unbelievable  hatred  "  for 
Prussia,  and  "  absolutely  unable  to  effect  anything  without  the 
assistance  of  the  Russian  ambassador."  His  one  resource  would 
have  been  to  call  in  General  M  Ollendorff 's  troops,  as  the  ministry 
at  Berlin  had  authorized  him  to  do;  but  to  this  Sievers  strongly 
objected,  declaring  that  he  could  not  approve  of  the  use  of  force 
when  everything  might  be  settled  amicably  in  a  few  weeks,  if 
Prussia  would  only  defer  to  the  just  and  moderate  demands  of 
the  Poles.  Thus  driven  from  pillar  to  post,  and  fearing  to  see 
his  negotiation  collapse  altogether,  the  mortified  envoy  was 
finally  induced  to  accept  sub  spe  rati  the  revised  draft  of  the 
treaty  prepared  by  Sievers  and  the  Deputation.  This  draft  con- 
ceded to  Prussia  the  lands  assigned  to  her  by  the  St.  Petersburg 
Convention,  but  only  half  of  the  '  rectified  '  frontier  established 
by  Mollendorff.  It  also  provided  that  a  commercial  treaty  should 
be  concluded  in  the  near  future  under  the  mediation  of  the  Em- 
press, which  should  reduce  the  crushing  tariffs  hitherto  levied  by 
Prussia  to  the  very  moderate  basis  of  a  two  per  cent  duty  on 
exports,  imports,  and  goods  in  transit.  The  present  treaty  was 
to  be  placed  under  the  guarantee  of  Russia  (by  way  of  implying 
that  otherwise  the  Poles  did  not  expect  Frederick  William  to 
keep  his  engagements).1 

1  For  the  above,  Buchholtz  reports  of  August  13,  14,  20,  21,  22,  25,  B.  A.,  R.  9, 
27,  1. 


476  TEE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

Having  thus  imposed  his  will  on  the  Prussian  minister,  Sievers 
next  prepared  to  force  the  treaty  through  the  Diet.  On  August 
26  the  Deputation  reported  to  the  assembly.  The  debates  of  the 
next  four  days  surpassed  all  previous  records  for  tumultuousness 
and  violence.  When  Podhorski,  a  deputy  from  Volhynia,  who 
later  received  eight  hundred  ducats  for  his  shameful  services,1 
proposed  that  the  Deputation  be  authorized  to  sign  the  treaty  r 
he  was  hooted  down,  threatened  with  death,  and  driven  from 
the  hall  as  often  as  he  dared  show  himself.  Szydlowski  (of  Plock), 
the  most  active  of  the  Zealots,  demanded  the  breaking  off  of  the 
negotiation,  on  the  ground  that  it  was  useless  to  negotiate  with 
a  Power  which  had  violated  its  last  two  treaties  with  the  Republic 
(of  1773  and  1790)  for  no  cause  whatever.  There  were  wild  cries 
of  execration  against  '  the  Brandenburger,'  and  against  that 
1  Catiline  '  Podhorski,  and  stinging  accusations  against  the  King 
for  his  past  errors  and  his  present  slackness.  Again  and  again 
the  whole  chamber  was  on  its  feet  and  swarming  into  the  aisles, 
and  it  seemed  as  if  it  would  come  to  blows.  Amid  the  general 
uproar  speeches  could  scarcely  be  heard.2 

Sievers  determined  to  make  an  end  of  the  matter.  After  several 
vigorous  notes  had  passed  unheeded,  on  September  2  he  sur- 
rounded the  castle  where  the  Diet  met  with  grenadiers  and 
cannon;  all  exits  were  closed;  the  Russian  general  Rautenfeld 
and  twelve  officers  took  their  seats  in  the  chamber,  and  the 
assembly  was  informed  that  no  one  would  be  allowed  to  leave 
until  the  Prussian  treaty  was  passed.  As  a  pretext  for  such 
unheard-of  indignities,  the  ambassador  alleged  the  necessity  of 
guarding  the  King,  since  a  (purely  fictitious)  plot  had  been  dis- 
covered against  His  Majesty's  person.  The  Diet  sat  until  far 
into  the  night,  and  then,  after  the  usual  scenes,  decided  to  yield. 
But  while  authorizing  the  Deputation  to  sign,  they  added  five 
new  conditions,  the  most  important  of  which  was  that  the  treaty 
of  cession  should  not  be  ratified  until  the  promised  commercial 
treaty  had  been  concluded.3 

1  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iv,  p.  35. 

2  On  the  scenes  of  August  26-30,  cf.  especially  HjOBaficKifi,  op.  cit.,  pp.  157  ff., 
and  KocTOMapoBt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  339  ff. 

3  The  other  conditions  were:   (1)  that  the  present  Primate  of  Poland,  although 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  477 

Buchholtz,  who  had  fancied  himself  at  the  end  of  his  labors, 
was  fairly  aghast  at  these  new  demands,  which  threatened  to  spin 
out  his  negotiation  for  another  weary  month  or  two.  There 
followed  angry  scenes  between  him  and  Sievers.  The  latter  re- 
fused to  employ  further  violence  against  the  Poles,  or  to  allow 
the  Prussians  to  do  so  on  their  own  account.  He  even  went  so 
far  as  to  justify  the  new  pretensions  of  the  Poles  and  to  declare 
that  he  would  never  coerce  the  Diet  into  retracting.  Quite  in 
despair  over  Russia's  "  insidious  "  policy,  Sievers'  absurd  mania 
for  "making  Poland  happy,"  and  his  own  helplessness  and  isola- 
tion, Buchholtz  could  only  beg  his  government  for  new  instruc- 
tions, while  advising  it  to  acquiesce  in  even  these  conditions.1 

It  has  already  been  noted  that  an  explosion  of  wrath  ensued  at 
Berlin.  The  Prussian  ministry  felt  that  they  had  carried  com- 
plaisance far  enough  by  agreeing  to  the  revised  treaty  proposed  by 
Sievers  and  the  Deputation,  and  that  their  patience  and' gener- 
osity were  being  abused.  Long  indignant  at  the  delays  at  Grodno, 
suspicious  that  the  Poles,  the  Imperial  Courts,  Sweden,  and  every- 
one else  were  leagued  together  to  rob  the  King  of  his  indemnity 
or  at  least  to  postpone  its  realization  indefinitely,  they  concluded 
that  the  time  had  come  for  bold  and  decisive  action.2  The  great 
result  of  this  crisis  was  the  memorable  declaration  already  de- 
scribed, by  which  the  King  informed  Austria  that  he  was  obliged 
to  abandon  the  campaign  against  France  in  order  to  go  to  the 
east  and  assure  his  acquisition  in  Poland.  How  unnecessary 
this  resolution  was  appears  from  the  fact  that  the  day  after  it 
was  announced  the  denouement  took  place  at  Grodno  in  a  manner 
altogether  satisfactory  to  Prussia. 

On  September  13  Buchholtz  had  been  ordered  to  present  one 
more  vigorous  note  demanding  the  immediate  conclusion  of  the 

remaining  Archbishop  of  Gnesen,  should  be  permitted  to  reside  inside  the  Republic; 
(2)  that  in  case  of  the  extinction  of  the  family  of  the  Princes  Radziwill,  the  House  of 
Brandenburg  should  raise  no  claims  to  its  inheritance;  (3)  that  both  the  treaty  of 
cession  and  the  commercial  treaty  should  receive  the  guarantee  of  Russia;  (4) 
that  the  much-revered  statue  of  the  Virgin  of  Czgstochowa  should  be  restored  to 
the  Republic. 

1  Buchholtz's  report  of  September  7,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1. 

*  Alvensleben  to  his  colleagues  in  the  ministry,  September  12,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1; 
the  cabinet  ministry  to  the  King,  September  14,  B.  A.,  R.  96,  147  H. 


478  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

treaty  as  presented  to  the  Diet  on  August  26,  i.  e.,  without  any 
of  the  conditions  or  amendments  made  on  September  2;  if  this 
step  failed  he  was  to  break  off  the  negotiation  and  await  further 
instructions.  Sievers  could  not  afford  to  risk  this  latter  con- 
tingency, for  he  had  always  been  ordered  to  see  to  it  that  the 
treaty  was  passed.  Moreover,  recent  dispatches  from  St.  Peters- 
burg indicated  that  the  Empress  was  growing  impatient  to  have 
the  affair  terminated,  in  order  to  clear  the  path  for  the  negotiation 
of  her  alliance  with  the  Republic.  Hence  Buchholtz  was  delighted 
to  observe  a  complete  change  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  his  col- 
league. Accurately  divining  his  sovereign's  wishes,  although  left 
without  very  precise  instructions,  Sievers  now  announced  that  he 
was  ready  to  use  the  most  efficacious  means  to  put  through  the 
Prussian  treaty  in  the  exact  form  desired  at  Berlin.1 

The  ensuing  journee  of  September  23  was  very  largely  a  repeti- 
tion of  the  scenes  of  September  2.  As  a  preliminary  step,  at  dawn 
of  that  day  the  Cossacks  dragged  from  their  beds  and  transported 
out  of  Grodno  the  four  leading  members  of  the  opposition.     When 

1  Buchholtz's  reports  of  September  17  and  24,  B.  A.,  R.  9,  27,  1.  Several  writers 
(e.  g.,  Kostomarov,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  376  ff.,  and  Sybel,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  439)  assume  a 
sudden  and  complete  change  of  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Empress  with  regard 
to  the  Prussian  negotiation,  and  urgent  instructions  to  Sievers  to  finish  at  once. 
Kostomarov  explains  this  by  the  conjecture  that  Catherine  foresaw  the  danger  of 
Frederick  William's  abandoning  the  French  war.  It  is  possible  that  she  had  such 
a  presentiment,  but  there  is  no  proof  of  it  in  her  rescripts  to  Sievers  of  this  time; 
in  fact  the  only  motive  there  given  for  hastening  the  affair  is  the  desire  to  expedite 
the  alliance  negotiation. 

The  rescript  to  Sievers  of  September  3  (N.  S.)  (practically  the  last  instructions 
he  received  before  the  denouement  at  Grodno)  was  not  particularly  urgent  or 
categorical:  the  ambassador  was  directed  to  "  accelerate  "  the  Prussian  treaty 
"  par  tous  les  moyens  qui  sont  en  votre  pouvoir,  evitant  toujours  la  violence  et 
conservant  autant  qu'il  vous  sera  possible  le  role  de  conciliateur  qui  vous  a  si  bien 
reussi  jusqu'a  present." 

But  that  Sievers  rightly  foresaw  her  intentions  appears  from  the  rescript  of 
September  7/18,  which  could  scarcely  have  reached  him  before  the  decisive  events 
at  Grodno:  for  here  he  was  authorized  to  use  "  toutes  sortes  de  moyens  "  (with- 
out exception).  "  Quelque  desir  que  J 'aye  de  faire  empecher  les  voyes  de  violence 
extreme,"  the  Empress  added  in  another  passage,  "  Je  n'en  ai  pas  un  moindre  de 
voir  enfin  terminer  cette  affaire."  The  general  sense  of  this  rescript  is  that  as  she 
had  now  procured  for  the  Poles  all  the  concessions  that  they  could  reasonably 
expect  from  Prussia,  there  was  no  longer  any  reason  for  delaying  the  conclusion 
of  the  treaty.     M.  A.,  IIojiLina,  III,  70. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  479 

towards  evening  the  deputies  gathered  at  the  castle,  they  found 
it  once  more  encircled  by  battalions  of  grenadiers,  with  cannon 
trained  on  the  doors,  and  the  artillerymen  standing  by  with 
lighted  matches.    General  Rautenfeld  took  his  accustomed  place 
in  the  chamber  near  the  throne,  and  once  more  the  word  was 
given  out  that  the  Diet  would  be  held  captive  until  it  had  passed 
the  Prussian  treaty  without  any  of  the  conditions  prescribed  on 
September  2.    The  Zealots  at  once  set  up  the  cry  that  it  was  use- 
less and  shameful  to  debate  under  such  conditions.    For  hours 
the  assembly  wrangled  over  the  question  whether  the  session 
should  or  could  not  be  opened.     One  deputation  after  another 
was  sent  to  Sievers  to  expostulate  —  to  no  purpose.     Finally, 
about  midnight,  the  Diet  relapsed  into  total  silence,  as  the  one 
means  left  to  it  of  protesting  against  violence.    General  Rauten- 
feld, growing  impatient,  several  times  reminded  the  members  of 
their  situation:    the  King  would  not  be  allowed  to  leave  the 
throne,  the  Senators  might  sleep  on  straw,  if  they  chose,  but  no 
one  would  be  permitted  to  leave  the  hall  until  the  ambassador's 
demands  had  been  satisfied.    If  the  assembly  remained  incorri- 
gibly obstinate,  he  was  ordered  to  proceed  to  the  most  extreme 
measures.    The  deputies  continued  to  sit  like  statues.    At  last, 
towards  4  a.m.  the  Russian  general  strode  to  the  door,  declaring 
that  it  only  remained  for  him  to  call  in  the  grenadiers.    The  Mar- 
shal Bielinski  thereupon  put  the  question:   "  Does  the  chamber 
consent  that  the  Deputation  should  sign  the  Prussian  treaty  sent 
to  the  Diet  by  the  Russian  ambassador  ?  "     No  one  answered. 
Twice  the  question  was  repeated  without  response.     Bielinski 
then  declared  that  since  silence  was  a  sign  of  consent,  the  motion 
was  unanimously  carried.1    Scarcely  speaking  a  word,  the  King 
closed  the  session,  and  the  deputies  trooped  out  in  silence  and 
in  tears.2 

Two  days  later  the  treaty  was  signed.3 

1  The  majority  had  probably  made  up  their  minds  in  advance  to  end  the  affair 
in  this  manner.    There  were  precedents  for  such  procedure. 

2  Probably  the  best  and  fullest  description  of  this  famous  '  Dumb  Session  '  is 
that  in  KocroMapoBT>,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  385-400. 

3  The  text  in  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  342-347. 


480  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

IV 

The  final  labors  of  the  Grodno  Diet  were  devoted  to  reorganiz- 
ing the  petty  state  that  Poland  now  was,  in  accordance  with 
Catherine's  plans  for  its  future.  Although  the  work  done  at  this 
time  was  to  last  but  a  few  months,  it  is  not  without  a  certain 
interest;  for  it  illustrates  the  consequences  which  the  Empress 
meant  to  draw  from  the  recent  dismemberment,  it  completed 
what  may  be  called  the  Second  Partition  resettlement  of  the 
Polish  Question,  and  it  indicates  to  some  degree  what  the  lot  of 
the  Polish  nation  would  have  been,  had  that  resettlement  proved 
permanent. 

Five  days  after  that  '  Dumb  Session,'  at  which  the  Russian 
ambassador  had  subjected  the  Diet  to  brutalities  unexampled  in 
the  history  of  any  other  parliamentary  body,  the  deputy  Ankwicz 
of  Cracow  proposed  the  conclusion  of  a  perpetual  alliance  with 
Russia,  on  the  ground  that  Poland's  only  hope  of  salvation  in  the 
future  lay  in  the  support  of  the  great  neighboring  Empire.1  By 
an  artful  bit  of  comedy,  the  draft  of  a  treaty  of  alliance  sent  down 
from  St.  Petersburg  was  then  formally  presented  to  the  ambassa- 
dor by  a  deputation  of  the  Diet  as  representing  the  summa 
desideria  of  the  Polish  nation;  Sievers  was  graciously  pleased  to 
accept  it;  and  on  October  14  it  went  through  the  chamber 
'  unanimously,'  the  Marshal  pretending  not  to  hear  the  opposing 
voices.2  The  significance  of  the  vote  was  well  summed  up  by  one 
of  the  Zealots  the  following  day  with  the  words,  "  Poland  has 
now  become  a  province  of  Russia."  3  It  was  not  without  justice 
that  Sievers  boasted  to  his  daughter  that  he  had  put  through  a 
treaty  without  a  parallel  in  modern  history.4 

By  the  terms  of  this  remarkable  document,  both  sides  promised 
to  aid  each  other  with  all  their  forces  in  case  of  war,  and  the  chief 
command  was  always  to  belong  to  the  Power  which  furnished  the 
greater  number  of  troops.  Since  the  burden  of  the  common 
defence  would  fall  chiefly  on  Russia,  the  King  and  government 
of  Poland  recognized  the  justice  of  allowing  the  Empress  that 

1  KocroMapoBi.,  op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  406  f.  3  Ibid. 

2  KocroMapoBi.,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  407.  4  Blum,  op.  cit.,  iii,  p.  395. 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  48 1 

degree  of  "influence"  in  military  and  political  matters  that  might 
seem  most  conducive  to  the  security  and  tranquillity  of  the 
Republic.  Under  the  same  pretext,  Russia  obtained  the  right  of 
sendingtroops  into  Poland  "in  all  cases  of  necessity,"  after  having 
amicably  notified  the  Republic;  and  of  keeping  them  there  in- 
definitely; and  of  maintaining  military  magazines  on  Polish  soil. 
The  Republic  agreed  to  enter  into  no  foreign  alliances  and  no 
important  dealings  with  foreign  Powers  without  the  consent  of 
Russia,  while  the  Empress  promised  to  accord  her  most  efficacious 
support  to  all  diplomatic  steps  of  the  Polish  government  that 
had  been  "  concerted  "  with  her  in  advance.  The  ministers  of 
the  two  states  abroad  were  to  act  in  harmony,  and  to  keep  each 
other  informed  of  all  the  important  business  that  passed  through 
their  hands.  Russia  received  the  right  of  representing  Poland 
at  courts  where  the  Republic  did  not  maintain  diplomatic  agents. 
Finally,  the  Empress  guaranteed  the  constitutional  and  other 
cardinal  laws  that  the  present  Diet  might  enact;  and  the  King 
and  the  Republic  bound  themselves  in  turn  to  make  no  constitu- 
tional changes  in  future  without  her  consent.1 

The  treaty  thus  gave  Russia  practically  unrestricted  control 
of  the  army  and  the  foreign  relations  of  the  Republic.  It  deprived 
the  Poles  of  the  right  of  altering  and  reforming  their  fundamental 
laws  and  institutions  at  their  discretion.  It  gave  legal  sanction 
and  the  widest  opportunities  for  Russian  interference  in  almost 
every  branch  of  Poland's  domestic  affairs.  It  was  indeed  a 
pactum  subjectionis  el  incorporationis,  as  the  Zealots  in  the  Diet 
ventured  to  call  it.2  Catherine  deserves  the  credit  of  having  in- 
vented, or  at  least  of  having  first  perfected,  that  system  of  'veiled 
protectorates  '  which  European  Powers  have  applied  so  frequently 
in  Asia  and  Africa  in  recent  times ;  for  the  position  of  Poland  as 
fixed  by  this  alliance  treaty  can  be  compared  only  to  that  of 
Egypt,  Tunis,  or  the  vassal  states  of  India  today. 

That  the  Empress  did  not  intend  to  allow  the  Republic  the 
slightest  vestige  of  real  independence  appears  from  a  rescript 
sent  to  Sievers  immediately  after  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty. 

1  The  text  of  this  treaty  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  op.  cil.,  pp.  347-353. 

2  De  Cache's  report  of  October  16,  V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1793. 


482  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

The  alliance,  she  declared,  was  only  a  device  for  adding  what 
remained  of  Poland  to  her  Empire  without  stirring  up  the  oppo- 
sition of  Austria  and  Prussia.  She  meant  to  assert  the  right  to 
advise  the  Republic  how  to  act  and  conduct  itself;  and  it  must 
ask  for  her  advice  and  follow  it.  She  expected  from  Poland  '  com- 
plete submission  to  her  counsels,  plans,  and  views.'  Her  am- 
bassador at  Warsaw  was  to  direct  everything  that  went  on  in  the 
Republic,  and  to  consider  himself  "  the  head  of  the  country."  l 
And  Sievers,  accurately  grasping  her  intentions,  assured  her: 
"  The  future  king  of  Poland  will  be  chosen  by  Your  Imperial 
Majesty,  and  will  receive  a  major-domo  under  the  name  of  the 
Russian  ambassador,  who  will  have  infinitely  greater  power  than 
any  Sicilian  viceroy  or  than  the  governor-general  of  Your 
Majesty's  province  of  Tver."  2 

From  the  standpoint  of  such  principles,  Sievers'  practice  dur- 
ing the  last  months  at  Grodno  left  nothing  to  be  desired.  He 
directed  all  the  operations  of  the  Diet  with  so  high  a  hand  that 
one  of  the  Zealots  declared  openly  that  it  was  a  farce  to  go  on 
with  this  assembly:  it  would  be  far  better  for  the  Marshal  simply 
to  invite  the  ambassador  to  make  whatever  arrangements  about 
Poland  he  chose,  and  to  let  the  deputies  go  home.3  Among  the 
characteristic  enactments  of  that  period  were  the  law  annulling 
all  the  acts  of  the  Four  Years'  Diet;  the  decree  reducing  the  army 
to  approximately  18,000  men;  and  the  revised  constitution,  pre- 
pared by  the  ambassador,  and  rushed  through  with  scandalous 
haste  during  the  last  hours  of  the  assembly.4  This  set  of  '  cardinal 
laws  '  sanctioned  the  traditional  rights  of  the  Diet  and  the  tradi- 
tional impotence  of  the  Crown;  the  Liberum  Veto  and  the  elec- 
tive kingship;  the  exclusive  rights  of  the  szlachta  to  civil  and 
ecclesiastical  honors  and  dignities;  serfdom  —  and  in  short  all 
the  worst  features  of  the  old  constitution.  In  order  to  perpetuate 
these  abuses,  it  was  decreed  that  no  future  Diet  could  "  change, 
correct,  modify  ...  or  interpret  "  these  cardinal  laws,  even  by  a 

1  Many  excerpts  from  this  remarkable  rescript  are  given  in  KoCTOMapoBt,  op.  cit., 
ii,  pp.  411  ff. 

2  Ibid.,  p.  415. 

3  Wegner,  Sejm  grodzietiski,  ostalni  usl$p,  pp.  169  f. 

4  The  text  is  printed  in  Angeberg,  op.  cit.,  pp.  354~357« 


THE  DIET  OF  GRODNO  483 

unanimous  vote;  and  that  they  were  to  remain  forever  "  sacred, 
stable,  and  immutable." 

After  this  worthy  pronouncement,  and  after  sending  an  envoy 
to  Catherine  to  thank  her  for  her  benefits  to  Poland,  the  assembly 
dispersed  (November  24)  in  gloom,  shame,  and  humiliation. 

"  The  name  of  Poland  has  virtually  been  erased  from  the  list 
of  states,"  was  the  comment  of  the  '  men  of  the  Third  of  May  ' 
upon  the  work  of  the  Grodno  Diet.1  The  Second  Partition  had 
terminated  with  the  loss,' not  only  of  more  than  half  the  territory 
of  Poland,  but  of  the  independence  of  what  was  left.  It  was 
practically  the  end  of  the  old  Republic. 

But  the  Polish  people  remained  to  be  heard  from.  No  nation 
not  utterly  bereft  of  a  sense  of  honor,  patriotism,  and  self-respect, 
could  have  submitted  passively  to  such  disasters,  losses,  and 
humiliations.  Caught  helpless,  unprepared,  and  almost  dazed 
by  the  action  of  the  partitioning  Powers  in  the  spring  of  1793, 
and  then  goaded  to  desperation  by  the  shameful  scenes  at  Grodno, 
the  better  part  of  Polish  society  had  been  gathering  itself  and 
rousing  itself  for  a  great  effort.  Since  July  of  1793  plans  were  on 
foot  which  were  to  lead  in  the  following  spring  to  the  great 
national  uprising  under  Kosciuszko  and  to  the  final  struggle  for 
Polish  independence.  But  that  story  belongs  to  the  history  of 
the  Third  Partition. 

1  Vom  Entstehen  und  Untergange  der  polnischen  Konstitution  vom  3  May,  ii,  p. 
311.  This  book,  the  apologia  of  the  exiled  Polish  reformers,  appeared  in  Germany 
about  the  close  of  1793. 


. 


CHAPTER  XXI 

Conclusion 


The  Second  Partition  was  the  death-sentence  of  the  Polish  state 
—  of  that  there  can  be  no  question.  The  First  Partition  had 
foreshadowed  the  ultimate  catastrophe,  but  did  not  render  it 
inevitable.  That  initial  dismemberment  was  only  an  amputation 
at  the  extremities;  it  left  a  body  politic  that  still  contained  the 
elements  essential  to  continued  national  life;  in  some  respects  it 
was  even  a  salutary  operation.  The  Third  Partition,  on  the  other 
hand,  was  the  necessary  and  immediate  result  of  the  Second:  it 
merely  ended  an  intolerable  situation  in  the  only  possible  way. 
It  was  the  Russo-Prussian  Treaty  of  1793,  therefore,  that  decided 
the  solution  which  the  Polish  Question  was  to  receive.  It  was 
the  Second  Partition  that  sealed  the  fate  of  the  Republic. 

While  any  attempt  to  analyze  the  causes  of  this  historic  tragedy 
or  to  assess  responsibilities  must  be  attended  by  grave  and  obvious 
difficulties,  the  reader  may,  perhaps,  fairly  expect  the  author  to 
state  whatever  conclusions  he  has  reached,  and  to  explain  to  what 
extent  the  results  of  the  present  investigation  accord  with  the 
views  advanced  by  previous  historians. 

The  favorite  thesis  of  German  and  Russian  writers — that  the 
Poles  themselves  were  primarily  responsible  for  their  own  down- 
fall— is,  of  course,  true  in  this  sense,  that  through  individual  and 
class  egoism,  indifference  to  the  common  weal,  and  blindness  to 
the  most  elementary  laws  of  sound  political  life,  the  Poles  had 
reduced  their  country  to  a  state  of  weakness  without  which  the 
Partitions  would  scarcely  have  been  possible.  One  can  hardly 
escape  the  feeling  that  the  First  Partition  was  the  just  retribution 
for  all  the  accumulated  sins  and  errors  of  the  two  preceding  cen- 
turies. But  with  the  Second  Partition,  the  case  is  different.  The 
crime  for  which  the  Poles  were  then  punished  was  that  of  an 

484 


CONCLUSION  485 

attempt  at  national  regeneration.  The  Second  Partition  was  the 
reply  of  the  neighboring  Powers  to  the  effort  made  by  the  Four 
Years'  Diet  to  reform  the  constitution,  recover  the  nation's  inde- 
pendence, and  restore  Poland  to  its  proper  place  among  European 
states.  Hence  Polish  patriotism  has  been  able  to  find  some  con- 
solation —  or  additional  motives  for  embitterment  —  in  the 
thesis  set  up  by  the  men  of  the  Third  of  May  in  their  apologia, 
that  Poland  fell  "  without  any  fault  on  her  side,  without  having 
given  the  neighbors  the  slightest  cause  for  revenge  or  hostility — 
just  at  the  moment  when  she  had  prepared  all  things  necessary 
for  her  happiness."  l 

But  the  question  presents  itself :  was  it  wise  or  prudent  to  make 
the  attempt  for  independence  at  that  time  and  under  the  given 
circumstances  ?  It  is  often  said  that  the  Poles  made  the  mistake 
of  seeing  the  root  of  their  troubles  in  the  Russian  domination, 
whereas  the  real  causes  of  the  evil  lay  in  their  own  perverted 
political  habits  and  prejudices,  their  own  moral  and  intellectual 
shortcomings,  their  own  military  and  economic  weakness;  that  a 
long  period  of  internal  transformation  was  necessary  before  the 
nation  could  safely  try  to  recover  its  independence;  and  that  in 
the  meantime  it  was  the  part  of  prudence  to  submit  to  the  Russian 
protectorate,  which  at  least  ensured  the  continued  existence  and 
the  territorial  integrity  of  the  state,  and  which  was  not,  in  the  last 
analysis,  incompatible  with  gradual  and  moderate  reforms.  This 
was,  in  essence,  the  policy  of  Stanislas  Augustus  after  the  First 
Partition.  But,  we  are  told,  "  fantastic  political  ideas  "  and 
"  patriotic  impatience  "  prevailed.  Unwilling  to  content  them- 
selves with  what  might  have  been  attained  by  protracted  hard 
work,  the  Poles  threw  themselves  into  the  pursuit  of  external 
political  independence,  which  was  at  that  time  unattainable. 
With  no  accurate  appreciation  of  their  own  resources  or  of  the 
hard  realities  of  the  situation,  they  insisted  on  hazarding  every- 
thing upon  a  single  throw,  and  thus  the  existence  of  the  Republic 
was  played  away.2 

1  Vom  Entstehen  und  Untergange  der  polnischen  Konstitulion  vom  3.  May,  1791, 
11,  pp.  323  f. 

2  The  above  represents  fairly,  I  think,  the  views  of  Bobrzyhski  and  Kalinka 
among  Polish  historians,  and  Kostomarov  and  Kareev  among  the  Russians. 


486      THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

However  convincing  this  indictment  may  seem  in  view  of  what 
actually  happened,  it  is  nevertheless  open  to  many  objections. 
If  the  decline  of  the  Republic  is  to  be  ascribed  chiefly  to  the 
defects  of  the  worst  constitution  then  to  be  found  in  Europe,  as 
most  historians  agree,  then  the  first  and  most  indispensable  step 
in  the  regeneration  of  Poland  must  be  to  get  rid  of  this  constitu- 
tion, and  to  establish  a  government  capable  of  concentrating  the 
strength  of  the  nation  for  great  national  tasks,  of  repressing  the 
evil  tendencies,  and  of  creating  and  fostering  the  ameliorating 
forces.  The  material  and  moral  resources  of  the  country  were  not 
altogether  inadequate;  the  worst  evil  was  the  lack  of  a  govern- 
ment able  to  make  use  of  them.  In  our  opinion,  the  Polish 
patriots  of  that  time  were  right  in  raising  the  political  reform  to 
the  first  plane.  But  no  such  reform  was  possible  as  long  as  Russia 
retained  her  control  over  the  country.  Moreover,  the  indictment 
in  question  rests  upon  the  utterly  unproved  and  unprovable 
hypothesis  that  Poland's  integrity  was  safe  as  long  as  the  nation 
submitted  passively  to  the  Russian  protectorate.  It  assumes  that 
under  the  beneficent  auspices  of  Russia  the  Republic  could  have 
looked  forward  to  a  long  unbroken  period  of  peace,  recuperation, 
and  steady  progress;  and  that  Poland  could  have  afforded  to  re- 
main for  a  generation  or  two  unarmed  and  defenceless,  trusting 
solely  to  the  protection  of  her  great  neighbor.  The  men  of  the 
Four  Years'  Diet  refused  to  make  so  naive  an  assumption.  Since 
1772  they  had  lived  in  constant  fear  of  a  new  partition;  they 
knew  that  every  crisis  in  the  North  put  their  political  existence 
in  peril;  they  believed  that  they  could  never  be  safe  as  long  as  the 
country  remained  in  its  helpless  condition,  dependent  solely  upon 
the  mercy  of  the  foreign  Powers.  In  this  case,  too,  it  is  difficult 
to  blame  them.  We  do  not  believe  that  the  Empress  was  so 
averse  to  a  new  partition  as  is  commonly  asserted.  At  any  rate, 
it  is  not  at  all  certain  that  in  case  of  a  serious  crisis  in  general 
European  politics  she  would  not  have  decided  to  free  herself 
from  embarrassments  by  a  new  partition,  no  matter  how  docile 
the  Poles  might  have  shown  themselves.  It  has  already  been 
pointed  out  that  the  rest  of  Europe  constantly  expected  a  further 
dismemberment  of  the  Republic,  and  that  this  had  become,  one 


CONCLUSION  487 

might  almost  say,  the  accepted  formula  for  settling  conflicts 
between  the  great  Eastern  Powers.  When  one  recalls,  moreover, 
how  long  and  assiduously  Potemkin  pursued  his  designs  against 
the  Republic;  how  seriously  a  partition  was  discussed  at  St. 
Petersburg  in  almost  every  year  of  the  Oriental  crisis,  in  1789, 
1790,  1791  — and  that  not  so  much  as  a  means  of  punishing 
Poland  as  of  disarming  the  hostility  of  Prussia;  and  how  readily 
the  Empress  succumbed  to  the  temptation  of  a  new  partition 
in  1792;  one  can  hardly  avoid  the  conclusion  that  submission  to 
Russia  afforded  no  guarantee  of  security  to  Poland,  and  that  the 
policy  advocated  by  Stanislas  offered  no  more  certainty  of  salva- 
tion than  the  policy  adopted  by  the  Patriots.  Indeed,  it  is 
probable  that  had  Poland  remained  submissive  and  passive,  she 
would  have  fallen  a  victim  to  a  new  partition  and  to  the  loss  of  her 
political  existence  sooner  or  later  —  with  the  sole  difference  that 
then  she  would  have  perished  shamefully,  and  her  ruin  would  have 
been  infinitely  more  deserved. 

The  general  European  crisis  following  the  outbreak  of  the 
Oriental  war  offered  the  Poles  a  great  opportunity  and  forced 
them  to  make  a  great  decision.  Three  courses  lay  open  to  them: 
alliance  with  Russia,  alliance  with  Prussia,  or  timorous  neutrality. 
An  alliance  with  Russia  could  have  been  purchased  by  bartering 
away  still  more  of  the  sovereignty  of  the  Republic,  and  by  hand- 
ing over  the  nation's  army,  its  fortresses,  and  its  richest  provinces 
to  Potemkin,  whose  ambitions  to  become  King  of  Dacia,  Duke  of 
the  Ukraine,  or  liberator  of  the  '  oppressed  '  Orthodox  people 
were  tolerably  well  known  at  Warsaw.  It  would  almost  certainly 
have  drawn  down  upon  the  country  an  attack  from  Prussia,  and 
one  may  imagine  how  much  protection  Poland  would  have  re- 
ceived from  Catherine,  absorbed,  as  she  was,  with  the  two  severe 
wars  she  already  had  on  her  hands.  Neutrality  would  apparently 
have  been  the  worst  of  all  courses,  for  it  would  have  left  the 
Republic  exposed  unaided  to  aggressions  from  both  sides.  The 
Four  Years'  Diet  decided  in  favor  of  alliance  with  Prussia; 
decided  to  seize  what  seemed  to  be  a  unique  and,  if  lost,  irre- 
coverable opportunity;  decided  to  attempt  at  once  the  great 
venture  of  throwing  off  the  foreign  yoke  and  putting  through  the 


488  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

political  reforms,  without  which  no  solid  national  revival  was 
possible. 

The  attempt  itself  was  justifiable  enough,  but  was  it  well 
carried  out  ?  On  the  whole,  we  think  the  effort  was  distinctly- 
creditable.  The  Diet  displayed  an  energy,  a  patriotic  enthusiasm, 
a  liberal,  enlightened  spirit,  and  a  high  appreciation  of  its  task, 
such  as  no  Polish  parliament  had  shown  for  two  centuries.  It 
succeeded  within  three  years  in  doubling  the  revenues  and 
trebling  the  military  forces  of  the  state;  it  gave  the  country  an 
administrative  system  which,  within  the  short  period  of  its  exis- 
tence, performed  an  immense  work;  it  made  a  brave  and  promis- 
ing attempt  to  win  for  the  Republic  the  sympathies  and  support 
of  the  classes  always  hitherto  neglected  —  the  bourgeoisie,  the 
Dissidents,  the  Jews,  the  peasantry  —  by  legislation  in  their 
favor;  and  finally,  by  establishing  the  Constitution  of  the  Third 
of  May,  it  proved  that  the  nation  had  broken  away  from  its  old 
errors  and  prejudices  and  was  ready  to  enter  upon  a  new  period 
of  sound  and  well-ordered  political  life.1  But,  as  against  all  this, 
there  is  much  to  be  put  on  the  debit  side.  The  Diet  was  guilty  of 
wounding  Catherine  unnecessarily  by  tactless  oratory  and  some 
gratuitous  affronts.  The  refusal  to  cede  Dantzic  and  Thorn  and 
even  a  small  part  of  Great  Poland  to  Prussia  was  probably  a 
mistake,  although  a  very  intelligible  one,  for  the  Poles  thus  lost 
their  last  chance  of  satisfying  the  natural  ambitions  of  Berlin 
without  a  new  partition,  their  last  chance  of  giving  their  alliance 
with  Prussia  some  prospects  of  permanence.  It  would  have  been 
wiser,  perhaps,  had  the  makers  of  the  new  constitution  contented 
themselves  with  designating  the  Elector  of  Saxony  as  the  future 
king,  while  postponing  the  establishment  of  the  hereditary  succes- 
sion until  a  later  period;  for  they  would  thus  have  gained  their 
essential  object  —  to  guard  against  the  dangers  of  a  new  inter- 
regnum —  at  least  for  a  long  time  to  come,  and  they  would  have 
avoided  stirring  up  that  storm  of  alarm  and  exasperation  which 

1  Cf.  the  quite  contrary  opinion  about  the  new  constitution  of  KocTOMapoBt, 
op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  115  ft".,  and  Solov'ev,  op.  tit.,  pp.  251  f.  Most  of  the  Polish  historians 
pass  eulogies  upon  the  constitution  itself,  but  some  of  them  (Bobrzynski  and 
Kalinka)  doubt  the  wisdom  of  introducing  such  fundamental  changes  at  such  a 
moment. 


CONCLUSION  489 

the  idea  of  an  hereditary  monarchy  in  Poland  aroused  at  Berlin 
and  St.  Petersburg.1  But  the  worst  mistake  of  the  Diet  lay  in  not 
pressing  forward  sufficiently  the  military  preparations  of  the 
Republic.  The  army  of  100,000  men,  which  was  voted  at  the 
beginning  of  the  Diet,  could  and  should  have  been  raised;  but 
three  and  a  half  years  after  that  memorable  vote,  at  the  outbreak 
of  the  war  with  Russia,  hardly  more  than  half  of  the  appointed 
number  of  troops  were  actually  under  arms,  and  in  other  respects 
as  well  Poland  was  lamentably  unready.  This  fatal  negligence 
was  due  in  part  to  the  fact  that  the  Diet,  which  had  such  a  multi- 
tude of  affairs  on  its  hands,  did  not  find  time  to  attend  properly 
to  military  matters;  in  part,  to  an  exaggerated  reliance  upon  the 
friendship  and  support  of  Prussia,  and  later,  of  the  Emperor 
Leopold;  in  part,  and  chiefly  perhaps,  to  the  lack  of  money  and 
credit.  Both  might  have  been  procured,  if  the  Polish  leaders  had 
known  how  to  set  about  the  task.  Hence  a  distinguished  his- 
torian has  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  fundamental  cause  of 
the  disasters  of  Poland  was  the  amazing  ignorance  of  the  Polish 
statesmen  of  that  time,  particularly  with  regard  to  economic  and 
financial  matters.2  At  all  events,  the  failure  of  the  Poles  to  arm 
themselves  properly  during  the  three  years'  respite  that  was 
granted  to  them,  avenged  itself  with  ruinous  results  in  the  cam- 
paign of  1792. 

That  campaign  presents  a  painful  spectacle.  What  is  one  to 
think  of  a  nation  which,  after  boasting  of  its  regeneration,  when 
called  upon  to  fight  for  its  liberty  and  very  existence  allows  itself 
to  be  conquered  by  a  hostile  army  of  only  100,000  men,  after  a 
struggle  lasting  barely  two  months  ?  Many  historians  have 
drawn  the  conclusion  that  the  heart  of  the  nation  was  not  in  this 
contest;  that  the  enthusiasm  manifested  over  the  work  of  the 
Third  of  May  was  purely  factitious  outside  the  capital ;  that  the 
mass  of  the  szlachta  preferred  the  old  constitution  and  secretly 
sympathized  with  the  Targowicians ;  and  that  the  nation  as  a 
whole  was  too  far  sunk  in  lethargy  and  demoralization  to  be  able 

1  Cf.  Korzon,  Wewnetrzne  dzieje,  Zamkniecie,  pp.  40  f.,  Kalinka,  Der  polnische 
Reichstag,  ii,  pp.  755~76o. 

2  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  Zamknie.de,  pp.  33  f. 


490  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  rouse  itself  to  a  manly  effort  even  in  such  a  crisis.1  On  the 
other  hand,  the  historian  who  has  most  thoroughly  investigated 
the  question,  has  discovered  so  many  signs  of  real  enthusiasm  and 
self-devotion  for  the  national  cause  that  he  arrives  at  the  convic- 
tion that  "patriotic  zeal  was  universal";  "the  government 
received  from  all  sides  encouragement  and  exhortations  to  per- 
severance ";  "  the  nation  ardently  desired  to  defend  its  inde- 
pendence." 2  Why,  then,  this  sudden  and  shameful  collapse  ? 
The  blame  must  fall  largely  upon  the  King,  who,  after  volun- 
tarily undertaking  the  direction  of  the  national  defence,  mis- 
managed everything,  refused  to  issue  the  summons  for  a  general 
rising  of  the  nation  in  arms  until  it  was  too  late,  and  then,  while 
the  military  situation  was  still  far  from  desperate,  cravenly  and 
traitorously  went  over  to  the  enemy.  But  it  is  unfair  to  make  the 
King  the  scapegoat  for  the  whole  disaster.  What  shall  one  say  of 
the  Patriotic  leaders  who,  with  unpardonable  shortsightedness, 
entrusted  the  direction  of  the  defence  to  a  man  whose  whole  past 
record  showed  him  tragically  unfitted  for  such  a  responsibility  ? 
Or,  when  the  King's  intention  to  surrender  had  become  apparent, 
why  did  no  one  find  the  courage  to  thrust  him  aside  and  to  force 
on  the  continuation  of  the  struggle  till  the  bitter  end  ?  Or  why 
did  the  mass  of  the  szlachta  wait  for  a  summons  from  Warsaw, 
instead  of  rushing  spontaneously  to  their  country's  defence  ?  The 
sum  of  the  matter  would  seem  to  be  that  —  in  spite  of  warm  and 
widespread  patriotic  zeal — the  nation  did  not  find  in  itself  or  in  its 
leaders  or,  least  of  all,  in  its  king  that  iron  will;  that  indomitable 
resolution;  that  readiness  to  risk  everything;  to  sacrifice  every- 
thing; and  to  stop  at  nothing,  which  alone  might  still,  perhaps, 
have  saved  it.  The  lack  of  a  great  man  of  action  at  the  head  was 
cruelly  felt,  but  the  morale  of  the  nation  was  also  at  fault. 

In  reviewing  the  causes  of  this  collapse,  one  should  not  over- 
look how  signally  fortune  had  turned  against  the  Poles  in  the 
preceding  two  years,  how  many  events  on  the  broader  stage  of 
Europe  had  combined  to  thwart  their  hopes  and  expectations  and 
to  produce  a  situation  infinitely  unfavorable  to  them.     As  ex- 

1  So,  for  instance,  Bobrzynski,  Dzieje  Polski,  ii,  pp.  338  f.,  KapieBi.,  Ha^eme 
IIojibfflH,  pp.  25  ff.,  KocTOMapoBt,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  119. 

2  Korzon,  op.  cit.,  v,  pp.  157  ff. 


CONCLUSION  49I 

amples,  one  might  cite  the  fiasco  of  Prussian  policy  in  1790,  the 
backdown  of  the  Triple  Alliance  before  Catherine  in  1791,  the 
sudden  and  complete  change  in  the  European  political  constella- 
tion that  followed,  the  premature  death  of  the  Emperor  Leopold, 
the  outbreak  of  the  Revolutionary  War  at  the  very  time  when 
Catherine  most  desired  to  have  her  hands  free,  and  the  un- 
paralleled treachery  of  Prussia  at  the  moment  of  the  Russian 
attack  on  Poland.  Few  nations,  perhaps,  have  had  to  conduct 
their  struggle  for  liberty  under  such  adverse  conditions. 

The  effort  made  by  the  Four  Years'  Diet  ended,  apparently,  in 
total  failure,  with  the  dismemberment  of  the  country  and  the 
virtual  annihilation  of  the  Polish  state.  But  mere  material 
success  or  failure  is  not  the  highest  standard  for  judging  such  an 
effort;  there  remains  the  ethical  criterion.  If  the  great  Powers 
had  annexed  the  whole  of  Poland  in  1772,  the  world  would  have 
said  that  the  Poles  deserved  their  fate,  and,  in  view  of  the  deathly 
languor  displayed  by  the  nation  at  that  time,  it  seems  probable 
that  the  Polish  name  and  Polish  nationality  would  also  have 
perished.  Twenty  years  later,  however,  a  new  era  had  dawned, 
and  Poland  fell,  not  at  the  moment  of  her  deepest  degradation, 
but  just  when  she  was  beginning  to  put  forth  new  life  and  to  show 
her  greatest  patriotism  and  energy.  The  work  of  the  Four  Years' 
Diet,  the  lofty  character  of  its  leaders,  the  generous  enthusiasms 
and  high  hopes  of  the  period,  the  Constitution  of  the  Third  of 
May,  the  effort  of  the  Polish  army  in  1792,  and  the  new  struggle 
for  liberty  under  Kosciuszko  in  1794  —  these  things  brought  at 
least  this  inestimable  advantage  that  they  furnished  the  nation 
with  a  treasure  of  spiritual  goods  upon  which  it  could  live  and 
maintain  its  faith  in  itself  and  its  future  after  the  loss  of  its  inde- 
pendence. From  these  tragic  but  ennobling  experiences  later 
generations  could  convince  themselves  and  the  unprejudiced 
outside  world  that  this  nation  had  not  deserved  to  perish.  And 
so,  we  think,  the  Patriots  of  1788  deserved  well  of  their  country. 
They  did  not  succeed  in  saving  the  Polish  state  —  perhaps  no  one 
could  have  done  that;  but  they  did  succeed  in  saving  Polish 
nationality  and  the  spiritual  life  of  their  people,  which  was,  after 
all,  more  important. 


492  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

II 

Those  Polish  historians  who  are  wont  to  trace  their  country's 
downfall  to  the  facts  of  geography  are  at  least  right  in  this  respect, 
that  Poland  had  the  unique  misfortune  of  being  placed  midway 
between  two  states,  which,  having  been  the  last  to  attain  the 
rank  of  great  Powers  and  having  their  territorial  foundations  only 
half-built,  were  throughout  the  eighteenth  century  reaching  out 
around  them  on  all  sides  with  a  restless,  youthful  energy,  an 
insatiable  voracity,  and  an  indifference  to  moral  scruples,  which 
the  older  Powers  might  emulate  but  could  scarcely  equal.  Poland 
was  not  only  the  weakest  state  of  her  size  in  that  age,  but  she  also 
held  the  most  exposed  and  dangerous  position.  While  Prussian 
writers  are  accustomed  to  throw  the  chief  responsibility  for  the 
Partitions  upon  Russia,  and  Russian  writers  return  the  compli- 
ment in  kind,  it  would  seem  fairer  to  divide  the  honors  evenly, 
for,  in  our  opinion,  the  Second  Partition,  like  the  First,  was  the 
result  of  the  common  and  equal  cupidity  of  both  Powers,  with 
Austria  playing  the  part  of  an  interested,  and  in  the  end  a  duped 
and  disappointed,  accomplice. 

Prussian  policy  during  the  period  surveyed  in  this  book  was 
essentially  one  of  territorial  aggrandizement.  The  plans,  the 
methods,  the  immediate  objective  varied  frequently;  but,  except, 
perhaps,  for  Frederick  William's  projected  attack  on  Austria  in 
1790,  the  primary  purpose  of  which  was,  apparently,  to  settle  the 
old  rivalry  between  the  two  German  Powers,  the  great  aim  —  the 
aim  underlying  the  Hertzberg  plan,  the  alliance  with  Austria,  the 
crusade  against  the  French  Revolution,  the  Prussian  machinations 
against  Poland  —  was  the  acquisition  of  new  territories :  acquisi- 
tions in  any  quarter  —  Juliers  and  Berg,  Lusatia,  Swedish 
Pomerania,  Courland,  Dantzic,  Great  Poland,  or  the  whole  left 
bank  of  the  Vistula;  acquisitions  by  any  means  but  usually  with 
the  minimum  of  effort,  whether  by  elaborate  diplomatic  combina- 
tions, like  Hertzberg's,  or  by  a  half-hearted  campaign  or  two,  as 
in  the  case  of  the  war  with  France.  This  aggressive  policy  was  not 
dictated,  of  course,  by  any  ideas  about  '  Prussia's  German  mis- 
sion,' or  the  duty  of  recovering  lands  of  German  nationality.    Its 


conclusion  493 

basis  was  simply  the  conviction  that  this  Prussian  Monarchy, 
which,  with  its  meagre,  scattered,  and  exposed  territories,  still 
seemed  to  be  only  the  skeleton  of  a  state,  must  take  on  flesh  and 
bulk,  unite  its  disjecta  membra,  and  acquire  a  defensible  frontier. 

Well-founded  as  that  conviction  might  be,  it  is  difficult  to  over- 
look the  sordidness  and  blindness  of  a  policy,  which  saw  in  the 
unparalleled  upheavals  which  Europe  was  then  going  through, 
only  opportunities  for  selfish  aggrandizement.  It  is  not  easy  to 
construct  an  apology  for  a  king  who,  in  the  course  of  a  very  short 
reign,  allied  himself  with  almost  every  state  in  Europe  in  turn, 
and  broke  faith  with  almost  every  one  of  them.  The  worst  part 
of  Frederick  William's  record,  however,  is  his  desertion  of  the 
Poles  in  1792  in  violation  of  his  solemn  engagements,  and  the 
initiative  which  he  took  in  provoking  a  new  partition  of  the 
allied  state,  which  had  given  him  no  cause  of  offence  whatever. 

Apologists  have,  at  any  rate,  been  found  even  for  Prussia's 
treatment  of  Poland.  One  need  not,  perhaps,  pay  much  attention 
to  such  extravagant  views  as  that  of  Treitschke,  who  saw  in  the 
Constitution  of  the  Third  of  May  only  an  outburst  of  the  old 
"  mortal  hatred  against  the  Germans,  the  Protestants,"  which 
"  must  be  taken  by  Prussia  as  a  declaration  of  war  "  l  —  unless, 
indeed,  Prussia  was  entitled  to  consider  any  attempt  on  the  part 
of  her  neighbors  to  live  under  decent  and  orderly  conditions  as  a 
casus  belli.  The  most  elaborate  vindication  of  Frederick  Wil- 
liam's policy  is  that  offered  by  Heinrich  von  Sybel,  whose  argu- 
ment is  substantially  as  follows. 

The  alliance  treaty  of  1790  had  been  torn  up  by  the  Poles 
themselves,  since  they  had  conspired  with  the  Emperor  Leopold 
to  introduce  their  new  constitution,  without  the  knowledge  and 
contrary  to  the  wishes  of  Prussia,  and  had  then  passed  over  more 
and  more  openly  into  the  clientele  of  Austria,  while  virtually 
abandoning  their  connection  with  Prussia  altogether.  Hence 
"  we  cannot  .  .  .  talk  of  the  breach  of  an  effective  treaty  in  the 
measures  adopted  by  Prussian  policy."  Frederick  William  could, 
in  any  case,  have  defended  Poland  only  if  he  received  the  loyal 
support  of  Austria.    But  the  latter  hastened  to  "  tear  asunder  the 

1  Deutsche  Geschichie,  i,  p.  113. 


494  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

new  bond  between  the  German  Powers  "  through  "  Leopold's 
plan  of  the  Polish-Saxon  union,"  which  Sybel  regards  as  "  the 
cornerstone  "  of  the  Emperor's  whole  political  system,  and  as  a 
plot  directed  against  the  most  vital  interests  of  Prussia,  which  was 
thereby  "  driven  into  the  arms  of  Russia."  Frederick  William's 
decision  in  favor  of  a  new  partition  was  then  forced  upon  him  by 
the  unparalleled  crisis  in  which  he  found  himself,  with  Russia, 
France,  and  Austria  simultaneously  announcing  offensive  plans 
which  l  threatened  the  whole  Continent  with  the  most  violent 
convulsions,'  '  called  all  existing  rights  and  titles  of  possession  in 
question,'  and  '  made  self-preservation  the  leading  principle  of 
every  individual.'  The  King  simply  chose  the  least  of  evils,  the 
only  course  which  did  not  lead  to  evident  disaster.  He  could  not 
have  remained  neutral  in  the  face  of  the  universal  onset  of  the 
other  Powers;  nor  could  he  have  allied  himself  with  "  the  Parisian 
assassins  "  in  favor  of  "  the  Polish  slaveholders  ";  nor  could  he 
have  thrown  himself  with  all  his  forces  upon  the  French,  while 
allowing  Russia  to  seize  the  whole  of  Poland.1 

This  argument  seems  to  us  false  in  almost  every  particular, 
false  as  a  presentation  of  the  course  of  events  and  as  an  inter- 
pretation of  the  motives  that  determined  the  King's  policy.  No 
evidence  whatever  has  yet  been  discovered  to  show  that  Leopold 
was  consulted  in  advance  as  to  the  introduction  of  the  new  Polish 
constitution.  It  seems  the  height  of  exaggeration  to  ascribe  so 
important  a  place  in  the  Emperor's  plans  to  the  project  for  the 
Saxon-Polish  union,  or  to  assert  that  Prussia  was  thereby  driven 
into  the  arms  of  Russia.  Frederick  William's  decision  in  favor  of 
a  new  partition  was  made  before  the  unparalleled  crisis  described 
by  Sybel  existed  —  in  February  or  March  of  1792  at  the  latest; 
and  it  would  be  difficult  to  prove  that  the  various  alternatives 
mentioned  above  presented  themselves  to  the  King's  mind  at  all.2 

1  The  above  is  based  upon  ideas  that  run  through  the  whole  of  the  Geschichte  der 
Revolutionszeit,  as  well  as  through  Sybel's  articles  in  the  Historische  Zeitschrift,  x, 
xii,  and  xxiii;  but  especially  upon  the  discussion  of  the  broader  aspects  of  the 
Second  Partition  in  the  work  first  cited,  iii,  pp.  224-228. 

2  Sybel's  work,  which  passes  as  one  of  the  classic  histories  of  the  Revolutionary 
period,  bristles  with  erroneous  assertions  and  judgments  regarding  Polish  affairs. 
Askenazy,  who  has  pointed  out  some  of  them,  goes  so  far  as  to  accuse  the  German 
historian  of  perverting  the  facts  deliberately  (op.  cit.,  pp.  130  f.). 


conclusion  495 

The  thesis  most  commonly  advanced  by  German  historians  is 
that  Prussia's  determination  to  appropriate  a  part  of  Poland  was 
a  "  justifiable  act  of  self-defence  "  (eine  That  gerechter  Notwehr), 
since  the  King  was  placed  in  a  position  where  he  had  to  decide 
either  to  tolerate  Russia's  exclusive  and  absolute  domination  in 
Poland,  or  else  by  a  new  partition  to  set  bounds  to  the  swelling 
flood  of  Muscovite  power.  "  It  was  a  MachtjrageP  The  whole  of 
Poland  must  not  be  allowed  to  fall  into  Russian  hands.  Prussia's 
own  safety  forbade  her  to  '  permit  the  Russian  garrisons  to  fix 
themselves  as  firmly  in  Posen  and  Gnesen,  as  in  Grodno  and 
Warsaw.' l  —  But  this  view  also  rests  upon  an  anachronism.  It 
ascribes  to  the  Prussian  statesmen  of  that  time  ideas  which 
modern  historians  think  they  ought  to  have  had,  but  of  which 
there  is  no  trace  in  the  records.  During  the  early  months  of  1792 
—  the  time  at  which  the  decision  in  favor  of  a  new  partition  was 
taken  at  Berlin  —  the  King  and  his  ministers  were  aware  that 
Russia  was  preparing  to  recover  her  old  influence  in  Poland.  But 
did  they  view  the  prospect  with  apprehension  ?  Not  in  the  least. 
They  believed  that  Russia  was  only  playing  into  their  hands,  for 
they  were  at  that  time  firmly  convinced  that  the  Empress  in- 
tended to  settle  the  fate  of  Poland  by  a  concert  of  the  neighboring 
Powers,  which  would  restore  her  preponderant  influence,  but 
would  also  assure  to  the  German  Courts  a  suitable  voice,  in  Polish 
affairs.  The  Prussians  were  not,  indeed,  disposed  to  allow  Cath- 
erine a  sole  and  exclusive  influence  in  Poland,  but  they  did  not 
believe  that  such  was  her  aim;  and  they  were  quite  ready  to 
accord  her  a  preponderant  influence.  In  numerous  Prussian 
documents  of  this  time  one  finds  the  statement  that  experience 
had  proved  that  it  was  natural  and  inevitable  that  Russia  should 
always  exercise  a  far  greater  authority  in  Poland  than  either  of  the 
German  Powers ;  and  that  such  a  state  of  things  was  not  only  not 
detrimental  to  Prussian  interests,  but  infinitely  preferable  to  the 
situation  existing  since  1788.2  It  may  therefore  be  asserted  that 
in  resolving  to  provoke  a  new  partition  Frederick  William  was 

1  Cf.,  e.  g.,  Treitschke,  op.  cit.,  i,  p.  131;  Heigel,  op.  cit.,  i,  pp.  570-573;  Sybel, 
op.  cit.,  iii,  pp.  224-228,  and  152,  note. 

2  In  substantiation  of  the  above,  one  may  cite  from  among  many  documents  the 
rescripts  to  Jacobi  of  March  1,  17,  April  6,  1792  (B.A.,  R.  1,  169);  to  Lucchesini, 


496  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

consciously  choosing,  not  the  lesser  of  two  evils,  but  the  greater  of 
two  advantages.  While  regarding  the  restoration  of  the  Russian 
ascendancy  in  Poland,  not  as  an  imminent  and  pressing  danger, 
but  rather  as  a  positive  gain  for  Prussia,  he  determined,  without 
any  real  necessity  or  compulsion  whatever,  to  exploit  the  situation 
still  further  in  order  to  satisfy  his  long-repressed  covetousness  for 
Polish  territory. 

It  may  readily  be  admitted  that  Prussia  needed  to  acquire 
Dantzic,  Thorn,  and  that  part  of  Great  Poland  which  projected  so 
deeply  into  the  side  of  the  Hohenzollern  Monarchy.  But  it  was 
also  a  Prussian  interest  of  equal,  and  perhaps  even  greater,  im- 
portance that  the  Republic  should  be  preserved  as  an  effective 
'  buffer-state,'  as  a  real  barrier  against  the  great,  aggressive 
military  Empire  in  the  east.  We  venture  to  think  that  a  revived 
Poland  —  consolidated  and  reinvigorated  under  the  Constitution 
of  the  Third  of  May  —  could  never  have  proved  so  serious  a 
danger  to  Prussia  as  the  advance  of  Russia  into  the  heart  of 
Central  Europe  to  within  striking  distance  of  Berlin.  At  all 
events,  it  behooved  Prussia  to  weigh  very  carefully  the  advantage 
of  every  acquisition  in  Poland  against  the  perils  involved  in  the 
aggrandizement  of  Russia  and  the  necessity  of  maintaining  the 
existence  of  the  Republic.  Frederick  the  Great  appears  to  have 
realized  this,1  and  so  did  Hertzberg.  Whatever  charges  may  be 
brought  against  the  latter,  it  must  be  said  in  his  favor  that  he 
planned  to  make  the  needed  acquisitions  on  the  east  with  the 
minimum  of  loss  to  the  Republic,  and  then  to  assure  the  perma- 
nent integrity  of  Poland's  remaining  possessions.2  But  those  who 
came  after  him  were  blind  to  such  considerations.  In  their  sense- 
less lust  for  territory,  they  demanded  far  more  than  they  had  any 
need  of,  thus  opening  the  door  to  still  more  inordinate  claims  on 
the  part  of  Russia;  and  to  these  latter  claims  they  assented 
without  a  moment's  hesitation,  although  it  was  obvious  that  a 

January  25  and  April  27  (ibid.,  R.  9,  27);  to  Goltz,  March  22  (ibid.,  R.  XI,  Russland, 
133);  Schulenburg  to  Brunswick,  May  6  (ibid.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  8gb.). 

1  Cf.  Sybel,  loc.  oil. 

2  Cf.  Hertzberg's  Memoir  in  Schmidt's  Zeitschrift,  vii,  p.  269;  P.  Wittichen, 
Die  polnische  Politik  Preussens,  pp.  69  f.;  Andreae,  Preussische  und  russische 
Politik,  p.  27. 


conclusion  497 

partition  arranged  on  so  gigantic  a  scale  could  mean  only  the 
virtual  annihilation  of  Poland.  Even  German  historians  admit 
that  Prussia's  acquisitions  were  immeasurably  dearly  bought.1 
In  our  opinion,  the  gain  was  far  outweighed  by  the  disadvantages: 
the  odium  inseparable  from  so  signal  a  breach  of  treaty  obliga- 
tions; the  quarrel  with  Austria  over  the  indemnities,  with  its 
fateful  result  upon  the  course  of  the  struggle  in  the  west;  the 
replacement  of  a  weak,  quiet,  and  altogether  inoffensive  neighbor 
on  the  east  by  a  powerful,  restless,  and  aggressive  one;  and  the 
inclusion  within  Prussia  of  a  large  alien  population,  which  could 
not  be  assimilated,  and  which,  had  it  been  permanently  retained, 
would  have  tended  to  give  Prussia  the  character  of  a  hybrid,  non- 
national  state  like  Austria.  In  short,  while  Prussia  obtained  by 
the  Second  Partition  the  largest  acquisition  of  territory  that  she 
had  made  down  to  that  time,  we  think  this  was  nevertheless  one  of 
the  most  short-sighted,  disastrous,  and  morally  reprehensible 
transactions  in  her  history. 

Ill 

The  majority  of  the  historians  who  have  treated  of  this  period 
have  advanced  the  thesis  that  Catherine  II  disliked  partitions; 
that  she  would  have  preferred  to  rule  over  the  whole  of  Poland  by 
influence  rather  than  to  make  territorial  acquisitions  at  its  ex- 
pense, which  must  be  purchased  by  corresponding  concessions  to 
the  German  Powers;  and  that  the  dismemberment  of  the  Re- 
public was  forced  upon  her  by  Prussia.  The  Second  Partition, 
like  the  First,  it  is  said,  was  a  triumph  of  Prussian  policy  over 
Russian.  It  was,  above  all,  Frederick  William's  threat  to  abandon 
the  French  war  and  to  turn  his  attention  to  the  east,  coupled 
with  the  incorrigibly  refractory  temper  displayed  by  the  Poles  and 
the  utter  failure  of  the  Confederates  of  Targowica  to  fulfil  the 
hopes  she  had  placed  in  them,  which  compelled  the  Empress  to 
agree  to  a  measure  which  was  repugnant  to  her  and  contrary  to 
the  fundamental  aims  of  her  Polish  policy.2    The  evidence  for  this 

1  Cf.  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i,  pp.  138,  507. 

2  Among  the  historians  who  take  this  general  view  of  Catherine's  aims  (and 
apply  it  to  the  Second  Partition,  in  case  they  treat  of  that  subject  at  all),  one  may 


498 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


view,  however,  is  very  inadequate.  As  far  as  the  Second  Partition 
is  concerned,  it  rests  chiefly  upon  the  Empress'  delay  in  the 
autumn  of  1792  in  acceding  to  the  demands  of  Prussia,  and  then 
upon  her  exposition  of  the  motives  that  had  determined  her  to 
yield,  contained  in  the  original  instruction  given  to  Sievers.  In 
our  opinion,  no  such  interpretation  need  be  put  upon  that  delay, 
which  can  better  be  explained  by  Catherine's  momentary  irrita- 
tion over  the  disasters  in  the  west,  and  her  natural  desire  to 
affect  a  certain  reluctance  about  so  delicate  a  transaction;  and 
she  was  under  no  necessity,  and  not  at  all  likely,  to  disclose  her 
real  motives  in  an  official  document  like  the  instruction  to 
Sievers,  which  was  not  of  confidential  character  and  which  was 
obviously  intended  chiefly  to  put  the  best  face  possible  on  a  very 
unsavory  business.  We  have  already  expressed  the  belief  that  the 
Empress'  '  opposition  '  and  '  scruples '  at  the  time  of  the  First 
Partition  were  chiefly  a  sham,  a  bit  of  stage-play  for  the  sake  of 
appearances;  and  we  think  it  highly  probable  that  her  attitude 
with  regard  to  the  Second  Partition  was  very  similar. 

It  is  true  that  no  entirely  conclusive  proof  of  this  can  be  offered 
from  the  documents  available,  but  the  indications  point  strongly 
in  that  direction.  Beneath  the  guarded  phraseology  of  the  famous 
rescript  to  Potemkin  of  July  18/29,  1791,  one  can  detect  Cath- 
erine's willingness  to  accept  a  new  partition  if  the  King  of  Prussia 
displayed  a  covetousness  which,  in  his  case,  could  be  assumed 
with  tolerable  certainty.  One  does  not  find  here  any  signs  of  a 
real  inclination  to  resist  such  a  suggestion.  We  have  already 
noted  the  astonishing  activity  of  the  Russian  envoys  at  Berlin 
and  Vienna  in  '  provoking  '  confidential  overtures  from  those 
Courts  with  regard  to  a  partition,  and  the  Empress'  discreet  but 
highly  significant  hints  to  Prussia  on  the  subject  of  indemnities, 
the  aim  of  which  was  probably  to  divert  the  King's  ambitions 
from  France  to  Poland.  In  April  of  1792,  at  the  moment  of 
beginning  the  intervention  in  Poland,  the  Empress'  council  laid 
down  the  principle  that  in  return  for  the  great  costs  of  the 

name  Sybel,  Sorel,  Raumer,  Janssen,  Bruckner,  Bobrzyriski,  Kalinka,  Askenazy, 
Smitt,  Martens,  Solov'ev,  and  Ilovalski.  The  contrary  view  is  held  by  only  a  few 
writers,  among  whom  one  may  cite  Herrmann,  Heigel,  Heidrich,  Smolenski,  and 
Kostomarov. 


conclusion  499 

enterprise  Russia  must  strive  to  obtain  at  least  perfect  security 
on  the  side  of  Poland  for  all  future  time,  and  that  no  merely- 
palliative  settlement  of  Polish  affairs  could  be  allowed.1  Coming 
from  a  body  dominated  by  Bezborodko,  one  of  the  earliest 
champions  of  a  partition,  this  dry  expression  of  the  protocol  gives 
matter  for  thought.  In  the  following  October  Bezborodko, 
reporting  the  first  definite  discussions  with  Goltz  about  the 
Prussian  demands,  declared  joyfully  that  no  opposition  was  to  be 
expected  to  "  our  intention  to  take  the  Ukraine,"  and  that  he  was 
in  favor  of  allowing  the  King  of  Prussia  to  send  his  troops  into 
Poland,  "  since  that  fits  into  our  plan  exactly,  and  will  certainly 
lead  to  the  quickest  denouement  of  the  affair."  2  When,  in 
addition  to  all  this  and  to  the  considerations  elsewhere  adduced, 
one  recalls  how  easily  Catherine  might  have  averted  a  partition 
had  she  made  any  genuine  effort  to  do  so,  how  brief  and  per- 
functory her  pretended  opposition  to  the  arrangement  really  was, 
and  how  little  necessity  there  was  for  her  to  give  way  had  she 
seriously  wished  to  stand  out,  it  is  difficult  to  escape  the  con- 
clusion that  the  generally  accepted  view  about  her  attitude  on 
this  question  is  wrong;  that  at  heart  she  desired  a  partition,  and 
from  an  early  date  —  perhaps  from  the  beginning  of  her  inter- 
vention in  Poland  3  —  secretly  intended  to  bring  one  about.  We 
cannot  agree,  therefore,  that  the  Second  Partition  is  to  be  con- 
sidered as  a  triumph  of  Prussian  policy  over  that  of  Russia.  On 
the  contrary,  it  seems  probable  that  Russia  attained  precisely 
what  she  had  long  desired  —  and  that  on  terms  most  advanta- 
geous to  herself  —  while  thrusting  the  apparent  moral  responsi- 
bility upon  Prussia. 

If  such  was  the  Empress'  policy,  what  were  her  motives  ?  It 
may  be  doubted  whether  her  conduct  was  guided,  as  is  sometimes 
said,4  by  the  desire  to  free  the  millions  of  Russian  and  Orthodox 
people  in  Poland  and  to  complete  the  political  unification  of  the 

1  Protocol  of  March  29  /  April  9,  Apx.  Toe.  Cob.,  i,  pp.  906-910. 

2  Note  of  Bezborodko,  of  October  26,  1792,  Apx.  Bop.,  xiii,  p.  275  (here  erron- 
eously placed  in  1793,  and  otherwise  undated). 

8  That  such  was  her  intention  appears  to  be  implied  in  two  letters  (of  Zavadovski 
and  S.  R.  Vorontsov  respectively)  published  in  the  Apx.  Bop.,  ix,  p.  302,  and  xii, 

P-  75- 

4  Cf.,  e.  g.,  Solov'ev,  op.  cit.,  pp.  255  f.,  304  f. 


/ 


5oo 


THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 


/ 


Russian  race.  It  is  true  that  in  a  few  official  documents  l  Cath- 
erine speaks  of  the  liberation  of  "  those  of  the  same  faith  and 
blood  as  ourselves  "  as  one  of  the  advantages  incidental  to  a 
partition;  and  she  sometimes  talked  of  the  necessity  of  regaining 
all  the  lands  where  the  old  Russian  princes  lay  buried.2  But  these 
sporadic  utterances  are  probably  merely  phrases  intended  to 
justify  the  Partition,  not  Catherine's  motives.3  When  she  had 
'  liberated  '  her  oppressed  compatriots  from  the  rule  of  the  Polish 
state,  she  did  nothing  to  free  them  from  the  far  worse  rule  of  the 
Polish  szlachta.  Except  for  an  attack  on  the  Uniate  Church,  she 
made  no  effort  to  assert  the  Russian  character  of  the  annexed 
region.  Indeed,  down  to  the  third  quarter  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  the  Russian  government  and  Russian  society  continued 
to  regard  that  region,  not  as  a  fundamentally  Russian  territory, 
but  as  a  Polish  territory  which  happened  to  have  a  considerable 
Russian  servile  population.4  The  modern  conception  of  the 
'  rights  of  nationality  '  was  so  utterly  alien  to  the  eighteenth 
century,  Catherine's  policy  was  shaped  on  such  entirely  different 
lines,  that  it  seems  incongruous  to  imagine  the  Empress  as 
governed  by  the  nationalist  impulse,  or  fired  with  the  ambition 
to  be  the  unifier  of  the  Russian  race.  What  she,  like  her  con- 
temporaries, was  vastly  more  concerned  about,  was  material 
power,  and  the  glory  and  profit  of  making  territorial  acquisitions. 
In  the  various  letters  that  have  come  down  to  us  in  which  her 
ministers  and  advisers  present  their  ideas  about  the  advantages 
to  be  gained  by  the  Partition,  one  finds  a  great  deal  about  the 
strategic  improvement  of  the  frontier,  and  the  greater  security 
against  Poland  and  Turkey;  most  of  all,  about  the  mere  magni- 
tude of  the  acquisition  in  area  and  population;  but  nothing  at  all 
about  the  gain  for  the  cause  of  Russian  national  unity.5  And 
doubtless  Catherine's  views  were  of  the  same  sort. 

1  E.  g.,  in  the  rescript  to  Potemkin  of  July  18/29,  1791,  and  the  instruction  to 
Sievers. 

2  XpanoBimKift,  ^HeBHHKt,  June  4/15,  1793,  p.  250. 

3  Cf .  KapieBt,  Ha^eme  IIo.ibmH,  p.  1 79. 

4  nmraHt,  HcTopia  PyccKoii  SraorpacfnH,  iv,  pp.  13  ff ;   KapieBt,  op.  cit.,  pp. 
179  ff. 

6  Zavadovski  to  S.R.  Vorontsov,  January  27/February  7, 1793,  Markov  to  S.R. 
Vorontsov,  November  8/19, 1792,  January  17/28, 1793,  April  18/29,  July  27/August 


CONCLUSION  501 

One  can  therefore  accept  only  with  qualifications  the  plea  most 
commonly  put  forward  by  Russian  historians  in  defence  of  Cath- 
erine's policy  in  the  matter  of  the  dismemberments  of  Poland,  and 
especially  of  the  Second  Partition;  the  plea,  namely,  that  she  was 
only  reclaiming  what  Poland  had  stolen  in  the  days  of  Russia's 
weakness,  and  continuing  the  work  of  the  old  '  gatherers  of  the 
Russian  lands.'  .  Kostomarov,  for  instance,  declares  that  the 
recovery  of  the  Russian  provinces  from  Poland  was  the  most 
justifiable  of  all  the  territorial  acquisitions  made  in  Europe  in  the 
eighteenth  century,  for  Catherine  was  restoring  to  her  Empire 
what  belonged  to  it  in  virtue,  not  of  mere  dynastic  traditions  or 
documents  from  the  archives,  but  of  an  age-long,  living  national 
tie.1  It  may  readily  be  admitted  that  the  great  historic  result  of 
her  work  was  the  virtual  completion  of  the  political  unification  of 
the  Russian  race;  but  it  must  be  added  that  that  achievement 
appears  to  have  been  only  an  involuntary  and  accidental  result  of 
her  policy.2  If  the  provinces  in  question  had  never  belonged  to 
Russia,  and  had  contained  only  a  solidly  Polish  population,  it  can 
scarcely  be  imagined  that  she  would  have  acted  any  differently. 

The  material  gain  accruing  to  Russia  from  the  Second  Partition 
was  immense.  Merely  in  point  of  size,  this  was  one  of  the  two  or 
three  largest  acquisitions  of  territory  that  any  Power  has  made  on 
the  continent  of  Europe  in  modern  times.  From  the  moral  stand- 
point, there  is  little  to  be  said  for  Catherine's  conduct.  The 
hypocrisy  and  the  flagrant  breach  of  promises  which  give  so 
odious  an  aspect  to  the  affair  were  well  set  forth  by  a  Russian 
statesman  of  that  time,  who  wrote:  "  The  thing  itself  is  too 
notoriously  unjust,  but  the  perfidious  manner  in  which  it  was 
executed,  renders  it  still  more  shocking.  Since  we  were  deter- 
mined to  commit  this  injustice,  we  ought  to  have  said  frankly  that 
we  were  robbing  Poland  to  avenge  ourselves,  because  she  had 
tried  to  make  an  offensive  alliance  with  the  Turks  against  us;  but 
instead  we  talked  of  friendship,  we  published  manifestoes  to  say 
that  we  were  seeking  only  the  happiness  of  Poland,  that  we  wished 

7,  Apx.  Bop.,  xii,  pp.  77  f.,  xx,  pp.  32,  34  ff.,  42  ff.,  48  ff.;  Markov  to  Razumovski, 
February  25/March  8,  1793,  P.A.,  XV,  576. 

1  Op.  oil.,  ii,  p.  667.  2  Cf.  KapteBt,  op.  cit.,  pp.  219  L 


502  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  assure  to  her  the  integrity  of  her  possessions  and  the  enjoyment 
of  her  old  government,  under  which  she  had  flourished  with  such 
eclat  through  so  many  centuries !  "  1  It  will  always  be  a  matter  for 
regret  that  the  assertion  of  the  rights  of  Russia  was  not  effected 
without  inflicting  an  even  greater  wrong  upon  Poland.  And  from 
the  standpoint  of  purely  Russian  interests,  it  may  perhaps  be 
doubted  whether  the  gains  made  by  the  Second  Partition  out- 
weighed the  resulting  disadvantages  and  dangers,  to  which  the 
events  of  the  last  century  and  especially  of  the  present  time  afford 
striking  testimony. 

IV 

In  considering  the  Polish  Question  in  the  late  eighteenth  cen- 
tury in  its  broadest  aspects,  as  one  of  the  great  international 
problems  of  that  age,  one  cannot  fail  to  be  impressed  with  the 
inefflcacy  here  of  certain  factors  that  have  served  to  maintain  the 
existence  of  other  states  too  weak  to  defend  themselves  of  their 
own  resources.  Holland,  Belgium,  Switzerland,  Portugal,  and 
Turkey  have,  to  a  large  extent,  owed  their  survival  to  the  fact 
that  one  or  more  of  the  great  Powers  were  interested  in  their 
preservation,  and  that  at  times  the  force  of  European  public 
opinion  has  been  strong  enough  to  prevent  the  more  unscrupulous 
forms  of  international  brigandage. 

Austria,  England,  and  France,  in  varying  degrees,  were  in- 
terested in  the  preservation  of  Poland.  Each  of  them,  within 
the  period  we  have  been  considering,  made  some  attempt  to  save 
the  sinking  Republic.  Pitt's  effort  in  1791  was,  perhaps,  the 
most  promising,  but  it  was  wrecked,  as  we  have  seen,  by  the 
blank  indifference  of  the  British  public  to  the  great  questions  at 
issue,  and  by  the  firmness  and  courage  of  Catherine  II.  Austria 
under  Leopold  II  adopted  an  enlightened  policy  towards  the 
Polish  Question,  which,  had  it  been  accepted  by  the  other  Powers, 
would,  in  our  opinion,  have  worked  out  to  the  great  advantage  of 
all  parties  concerned.  While  the  Emperor  has  been  accused  of 
conducting  the  affair  with  far  less  energy  and  determination  than 
its  importance  deserved,2  while  some  historians  3  have  even  held 

1  S.  R.  Vorontsov  to  his  brother,  May  7/18,  1793,  Apx.  Bop.,  ix,  p.  302. 

2  Cf.  Huffer,  Oeslreich  und  Preussen,  pp.  38  f.         3  Herrmann  and  Heigel. 


CONCLUSION  503 

that  he  was  tolerably  indifferent  about  the  whole  matter,  it  would 
seem  that  he  made  every  effort  in  behalf  of  Poland  that  was  com- 
patible with  Austria's  difficult  international  position.  His  policy 
was  condemned  to  failure  by  the  outbreak  of  the  trouble  with 
France,  and  by  the  desertion  of  Prussia  to  the  side  of  the  Empress. 
In  general,  the  international  situation  in  the  late  eighteenth 
century  was  extremely  unfavorable  to  Poland.  As  long  as  Eng- 
land and  France  were  almost  constantly  at  odds,  while  Austria 
and  Prussia,  according  to  the  mot  of  Joseph  II,  found  their  chief 
business  in  seeing  which  should  stand  higher  in  the  favor  of 
Russia,1  any  effective  combined  action  of  the  great  Powers  in 
defence  of  the  Republic  was  almost  impossible. 

As  for  the  deterrent  force  of  public  opinion,  this  was  precisely 
the  time  when  that  factor  exercised  least  influence  upon  the  policy 
of  the  great  Powers,  when  in  most  capitals  policy  was  determined 
by  a  handful  of  persons  —  princes,  ministers,  favorites,  or  back- 
stairs intriguers  —  and  when  international  morality  had  reached 
its  very  lowest  ebb.  The  unprincipled  and  unscrupulous  char- 
acter of  eighteenth  century  politics  is  too  well  known  to  require 
description.  In  one  sense,  the  dismemberments  of  Poland  were 
nothing  exceptional  in  that  age.  The  history  of  the  century  is 
filled  with  partitions  or  projects  of  partition;  there  was  scarcely  a 
state  on  the  Continent  whose  dismemberment  was  not  plotted  by 
its  neighbors  at  one  time  or  another  during  those  hundred  years. 
The  mania  of  the  monarchs  of  that  day  to  get  as  much  land  as 
possible  —  whenever  and  wherever  possible  —  the  conception 
voiced  by  Louis  XIV  that  "  to  aggrandize  oneself  was  the 
worthiest  and  most  agreeable  occupation  of  a  sovereign"2  afforded 
an  ever-ready  motive  for  partitions.  The  growing  indifference  to 
rights,  treaties,  promises,  or  obligations  of  any  kind  removed 
restrictions  upon  such  operations.  The  doctrine  of  the  balance  of 
power  supplied  the  pretext,  for  it  had  been  happily  discovered 
that  that  doctrine,  originally  invented  to  assure  the  existence  of 
the  weak  states  against  the  strong,  might  equally  well  be  applied 

1  Joseph  told  Nassau:  "  Mon  mdtier  et  celui  du  roi  de  Prusse  est  de  travailler  a 
qui  sera  le  mieux  avec  la  Russie."    Aragon,  Nassau-Siegen,  p.  282. 

2  Lemontey,  Ulablissement  monarchiquc  de  Louis  XIV,  p.  369,  note. 


504  THE  SECOND  PARTITION  OF  POLAND 

to  combinations  of  the  strong  states  to  destroy  the  weak,  provid- 
ing the  robbers  divided  the  booty  evenly  among  themselves. 

But  while  the  dismemberments  of  Poland  fitted  in  with  the 
whole  spirit  and  tendencies  of  the  politics  of  that  age,  there  was 
also  something  new  in  them.  The  First  Partition  was  novel  in 
that  this  was  the  first  occasion  when  foreign  Powers  had  dismem- 
bered a  state  without  having  first  gone  to  war  with  it  or  without 
bloodshed  among  themselves.  If  this  was  taking  a  long  step 
forward  towards  making  the  '  droit  de  convenance  '  the  sole  law  in 
international  relations,  the  Second  Partition  went  even  further. 
In  1793  the  partitioning  Powers  did  not  even  trouble  themselves, 
as  they  had  done  in  1772,  to  invoke  some  kind  of  historic  titles, 
drawn  from  the  archives,  as  at  least  a  formal  satisfaction  to  the 
public  law  of  Europe.  The  only  excuses  which  they  proffered  for 
their  usurpations  were:  the  necessity  they  were  under  of  exer- 
cising a  sort  of  sanitary  police  over  their  corner  of  the  Continent 
to  prevent  the  contagious  spread  of  dangerous  ideas  —  a  plea  the 
like  of  which  Europe  had  not  heard,  at  least  since  the  time  of  the 
Wars  of  Religion ;  and  then  their  right  to  '  indemnify  '  themselves 
for  their  beneficent  exertions.  If  the  brazen  falseness  and 
cynicism  of  this  were  fitted  to  shock  even  eighteenth  century 
Europe,  the  violation  by  both  the  partitioning  Powers  of  very 
recent  promises  and  obligations  to  the  Poles  was  also  more  open 
and  shameless  than  at  the  time  of  the  First  Partition.  Hence 
with  right  the  Second  Partition  of  Poland  has  always  been  held  up 
as  the  supreme  manifestation  of  the  tendencies  of  the  '  cabinet 
policy  '  of  the  eighteenth  century;  the  classic  example  of  the 
moral  degeneracy  and  rottenness  of  the  old  monarchical  Europe. 
One  cannot  better  sum  up  the  moral  aspects  and  not  the  least  of 
the  political  consequences  of  the  Partition  than  in  the  words  of  an 
old  writer  who  declared: 

"  It  was  the  kings  themselves  who,  on  the  eve  of  the  insurrec- 
tion of  peoples,  taught  them  that  no  right  existed  for  them  except 
that  of  the  strongest,  and  that  when  they  invoked  liberty,  it  was 
an  ignoble  sacrilege;  they  taught  them  that  they  were  not  to  be 
believed  even  when  they  spoke  of  the  public  tranquillity,  and  of 


CONCLUSION  505 

the  respect  due  to  the  hereditary  power  of  princes;  for  these  same 
monarchs  who  constituted  themselves  the  defenders  of  monarchy 
in  France,  dismembered  Poland  while  appealing  to  the  mostv"' 
anarchical  liberty!  In  short,  there  was  only  one  law  for  them, 
only  one  principle,  that  of  interest  and  the  glory  of  their  dynasties. 
The  peoples  have  profited  by  the  lesson."  1 

1  Laurent,  Etudes  sur  Vhistoire  de  Vhumanite,  xi,  p.  333. 


APPENDICES 


APPENDIX   I 

The   Russian   Declaration   to   Austria   of  May  10/21,  1788, 
Guaranteeing  the  Integrity  of  Poland  [V.  A.,  Russland, 

Berichte,  1788] 

Les  deux  Cours  Imperiales  par  l'article  secret  de  leur  Traite  d'Alli- 
ance  ont  suffisamment  pourvu  au  cas  possible  d'une  attaque  hostile 
de  Tune  d'Elles  ou  de  toutes  deux  ensemble  de  la  part  du  Roi  de 
Prusse  pendant  qu'Elles  seroient  occupees  a  une  guerre  avec  la  Porte 
Ottomanne.  Elles  se  trouvent  egalement  chargees,  tant  par  des  en- 
gagements contractus  entre  Elles  en  particulier  que  par  un  Traite 
solemnel  et  immediat  avec  la  Republique  de  Pologne  de  la  garantir 
de  ses  possessions  actuelles.  La  bonne  foy  est  d'accord  avec  leur  in- 
teret  respectif,  pour  leur  faire  respecter  religieusement  l'obligation 
qu'Elles  se  sont  imposee  a  Elles  memes  et  pour  ne  pas  souffrir  qu'elle 
soit  enfreinte  d'aucune  autre  part.  L'lmperatrice  a  deja.  manifeste 
dans  plus  d'une  occasion  a  Sa  Majeste  l'Empereur  des  Romains  la 
fermete  de  ses  intentions  a.  cet  egard.  Cependant  pour  complaire  a 
la  sollicitude  qu'il  a  marque  recemment  a  ce  sujet,  Sa  Majeste  Im- 
periale  ne  balance  pas  a  Lui  dormer  de  nouveau  l'assurance  la  plus 
formelle,  que  si  le  Roi  de  Prusse  entreprenoit  dans  les  conjunctures 
presentes  de  s'emparer  de  quelques  unes  des  possessions  actuelles  de 
la  Republique  de  Pologne,  Sa  Majeste  l'lmperatrice  n'hesiteroit  pas 
un  instant  de  se  joindre  a  Sa  Majeste  l'Empereur  pour  faire  con- 
jointement  a  ce  Prince  les  representations  les  plus  energiques  et  les 
plus  capables  de  le  detourner  d'un  dessein  nullement  compatible 
avec  la  bonne  intelligence  et  la  tranquillite  entre  les  voisins,  ni  avec 
la  religion  des  Traites;  et  qu'en  cas  que  ces  representations  fussent 
infructueuses,  Sa  Majeste  l'lmperatrice,  faisant  cause  commune 
avec  Sa  Majeste  l'Empereur,  employeroit  pour  empecher  l'effet  d'un 
tel  dessein  toutes  les  forces  et  tous  les  moyens  que  la  surete  de 
son  propre  Empire  et  le  besoin  d'opposer  une  defence  convenable  a 
son  Ennemie  actuelle,  la  Porte  Ottomanne,  pourroient  laisser  a  sa 
disposition. 
Le  Ministere  de  l'lmperatrice,  authorise  a  etre  l'interprete  des 


5IO  APPENDIX  II 

sentimens  et  des  intentions  de  Sa  Majeste  par  rapport  a  la  circon- 
stance  envisagee  ci-dessus,  croit  avoir  parfaitement  rempli  l'objet 
desire  par  la  Cour  Imperiale  de  Vienne,  en  lui  faisant  delivrer  cet 
ecrit  mirni  de  sa  signature. 

Fait  a,  St.  Petersbourg  le  10.  May  (21),  1788. 
Cte.  Jean  d'Osterman. 
Alexandre,  Cte.  de  Besborodko. 
A.  de  Marcoff. 

APPENDIX   II 

On  Catherine's  Attitude  towards  the  Project  of  a 
Russo-Polish  Alliance 

The  views  of  the  two  chief  Polish  historians  who  have  treated  this 
question  differ  fundamentally  here,  as  on  most  other  questions. 
Kalinka  declared:  "Die  Kaiserin  .  .  .  wiinschte  entschieden  ein  Biind- 
niss  mit  Polen  zu  schliessen";1  while  Askenazy  asserts  that  the 
Empress  entered  into  the  alliance  project  "with  deep  reluctance, 
against  her  own  better  judgment,"  apparently  only  in  order  to 
satisfy  Potemkin.2  On  this  point,  I  incline  to  the  view  of  Kalinka, 
for  the  following  reasons. 

(1)  The  conclusion  of  a  close  alliance  with  Poland  was  quite  in 
the  traditions  of  Catherine's  policy.  Early  in  her  reign,  she  and  Panin 
had  been  very  eager  for  such  a  connection,  especially  for  the  event 
of  war  with  the  Turks.3  The  reasons  which  led  her  to  decline 
Stanislas'  offer  during  the  Crimean  crisis  have  not  yet  been  cleared 
up;  but  they  may  well  have  been  of  purely  temporary  or  accidental 
character.  From  a  hitherto  unpublished  draft  of  a  letter  to  Potem- 
kin, undated  but  certainly  of  1782-83,  it  appears  that,  at  the  last 
Turkish  crisis  before  the  one  under  discussion  in  the  text,  the  Em- 
press had  intended  to  draw  the  Poles  into  active  cooperation  with 
Russia  against  the  Porte,  probably  by  means  of  a  Confederation.4 
And  in  discussing  the  execution  of  the  '  Greek  project '  with  Joseph 
in  1782,  Catherine  spoke  of  getting  Poland  to  'enter  the  lists.'6 

1  Der  polnische  Reichstag,  i,  p.  81. 

2  Przymierze  polsko-pruskie,  p.  34. 

3  ^e^yaHHt,  BHinraaa  nojraTHKa  Poccin,  1762-17J4,  pp.  263  f. 
«  P.  A.,  X,  53. 

6  September  10/21,  1782:  Arneth,  Joseph  II  und  Katharina,  p.  146. 


APPENDIX  II  511 

(2)  At  Kanev,  where  the  plan  of  alliance  was  proposed,  Catherine 
allowed  Stackelberg  and  Bezborodko  to  tell  the  King  that  this  was 
a  project  that  particularly  pleased  her,  and  one  that  must  certainly 
be  carried  out  —  only  carefully  and  at  the  right  time.1  Already  she 
indicated  that  the  time  she  had  fixed  for  realizing  it  was  at  the  meet- 
ing of  the  next  ordinary  Diet,  then  a  year  and  a  half  in  the  future. 
After  the  Kanev  meeting,  in  all  the  Russian  documents  that  he  before 
us,  it  is  assumed  as  a  matter  of  course  that  an  alliance  is  to  be  con- 
cluded; and  the  only  question  is  as  to  the  precise  terms.2 

(3)  It  is  true  that  Catherine  did  declare  that  it  was  not  useful  for 
Poland  to  become  "more  active,"  but  she  was  here  condemning,  not 
every  alliance  with  Poland  whatsoever,  but  one  that  would  make 
the  country  stronger.  It  is  true  that  she  wrote  Potemkin  one  day 
that  if  the  Poles  showed  themselves  loyal  this  time,  it  would  be  the 
first  example  in  their  history;  but  here  she  was  obviously  bent  on 
dampening  Potemkin's  too  sanguine  hopes  about  the  utility  of  the 
alliance,  and  especially  on  finding  an  excuse  for  preventing  him  from 
flooding  her  army  with  his  Polish  friends  and  creatures.  (See  his 
letter  and  her  reply  in  Solov'ev  (Ssolowjoff)  Geschichte  des  Falles  von 
Polen,  p.  186.)  Solov'ev  comments  quite  justly:  "Katharina  theilte 
nicht  die  sanguinischen  Hoffnungen  Potomkins,  der  in  alien  Dingen 
seiner  feurigen  Phantasie  freien  Lauf  liess;  dennoch  wandte  sie  alle 
Mittel  an,  Polen  fiir  das  Biindniss  zu  gewinnen." 

Finally,  Catherine's  long  delays  in  attending  to  the  alliance  project 
cannot  be  adduced  as  evidence  that  she  disliked  and  distrusted  the 
plan;  for,  having  from  the  outset  fixed  the  autumn  of  1788  as  the 
time  for  her  action,  there  was  no  need  to  announce  her  precise 
intentions  much  earlier;  especially  to  announce  them  at  Warsaw, 
where  state  secrets  were  very  badly  kept.  In  short,  in  opposition 
to  Askenazy,  I  should  say  that  Catherine  was  not  dragged  into  this 
unfortunate  plan  by  Potemkin,  but  that  she  went  into  it  of  her  own 
accord,  thinking  to  find  in  it  the  best  means  of  keeping  Poland  in 
order  during  the  Oriental  war. 

1  The  King  to  Kicinski:   Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii.  pp.  19  ff. 

2  Cf.,  for  instance,  the  commentary  of  Bezborodko  —  doubtless  the  Empress' 
mouth-piece  here  —  upon  the  draft-treaty  sent  from  Warsaw  (PycCKift  ApxnBi, 
1888,  hi,  pp.  184  ff.)  This  undated  commentary  was  written  not  later  than 
October  6/17,  1787. 


512  APPENDIX  III 


APPENDIX   III 

On  Potemkin's  Secret  Plans 

It  is  well  known  that  Potemkin  exercised  a  stronger  and  more 
durable  influence  over  Catherine  than  any  other  of  her  favorites  and 
advisers;  that  he  had  a  policy  of  his  own,  which  often  conflicted  with 
hers;  that  he  cherished  vast,  far-reaching  personal  ambitions,  part  of 
which  he  could  not  confide  even  to  her.  An  investigation  of  those  am- 
bitions is  of  great  importance  for  the  study  of  Russian  policy  towards 
Poland  in  this  period;  but  it  is  also  extremely  difficult,  for  it  must 
be  based,  for  the  most  part,  on  the  conjectures  or  rumors  as  to  Po- 
temkin's secret  plans  of  which  contemporary  writings  and  diplomatic 
correspondence  are  full,  on  more  or  less  enigmatic  passages  scattered 
here  and  there  in  confidential  letters,  and  then  on  what  may  be  in- 
ferred from  the  Prince's  own  actions.  Professor  Askenazy,  in  the 
brilliant  book  so  often  cited  here  {Przymierze  polsko-pruskie,  pp.  35- 
41,  199  ff.),  has  been  the  first  to  penetrate  deeply  into  this  labyrinth 
of  mysteries  and  to  offer  a  consistent,  acute,  and  convincing  inter- 
pretation of  Potemkin's  secret  aims.  The  following  excursus  is  in 
substantial  agreement  with  Askenazy 's  views;  but  it  is  also  based  on 
the  first-hand  study  of  the  sources. 

From  the  moment  of  his  rise  to  power,  Potemkin  busied  himself 
with  plans  for  acquiring  a  'sovereignty'  somewhere  outside  of  Russia; 
this,  both  because  of  personal  ambition  and  because  it  behooved  him 
to  provide  for  his  own  prospects  in  case  of  the  Empress'  death.  If 
he  lived  to  see  Paul  or  Alexander  ascend  the  throne  —  both  bitterly 
hostile  to  him  —  he  could  expect  no  other  fate  than  that  of  Men- 
sikov  or  Biihren,  unless  he  were  out  of  reach.  His  first  thought, 
apparently,  was  to  acquire  the  duchy  of  Courland.  Catherine  not 
only  approved  this  scheme,  but  drew  up  a  plan  for  getting  the  reign- 
ing Duke  deposed  and  putting  Potemkin  in  his  place.1  For  some 
reason,  however,  she  suspended  the  execution  of  this  plan.  Potemkin 
held  to  it  at  least  until  1779,  but  after  that  abandoned  it,  whether 
because  he  was  bought  off  by  the  Duke,  as  rumor  had  it,  or  be- 

1  See  Bvuih6&cowb,  UpHCoejiiHHeHie  KypjurafliH  k-b  Poccin,  in  the  Pyc.  Clap, 
lxxxiii, ',  pp.  31  ff.,  especially  the  rescript  to  Stackelberg  of  May  2/13,  1776,  in 
which  the  Empress  announces  her  intentions. 


APPENDIX  III  513 

cause  he  found  Courland  too  poor  an  establishment  and  too  near 
St.  Petersburg.1 

Next,  perhaps,  or,  more  probably,  contemporaneously  with  the 
Courland  project,  went  the  plan  of  gaining  the  crown  of  Poland. 
His  acquisition  in  1775  of  the  Polish  indygenat  (a  sort  of  naturaliza- 
tion among  the  szlachta)  may  have  been  intended  as  the  first  step  in 
this  direction.  Then  from  1776  on,  Potemkin  appeared  as  the  pro- 
tector and  instigator  of  the  opposition  in  Poland,  the  patron  of  that 
unholy  clique  of  adventurers,  fanatics,  and  scoundrels  who  later 
brought  about  the  Confederation  of  Targowica  and,  indirectly,  the 
Second  Partition  of  the  Republic.  By  1781  it  had  become  the  uni- 
versal conviction  at  St.  Petersburg  that  the  Polish  crown  was  the 
goal  of  Potemkin's  ambition.2 

But  as  the  'Greek  project'  came  more  and  more  to  the  front,  the 
favorite  seems  to  have  transferred  his  attention  to  the  more  glitter- 
ing project  of  carving  out  for  himself  a  new  realm  around  the  Black 
Sea.  The  Danubian  Provinces  would  serve  as  the  nucleus  of  this 
'Kingdom  of  Dacia,'  but  that  was  not  sufficient.  Potemkin  was  ac- 
cused of  wishing  to  set  himself  up  as  a  feudal  prince,  or  even  as  in- 
dependent sovereign,  in  'New  Russia,'  the  Crimea  and  the  adjacent 
regions  already  annexed  to  the  Russian  Empire,  of  which  he  was 

1  That  Potemkin  held  to  the  Courland  project  as  late  as  1779  appears  from  an 
unpublished  letter  from  Stackelberg  to  him  of  January  21/February  1,  1779  (P.  A., 
X,  887).  See  also  the  memoirs  of  his  emissary,  Karl  Heinrich  von  Heyking,  edited 
by  Baron  Alfons  von  Heyking,  Aus  Polens  und  Kurlands  letzten  Tagen,  pp.  212  ff. 
Heyking  supposes  that  the  Empress  did  not  want  the  Courland  plan  to  suc- 
ceed, which  would  indicate  that  her  distrust  of  his  ambition,  so  marked  later 
on,  began  at  a  very  early  date.  See  also  Gortz,  Denkwiirdigkeiten  i,  pp.  123  ff.; 
Dohm,  Denkwiirdigkeiten  ii,  Zusatze,  xxvi  f.;  [Helbig],  "Potemkin  der  Taurier," 
Minerva,  xxiii,  pp.  461  ff.;  Seraphim,  Geschichte  des  Herzogtums  Rutland,  2nd  ed., 
pp.  308  f . 

2  That  is  the  statement  of  Dohm  (ii,  Zusatze,  xlv  ff.),  who  had  it  on  the  au- 
thority of  Gortz,  the  Prussian  envoy  at  that  time.  Cf.  also  Segur,  Memoires,  ii, 
p.  264;  Herrmann,  Russische  Geschichte,  Erganznngsba>id,  p.  107  —  where  Potemkin's 
ambitions  on  the  Polish  crown  are  suggested  as  early  as  1775;  Castera,  Histoire  de 
Catherine  II,  iii,  p.  358.  Whether  Potemkin  ever  wholly  abandoned  the  hope  of 
getting  the  Polish  crown  may  perhaps  be  doubted.  At  the  very  end  of  his  life  some 
of  those  nearest  him  surmised  that  that  was  still  the  object  of  his  ambition;  see 
EnreJitrapATi,  3anHCKH,  pp.  124  f.,  and  in  the  Memoirs  of  Stanislaw  Nalecz 
Malachowski  (Polish),  the  very  interesting  but  somewhat  questionable  tale  re- 
lated after  his  death  by  Potemkin's  favorite  niece,  the  Countess  Branicki:  "his 
intention  was  to  win  over  all  the  Cossacks,  unite  with  the  Polish  army,  and  pro- 
claim himself  King  of  Poland." 


5H 


APPENDIX  III 


governor-general  and  almost  uncontrolled  master.1  However  that 
may  be,  it  is  probable  that  he  was  much  more  concerned  with  the 
designs  on  Poland  discussed  in  the  text. 

The  exact  extent  of  his  purchases  of  land  in  Poland  cannot  be  as- 
certained at  present;  but  it  was  undoubtedly  enormous.  The  enter- 
prise began  on  a  large  scale  about  1781; 2  it  was  continued  with  the 
aid  of  the  Empress,  who,  for  instance,  helped  him  to  effect  a  loan  of 
five  million  rubles  for  this  purpose  in  1787;  it  went  so  far  that  even 
in  1788  Buchholtz,  the  Prussian  minister  at  Warsaw,  reported  that 
Potemkin  had  sold  all  his  estates  in  Russia  in  order  to  buy  land  in 
Poland,  and  that  this  indicated  clearly  his  designs  on  the  country.3 
The  statement  is  substantially  true.  Askenazy  cites  a  "  fragmentary 
inventory"  of  Potemkin's  property,  made  out  after  his  death,  which 
would  show  that  he  had  only  6,000  male  peasants  in  Russia,  but 
over  70,000  in  Poland.4  The  latter  figure  is  certainly  far  too  small, 
however,  for  from  one  reliable  source  it  appears  that  the  great  estate 
of  Smila  alone  contained  about  112,000  male  'souls.'5  At  the  time 
of  his  death  the  Prince  still  retained  some  not  very  considerable 
estates  in  Russia,  while  his  Polish  possessions  far  exceeded  in  size 
many  a  German  or  Italian  state. 

These  purchases  were  made  in  the  southeastern  palatinates,  espe- 
cially in  that  of  Kiev.  That  they  had  a  political  motive  cannot  be 
doubted.  Potemkin  tried  to  convince  Catherine  that  it  was  for  the 
good  of  the  Empire  that  he  should  buy  up  all  that  corner  of  Poland 
which  projected  into  Russian  territory  and  which  it  was  so  important 
for  Russia  to  control.  This  was  to  be  a  veiled  form  of  annexation.6 
Catherine,  however,  seems  presently  to  have  suspected  that  his  real 
aim  was  very  different  and  less  disinterested;  and  henceforth  she 
was  not  so  ready  to  help  in  these  acquisitions.7  One  day  the  remark 
escaped  her  in  the  presence  of  her  secretary:  "From  his  newly  bought 


1  See  the  biography  of  the  Prince  in  the  Pyc.  OrapHHa,  xii,  p.  695,  xiv,  p.  246, 
Helbig,  in  Minerva,  xxiii,  p.  228. 

2  Cf.  Cobenzl  to  Joseph,  September  12,  1781,  F.  R.  A.,  II,  liii,  p.  226. 

3  Report  of  September  12,  B.  A.,  Fol.  323. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  36. 

6  See  the  article  by  Rulikowski  on  Smila  in  the  Shwtiik  geograficzny  krolestwa 
polskiego. 

6  See  his  letter  to  the  Empress  of  March  27/April  7,  1788,  C6opHHKT>  Boeirao- 
HCTopHHecKHxi  jiaTepiajioBt.  EyMara  Khh3h  Tpiiropifl  AjieKcanipoBHia  IIoTeM- 
KHHa-TaBpniecKaro,  vi,  pp.  252  f. 

7  Cf.  her  letter  to  him  of  January  11/22,  1788,  PyccKaa  OrapHHa,  xvi,  p.  446. 


APPENDIX  III  515 

lands  in  Poland  Potemkin  will,  perhaps,  make  a  tertium  quid,  inde- 
pendent of  both  Russia  and  Poland."1  Very  similar  opinions  were 
generally  current  at  that  time.  It  was  supposed,  and  probably  with 
truth,  that  as  a  first  step  Potemkin  wished  to  have  a  duchy  created 
for  him  in  the  Ukraine,  which  should  be  a  fief  of  Poland  in  the  same 
loose,  unreal  way  as  Courland  was.2  At  Kanev  the  Russian  am- 
bassador himself  told  Stanislas  Augustus  that  he  had  heard  that 
Potemkin  desired  his  great  estate  at  Smila  turned  into  some  kind  of 
a  feudal  principality.3  And  de  facto  Smila  was  such  a  status  in  statu, 
with  its  court,  its  elaborate  military-feudal  system,  its  army  of  horse 
and  foot.4 

As  to  Potemkin's  attitude  towards  the  King's  plan  for  an  alliance, 
cf.  Stanislas'  letters  to  Kiciriski  of  March  21,  March  29,  May  8,  1787, 
in  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii;  Stanislas  to  Potemkin,  May  7,  July  16, 
September  24,  October  1,  1787  (P.  A.,  V.  166)  and  July  14,  1787 
(Petrograd  Imperial  Public  Library,  Papers  of  V.  S.  Popov — these 
unpublished  letters  are  mainly  filled  with  thanks  for  Potemkin's 
efforts  to  put  through  the  alliance) ;  EpHKHept,  HoTeMKHHt,  pp.  86  ff . ; 
Aragpn,  Nassau-Siegen,  pp.  101  ff.,  131  ff.;  Potemkin's  remarks  on  the 
King's  draft  for  the  alliance  treaty,  in  the  Pyc.  ApxHBi,  1888,  iii, 
pp.  184  ff.  / 

The  Branicki-Potocki  plan  for  a  Confederation  in  the  provinces, 
the  'national  militia,'  etc.,  sent  in  with  a  recommendation  by  Potem- 
kin, probably  in  January,  1788,  is  printed  in  the  Pyc.  Apxrai,  1874, 
ii,  pp.  269-280,  and  in  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii,  pp.  104-113. 

For  Potemkin's  urgent  pleas  to  conclude  matters  with  the  Poles 
at  once,  to  make  use  of  the  magnates,  to  enlist  as  many  of  the  Poles 
as  possible  in  the  Russian  armies,  etc.,  see  his  correspondence  with 
Catherine  for  the  first  half  of  1788  in  the  Pyc.  CiapHiia,  xvi,  and 
the  C6opHHKt  H.  P.  H.  0.,  xxvii.  Cf .  also  XpanoBmrKiii,  ^neBiraKi,  April 
14/25,  1788,  pp.  43  f.;  Popov  to  Potemkin,  April  14/25,  1788,  in 
the  Pyc.  Apx.,  1865,  pp.  751  f.;  Potemkin  to  Suvorov,  April  29/ 
May  10,  1788,  in  the  Pyc.  OrapHna,  xiii,  pp.  32  f. 

On  Potemkin's  intrigues  with  the  Polish  magnates,  and  the  plans 
for  a  Confederation  which  should  "restore  all  the  national  liberties 

1  XpanoBHudH,  ^neBHHKi,  March  16/27,  1787,  p.  16. 

2  Cf.  the  remarks  of  the  Grand  Duke  Paul,  in  June,  1787,  cited  by  Bilbasov  in 
the  Pyc.  Orap.  lxxxiii,  ',  p.  32.  Stanislas  Augustus  worried  much  over  this 
danger:  see  EpnKHepi,  IIoTeMKHHi,  p.  87. 

3  The  King  to  Kicirtski,  March  21,  1787,  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii,  p.  12. 

4  Cf.  the  above-cited  article  in  the  Slownik  gcograficzny. 


516  APPENDIX  IV 

without  restriction,"  and  perhaps  even  establish  some  new  kind  of 
oligarchical  federalism:  cf.  the  secret  memoir  of  Rzewuski  to  the 
Prussian  government,  November,  1788  (B.  A.,  Pologne,  Fasc.  1097); 
Buchholtz's  report  of  November  1  (B.  A.,  Fol.  323),  and  Lucchesini's 
of  December  25,  1788  (B.  A.,  R.  9,  27);  Zaleski,  Korespondencya 
krajowa  Stanistawa  Augusta,  pp.  2361!.,  242;  Kalinka,  Der  polnische 
Reichstag,  i,  pp.  64  ff.,  86  f.,  105  ff.,  113  ff.;  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp. 

37  £ 

On  Pot  em  kin's  efforts  to  recruit  troops  in  Poland  (apart  from  the 

forces  to  be  furnished  by  the  magnates),  and  especially  to  enlist 
Cossacks:  cf.  Apx.  Toe.  CoB*Ta,  September  25/October  6,  1787;  orders 
to  Nerancic,  January  25/February  5,  1788,  in  the  C6ophhki>  BoeH.-HCTop. 
MaTepiaaoBT,,  vi,  pp.  196  f.;  Potemkin  to  Catherine,  March  18/29, 
1788,  ibid.,  pp.  243  f.  Dzieduszycki  to  Deboli,  April  23, 1788  (M.  A., 
no.n>ma,  IV,  8),  encloses  a  passport  given  to  a  Russian  recruiting 
officer,  in  Potemkin's  name,  to  enlist  troops  in  the  four  southeastern 
palatinates. 

On  Potemkin's  extraordinary  interest  in  Cossacks,  his  efforts 
during  the  winter  of  1787-88  to  organize  a  new  and  very  numerous 
Cossack  army,  his  plan  for  forming  great  Cossack  settlements  along 
the  Polish  and  Turkish  frontiers,  etc.:  cf.  HeTpoBi,,  Biopaa  Type^aa 
BofiHa,  i,  pp.  125-129;  Stein,  Geschichte  des  russischen  Heeres,  pp. 
172  ff.;  documents  in  the  C6opHHKt  BoeH.-HC-rop.  MaTepiajioBi,  vi,  passim; 
Apx.  BopoHn,oBa,  xiii,  p.  227. 

That  along  with  his  other  projects  Potemkin  also  held  in  reserve 
as  early  as  1788-89  the  plan  of  heading  an  Orthodox  and  Cossack 
rising  in  the  Ukraine  is  only  an  hypothesis,  but  a  very  probable  one. 
It  is  quite  certain  that  he  later  had  such  a  plan  (1790);  it  was  uni- 
versally ascribed  to  him  in  Poland  during  the  troubles  in  the  Ukraine 
in  1789,  reported  by  all  the  foreign  ministers  to  their  courts,  and 
only  half  denied  at  St.  Petersburg.  Cf .  Kalinka,  Der  polnische  Reichs- 
tag, i,  pp.  440-443,  and  Askenazy,  op.  cit.,  pp.  38  f. 


APPENDIX   IV 

On  the  Change  in  Prussian  Policy  in  the  Summer  of  1789 

It  is  only  within  the  last  fifteen  years  that  historians  have  realized 
the  importance  of  the  summer  of  1789  as  marking  a  decided  turning- 
point  in  Prussian  policy.    For  recent  discussions  of  the  subject,  see: 


APPENDIX  IV  517 

P.  Wittichen,  Die  polnische  Politik  Preussens,  ch.  v;  F.  C.  Wittichen, 
"Die  Politik  des  Grafen  Hertzberg,"  in  Hist.  Vjschr.,  ix,  pp.  183  ff.; 
Krauel,  Graf  Hertzberg  als  Minister,  pp.  44  ff.;  Luckwaldt,  "Zur 
Vorgeschichte  der  Konvention  von  Reichenbach,"  in  Delbriick-Fest- 
schrift,  pp.  232-256;  Salomon,  William  Pitt,  i\,  pp.  451  f.;  Aske- 
nazy,  Przymierze  polsko-pruskie,  pp.  55  f.  The  chief  printed  sources 
are  the  correspondence  between  Hertzberg  and  Lucchesini  in  Dembin- 
ski,  op.  cit.,  and  that  of  Schlieffen  with  Hertzberg  and  Ewart  in  Nach- 
richt  von  einigen  Hausern  des  Geschlechtes  der  von  Schlieffen,  ii,  pp. 
408  ff. 

To  Paul  Wittichen  and  Krauel  belongs  the  honor  of  having  first 
brought  to  light  Hertzberg's  proposals  for  immediate  vigorous  action 
that  summer.  These  proposals  occupy  the  central  place  in  Witti- 
chen's  defence  of  Hertzberg,  as  he  finds  here  the  occasion  when  the 
minister's  much-criticized  plan  might  have  been  brilliantly  executed. 
Here  was  the  unique  opportunity,  the  neglect  of  which  avenged  itself 
at  Reichenbach.  Salomon  accepts  this  view,  while  Krauel  argues 
against  it  —  as  I  think,  with  justice.  For  one  may,  perhaps,  accept 
the  apparently  unanimous  opinion  of  the  Prussian  generals  that  the 
army  was  not  ready  in  September  of  1789;  and  moreover,  if  one  was 
to  go  to  war,  there  was  no  need  to  begin  with  such  a  declaration  as 
Hertzberg  proposed,  which,  without  conciliating  the  enemy,  would 
have  alienated  every  friend.  The  belligerent  Powers  would  probably 
have  made  peace  with  each  other  on  terms  reciprocally  much  more 
advantageous  than  Hertzberg's,  and  Prussia  would  have  been  left 
isolated  and  discredited. 

Wittichen  is  responsible  for  placing  in  circulation  a  story  which  I 
regard  as  at  best  only  an  unproved  hypothesis,  and  probably  an  error: 
the  story,  namely,  of  Hertzberg's  proposed  "Anschlag  auf  Gross- 
Polen."  He  declares  that  in  case  the  Imperial  Courts  rejected  the 
Prussian  plan  of  pacification,  Hertzberg  intended  immediately  and 
without  further  preliminaries  to  seize  a  large  part,  perhaps  all,  of 
Great  Poland,  so  that  Prussia  would  thus  at  once  realize  the  part  of 
the  'plan'  that  most  concerned  her,  whatever  might  happen  in 
other  quarters.  Wittichen  thinks  that  Russia  would  have  offered 
no  opposition  to  this  —  at  the  most,  she  might  have  appropri- 
ated a  few  Polish  territories  herself ;  Austria  would  have  been 
terrorized  or  coerced  into  submission;  as  for  the  Poles,  Hertzberg 
had  isolated  them  so  successfully  that  they  must  have  accepted 
whatever  Prussia  dictated.     This  would,  indeed,  have  been  a  piece 


518  APPENDIX  IV 

of  treachery  and  high-handedness  seldom  paralleled.  F.  C.  Witti- 
chen, Salomon,  and  Askenazy  repeat  the  tale  much  as  P.  Wittichen 
has  given  it. 

It  is  to  be  noted,  however,  that  none  of  the  texts  cited  by  Witti- 
chen in  support  of  his  theory  —  a  few  very  vague  passages  from 
letters  —  contain  the  slightest  proof  that  Great  Poland  was  to  be 
won  by  such  a  violent  procedure.  There  is  nothing  to  show  that  the 
minister  did  not  hold  to  his  old  plan  of  acquiring  (a  part  of)  Great 
Poland  by  voluntary  cession  from  the  Republic,  in  return  for  Galicia 
wrested  away  from  Austria. 

To  the  best  of  my  knowledge,  we  have  from  Hertzberg's  pen  only 
one  fairly  concrete  account  of  the  military  measures  recommended 
by  him  that  summer.  It  is  contained  in  his  letter  to  Schlieffen  of 
October  22,  1789.1  Here  there  is  no  reference  to  any  'Anschlag  auf 
Gross-Polen '  —  an  omission  which  Wittichen  attempts  to  explain 
away  by  all  manner  of  conjectures.  Instead  there  is  mention  only  of 
two  preliminary  military  movements,  the  one  on  the  frontiers  of 
Galicia,  the  other  on  the  side  of  Livonia;  and  then,  in  case  of  a  re- 
fusal on  the  part  of  the  Imperial  Courts,  the  invasion  of  Austrian 
territory  is  to  begin. 

In  Hertzberg's  statements  regarding  a  possible  war  with  the  Im- 
perial Courts  one  almost  invariably  finds  him  counting  on  the  co- 
operation of  the  Poles.  The  following  passages  seem  to  me  signifi- 
cant (August  1,  1789,  Hertzberg  to  Lucchesini):  "Je  suis  d'accord 
avec  vous  sur  la  necessite  de  frapper  le  grand  coup  pour  nous  et  pour 
nos  amis.  .  .  .  il  me  semble  .  .  .  qu'il  vaudroit  mieux,  apres  avoir 
recu  notre  derniere  reponse  de  Constantinople,  que  nous  offrions 
notre  plan  dilemmatique  .  .  .  comme  en  Hollande,  et  qu'apres  le 
refus  qu'on  peut  prevoir,  nous  concertions  et  executions  tout  de  suite 
avec  nos  amis  notre  grand  plan."  2 

(August  22,  Hertzberg  to  the  King)  .  .  .  "II  me  semble  que  le 
cas  existeroit  toujours  de  presenter  aux  deux  Cours  Imperiales  sa 
[His  Majesty's]  mediation  armee  et  notre  Plan  avec  le  mouvement 
de  l'armee;  ...  en  cas  qu'il  [the  plan]  ne  fut  pas  accepte  par  les 
deux  Cours  Imperiales,  V.  M.  est  sur  de  l'alliance  de  la  Porte,  de  la 
Suede  et  de  la  Pologne,  meme  avant  d'en  avoir  les  actions  solemnels 
[sic]."  3     It  would  seem  hardly  probable  that  even  Hertzberg  could 

1  Schlieffen,  op.  citi,  pp.  430  ft.,  reprinted  by  P.  Wittichen,  op.  cil.,  pp.  93  ff. 

2  Dembinski,  Documents,  i,  p.  403. 
*  B.  A,  R.  9,  27. 


APPENDIX  V  519 

have  fancied  that  the  Poles  would  join  in  the  war  on  Austria,  if 
Prussia  began  operations  by  seizing  Great  Poland. 

Summing  it  up,  I  think  Wittichen's  view  rests  on  a  mere  conjec- 
ture, which  finds  very  little  support  from  the  sources,  and  for  which 
anything  like  a  solid  proof  has  not  yet  been  furnished.  It  is  to  be 
noted  that  Luckwaldt,  who  has  written  the  most  detailed  and  the 
most  recent  account  of  the  events  of  that  summer,  makes  no  men- 
tion of  any  proposed  'Anschlag  auf  Gross-Polen.' 


APPENDIX   V 

OSTERMANN  TO  ALOPEUS,  MARCH  14/25,  1791  [M.  A.,  Hpyccifl,  VI,  24] 

J'ai  mis,  Monsieur,  sous  les  yeux  de  l'lmperatrice  Votre  depeche 
du  8/19  Fevr.1  Son  contenu  a  ete  d'autant  plus  agr^able  a  S.  M.  I. 
qu'il  est  parfaitement  conforme  aux  intentions  que  Vous  aves  tou- 
jours  ete  charge  d'annoncer  en  Son  nom,  tant  par  les  instructions  que 
Vous  aves  emportees  en  partant  d'ici,  que  par  celles  qu'on  Vous  a 
fait  parvenir  ulterieurement  durant  Votre  mission  a  Berlin.  Les 
unes  et  les  autres  expriment  constamment  le  desir  et  le  voeu  de 
S.  M.  I.  de  conserver  et  de  maintenir  une  bonne  harmonie  impertur- 
bable avec  S.  M.  Prussienne.  En  effet  ce  systeme  etant  analogue  aux 
interets  des  deux  Monarchies  et  le  Roi  de  Prusse  paraissant  partager 
a  cet  egard  la  conviction  de  l'lmperatrice,  il  ne  s'agit  que  de  calmer 
et  d'ecarter  les  ombrages  et  les  soupcons  qui  ont  dirige  jusqu'a  pre- 
sent la  politique  de  la  Cour  de  Berlin  en  sens  contraire.  Le  moyen 
qu'on  Vous  a  suggere  et  dont  Vous  rendes  compte  dans  la  depeche 
susmentionnee  pour  etablir  et  consolider  la  confiance  entre  les  deux 
Cours  ne  repugne  en  rien  a  la  sincerite  des  vues  de  S.  M.  I.  et  de  Ses 
dispositions  a,  l'egard  de  S.  M.  Prussienne.  Elle  a  asses  developpees 
[sic]  ces  dernieres  dans  toute  Sa  conduite  pour  ne  laisser  aucun  doute 
de  la  facilite  avec  laquelle  Elle  se  pretera  a  tout  ce  qui  pourra  effec- 
tuer  un  rapprochement  aussi  desirable  pour  les  deux  Souverains. 
C'est  dans  ce  sens  que  nous  nous  sommes  expliques  demierement 
aussi  vis-a-vis  de  la  Cour  de  Dannemark  en  reponse  aux  ouvertures 
qu'elle  nous  a  faites  au  nom  de  celle  de  Berlin  relativement  aux  con- 
jonctures  actuelles;  et  nous  avons  ordre  de  Vous  autoriser,  Monsieur, 
en  cas  que  cette  derniere  persiste  dans  les  dispositions  qu'on  Vous  a 

1  For  this  dispatch,  see  Dembinski,  Documents,  i,  pp.  116-119. 


520 


APPENDIX  V 


temoignees  en  dernier  lieu,  a  lui  annoncer  que  Tlmperatrice  ne  fera 
nulle  dimculte  de  donner  les  mains  a  un  arrangement  provisionel 
touchant  le  Traite  d'alliance  que  S.  M.  Prussienne  desire  de  conclure 
avec  Elle  a.  la  suite  de  notre  paix  avec  la  Porte  Ottomanne.  Vous 
nous  instruires  de  la  forme  que  la  Cour  de  Berlin  voudra  donner  a 
l'acte  ou  a  la  convention  secrette  qu'on  pourroit  arreter  entre  les 
deux  Cours.  Nous  ne  dirons  qu'un  mot  de  ce  qui  doit  faire  la  sub- 
stance de  cette  transaction.  Elle  doit  d'abord  porter  l'engagement 
mutuel  de  renouveller  apres  la  presente  guerre  finie  les  anciennes 
liaisons  entre  la  Russie  et  la  Prusse  sur  le  meme  pied  ou  elles  ont 
existees  jusqu'a  l'annee  1788.  Ensuite  on  stipulera  en  termes  pro- 
pres  la  promesse  positive  de  la  part  de  S.  M.  Prussienne,  non  seule- 
ment  de  ne  point  s'opposer  a  ce  que  Tlmperatrice  amenat  la  Porte 
Ottomanne  par  tous  les  moyens  possibles  a.  faire  la  paix  aux  condi- 
tions que  S.  M.  a  proposees,  a  savoir:  le  renouvellement  pur  et  simple 
des  anciens  Traites  et  transactions  anterieures  a  cette  guerre-ci  et  la 
cession  d'Oczakoff  avec  son  territoire  jusqu'au  Dniester,  de  maniere 
que  cette  riviere  serve  desormais  de  frontiere  entre  les  deux  Empires, 
mais  aussi  a  employer  aupres  de  la  dite  Porte  Ses  representations  et 
Ses  exhortations  les  plus  efficaces  et  les  plus  energiques  a  fin  de  la 
determiner  a  accepter  ces  conditions.  ...  Si  ...  S.  M.  Prussienne 
se  determine  a  realiser  un  accord  ou  un  arrangement  analogues  au 
plan  que  nous  venons  d'esquisser  et  qu'Elle  Vous  fasse  connaitre 
Ses  intentions  definitives  la  dessus,  nous  n'attendrons  que  le  rap- 
port que  Vous  nous  en  feres,  pour  Vous  envoyer  le  projet  d'acte 
ou  de  convention  secrette  avec  les  pleins  pouvoirs  requis  pour  le 
conclure  et  le  signer  et  le  convertir  en  instrument  authentique  et 
revetu  de  toutes  les  formalites  usitees  dans  les  transactions  entre 
les  Souverains. 

Le  courrier  que  nous  Vous  depechons,  pour  mieux  cacher  sa  desti- 
nation, a  ordre  de  ne  s'arreter  aupres  de  Vous  que  le  terns  qu'il  lui 
faudra  pour  Vous  remettre  cette  depeche  et  de  passer  d'abord  a 
Hambourg,  ou  Mr.  de  Gross  le  retiendra  une  huitaine  de  jours  et 
Vous  le  renverra  pour  chercher  les  rapports  que  Vous  seres  dans  le 
cas  de  nous  transmettre  et  pour  nous  les  apporter  ici.  Vous  voyes 
que  de  cette  maniere  le  tems  sera  epargne  autant  qu'il  est  possible 
et  qu'il  ne  tiendra  qu'a  la  Cour  de  Berlin  d'ecarter  les  extremites 
auxquelles  les  circonstances  au  grand  regret  de  l'Imperatrice  et  au 
grand  detriment  des  interets  respectifs  paroissent  avoir  achemine 
les  choses. 


APPENDIX  VI  521 


APPENDIX   VI 

Notes  on  Chapter  IX 

1.    On  the  Origin  of  Bischoffwerder's  Second  Mission 

to  Leopold 

How  far  the  Emperor  was  responsible  for  bringing  about  this 
mission  is  a  disputed  question.  It  was  asserted  in  the  Prussian  en- 
voy's instructions  that  Leopold  had  asked  to  have  Bischoffwerder 
sent  to  him;  and  this  statement  has  been  very  frequently  repeated 
by  German  historians.  Leopold,  on  the  other  hand,  denied  having 
expressed  such  a  wish;1  and  although  this  has  been  declared  to  be 
merely  a  dementi  for  use  at  St.  Petersburg,  I  am  inclined  to  think  the 
Emperor  spoke  the  truth.  If  he  had  really  expressed  the  wish  for 
such  a  mission,  why  was  it  that  on  Bischoffwerder's  arrival  his  first 
step  was  to  attempt  to  persuade  the  Prussian  envoy  that  he  had  not 
done  so?  Besides,  in  his  report  to  Grenville  of  May  15  Elgin  said 
merely:  "I  even  venture  to  conceive  it  possible,  that  should  His 
Prussian  Majesty  send  to  the  Emperor  some  confidential  person  with 
powers  similar  to  those  His  Majesty  has  been  pleased  to  entrust  with 
me  (I  must  add  that  the  Emperor  repeatedly  mentioned  Colonel 
Bischoffwerder  in  high  terms  of  approbation),  such  preliminary 
stipulations  might  be  immediately  signed  by  us,"2  .  .  .  The 
same  day  Elgin  wrote  to  Ewart  at  Berlin  about  the  matter,  and  in 
the  translation  of  that  letter  communicated  by  Ewart  to  the  Prus- 
sian ministry  the  important  passage  runs:  "il  m'a  paru  qu'il  Lui 
[the  Emperor]  seroit  fort  agreable  qu'une  personne  de  confiance  fut 
envoyee  aupres  de  Lui  par  Sa  Majeste  Prussienne  avec  des  pouvoirs 
semblables  aux  miens.  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  m'a  parle  tres  souvent 
du  Colonel  de  Bischoffwerder  dans  les  termes  de  la  plus  haute  Estime 
et  Confiance,  qui  prouvoient  combien  Elle  desiroit  de  le  revoir."  3 
From  this  it  appears  that  Elgin  himself,  encouraged  by  some  words 
of  praise  for  Bischoffwerder  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor,  conceived 
the  idea  of  bringing  the  'worthy  Colonel'  upon  the  scene  in  order  to 
help  along  his  own  negotiation. 

1  "Journal  iiber  die  Verhandlungen  mit  Bischoffwerder,"  Vivenot,  i,  p.  178. 

2  F.  z.  D.  G.,  v,  p.  251.  *  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172. 


522 


APPENDIX  VI 


The  question  has  a  certain  importance,  inasmuch  as  the  Emperor's 
supposed  request  has  often  been  taken  as  a  proof  of  his  eagerness  in 
May  for  an  immediate  alliance  with  Prussia  —  an  eagerness  of  which 
I  find  no  clear  signs  until  about  the  middle  of  June,  when  French 
affairs  suddenly  assumed  a  dangerous  aspect. 


2.    On  the  Vienna  Convention  of  July  25,  1791 

The  origin  of  the  much-discussed  '  separate  article '  on  Polish  affairs 
may  be  traced  from  the  following  excerpts. 

(1)  February  21,  1791,  Bischoffwerder  proposed  as  one  of  the 
articles  of  the  projected  alliance:  "D'eloigner  par  des  moyens  sages 
et  bien  concertes  l'influence  de  la  Russie  en  Pologne  (comme  le  foyer 
d'ou  la  plus  part  [sic]  des  intrigues  de  la  Cour  de  Petersbourg  sont 
parties)  sans  rechercher  neanmoins  aucune  influence  preponderante 
en  Pologne,  ne  desirant  que  le  maintien  de  la  constitution  actuelle 
de  ce  Royaume  et  un  Roi  librement  elu  de  la  nation  polonoise  selon 
leurs  Loix  sans  l'intervention  de  la  Russie. 

"  (Pour  rendre  cet  Article  ostensible  on  propose  de  le  changer  ainsi.) 
D'eloigner  par  des  moyens  sages  et  bien  concertes  tout  influence 
preponderante  en  Pologne  de  la  part  de  ses  trois  voisins,  de  maniere 
a  y  maintenir  toutefois  la  constitution  actuelle  de  ce  Royaume  et 
un  Roy  librement  elu  par  la  nation  polonoise  selon  leurs  loix."  1 

(2)  The  Austrian  'observation'  on  this  was:  "On  est  pret  d'entrer 
dans  ces  vues  et  l'on  est  meme  si  persuade  qu'elles  sont  propres  a 
combiner  les  veritables  interets  des  trois  Puissances  voisines  de  la 
Pologne  qu'on  ne  croit  pas  difficile  de  consolider  ces  vues  par  un 
nouveau  concert  entre  elles."  2 

(3)  Juty  22>  I79I>  Bischoffwerder  again  presented  this  article  in 
the  'ostensible'  form  just  given,  with  the  additional  clauses:  "Et 
pour  ecarter  —  apres  la  Revolution  qui  vient  de  se  faire  dans  ce 
Royaume  —  tout  Sujet  de  jalousie  et  d'ombrage,  les  deux  Cours 
sont  tombes  d'accord:  qu'il  ne  pourra  jamais  etre  question  d'un 
mariage  entre  l'lnfante  et  un  Prince  des  trois  Puissances  voisines, 
ni  de  l'elevation  d'un  tel  Prince  dans  le  cas  d'une  nouvelle  election 
au  Throne  de  Pologne."  3 

(4)  The  final  (Austrian)  redaction:  "Les  interets  et  la  tranquil- 
lite  des  Puissances  voisines  de  la  Pologne  rendant  infiniment  desira- 
ble qu'il  s'etablisse  entre  Elles  un  concert  propre  a  eloigner  toute 

1  V.  A.,  Vortrdge,  1791.  2  V.  A.,  ibid.  8  V.  A.,  ibid. 


APPENDIX  VI  S23 

jalousie  ou  apprehension  de  preponderance,  les  Cours  de  Vienne  et 
de  Berlin  conviendront  et  inviteront  la  Cour  de  Russie  de  convenir 
avec  Elles,  qu'Elles  n'entreprendront  rien  pour  alterer  l'integrite  et 
le  maintien  de  la  libre  constitution  de  la  Pologne;  qu'Elles  ne  cher- 
cheront  jamais  a  placer  un  Prince  de  leurs  Maisons  sur  le  Trone  de 
Pologne,  ni  par  un  mariage  avec  la  Princesse  l'lnfante,  ni  dans  le 
cas  d'une  nouvelle  election,  et  n'employeront  point  leur  influence 
pour  determiner  le  choix  de  la  Republique  dans  l'un  ou  l'autre  cas 
en  faveur  d'un  autre  Prince  hors  d'un  concert  mutuel  entre  Elles."  l 

Askenazy2  finds  a  contradiction  between  the  recognition  of  the 
new  constitution  implied  in  the  mention  of  the  Infanta  and  the  refer- 
ence to  a  possible  new  election  to  the  throne.  He  overlooks  the  fact 
that  the  acceptance  of  the  crown  by  Frederick  Augustus  was  by  no 
means  certain,  and  that  in  case  he  refused  it,  a  new  election  would 
be  necessary  even  according  to  the  new  constitution.  I  think  he  is 
equally  in  error  in  asserting  that  the  apparent  recognition  accorded 
to  the  new  form  of  government  was  belied  and  reduced  to  a  mere 
sham  by  the  setting  up  of  a  condition  impossible  of  fulfilment,  namely 
the  approval  of  Russia.  In  the  first  place,  it  is  nowhere  said  in  the 
article  that  Austria  and  Prussia  would  submit  to  a  Russian  veto  on 
the  new  constitution;  and  secondly,  they  could  not  know  at  that 
time  in  Vienna  that  the  Empress  would  never  give  her  consent  to 
the  new  regime  in  Poland  —  in  fact,  they  had  reason  to  think  that 
she  would. 

The  article  was  certainly  not  considered  at  Warsaw  as  an  open 
sign  of  Prussia's  desertion  (as  Askenazy  regards  it) :  on  the  contrary, 
Stanislas  Augustus  was  deeply  gratified  and  encouraged  by  it.  See  his 
letters  to  Bukaty  of  August  20,  and  to  the  Crown  Secretary  Rzewuski 
of  August  24,  Kalinka,  Ostatnie  lata,  ii,  pp.  199  ff.,  and  Smolenski, 
Ostatni  rok  sejmu  wielkiego,  pp.  240  f . ;  also  de  Cache's  reports  of 
August  24,  31,  September  3,  10  (V.  A.,  Polen,  Berichte,  1791);  Bul- 
gakov's of  August  13/24  (M.  A.,  nojibma,  III,  64). 

3.    On  Bischoffwerder's  Attitude  towards  an  Intervention 

in  France 

There  is  no  doubt  that  in  signing  the  Vienna  Convention  Bischoff- 
werder  went  far  beyond  the  instructions  given  him  by  the  Prussian 
ministry,  but  it  is  not  improbable  that  he  may  have  had  further 

1  V.  A.,  Vortrage,  1791.  2  Przymierze  polsko-pruskie,  pp.  150  ff. 


524 


APPENDIX  VII 


secret  orders  from  the  King.  This  suspicion  arises  particularly  with 
regard  to  French  affairs.  It  has  been  noted  in  the  text  that  the  King 
was  busy  in  September,  1790,  with  plans  for  an  intervention  in  France; 
in  November  he  promised  one  of  the  Count  of  Artois'  agents  his  aid 
under  certain  conditions; x  in  the  spring  of  1791  there  appear  to  have 
been  further  negotiations,  in  the  course  of  which  he  stipulated  the 
repayment  of  his  expenses  as  the  condition  of  his  cooperation.2 
These  pourparlers  came  to  the  knowledge  of  the  Prussian  ministry 
only  in  June,  and  then  only  imperfectly,  but  they  were  doubtless 
known  to  Bischoffwerder.  It  is  also  worth  notice  that  some  months 
later  Prince  Hohenlohe  —  who  as  early  as  September,  1790,  was  the 
confidant  of  his  master's  views  on  French  affairs  —  told  Fersen 
that  Bischoffwerder  on  going  to  Italy  had  been  charged  to  propose 
to  the  Emperor  an  intervention  in  France  and  a  scheme  for  territo- 
rial 'indemnities'  similar  to  that  which  had  once  been  suggested  to 
Reuss.3  According  to  Hohenlohe,  Leopold  rejected  the  latter  idea. 
Carisien,  the  Swedish  envoy  in  Berlin,  in  general  a  very  good  ob- 
server, also  held  that  one  of  the  chief  objects  of  Bischoffwerder's 
mission  to  Italy  was  to  find  out  the  Emperor's  views  on  the  state  of 
affairs  in  France.4  Insufficient  as  the  evidence  is,  it  is  difficult  to 
understand  how  Bischoffwerder  could  have  entered  from  the  outset 
with  such  zeal  upon  Leopold's  proposals  for  an  intervention  in  France, 
unless  he  knew  that  they  corresponded  closely  to  the  views  of  his 
own  sovereign. 

APPENDIX  VII 

On  the  Austrian  Attitude  towards  the  Plan  for  the 
Permanent  Union  of  Saxony  and  Poland 


Sybel  long  maintained  that  the  plan  in  question  was  originated  by 
Leopold  soon  after  the  revolution  of  the  Third  of  May,  and  was  pro- 
posed by  him  at  that  time  to  Russia.5  This  position  Sybel  later  had 
to  abandon.     Herrmann  was  right  in  maintaining  that  the  project 

1  Schlitter,  Marie  Christine,  p.  xxii. 

2  Fersen  to  Taube,  April  11,  in  Klinckowstrom,  Le  Comte  de  Fersen  el  la  Cour  de 
France,  i,  p.  99;  instruction  to  Baron  Roll,  May  21,  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172. 

3  Fersen  from  Prague,  September  6,  1791,  Klinckowstrom,  op.  oil.,  i,  pp.  24  f. 

4  Taube,  Svenska  beskickningars  berdttelser,  p.  85.  Cf.  also  Taube  to  Fersen, 
February  6,  1792,  Klinckowstrom,  op.  cit.,  ii,  p.  165. 

5  See  H.  Z.,  x,  pp.  418  ff.,  xii,  pp.  280  ff. 


APPENDIX  VIII  525 

originated  with  the  Elector,  but  wrong  in  asserting  that  Leopold 
never  supported  it.1  Beer's  account2  is  much  more  accurate,  but 
fails  to  notice  the  real  reason  for  the  Emperor's  cautious  attitude  in 
this  matter:  the  fact  that  his  daughter  was  married  to  the  prince  to 
whom  it  was  proposed  to  assure  the  Polish  succession. 

Frederick  Augustus  conceived  the  plan  of  the  Saxon-Polish  per- 
sonal union  as  early  as  June,  1791; 3  it  was  broached  by  his  minister 
Gutschmidt  to  Spielmann  at  Pillnitz;4  it  seems  to  have  formed  one 
of  the  topics  discussed  in  a  letter  from  the  Elector  to  the  Emperor 
not  long  afterwards.5  At  Vienna  the  plan  was  immediately  approved.6 
While,  for  the  reason  mentioned  in  the  text,  the  point  was  passed 
over  lightly  in  the  ostensible  instructions  given  to  Landriani,  Kaunitz 
added  in  a  secret  postscript  that  this  plan  was  of  much  importance 
for  Austrian  interests,  and  continued:  "Mr.  de  Landriani  ne  laissera 
pas  de  seconder  cet  objet  autant  qu'il  pourra  sans  risquer  qu'on  nous, 
soupconne  des  vues  secondaires.  Comme  au  reste  l'Electeur  tient 
lui-meme  tres-fortement  a  la  reussite  de  ce  point,  il  sera  plus  facile 
de  combiner  a  cet  egard  le  but  essentiel  avec  les  menagemens  deli- 
cats  auxquels  nous  sommes  astreints."  7  This  fear  of  being  suspected 
of  'vues  secondaires,'  which  has  hitherto  been  overlooked  by  histo- 
rians, is  the  dominant  consideration  in  the  Austrian  utterances  on 
this  subject. 

APPENDIX  VIII 

On  the   Note   from    Catherine   to   Zubov  Reported 
by  Goltz,  February  3,  1792 8 

This  enigmatic  episode  has  been  related  by  all  historians  of  the 
period,  and  has  given  rise  to  a  variety  of  conjectures.  It  has  been 
almost  universally  stated  that  Goltz  actually  saw  the  note  in  question, 
but  I  think  that  can  hardly  have  been  the  case,  for  the  envoy  nowhere 
claims  to  have  seen  it,  and  he  complains  in  his  report  of  February  7 

1  F.  z.  D.  G.,  iv,  pp.  397  ff.  2  H.  Z.,  xxvii,  pp.  11  ff. 

3  Hartig's  report  of  June  24,  V.  A.,  Sachsen,  Berichte,  1791. 
*  Spielmann  to  Kaunitz,  August  31,  Vivenot,  i,  pp.  239  f. 

5  Cf.  the  instructions  to  L.  Cobenzl  of  November  12. 

6  Cf.  Schlitter,  Kaunitz,  Ph.  Cobenzl  utid  Spielmann,  pp.  89  f. 

7  V.  A.,  F.  A.  62  A. 

8  The  several  dispatches  from  Goltz  cited  in  this  appendix  are  all  to  be  found  in 
the  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133. 


526 


APPENDIX  VIII 


that  he  had  been  unable  to  learn  more  of  the  details  of  the  Russian 
project,  since  "le  personnage  peureux  et  borne  qui  avoit  fait  la  lecture 
en  question1  n'a  rien  su  ajouter  aux  notions  deja  communiquees." 
Cf.  the  phrase  in  his  report  of  February  3:  "Ce  papier  n'ayant  ete  lu 
qu'a  la  hate,  il  a  ete  impossible  d'en  savoir  davantage."  The  point 
is  not  without  interest,  because  it  has  been  so  often  assumed  that 
the  note  was  written  only  to  be  shown  to  Goltz,  and  that  it  was  a 
ballon  d'essai  intended  to  tempt  Prussia  out  of  her  reserve.2 

I  think  it  more  probable  that  this  was  an  ordinary  case  of  a  'leak.' 
Whitworth,  the  English  envoy,  to  whom  the  Russians  could  have 
no  possible  reason  for  letting  out  such  secrets,  had  managed  to  get 
even  fuller  information  as  to  these  same  Russian  plans  earlier  than 
Goltz,  without  the  latter's  knowledge,  and  apparently  through  the 
same  channel.  If  the  secret  was  betrayed  in  one  case,  why  not  in 
the  other?3 

Whitworth  does  not  speak  of  a  note,  but  the  plan  which  he  reports 
agrees  almost  entirely  with  that  described  by  Goltz.  He  refrained 
at  first  from  confiding  in  his  colleague.  The  latter  appears  to  have 
broached  the  subject  to  him,  and  to  have  used  his  (Whitworth's) 
knowledge  to  verify  the  sources  of  his  own  information. 

The  Russian  archives  have  as  yet  failed  to  disclose  any  documents 
bearing  on  this  episode.  Under  such  circumstances  the  incident 
must  remain  obscure,  but  we  are  certainly  not  in  a  position  to  speak 
of  it,  with  Hausser,  as  "a  Russian  proposition  to  Prussia  for  a  parti- 
tion of  Poland."  All  that  we  can  say  is  that  some  underling,  possi- 
bly a  servant,  in  Zubov's  household  or  in  the  Russian  Foreign  Office, 
came  to  the  English  and  Prussian  ministers  with  an  extremely  in- 
teresting story  about  the  Empress'  plans  against  Poland  and  her 
readiness  to  propose  a  partition;  and  that  in  his  conversation  with 
Goltz  he  claimed  that  the  source  of  his  knowledge  was  a  note  from 
Catherine  to  Zubov,  which  he  had  managed  to  read.  Possibly  he 
was  sent  to  make  this  revelation  by  his  superiors.  More  probably 
he  was  selling  information,  genuine  or  fictitious.  The  story  he  told 
has,  in  itself,  not  a  single  improbable  feature.  We  know,  for  in- 
stance, that  at  one  time  there  was  talk  at  St.  Petersburg  of  sending 
Repnin  to  command  the  army  against  Poland.4     Igelstrom  went 

1  The  italics  are  mine. 

2  Cf.,  e.g.,  Hausser,  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i,  pp.  352  f.,  and  Heidrich,  Pretissen  im 
Kampfe  gegen  die  franzosische  Revolution,  pp.  177  f. 

3  Cf.  Whitworth's  report  of  January  31,  1792,  Herrmann,  Ergdnzungsband, 
pp.  243  f.  *  Sea  CoopHHKt,  xxix,  p.  175. 


APPENDIX  IX  527 

down  to  take  the  command  in  the  government  of  Smolensk  just  about 
this  time,1  thus  corroborating  another  detail  of  the  story.  It  is  quite 
possible,  then,  that  Goltz's  informant  was  truly  reporting  a  genuine 
note  —  and  vastly  important  state  secrets. 


APPENDIX   EX 

Felix  Potocki  to  Potemkin,  May  14,  1791  (from  Vienna). 
[Original.     M.  A.,  Iio.ii>ina,  II,  j]2 
Monseigneur. 

Je  eu  l'honneur  de  recevoire  a  Paris  la  lettre  que  Votre  Altesse 
a  bien  voulu  m'ecrire  avant  son  depart  pour  Petersbourg,  je  quitte 
a  l'insant  ce  pais  la  pour  me  rapprocher  de  vous  en  attendant  ce 
que  S.  M.  PImperatrice  voudra  bien  fair  pour  la  conservation  de 
Notre  Republique,  mais  en  arrivant  ici  je  trouve  les  nouvelles  qu'elle 
est  aneantie  ainsi  que  notre  liberte,  par  le  coup  que  le  Roi  vient  de 
lui  porter,  ce  Roi  que  l'lmperatrice  a  donne  a.  une  nation  libre  n'est 
plus  chef  d'unne  Republique,  il  est  souverain  d'unne  Monarchie 
nouvelle,  nous  avons  perdue  notre  libertee,  nos  voisins  perdiron 
bientot  la  tranquility,  il  est  done  de  lur  interet,  il  est  du  notre,  de 
briser  la  fatal  constitution  que  le  Roi  vient  de  nous  imposer,  de  re- 
tablir  la  Republique  et  de  lui  donner  unne  forme  stable.  Tout  bon 
Polonois  qui  n'est  pas  seduit  par  la  Cabale  Prussienne  et  Roiale  est 
persuade  que  le  salut  de  la  Patrie  ne  peut  deja  nous  venir  que  de  la 
Russie,  sans  elle  la  nation  autrefois  libre  est  asservie,  le  Nombre  des 
Mecontents  dans  toutes  les  provinces  de  la  Pologne  est  grande,  mais 
ils  sont  intimide,  leur  courage  se  relevera  si  on  leur  donne  de  l'appui. 
Je  prend  la  liberte  de  joindre  ici  un  projet  du  Hetman  Rzewuski,  ce 
n'est  que  pour  vous  fair  voir  notre  bonne  volonte,  car  pour  les  pro- 
jets  je  croi  qu'il  ne  faudra  les  former  qu'apres  etre  convenu  de  la 
volonte  de  briser  les  chaines  qu'on  vient  d'imposer  a,  la  Pologne. 
Pour  moi  je  suis  persuade  qu'il  est  impossible  de  maintenir  la  liberte 
de  la  Pologne  si  on  laisse  la  Royaute  jointe  a  la  Republique,  un 
guvernement  federative  seroit  le  plus  convenable  a  un  pais  etendue 
qui  doit  servire  de  bariere  entre  les  plus  grandes  Monarchies  du 
Monde,  les  provinces  independentes  et  unies  ne  pouroient  jamais 
etre  asservie  par  un  seul,  car  personne  ne  pourroit  se  servir  de  la 
force  integral  de  l'etat  si  les  provinces  ont  leur  guvernement,  leurs 

1  Goltz's  report  of  February  17. 

2  I  have  followed  the  writer's  astonishing  spelling  and  punctuation. 


528 


APPENDIX  X 


armees,  et  leurs  tresors  separes,  si  leurs  interet  est  necesserement 
diverses,  et  si  elles  ne  sont  jointes  que  par  l'interet  de  leur  conserva- 
tion. Je  ne  sai  si  je  me  trompe,  mais  je  croi  que  ce  seroit  le  moment 
d'executer  ce  projet,  et  la  chose  se  faire  naturelement,  si  la  Russie 
donnee  de  l'appui  au  mecontents,  il  faudra  commencer  par  unne 
confederation  dans  les  quatre  Palatinats  de  Volhinie,  Podolie,  Kiovie 
et  Braclaw,  qui  forme  la  plus  grande  Moitie  de  la  force,  de  la  Popula- 
tion, et  des  revenues  de  la  Pologne,  un  autre  confederation  se  for- 
meroit  en  Lituanie  et  ce  deux  Confederation  etabliroient  dans  chaque 
de  ces  provinces  un  guvernement  civile  et  militaire,  les  revenues  de 
l'etat  serviroient  pur  solder  les  troupes  de  la  Province  et  on  formeroit 
un  tribunal  pour  que  la  joustice  ne  soit  pas  interrompue.  Les  pro- 
vinces protesteroient  contre  le  gouvernement  et  la  constitution  que 
le  Roi  leurs  a  imposee  on  jureroient  de  maintenir  la  liberte  on  in- 
viteroient  les  autres  Palatinats  a  immiter  leur  exemple,  et  bientot 
il  seroit  suivie,  la  revolution  finiroit  par  un  congres  de  Provinces 
Confederes  qui  prenderoient  le  nom  des  Provinces  independentes  et 
unies  de  la  Republique  de  Pologne,  on  pourroit  maime  conserver  au 
Roi  le  titre  et  les  emoluments  de  sa  dignite  presente  il  ne  representera 
pourtant  que  le  president  de  congres  et  a  sa  mort  le  charge  de  presi- 
dent ne  seroit  que  pour  deux  ans. 

Voila  mes  reves  mon  Prince  si  on  veut  les  executer  ou  non  il  est 
certain  que  nous  desirons  la  libertee,  et  qu'il  faut  de  la  tranquilite 
pour  nos  voisins.  Si  Votre  Altesse  trouvera  necessaire  que  je  viens 
vous  voire  aies  la  bonte  de  me  le  dire.  Votre  Altesse  connoit  par- 
faitement  Finvariabilite  de  mes  principes  le  respect  et  Padmiration 
dont  je  suis  penetre  pour  le  Souverain  qui  fait  l'ornement  de  ce 
siecle,  et  l'amitie  sincere  pour  votre  personne.  Mon  Prince,  votre 
nom  seroit  deja  immortel,  soies  encor  le  liberateur  d'une  Nation 
oprime  pour  qu'il  soit  cherie  a  jamais. 

J'ai  l'honneur,  etc. 


APPENDIX  X 

Bezborodko  to  the  Empress,  January  25/February  5, 
1792  (from  Jassy).     [M.  A.,  Typijifl,  LX,  14] 

[Reports  his  discussions  with  Potocki  and  Rzewuski  as  to  a  Con- 
federation to  be  formed  in  Poland  under  Russian  protection]  .  .  . 

ITpeame  HeacejiH  ocm4jiiocb  a  CKa3aTt  ito  jth6o  OTHOCHTejiBHo  naMipemfl  na- 
TpioTOBt    nojUxCKHxt,    ;i;o3Bo.ii>Te,    BceMHaocTHBMmaa    rocyaapHHa,   H3T>acHHTB 


APPENDIX  X  529 

HHcrocepneHHo  hto  rjiaBHEfimaa  TpyjrnocrB  bb  tomt>  npejuiejEHTt  He  otb  caMnxt 
HojiaKOBT.,  ...  ho  oti.  jrpyrnxi.  ^bopobi,  IIojibni'B  coci.iCTBeHHBix'B.  ^to  KacaeTca 
;jo  BiHCKaro,  xota  Hacroamia  ero  HaMipeHia  ne  corjiacyiOTt  cb  HaraHMH,  h6o 
y  Hero  KpoeTca  mhcjib  Bocno.iB30BaTBca  jriaTejiBHoc™  IIojiBinH  kt.  tomjt,  ,ito6,b 
bt.  Heft  npioSpf.CTB  ce6i  coio3HHKa  ojiHoro  6oju.me,  o6"y3;raTB  Kopojia  HpyccKaro^ 
h  bt>  cjiy^ai  noTpe6noM,B  Ha  Hero  o6paTHTB  tiro  jjepjKaBy;  ho  Korjja  oji,Ha2Kji.e 
BiHCKift  jibopt.  yBHAHTi.  ito  Bame  BejiniecxBo  BCBMt  HHHiia  npejrnojioaceHia 
HMieie,  h  hto  oHHa  TBep,iH  h  HenpeMT>HHBi,  to  ohb  KOHe^Ho  He  CTanerB  Ha  nyTH. 
HcnojmeHia  hxt>,  h6o  othiojib  He  cbohctb6hho  hto6t>  HsmepaTopT.  noatepTBOBajiT. 
cok)3omi>  tojib  HaTypa.iBHHjn>  h  tojib  BHro^HHM'B,  KaKOBt  ecTB  Meamy  AByiia  HMne- 

paTOpCKHMH  JJBOpaMH  OTflaJieilHBIMT.  BHJiaM'B  H  yBaJKeniaMT.,  H  1T06'b  OHT.  yjJOBOJIBCT- 

BOBa.ica  3aMiBHTB  onua  CBa3H  bt.  cymecTBi  Hnnero  He  SHa^ymeft,  KaKOBa  y  Hero 
TenepB  cociaBJieHa  cb  BepjrancKHMT.  jtbopomt,.  Bee  tto  hh  CTaHeTi.  ohb  jrijiaTB 
BonpeKH  HaMi  6yjieT'B  eflnHCTBeiiHo  3aKJiroiaTBca  bt>  noBTopeHiH  cobt>tobt>  h 
npeACTaB.ieHift,  na  KOTopna  tojibko  oji;Ha  3af>OTa  6y,neT'B  tto  HnfiyjiB  OTBiiaTB, 
no  npHMipy  KaKT.  h  bt>  boimt.  nameft  cb  TypKaira  ciy^iajiocB  nocirB  PeftxenSaxcKoft 
KonBeHHin,  hto  o6opoHaacb  nponiBy  yrpo3T.  h  AO-MoraTeJiBCTBT.  AHr.im  h  HpycciH 
AOJiHHH  mh  6bijih  o6opoHaTBca  n  npoTHBy  po6khxt>  cobt.tobb  HiinepaTopa,  xoxa 
nocjri  BonpeKH  chiii.  coBT>TaMT>  Bee  aceaaeMoe  oflepasaTB  npejtycirEJiH.  Ho  ct 
jrpyrofi  CTopoHBi  othkw>  ce6a  jiacuaTB  He  cjiiiyeTT.,  ito6t.  b-b  ciy^ai  6yie  6ep- 
jHHCKift  jjBopT.  npHMen  npoTHBy  Haci.  cnjieft  CTopoHy  Kopojia  HojiBCKaro  h  ero 
e^HHOMUCJieHHHX'B,  irDnsHaJiT.  BiHCKift  jiBopt  casus  foederis,  h  HaMT.  yiHHnjTB 
nocofiie.  CBepxi>  Toro,  nojiaraa  ito  tocjio  chjit.  Bamero  HiunepaTopcKaro  Bejra- 
necTBa  necpaBHeHHo  npeBocxojtnTT.  TaKOBHXT.  Kopojia  HpyccKaro,  ito  xpadpocrB 
BofmcTBa  Bainero  HH^Befi  bt.  cbt>tt.  He  ycrynaerB,  —  ho  no  yTOMJiemro  ^ByMa  tojib 
TarocTHHMH  BoftnaMH,  npH  ncromemH  .neHeaniBixT.  cpe^CTBT.,  KOTopBia  e^nno 
npe3i  HicKOJiLKo  ji^tt.  cnoKoftcTBia  HanojiueHBi  tojibko  6htb  MoryrB,  nepeMiua 
HojiBCKaro  HpaBjieHia  He  ctohtb  6yKeTT>  hoboS  TarocTHoft  boFihh,  ecjin6T>  oniio 
BMicTi  cb  HojiBmeft  h  Ilpyccieft  6e3i>  ABCTpiftCKaro  noco6ia  npoH3BojiiHTB  na- 
jjoo'ho;  a  noTOMy  h  HyacHie  Bcero  caMHMT.  acnusiT.  o6pa30M,B  npesBapnTeJiBHo 
yiocTOBipnTBca  bt.  o6pa3,E  npanoMT.  MHCJieft  6epjiHHCKaro  Ka6nHeTa.  .  .  . 

A  noTosiy  cmt,k>  H3T.acHHTB  MHiHie  Moe  ^to  npn  HanepTaHin  njiana  no  A^JiaMt 
Hojibckhmb  npea;j;e  npncTynjiema  kt.  HcnojiHeHiio  ero  Heo6xoji;HMo  Haji;o6Ho  CHe- 

CTHCB  CB  flBOpOMT.  6ep.IHHCKHMT,  H  BeCBJia  HCKyCCTHHHT.  H  OCTOpOSKHHMT.  O^paSOMTf 

CTapaTBCa  y3HaTB  ero  mhcjih,  h  npn  ycMOTpiHin  pacnojioatenia  ero  npeSuTB 
paBiioj;yraHHMT.,  Torjjaace  TBep^Bin  aaTB  OTBiTT.  BincKOMy  flBopy.  .  .  .    Ka3ajiocB 

6BI    ITO   BepjIHHCKift    J^BOpi.    CB   HBKOTOpHMT.    yjj;OB0.1BCTBieMT>    yCMOTpHTT.    pa3HOCTB 

MBic.ien  MesKAy  SByMa  ABopaMH  IIjinepaTopcKHMn,  h  no  cyeraocTH  CBoeft  nanpaBHTt 
CBon  CTapania  cb  naMH  cS.iHJKHTBca ;  no  iToaee  He  cxo^Haro  h  bt.  ccmt.  canoMt 
c6jinateHiH  ?  3Haio  ^to  oht.  Miioria  HanecB  BaiiT.  ocKop6jienia  jiftcTBOBaBT.  ^aiKe 
h  KOBapno  npoTHBy  no.iB3u  h  6jiara  Ihinepin  Banieft  ...  ho  Bame  BejranecTBO 
nojiyiH.in  yse  BceHapoj,noe  y^oB-ieTBopeHie  corjiamemeMT.  h  TafiHuxT.  n  aBiiuxT. 
BparoBT.  Bainnxi.  na  Bamn  bh^h  h  HaMipenia,  .  .  .  (The  Court  of  Vienna  was 
about  to  invite  the  Empress  to  accede  to  its  alliance  with  Prussia.)  SL  no^HTaK) 
TaKOBoe  npiiCTyiiJienie  k'b  coM3y  spyrnxT.  ne  yAo6HHMT>,  ho  oTBeprnyTB  oHoe  aBHO 
Taitate  He  cxojtho,  h6o  Torji;a  6ep.iHHCKoft  ;iBopi  hobbih  noBoj.'B  kt.  Bpe^HBiMT,  ero 
jrificTBiaMT.  npnMeTB ;   bmIjcto  toto  ito  Bcero  Jiyime  no^aTBca  Ha  ero  HCKanie 

H    Sjt.iaTB    COK)3T.    6e3n0CpejCTBeHHBIMB,    KOTOpUH    HH    KT.  HeMJr    6hl   .    .    .    \illegible\ 

Kpoiit,  noKoa  h  rapaHTin  B3aftMHHxi  B.iaj,tnift,  pa3yMia  ero  HHuiuiHia  BTastiiia, 
a  He  KaKie  jih6o  hobbic  3axBaTH.    Chmt.  Bocno.iB30Ba.incB  6bi  mbi  na  nojBCKia  jrf>.ia, 


53° 


APPENDIX  XI 


ocTajiHCfc  bi>  noKoi  nocii  apoHTpaMH  Meatfly  BiHCKHMt  h  6epjraHCKHM-b  ^Bopaivra, 
H  HaKoneirb  no  OTfloxHOBemeMt  h  nonpaBJieHieMi.  pasHaxi  ^aciefi  6ujih  6u 
rocnoji;aMH  pinmTbca  Ha  Bee  hto  naMi  Hyamo  h  Bbiroji;Ho.  OnacHOdb  npefljieacaTb 
Mor.ia  6h  co  ctopohh  6epjiHHCKaro  ji,Bopa  no  ero  ara,HH0CTH  Ha  npio6p,BTeHie 
r^aHCKa  h  TopyHa  co  npo^HMH  3eMJiflMH ;  ho  h  kt>  ceaiy  othhti.  6jA(iTb  bcakm 
noBo^i.  Koi\na  noMHHyrbift  .a^opi.  yBH^HTi.  ito  Bame  HiinepaTopcKoe  BejiniecTBO 
e^HHCTBeHHO  HaMtpeHH  cnoco6cTBOBaTb  BoscTaHOBjieHiK)  npeatnefi  cboSojth  nojib- 
ckoh  h  yHHTroatemio  BpejtHeft  h  onacHoii  fljra  cocBjieft  KoHCTHTyiriH  6e3i  bcakhxt. 

KOpHCTHHXl>    BHflOBl,,  O    KOTOpHXl.    He    MOJKeTt    KopOjIb    IIpyCCKiH    He    HyBCTBOBaTb 

ito  Bb  HacTOflmeM'b  no-ioatemH  jrBjrb,  h  npn  pa3Ba3aHHHxi  y  Haw.  pyuaxi  Hejib3a 
uwb  yji,OBJieTBopHTb  HnaKo  KaKi  o6w,iiwb  Tpext  cocbahhxi.  ABopoBi  corjiacieMt 
h  pasaijieMt  Meamy  hhmh  ypaBHHTe.ibHUMi>.  .  .  . 


APPENDIX   XI 

On  Frederick  William's  Attitude  towards  the  Proposals 
oe  Austria  and  Russia  in  March,  1792 

The  rescript  to  Bischoffwerder  rejecting  Spielmann's  Polish  plan 
is  dated  March  13,  therefore  a  day  after  Goltz's  dispatches  of  Feb- 
ruary 29  arrived  in  Berlin;  but  it  appears  from  the  rescript  to  Bischoff- 
werder of  the  14th  that  that  of  the  13th  was  already  drawn  up  before 
the  Russian  overtures  were  known.1  The  King's  decision  to  reject 
the  Austrian  plan  was,  therefore,  in  no  way  influenced  by  the  Em- 
press' proposals. 

Sybel's  statement  that  Reuss  presented  Spielmann's  memoir  on 
March  10,  and  was  informed  on  the  13th  that  Prussia  could  under 
no  circumstances  approve  it,  is  utterly  erroneous.2  The  memoir  was 
sent  to  Berlin  only  on  the  17th  and  was  presented  by  the  Austrian 
envoy  the  22nd.3 

One  cannot  possibly  agree  with  the  eloquent  passage  in  which 
Sybel  describes  the  great  alternative  before  which  Frederick  William 
was  placed  by  the  simultaneous  proposals  of  Austria  and  Russia, 
the  former  inviting  him  to  commit  political  suicide,  the  latter  offer- 
ing him  prospects  of  a  handsome  acquisition;  the  conflict  in  the  King's 
breast;  the  decision  determined  by  the  news  from  Paris  of  de  Les- 
sart's  fall,  which  rendered  war  with  France  inevitable  and  opposition 
to  Catherine  impossible.  Nor  can  one  subscribe  to  the  conclusion: 
"Es  war  .  .  .  nicht  das  Ergebnis  einer  lange  vorbereiteten  Habgier, 

1  B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172. 

2  Sybel,  Geschichte  der  Revolutionszeit,  ii,  pp.  187,  191. 

8  Reuss'  report  of  the  25th,  V.  A.,  Preussen,  Berichte,  1792. 


APPENDIX  XII  531 

-sondern  inmitten  eines  beispiellosen  europaischen  Krisis  der  rasch 
.ergriffene,  das  kleinste  Uebel  bezeichnende  Ausweg."  !  —  Apart  from 
the  fact  that  the  Austrian  proposals  had  already  been  rejected  before 
the  Russian  ones  were  known,  there  is  no  evidence  that  Frederick 
William  hesitated  a  moment  about  his  decision.  The  news  of  de 
Lessart's  fall  (March  10)  could  not  possibly  have  reached  Berlin  by 
the  13  th.  Neither  then  nor  for  some  weeks  more  did  the  King  know 
that  war  with  France  was  inevitable,  although  he  devoutly  wished 
that  it  were.  The  determination  in  favor  of  a  new  partition  of  Poland 
was  not  forced  upon  him  by  "an  unparalleled  crisis"  (he  was  doing 
his  best  to  bring  one  about),  but  had  already  long  existed  in  Frederick 
William's  mind,  at  least  in  the  form  of  a  pious  wish  —  probably,  as 
Heidrich  suggests,2  ever  since  the  previous  August. 


APPENDIX   XII 

Documents  Illustrating  the  Origins  of  the  Polish- 
Bavarian  Project 

1.  Louis  Cobenzl  to  Philip  Cobenzl,  May  19,  1792.     [Private 

letter.     V.  A.,  Russland,  Fasc.  139] 

(Describing  Simolin's  account  of  his  sojourn  in  Vienna  in  March, 

1792) 

.  .  .  Simolin  a  dit  aussi  qu'ayant  parle  a  Bischofsverder  de  la 
future  Election  de  l'Empereur  et  des  pretentions  de  l'Electeur  Pala- 
tin  a  devenir  Roi,  il  lui  avoit  dit  pourquoi  ne  le  feriez  Vous  pas  Roi 
de  Bourgogne,  comme  la  chose  avoit  ete  proposee  autre  fois,  a  quoi 
Bischofsverder  avoit  repondu,  si  la  chose  etoit  proposee  a  present  je 
crois  qu'on  y  consentiroit  chez  nous. 

2.  Louis    Cobenzl  to  Philip   Cobenzl,  July  21,  1792.    [Official 

report.     V.  A.,  Russland,  Berichte,  1792] 

...  La  reprise  de  ce  Projet  [the  Bavarian  Exchange]  a  du  etre  ici 
d'autant  moins  inattendue,  que  je  me  rapelle  avoir  entendu  dire  a 
Monsieur  de  Simolin  que  Bischofsverder  lui  en  avoit  parle,  et  lui 

1  Geschichte  der  Revolutionszeit,  ii,  pp.  188-191. 

2  Preusscn  im  Kampfe  gcgen  die  franzosische  Revolution,  pp.  181  f. 


532  APPENDIX  XII 

avoit  dit  que  le  Roi  son  Maitre  ne  seroit  pas  contraire  a.  l'echange  de 
la  Baviere,  s'il  pouvoit  en  esperer  autant  de  notre  part  pour  l'Acqui- 
sition  de  Danzic,  Thorn  et  du  pais  adjacent.  .  .  . 

3.  Alopeus  to  Ostermann,  May  8/19, 1792.    [M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  29] 

.  .  .  M.  de  Bischoffwerder  m'ayant  ecrit  de  Potsdam  de  venir  le 
voir  a  Charlottenbourg  ou  il  est  arrive  hier  avec  le  Roi,  je  m'y  suis 
rendu  immediatement  apres  etre  sorti  de  la  conference  avec  le  C.  de 
Schoulenbourg.  II  s'est  repandu  en  protestations,  comme  l'avoit 
fait  le  Ministre,  sur  les  sentiments  d'amitie  toute  particuliere  que  le 
Roi  son  Maitre  portait  a  S.  M.  I.  et  sur  les  dispositions  relatives 
aux  affaires  de  Pologne  qui  en  etoient  la  suite.  II  lacha  a  cette  occa- 
sion un  propos  que  je  crois  de  mon  devoir  de  ne  pas  derober  a  la  con- 
noissance  de  V.  Exc.  "  Je  crois,  dit-il,  que  le  vieux  Prince  Kaunitz  a 
tres  fort  raison,  qui  pretend  que  pour  ecarter  une  bonne  fois  tout 
sujet  de  discussion  entre  les  voisins  de  la  Pologne,  il  faudroit  la  re- 
duire  a  un  objet  si  insignifiant  qu'on  put  lui  laisser  la  liberte  de  pren- 
dre telle  forme  que  bon  lui  sembleroit.  Ce  principe  adopte,  il  seroit 
facile  de  s'entendre,  et  le  role  important  de  regler  cette  affaire  seroit 
encore  reserve  a  lTmperatrice.  J'en  ai  parle  etant  a  Vienne  et  au 
Comte  Razoumovski  et  a  Mr.  de  Simolin." 

M'etant  borne  a  l'ecouter  tranquillement,  je  n'y  ai  rien  repondu, 
et  j'ajoute  que  le  Comte  de  Schoulenbourg  n'a  jamais  articule  le 
moindre  mot  a  ce  sujet. 

4.  Razumovski   to  the    Empress,    March   11/22,   1792.   [M.  A., 

ABdpia,  III,  52] 

Madame. 

Les  objets  importans  qui  occupent  presentement  les  cabinets  des 
cours  les  plus  en  relations  avec  Votre  Majeste  Imperiale,  ont  donne 
lieu  a  des  entretiens  et  a  des  developpemens  d'idees  que  je  crois 
devoir  porter  directement  a  Sa  connaissance. 

Le  General  Bishoffswerder  que  je  connaissais  precedement  a 
neanmoins  desire  d'etre  porteur  d'une  lettre  de  Mr.  Alopeus  pour 
moi.  Le  concert  relatif  aux  affaires  de  France  a  fourni  matiere  a  la 
conversation  lorsque  le  hasard  me  l'a  fait  rencontrer,  et  toujours  il 
m'a  fait  sentir  que  les  mesures  a  prendre  a  l'egard  de  la  Pologne  met- 
traient  obstacle  a  l'activite  qu'on  aurait  a  attendre  de  la  Cour  de 
Vienne.     Nos  entretiens  ont  ete  vagues  parce  que  je  ne  m'y  suis 


APPENDIX  XII  533 

livre  qu'avec  la  circonspection  que  j'ai  juge  m'etre  convenable  sous 
tous  les  rapports;  attentif  cependant  a.  ce  qu'il  me  disait,  j'ai  cru 
pouvoir  hasarder  entr'autres  idees  generates  sur  la  Pologne,  un  ar- 
rangement sortable  pour  les  trois  Cours,  et  propre  a  porter  une  at- 
teinte  decidee  a  l'accroissement  des  forces  et  de  la  puissance  de  cette 
Republique.  Hier  nous  etant  trouves  a  portee  de  reprendre  la  meme 
conversation,  il  me  dit  qu'il  venait  de  recevoir  des  nouvelles  de 
Berlin,  qui  l'instruisaient  de  la  communication  qui  y  avait  ete  faite 
par  ordre  de  Votre  Majeste  Imperiale  touchant  les  affaires  de  Pologne, 
qu'elle  etait  de  la  meme  teneur  que  les  depeches  qui  nous  sont  par- 
venues  ici  dernierement,  et  que  le  Roi  son  Maitre  dispose  a.  concourir 
aux  intentions  de  Votre  Majeste  Imperiale,  mais  regrettant  qu'elles 
ne  fussent  pas  asses  clairement  exprimees,  avait  deja  fait  solliciter 
aupres  du  ministre  de  Votre  Majeste  Imperiale  des  explications  plus 
precises.  Dans  la  suite  du  discours  mettant  toute  finasserie  de  cote, 
il  revint  a  l'arrangement  dont  j'ai  fait  mention  ci  dessus,  et  parlant 
sans  reserve  il  me  dit  qu'il  le  considerait  comme  le  seul  moyen  d'aller 
au  but  commun  des  trois  puissances,  tant  par  rapport  a  la  Pologne 
que  relativement  a  leurs  projets  a  l'egard  de  la  France.  Que  si  Votre 
Majeste  Imperiale  voulait  s'entendre  avec  la  Cour  de  Berlin  sur  un 
accroissement  respectif  de  possessions  en  Pologne,  on  pourrait,  comme 
equivalent,  faire  revivre  en  faveur  de  la  Cour  de  Vienne  l'echange 
tant  desire  par  feu  S.  M.  l'Empereur  Joseph  de  la  Baviere  contre 
les  Pays  Bas,  et  en  poursuivant  le  plan  projette  a  l'egard  de  la  re- 
volution Francaise,  on  obtiendrait  le  double  but  d'y  etouffer  la  con- 
tagion et  de  ramener  les  Provinces  Belgiques  a  l'obeissance  avant  de 
leur  faire  changer  de  domination. 

Telle  est  la  substance  de  ma  conversation  avec  Mr.  le  General  de 
Bishoffswerder.  En  me  disant  qu'il  n'avait  aucune  instruction  du 
Roi  son  Maitre  analogue  a  un  pareil  projet,  il  m'a  cependant  repete 
a  plusieurs  reprises  que  cette  proposition  serait  accueillie  avec  satis- 
faction par  Sa  Majeste  Prussienne  et  qu'au  surplus  si  elle  ne  pouvait 
avoir  l'effet  desire,  elle  resterait  ensevelie  dans  le  secret  entre  le  tres 
petit  nombre  de  personnes  qui  en  seraient  instruites. 

5.  Frederick    William   to   Bischoffwerder,   March    14,    1792. 
[B.  A.,  R.  1,  Conv.  172] 

...  II  paroit  que  les  vues  de  lTmperatrice  touchant  la  Pologne 
pourroit  amener  l'evenement  que  le  Due  de  Bronsviq  souhaite  de  voir 


534 


APPENDIX  XIII 


arriver  l  et  dont  il  parle  dans  la  lettre  que  je  Vous  envoie  a  Dresde, 
ce  qui  seroit  certainement  tres  favorable  pour  cet  Etat  ainsi  que  Vous 
juges  bien  que  je  dois  souhaiter  que  la  Cour  de  Vienne  entre  dans  la 
meme  idee,  ce  qui  est  peut  etre  possible  puisque  selon  toute  apparence 
la  Russie  restera  ferme,  la  chose  etant  trop  de  son  propre  interet. 


APPENDIX  XIII 

Documents  Illustrating  the  Earliest  Discussions 

between  Russia  and  Prussia  Regarding  a 

New  Partition 

i.  Alopeus  to  Ostermann,  May  8/19, 1792.  [M.  A.,  Hpyccia,  III,  29] 
.  .  .  Schulenburg  said  to  him:  "qu'il  alloit  ecrire  au  Comte  Goltz, 
qu'il  lui  revenoit  de  tous  cotes  que  l'lmperatrice  avoit  pour  objet  de 
combiner  les  affaires  de  Pologne  avec  celles  de  France;  qu'il  ne  com- 
prenoit  pas  ce  que  cela  voudroit  dire,  n'en  ayant  pas  la  moindre  con- 
noissance,  et  que  le  Comte  de  Goltz  devoit  demander  a  Votre  Excel- 
lence des  eclaircissements  a  cet  egard." 

[The  rest  of  this  dispatch,  relating  to  Bischoffwerder's  pointed 
hints  about  a  new  partition,  is  printed  in  Appendix  XII.] 


2.  Ostermann  to  Alopeus,  June   10/21,   1792.     [MA.,  Hpyccia 
III,  28] 

...  La  franchise  avec  laquelle  Mr.  le  Comte  de  Schoulenbourg 
s'est  explique  avec  Vous,  Monsieur,  sur  le  dessein  de  S.  M.  Prussienne 
de  se  faire  indemniser  par  la  France  des  fraix  que  son  entreprise  doit 
lui  couter,  a  ete  envisagee  par  l'lmperatrice  comme  une  nouvelle 
marque  de  confiance  que  le  Roy  a  bien  voulu  lui  donner.  S.  M.  I. 
ne  voit  rien  que  de  juste  dans  une  vue  aussi  naturelle  et  si  son  con- 
cours  y  est  necessaire,  Elle  n'attendra  pour  s'y  determiner  que  les 
eclaircissemens  ulterieurs  sur  la  nature  et  le  genre  d'une  indemnite 
qui  tres  probablement  sera  aussi  reclamee  par  les  autres  Puissances 
qui  ont  concourru  pareillement  a  l'entreprise.  Mais  dans  cette  oc- 
casion Elle  croit  devoir  presenter  a  la  meditation  et  a  la  considera- 
tion de  S.  M.  Prussienne,  que  si  la  France,  deja  ruinee  et  epuisee  par 
l'anarchie  et  la  desorganisation  totale,  auxquelles  elle  est  en  proye 

1  A  partition  of  Poland,  cf.  p.  238,  note  1. 


APPENDIX  XIII  535 

depuis  tant  d'annees,  et  grevee  par  la  charge  des  remboursemens 
qu'elle  aura  a.  faire,  se  voit  encore  garrotee  par  une  forme  de  gou- 
vernement  et  de  constitution  tellement  combinee  que  les  ressources 
qui  lui  resteront  ne  puissent  se  developper  avec  l'energie  et  le  ressort 
indispensablement  necessaires  apres  des  secousses  aussi  violentes 
et  aussi  destructives,  il  ne  faudra  plus  compter  ce  Royaume  pour 
quelque  chose  dans  la  balance  generate  de  l'Europe.  Or  il  paroit 
essentiel  d'examiner  des  a  present  pour  le  bien  et  la  tranquillite  de 
celle-ci,  a.  quel  point  peut  influer  sur  l'un  et  l'autre  l'aneantissement 
complet  d'existence  politique  d'un  Etat  aussi  considerable  que  la 
France.  .  .  . 

3.  The  Prince  of  Nassau  to  the  Empress,  June  30/JuLY  11, 

1792.     [M.  A.,  France,  IX,  Princes  et  Emigres,  1792] 

Dans  une  conversation  que  j'ai  eu  avec  Bischoffwerder  [on  June 
29,  N.  S.],  et  pour  laquelle  il  m'a  demande  le  secret,  il  m'a  assure  que 
la  cour  de  Vienne  ne  vouloit  autre  chose  que  l'arrangement  de  la 
Baviere  tel  que  Votre  Majeste  Imperiale  l'avoit  propose  autrefois, 
et  que  quant  a  la  Prusse  l'Empereur  etoit  convenu  de  proposer  a 
Votre  Majeste  Imperiale  de  luy  faire  ceder  par  la  Pologne  les  en- 
claves qui  lui  conviennent  pour  arrondir  Ses  etats;  que  ces  arrange- 
mens  aiant  lieu,  il  n'en  couteroit  a  la  France  que  quelques  morceaux 
de  la  Lorraine  et  de  l'Alsace,  que  la  Prusse  sentoit  bien  que  ...  la 
France  ...  est  un  pais  si  necessaire  au  maintien  de  l'Equilibre  en 
Europe. 

4.  Schulenburg  to  Frederick  William,  July  i,  1792.     [B.  A., 

R.  XL,  Russland,  133] 

[Reporting  a  conversation  with  Alopeus]  J'ai  tache  de  le  sonder 
si  sa  Cour  auroit  des  vues  d'acquisition  en  Pologne,  ou  si  elle  se 
borne  simplement  au  renversement  de  la  Constitution  du  3  de  Mai. 
Quoique  je  ne  lui  aie  pas  fait  cette  question  directement,  il  en  a  de- 
vine  le  sens  et  m'a  repondu  que  l'lmperatrice  reconnoissoit  la  jus- 
tice d'une  indemnite  parfaite  des  fraix  qu'occasionnoient  les  affaires 
de  France,  et  qu'il  avoit  l'ordre  expres  de  prier  que  Votre  Majeste 
voulut  communiquer  Ses  idees  comment  Elle  croyoit  que  cette  in- 
demnite pourroit  se  procurer.  La  reponse  a  cette  question  sera  deli- 
cate, mais  toujours  elle  nous  rapprochera  du  but. 


536 


APPENDIX  XIII 


5.     SCHULENBURG     AND     ALVENSLEBEN     TO      FREDERICK     WlLLIAM, 

July  3,  1792.     [B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Russland,  133] 

[On  the  subject  of  '  indemnisation '  for  the  French  war]  Nous 
avons  la  satisfaction  d'annoncer  a  V.  M.  que  non  seulement  l'lmpera- 
trice  de  Russie  la  regarde  comme  juste  et  naturelle,  mais  qu'elle 
promet  aussi  en  cas  de  besoin  d'y  concourir  en  faveur  de  toutes  les 
Puissances  cooperantes  .  .  .  Cette  ouverture  significative  est  ac- 
compagnee  de  la  reflexion  que  la  France  etant  deja  ruinee  et  epuisee 
aujourd'hui,  il  lui  restera  difrkilement  son  veritable  poids  dans  la 
balance  generale.  L'observation  est  juste,  .  .  .  mais  on  diroit, 
Sire,  que  la  Cour  de  Russie,  en  plaidant  la  cause  de  la  France, 
cherche  a.  detourner  l'idee  d'un  demembrement  dont  ce  Royaume 
pourroit  etre  menace,  et  qu'en  offrant  sa  concurrence  pour  faciliter 
les  moyens  de  l'indemnite  future,  elle  veut  laisser  entrevoir  une  possi- 
bilite  de  la  trouver  du  cote  de  la  Pologne  —  le  seul  ou  son  influence 
pourroit  etre  employe  avec  succes.  —  They  mean  to  draw  Alopeus 
out  further  "afin  de  preparer  imperceptiblement  les  esprits  aux 
ouvertures  qui  vont  suivre." 


6.    Alopeus  to  Ostermann,  June  22/JuLY  3,  1792.    [M.  A.,  Hpyccia, 
III,  29] 

Par  le  compte  que  j'ai  eu  l'honneur  de  rendre  de  la  conversation 
du  Comte  de  Schoulenbourg  avec  le  Prince  de  Nassau,  j'ai  prevenu 
en  partie  les  orders  de  Votre  Excellence  contenus  dans  l'Apostille  de 
sa  depeche  du  10  Juin,1  mais  pour  me  mettre  en  etat  de  les  remplir 
encore  plus  particulierement,  j'ai  saisi  le  pretexte  du  besoin  de 
quelque  eclaircissement  que  j'avois  demande  au  Ministre,  et  je  me 
suis  rendu  hier  au  soir  ches  lui.  Alors  j'ai  amene  insensiblement  la 
conversation  a  ce  qu'il  m'importoit  d'eclairer.  Elle  m'a  conduit  a  des 
resultats,  qui  a  ce  que  j'ose  me  flatter,  repandront  le  jour  necessaire 
sur  les  vues  des  Cours  de  Vienne  et  de  Berlin.  II  n'existe  pas  de  con- 
cert eventuel  entre  elles,  mais  il  y  a  eu  naturellement  des  pour- 
parlers sur  le  genre  des  indemnites  auxquels  elles  devroient  aspirer. 
Le  remboursement  des  fraix  en  argent  comptant  paroissant  impossi- 
ble et  ayant  meme  l'inconvenient  de  grever  la  France  d'une  nouvelle 
masse  de  dettes,  qui  la  tiendroit  garotte  et  influeroit  ainsi  sur  son 
existence  politique,  il  a  paru  au  Comte  Schoulenbourg  que  l'Autriche 

1  I  have  been  unable  to  find  this  apostil. 


APPENDIX  XIV  537 

pourroit  faire  des  acquisitions  territoriales  sur  la  France  sans  que  ce 
Royaume  en  fut  affoibli  dans  sa  valeur  politique.  La  Cour  de  Vienne 
n'y  trouve  d'autre  inconvenient  que  le  sentiment  de  haine  et  l'odieux 
dont  elle  se  chargeroit  de  la  part  de  la  plus  grande  partie  de  l'Europe; 
mais  dans  le  fond  ce  n'est  peutetre  que  le  desir  de  realiser  son  projet 
de  l'echange  de  la  Baviere  auquel  elle  paroit  toujours  attachee.  Ici 
on  n'y  trouve  plus  les  memes  dangers  qu'autrefois,  pourvu  que  par 
de  nouvelles  acquisitions  la  balance  soit  maintenue.  L'impossi- 
bilite  d'en  faire  sur  la  France,  tant  a  cause  de  l'eloignement  que  par 
la  necessite  de  ne  pas  echancrer  ce  Royaume  comme  la  Pologne,  a. 
laquelle  un  role  subalterne  doit  etre  assigne,  motive  l'idee  de  cher- 
cher  les  indemnites  pour  la  Prusse  en  Pologne  meme.  Le  Comte  de 
Schoulenbourg  m'a  assure  de  ne  pas  encore  connoitre  les  vues  du 
Roi  son  Maitre  a  cet  egard;  mais  il  s'est  propose  de  Lui  en  parler. 
La  lisiere  de  la  Pologne,  qui  uniroit  le  Royaume  de  Prusse  a  la  Silesie, 
en  fait  l'objet,  et  il  croit  que  la  Russie  pourroit  egalement  faire 
l'acquisition  de  l'Ukraine  Polonoise,  a  fin  de  former  de  ses  nouvelles 
acquisitions  sur  les  Turcs  une  masse  contigue  avec  ses  anciennes  pos- 
sessions. C'est  la  en  gros  l'idee  que  ce  Ministre  a  concu  de  la  nature 
et  du  genre  des  indemnites.  .  .  . 


APPENDIX  XIV 

On  Razumovski's  Conversations  with  Cobenzl  of 

June  30  and  July  i,  1792,  Regarding 

the  Polish-Bavarian  Plan 

The  chief  source  for  the  account  given  in  the  text  is  Razumovski's 
letter  to  Bezborodko  of  July  4,  which  is  supplemented  by  Ph.  Cobenzl's 
dispatch  to  L.  Cobenzl  of  September  13  (this  latter  printed  in  Vivenot, 
ii,  pp.  202  f.). 

With  the  aid  of  Razumovski's  report  I  am  able  to  present  this  in- 
cident for  the  first  time,  I  believe,  in  its  true  light.  It  has  long  been 
partially  known  through  the  Vice-Chancellor's  above-cited  dispatch 
of  September,  through  a  few  vague  references  in  the  Prussian  records, 
and  more  recently  through  a  brief  and  very  unsatisfactory  resume  of 
the  ambassador's  report  published  by  Wassiltchikow,  Les  Razou- 
tnowski,  ii ,  pp.  139  f .,  and  erroneously  dated  July  23  (instead  of 
June  23/ July  4).    None  of  these  sources  afforded  a  precise  clue  as  to 


53§  APPENDIX  XIV 

the  date  of  the  incident,  or  sufficed  to  show  in  what  relation  it  stood 
to  the  development  of  the  Polish-Bavarian  plan.  Sybel  surmised 
that  these  conversations  took  place  in  May,  just  about  the  time  of 
Schulenburg's  first  overture  to  Spielmann;  and  he  conjectured  that 
it  was  Razumovski  who  first  suggested  to  the  Austrians  the  idea  of 
reviving  the  Bavarian  Exchange  project  ("a  pregnant  hint  which 
was  enough  to  inflame  the  Vice-Chancellor's  mind"),  thus  leading 
Spielmann  to  propose  that  plan  to  Schulenburg.1  Very  similar  ac- 
counts are  given  in  Hausser2  and  Sorel.3  Heidrich4  and  Heigel5  are 
much  nearer  the  truth  as  to  the  time  and  the  significance  of  Razu- 
movski's  insinuations  to  Cobenzl,  though  Heidrich  is  certainly  wrong 
in  supposing  that  the  ambassador  made  his  suggestions  at  the  im- 
pulse of  the  Austrians. 

The  text  of  the  Russian  ambassador's  report  follows. 

Razumovski  to  Bezborodko,  June  23/JuLY  4,  1792.    "Tres  se- 
cret."    [M.  A.,  ABdpia,  III,  54] 

Monsieur  le  Comte. 

L'Echange  de  la  Baviere  projette  sous  le  regne  de  feu  l'Empereur 
Joseph  et  dont  les  negotiations  entamees  sous  les  auspices  de  Sa 
Majeste  Imperiale  Notre  Souveraine,  parvinrent  malheureusement 
a  la  connaissance  du  cabinet  de  Berlin  et  en  furent  traversers  d'une 
maniere  si  eclatante,  cet  echange  n'a  point  cesse  d'etre,  dans  le  secret 
du  cabinet  de  Vienne,  une  maxime  d'Etat.  J'eus  lieu  de  la  soup- 
conner  de  bonne  source  et  je  mis  la  plus  grande  attention  a  m'en 
convaincre.  La  visite  que  le  Roi  doit  rendre  au  retour  de  Francfort 
a  l'Electeur  Palatin  a  Munick  a  redouble  ma  vigilance;  enfin,  apres 
m'etre  captive,  j'ose  le  dire,  quelque  confiance  de  la  part  du  minis tere 
d'ici  depuis  que  l'Imperatrice  ma  Souveraine  a  daigne  m'honorer 
de  la  sienne  en  me  conferant  le  poste  que  j'ai  l'honneur  de  remplir, 
j'ai  voulu  m'assurer  si  le  projet  en  question  entrait  dans  les  plans 
actuels  du  cabinet  autrichien.  Dans  une  conversation  familiere 
avec  Mr.  le  Vice-Chancelier  Comte  de  Cobenzl  j'ai  hasarde  de  toucher 
cette  corde  et  ce  que  j'en  ai  dit  a  ete  fonde  sur  ma  profession  de  foi 
a.  l'egard  de  cette  cour,  sur  les  protestations  sinceres  auxquelles  m'au- 

1  Op.  cit.,  ii,  pp.  209  f. 

2  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i,  p.  358. 

3  U  Europe  et  la  Revolution  franqaise,  ii,  pp.  467  f. 

4  Op.  cit.,  p.  225,  note  1. 

6  Deutsche  Geschichte,  i,  p.  537. 


APPENDIX  XIV  539 

torisent  les  dispositions  loyales  et  bienveillantes  de  l'lmperatrice 
envers  la  Maison  d'Autriche,  et  Son  invariable  attachement  aux 
principes  de  notre  alliance;  que  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  prenait  par 
consequent  l'interet  le  plus  vif  au  bien  etre  et  a.  la  prosperite  solide 
de  la  Maison  d'Autriche,  etc.  etc.  Nous  nous  rimes  des  complimens 
et  cela  en  resta  la. 

Le  lendemain,  Dimanche  20  Juin/i  Juillet,  au  sortir  de  l'audience 
des  ambassadeurs  ches  LL.  MM.  je  trouvais  Mr.  de  Cobenzl:  il  me 
prit  a  part  et  me  dit  "Saves  vous  que  notre  conversation  d'hier  m'a 
roule  sans  cesse  dans  l'esprit.  La  maniere  franche  et  amicale  dont 
nous  avons  parle  m'a  engage  a.  en  faire  part  au  Roi;  il  vous  sait  bien 
bon  gre  des  bons  sentimens  que  vous  temoignes.  Vous  aves  penetre 
notre  Secret;  nous  n'en  avons  point  pour  votre  cour  et  vous  alles  en 
juger.  Nous  envisageons  la  circonstance  presante  des  affaires  de 
l'Europe  comme  la  plus  favorable  a.  effectuer  l'echange  de  la  Bavierre 
contre  les  Pays  Bas.  Mais  avant  d'y  songer,  avant  de  faire  la  plus 
petite  demarche,  le  Roi  veut  consulter  l'lmperatrice  avec  la  franchise, 
la  confiance  la  plus  illimitee,  et  l'intention  de  Se  regler  entierement 
d'apres  les  conseils  et  les  mesures  qu'Elle  lui  suggerera.  Le  Roi 
souhaiterait  que  vous  en  fissies  l'ouverture;  et  m'autorise  en  meme 
terns  a,  en  ecrire  a.  l'Ambassadeur  Comte  de  Cobenzl,  le  tout  sous  le 
plus  grand  secret,  car  personne  ne  s'en  doute  ici;  et  le  Roi,  vous, 
moi,  et  Mr.  de  Spielmann  sont  et  seront  les  seuls  qui  en  seront  in- 
struits.  De  sorte  que  si  l'lmperatrice  ne  juge  point  a,  propos  que  le 
projet  ait  lieu,  il  sera  comme  non  avenu  et  restera  enseveli  entre  les 
personnes  qui  en  sont  les  depositaires. 

L'opposition  de  la  cour  de  Berlin,  a  t'il  continue,  est  le  plus  grand 
obstacle  qui  pourrait  s'y  rencontrer.  Sans  doute  les  termes  amicals 
ou  nous  sommes  avec  elle  peuvent  nous  mettre  a,  l'abri  du  moins  des 
consequences  funestes  qui  suivirent  ce  projet  sous  l'Empereur  Joseph, 
mais  ils  n'obtiendront  [sic]  surement  pas  son  agrement  sans  que  le 
Roi  de  Prusse  de  son  cote  fasse  une  acquisition.  Cette  acquisition 
serait  comme  de  raison  aux  depens  de  la  Pologne,  et  nomement  de 
Dantzig  et  Thorn  convokes  depuis  si  longtems  et  dont  on  ne  saurait 
l'empecher  de  s'emparer  a,  la  premiere  circonstance  favorable;  ce 
qui  meme  eut  ete  fait  deja  sous  un  ministere  plus  habile.  Nous 
n'hesiterions  done  pas  d'y  souscrire,  et  quoique  par  notre  echange 
nous  perdrions  a  peu  pres  2  millions  de  revenus,  nous  ne  croirions  pas 
acheter  trop  cher  l'arrondissement  et  la  stabilite  de  nos  possessions. 

Tel  a  ete  le  precis  de  ce  que  m'a  dit  le  Comte  de  Cobenzl.    En  le 


54-0  APPENDIX  XV 

quittant  j'eus  une  conversation  avec  le  Baron  de  Spielmann  a  peu 
pres  de  la  meme  teneur.  II  me  dit  au  surplus  que  le  General  Bishoffs- 
verder  avec  lequel  il  s'est  lie  dans  les  differens  voyages  qu'il  a  faits 
ici,  lui  avait  temoigne  dans  son  dernier  sejour  tres  confidement  [sic] 
des  dispositions  tres  opposees  au  Systeme  de  non  agrandissement 
qu'il  professait  dans  le  public  et  dont  on  a  fait  la  base  du  traite  de 
Berlin  (ce  dont  j'ai  eu  moi  meme  dans  le  terns  des  notions  positives) 
et  qu'il  lui  avait  touche  meme  quelque  chose  de  conforme  a.  l'objet 
dont  nous  nous  entretenions  presentement.  Enfin  l'un  et  l'autre  me 
dirent  au  nom  de  leur  maitre  qu'il  considerait  la  reussite  de  ce  projet 
comme  tenant  absolument  a,  la  volonte  et  bonne  disposition  de  l'lm- 
peratrice  et  qu'on  se  conformerait  entierement  a.  ce  que  Sa  Majeste 
Imperiale  jugerait  a.  propos  de  decider.  Je  repondis  par  les  memes 
assurances  que  ci  dessus,  mais  j'ajoutais  que  peutetre  dans  un  ar- 
rangement pareil  faudrait-il  avoir  egard  a  des  convenances  relatives 
aux  interets  de  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  et  que  j'y  comptais  avec  la 
meme  confiance  a  laquelle  je  venais  d'inviter  le  ministere  de  S.  M. 
Apostolique  envers  nous.  Cette  clause  ne  parut  nullement  deplaire 
et  apres  m'avoir  fait  les  protestations  les  plus  vives  des  obligations 
qu'on  nous  aurait,  nous  convinmes  que  j'expedierais  un  courier  et 
hier  au  soir  on  m'envoya  le  paquet  ci  joint  pour  l'Ambassadeur 
Comte  de  Cobenzl. 

En  suppliant  V.  Exc.  de  porter  cette  depeche  a.  la  connaissance  de 
Sa  Majeste  Imperiale,  j'ose  esperer,  Monsieur  le  Comte,  de  n'etre 
point  desapprouve  dans  la  marche  que  j'ai  suivie.  J'avais  de  fortes 
presomptions  sur  l'existence  du  projet  d'echange,  jamais  moment 
ne  m'a  paru  plus  favorable  pour  l'effectuer  que  la  Situation  actuelle 
de  l'Europe.  C'est  sous  ce  point  de  vue  que  j'ai  cru  devoir  provo- 
quer  la  confidence  qui  m'en  a  ete  faite,  et  qui  soumise  entierement 
au  bon  plaisir  de  Sa  Majeste  Imperiale  ne  saurait  porter  aucun  preju- 
dice ni  a.  nos  interets,  ni  a.  nos  vues  dans  la  supposition  ou  elles  ne 
seraient  point  analogues  a,  celles  qu'on  a  ici.  .  .  . 


APPENDIX  XV 

On  the  Date  of  Spielmann's  Plan  Discussed  on  Pages  351  f. 

This  plan  was  brought  to  light  through  the  document  published 
in  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  348-351,  and  there  entitled  "Protokoll  aufge- 
nommen  zwischen  Spielmann  und  Haugwitz."    This  document  is  in 


APPENDIX  XV  541 

-the  form  of  an  unsigned  agreement  or  convention  between  the  two 
Courts.  It  is  undated,  but  it  was  sent  to  Vienna  along  with  Spiel- 
mann's  report  of  November  6.  The  question  at  issue  is:  when  was 
this  plan  drawn  up  and  presented  to  the  Prussians? 

It  should  be  remarked,  in  the  first  place,  that  the  original  document 
does  not  bear  the  title  'Protokoll'  or  any  other  title.  Spielmann 
refers  to  it  in  his  report  only  as  a  'plan.'  Secondly,  while  he  did  not 
attach  a  date  to  it,  some  one  has  written  on  the  back  of  it:  "N.  B. 
Dieser  hochst  wichtige  Vortrag  muss  zwischen  dem  letzten  Bericht 
des  B.  Spielmann  d.  d.  x.  15.  und  der  preussischen  Verbale  Note 
vom  25.  x.  redigirt  worden  [sein]."  While  one  cannot  be  certain,  it 
is  probable  that  this  note  was  added  immediately  upon  the  receipt 
of  the  document,  and  that  it  indicates  the  idea  then  formed  at  Vienna 
as  to  the  date  of  composition  of  the  plan. 

The  only  direct  evidence  to  be  obtained  from  the  report  of  No- 
vember 6  is  the  following  passage  with  which  that  dispatch  begins: 
"Ueber  welchen  beyderseitigen  Entschiidigungsplan  ich  mit  Graf  en 
Haugwitz  unter  Voraussetzung  der  Allerhochsten  Genehmigung  iiber- 
eingekommen  bin,  bevor  nach  der  Hand  die  ganze  Reihe  der  spdtem 
Ungliicksfalle  eingetreten  ist,1  geruhen  E.  Exc.  aus  der  gehorsamst 
hier  anverwahrten  Beylage  zu  ersehen."  Although  by  no  means 
clear,  this  passage  is  enough  to  refute  the  statement  made  by  Sybel2 
and  Sorel3  that  this  'protocol'  represents  an  agreement  reached  be- 
tween Haugwitz  and  Spielmann  after  the  Note  of  Merle  (October 
25)  and  on  the  basis  of  that  note.  For  on  this  theory,  how  explain 
the  reference  to  "the  whole  series  of  the  later  disasters"?  How  ex- 
plain the  fact  that  the  Note  of  Merle  is  not  mentioned,  and  that 
the  principles  of  the  '  protocol '  are  utterly  different  from  those  of  the 
Prussian  declaration  of  October  25?  One  must  do  violence  to  the 
whole  history  of  the  affair  to  represent  a  Prussian  minister  agreeing 
after  the  Note  of  Merle  to  make  his  master's  occupation  in  Poland 
dependent  on  the  conclusion  of  the  Exchange  treaty  with  the  Bava- 
rian House.  Sybel  has  evidently  given  Spielmann's  negotiation  a 
quite  fictitious  denouement.  The  "agreement  of  Merle,"  of  which 
he  speaks,  most  certainly  never  took  place. 

Heidrich  has  already  pointed  this  out,  but  I  am  equally  unable  to 
agree  with  his  theory.    He  declares  that  the  'protocol'  represents  an 

1  The  italics  are  mine. 

2  Geschichte  der  Revolutionszcil,  ii,  pp.  362  f. 

3  L' Europe  ct  la  Revolution  franqaise,  iii,  p.  168. 


542 


APPENDIX  XV 


agreement  effected  between  Spielmann  and  Haugwitz  on  the  journey 
westward  from  Frankfort,  or  at  least  before  the  latter  minister's  de- 
parture from  Luxemburg  for  Verdun  (September  26).  For  this  view 
I  can  see  only  two  possible  grounds:  (1)  the  passage  cited  above  from 
Spielmann's  dispatch  of  November  6,  to  which  I  shall  return  later; 
and  (2)  Haugwitz's  letter  to  Schulenburg  of  September  30,  in  which 
he  reports  what  he  has  learned  of  the  new  Austrian  propositions. 
The  sum  of  what  he  says  is  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  now  demands 
a  'supplement'  in  Alsace  and  Lorraine  as  far  as  the  Moselle;  he  men- 
tions none  of  the  other  provisions  of  the  'protocol';  he  does  not  hint 
for  a  moment  that  he  has  already  reached  a  provisional  agreement 
with  Spielmann,  that  a  written  plan  has  been  presented  to  him,  that 
he  has  made  any  definite  proposals  as  to  the  Prussian  acquisitions.1 
Spielmann,  on  his  side,  says  in  a  letter  to  Cobenzl  of  September  27: 
"Mit  dem  H.  Graf  en  v.  Haugwitz  habe  ich  liber  mein  aufhabendes 
Geschaft  ausftihrlich  und  umstandlich  conferiret";2  and  October  15 3 
that  the  King  seemed  inclined  to  grant  Austria  "die  Zutheilung  ander- 
weitiger  reichlicher  Surrogate  fur  die  Markgrafthtimer,  woriiber  ich 
bereits  seit  Frankfurt  den  Grafen  von  Haugwitz  vorlaufig  bestens 
zu  sondiren  und  zu  stimmen  gesucht  hatte."  —  I  will  readily  admit 
that  much  of  the  plan  contained  in  the  'protocol'  had  been  already 
discussed  on  the  journey  from  Frankfort;  but  I  do  not  see  any  signs 
whatever  that  the  two  ministers  had  advanced  so  far  that  Spielmann 
could  embody  their  agreement  in  a  written  plan,  and  especially  in 
one  like  this;  and  there  are  many  reasons  that  render  it  highly  im- 
probable that  such  was  the  case. 

In  the  first  place,  consider  the  initial  article  about  the  continua- 
tion of  the  war.  Heidrich  says,  indeed,  that  at  the  time  of  Spiel- 
mann's departure  from  Vienna  the  Austrians  had  already  grown 
familiar  with  the  idea  that  it  would  take  a  second  campaign  to  get 
the  terms  of  peace  that  they  wanted;  that  they  already  planned  to 
draw  England,  Russia,  and  other  Powers  into  the  contest;  and  that 
they  were  inclined  to  go  in  for  a  war  of  conquest  in  the  grand  style. 
As  proof  of  this  he  offers  only  a  by  no  means  significant  citation  from 
the  Politisches  Journal,  pp.  1005  f.  When  one  turns  to  the  Austrian 
records  themselves,  one  gains  quite  a  different  impression:  one  finds 
that  the  great  desire  at  Vienna  was  to  make  peace  as  soon  as  possi- 

1  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankreich,  89  K. 

2  V.  A.,  Mission  in  das  preussische  Hauplquartier  de  1792. 

3  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  273. 


APPENDIX  XV  543 

ble.  As  there  is  absolutely  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  temper  of 
his  Court  had  changed  in  the  week  following  Spielmann's  departure, 
one  may  take,  for  example,  Cobenzl's  instructions  to  the  Referendary 
of  September  20,1  which  contain  the  clearest  utterances  on  this  sub- 
ject. The  Vice-Chancellor  writes  that  since  nothing  lies  nearer  the 
Emperor's  heart  than  the  speedy  termination  of  the  war,  this  must 
be  one  of  the  objects  of  Spielmann's  special  care.  He  considers  fur- 
ther the  possibility  that  the  capture  of  Paris  might  not  end  the  affair; 
suggests  an  armistice  and  a  negotiation  for  peace  during  the  winter; 
shows  the  greatest  desire  to  avoid  a  '  long,  ruinous  war"  at  any  hon- 
orable price.  I  cannot  find  here  any  sign  that  the  Imperial  Court 
had  already  resolved  on  a  new  campaign,  on  building  up  a  great 
coalition,  or  on  a  grand  war  of  conquest.  —  Then  one  should  notice 
the  development  of  Spielmann's  ideas  on  the  subject.  On  September 
30  he  writes  that  their  main  aim  must  be  to  get  out  of  this  "  costly 
game"  (the  war)  as  soon  as  possible;  and  hence  they  ought  to  offer 
the  French  "a  very  cheap  bargain,"  insisting  chiefly  that  the  King  of 
France  should  be  restored  to  at  least  a  "quasi-freedom."2  How  rec- 
oncile this  with  the  great  war  of  conquest,  for  which,  according  to 
Heidrich,  Spielmann  had  just  come  to  an  agreement  with  Haugwitz? 
Then,  on  October  43  the  Referendary  has  learned  of  the  retreat  of 
the  allied  armies,  and  begins  to  fear  "die  leider  nur  zu  wahrschein- 
liche  Unvermeidlichkeit  einer  zweiten  Campagne."  Finally,  on 
October  15  he  has  become  convinced  of  the  necessity  of  continuing 
the  war,  and  exposes  at  length  the  reasons  that  have  led  him  to  con- 
tinue his  negotiations  in  spite  of  tJiat  fact.  In  one  place  in  this  report 
he  writes:  "Meiner  Betrachtung,  dass  die  bisherigen  supposita  durch 
den  unerwarteten  Ausgang  der  Campagne  nicht  wenig  geandert 
wtirden,  setzt  derselbe  [Haugwitz]  die  Ueberzeugung  seines  Herrn 
von  der  absoluten  Nothwendigkeit  einer  zweiten  Campagne  .  .  .  ent- 
gegen."  4  These  words  are  absolute  nonsense  on  the  supposition 
that  the  two  ministers  had  long  been  agreed  on  a  plan,  the  first 
article  of  which  provided  for  a  second  campaign.  Unless  Spielmann's 
reports  are  to  be  considered  a  mass  of  duplicity,  one  cannot  suppose 
that  he  had  consented  to  such  an  article  in  September  —  at  a  time 
when  the  allied  armies  were  supposed  to  be  fast  approaching  Paris. 
And  as  for  Haugwitz,  who  in  May  and  again  in  July  had  opposed 

1  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  211-221. 

2  V.  A.,  Mission  in  das  prcussische  Hauptquartier. 

s  Vivenot,  ii,  pp.  248  f.  4  Vivenot,  ii,  p.  274. 


544  APPENDIX  XV 

the  war  altogether,  how  can  one  believe  that  in  September  —  with- 
out any  necessity  or  a  shadow  of  authorization,  as  far  as  we  can  see 
—  he  had  agreed  to  a  second  campaign  merely  in  order  to  conquer 
Alsace  and  Lorraine  for  Austria? 

There  is  another  equally  valid  reason  why  this  'protocol'  cannot 
be  referred  to  September.  The  Emperor  had  on  September  9  ap- 
proved the  ideas  of  the  Conference  ministers,  who  opposed  staining 
the  honor  of  their  Court  by  any  active  participation  in  the  dismem- 
berment of  Poland.  Is  one  to  suppose  that  immediately  afterwards 
Spielmann  proposed  to  Haugwitz  the  plan  for  an  Austrian  occupa- 
tion of  Polish  territory  —  an  occupation  which  might  be  turned 
into  permanent  possession,  in  case  acquisitions  failed  to  be  secured 
elsewhere?  On  this  point,  Spielmann  speaks  quite  definitely  in  his 
report  of  November  6.  He  relates  telling  Haugwitz  (about  October 
27)  that  he  had  had,  when  he  left  Vienna,  no  instructions  relative  to 
an  Austrian  acquisition  in  Poland;  and  that  it  was  therefore  only  in 
view  of  the  changed  circumstances  and  as  his  private  idea  that  he  had 
suggested  this  expedient  after  his  return  from  Verdun  (i.e.,  after 
October  12).    This  seems  to  me  conclusive  against  Heidrich's  theory. 

From  the  dozen  similar'  considerations  that  might  be  advanced 
here,  I  shall  mention  but  two  more.  If  in  September  Haugwitz  had 
reached  an  agreement  with  Spielmann  that  could  be  put  into  precise 
written  form,  why  did  the  King  send  him  back  from  Consenvoye  to 
receive  the  Austrian's  definite  propositions?  Or  again,  how  could 
Haugwitz  in  September  have  indicated  to  Spielmann  the  exact  line 
of  demarcation  that  his  Court  desired  in  Poland?  As  far  as  we  know, 
he  had  received  no  instructions  on  that  point;  his  proposals  of  August 
had  apparently  been  passed  over  without  an  answer;  it  was  only  at 
Consenvoye  that  the  King  had  drawn  on  the  map  the  line  he  meant 
to  claim. 

If  these  reasons  seem  decisive  against  placing  the  'protocol'  in 
September,  it  is  not  hard  to  show  that  that  document  fits  in  very 
well  with  the  circumstances  of  mid-October.  In  the  first  place,  the 
passage  at  the  beginning  of  Spielmann's  report  of  November  6  can 
be  rightly  understood,  I  think,  only  if  one  places  the  emphasis  on  the 
word  spatern:  i.e.,  the  plan  was  drawn  up  before  the  later  disasters 
set  in.  For  Spielmann  proceeds  immediately  to  tell  what  disasters 
he  is  referring  to:  the  retreat  from  Verdun,  which  turned  into  a  rout, 
the  total  evacuation  of  French  soil,  the  highly  suspicious  conduct  of 
the  Prussians,  the  appearance  that  they  were  trying  to  get  out  of  the 


APPENDIX  XV  545 

war  and  abandon  Austria,  etc.,  etc.  Now  these  suspicions  appear 
only  in  the  report  of  November  6;  and  they  had  much  to  do  with 
inducing  Spielmann  to  change  his  tactics  with  the  Prussians.  In  his 
last  preceding  report  (October  15)  he  still  shows  himself  convinced 
of  the  Prussian  loyalty.  The  change  evidently  occurred  after  that. 
At  the  end  of  this  report  of  the  15th,  he  states  that  he  has  decided  to 
go  on  with  the  negotiation,  and  that  the  plan  which  he  means  to 
proceed  by  —  under  reservation  of  the  Emperor's  approval  —  will 
be  sent  in  later.  Then  at  the  very  beginning  of  the  next  dispatch 
(November  6),  he  submits  this  plan  (the  'protocol'),  which  he  has 
agreed  upon  with  Haugwitz  —  under  reservation  of  the  Emperor's 
approval  —  "before  the  later  disasters  set  in."  It  is  obvious,  I 
think,  that  October  15  must  be  taken  as  the  terminus  post  quern. 

The  terminus  ante  quern  can  also  be  determined  with  fair  precision. 
On  October  19  Haugwitz  writes  to  Schulenburg  that  Spielmann  has 
presented  him  with  a  memoire  analogous  to  the  principles  reported 
in  his  letter  of  September  30.1  Perhaps  the  term  memoire  does  not  fit 
very  well  the  document  we  have  been  considering;  but  the  word 
memoire  is  used  rather  loosely  in  the  language  of  this  period,  and 
Haugwitz  may  have  chosen  it  as  less  suggestive  of  anything  approach- 
ing a  definite  agreement.  For  several  reasons  I  am  convinced  that 
this  memoire  was  really  the  'protocol'  printed  in  Vivenot.  In  the 
first  place,  it  is  not  easy  to  suppose  that  if  Spielmann  had  presented 
another  document  to  Haugwitz,  he  would  not  have  sent  it  home,  or 
even  have  mentioned  it  in  his  report  of  November  6.  Furthermore, 
Haugwitz  writing  to  Schulenburg  on  October  19,  immediately  after 
speaking  of  the  memoire,  declared  that  the  Court  of  Vienna  seemed 
more  inclined  to  the  continuation  of  the  war  (which  would  appear  to 
be  a  reference  to  Article  I  of  Spielmann's  plan);  and  on  October  27 
he  added  that  the  memoire  contained  the  familiar  proposition  about 
Alsace-Lorraine  as  far  as  the  Moselle,  the  demand  for  the  King's 
mediation  at  Zweibriicken,  the  concession  of  the  line  Czestochowa- 
Rawa-Soldau  to  Prussia,  and  a  provision  about  an  Austrian  oc- 
cupation, and  possibly  an  Austrian  acquisition,  in  Poland.1  In 
short,  the  memoire  described  by  Haugwitz  seems  to  have  contained 
all  the  important  articles  of  the  'plan'  sent  in  by  Spielmann.  More- 
over, Haugwitz  wrote  that  he  had  expressly  rejected  the  proposition 
about  the  Austrian  occupation  in  Poland,  and  Spielmann  also  re- 
ported that  this  was  the  only  article  of  his  'plan'  to  which  Haug- 

1  B.  A.,  R.  XI,  Frankrekh,  89  K. 


546  APPENDIX  XVI 

witz  refused  to  agree.  From  all  this,  it  seems  evident  that  the  memoire 
and  the  'plan'  were  one  and  the  same  document.  The  so-called  'pro- 
tocol' printed  in  Vivenot  represents,  then,  not  an  agreement  reached 
after  the  Note  of  Merle,  nor  one  dating  from  late  September,  but 
rather  the  draft  of  a  convention  submitted  by  Spielmann  to  Haug- 
witz  between  the  15th  and  the  19th  of  October. 


APPENDIX   XVI 

Documents  Illustrating  Haugwitz's  Final  Negotiation 

at  Vienna1 

1.    Haugwitz's  Report  or  December  24, 1792.     [B.  A.,  R.  1,  170] 

En  mettant  le  sceau  sur  les  negotiations  relativement  aux  justes 
indemnites  de  Ses  fraix  de  guerre  dont  V.  M.  a  daigne  me  charger  a 
la  Cour  d'ici,  je  crois  ne  pas  devoir  tarder  de  mettre  sous  les  yeux  de 
V.  M.  les  derniers  resultats.  La  reponse  a  la  Note  de  Merle  etant 
peu  satisfaisante,  je  provoquai  la  communication  de  tout  ce  qu'on 
feroit  passer  a  la  Cour  de  Russie  sur  ce  sujet.  Les  termes  qu'on  em- 
ploye en  s'expliquant  vis  a  vis  de  l'lmperatrice  de  Russie  sur  la  prise 
de  possession  immediate  de  V.  M.  etoient  a  la  verite  plus  precis, 
mais  la  Cour  d'ici  revenant  a  une  prise  de  possession  interimistique 
en  Pologne  de  sa  part,  il  sembloit  que  c'etoit  eloigner  de  fait  ce  qu'on 
parut  d'ailleurs  demander  avec  sollicitude.  .  .  .  Je  n'ai  cependant 
pas  pu  etre  tranquille,  et  beaucoup  moins  pouvois-je  me  resoudre  a 
quitter  Vienne  avant  que  de  n'etre  entierement  rassure  sur  le  parti 
defrnitif  auquel  se  determineroit  la  Cour  de  Vienne.  En  employant 
done  les  moyens,  auxquels  Votre  confiance  m'a  autorise,  je  suis  enfin 
parvenu  a,  vaincre  tous  les  obstacles.  Je  viens  de  recevoir  l'assurance 
formelle  du  Ministere  Imperial  portant:  que  S.  M.  l'Empereur  ad- 
dressera  les  instances  les  plus  pressantes  pour  engager  l'lmperatrice 
de  Russie  a.  consentir  a  la  prise  de  possession  actuelle  de  V.  M.  sans 
y  ajouter  aucune  condition  relativement  a.  une  prise  de  possession  en 
Pologne  de  la  part  de  l'Empereur,  en  se  bornant  uniquement  a  de- 
mander que  l'lmperatrice  veuille  conjointement  avec  V.  M.  garantir 

1  The  chief  documents  on  the  Austrian  side  relating  to  this  negotiation  have 
been  published  by  Vivenot  (Quellen  zur  deutschen  Kaiser politik  Oesterreichs,  vol.  ii), 
and  Haugwitz's  reports  of  December  12  and  19  are  printed  in  Herrmann,  Russische 
Geschichte,  Ergdnzungsband,  pp.  308  ff.,  314  f. 


APPENDIX  XVI  547 

son  consentement  a  l'echange  de  la  Baviere.  Le  Ministere  de  Vienne 
s'est  porte  meme  a,  motiver  le  besoin  d'une  telle  prise  de  possession 
de  la  part  de  V.  M.  de  la  facon  la  plus  prononcee,  en  y  ajoutant  que 
l'Empereur  etoit  intimement  persuade  que  V.  M.  etoit  disposee  a 
prendre  une  part  vigoureuse  a.  la  continuation  de  la  guerre  actuelle, 
mais  qu'il  etoit  egalement  convaincu  que  l'arrondissement  en  Pologne 
et  la  prise  de  possession  immediate  etoit  l'unique  moyen  de  porter 
V.  M.  a.  suivre  son  inclination  a  lui  porter  son  secours. 

2.    Razumovski's    Report    of   January    2i/February    i,    1793. 
[M.  A.,  ABCTpk,  III,  54] 

Le  Sieur  Cesar  .  .  .  ayant  entendu  parler  des  preparatifs  dans 
les  trouppes  de  l'Empereur  pour  entrer  en  Pologne,  a  cru  devoir  s'en 
expliquer  avec  Mr.  le  Comte  de  Cobenzl.  Celui-ci  lui  a  repondu  que 
l'entree  n'aurait  point  lieu  jusqu'a  la  reception  de  la  reponse  de  notre 
Cour  au  sujet  de  la  garantie  conjointe  avec  celle  de  Berlin,  touchant 
l'echange  de  la  Baviere  et  que  dans  le  cas  seulement  ou  cette  garantie 
ne  serait  point  accordee.  Le  Sieur  Cesar  allarme  de  cette  reponse 
est  venu  s'en  ouvrir  a.  moi.  II  m'a  temoigne  avoir  ignore  parfaite- 
ment  la  question  de  la  garantie,  m'a  proteste  que  ce  ne  pouvait  etre 
l'intention  de  son  Maitre,  et  qu'il  ne  s'en  trouvait  pas  un  mot  dans 
les  ecrits  que  lui  avait  laisses  a.  son  depart  le  Comte  de  Haugwitz.  .  .  . 
Enfin  il  m'a  soutenu  que  ces  deux  points  rentraient  directement 
dans  le  sens  de  la  reponse  faite  a.  la  note  de  Merle,  reponse  qu'il  dit 
avoir  ete  rejette  par  le  Roi  son  maitre.  Cependant  il  est  hors  de 
doute  que  le  Comte  de  Haugwitz  en  a  ete  informe,  car  il  m'en  a 
souvent  parle.  II  n'en  est  pas  moins  certain  que  la  susdite  reponse 
a  la  note  de  Merle  n'a  point  ete  rendue  au  Ministere  d'ici,  que  par 
consequent  elle  a  ete  de  fait  acceptee.  II  en  resulte  done  que  le  Comte 
de  Haugwitz,  pour  faciliter  les  negociations,  a  mis  dans  les  confe- 
rences plus  de  condescendance  que  n'en  portent  ses  rapports,  et  que 
cette  matiere  qui  paraissait  entendue  entre  lui  et  le  Ministere  de 
Vienne  pourrait  encore  etre  sujet  a,  de  nouveaux  embarras.  Le 
Sieur  Cesar  me  disant  tout  cela  sous  le  sceau  de  la  confiance,  l'a 
portee  jusqu'a  me  faire  lecture  du  dernier  rapport  du  Comte  de 
Haugwitz,  ou  .  .  .  il  dit  que  cette  Cour  ci  espere  s'assurer  du  con- 
sentement du  Roi  de  Prusse  a  l'echange  de  la  Baviere;  or,  ce  mot  de 
consentement  differe  bien  de  garantie. 


548 


APPENDIX  XVI 


3.    Haugwitz's  Report  to  the  King,  May  6,  1793.     [B.  A.,  R. 
96,  147  H] 

.  .  .  Un  des  principes  que  la  Cour  de  Vienne  a  desire  de  poser 
pour  base  des  negotiations  presentes  des  leur  origine,  c'est  celui  d'une 
pretendue  parite  d' aggrandissement  qu'elle  s'avise  de  deduire  de  Ves- 
prit  de  son  Alliance  avec  la  Prusse,  sans  que  de  son  propre  aveu  il 
en  soit  fait  mention  dans  le  Traite.  .  .  .  J'avoue  que  dans  les  pre- 
miers terns  de  ma  mission  a  la  Cour  Imperiale,  j'ai  entendu  produire 
et  reproduire  ce  principe  avec  la  plus  grande  assiduite,  et  que  les 
Ministres  avoient  le  talent  de  faire  valoir  comme  s'il  avoit  passe  en 
axiome;  mais  ils  transgressent  les  loix  de  la  verite  en  sou  tenant  "que 
c'est  moi  qui  l'ai  reconnu  aux  conferences  de  Luxembourg  et  de 
Vienne."  Rien  de  plus  faux.  Le  piege  etoit  heureusement  trop 
visible.  .  .  .  J'ai  evite  au  contraire  tout  ce  qui  auroit  pu  impliquer 
de  ma  part  le  moindre  aveu  de  ce  genre,  et  loin  de  souscrire  aux  pre- 
tensions d'indemnites  que  les  Ministres  Autrichiens  m'opposoient 
pour  essayer  de  contrebalancer  celles  de  ma  Cour,  je  n'ai  jamais  eu 
qu'une  seule  et  meme  facon  de  repondre  a  leurs  argumens.  Je  leur 
objectai  "que  si  l'Autriche  croyoit  avoir  des  droits  pour  etre  dedom- 
mages  des  fraix  de  la  guerre,  ces  titres  ne  devroient  cependant  pas 
etre  confondus  avec  ceux  de  la  Prusse.  Que  l'une  etoit  partie  prin- 
cipal et  attaquee;  l'autre,  partie  accessoire  et  auxiliaire,  fesant  des 
sacrifices  considerables  en  faveur  d'une  cause  qui  n'est  pas  la  sienne, 
et  pour  lesquels  elle  demande  a,  etre  indemnisee.  Que  la  Cour  de 
Vienne  ayant  reconnu  l'equite  de  cette  indemnite,  la  Prusse  en  se  la 
procurant  par  son  arrondissement  en  Pologne,  n'y  retrouve  que  le 
recouvrement  de  ses  avances,  le  fruit  d'une  cooperation  dont  elle 
s'est  chargee  a.  la  requisition  de  l'Autriche,  et  de  laquelle  cette  Puis- 
sance est  obligee  de  lui  tenir  compte,  tandis  que  si  Ton  accorde  a 
celle-ci  le  droit  de  reclamer  un  dedommagement  de  son  cote,  ce  n'est 
absolument  qu'aux  depends  de  la  France  son  ennemie  qu'elle  peut  la 
realiser." 

Tels  etoient,  Sire,  daignez  en  grace  Vous  en  souvenir,  les  principes 
que  j'osai  Vous  soumettre  lorsque  le  8  Mai  de  l'annee  derniere  j'eus 
l'honneur  d'entretenir  V.  M.  sur  cette  matiere  a  Charlottenbourg,  et 
telle  etoit  ma  profession  de  foi  a  Vienne,  lors  meme  que  je  n'etois  pas 
encore  appele  a  discuter  rigoureusement  cette  matiere.  Mais  des 
l'instant  ou  je  fus  autorise  a  l'eclaircir  de  plus  pres,  je  l'ai  fait  sans 
detour  avec  une  franchise  et  une  precision  qui  ne  pouvoit  plus  laisser 
le  moindre  doute. 


APPENDIX  XVI  549 

(The  first  occasion  for  a  categorical  explanation  was  at  Luxem- 
burg, when  he  had  been  charged  to  announce  to  Spielmann  the  terms 
under  which  the  King  would  consent  to  continue  the  war.)  Le 
Referendaire  intime  revenant  alors  a  sa  these  favorite  de  la  parite 
des  indemnisations,  je  saisis  l'apropos  pour  dechirer  le  voile  et  pour 
lui  indiquer  la  difference  de  nos  calculs.  Je  lui  declarai  en  autant 
de  termes:  "que  si  jamais  il  pouvoit  avoir  ete  question  d'etablir  entre 
les  deux  Puissances  alliees  un  Sisteme  d'egalite  dans  leur  agrandisse- 
ments  futurs,  ce  Sisteme  devoit  s'entendre  uniquement  des  acquisi- 
tions qu'elles  seroient  a  meme  de  faire  par  des  convenances  reci- 
proques."    (The  present  case  entirely  different,  etc.). 

Je  n'en  disconviens  pas,  cette  explication  acheva  de  troubler  le 
B.  de  Spielmann;  il  me  repondit,  "que  mes  principes  diametralement 
opposes  aux  siens  etoient  absolument  neufs  pour  lui  et  que  s'ils 
devoient  prevaloir,  il  y  voyoit  le  tombeau  de  V Alliance  entre  les  deux 
Cours." 

A  l'appui  de  ce  que  j'avancois,  et  pour  en  tamer  la  negotiation  prin- 
cipale,  je  remis  alors  auB.de  Spielmann  la  Note  qui  avoit  ete  pre- 
pared dans  le  Quartier  General  de  Merle  la  veille,  25.  Octobre  1792, 
sous  les  yeux  de  V.  M.  et  qui  renfermoit  les  conditions  irrevocables 
qu'Elle  venoit  de  mettre  a  sa  cooperation  pour  la  campagne  suivante 
...  La  dessus  j'etalai  sur  la  table  du  B.  de  Spielmann  l'exemplaire 
original  de  la  carte  de  la  Pologne  sur  laquelle,  Sire,  Vous  aviez  trace 
de  main  propre  dans  le  camp  de  Consanvoy  la  ligne  de  Vos  acquisi- 
tions de  Czenstochow  par  Rawa  a  Soldau.  Je  lui  montrai  au  doigt 
cette  ligne  de  demarcation,  en  lui  disant  "que  telle  seroit  l'indem- 
nite  de  V.  M.  et  qu'apres  en  avoir  ete  mise  en  possession,  elle  con- 
tinueroit  a  l'Empereur  pendant  la  campagne  prochaine  la  meme 
assistance  qu'Elle  lui  avoit  accordee  dans  celle-ci."  ...  II  me  fallut 
essuyer  pendant  trois  heures  une  longue  suite  de  declamations  et  de 
plaintes,  dont  le  retournant  fut  toujours  l'insupportable  principe  de 
la  parite,  et  la  necessite  de  l'adopter  invariabiement  pour  base  des 
liaisons  subsistantes  entre  les  deux  Cours.  (He  had  finally  ended 
the  discussion  by  saying)  "Que  sans  pouvoir  remonter  au  passe, 
j'etois  oblige  de  m'en  tenir  a.  la  situation  des  affaires  telle  qu'elle  se 
presentoit  aujourd'hui.  Que  la  resolution  de  V.  M.  et  Ses  conditions 
etoient  invariables,  et  que  si  la  possession  immediate  de  l'arrondisse- 
ment  propose  pouvoit  rencontrer  les  moindres  obstacles,  la  retraite 
de  l'armee  Prussienne  restoit  decidee  sans  retour."  .  .  . 

(At  Vienna  he  had  then  daily  pressed  the  Austrians  for  a  satis- 


55° 


APPENDIX  XVI 


factory  answer,  repeating  constantly),  "que  j'entendois  par  la  prise 
de  possession  de  l'acquisition  de  V.  M.  en  Pologne  non  leur  occupa- 
tion eventuelle  ou  interimale,  mais  leur  propriete  permanente  et  leur  in- 
corporation complette  a  la  Monarchic  Prussienne." 

A  force  de  renouveller  d'heure  en  heure  mes  representations,  mes 
instances,  mes  declarations  energiques,  et  je  dirois  presque  mes  com- 
minations,  j'eus  le  bonheur  enfin  de  ramener  les  deux  Ministres  du 
Cabinet  a  des  dispositions  plus  favorables.  .  .  .  Ce  fut  dans  les 
journees  du  21  et  22  Decembre,  que  s'opera  cet  heureux  changement; 
j'obtins  le  consentement  pur  et  simple  a.  la  prise  de  possession  effec- 
tive et  on  laissa  de  cote  les  chevilles  qui  avoient  herisse  jusqu'ici 
l'issue  de  ma  negotiation.  Les  assurances  formelles  que  je  recus  de 
la  bouche  du  Comte  Cobenzl  et  du  B.  de  Spielmann,  furent  en  meme 
terns  accompagnees  de  la  promesse  positive:  "Que  S.  M.  l'Empereur 
addressera  les  instances,  les  plus  pressantes,"  etc.  (word  for  word  as 
in  the  report  of  December  24  printed  above).  ...  La  seule  restric- 
tion qu'on  se  permit  d'ajouter,  ce  fut:  que  l'lmperatrice  de  Russie 
voulut,  conjointement  avec  S.  M.  le  Roi  de  Prusse,  garantir  son  con- 
sentement a  Vechange  de  la  Baviere,  qui  me  presentoit  a.  la  verite  un 
sens  obscur  et  louche,  mais  sur  laquelle  je  ne  me  crus  pas  oblige,  par 
cette  meme  raison,  de  faire  le  difficile,  persuade  qu'elle  auroit  grand 
besoin  d'etre  determine  avec  plus  de  clarte  dans  la  suite. 

(The  23rd  he  had  had  his  final  audience  with  the  Emperor.)  L'Em- 
pereur me  repondit  du  ton  le  plus  affectueux,  "qu'il  etoit  bien  loin 
de  se  permettre  le  moindre  doute  sur  l'amitie  et  les  sentimens  de  V. 
M.;  mais  qu'il  ne  pouvoit  me  cacher  une  chose  qui  l'embarrassoit. 
Vous  savez,  continua-t-il,  que  j'ai  donne  mon  consentement  a.  l'ag- 
grandissement  du  Roi  en  Pologne;  mais  puisque  S.  M.  a  fait  de  cette 
acquisition  la  condition  sine  qua  non  de  sa  cooperation  a,  la  guerre, 
je  dois  conserver  quelques  apprehensions  que  malgre  les  ordres  les 
plus  positifs  qui  sont  adresses  auC.de  Cobenzl  a.  Petersbourg,  nous 
ne  rencontrions  des  difficultes  pour  emporter  aussi  l'acquiescement 
de  l'lmperatrice  de  Russie."  .  .  .  Ainsi  finit  cette  audience  memo- 
rable dans  laquelle  l'Empereur  me  parla  en  termes  si  positifs  de  son 
consentement  donne  et  meme  de  son  inquietude  a  voir  realise  le  plan  de 
V.  M.,  sans  rappeller  une  seule  de  ces  clauses  restrictives  que  ses 
Ministres  avoient  interjettees  auparavant.  ...  II  [Cobenzl]  poussa 
meme  la  resignation  jusqu'a  me  dire  "qu'il  souscrivoit  respectueuse- 
ment  aux  volontes  de  son  maitre  convaincu  d'ailleurs  de  la  justice 
de  nos  pretensions."  .  .  .  Dans  ces  derniers  terns  de  mon  sejour  a, 


APPENDIX  XV II  551 

Vienne  j'avois  quitte  le  ton  du  negociateur  pour  prendre  celui  d'un 
homme  qui  veut,  et  qui  annonce  les  volontes  peremptoires  de  son 
Maitre. 


APPENDIX   XVII 

Notes  of  the  Empress  Belonging  to  the  Papers  of  the 
Secret  Conference  of  October  2q/November  9,  1792. 

[P.  A.,  X,  69] 

1.  Moauio  6u  h  to  CKa3aTh  em,e  JIpyccaKaMt,  ^to  Hain>  KaateTca  Tenepi.  ne 
BpeMfl  naiaTb  hobbig  xjoiiotbi  Koraa  Akjio  H^eTS  no  BBipyneiria  HiMeu.Kofl  Iliinepin 
h  ea  nt.tocTn  n3i  pyKt  $paHii,y30BT>,  koh  He  tokmo  3aBjia;i,'E.!iH  Tpeiia  Kypcjmper- 
Bann  ho  h  temt.  ropo^oirb  ate  rjrfe  KopoHyiOTca  IbinepaTopbi. 

2.  '  IIpaBn.ia  Bt  tomt>  jri-irE  uasieTca  6htb  .hojijkhh  OT^ajraTb  jrijiearb  HojitmH 

KOJHKO  MOJKHO. 

IIocji'b  St^CTBeHHoft  KaMnamH  ht,ti  npio6p,ETeHii1  yciOBHTtca,  h  mh  ne  Bf^a- 
em>  tto  jrijiaTt  xoTart  ct  naMH  jse  hh  0  leMi.  Tyrt  He  6e3t  Bi^ona  BiHCKaro 
jrBopa  ne  npncTynnTb  Kt  onojiy  jrijiy. 

Ychjihtb  IIpyccKaro  Kopo.ia  hh  fl.ia  ^ero. 

HpOTHBy  leCTHOCTH  H  06TjIIl,aHin  OTHIOAB  hh  ieBO  [sic]  npHHHMaTt. 


Note  of  the  Empress  Belonging  to  the  Papers  of  the 

Secret  Conference  of  November  4/15,  1792. 

[P.  A,  X,  69] 

A  la  maniere  pressante  dont  le  Comte  Goltz  a  parle  hier,  il  n'y  a 
qu'a  repondre  que  sans  savoir  ce  que  la  Cour  de  Vienne  mon  Allie 
repondra  et  me  communiquera  je  ne  saurois  rien  dire,  qu'outre  cela 
il  est  indispensablement  necessaire  de  savoir  quelle  sera  la  conduite 
de  l'Angleterre,  que  selon  nos  Avis  de  Constantinople  les  intrigues 
y  augmente  pour  porter  le  Divan  a  nous  declarer  la  guerre,  qu'on 
l'a  deja  porte  a  faire  travailler  a  un  Armement  maritime,  qu'en  con- 
sequence je  ne  trouve  pas  que  la  Prudence  permette  de  commencer 
de  nouveaux  embarras  tandis  surtout  que  ceux  qui  existent  ne  sont 
pas  finis  ni  que  nous  puissions  en  prevoir  la  fin,  etant  dans  une  tres 
parfaite  ignorance  sur  le  plan  des  hauts  Allies,  lequel  jusqu'ici  a  ete 
diametralement  opose  a.  tout  ce  que  nous  avons  propose,  et  meme 
jusque  la  que  les  Princes  freres  du  Roy  de  France,  loin  d'etre  mis  en 
avant,  sont  chasses  de  lieu  en  lieu  et  prets  a.  perir  de  faim  et  de  misere 

1  This  note  follows  immediately  upon  the  preceding  in  the  volume  from  which 
it  is  taken,  and  in  all  probability  belongs  with  it. 


552  APPENDIX  XVIII 

avec  la  Noblesse  nombreuse  qui  est  restee  fidele  a,  la  Cause  du  Roy 
qui  est  reconnue  pour  celle  de  tous  les  Souverains.  Que  nous  n'ajou- 
tons  pas  foy  au  bruit  general  de  l'Europe  comme  si  S.  M.  etoit  con- 
venu  avec  les  Rebelles  de  je  ne  sai  quel  arrangement,  que  nous  n'y 
ajoutons  pas  foy  parce  que  ces  bruits  sont  injurieux  a  sa  gloire  et  sa 
probite. 


APPENDIX  XVIII 

Rescripts  of  Catherine  II.  to  Sievers  with  Regard 

to  the  Negotiations  at  the  Diet  of  Grodno. 

[M.  A.,  EojiBnia,  III,  70] 

1.    May  26/ June  6,  1793 

Apres  vous  avoir  annonce  mes  intentions  en  termes  ostensibles 
dans  le  Rescrit  Russe,  qui  accompagne  celui-ci,  je  ne  veux  point  vous 
laisser  ignorer  les  motifs  particuliers  qui  m'ont  determinee  a  faire 
traiter  separement  les  objets  de  cession  a  faire  aux  deux  Cours  Co- 
partageantes  d'avec  ceux  de  la  nouvelle  Constitution  et  des  liaisons 
politiques  et  commerciales  de  la  Pologne.  .  .  .  Depuis  j'ai  scu  de 
differens  cotes  que  les  plus  senses  d'entre  les  Polonois  sentoient  que 
dans  la  foiblesse  et  le  neant.ou  leur  pays  seroit  plonge  a  la  suite  du 
nouveau  demembrement  qu'il  vient  de  subir,  il  lui  seroit  difficile  ou 
plutot  impossible  de  subsister  en  Corps  d'Etat  libre  et  independant. 
En  partant  de  la,  presque  tous  desireroient  asses  unanimement  de 
pouvoir  suivre  la  destinee  de  ceux  de  leurs  compatriotes,  qui  ont 
passe  sous  ma  domination.  Je  ne  scaurois  ecouter  leurs  voeux  a  cet 
egard  sans  exciter  la  jalousie  des  Puissances  voisines  et  sans  leur 
attirer  une  foule  d'embarras  qu'il  importe  d'eviter  dans  ce  moment. 
Mais  il  ne  seroit  pas  impossible  d'y  suppleer  au  moyen  d'un  traite 
d'alliance  et  d'union  si  etroite  entre  les  deux  Nations,  que  sans  rendre 
l'une  sujette  a  l'autre,  elles  fussent  liees  inseparablement  entre  elles. 
(A  somewhat  similar  plan  had  been  opposed  in  1788  by  the  Court  of 
Berlin.)  Quoique  les  choses  soyent  changees  et  par  les  rapports  ou 
je  suis  avec  cette  cour  et  par  la  position  ou  nous  nous  trouvons  re- 
spectivement,  il  n'en  est  pas  moins  certain  que  si  cette  question  etoit 
remise  sur  le  tapis  dans  le  terns  que  nous  negocions  en  commun  avec 
Elle,  il  en  resulteroit  de  deux  choses  l'une,  ou  qu'elle  voudroit  par- 
ticiper  de  maniere  ou  d'autre  a  mes  arrangemens  avec  les  Polonois 
ou  qu'elle  tacheroit  de  se  procurer  encore  de  nouveaux  avantages  a 


APPENDIX  XVIII  553 

leur  depens.  Ni  l'un  ni  l'autre  n'etant  ni  de  ma  convenance  ni  de 
mes  ihterets,  j'ai  cherche  a.  ecarter  les  Prussiens  et  a.  les  mettre  hors 
du  jeu  aussitot  qu'ils  auront  arrange  et  termine  l'article  de  leurs 
acquisitions.  C'est  d'apres  ces  principes  que  j'ai  fait  rediger  les 
stipulations  du  Traite  de  cession  et  regie  la  marche  de  la  Negocia- 
tion  que  je  leur  ferai  proposer  et  adopter;  c'est  aussi  par  cette  con- 
sideration que  je  n'ai  pas  voulu  que  dans  votre  projet  d'acte  on  fit 
mention  d'aucune  transaction  eventuelle  a  l'exception  d'un  Traite 
de  Commerce  pour  que  la  Cour  de  Berlin  ne  fit  rien  de  semblable  a 
notre  imitation.  J'ai  laisse  a  votre  choix  de  proroguer  ou  de  dis- 
soudre  la  Diette;  mais  lorsqu'elle  se  sera  rassemblee  pour  la  raison 
de  travailler  a,  l'organisation  du  gouvernement  de  la  Republique,  ce 
sera  votre  affaire  de  disposer  les  esprits  de  maniere  que  la  proposi- 
tion d'un  Traite,  tel  que  je  viens  de  le  determiner  cy-dessus,  me 
vient  d'eux  spontanement  et  comme  un  accessoire  qui  n'a  ete  nulle- 
ment  premedite.  Je  ne  mets  d'intervale  entre  la  dissolution  ou  la 
prorogation  et  le  nouveau  rassemblement  de  la  diette  que  celui  de 
six  a,  huit  semaines;  car  il  faut  profiter  de  l'occupation  de  nos  voisins 
pour  arranger  solidement  et  stablement  toutes  nos  affaires  avec 
la  Republique.  Malgre  la  stipulation  qui  abandonne  aux  Polonois 
le  soin  de  l'arrangement  futur  de  leur  gouvernement,  vous  saures 
vous  menager  les  moyens  d'y  influer  indirectement  a.  l'exclusion  de 
votre  Collegue  Prussien,  et  sans  de  bien  grands  efforts  vous  con- 
tinueres  a.  diriger  les  esprits  dans  tous  les  sens  qui  conviendront  les 
plus  a.  mes  mterets. 

2.    June  23/ July  4,  1793 

.  .  .  Cependant  il  me  paroit  qu'il  ne  sera  pas  tout  a.  fait  superflu 
de  vous  retracer  aujourd'huy  la  marche  et  l'ordre  que  vous  aves  a. 
suivre  dans  la  negotiation  qui  vous  est  confiee  et  de  vous  faire  part 
en  meme  terns  et  dans  la  plus  intime  confidence  des  motifs  qui  m'ont 
determinee  a,  les  adopter.    Je  commencerai  par  ces  derniers. 

La  Cour  de  Vienne  depuis  l'installation  de  son  nouveau  Ministere 
commence  a.  manifester  une  inquietude  bien  plus  vive  qu'elle  ne  l'a 
fait  par  le  passe  sur  les  acquisitions  des  deux  Cours  Voisines  en  Pologne. 
Apres  avoir  fait  d'inutiles  tentatives  pour  en  diminuer  les  portions, 
elle  vient  d'avoir  recours  a.  moi  par  des  representations  amicales  pour 
m'engager  en  cas  de  non-reussite  des  plans  des  compensations  qui 
lui  etoient  assignees  dans  notre  convention  avec  le  Roy  de  Prusse  a. 
lui  reserver  egalement  en  Pologne  une  part  equivalente  a.  celle  de 


554 


APPENDIX  XVIII 


chacun  de  nous  deux.  Mais  en  attendant,  et  a  tout  evenement  Elle 
me  demande  a  se  mettre  des  a  present  en  possession  de  la  Ville  de 
Cracovie  et  dequelqu'  arrondissement  de  limites  du  cote  de  la  Gallicie; 
.  le  tout  sous  pretexte  que  cette  province  sera  trop  exposee  vis  a  vis 
des  Prussiens  apres  l'occupation  qu'ils  ont  faite  de  Czenstochova.  .  .  . 
Cette  raison  sans  doute  n'est  pas  sans  poids,  mais  comme  en  l'admet- 
tant  nous  risquerions  d'un  cote  d'appauvrir  trop  la  portion  restante 
de  la  Pologne,  et  de  manquer  par  la  le  but  que  nous  proposions  de  la 
conserver  sur  le  pied  d'un  Etat  intermediaire,  et  que  de  l'autre  en 
jettant  ce  nouvel  incident  au  milieu  de  notre  negociation  nous  ne 
pourrions  que  l'embarrasser  et  la  prolonger  non  sans  des  inconve- 
niens  majeurs,  j'aurois  desire  de  pouvoir  y  trouver  quelque  autre 
expedient  qui  put  concilier  les  interets  des  Autrichiens,  sans  en  venir 
a  une  concession  de  territoire  Polonoise  vis  a  vis  d'eux,  et  sans  avoir 
l'air  de  manquer  a.  nos  engagemens  vis  a  vis  des  Prussiens.  Cet  ex- 
pedient le  plus  naturel  seroit  celui  de  faire  desister  ces  derniers  de  la 
conservation  de  Czenstochowa  dans  la  ligne  de  demarcation  qu'ils 
ont  tracee  jusqu'ici.  Connoissant  leur  avidite  toujours  aussi  prompte 
a  envahir  qu'incapable  de  se  dessaisir  de  ce  qu'ils  ont  eu  une  fois  en 
main,  il  ne  seroit  pas  permis  de  se  flatter  d'aucun  accommodement  a 
ce  sujet,  si  on  venoit  a  le  leur  proposer  avant  que  l'arrangement  qui 
nous  concerne  fut  consomme.  Mais  lorsque  celui-ci  sera  parvenu  a 
toute  la  maturite,  il  ne  sera  peut-etre  pas  impossible  a  l'aide  de  l'in- 
tervention  autrichienne  et  d'une  opposition  tant  soit  peu  soutenue 
de  la  part  des  Polonois  d'obtenir  quelque  modification  ou  relachement 
sur  ce  point.  .  .  .  En  attendant,  pour  le  bien  de  nos  propres  affaires, 
voila  la  conduite  que  vous  aves  a  tenir: 

i°.  Continues  a  insister  sur  la  nomination  de  la  delegation  pour 
traiter  avec  vous  et  votre  Collegue  Prussien,  s'entend  avec  l'un 
apres  l'autre  et  par  consequent  avec  vous  le  premier,  sur  l'objet  de 
vos  declarations  respectives.  Si  pour  remporter  cette  determination, 
il  vous  faudra  employer  tour  a  tour  les  promesses  et  les  menaces, 
tenes  vous  sur  leur  nature  a  ce  qui  vous  en  est  prescrit  dans  vos  in- 
structions. Parmi  les  menaces,  si  vous  les  trouves  plus  necessaires 
qu'autre  chose,  n'oublies  pas  de  faire  sentir  aux  nonces  de  la  Diette, 
que  s'ils  different  la  nomination  de  la  delegation  en  question,  vous 
aves  ordre  de  rompre  la  negociation,  de  vous  retirer,  et  de  faire  traiter 
la  Pologne  en  pays  ennemi  en  y  levant  les  contributions  et  en  le 
livrant  a  la  discretion  des  trouppes,  .  .  .  et  engages  le  ministre  de 
Prusse  a  tenir  le  meme  langage. 


APPENDIX  XVIII  555 

2°.  Des  que  de  cette  maniere  ou  de  toute  autre  vous  parviendres 
a,  nouer  votre  negociation,  ne  perdes  pas  de  terns  pour  conclurre 
votre  Traite  et  pour  disposer  les  choses  de  maniere  qu'aussitot  que 
nos  ratifications  vous  seront  arrivees,  elles  puissent  etre  echangees 
contre  celles  du  Roy  et  de  la  Diette  de  Pologne. 

3°.  Lorsque  le  tour  du  ministre  Prussien  viendra,  vous  vous 
etablires  naturellement  en  Conciliateur  entre  lui  et  les  Polonois. 
Vous  n'y  mettres  que  le  degre  d'activite  et  d'energie  analogue  a, 
l'intention  cy-dessus  annoncee,  laissant  le  champ  libre  aux  objec- 
tions Polonoises  et  les  appuyant  meme  en  tant  que  de  raison  et  de 
justice.  II  n'y  aura  non  seulement  aucun  inconvenient,  mais  beau- 
coup  d'avantage  a,  gagner  du  terns  dans  cette  seconde  negociation. 

4°.  Laisses  les  Lithuaniens  a,  eux-memes.  Accueilles-les,  mais  ni 
les  conseilles  ni  les  deconseilles.  Vous  aves  fort  bien  repondu  a, 
l'eveque  Cossacovsky;  mais  restes  en  la,  et  empeches  toute  explosion 
prematuree  et  par  consequent  indiscrette. 

3.    August  11/22,  1793 

...  II  etoit  a,  prevoir  que  les  differentes  mesures  mal  calculees 
que  les  Prussiens  ont  adoptees  au  debut  meme  de  leur  negociation 
entraveroient  la  marche  de  cette  affaire  par  des  nouvelles  diffi- 
cultes.  .  .  .  Vous  etes  tres  bien  entre  dans  ma  facon  de  penser  en 
posant  pour  principe  de  vos  explications  avec  les  deux  partis  que  je 
ne  refuserai  surement  pas  mon  appui  efncace  .  .  .  au  Roi  de  Prusse 
dans  tout  ce  qu'il  pourra  exiger  legitimement  de  la  Pologne  en  vertu 
de  la  Convention  conclue  entre  moi  et  la  Cour  de  Berlin;  mais  qu'en 
meme  terns  je  n'employerai  jamais  la  violence  et  les  moyens  coer- 
citifs  pour  forcer  les  Polonois  dans  l'etat  d'abandon  et  de  desolation 
ou  ils  se  trouvent,  a,  recevoir  des  conditions  injustes  et  onereuses. 
(As  to  the  two  points  which  the  Poles  demanded  from  Prussia:  strict 
adherence  to  the  line  of  demarcation  indicated  by  the  Convention 
of  St.  Petersburg,  and  certain  commercial  stipulations  in  their  favor) 
Je  me  crois  d'autant  plus  autorisee  a.  insister  sur  ces  deux  points 
aupres  du  Roi  de  Prusse  que  mon  exactitude  a  remplir  le  premier  et 
ma  generosite  a  l'egard  du  second  peuvent  lui  servir  d'exemple;  et 
puisque  les  Prussiens  et  les  Polonois  s'en  rapportent  egalement  a.  ma 
mediation  dans  ces  differends,  je  ne  pourrai  jamais  donner  mon 
suffrage  que  d'apres  la  stricte  equite.  ...  II  resulte  de  cet  expose 
que  vous  deves  soutenir  et  pousser  par  tous  les  moyens  qui  sont 
en  votre  pouvoir,  sans  cependant  user  de  voyes  de  fait,  la  negocia- 


556 


APPENDIX  XVIII 


tion  Prussienne  appuyee  sur  les  principes  developpes  cy-dessus,  et 
soutenir  en  meme  tems  les  Polonois  dans  leurs  justes  demandes  re- 
latives aux  deux  points  en  question.  Vous  deves  cependant  assurer 
ces  derniers  que  ma  ferme  volonte  est  que  le  Traite  avec  le  Roi  de 
Prusse  se  fasse,  et  que  je  tiendrai  religieusement  ma  parole  a.  ce  der- 
nier. La  marche  que  les  Polonois  devraient  a  mon  avis  adopter  dans 
ce  moment-ci,  au  lieu  des  clabauderies  et  des  intrigues  qui  les  agitent, 
devroit  etre  de  former  en  prenant  pour  base  la  Declaration  Prussienne 
du  9  Avril,  un  contreprojet  de  Traite  dans  lequel  ils  insereroient 
toutes  les  stipulations  commerciales  qu'ils  ont  droit  d'exiger  et  les 
differentes  specifications  qui  doivent  determiner  avec  exactitude  la 
demarcation. 

Dans  ce  nouveau  Projet  de  Traite  la  garantie  de  la  future  constitu- 
tion de  la  Republique  ne  devroit  absolument  pas  avoir  lieu,  et  de 
quelque  maniere  que  les  choses  aillent,  vous  aures  soin  qu'elle  ne  s'y 
trouve  pas,  ce  qui  est  consequent  au  but  que  je  me  suis  propose  .  .  . 
d'ecarter  desormais  les  Prussiens  de  toute  influence  dans  les  affaires 
interieures  de  la  Pologne.  Ce  contreprojet  communique  une  fois 
au  Sr.  Bucholz,  la  Cour  de  Prusse,  tranquille  sur  le  fond  de  Paffaire, 
auroit  mauvaise  grace  de  se  refuser  a  des  concessions  de  moindre  im- 
portance pour  elle,  et  les  deux  partis  se  trouveront  bientot  d'accord. 


4.    August  23/September  3,  1793 

.  .  .  Dans  tout  ce  que  vous  avez  dit  et  fait  en  faveur  des  Polonois, 
vous  avez  rempli  parfaitement  Mes  intentions,  et  la  Cour  de  Prusse, 
quelque  contraire  que  puissent  paroitre  a  ses  interets  la  marche  que 
vous  avez  tenue,  ne  pourra  sans  doute  s'empecher  de  reconnoitre  les 
principes  de  justice  et  d'humanite  qui  en  ont  ete  la  base.  Le  nou- 
veau Projet  de  Traite  entre  la  Prusse  et  la  Pologne  redige  a  la  suite 
des  dernieres  Conferences,  Me  paroissant  reunir  en  faveur  de  cette 
derniere  tous  les  avantages  conciliables  avec  le  sacrifice  inevitable 
qu'elle  doit  faire  a  la  Prusse,  Je  ne  vois  plus  ce  qui  pourroit  en  arreter 
la  conclusion,  et  Je  vous  enjoins  expressement  de  l'accelerer  par  tous 
les  moyens  qui  sont  en  votre  pouvoir,  evitant  toujours  la  violence 
et  conservant  autant  qu'il  vous  sera  possible  le  role  de  conciliateur 
qui  vous  a  si  bien  reussi  jusqu'a.  present.  Le  prompt  achevement  de 
la  Negotiation  Prussien  Me  tient  aujourd'hui  d'autant  plus  a  cceur, 
que  Je  me  suis  decidee  a  n'entamer  aucune  autre  sur  les  differens 
objets  a  regler  entre  Moi  et  la  Pologne  avant  que  celle-ci  ne  soit  finie. 


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INDEX 


INDEX 


Adair,  Robert,  190. 

Africa,  481. 

Agriculture,  revival  of,  in  Poland,  60. 

Akerman,  town  in  Bessarabia,  1 20. 

Alexander  I,  emperor  of  Russia  (1801- 

25),  512. 
Alexander  II,  emperor  of  Russia  (1855- 

81),  5- 

Alexis,  tsar  of  Russia  (1645-76),  32. 

Alopeus,  Russian  envoy  at  Berlin,  78, 
in,  161, 181,  234,  238,  260,  311  f.,  321, 
322,  323,  325,  347,  n.  3,  355,  379,  421, 

532i  534  *;  53°  f- 

Alsace,  159,  218,  231,  239,  340,  344,  346, 

348,  415,  420,  423,  432,  435,  535,  542, 

544- 
Alvensleben,  Count,  Prussian  minister, 

189,  272  f.,  337. 
Andrusovo,  Truce  of  (1667),  41. 
Ankwicz,  Polish  deputy,  480. 
Ansbach,  Franconian  margraviate,  174, 

326,  328,  335  f.,  338-347- 
Anton,    Prince,    brother    of    Frederick 

Augustus  I,  227. 
Aragon,  16. 

Aragonese  Cortes,  the,  8. 
Armed  Neutrality,  the,  184. 
Armenians,  26. 
1  Army  of  the  Grand  Hetman's  Staff,' 

the,  139. 
Artois,  423. 

Artois,  Count  of,  159,  218,  524. 
Asia,  481. 

Auckland,  Lord,  English  statesman,  164. 
Augustus  II,  king  of  Poland  (1697-1704, 

1700-33),  33,  34,  35- 
Augustus  III,  king  of  Poland  (i733_03)» 

21,  35,  62. 
Austria,  5,  26,  n.  1,  32,  33,  37,  38,  40,  47, 

53,  54;    alliance  with  Russia  (1781), 

64-74;    attitude   towards   the   Polish 


revolution,  105-108;  the  Convention 
of  Reichenbach,  128-152;  formation 
of  the  Austro-Prussian  alliance,  201- 
216;  policy  of  Leopold  II,  217-242; 
Francis  II  and  the  French  and  Polish 
problems,  255  ff.,  263-273;  agrees  and 
then  disagrees  with  Prussia,  310-347; 
the  note  of  Merle,  348-361;  Haug- 
witz's  final  negotiation  at  Vienna,  362- 
376;  attitude  towards  the  Russo- 
Prussian  alliance  treaty,  398-439;  re- 
marks on  the  relation  of  Austria  to  the 
Polish  Question,  492,  502  f. 
Austrian  Netherlands,  70,  120,  128,  129, 
136,  148,  149,  172,  262,  267,  314,  327, 
328,  351,  354,  362,  392,  413,  414,  432, 
436. 

Baireuth,  Franconian  margraviate,  174, 

326,  328,  335  f.,  338-347- 
Balkan  Peninsula,  the,  5. 
Bar,  Confederation  of,  50,  98. 
Barere,  French  politician,  450. 
Bavaria,  66,  72,  73,  174,  262,  314,  328, 

344,  346,  357,  361,  366,  383,  399,  43°, 

433,  435,  535- 
Bavaria,  Elector  of,  see  Charles  Theodore. 
Bavarian  Exchange,  the,   72,   73,   262- 

273,   3io-347,   357-375,   39i  f-,   398- 

422,  423,  429-436,  53I~534- 
Bavarian  Succession,  War  of  the  (1778- 

79),  66  f.,  82. 
Belgium,  6,  73,  117,  n8,  120,  262,  353, 

365,  368,  380,  424,  44i,  442,  451,  502. 
Belgrade,  120,  142,  143. 
Bender,  fortress  in  Bessarabia,  120,  183. 
Berg,  159,  239,  328,  335,  346,  347,  492-  . 
Berlin,  Treaty  of  (Feb.  7, 1792),  236,  241, 

270,  3°5,  3°6- 
Bernstorff,  Count,  Danish  minister,  166, 
199. 


575 


576 


INDEX 


Bessarabia,  76,  83,  154. 
Bezborodko,  Russian  minister,  no,  182, 
183,  244,  250,  251  ff.,  277  ff.,  280,  320, 

333,  377,  380,  389,  499,  5",  528  ff. 

Bielinski,  Stanislas,  Polish  politician, 
461,  464,  470,  479,  480. 

Bischoffwerder,  favorite  of  Frederick 
William  II  of  Prussia,  73,  in,  117, 
159,  161,  173-177,  181,  202,  208-214, 
220,  228,  234,  237,  238  ff.,  256,  257, 
258,  262,  263,  264,  269,  310  ff.,  323, 
325,  339,  34o,  359,  360,  521  I-,  524, 

S30,  531-534,  535- 
Bismarck,  Prince,  5. 
Bobrzynski,  Polish  historian,  11. 
Bochnia,  circle  in  Galicia,  144. 
Bohemia,  9,   12,   13,   16,   38,  135,  141, 

142. 
Bosnia,  144. 

Bourbon,  House  of,  32,  106. 
Braclaw,  palatinate  of,  140,  528. 
Branicki,  Polish  grand  hetman,  84,  85, 

87,  88,  249  f.,  396. 
Breteuil,  agent  of  Louis  XVI,  232. 
Brissot,  French  politician,  450. 
Brody,  town  in  Galicia,  144. 
Brunswick,  Charles  Frederick  William, 

Duke  of  (1780-1806),  73, 143, 159, 195, 

23°,  237,  310,  339,  355,  360,  437,  533  f. 
Brzesc  Kujawski,  palatinate  of,  331,  342, 

n.  4. 
Buchholtz,  Prussian  envoy  at  Warsaw, 

90,  98,  99,   102,  394,  396,  457,  460, 

463-478,  514,  556. 
Buda,  302,  315,  318. 
Biihren,  Russian  adventurer,  512. 
Biilow,  Prince  von,  5. 
Bukovina,  134. 
Bulgakov,  Russian  envoy  at  Warsaw, 

139,  197,  198,  245,  280,  285,  292,  293, 

294,  296,  302,  395. 
1  Burgundy,  Kingdom  of,'  262  f. 
Burke,  Edmund,  British  statesman,  55, 

186,  199,  445. 

'  Cabinet  policy,'  504. 
CachS,  de,  Austrian  diplomat,  89,  106, 
206,  413. 


Caesar,  Prussian  charge  d'affaires  at 
Vienna,  362,  373,  374,  4°°,  403,  404, 
412,  n.  2,421,  435,  547. 

Carisien,  Swedish  diplomat,  524. 

Carpathians,  the,  30. 

Casimir  III,  the  Great,  king  of  Poland 
(i333-7o),  8. 

Casimir  IV,  king  of  Poland  (1444-92),  9. 

Catalonia,  8. 

Catherine  II,  empress  of  Russia  (1762- 

96),  32,  33,  34,  36,  38,  42,  43,  44,  66; 
her  Polish  policy  and  the  First  Parti- 
tion, 45-55;  policy  towards  Poland 
after  the  First  Partition,  64-67,  509  f.; 
relations  with  Prussia  and  Austria,  67- 
74;  journey  to  the  Crimea,  74;  proj- 
ect of  a  Russo-Polish  alliance,  82-91, 
93,  102,  510  f.;  denounced  in  the  Pol- 
ish diet,  99,  109;  announces  that  she 
will  withdraw  her  troops  from  Poland, 
100;  letter  to  Potemkin,  107  f.;  her 
'  pretended  dignity,'  109;  absorbed  in 
the  Swedish  war,  138;  grudgingly  sup- 
ports Potemkin's  schemes,  139  f., 
245  ff.,  512-515;  her  diplomatic  vic- 
tory over  the  Triple  Alliance,  153- 
191;  opposed  to  the  Constitution  of 
the  Third  of  May,  206  ff.,  214,  243; 
feigned  zeal  for  the  French  enterprise, 
217,  219,  235,  248;  reconciled  with 
Prussia,  233  f.;  note  to  Zubov,  237, 
5255.;  turns  her  attention  to  Poland, 
244,  247-261,  274-309;  agrees  with 
Prussia  upon  the  Second  Partition, 
377-397;  keeps  Austria  from  sharing 
in  the  Partition,  426  f.,  438  f.,  553  f.; 
extorts  the  consent  of  the  Republic  to 
its  dismemberment,  454-483,  552-556; 
general  remarks  upon  her  policy,  497- 
502. 

CernySev,  Count,  Russian  statesman,  51. 

Champagne,  349,  371. 

Charlemagne,  41,  143. 

Charles  X  Gustavus,  king  of  Sweden 
(1654-60),  32. 

Charles  XII,  king  of  Sweden  (1697- 
1718),  33,  35. 

Charles  of  Saxony,  Prince,  36,  n.  2. 


INDEX 


S77 


Charles  Augustus.duke  (later  grand  duke) 
of  Saxe-Weimar-Eisenach  (1775-1828), 

143- 
Charles   Theodore,   elector   of    Bavaria 
(1777-99),  iS9»  I74,  262  f.,  315,  316, 
3*7,  33i»  335,  359,  360,  366,  402,  432, 

433- 
Chmielnicki,  Bogdan,  Cossack  hetman, 

87. 
Choczim,  town  in  Bessarabia,  140,  386, 

39°- 

Choiseul,  French  statesman,  38,  45,  47. 

Chreptowicz,  Polish  minister,  292,  293. 

Cities,  decline  of,  in  Poland,  14  f. 

Clergy,  the,  in  Poland,  15. 

Clovis,  41. 

Coalition,  the  First,  against  France,  4, 
72,  337,  425,  427,428. 

Cobenzl,  Count  Louis,  Austrian  ambassa- 
dor at  St.  Petersburg,  68,  79,  80,  81, 
106,  107,  108,  109,  no,  137,  138,  140, 
182,  206  ff.,  214,  223  ff.,  253  f.,  266, 
303  f.,  307,  319  (.,  333  ff.,  339,  341, 
37i  (-,  373,  375,  377,  378,  383,  388, 
398, 401,  404, 407, 409, 412, 420,  426  f., 
428,  439,  531  L,  539,  540,  550. 

Cobenzl,  Count  Philip,  Austrian  vice- 
chancellor,  7  2  f.,  1 73, 176, 21 1, 255, 262, 
318  ff.,  322,  328,  329,  332,  341,  343- 
347,  369  ff.,  374,  398-406,  531  f.,  538  f. 
542,  543,  547,  550. 

Coblenz,  229,  360. 

Colloredo  family,  the,  401. 

Colloredo,  Prince,  chancellor  of  the  Em- 
pire, 399. 

Colloredo-Wallsee,  Count,  Austrian  gen- 
eral and  conference  minister,  255,  n. 

1,  328,  343- 
Cologne,  360. 
Committee  of  Public  Safety,  First,  in 

France,  451  f. 
Committee  of  Public  Safety,  Second,   in 

France,  452  f. 
Condillac,  French  philosopher,  61. 
Condorcet,  French  philosopher,  55. 
'  Confederations,'  10,  12,  13,  21  f.,  24. 
Consenvoye,   349,  355,   382,  408,   544, 

549- 


Constantine,  grandson  of  Catherine  II, 

154,  293,  294. 
Constitutional  party,  the,  454. 
Convention,  the,  in  France,  448,  450. 
Cossacks,  31,  86  f.,  138  f.,  191,  298,  449, 

474,  478,  516. 
Council  of  the  Empire,  the,  in  Russia, 

277,  279. 
Counter-Reformation,  the,  24. 
Courland,  25,  n.  1,  44,  85,  126,  313,  318, 

386,  387,  391,  466,  492,  512  f.,  515. 
Cracow,  13,  32,  391,  399,  480,  554. 
Crimea,  the,  69,  70,  72,  73,  76,  120,  153, 

449,  45°,  5*3- 

Croatia,  Turkish,  142,  144,  145. 

Custine,  French  general,  349. 

Czarniecki,  Stefan,  Polish  general,  25. 

Czartoryski,  Prince  Adam  Casimir,  Pol- 
ish reformer,  97,  103,  n.  1,  221,  288. 

Czartoryskis,  Polish  noble  family,  28, 
48,  49,  62. 

Czgstochowa,  town,  349,  352,  391,  407, 

409,  549,  554- 

'  Dacia,  Kingdom  of,'  69,  85,  138,  139, 

487,  5i3- 

Dacia,  proposed  principality  of,  154. 

Danton,  French  revolutionist,  451  f. 

Dantzic,  Polish  city,  65,  66,  67,  77,  86, 
113,  123,  124,  125,  132,  134,  145,  146, 
151,  154,  161,  163,  168,  169,  170,  171, 
174,  176,  179,  205,  252,  263,  318,  342, 
n-  4,  391,  394,  445,  488,  492,  496- 

Danubian  Principalities,  the,  120. 

Denmark,  90,  94,  114,  157,  162,  166. 

Descorches,  French  diplomat,  449  f.,  452. 

Dietines,  the,  17  ff. 

Diez,  Prussian  envoy  at  Constantinople, 
77,  119,  120. 

Dissidents,  the, in  Poland,  42  f .,  49  f ., 488. 

Dolgoruki,  Prince,  Russian  diplomat,  34. 

Druja,  town,  390. 

Drunkenness,  63. 

Dubienka,  battle  of  (1792),  290,  291. 

'  Dumb  Diet,'  the  (17 17),  34. 

'  Dumb  Session,'  the,  479,  480. 

Dumouriez,  French  minister  and  general, 
348,  441,  447,  449,  45°,  45*- 


578 


INDEX 


Eastern  Church,  the,  26. 

Eastern  Question,  the,  3,  163. 

East  Prussia,  5,  40,  44,  65,  143,  314,  387. 

Eden,  Sir  Morton,  British  ambassador 
at  Vienna,  413,  442. 

Edenkoben,  village  in  the  Lower  Palati- 
nate, 435. 

Education  Commission,  the,  59. 

Egypt,  481. 

Elgin,  Lord,  British  diplomat,  172,  188, 
209,  521. 

Elizabeth,  empress  of  Russia  (1741-62), 
36,  40. 

England,  15,  75,  78,  90,  94, 107,  108,  114, 
116,  118,  119,  121,  130  ff.,  134,  141, 
146,  147,  148,  209,  210,  232,  268,  351, 
365,  375,  42i,  425,  S°2,  503;  diplo- 
matic defeat  of,  by  Russia,  153-191, 
310;  relations  to  the  Bavarian  Ex- 
change project,  327,  328,  329,  331, 336, 
352,  367,  368,  369  f.,  401,  402,  415  f., 
420,  430,  432-436;  relations  to  the 
Second  Partition,  384,  388,  412,  413  f., 
419,  422  f.,  428,  440-445;  relations  to 
the  First  Coalition  and  the  French 
Revolution,  431,  432. 

Enlightenment,  the,  61,  62. 

Ermeland,  see  Warmia. 

Essen,  Saxon  diplomat,  220. 

Eternal  Alliance,  the  (1773),  166. 

Eternal  Peace,  the  (1686),  42. 

Ewart,  British  envoy  at  Berlin,  164, 
187  f.,  189,  202,  209,  521. 

Favier,  French  writer,  446,  447. 
Fawkener,  British  diplomat,  188,  189  f. 
February  alliance,  see  Berlin,  Treaty  of. 
Federative  System,  the,  94, 115, 116, 126, 

203;  downfall  of,  158-191,  445. 
Finckenstein,  Prussian  minister,  189, 337. 
Finland,  449. 

First  Great  Northern  War,  the,  32,  33. 
Flanders,  French,  329,  420. 
Floridablanca,  Spanish  minister,  166. 
Foc§ani,  battle  of  (1789),  120. 
Four  Years'  Diet,  the  (1788-92),  56,  59, 

60,  62,  95-109,  192-216,  280,  283-286, 

485,  486,  487  ff.,  491. 


Fox,  Charles  James,  British  statesman, 
185,  190,  441. 

France,  4,  5,  26,  n.  1,  35,  37  f.,  40,  43,  44, 
50,  61,  70,  106,  115,  158,  159,  160,  165, 
166,  167,  174,  185,  212,  217  ff.,  228  f., 
313,  348  f.,  430;  declares  war  on 
Austria,  266;  attitude  towards  the 
Second  Partition,  446-453,  502  f. 

Francis  II,  Holy  Roman  emperor  (1792- 
1806),  emperor  of  Austria  (1804-35), 
255  f-,  303,  3i3,  315-320,  326-347,  352, 
356,  357,  360,  362-373,  392,  401  f., 
404  ff.,  408,  410-414,  416,  418-439, 
546-550. 

Frankfort,  348,  349;  imperial  coronation 

at  (1792),  3J7,  324-327,  329- 
Frederick  I,  king  of  Prussia  (1701-13), 

35- 
Frederick  II, '  the  Great,'  king  of  Prussia 
(1740-86),  32,  40,  45,  47,  52,  53,  55,  65, 
66,  68,  69,  70,  72,  76,  119,  143,  314, 

33o,  349,  496. 

Frederick  Augustus  I,  '  the  Just,'  elector 
(later  king)  of  Saxony  (1763-1827), 
116,  126,  195,  199,  202,  203,  206,  210, 
218,  219,  220-223,  225-228,  234,  241, 
257,  288,  489,  523,  525. 

Frederick  William,  elector  of  Branden- 
burg (1640-88),  32,  40. 

Frederick  William  II,  king  of  Prussia 
(1786-97),  73,  76,  86,  94,  98,  107,  109, 
"7-I5I,  154,  i55f-,  157-162,  169, 
173  ff.,  177-182,  188  f.,  202  f.,  205, 
209  f.,  212,  214  f.,  217-225,  230-239, 
251  f.,  256-261,  263  ff.,  268-273,  279, 
286  ff.,  303,  305  f.,  310-345,  348-396, 
399,  400,  404,  408  f.,  416  ff.,  420  ff., 
424  f.,  427-431, 433-438, 442, 445, 447, 
449,  451,  453,  47*,  475,  477,  492-495, 
497  ff.,  519  ff.,  530  f.,  532-537,  54i  I; 

544-551- 
Freemasonry,  spread  of,  in  Poland,  61. 

French  Revolution,  the,  160,  216,  266, 
348  f . ;  relation  of,  to  the  Polish  Ques- 
tion, 217-242,  446-453,  502  f. 

Furslenbund,  the,  71,  94,  114,  143. 

Galatz,  Preliminaries  of  (1791),  190. 


INDEX 


579 


Galezowski,  Polish  deputy,  468. 

Galicia,  54,  66,  67,  76,  77,  "7,  "8,  120, 
122,  123,  134,  i37,  140,  142,  144,  i4S, 
146,  150,  151,  226,  320,  385,  407,  4ii, 
420,  554- 

Gambling,  63. 

<  Gegu,'  156. 

Generality,  the,  of  the  Confederation, 

394-397,  457- 
George  I,  king  of  England  (1714-27),  43. 
George  III,  king  of  England  (1760-1820), 

107. 
Germanic  Empire,  the,  351,  356,  381, 

402,  431. 
Germanization,  policy  of,  5. 
Germans,  14,  26. 
Germany,  4,  28,  43,  65,  174,  33°,  380, 

420. 
Girondists,  the,  281,  447,  448,  449,  45*- 
Giurgevo,  town  in  Wallachia,  144. 
Gnesen,  city  in  Poland,  391,  495- 
Gnesen,  palatinate  of,  331,  342,  n.  4. 
Gortz,  Prussian  diplomat,  67. 
Goethe,  143. 
Golitsyn,  Russian  ambassador  at  Vienna, 

253,  257,  266. 
Goltz,    Count,    Prussian   envoy   at   St. 

Petersburg,  181  f.,  232,  234,  237,  253, 

254,  258,  259,  260,  300,  303  f.,  306,  307, 
308,  311,  324,  334,  340  ff-,  354  f-,  375, 
378,  379  f-,  382  f.,  385,  386-389,  4i9, 
420,  499,  525  ff.,  530,  534,  55i- 

Goltz,  Count,  Prussian  envoy  at  War- 
saw, 168  f.,  202. 

Grand  Duke,  the,  see  Paul  I. 

Great  Diet,  the,  see  Four  Years'  Diet. 

Great  Elector,  the,  see  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, elector  of  Brandenburg. 

Great  Poland,  32,  40,  65,  66,  67, 113, 134, 
146,  260,  393,  431,  488,  492,  496- 

'  Greek  project,'  the,  69  f.,  72,  510,  5*3- 

Grenville,  Lord,  British  minister,  187, 
188,  401,  442,  443,  444,  521. 

Grimm,  Friedrich  Melchior,  Baron,  man 
of  letters,  168,  190,  244,  380. 

Grodno,  Diet  of  (1793),  394,  413,  426, 
427,  428,  434,  436,  437,  444,  454"483, 
552-556. 


Gustavus  III,  king  of  Sweden  (1771-92), 
90,  119,  138,  144,  155,  l66  f.,  178,  183, 
195,  217,  243,  310,  448. 

Hailes,  British  envoy  at  Warsaw,  116, 
170  f. 

Hainault,  159,  329. 

Halicz,  district  in  Galicia,  134. 

Hapsburg,  House  of,  13,  32,  37,  38. 

Hartig,  Austrian  diplomat,  206. 

Haugwitz,  Count,  Prussian  minister, 
301  ff.,  325,  326,  330,  335,  338  ff.,  342, 
344,  345,  347,  348-356,  358-361,  367, 
369-376,  407-410,  540-551. 

Henry,  prince  of  Prussia,  brother  of 
Frederick  the  Great,  52,  73,  162. 

Herault,  French  revolutionist,  450. 

Hermitage,  the,  382. 

Hertzberg,  Count,  Prussian  minister, 
66  L,  70,  76-81,  84,  85,  90,  105,  109, 
116,  117,  118,  119,  121,  123,  124  f., 
126,  132,  133,  141,  142,  144,  i45,  146, 
150,  151,  155,  160,  161,  162,  168,  173, 
179,  189,  199,  314,  492,  496;  his 
'grand  plan,'  66  f.,  76-81,  132-148; 
his  hypothetical '  Anschlag  auf  Gross- 
Polen,'  517  ff. 

Hochheim,  330. 

Hochkirch,  battle  of  (1758),  143- 

Hohenlohe-Ingelfingen,  Prince,  159,  160, 

524- 

Hohenlohe  (Kirchberg),  Imperial  gener- 
al, 353- 

Hohenzollerns,  the,  4,  39  f.,  65. 

Holland,  78,  94,  114,  "5,  13°,  148,  173, 
352,  442,  45i,  502. 

Holstein,  90. 

Holy  Roman  Empire,  see  Germanic  Em- 
pire. 

Hiiffer,  Hermann,  German  historian,  430. 

Humanism,  influence  of,  upon  Polish 
thought,  24. 

Hundred  Years'  War,  the,  between  Po- 
land and  the  Teutonic  Order,  8. 

Hungary,  9,  12,  13,  38,  117,  118,  120. 

Igelstrom,    Russian   general,   395,   458, 

462,  526  f. 
Imperative  mandate,  the,  19  f. 


58o 


INDEX 


India,  481. 

'  Infanta  of  Poland,'  the,  200,  205,  213, 

306.  523- 
Inowroclaw,  palatinate  of,  331,  342,  n.  4. 
International  morality,  at  its  lowest  ebb 

in  the  eighteenth  century,  503. 
Italy,  5,  28,  128,  209. 
Ivan  III,  '  the  Great,'  grand  duke  of 

Moscow  (1462-1505),  41. 

Jablonowski,  Polish  diplomat,  203. 
Jacobi,  Prussian  envoy  at  Vienna,  then 

at  London,  146,  256,   257,   264,  270, 

272,  301  ff.,  369  f. 
Jacobins,  158,  166,  326,  351,  382,  423, 

447,  45°- 

Jagellonian  dynasty,  the,  9  f.,  18. 

Jassy,  city  in  Moldavia.  138,  249,  250, 
277,  283. 

Jassy,  Peace  of  (1792),  190. 

Jemappes,  battle  of  (1792),  302,  3^4- 

Jenkinson,  English  politician,  445. 

Jesuits,  the,  24,  59. 

Jewish  money-lenders,  15. 

Jews,  14,  26,  488. 

John  II  Casimir,  king  of  Poland  (1648- 
68),  24,  31,  33,  296. 

John  III  Sobieski,  king  of  Poland  (1674- 
96),  25,  32. 

Joseph  II,  Holy  Roman  emperor  (1765- 
90),  32,  45,  60,  66,  68.  71,  72,  73,  74, 
79,  108,  114,  117,  125,  128,  256,  261, 
262,  308,  331,  333,  503. 

Juliers,  159,  239,  328,  335,  346,  347,  492- 

July  Convention,  see  Vienna,  Prelimi- 
nary Convention  of. 

Kakhovski,     Russian     general,     276  f., 

289  f.,  292,  293. 
Kalckreuth,  Prussian  general,  143. 
Kalisz,  city  in  Poland,  391. 
Kalisz,  palatinate  of,  77,  331,  342,  n.  4. 
Kamieniec,  Polish  fortress,  30,  399,  420. 
Kanev,  town  on  the  Dnieper,  74,  83,  85, 

5",  5i5- 
Karski,  Polish  deputy,  468  f. 

Kaschau,  Privilege  of  (1374),  9- 
Kaunitz,  Prince,  Austrian  statesman,  45, 
65,  68,  72,  74,  79,  81,  89,  105,  106,  123, 


128,  131,  136,  141,  149,  160,  i6r,  175, 
177,  204-209,  211  f.,  219,  222-226, 
228  ff.,  234,  236,  239,  248,  255,  256, 
265  f.,  268,  280,  300-304,  312,  315- 
318,  325,  343,  403,  406,  525,  532. 

Kayserlingk,  Russian  diplomat,  54. 

Kiev,  city  in  Russia,  154,  168,  183. 

Kiev,  palatinate  of,  in  Poland,  140,  514, 
S28. 

Kimbar,  Polish  deputy,  469. 

Kollataj,  Hugo,  Polish  reformer,  97,  193, 

295- 
Konarski,  Stanislas,  Polish  liberal,  61. 
Korzon  Polish  historian,  59  f. 
Kosciuszko,  Tadeusz,  Polish  patriot  and 

general,  56,  289  ff.,  450,  483,  491. 
Kossakowski,   bishop   of  Livonia,   461, 

466,  470,  472,  555. 
Kossakowski,  Polish  hetman,  461. 
Kossakowskis,  Polish  family,  462  f.,  465, 

468. 
Kostomarov,  Russian  historian,  501. 
Krecetnikov,  Russian  general,  276  f. 
Kunersdorf,  battle  of  (1759),  143. 
Kurow,  town  on  the  Vistula,  290. 

Lacy,  Count  Franz  Moritz  von,  Austrian 
field  marshal,  255,  n.  1,  328,  329,  343, 

344,  398,  399- 

Landriani,  Chevalier,  Austrian  diplomat, 
225-228,  241,  265  f.,  283,  525. 

Laudon,  Baron  von,  Austrian  field  mar- 
shal, 142  f. 

'  League  of  the  North,'  the,  453. 

Lebrun,  French  minister,  448  ff.,  452. 

Leeds,  186. 

Leeds,  Duke  of,  British  minister,  165, 
187,  188. 

Lehrbach,  Count,  Austrian  diplomat, 
262  f.,  317,  429-438- 

Leipsic,  297,  450. 

Leopold  II,  Holy  Roman  emperor  (1790- 
92),  128-152,  203-211,  217-242,  261, 
306,  308,  312,  319,  489,  49i,  493-  494, 
502  f.,  524  f. 

Lessart,  de,  French  minister,  530. 

Liberum  Veto,  the,  7,  20  f.,  24,  61,  62, 
199,  464,  482. 


INDEX 


58l 


Lithuania,  29,  n.  1,  32,  276,  289,  290, 
292,  462,  463,  465,  466,  475,  528. 

Lithuanians,  26,  466,  555. 

Little  Russia,  138. 

Little  Russians,  26. 

Livonia,  52,  178,  179,  183. 

Lobarzewski,  Polish  deputy,  468,  469, 
470. 

Locke,  John,  English  philosopher,  61. 

Longuyon,  town  in  France,  355. 

Longwy,  349,  353. 

Lorraine,  239,  348,  415,  420,  423,  432, 

435.  535,  542,  544- 
Louis  XIV,  king  of  France  (1643-17 15), 

37,  46,  153,  5°3- 
Louis  XV,  king  of  France  (1715-74),  38. 
Louis  XVI,  king  of  France  (1774-92), 

218  f.,  228,  229,  231,  232,  239  f.,  317. 
Louis  of  Anjou,  king  of  Poland  (1370- 

82),  9. 
Louis,  Prince,  son  of  Frederick  William 

II,  195- 

Lower  classes,  degradation  of  the,  in 
Poland,  63. 

Lower  Palatinate,  the,  360. 

Lublin,  290. 

Lucchesini,  Marquis,  Prussian  diplomat, 
envoy  at  Warsaw,  99  f.,  102,  103,  105, 
116,  117  f.,  121,  122,  124,  126,  128, 
146,  152,  160,  168,  227,  233,  286,  347, 
n-  3,  353  i-,  368,  376,  409,  416,  417  ff-, 
424,  425,  429,  432-437. 

Lusatia,  174,  212,  326,  339,  344,  492. 

Luxemburg,  348,  349  f.,  360,  362,  375, 
409,417,  542,  549- 

Mably,  French  publicist,  55. 
Matin,  battle  of  (1791),  246. 
Mainz,  326,  328,  329  ff.,  332,  341,  342, 

349,  409,  4io- 
Malachowski,  Stanislas,  marshal  of  the 
Confederation  for  the  Crown,  97,  196, 

295,  297- 
Mamonov,  Russian  favorite,  109. 
Manchester,  186. 
Mannheim,  fortress,  360. 
Manstein,   Prussian   general,   237,   353, 

437- 


Manufactures,  development  of,  in  Po- 
land, 60. 

Marcolini,  favorite  of  Frederick  Augus- 
tus I,  225. 

Marengo,  battle  of  (1800),  405. 

Marie  Antoinette,  queen  of  France,  211, 
228. 

Maritime  Powers,  the,  316,  441. 

Markov,  Russian  general,  290. 

Markov,  Russian  minister,  252,  277,  304, 
321,  333,  377,  389,  420,  429  f.,  439. 

Matuszewicz,  Polish  reformer,  198. 

Mazarin,  37,  446. 

Mazovia,  district  in  Poland,  342,  463. 

Mensikov,  Russian  statesman,  512. 

Mercy,  Count,  Austrian  minister  and 
diplomat,   232,   355,    358,    413,    423, 

439- 
Merle,  Note  of  (Oct.  25,  1792),  337,  348- 

361,  363  f.,  367  f.,  382,  383,  408,  409, 

417,419. 
Middle  class,  decline  of  the,  in  Poland, 

14  f. 
Mikorski,  Polish  deputy,  469. 
Middleton,  199. 
Milan,  210. 
Mirabeau,  77,  166. 
Model  Parliament,  the  (1493),  17. 
M  Ollendorff,  Prussian  general,  143,  179, 

394,  472,  475- 
Mohilev,  palatinate  (later,  government) 

of,  54,  140. 
Moldavia,  76,  83,  139,  154,  246,  247,  276, 

279,  387- 
Montmorin,  French  minister,  166. 
Morals,  deterioration  of,  in  consequence 

of  the  new  culture,  61,  63. 
Moravia,  13,  135,  142. 
Murray,   Sir  James,   British   diplomat, 

442,  443- 
Muscovites,  9,  14,  31,  33. 

Napoleon,  289. 

Napoleon  III,  emperor  of  the  French 

(1852-70),  5. 
Naruszewicz,  Polish  historian,  n. 
Nassau,  Prince  of,  agent  of  Catherine  II, 

323,  325,  535,  530- 


582 


INDEX 


National  Assembly,  the,  in  France,  166, 

218,  229,  244. 
Neerwinden,  battle  of  (1793),  405,  451. 
Netherlands,  see  Austrian  Netherlands, 

Belgium,  Holland. 
New  Russia,  513  f. 
Nieszawa,  Statutes  of  (1454),  9,  17. 
Nihil  Novi,  Polish  statute  (1505),  9,  13, 

18. 
Nootka  Sound  controversy,  the,  141, 164. 
Norwich,  186. 
Nuncios,  Chamber  of.  18. 

Oczakow,  fortress  at  the  mouth  of  the 
Dnieper,  76,  109;    diplomatic  contest 

over,  153-191.  44o,  44i- 

Oginski,  Count,  Polish  nobleman,  103, 
n.  1,  170. 

Oriental  war,  the,  74,  75,  78,  83, 100, 107, 
no,  120,  129,  138,  153-190.  5"- 

Orsova,  town  on  the  Danube,  142,  148. 

Ostermann,  Russian  vice-chancellor,  76, 
81,  109,  no,  157,  208,  253,  257,  304, 
306,  320,  322,  324,  334,  341,  355,  374, 
380,  382,  383,  385,  386,  388,  389,  400, 
425,  428,  429,  519  f.,  534  f.,  536  f. 

Ostrowski,  Polish  patriot,  295  f. 

Ozarowski,  Polish  politician,  451. 

Padua,  Circular  of  (July  6,  1791),  217. 
Panin,  Russian  statesman,  47,  50,  52, 

510. 
Parandier,  French  agent,  450. 
'  Parasites,'  the,  95,  124. 
'  Paris,  the  promenade  to,'  325. 
Particularist  spirit,  the,  in  Poland,  16. 
Partition  of  1772  (the  First  Partition), 

3,  49,  51-55,  337,  379,  39*,  459,  484, 

485,  492,  497,  498,  504. 
Partition  of  1793  (the  Second  Partition), 

3,  140,  216,  263,  310-505,  534-556. 
Partition  of  1795  (the  Third  Partition), 

3,  439,  483,  484- 

Partition  of  181 5  (the  Fourth  Partition), 

4,  n.  1. 

Passarowitz,  Peace  of  (1718),  129,  134, 

142,  144. 
Patkul,  Russian  envoy,  44,  n.  1. 


'Patriots,'  the,  71,  92-100,  112  ff.,  151, 

170  f.,  194,  196,  204,  297,  393,  450, 

487,  490,  491. 
Paul  I,  emperor  of  Russia  (1 796-1801), 

109,  234,  512. 
Permanent  Council,  the,  58,  99,  102  f.; 

abolished,    100,    104,    108;     restored, 

457  i- 

Peter  I,  '  the  Great,'  tsar  of  Russia 
(1682-1725),  33  f.,  35,  36,  43,  44,  45. 

Philip  II,  king  of  Spain  (1556-98),  296. 

Piasts,  Polish  dynasty,  8,  16. 

Piattoli,  Italian  adventurer,  195,  196. 

Picardy,  423. 

Pillnitz,  218,  219,  220,  525. 

Pinsk,  town  in  Poland,  386.  390. 

Piotrkow,  town,  342;  Diet  at  (1493),  17. 

Pistor,  Russian  general,  276  f. 

Pitt,  William,  the  younger,  English 
statesman,  75,  78,  114,  116,  130,  131; 
his  unsuccessful  diplomatic  contest 
with  Catherine  II,  153-191,  197,  209, 
365,  449,  502;  his  attitude  towards 
the  Second  Partition,  440-445. 

Plock,  palatinate  of,  463,  476. 

Pocutia,  district  in  Galicia,  134. 

Podhorski,  Polish  deputy,  476. 

Podolia,  palatinate  of,  140,  249,  528. 

Poland,  Kingdom  of  (Russian),  4,  n.  1,  6. 

Polangen,  district  in  Poland,  387,  389. 

Polish  Question,  the,  general  discussion 

of,  3-7,  484-505- 
Polish-Saxon  Question,  the,  4,  200,  203, 
206,  207,  208,  210,  213,  214,  219  ff., 
225-228,   234  f.,   241,   257,   288,  489, 

523,  525- 

Polish  Succession,  War  of  the  (1733-38), 
449. 

Polotsk,  palatinate  of,  54. 

Poltava,  battle  of  (1709),  33,  162. 

Pomerania,  40,  315,  449,  492. 

Poniatowski,  Prince  Joseph,  Polish  gen- 
eral, 289  f.,  292  f. 

Poniatowski,  Michael  George,  primate 
of  Poland,  295. 

Poniatowski,  Stanislas,  see  Stanislas  II 
Augustus. 

Popov,  Russian  minister,  252,  275,  321. 


INDEX 


583 


Portugal,  502. 

Posen,  city  in  Poland,  391,  495. 

Posen,  palatinate  of,  77,  331,  342,  n.  4. 

Potemkin,  Russian  statesman  and  gen- 
eral, 67,  68,  69,  84-87,  105,  107,  109, 
no  f.,  138-141, 154. 155, 180-183,  207, 
245  ff.,  249,  250,  252,  275,  278,  390  f., 
487,  498,  510,  5".  512-516,  527  f. 

Potocki,  Felix,  Polish  magnate,  84,  85, 
87,  88,  245,  246,  249,  274,  385,  395, 

396,  527  i. 
Potocki,    Ignacy,    Polish   reformer,    97, 
103,  n.  1,  195,  196,  198,  284,  287,  288, 

293>  295,  296. 

Potocki,  Stanislas,  Polish  orator,  97. 

Potockis,  Polish  family,  28,  292. 

Prague,  13;   coronation  at  (1792),  332. 

Protestant  party,  reform  program  of,  18. 

Protestants,  26,  493. 

Prussia,  4,  34,  37,  43,  46,  53,  54,  60; 
designs  of,  in  1787-88,  75-81;  atti- 
tude towards  the  plan  of  a  Russo- 
Polish  alliance,  89-91;  woos  Poland, 
99-105;  the  Prusso-Polish  alliance, 
1 1 2-1 27;  the  Convention  of  Reichen- 
bach,  128-152;  as  a  member  of  the 
Triple  Alliance,  1 53-191 ;  formation  of 
the  Austro-Prussian  alliance,  201-216; 
hopes  for  a  partition  of  Poland,  237- 
240;  negotiations  with  Austria  and 
Russia,  257-273;  agrees  and  then  dis- 
agrees with  Austria,  310-347;  the 
note  of  Merle,  348-361;  Haugwitz's 
final  negotiation  at  Vienna,  362-376; 
the  Russo-Prussian  partition  treaty, 
377-397;  consummation  of  the  parti- 
tion, 454-483;  remarks  on  the  relation 
of  Prussia  to  the  fall  of  Poland,  484, 
487,  488,  489,  492-497;  Prussian  pol- 
icy one  of  territorial  aggrandizement, 
492-496. 

Pugacev,  Russian  pretender,  449. 

Pulaski,  Polish  politician,  461. 

Quadruple  Alliance,  the,  165  f. 

Radom,  Confederation  of  (1767),  50,  86. 
Radziwill  Palace,  club  of  the,  95,  193. 


Radziwills,  Polish  family,  28,  476,  n.  3. 

Ratisbon,  Diet  of,  356. 

Rautenfeld,  Russian  general,  476,  479. 

Rawa,  town,  342,  349,  391,  409,  549. 

Raynal,  French  philosopher,  55. 

Razumovski,  Russian  ambassador  at 
Vienna,  263 f.,  269,  318-323,  367,  374, 
379,  4°o,  401,  403,  404,  412,  n.  2,  413, 
414,  421,  425,  433,  532,  537-540,  547- 

Reichenbach,  Convention  of  (1790),  137- 
152. 

Repnin,  Prince,  Russian  general  and 
diplomat,  52,  98,  237,  246,  526. 

'  Republicans,'  the,  96,  204. 

Reuss,  Prince,  Austrian  envoy  at  Berlin, 
73,  144,  148,  159,  160,  176,  223,  229, 
236,  269  f.,  271,  272,  303,  310,  312-315, 

325,  334,  335,  339  f-,  344,  347,  360,  366, 

368,  412,  416,  417,  418,  437,  530. 
Richelieu,  37,  446. 
Richmond,  Duke  of,   British  minister, 

187. 
Riga,  town  in  Livonia,  179. 
Rimnic,  battle  of  (1789),  120. 
Robespierre,  French  revolutionist,  450, 

452  f. 
Roll,  Baron,  agent  of  the  Count  of  Artois, 

159- 
Roman  Catholics,  26. 
Rosenberg,  Prince,  Austrian  conference 

minister,  255,  n.  1,  328,  329,  343,  344, 

346- 

Rosicrucian  Society,  the,  301,  n.  3. 

Rousseau,  55,  61. 

Royalists,  Polish  party,  96,  97. 

Rumiantsov,  309. 

Rurik,  legendary  Russian  prince,  41. 

Russia,  4,  5,  12,  25,  n.  1,  26,  n.  1,  33, 
62;  relations  with  Poland  after  the 
First  Partition,  57-62;  alliance  with 
Austria  (1781),  64-74;  plan  f°r  a 
Russo-Polish  alliance,  82-91,  510  f.; 
her  rule  in  Poland  overthrown,  92-1  n; 
diplomatic  contest  with  the  Triple 
Alliance,  153-191;  prepares  to  attack 
Poland,  243-282;  reconquers  Poland, 
283-309;  the  Russo-Prussian  parti- 
tion treaty,  377-397;    consummation 


5§4 


INDEX 


of  the  partition,  454-483;  general  re- 
marks on  the  relation  of  Russia  to  the 
fall  of  Poland,  484,  485,  486,  487,  489, 
491,  492,  497-502,  504. 

Russification,  policy  of,  6. 

Rzeszow,  circle  in  Galicia,  144. 

Rzewuski,  Seweryn,  Polish  malcontent, 
249,  395,  390- 

St.  Petersburg,  Convention  of  (Jan.  23, 

1793),  377-453,  47o,  472. 

Saldern,  Russian  diplomat,  98. 

Samogitia,  32,  92. 

Sapieha,  Prince,  marshal  of  the  Confed- 
eration for  Lithuania,  9  7 ,  n.  1 ,  103 ,  n.  1 . 

Sardinia,  70,  322. 

Saxon  Kings,  the,  25,  33,  61. 

Saxony,  40,  117,  174,  205,  206,  207,  208, 
220,  226,  227,  228,  242,  256,  285,  455. 

Saxony,  Elector  of,  see  Frederick  Augus- 
tus I. 

Schonbrunn,  344. 

Schonwalde,  town  in  Silesia,  144,  146. 

Schulenburg,  Count,  Prussian  minister, 
179,  189,  233,  234,  237,  259,  260,  271, 
273,  287,  310-315,  318,  321,  322-325, 
329  ff.,  335-342,  353,  409,  411,  532, 

534,  535  ff-,  542,  545- 
Second  Great  Northern  War,  the,  33. 
Semonville,  French  diplomat,  447. 
Senate,  the,  18,  200,  464. 
Seven  Years'  War,  the,  38,  40,  44,  71. 
Siberia,  456,  469. 
Sicinski,  Polish  deputy,  20. 
Sieradz,  city  in  Poland,  391. 
Sieradz,  palatinate  of,  331,  342,  n.  4. 
Sievers,  Baron,  Russian  ambassador  to 

Poland,  395,  396,  426,  455-482,  498, 

552-556- 
Sieyes,  French  statesman,  193. 
Sigismund  II,  king  of  Poland  (1548-72), 

18. 
Silesia,  5,  40,  65,  118,  123,  135,  141,  142, 

143,  159,  3*4,  342,  537- 
Simolin,  Russian  diplomat,  263,  531,  532. 
Sistova,  Congress  of  (1790-91),  160,  168, 

209,  215. 
Smila,  estate  in  Poland,  514,  515. 


Sodermanland,  Duke  of,  regent  of  Swe- 
den, 448,  452. 

Soldau,  town,  342,  349,  391,  409,  549. 

Spain,  70,  106,  141,  164,  166. 

Spielmann,  Austrian  minister,  73,  136, 
141,  142,  144  f.,  148,  149,  211  ff., 
255  ff.,  258,  261  f.,  264  f.,  272,  273, 
301  f.,  312-319,  326-335,  343-353, 355, 
358-361,  362-366,  369,  374,  379,  380, 
383,  401,  404,  405,  406,  408,  409,  410, 
411,  412,  525,  53°,  538,  539,  540-546, 

549  i- 

Spires,  349. 

Stackelberg,  Russian  ambassador  to  Po- 
land, 57,  85,  91,  97,  98,  99,  100,  I22, 

139,  5ii- 

Stadion,  Austrian  diplomat,  369,  375. 

Stael-Holstein,  Baron  de,  Swedish  diplo- 
mat, 448,  450,  452. 

Standestaat,  7. 

Stanislas  II  Augustus  (Poniatowski),king 
of  Poland  (1764-95),  47~49,  53  i-,  58, 
60,  61,  67,  71;  strives  for  a  Russo- 
Polish  alliance,  82-91,  92,  93;  his 
policy  at  the  beginning  of  the  Four 
Years'  Diet,  96,  97;  opposes  the  Prus- 
sian connection,  99,  122  f.;  ill  health 
of,  112;  his  enormous  debts,  122, 
456  f.;  drafts  a  new  constitution,  196; 
the  Third  of  May,  198  f.;  makes 
brave  speech  in  response  to  the  Rus- 
sian declaration,  285;  talks  of  fight- 
ing, 291;  inquires  concerning  'a 
proper  cuisine',  291,  296;  appeals  to 
Catherine,  292  ff.;  yields  to  Russia, 
295  ff.,  490;  wishes  to  abdicate,  396; 
talks  of  Siberia,  456  f.;  accepts  money 
from  Sievers,  461;  his  speeches  in  the 
Diet  of  Grodno,  464  f.,  468,  469,  473; 
at  the  '  Dumb  Session,'  479. 

Starhemberg,  Prince,  Austrian  confer- 
ence minister,  343,  346. 

Staszic,  Stanislas,  Polish  liberal,  6 2, 9 2, 93, 

State  Chancellery,  the,  in  Austria,  255. 

403,  405- 
State  Conference,  the,  in  Austria,  255, 

262,  267,  273,  327-331,  343-347,  361, 
362  f.,  369,  373  f.,  398  f.,  409. 


INDEX 


585 


Straz,  the,  200. 

Sulkowski,  Polish  adventurer,  103,  n.  1. 
Suvalov,  Russian  minister,  109. 
Suvorov,  Russian  general,  382. 
Svensksund,    naval    battle    of    (1790), 

144. 
Swabia,  346. 
Sweden,  16,  25,  n.  1,  32,  36,  37,  38,  43, 

44,  n.  1,  70,  75,  78,  90  f.,  94,  no,  114, 

139,  155,  157,  162,  166,  243,  248,  446, 

447  i-,  449,  45°,  452  f-,  477- 
Swedes,  14,  24,  31,  32,  S3,  119,  446. 
Switzerland,  453,  502. 
Sybel,  Heinrich  von,  German  historian, 

493  *• 
Szlachta,  the,  8-25. 

Szydlowski,  Polish  deputy,  476. 


Targowica,  Confederation  of  (1792),  87, 
249,  275-282,  294-298,  382-385,  394, 
454  i-,  458,  462  ff.,  497,  5i3- 

Tarn6w,  circle  in  Galicia,  144. 

Tartars,  9,  26,  31,  449. 

Teschen,  Peace  of  (1779),  67,  330. 

Third  of  May,  Revolution  of  the,  191, 
192-216,  488,  489,  491. 

Thirty  Years'  War,  the,  37. 

Thorn,  Polish  city,  65,  66,  67,  77,  113, 
123,  124,  125,  132,  134,  145,  146,  151, 
154,  161,  163,  168,  169,  170,  174,  176, 
252,  263,  318,  342,  n.  4,  391,  4S8,  496; 
massacre  at  (1724),  26. 

Thugut,  Baron  von,  Austrian  minister, 
355,  401  f.,  405  i-,  410-415,  422-430, 
432,  433,  438  f-,  444- 

Tilsit,  Treaty  of  (1807),  4. 

Trade,  decline  of,  in  Poland,  14  f. 

Treitschke,  German  historian,  493. 

Triple  Alliance,  the,  of  England,  Hol- 
land, and  Prussia,  in  1788,  78,  114  f., 
116,  125,  126,  130,  134,  152,  163,  173, 
176,  209,  215,  246,  491. 

Triple  Alliance  of  the  North,  the,  167. 

Tunis,  481. 

Turgot,  French  statesman,  55. 

Turkey,  3,  36,  37,  38,  43,  70,  74,  94,  no, 
"4,  133,  3io,  428,  446,  447,  449,  500, 


502;     concludes   peace   with    Russia, 

I53-I91- 
Turkish  Question,  the,  3. 
Turkish  war,  see  Oriental  war. 
Turks,  the,  14,  43,  50,  51,  69,  70,  115, 

118,  120,  129,  132,  137,  139,  145,  147, 

148,  243,  244,  250,  253,  446,  450,  452, 

501,  537- 
Tuscany,  12. 

Tver,  Russian  province,  482. 
Tyszkiewicz,    Count,    Polish    magnate, 

467. 


Ukraine,  the,  44,  50,  60,  85,  87,  100,  109, 
138,  141,  180,  237,  245,  246,  276,  278, 
288  f.,  313,  314,  318,  324,  390,  487, 
499,  5i5,  5i6,  537. 

Uniate  Church,  the,  500. 

Upper  Palatinate,  the,  314. 

Usedom,  Prussian  general,  103. 


Valmy,  battle  of  (Sept.  20,  1792),  347, 

348,  384- 
Veiled  protectorates,  system  of,  481. 
Venice,  297,  423  f.,  439. 
Venice,  doge  of,  10. 
Verdun,  348,  349,  350,  542,  544. 
Verela,  Peace  of  (1790),  155,  167,  168. 
Vergennes,  Comte  de,  French  statesman, 

69  f. 
Vergniaud,  French  statesman,  450. 
Verninac,  French  diplomat,  448. 
Versailles,  Treaty  of  (1756),  212,  236. 
Vienna,  Congress  of,  4. 
Vienna,     Preliminary     Convention     of 

(July  25,  1791),  214  f.,  234  f.,  236,  241, 

3°5- 

Vitebsk,  palatinate  of,  54. 

Vladimir,  Saint,  '  the  Great,'  grand 
prince  of  Russia  (980-1015),  41. 

Volhynia,  district  in  Poland,  140,  249, 
391,476,  528. 

Voltaire,  55,  61. 

Vorontsov,  A.  R.,  Russian  minister,  377. 

Vorontsov,  S.  R.,  Russian  envoy  at  Lon- 
don, 185,  186,  501  f. 


586 


INDEX 


Wakefield,  186. 

Wallachia,  76. 

Warmia  (Ermeland),  ancient  division  of 
Poland,  54. 

Warsaw,  296  f.,  391,  454. 

Weissenburg,  lines  of,  437. 

Westphalia,  449. 

West  Prussia,  32,  40,  54,  65,  143. 

White  Russia,  154,  168. 

White  Russians,  26. 

Whitworth,  British  envoy  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, 178,  442,  526. 

Wiec,  17  f. 

Wladyslaw  I  Lokietek,  king  of  Poland 
(1319-33),  16. 

Wollner,  favorite  of  Frederick  William  II 
of  Prussia,  73. 

Wojna,  Polish  diplomat,  427. 

Wurmser,  Austrian  general,  437. 


Yarmouth,     Lord,     British     diplomat, 

432  f.,  436. 
York,  Duke  of,  195. 

Zabiello,  Polish  politician,  461. 
Zamosc,  circle  in  Galicia,  144. 
Zaporozhian  S&c,  destruction  of  the,  86. 
Zavadovski,  Russian  minister,  440. 
'Zealots,'  the,  463-470,  476,  479,  480, 

481,  482. 
Zielehce,  battle  of  (1792),  290,  291. 
Zimmermann,  180. 

Zips,  the,  25,  n.  1,  51,  134.  • 

Zubov,  favorite  of  Catherine  II,  180,  237, 

245,  252,  254,  259,  274,  275,  277,  371, 

462,  526. 
Zweibriicken,  336,  359,  360,  429. 
Zweibrucken,  Duke  of,  315,  317,  331, 

35i,  358,  415,  433- 


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